CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN RELIGION.

THAT it is the right and the duty of all men to exercise their reason in inquiries concerning religion, is a truth so manifest, that it may be presumed there are none who will be disposed to call it in question.

Without reason there can be no religion; for in every step which we take, in examining the evidences of revelation, in interpreting its meaning, or in assenting to its doctrines, the exercise of this faculty is indispensable.

When the evidences of Christianity are exhibited, an appeal is made to the reason of men for its truth; but all evidence and all argument would be perfectly futile, if reason were not permitted to judge of their force. This noble faculty was certainly given to man to be a guide in religion, as well as in other things. He possesses no other means by which he can form a judgment on any subject, or assent to any truth; and it would be no more absurd to talk of seeing without eyes, than of knowing any thing without reason.

It is therefore a great mistake to suppose, that religion forbids or discourages the right use of reason. So far from this, she enjoins it as a duty of high moral obligation, and reproves those who neglect to judge for themselves what is right.

But it has frequently been said by the friends of revelation, that although reason is legitimately exercised in examining the evidences of revelation, and in determining the sense of the words by which it is conveyed; yet it is not within her province to sit in judgment on the doctrines contained in such a divine communication. This statement, though intended to guard against the abuse of reason, is not, in my opinion, altogether accurate. For it is manifest, that we can form no conception of a truth of any kind, without reason; and when we receive any thing as true, whatever may be the evidence on which it is founded, we must view the reception of it to be, reasonable. Truth and reason are so intimately connected that they can never, with propriety, be separated. Truth is the object, and reason the faculty by which it is apprehended; whatever be the nature of the truth or of the evidence by which it is established. No-doctrine can be a proper object of our faith which it is not more reasonable to receive, than to reject. If a book, claiming to be a divine revelation, is found to contain doctrines which can in no way be reconciled to right reason, it is a sure evidence that those claims have no solid foundation, and ought to be rejected. But that a revelation should contain doctrines of a mysterious and incomprehensible nature, and entirely different from all our previous conceptions, and, considered in themselves, improbable, is not repugnant to reason; on the contrary, judging from analogy, sound reason would lead us to expect such things in a revelation from God. Every thing which relates to this Infinite Being, must be to us, in some respects, incomprehensible. Every new truth must be different from all that is already known; and all the plans and works of God are very far above and beyond the conception of such minds as ours. Natural religion has as great mysteries as any in revelation: and the created universe, as it exists, is as different from any plan which men would have conceived, as any of the truths contained in a revelation can be. But it is reasonable to believe, what by our senses we perceive to exist; and it is reasonable to believe, whatever God declares to be true.

In receiving, therefore, the most mysterious doctrines of revelation, the ultimate appeal is to reason. Not to determine whether she could have discovered these truths; not to declare, whether considered in themselves, they appear probable; but to decide, whether it is not more reasonable to believe what God speaks, than to confide in our own crude and feeble conceptions. Just as if an unlearned man should hear an able astronomer declare, that the diurnal motion of the heavens is not real but only apparent, or that the sun is nearer to the earth in winter than in summer; although the facts asserted, appeared to contradict his senses, yet it would be reasonable to acquiesce in the declarations made to him by one who understood the subject, and in whose veracity he had confidence. If, then, we receive the witness of men, in matters above our comprehension, much more should we receive the witness of God, who knows all things, and cannot deceive his creatures, by false declarations.

There is no just cause for apprehending, that we shall be misled by the proper exercise of reason, on any subject, which may be proposed for our consideration. The only danger is, of making an improper use of this faculty, which is one of the most common faults to which our nature is liable Most men profess, that they are guided by reason in forming their opinions; but if this were really the case, the world would not be overrun with error; there would not be so many absurd and dangerous opinions propagated, and pertinaciously defended. They may be said, indeed, in one sense, to follow reason, for they are guided by a blinded, prejudiced, and perverted reason.

One large class of men are accustomed, from a slight and superficial view of the important subject of religion, to draw a hasty conclusion, which must prove, in the highest degree, detrimental to their happiness. They have observed, that in the modern, as well as ancient world, there is much superstition, much imposture, much diversity of opinion and variety of sects, many false pretences to Divine Inspiration, and many false reports of miracles, and prophetic oracles: and without giving themselves the trouble of searching diligently for the. truth, amidst the various contending claims, they draw a general conclusion, that all religions are alike: that the whole affair is a cheat, the invention of cunning men who imposed on the credulity of the unthinking multitude: and that the claims to Divine Revelation, do not even deserve a serious examination. Does right reason dictate such a conclusion as this? If it did, and we were to apply it to all other concerns, it would make a sad overturning in the business of the world. Truth, honesty; and honor might, on these principles, be discarded, as unmeaning names; for of all these there have been innumerable counterfeits, and concerning all of them, an endless diversity of opinion.

A second class, who profess to be men of reason, pay more attention to the subject of religion; but their reason is a prejudiced judge. They listen with eager-. ness to, all that can be said against revelation. They read with avidity the books written against Christianity, and but too faithfully treasure up every objection to religion; but her advocates. never obtain from them a fair hearing. They never inquire, whether the arguments. and objections which appear to them so strong, have not been refuted. With the means of conviction within their reach, they remain firmly fixed in their infidelity; and as long as they pursue this partial method of investigation, they must ever remain in the same darkness.

A third class, who wish to be considered as taking reason for their guide, are under the dominion of vicious passions; of ambition, avarice, lust, or revenge. Men of this character, however strong their intellect, or extensive their erudition, can never reason impartially on any subject which interferes with the gratification of their predominant desires; and as religion forbids, under severe penalties, all irregular passions and vicious indulgences, they pursue it with malignant hatred. As one well observes, “they are against religion, because religion is against them” Such men never reason calmly on the subject, and they are incapable of receiving any benefit from the arguments of others. They never think of religion but with a feeling of enmity, and they never speak of it but in the language of sneer, or abuse. There is no object which this race of infidels. have more at heart, than to root up every principle of religion from the minds of men, and to drive it from the earth, so that not one vestige of it might remain to give them torment. Voltaire may be considered as the leader. of this band; and his humble imitators, have been too numerous, in every Christian country.

But there is still another class of men, more distinguished, as masters of reason, than those who have been mentioned. They are the cold, speculative, subtle set of skeptics, who involve themselves. in a thick mist of metaphysics; attack first principles, and confound, their readers with paradoxes. The number of those who belong to this class, is, perhaps, not large, but they are formidable: for while the other enemies of the truth, scarcely make a show of reason, these philosophers are experienced in all the intricacies of a refined logic; so that in their hands, error is made to appear in the guise of truth. Should we yield ourselves to the sophistry of these men, they will persuade us to doubt, not only of the truth of revelation, but of our senses, and of our very existence. If it be inquired, how they contrive to spread such a colouring of skepticism over every subject; the answer is, by artfully assuming false principles as the premises of their reasoning; by reasoning sophistically on correct principles; by the dexterous use of ambiguous terms; by pushing their inquiries beyond the limits of human knowledge; and by calling in question the first principles of all knowledge. But it is not easy to conjecture what their motive is; most probably, however, it is vanity. They are ambitious of appearing more profound and acute than other men; and distinction is not so readily obtained in the common course, as by flying off in an eccentric orbit. It cannot be any sincere regard for truth, which influences them; for, upon their principles, truth and reason are equally worthless. They pull down every thing, but build up nothing in its place. Truth has no greater enemies in the world than this Pyrrhonic sect.; and it is to be lamented, that, sometimes, ingenious young men are caught in the wiles of their sophistry, and are led so far into the labyrinth of their errors, that they are never able to extricate themselves; and all their fair prospects of virtue and usefulness are obscured forever.

Before I leave the consideration of the various classes of persons, who, while they profess to be guided by reason, make an improper use of this faculty, I ought to mention a set of men, distinguished for their learning and ingenuity, who profess to receive the Christian revelation, and glory in the appellation of Rational Christians. They proceed on the plausible and (if rightly understood) correct principle, of receiving nothing as true, but what their reason approves; but these very men, with all their fair appearances of rationality, are chargeable with as gross a dereliction of reason, as can well be conceived; and, in regard to consistency, are more vulnerable, than any of those already mentioned. For, while they admit, that God has made a revelation, they insist upon the right of bringing the truths revealed, to the test of human judgment and opinion, and reject diem as unreasonable, if they do not accord with this standard. But. the declaration of God is the highest reason which we can have for believing any thing. To set up our opinion against the plain expression of his will, is surely presumption of the highest kind. Perhaps, however, I do not represent the case with perfect accuracy. Perhaps, no man is chargeable with such an inconsistency, as to admit a thing to be contained in an undoubted revelation, and yet reject it. The exact state of the matter is this. The Scriptures, it is admitted, contain a revelation from God; but there are many things in the Bible, which, if taken in the most obvious sense, are inconsistent with reason; now, as nothing inconsistent with reason can be from God, it is concluded, that this cannot be the true sense of Scripture. Accordingly, their wits are set to work, and their learning laid under contribution, to invent and defend some other sense. Upon these principles, a man may believe just as much, or as little as he pleases, of what the Bible contains; for it has been found that no text is so stubborn as not to yield to some of the modes of treatment which have been adopted:, But I maintain, that this whole procedure is contrary to, right reason. The plain course which reason directs us to pursue, is, after examining the evidences of revelation; and being satisfied, to come to the interpretation. of the Scriptures with an unbiassed mind; and in the exercise of a sound judgment, and with the aid of those helps and rules which reason and experience suggest, to obtain: the sense of the several parts of the document and although this sense may contradict our preconceived, opinions, or clash with our inclinations,. we ought implicitly to receive it; and not by a refined ingenuity, and labored critical process, extort a meaning, that will: suit our own notions. This is not to form our opinions by the Word of God, but to cut down the sublime and mysterious doctrines of revelation, to the measure of our. narrow conceptions. And thus, in the creed of many, called rational Christians, the divine system of heavenly truth is shorn of its glory, and comes forth little more than an improved theory of Natural Religion. There is no reason in this.

But what if the plain sense of Scripture be absolutely repugnant to the first principles of reason? Let that be demonstrated, and the effect will be, rather to overthrow the Scriptures, than to favor such a method of forming a theory from them. But no such thing can. be demonstrated. The reasonings by which it has been attempted to prove, that the doctrines, commonly called orthodox, are contrary to reason, are fallacious; and a similar mode of reasoning, on the truths of Natural Religion, will land us in atheism.

Deistical writers have been fond of representing faith, and reason as irreconcilable. They have insinuated, and even asserted, that revelation cannot be received without a renunciation of reason; and have affected to regret, that it should be subjected to the trial of a rational investigation, which they allege, it can by no means bear. This was a favorite topic with Morgan, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, and Hume. The last mentioned author, in the close of his far famed Essay on Miracles, uses the following language; “Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason, and ‘tis a sure method of exposing it, to put it to a test, which it is, by no means fitted to endure.”—And again: “Mere reason, is insufficient to convince us of its [the Christian Religion’s] veracity, and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continual miracle, in his owns person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding.”

On the insidious nature of this attack, I shall not stop to remark, except to observe, that it may be taken as a specimen, not only of Hume’s method of treating Christianity, but of that of the whole tribe of deistical writers, until very recently, when they have come out boldly. Under the mask of friendship, and with the words of respectfulness on their lips, they have aimed the most deadly thrusts at the vitals of Christianity. But in regard to the sentiment; expressed in this extract, the friends of revelation utterly disclaim it, and hold it to be false and unfounded. The state of the controversy between Christians and deists, did not authorize any such assertion. The defenders of the truth have ever been ready to meet their antagonists on the ground of impartial reason. They have met them at every point, where they have chosen to make the assault; and I may safely say, that no deistical argument remains unrefuted, no infidel objection undetected and unexposed.. As. Mr. Hume wrote this immediately after finishing his argument against miracles, perhaps he felt a confidence, that he had achieved what none before were able to effect. But his confidence was premature: the argument which he claims the honor of having discovered, (though this might be disputed on good ground,) has been refuted, with a clearness of evidence, sufficient to bring conviction to any mind, but that of a sophist and a skeptic. But we shall have further occasion, in the sequel, to consider the force of Mr. Hume’s reasonings against miracles.

It may, perhaps, require some apology, that a subject which has been so fully and ably discussed, in numerous volumes, should be attempted to be treated in a short essay. My only apology is, that the poison of infidelity is imbibed by many, who never have access to the antidote. It is much to be regretted that some of the books which are almost sure to fall into the hands of literary youth, are deeply tinctured with skepticism. How many read Hume and Gibbon, who never have seen the answers of Campbell and Watson. Now, if we can present, even a brief outline of the evidences of Christianity, to those who may not be disposed to read larger works, we may be contributing, in some small degree, to prevent the progress of one of the greatest evils to which men are liable.

CHAPTER II.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BANISH ALL RELIGION FROM THE WORLD; AND IF IT WERE POSSIBLE, IT WOULD BE THE GREATEST CALAMITY WHICH COULD BEFAL THE HUMAN RACE.

IT is not my object here, to consider religion as it is a matter of duty, or a means of obtaining happiness in a future world; for both these would be equally disregarded by those men who aim at the subversion of all religion. What I shall attempt, at present, is to state and establish the fact, that man is so constituted, that he must have some sort of religion.

And the truth of this will be manifest, from an inspection of the principles of human nature, and from the history of the world. Man has naturally a sense of moral obligation, a perception of the difference between right. and wrong, feelings of remorse or approbation on the review of his conduct, fears of future retribution when he has committed a crime, and a propensity to pay religious homage to some object, visible or invisible. These are what have been called his religious feelings; and from them he has received the appellation of a religious animal. And certainly there is nothing by which man is so clearly distinguished from the creatures below him, as this capacity for religion; for whatever indications they give of sagacity in other matters, it is impossible to communicate to them any ideas of morality, or any impressions of a religious nature. Now, that these feelings are natural, and not adventitious, is manifest, because they are found to exist in men of all ages, of all countries, and in every different state of society. And hence, no nation, ancient or modern, has ever been found without some kind of religion. It would be as difficult to find a whole nation without religion, as to find one destitute of speech. Some travellers, it is true, from superficial observation, have reported that some savage tribes had no ideas of religion, and no species of worship; but on more accurate examination, it has been ascertained, that this was a mistake. And from our present knowledge of the nations of the earth, we are authorised to assert, that there is not one totally destitute of some sense of religion, and some form of worship. The same thing was well known to all the wisest men of antiquity. It is a fact from which both Plato and Cicero have derived many important conclusions. And these principles of our nature are so deeply radicated, that they never can be removed. Men may be induced to abandon their old religion, and to adopt a new one; but they never can remain long free from all religion. Take away one object of worship and they will soon attach themselves to another. If unhappily they lose the knowledge of the true God, they will set up gods of their own invention: or receive them from others. The history of all nations bears such ample testimony to this fact, that it cannot be denied. Now, this universality of religion evinces, in the clearest manner, that the principle is natural, that it is an essential thing in the constitution of man: just as the fact, that men are always found living in society, proves that the social principle exists, and is natural to man.

Atheistical men, have, indeed, attempted to trace all religious feelings, and all rites of worship, to the craft of priests, and policy of rulers; but this opinion is not only unsupported by historical testimony, but is most unreasonable in itself. For if there had not existed a predisposition to religion in the minds of men, such a design would never have been conceived; and if it. had, all attempts to introduce into the minds of men, ideas so foreign to their nature, must have been abortive.

At any rate, such an imposition could not have tow tinned for so long a time, and could not have been extended to every tribe and nation in the world. If no sense of religion had existed in the minds of men, priests and politicians, however cunning, would have had no handle to take hold of, no foundation on which to build. Besides, it seems to be forgotten by the advocates of this hypothesis, that the existence of priests, supposes the previous existence of religion.

They have, moreover, alleged, that fear produced the gods. Be it so; it still confirms my position, that there is something in the nature of man which leads him to religion; and it is reasonable to conclude, that a cause which has operated uniformly, heretofore, will continue to produce the same effects as long as the world stands. It is impossible, therefore, to banish all religion from the world.

To what degree, atheists have succeeded, in divesting themselves of all religious impression, I do not pretend to know. That some men have gone to a great length in counteracting the constitutional tendencies, and extinguishing the feelings, of nature, is undoubtedly true; but there have been sufficient indications to lead to the opinion, that there is more of affectation than reality in the bravery of their profession. It is known that some of them have, above other men, been the slaves of superstitious fears; and that others, in times of extreme peril, as in a storm at sea, have, for the moment, renounced their atheism, and cried as earnestly for mercy, as those around them. Now, if these philosophers, with all their reasoning, are not able to erase all religious impressions from their own minds, it is vain to attempt to banish all religion from the world.

But suppose the great work achieved; and that every vestige of religion was obliterated; what would be the result? Would men remain without any objects of religious homage? Would they never again be afraid of invisible powers? Would the feelings of remorse at no time urge them to perform some sort of penance, or attempt some kind of expiation? Would no impostors and false prophets arise to deceive the world again with their dreams, fancies, and pretended revelations? They must have made but superficial observations on human nature, who think that none of these things would ever occur.

If those persons, therefore, who oppose Christianity, hope, by its subversion, to get rid of all religion, they do greatly deceive themselves. This work being accomplished, they would soon have more to perform in endless progression. Instead of the pure, mild, benignant, religion of Christ, they would soon find themselves surrounded by superstitions as foul and as false, as monstrous and as absurd, as any which the hot bed of paganism ever produced. Look into the heathen world, and see the abominations and miseries which inveterate superstition perpetuates in some of the fairest and most populous regions of the globe. Look at the savage tribes of Africa and America, and contemplate the cruel bondage of superstition, to which the people are subjected. Evils as great would soon grow up among us, were it not for the salutary influence of Christianity. Our forefathers, before they became Christians, were in the same degraded and wretched situation. And shall we curse our posterity by bringing back those evils from which our fathers escaped? It is a truth which should be proclaimed every where On the house tops, that it is the Bible, which has delivered us from the horrid dominion of superstition; and it is the Bible, which must prevent its return. Philosophy has had no hand in working out this deliverance from the horrors of idolatry. With all her celebrated schools and sages, she never turned one individual from the worship of idols; and she would be equally powerless in preventing the return of superstition, if other barriers were removed.

But, I proceed now to the second part of my proposition, which is, that if religion could be banished from the world, it would be the greatest calamity which could befal the human race.

It has formerly been a matter of discussion with the learned, whether the influence of superstition or atheism was most baneful on society. Plutarch, Bacon, Boyle, Warburton, and others, have handled this subject, in a learned and ingenious manner, and arrived at very different conclusions. However doubtful this question may have been considered in former times, I believe all reflecting men are now pretty well satisfied, that the question is put to rest forever. We have recently beheld the spectacle of a great nation casting off contemptuously the religion of their fathers, and plunging at once into the abyss of atheism. We have seen the experiment tried, to ascertain whether a populous nation could exist without the restraints of religion. Every circumstance was as favourable to the success of the experiment, as it could be. Learning was in its highest state of advancement; philosophy boasted of an approximation to perfection; and refinement and politeness had never been more complete among any people. But what was the result? It is written in characters of blood. It was as if a volcano had burst upon the, world, and disgorged its fiery flood over all Europe. Such a scene of cruelty, cold-blooded malignity, beastly impurity, heaven-daring impiety, and insatiable rapaciousness, the world never witnessed before, and, I trust in God, will never witness again. The only ray of hope which brightened the dismal, prospect was, that this horrible system contained in itself the principles of its own speedy downfall, Atheism has no bond of union for its professors; no basis of mutual confidence. It breeds suspicion, and consequently hatred, in every breast; and it is actuated by a selfishness which utterly disregards all the bonds of nature, of gratitude, and of friendship. To an atheist, fear becomes the ruling passion. Conscious of his own want. of virtue, of honor, and humanity, he naturally views his fellows in the same light, and is ready to put them out of the way as soon as they appear, in any degree, to become. obstacles to the accomplishment of his plans. Hence the bloody actors in this tragedy, after glutting their revenge, by shedding the blood of innocent Christians and unoffending priests, turned. their murderous weapons against each other. Not. satisfied with inflicting death on, the objects of their suspicion or envy, they actually feasted their eyes, daily, with the streams of blood which incessantly flowed from the guillotine. Never was the justice of heaven against impious and cruel men more signally displayed, than in making these miscreants the instruments of vengeance upon each other. The general state of morals, in France, during the period in which Christianity was proscribed, and atheism reigned, was such as almost exceeds belief. An eye-witness of the whole scene, and an actor in some parts of it, has drawn the following sketch:—“Multiplied cases of suicide; prisons crowded with innocent persons; permanent guillotines; perjuries of all classes; parental authority set at naught; debauchery encouraged by an allowance to those called unmarried mothers; nearly six thousand divorces within the single city of Paris, within a little more than two years after the law authorized them;—in a word, whatever is most obscene in vice, and most dreadful in ferocity!”

Gregoire.

But we must not suppose that the whole mass of the French people became atheists, during this period. Far from it. A large majority viewed the whole scene with horror and detestation; but the atheistical philosophers had got the power in their hands; and though a small minority of the nation, were able to effect so much mischief. But from this example we may conjecture, what would be the state of things, if the whole mass of people in a nation should become atheists, or be freed from all the restraints of conscience and religion. Such an event will never occur, but if it should, all must acknowledge, that no greater calamity could be imagined. It would be a lively picture of hell upon earth; for what is there in the idea of hell more horrible, than the absence of all restraint and all hope, and the uncontrolled dominion of the most malignat passions! But there would be one remarkable point of difference, for while atheists deny the God that made them, the inhabitants of hell believe and tremble.

CHAPTER III.

IF CHRISTIANITY BE REJECTED, THERE IS NO OTHER RELIGION WHICH CAN BE SUBSTITUTED IN ITS PLACE; AT LEAST NO OTHER WHICH WILL AT ALL ANSWER THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH RELIGION IS DESIRABLE.

IT has been proved in the former section, that it is necessary to have some religion. We are already in possession of Christianity, which, by the confession of deists themselves, answers many valuable purposes.—ht behoves us, therefore, to consider well, what we are likely to obtain by the exchange, if we should relinquish it. If any man can show us a better religion, and founded on better evidences, we ought, in that event, to give it up willingly; but if this cannot be done, then surely it is not reasonable to part with a certain good, without receiving an equivalent, in its place. This would be, as if some persons sailing on the ocean, in a vessel which carried them prosperously, should determine to abandon it, without knowing that there was any other to receive them, merely because some of the passengers, pretending to skill, suggested that it was leaky, and would sooner or later founder.

Let the enemies of Christianity tell us plainly what their aim is, and what they design to substitute in the place of the Bible. This, however, they are unable to perform and yet they would have us to consent to give up our dearest hopes without knowing what we are to receive, or whether we are to receive any thing, to compensate for the loss.

This is a point of vital importance, and demands our most serious attention. If it is really intended to substitute some other religion in the place of Christianity, we ought certainly, before we make the exchange, to have the opportunity of examining its claims, that we may know whether it will be likely to answer the purposes for which religion is wanted. To bring this subject fairly into view, let us take a survey of the world, and inquire, what it has to propose for our selection, if we should renounce Christianity.

There are only three things, in that event, between which we must choose. The first, to adopt some of the existing, or some of the exploded systems of Paganism; the second, to accept the Koran instead of the Bible; and the third, to embrace Natural Religion, or pure deism.

Few men have had the effrontery to propose a return to Paganism: yet even this has not been too extravagant for some whose names stand high as men of literature. The learned Gibbon has not, that I recollect, expressed his opinion, on this subject, explicitly; but it may be fairly inferred, from many things in his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, that he deeply regretted the subversion of the old Pagan system, and that the progress of Christianity was far from affording him any pleasure.

But although he makes it sufficiently manifest, that, could his wishes have governed past events, the old system would never have been disturbed, and Christianity never have had a footing; yet we cannot say, whether he would have given his vote to have the temples rebuilt, and the Pagan rites restored. It is difficult to tell what he wished to accomplish, by his opposition to Christianity; or whether he had any definite view, other than to manifest his hatred to the Gospel and its Author.

Taylor, the learned translator of Plato, openly avowed his predilection for the religion of the Athenian philosopher, and his wish that it might be revived; and, speaks in contemptuous terms of Christianity, in comparison with Platonism; but be never could have supposed that to be a suitable religion for the bulk of men, which had not the least influence upon them, while the philosopher lived. This, then, would be no substitute for Christianity; for under its benign influence, even THE POOR HAVE THE GOSPEL PREACHED. UNTO THEM. But I have no doubt, that, if the truth could be ascertained, we should find, that this sublime genius derived some of his best ideas, directly or indirectly from the Scriptures; and that if he had lived under: the light of the Gospel, he never would have spoken, of it as his translator has done.

In the time of the revolution in France, after some trial had been made of having no religion, D’Aubermenil proposed a new religion, in imitation of the ancient Persians. His plan was to have the Deity represented by a perpetual fire, and offerings made to him, of fruits, oil, and salt; and libations poured out to the four elements. It was prescribed, that worship should be, celebrated daily in the temple, that every ninth day should be a sabbath, and that on certain festivals, all ages should unite in dances. A few fanatics in Paris, and elsewhere, actually adopted the new religion, but they were unable to attract any notice, and in a hula. time sunk into merited oblivion.

CHAPTER IV.

REVELATION NECESSARY TO TEACH US HOW TO WORSHIP GOD ACCEPTABLY—THE NATURE AND CERTAINTY OF A FUTURE STATE—AND ESPECIALLY, THE METHOD BY WHICH SINNERS MAY OBTAIN SALVATION.

IT would be superfluous here to repeat what was said in the preceding chapter, respecting the need in which man stood of a revelation when he first proceeded from the hands of his Creator. The object which we have, at present, in view, is, to inquire, whether man, in the condition in which we now find him, and in which history informs us he has existed for ages, does not stand in urgent need of more light titan he possesses; and, whether, there are not some points of vital importance, concerning which he must remain in the dark, unless the knowledge of the truth is communicated to him by a revelation from God. Let it be understood, however, in what sense it is asserted, that a revelation is necessary. Of course, it is not meant, that there is any natural necessity for such an event; nor is it intended, that God is obliged by any necessity, to grant a revelation. The necessity contended for, relates altogether to the wants of man. It is found, that in all times, and littler all circumstances, he needs information, which he cannot obtain from the unassisted exercise of his own reason; or, at least, cannot obtain so satisfactorily from this source, as from divine revelation.

CHAPTER V.

THERE IS NOTHING IMPROBABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN THE IDEA OF A REVELATION FROM GOD; AND CONSEQUENTLY, NOTHING IMPROBABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN SUCH A MANIFEST DIVINE INTERPOSITION, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A REVELATION.

THAT a revelation is possible, will not be called in question by any who believe in the existance of a God; nor can it be believed that there is any thing in the notion of a revelation, repugnant to the moral attributes of the Supreme Being. It cannot be inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness, or holiness of God, to increase the knowledge of his intelligent creatures. The whole end of a revelation is to make men wiser, better, and happier; and what can be conceived more accordant with our ideas of divine perfection, than this?

That man is capable of receiving benefit from a revelation, is a truth so evident, that it would be folly to spend time in demonstrating it; for whatever may be thought of the sufficiency of Natural Religion, if it was fully understood and improved; yet all must admit, that men, generally, have not been sufficiently enlightened on the subject of religion. The history of the world, in all ages, proves the deplorable ignorance of the greater part of the human race, even on those subjects, which the advocates of Natural Religion, confess to be most important and fundamental, as has been proved in the preceding chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY.

I do not know that any one has denied that a miracle would be credible, if exhibited to our senses. A man might, indeed, be deceived by an illusion arising from some disorder in his senses; but if he was conscious of being in a sound state of body and mind, and should witness not only one, but a variety of miracles; not only a few times, but for years, in succession; and, if he should find, that all around him had the same perceptions of these facts as himself, I need not say, that it would be reasonable to credit his senses, for the constitution of his nature would leave him no choice: he would be under the necessity of believing, what he saw with his eyes, heard with ears, and handled with his hands. But are there facts which a man would credit on the evidence of his senses, which can, by no means, be rendered credible by the testimony of any number of witnesses? Then there might be facts, the knowledge of which could never be so communicated as to be worthy of credit. According to this hypothesis, the constitution of our nature would require us to withhold our assent from what was true, and from what others knew to be true. If a thousand persons of the strictest veracity should testify, that they had repeatedly witnessed a miracle, and if all circumstances should concur to corroborate their testimony, yet upon this principle it would be unreasonable to credit them; even if they should consent to die in confirmation of what they declared to be the fact. This is the ground taken by Mr. Hume, in his boasted argument against miracles. But, it appears to me, that every man, previously to examination, must be convinced that it is false; for it is contrary to common sense, and universal experience of the effect of testimony. The true principle on this subject, is, that any fact which would be believed on the evidence of the senses, may be reasonably believed on testimony. For there may be testimony of such a nature, as to produce conviction as strong as any other conceivable evidence; and such testimony in favor of a miracle, would establish it as firmly as if we had witnessed it ourselves. But, notwithstanding this is the conclusion of common sense and experience, the metaphysical argument of Mr. Hume has had the effect of perplexing and unsettling the minds of many: and as he boasts, that “it will be useful to overthrow-miracles as long as the world endures,” it seems necessary to enter into an examination of his argument, that we may be able to expose its fallacy. This has already been done, in a convincing manner, by several men,

Dr. Campbell, Prof. Vince, Mr. Adam, Dr. Douglas.

The argument of Mr. Hume will be best exhibited in his own words. “A miracle,” says he, “supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision, than of argument. No testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability.”—“We establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, and make a just foundation for any system of religion.”—“Our belief or assurance of any fact from the report of eye witnesses, is derived from no other principle, than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our own observation; here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witness, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; if, besides, the testimony considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof; of which the strongest must prevail. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree.”

Here we have the substance of Mr. Hume’s argument, on which I propose to make some remarks, intended to show that its whole plausibility depends on the assumption of false principles and the artful use of equivocal terms.

CHAPTER VII.

`THE MIRACLES OF THE GOSPEL ARE CREDIBLE.

HAVING shown, in the preceding chapter, that miracles may be so attested as to be credible, I come now to examine the evidence by which the miraculous facts recorded in the New Testament, may be established.

This is the main point in our inquiry; for, after all that has been said, it must be admitted, that unless the Christian religion is attended with sufficient evidence, we cannot believe in it, even if we would.

Before entering directly on this discussion, it may be useful to premise a few things respecting the nature and force of testimony, which, it is presumed, will be admitted by all who have attended to the subject.

This species of evidence admits of all conceivable degrees, from the weakest probability to the fullest assurance; for while, on this ground, we yield to some reports, the most hesitating assent, we are as certainly persuaded of others, as of those things which we perceive by our senses, or have demonstrated by mathematical reasoning.

The exact force of testimony cannot be calculated by rule, nor estimated by reason; but is known, only from experience. Many things are believed on testimony, with the most unwavering confidence, when we are utterly unable to explain the precise ground on which our conviction rests. The sources of our information have been so numerous, and the same facts presented to us in so many forms, that it is impossible to attribute to each its influence in gaining our assent. If we were asked, on what particular testimony we believe there is such a place as Rome, or why we believe that such a person as Buonaparte lately figured in Europe, we could only answer, in the general, that multiplied testimonies of these facts, had reached us, so that all possibility of doubting was excluded. The same assurance, and resting on the same grounds, is experienced in relation to facts, which occurred in ages (; long past. Who can bring himself to doubt, whether such persons as Julius Cæsar, Paul, Mohammed, Columbus, or Luther, ever existed?

When we have obtained evidence to a certain amount, nothing is gained by the admission of more. The mind becomes, as it were, saturated, and no increase of conviction is produced, by multiplying witnesses. One sound demonstration of a theorem in mathematics, is as good as a hundred. A few upright witnesses who agree, and are uncontradicted by other evidence, are as satisfactory as any conceivable number. On a trial for murder, if there were a thousand witnesses who could attest the fact, a judicious court would not deem it necessary to examine more than half a dozen, or at most, a dozen, if there were a perfect agreement in their testimony. Experience only can inform us, what degree of evidence will produce complete conviction; but we may judge from former experience, what will be the effect of the same evidence, in future: and from the effect on our own minds, what it will be on the minds of others.

Testimony, not of the strongest kind, may be so corroborated by circumstances, and especially by the existing consequences of the facts reported, that it may be rendered credible, and even irresistible. Should a historian of doubtful credit attest, that an eclipse of the sun occured, on a certain day, and was visible in a certain place; if we possessed no other evidence of the fact, it might be considered doubtful, whether the testimony was true or false; but if by astronomical calculation, it should be found, that there must have been an eclipse of the sun at the time, and visible at that, place, the veracity of the witness, in this case, would be confirmed, beyond all possibility of doubt. Or, should we find it recorded by an anonymous author, that an earthquake, at a certain time, had overthrown a certain city; without further evidence, we should yield but a feeble assent to the statement; but if, on personal observation, or by the report of respectable travellers, it was ascertained, that the ruins of an ancient city existed in that place, we should consider the truth of the history as sufficiently established.

The evidences of the Christian religion may be sufficient, and yet not so strong as inevitably to produce conviction. Our conduct in the pursuit and reception of truth, may be intended by our Creator, to be an important part of the probation to which we are subjected; and, therefore, the evidence of revelation is not so great as to be irresistible; but is of such a kind, that the sincere and diligent inquirer will be in no danger of fatal mistake; while men of pride and prejudice, who prefer darkness to light, will be almost sure to err.

See Pascal’s Thoughts.

It is natural for all men to speak the truth; falsehood requires an effort. Wicked men lie, only when they have some sinister end in view. Combinations to deceive, are never formed, but with a view to accomplish some object desirable to those concerned. No set of men will be at the trouble of forging and propagating a falsehood, which promises them no profit or gratification. Much less will they engage in such an enterpriser with the view of bringing evil on themselves; or, when they foresee, that it can be productive of nothing,. but pain and reproach.

Between truth and falsehood there is so great a difference, that it is extremely difficult for the latter, so. effectually to assume the garb, and exhibit the aspect of the former, as, upon a strict scrutiny, not to be detected. No imposture can stand the test of rigid inquiry; and when the inquisition is made, the truth seldom, remains doubtful: the fraud is pretty sure to become manifest. The style and manner of truth are entirely different from those of falsehood. The one pursues a direct course, is candid, unaffected, and honest; the other, evasive, cunning, tortuous, and inconsistent; and is often betrayed, by the efforts made to avoid detection.

When both sides of a question are pressed with difficulties, reason teaches us to choose that which is attended with the fewest. Objectors to Christianity often forget to notice the difficulties of their own hypothesis. Every question has two sides—if we, reject the affirmative, we, of necessity, receive the negative with the consequences with which it may be burdened. If we reject the evidence of Christianity, and deny that miracles ever existed, we are bound to account for the existence of the Christian church, and for the conduct of the first preachers and primitive believers, on other principles. And whoever seriously undertakes this, will impose on himself a difficult task. Gibbon, has put forth his strength, on this subject, with very small success. His account of the origin of Christianity is very unsatisfactory, and is totally defective in historical evidence.

Decline and fall of the Roman Empire, c. iv., & xvi.

If the evidences, on both sides of an important question, appear to be pretty equally balanced, it is the dictate of wisdom to lean to the safe side. In this question, undoubtedly, the safe side is that of religion; fir, if we should be mistaken here, we shall suffer no loss, and obtain sonic good by our error; but a mistake on the other side, must prove fatal.

When a proposition has been established by proper and sufficient evidence, our faith ought not to be shaken by every objection, which we may not be able to solve. To admit this, would be to plunge into skepticism, on all subjects; for, what truth is there to which some objection may not be raised that no man can fully answer? Even the clearest truths in science are not exempt from objections of this sort. It must be so, as long as our minds are so limited, and the extent of human knowledge so narrow. That man judges incorrectly, who supposes, that when he has found out some objection to Christianity which cannot be satisfactorily answered, he has gained a victory. There are, indeed, objections, which relate to the essence of a proposition, which, if sustained, do overthrow the evidence; but there are other numerous objections which leave the substantial evidence undisturbed. Concerning them, I speak, when I say, that objections, though not capable of an answer, should not be permitted to unsettle our faith.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BIBLE CONTAINS PREDICTIONS OF EVENTS, WHICH NO HUMAN SAGACITY COULD HAVE FORESEEN, AND WHICH HAVE BEEN EXACTLY AND REMARKABLY ACCOMPLISHED.

THE subject of prophecy is so extensive, and the difficulty of presenting, with brevity, the argument which it furnishes, so great, that if I had not determined to give a general outline of the evidences of revelation, I should have omitted this topic, as one to to which justice cannot be done, in so short an essay.

But, I would not be understood as intimating, that the evidence from prophecy is of an inferior kind. So far from believing this to be the fact, I am persuaded, that whoever will take the pains to examine the subject thoroughly, will find that this source of evidence for the truth of revelation, is exceeded by no other, in the firmness of conviction which it is calculated to produce. Prophecy possesses, as a proof of divine revelation, some advantages which axe peculiar. For the proof of miracles we must have recourse to ancient testimony; but the fulfilling of prophecy may fall under our own observation, or may be conveyed to us by living witnesses. The evidence of miracles cannot, in any case, become stronger than it was at .first; but that of prophecy is continually increasing, and will go on increasing, until the whole scheme of predictions are fulfilled. The mere publication of a prediction furnishes no decisive evidence, that it is a revelation from God: it is the accomplishment which completes the proof. As prophecies have been fulfilled in every age, and are still in a course of being fulfilled; and as some most remarkable predictions remain to be accomplished, it is plain, from the nature of the case, that this proof will continue to increase in strength.

It deserves to be well weighed, that any one prediction which has been fulfilled, is, of itself, a complete evidence of divine revelation; or to speak more properly, is itself a revelation. For, certainly, no one but God himself can foretell distant future events which depend entirely on the purpose of Him, “who worketh all things after the council of his own will.”

If then, we can adduce one prophecy, the accomplishment of which cannot be doubted, we have established the principle, that a revelation has been given; and if in one instance, and to one person, the probability is strong, that he is not the only person, who has been favored with such a communication.

The remark, which is frequently made, that most prophecies are obscure, and the meaning very uncertain, will not affect the evidence arising from such as are perspicuous, and of which the accomplishment is exact. There are good reasons, why these future events should sometimes be wrapped up in the covering of strong figures and symbolical language; so that often the prophet himself, probably, did not understand the meaning of the prediction which he uttered. It was not intended, that they should be capable of being dearly interpreted, until the key was furnished, by the completion. If these observations are just, the study (of the prophecies will become more and more interesting, every day; and they will shed more and more light on the truth of the Scriptures.

What I shall attempt at present, and all that is compatible with the narrow limits of this discourse, will be to exhibit a few remarkable predictions, and refer to the events, in which they have been fulfilled. They who wish for further satisfaction, will find it, in the perusal of Bishop Newton’s excellent Dissertations on the prophecies, to which I acknowledge myself indebted for a considerable part of what is contained in this chapter.

The first prophecies which I will produce; are those of Moses, respecting the Jews. They are recorded, principally, in the xxvi. chapter of Leviticus, and in the xxviii. chapter of Deutoronomy; of which, the following predictions deserve our attention.

1. The Lord shall bring, a nation against thee from afar, from the end of the earth, as swift as the eagle flieth; a nation whose tongue thou shalt not understand. This prophecy had an accomplishment, both in the invasion of Judea by the Chaldeans, and by the Romans; but more especially, the latter. Jeremiah, when predicting the invasion of the Chaldeans, uses nearly the same language as Moses. Lo, I will bring a nation upon you from afar, O house of Israel, saith the Lord, it is an ancient nation, a nation whose language thou knowest not.

Jer. x. 15.

But with still greater propriety may it be said, that the Romans were a nation from afar; the rapidity of whose conquests resembled the eagle’s flight; the standard of whose armies was au eagle; and whose language was unknown to the Jews.

The enemies of the Jews are also characterized as a nation of fierce countenance, who shall not regard the person of the old, nor show favor to the young. Which was an exact description of the Chaldeans. It is said, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 17, that God brought upon the Jews, the king of the Chaldees, who slew their young men with the sword in the house of their sanctuary, and had no compassion upon young man or maiden, old man, or him that stooped for age. Such also were the Romans. Josephus informs us, that when Vespasian came to Gadara, “he slew all, man by man, the Romans showing mercy to no age.” The like was done at Gamala.

2. It was predicted, also, that their cities should be besieged and taken. And he shall besiege thee in all thy gates, until thy high and fenced walls come down, wherein thou trustedst. This was fulfilled when Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, came against Samaria, and besieged it:

2 Kings, xviii. 9, 10.

In their sieges they were to suffer much by famine, in the straitness wherewith their enemies should distress them. Accordingly, at Samaria, during the the siege, there was a great famine, so that an asses head was sold for four score pieces of silver.

2 Kings, vi. 5.

And when Jerusalem was besieged by Nebuchadnezzar, the famine prevailed in the city, and there was no bread for the people of the land.

2 Kings, xxv. 3.

It was foretold, that in these famines, women should eat their own children. Ye shall eat, says Moses, the flesh of your sons and of your daughters. And again, thou shalt eat the fruit of thine own body.

Jer. xxvi. 29; Deut. xxviii. 53.

CHAPTER IX.

NO OTHER RELIGION POSSESSES THE SAME KIND AND DEGREE OF EVIDENCE AS CHRISTIANITY: AND NO OTHER MIRACLES ARE AS WELL ATTESTED, AS THOSE RECORDED IN THE BIBLE.

HAVING given a brief view of the external evidences of Christianity, it is now proper to inquire, whether any system of religion, ancient or modern, is as well supported by evidence; and whether, other miracles have testimony in their favor, as satisfactory, as that by which the miracles of the Gospel are accompanied.

The usual declamation of infidel writers, on this subject, is calculated to make the impression on unsuspicious readers, that all religions are similar in their origin;—that they all lay claim to miracles and divine communications;—and that all stand upon an equal footing. But when we descend to particulars, and inquire, what religions that now exist, or ever did exist, profess to rest their claims on well attested miracles, and the exact accomplishment, of prophecy, none besides the Jewish and Christian can be produced. Among the multiform systems of Paganism, there is not one, which was founded on manifest miracles or prophecies. They had, indeed, their prodigies and their oracles, by which the credulous multitude were deceived; and their founders pretended to have received revelations, or to have held communion with the gods. But what well attested miraculous fact can be produced, from all the religions of the heathen world? What oracle ever gave responses so clear and free from ambiguity, as to furnish evidence, that the knowledge of futurity was possessed? It is easy to pretend to divine revelation: this is done by every fanatic.

It is not disputed, that many impostors have appeared in the world, as well as many deluded fanatics. But the reason why all their claims and pretensions may with propriety be rejected, is, that they were not able to exhibit any satisfactory evidence, that they were commissioned from heaven, to instruct mankind in religion.

In this we are all agreed. Of what use, therefore, can it be, to bring up these impostures and delusions, when the evidences of the Christian religion are under consideration? Can it be a reason for rejecting a religion which comes well attested, that there have been innumerable false pretensions to divine revelation? Must miracles, supported by abundant testimony, be discredited, because there have been reports of prodigies and miracles which have no evidence? And because heathen oracles have given answers to inquiries respecting future events, dark, indeterminate, and designedly ambiguous; shall we place no confidence in numerous authentic prophecies, long ago committed to writing, which have been most exactly and wonderfully accomplished?

It is alleged, that the early history of all ancient nations is fabulous, and abounds in stories of incredible prodigies; and hence it is inferred, that the miracles of the Old and New Testament, should be considered in the same light. To which it may be replied, that this general consent of nations, that miracles have existed, is favorable to the opinion that true miracles have at some time occurred. It may again be observed, that the history of Moses, which is more than a thousand years older than any profane history, has every deuce of being a true relation of facts;—and, moreover, that the age in which the miracles of the New Testament were performed, so far from being a dark and fabulous age, was the most enlightened period of the heathen world. It was the age of the most celebrated historians, orators, and poets. There never was a time, when it would have been more difficult to gain a general belief in miracles, which had no sufficient testimony, than in the Augustan, and succeeding age. Not only did learning flourish; but there was at that period, a general tendency to skepticism and atheism. There can evidently, therefore, be no inference unfavorable to Christianity, derived from the belief of unfounded stories of miraculous events, in the dark ages of antiquity. The only effect of the prevalence of false accounts of miracles, should be, to produce caution and careful examination into the evidence of every report of this kind. Reason dictates, that truth and falsehood should never be confounded. Let every fact be subjected to the test of a rigid scrutiny, and let it stand or fall, according as it. is supported or unsupported by testimony. If the miracles of the Bible have no better evidence than the prodigies of the heathen, they ought to receive no more credit; but if they have solid evidence, they ought not to be confounded with reports which carry imposture on their very face; or, at least, have no credible testimony in their favor.

There is no other way of deciding on facts, which occurred long since, but by testimony. And the truth of Christianity is really a matter of fact. In support of it, we have adduced testimony which cannot be invalidated; and we challenge our opponents to show, that any other religion stands on the same firm basis. Instead of this, they would amuse us with vague declamations on the credulity of man, and the many fabulous stories which have been circulated and believed. But what has this to do with the question? We admit all this, and maintain that it does not furnish the semblance of an argument against the truth of the well attested facts, recorded by the evangelists. Because there is much falsehood in the world, is there no such thing as. truth? It would be just as reasonable to conclude, that, because many men have been convicted of false, hood, there were no persons of veracity in the world; or that because there were many knaves, all pretensions, to honesty were unfounded.

The Mohammedan religion is frequently brought forward by the enemies of revelation, with an air of confidence, as though the pretensions and success of that impostor, would derogate from the evidences of Christianity. It is expedient, therefore, to bring this, subject under a particular examination. And here, let it be observed, that we do not reject any timing, respecting the origin and progress of this religion, which has been transmitted to us by competent and credible witnesses. We admit that Mohammed existed, and was the founder of a new sect; and, that from a small be, ginning, his religion spread with astonishing rapidity over the fairest portion of the globe. We admit, also, that he was the author of the Koran, which he composed, from time to time, probably with the aid of some one or two, other persons. Moreover, it is admitted;, that he was an extraordinary man, and prosecuted the. bold scheme which he had projected, with uncommon perseverance and address. Neither are we disposed to deny, that the Koran contains many sublime passages, relative to God and his perfections, and many sound and salutary precepts of morality. That the language is elegant, and a standard of purity in the Arabic tongue, has been asserted by all Mohammedan writers, and conceded by many learned Christians. But as to his pretended revelations, there is no external evidence, whatever, that they were real; and there is an overwhelming weight of internal evidence, that they are not from God.

To bring this subject fairly before us, let the following considerations be impartially weighed:

1. The pretensions of Mohammed were supported by no miracles, or prophecies. Ile was often called upon by his opposers to confirm his mission, by this decisive proof; but he always declined making the attempt; and resorted to various excuses and subterfuges. In the Koran, God is introduced, as saying, “Nothing hindered us from sending thee with miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with imposture:—thou art a preacher only.” Again, “That if he did perform miracles, the people would not believe, as they had before rejected Moses, Jesus, and the prophets, who performed them.”

Dr. Paley

Paley’s Evidences.

CHAPTER X.

THE BIBLE CONTAINS INTERNAL EVIDENCE THAT ITS ORIGIN IS DIVINE.

As the Old and New Testaments are intimately connected, and form parts of the same system, it is unnecessary to make any distinction between them, in considering this branch of the evidence of divine revelation.

A late writer,

Dr. Chalmers.

But these two species of evidence, though distinct, are harmonious, and strengthen each other. There is, therefore, no propriety in disparaging the one, for the purpose of enhancing the value of the other. I believe, the fact is, however, that more instances have occurred of skeptical men being convinced of the truth of Christianity, by the internal, than the external evidences. It is the misfortune of most infidels, that they have no intimate acquaintance with the Bible; and even many of those who have undertaken to write against it, appear never to have read it, with any other view, than to find some ground of objection.

No doubt, it is necessary to come to the examination of this species of evidence, with a candid and docile disposition. If reason be permitted proudly to assume the seat of judgment, and to undertake to decide what a revelation ought to contain in particular; in what manner, and with what degree of light it should be communicated; whether it should be made perfectly at once, or gradually unfolded; and whether, from the beginning, it should be universal: no doubt, the result of an examination of the contents of the Bible, conducted on such principles, will prove unsatisfactory; and insuperable objections will occur .at every step in the progress. It was wise in Dr. Chalmers, to endeavor to discourage such a mode of investigation, as being most unreasonable; for how is it possible, that such a creature as man, should be able to know what is proper for the infinite God to do, or in what way he should deal with his creatures upon earth? To borrow the language of this powerful writer;

Chalmers’ Evidences.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENT, WERE WRITTEN BY THE INSPIRATION OF GOD; AND THIS INSPIRATION, HOWEVER IT MAY BE DISTINGUISHED, WAS PLENARY; THAT IS, THE WRITERS WERE UNDER AN INFALLIBLE GUIDANCE, 130TH AS IT RELATES TO THE IDEAS AND WORDS: AND YET, THE ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE, HABITS, AND PECULIAR DISPOSITIONS OF THE WRITERS, WERE NOT SUPERSEDED.

HAVING endeavored to establish the authenticy of the Scriptures, I come now to say something respecting the inspiration of the writers of the several books. These two subjects are, it is true, involved, in each other; and many of the arguments for the former, are conclusive in favor of the latter; but still, there is a distinction which it is important to observe. A book may be authentic, without having the least claim to inspiration, as are all true narratives of facts, written by men of veracity, in the exercise of their unassisted powers. The gospel history may be established on the common principles of human testimony, in the same manner, as any other history. Indeed, this must be done, in the order of proof, before any convincing argument can be formed, in favor of divine revelation. Accordingly, all judicious writers on the Evidences of Christianity, first attempt to establish the facts recorded in the Gospels, by an appeal to merely human testimony. This distinction is so clear, and practically so important, that many persons believe in the facts—miracles as well as others—and yet have no conviction that the history of these events was written by divine inspiration. This is understood to be the case in regard to most of those called Unitarians. Dr. Priestley, in his “Institutes of the Christian Religion,” has established the authenticity of the facts, recorded by the evangelists, with great force of reasoning; and yet, in the same work, he utterly denies the plenary inspiration of these writers; but alleges, that they were men of veracity, and that their testimony should be received, just as we receive that of other credible historians; but without ascribing infallibility to them The same opinions have been maintained by many others. The authenticity of the facts is sufficient to demonstrate, that the Christian religion is of divine origin; but it does. not follow, as a matter of course, that the historian who gives an account of the facts orr which it rests, was inspired. This is a distinct inquiry; and, although, not so vitally important as the former, yet is of great moment, and deserves a serious and impartial consideration.

It may be proper, also, in this place, to distinguish between inspiration, and that illumination, which every true Christian must receive, and which is the foundation of that saving faith which is produced in the mind, by the operation of the Holy Spirit. The distinction is, that the object of inspiration is commonly to reveal some new truths; or more clearly to reveal such as were before but obscurely revealed; or, it is intended, to direct the mind, in a supernatural way, to write and speak certain things; and so superintends or strengthens its faculties, that it is enabled to communicate, with unerring certainty, truths before known; or, to form ideas and adopt expressions so sublime, as to be above the range of the natural powers of the person. But the illumination of the Holy Spirit communicates no new truths, but enables the soul spiritually to apprehend truths already revealed. Here then is the grand distinction between those spiritual influences which all Christians enjoy, and enthusiasm, which claims something of the nature of inspiration. The sober Christian can appeal to the word of God, as containing all the ideas by which his mind is affected, in its highest elevations of joy and love: but the enthusiast departs from the written word, and trusts to impulses, impressions on the imagination, immediate suggestions, dreams, or supposed visions. If these impulses or suggestions were from the Spirit of God, they would be strictly of the nature of inspiration. And, accordingly, most fanatics believe themselves to be inspired; but however strong their persuasion, we are not bound to believe in their pretensions, unless they can exhibit these external proofs, by which God is pleased to give attestation to those communications which he makes to men.

There is also a difference between inspiration, and revelation. All revelations are not made by a suggestion of truth to the mind of an individual. God often spike to people of old, by audible voices; and communicated his will by the missions of angels. Many persons have thus received divine revelations, who had no pretensions to inspiration. All the people of Israel, who stood before God at Mount Sinai, heard his voice, uttering the ten commandments, and yet no one would say, that all these were inspired. So, also, when Christ was upon earth, in more instances than one, a voice was heard declaring, that he was the beloved Son of God. Indeed, all who had the opportunity of hearing Christ’s discourses, might be said to receive a revelation immediately from God; but it would be absurd to say, that all these were inspired. Dr. Dick is of opinion, that the word revelation would be more expressive, as being more comprehensive than suggestion, which last conveys the idea of an operation on the mind; whereas, truth, in many cases was made known, in other ways. But for the reasons stated above, it would not do to substitute the word revelation for inspiration; inasmuch as, multitudes received revelations, who had no claim to inspiration. And when inspiration is confined to those who wrote the books of Scripture, no other word would so clearly express the idea.

Inspiration has, by theologians, been distinguished into three kinds; that of superintendence, of suggestion, and elevation. The first of these takes place, when a historian is influenced, by the Holy Spirit, to write, and in writing is so directed as to select those facts and circumstances, which will answer the end proposed; and so assisted and strengthened in the narrative of events, as to he preserved from all error and mistake. The facts need not be revealed, because they may be well known to the writer from his own observation, and may be deeply impressed on his memory; but, no man can avoid inaccuracies and mistakes, in a narrative of facts, long past. If it is important that such a narrative be exempt from error, the writer must be inspired. But as the chief object of inspiration is, to communicate truths before unknown; so, the inspiration of suggestion is requisite, in all such eases; as when the prophets were inspired to predict the revolutions of empires; or, to communicate a message from God to a whole people, or to an individual, the ideas must of course, have been immediately suggested, by the Holy Spirit. The third species of inspiration, is, when, by a divine influence, persons are enabled to bring forth productions, in speaking or writing, far more sublime and excellent, than they could have attained, by the exercise of their own faculties. Thus, often, women, under the inspiration of God, have instantly uttered, in elevated strains of poetry, discourses in praise of God, which, by their unassisted powers, they could never have produced. In these compositions, there may be no revelation of new truth; nor is there a mere superintendence of the human faculties, as in the first case, was described; but the powers of the mind, are, for the occasion, wonderfully elevated above their common level, so that the conceptions are more vivid and sublime, and expressed in language more appropriate and striking, than would have naturally occurred to them. By an inspiration of this sort, David wrote the Psalms, and Solomon the Proverbs, and the Speakers in the book of Job, the sublime discourses, which are there recorded. Many things of this kind, are also found in the writings of the prophets.

Here, another question of some perplexity, demands our attention. It is, whether the words of Scripture, as well as the ideas, were given by inspiration. On the one hand, it is alleged, that there is no necessity for supposing that the words used in communicating revealed truth, should be suggested by the Holy Spirit; and that the fact proves that no such inspiration existed, because the style of each of the writers is peculiar, and accords precisely with his education, disposition, and turn of mind. But on the other hand, it is argued that unless the words were inspired, as well as the ideas we cannot be certain, that the writer has, in any case, communicated accurately, the mind of the Spirits; for, men are liable to mistake, in the selection of appropriate words, as much as in any thing else; and as men often fail in conveying their own ideas, in language which correctly expresses their meaning; so, also, they might make similar mistakes in the use of language, to express ideas received by inspiration; if in this matter they were left to the guidance of their own minds. It has also been plausibly urged in favor of inspiration extending to the words, that we can scarcely conceive of a revelation of truths to the mind, without supposing, that they were clothed in language. We cannot even think distinctly, much less reason conclusively, on any subject, without the intervention of words.

Now, it is probable, that, that has occured in this controversy, which has in many others; namely, that both parties are right; or, rather, that the truth will be fully possessed, by adopting the views entertained on both sides, and endeavoring to reconcile them. The fact is, that the same principles which apply to the ideas, may, without any alteration, be applied to the words. When the truths revealed were before unknown to the inspired person; and, especially—as seems often to have been the case with the prophets—when they did not fully comprehend the import of what was revealed, it is necessary to suppose, that the words, as well as ideas, were immediately suggested by the Holy Spirit. This was remarkably the case, when the apostles and others received the gift of tongues; which was nothing else but the inspiration of words, as they were needed, for the communication of the truths of the Gospel.

But as in the narration of well-known facts, the writer did not need a continual suggestion of every idea, but only to be so superintended, as to be preserved from error; in the use of language, in recording such familiar things, there existed no necessity that every word should be inspired; but there was the same need of a directing and superintending influence, as in regard to the things themselves. Here then, we see, that the language of the sacred writers might be preserved from impropriety, and inaccuracy; and yet, all the characteristics of style, peculiar to each writer, be retained. Just as if a master should so guide the hand of a child in writing, that the pen should be actually moved by the pupil; but governed and directed by the master, so as not to transgress the limits prescribed. Or, this superintendence, both as to ideas and words, may be illustrated, by the case of a father conducting a child along a narrow path. The child walks by its own activity, and takes steps according to its ability; but the father preserves it from falling, and keeps it in the straight path. Just so it is with men, when under the superintending influence of the Holy Spirit. Their own powers of understanding, memory, and invention, are not superseded, but only directed, and preserved from inaccuracy and error; but the man pursues his own peculiar method of thinking, reasoning, and expression. Ile speaks or writes in the language which he has learned, and uses that idiom and style, which have become habitual; so that inspired men, will, according to this theory, retain their peculiarity of style and expression, just as fully as if they were writing or speaking, without inspiration.

Some object to this theory of superintendence, under the impression, that it is less perfect, than if every thing was inspired by direct suggestion of the Holy Spirit. But there is really no foundation for this objection. It certainly is a matter of no consequence, how our knowledge is obtained, if only it is rendered infallibly certain. There are many things, concerning which we could not acquire a greater degree of assurance than we already possess, by inspiration of any kind: and such knowledge, acquired by the exercise of reason or intuition, is not the less valuable, because it has been obtained in a natural way. Indeed, these natural faculties, by which we are so constituted as to be capable of certain knowledge of the first principles of truth, are the gift of God, as much as any inspiration can be; and the clear intuitive knowledge, which we .possess of certain truths, may be considered as a sort of permanent inspiration; for, suppose a man, by a constant plenary inspiration, to be made absolutely sure of the truth of certain propositions, so that he could not entertain any doubt respecting them, in what respect would there be any difference between this, and the intuitive perception of self-evident principles, which every rational man by nature possesses? There would, then, be nothing gained by the inspiration of direct suggestion, in regard to our knowledge of those things, of which we already possess intuitive certainty; so, it is also evident, that in relation to all our knowledge acquired by experience, or testimony, we only need such an influence, as will enable us to communicate what ought to be recorded, for the benefit of the church, and to do this without error, either as to matter or manner.

Some, who do not deny the inspiration of the sacred writers, in the general, have thought it necessary to make concessions on this subject, which are not called for, from the nature of the case, and have thus involved the cause which they defend, in real difficulties. They have granted, that while, in all matters of real importance, the penmen of the Scriptures were guided by a plenary inspiration; yet, in trivial matters, and the relation of unimportant circumstances, they were left to their own unassisted powers; and in such matters; have, therefore, fallen into mistakes, such as are incident to other honest historians, in similar circumstances. Now, no evil or inconvenience would result from this hypothesis, if the line could be definitely drawn, between the parts of the book, written by inspiration, and those in which the writers were left, to themselves. But as no human wisdom is sufficient to draw this line, the effect of this opinion is, to introduce uncertainty and doubt, in a matter, concerning which assurance is of the utmost importance. And it is in itself an improbable supposition, that the spirit of God should infallibly guide a writer in some parts of his discourse, and forsake him in other parts. If we find a witness mistaken in some particulars, it weakens our confidence in his general testimony. And could it be shown, that the evangelists had fallen into palpable mistakes, in facts of minor importance, it would be impossible to demonstrate, that they wrote any thing by inspiration.

The case of Paul is often adduced to prove, that a writer, who, for the most part, was inspired, may, in particular cases, be left to follow his own opinions.

See 1 Cor. vii. 12-40.

NOTE A.

AN APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.

On the Proof of Miracles by Testimony.

IN a recent popular, but anonymous publication, entitled, Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation, By the Author of Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions,” the doctrine of ne, on the subject of testimony, has been exhibited in a ...a somewhat new and imposing, And as this writer has ired considerable celebrity in England, and his Essays have been republished in Philadelphia, and recommended strongly to the public, upon the authority of the Westminster Review, it seems necessary to guard the public against the insidious design of these Essays; which we have reason to think, was not known to those concerned in the republication of the work in this country. Indeed, the ingenious author, never brings the subject of divine revelation directly into view, in all that he has written; and I believe, the word “miracles” does not occur in either of the volumes which he has published nevertheless, it is a fact, that in the last of his essays, he has revived, in substance, the famous argument of Hume, on miracles; and has, with even more concealed istry; than that celebrated infidel employed, endeavored to e that no testimony, however strong, is sufficient to establish fact which involves a deviation from the regular course of the laws of Nature. But that I may not be suspected of misrepresenting the sentiments of this discriminating and popular writer, I will here insert an extract, from the Essay before-mentioned, which contains the substance of the whole argument.

“But it is only a small part of our knowledge of past events which we gather from physical evidence. By far the most important source of information of such events is the testimony of human beings; and it is a curious, interesting, and momentous inquiry, whether we proceed on the same principle when we avail ourselves of this moral evidence to penetrate into the past, as when we make use of that which is of a purely physical character.

“Testimony must be either oral or written. As far as the mere physical circumstances are concerned, we evidently commence our use of it by reasoning from effects to causes. We infer, for example, that the writing before us has been the work of some human being, in doing which we of course assume the uniformity of causation. If from the circumstances attending the testimony we infer that is entitled to be received as veracious; if for instance, we find that it has proceeded from a man of tried integrity, and who acted under the influence of motives which render it unlikely that he should deceive, our inference still proceeds on the assumption of the same principle. I may have in other cases found these circumstances to have been the precursors or causes of true testimony; but how can I or any one tell that they have operated in the same way in the instance before me? The reply must evidently I be, that it is impossible to avoid assuming that the same causes have invariably the same effects.

“In fact, if we examine any of the rules which have been laid down for the reception of testimony, or any of those marks which have been pointed out as enabling us to judge of its credibility, we shall find them all involving the uniformity of causation. It is allowed on all hands, that the concurrence of a number of witnesses in the same assertion, their reputation for veracity, the fact of the testimony being against their own interest, the probability of detection in any false statements, are all circumstances enhancing the credibility of what they affirm. These are considered as general principles on the subject gathered from experience, and we apply them instinctively to any new case which may be presented to us, either in the course of our own observation, or as having taken place at some former period. But it is obvious from what has just been said, that unless we assume a uniformity in the succession of causes and effects, we cannot transfer our experience from any one case to another. That certain circumstances have produced true testimony in one or a hundred instances, can be no reason why they should produce it in a different instance, unless we assume that the same causes have necessarily the same effects.

“It is clearly shown by this reasoning, that in the reception of testimony and the use of physical evidence we proceed on the same principle. But in the case of testimony there is a peculiarity not belonging to physical evidence. In the former we not only have certain effects from which it is our task to infer the causes, or certain causes from which to infer the effects; as when we judge the writing before us to have been the work of some human being, or the testimony to be true on account of the circumstances under which it was given; but the testimony itself consists of the assertion of facts, and the nature of the facts asserted often forms part of the grounds on which the veracity of the testimony is determined; it frequently happens, that while external circumstances tend to confirm the testimony, the nature and circumstances of the facts attested render it highly improbable that any such facts should have taken place, and these two sets of circumstances -may be so exactly equivalent as to leave the mind in irremediable doubt. In the consideration of both, however, the same assumption is involved. We think the facts improbable, because we have found them rarely occurring under the circumstances stated; we think the testimony likely to be true, because we have generally found true testimony to proceed from witnesses acting under the influence of similar motives, and what we have found to happen in other cases we are irresistibly led to conclude must also happen in the case before us.

“The opposition of the circumstances of the evidence and the nature of the facts may be carried still further. Assertions are frequently made which in themselves imply a breach of the uniformity of causation. From such cases the conclusions already established remove all difficulty. To weigh probabilities, to determine what credit is due to two sets of conflicting circumstances, neither of which as far as our knowledge extends is irreconcilable to the usual course of nature, is often a nice and arduous task; but if the principles of this essay are correct, it is easy to see what reception ought to be given to assertions professedly implying a deviation from the uniform succession of causes and effects.

“Suppose, for instance, any person to affirm that he had exposed a cubic inch of ice to a temperature of 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, and that at the expiration of an hour it had retained its solidity. Here is a sequence of events asserted which is entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to show that to believe the assertion would involve a logical absurdity. The intrinsic discrepancy of the facts could never be overcome by any possible proofs of the truth of the testimony.

“For let us put the strongest case imaginable; let us suppose that the circumstance of the ice remaining unmelted, rests on the concurrent testimony of a great number of people, people too of reputation, science, and perspacity, who had no motive for falsehood, who had discernment to perceive and honesty to tell the real truth, and whose interests would essentially suffer from any departure from veracity. Under such circumstances false testimony it may be alleged is impossible.

“Now mark the principle on which this representation proceeds. Let us concede the positions, that what is attested by a great number of witnesses must inevitably be true,—that people of reputation and intelligence without any apparent motive for falsehood are invariably accurate in their testimony, and that they are above all, incapable of violating truth, when a want of veracity would be ruinous to their interests. Granting all this, I ask the objector, how he knows that these things are so; that men of this character and in these circumstances speak truth? He will reply that he has invariably found them to act in this manner: but why, because you found them to act in this manner in a few or even in many cases, within your own experience or in the experience of ages, do you conclude that they have acted so in all cases and in the case before us? The only answer is, that it is impossible not to take for granted, that in precisely similar circumstances similar results will ensue, or that like causes have always like effects.

“Thus on the ground of the uniformity of causation, he would be maintaining the competency of testimony to prove a fact which implies a deviation from that uniformity.”

Now it will abbreviate the answer to this specious argument, to acknowledge, that the general principle which this author takes so much pains to establish, and on which he builds his reasoning, is freely admitted, to be not only correct, but self-evident. That the same causes uniformly produce the same effects, is a truth so obvious, and so generally admitted, that it. was unnecessary for the ingenious author of this essay, to spend so much time in rendering it evident. And I am willing to admit its certainty to be as undoubted in moral, as in physical subjects. But while I freely admit, that the same causes will uniformly be followed by the same effects, I do by no means accede to the proposition, which our author seems to consider as of the same import; namely, that the course of nature, or the laws of nature, never have been interrupted, or suspended; and the whole appearance of force and plausibility which the argument of this writer possesses, arises from the artful confounding of these distinct propositions. I agree, that no testimony can be strong enough to induce a rational man to believe that the same causes will not be attended with the same effects: for this would be to assent to an evident absurdity. But it is an entirely different thing to believe, that the laws of nature have sometimes been suspended; for in this case, we suppose, that an extraordinary cause has intervened. To believe, that a divine power has interposed to change the course of nature, is surely not the same thing, as to believe that the same cause which commonly produced one effect, is now attended by another entirely different. The natural causes, it is true, remain the same, but the general proposition slated above, is not true, if confined only to these. If there exist supernatural causes, or a power superior to the laws of nature,—and this our author does not profess to deny—then the laws of nature, or mere natural causes may remain the same; and yet, by the operation of these supernatural causes, effects entirely diverse from those that would be the sequence of natural causes, may take place, And the author himself seems in one place to, have been aware of this distinction, and to admonish the reader of its existence; and yet, through the whole of the argument he proceeds, as if the two propositions were identical. fie ought, however, to have recollected, that while no man in his senses disbelieves the first proposition, much the greater number of men have believed, that in some cases the laws of nature have been suspended; not, that they thought that the same causes did not, in these instances, produce the same effects, but that other causes of greater potency than natural causes, were put into operation.

When our author, therefore, infers from the uniformity of causation, that no testimony is sufficient to be the foundation of a rational belief, that there has been a deviation from the common course of nature, be applies a correct principle to a case to which it evidently does not belong. Because, the same cause must produce the same effects, does it follow, that when another and superior cause operates, the same effects must be produced? This would be in direct repugnance to his own maxim. Then, before this principle of the uniformity of causes and effects can he applied, it must be demonstrated, that in the case under consideration, no other causes operate, but such as are usual and natural, and whenever he shall be able to establish this, there will be no further contest respecting the matter.

That I do not misrepresent the argument of the author, wilt appear satisfactorily, by considering the cases which be has adduced. “Suppose, for instance,” says he, “any person to affirm, that he had exposed a cubic Inch of ice to a temperature of 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, and that at the expiration of an hour, it had retained its solidity. Here is a sequence of events asserted, which is entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to show, that to believe the assertion, would involve a logical absurdity, The intrinsic discrepancy of the facts could never be overcome by any possible proofs of the truth of testimony.”

In another page, he says, “If a number of Men were to swear, that they had seen the mercury of the barometer remain at the height of thirty inches, when placed in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump, their testimony would be instantly rejected. The universal conclusion would be, that such an event was impossible.” What is here so confidently asserted, would only be true upon the supposition, that no causes but such as were natural operated in the cases adduced; but on the hypothesis of the operation of a supernatural cause, there would be neither absurdity nor impossibility in either of the facts. What! could not He, who established these laws, and gave to heat and air, respectively, their peculiar powers and qualities, suspend their usual operation? Could not He, clause the ice to remain unmelted in any temperature; and the mercury to remain suspended, without the pressure of the atmosphere? But the sophistical nature of the argument used, is most evident. The principle is, that similar causes must have similar effects. Very good—what then? Why, if ice remain unmelted at 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, then this principle would be violated. I answer, not at all, provided another cause is in operation, of such potency as to counteract the usual effects of caloric; or to counteract the gravity of the quicksilver, in vacuo. And it will not do to allege, that God, who established these laws, will not contravene them, on any occasion; for this would be an entire change of the ground of the argument, and a relinquishment of the principle on which the reasoning of our author is founded. Besides, it would be a mere begging the question in dispute.

Now, in both the cases adduced by this writer, to illustrate and confirm his argument, on which he pronounces so confidently, that the judgment of men would universally reject any testimony, I beg leave to be of a different opinion, and will appeal to the common sense of all reflecting men, whether, on the supposition, that a dozen men of perspicacity and undoubted integrity, should solemnly affirm that they had seen a cubic inch of ice remain an hour unmelted at 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, whether they could refuse their assent? even if they knew of no good reason why the laws of nature should be suspended. But if they knew that an important purpose in the divine government could be answered by such a miracle, much less testimony would be sufficient to produce unwavering conviction of the truth of the extraordinary fact. And while they assent to such facts, on sufficient testimony; they are guilty of no absurdity, and violate no rule of common sense. It is true, that the credibility of the event reported, may be reduced to this question—whether is it more probable, that the laws of nature should, for a good end, be suspended, or that twelve men of tried veracity, should agree to assert a falsehood, without any motive to induce them to do so? And here our ingenious author revives the metaphysical balance or Mr. Hume; and after admitting that the evidence from testimony may be so strong that nothing is wanting to give it force, yet the maxim, that the same causes must have the same effects, is also a truth so certain, that no evidence can countervail it. We have, therefore, according to this statement, the equipoise of evidence, which we have already considered, in Mr. Hume’s argument. The rational mina, in such circumstance, must remain neutral; it can neither believe nor disbelieve; for the evidence for the one exactly counterbalances that for the other. But after stating this hypothesis, our author finds that the evidence from testimony never can be so convincing, as that which we have for the uniformity of causation. His words are—“If the rejection and the admission of the testimony equally implied a deviation from the uniform sequence of causes and effects, there could be no reason for rejecting or admitting it.”—“But the rejection of the testimony is not in this predicament. The causes of testimony, or in other words, those considerations which operate on the minds of the witness, cannot always be ascertained; and as we are uncertain as to the causes in operation, we cannot be certain of the effects, we cannot be sure that the circumstances of the witness are such as have given rise to true testimony, and consequently we cannot be sure that the testimony is true.”

On this whole subject I have several remarks to make.—First, this method of destroying the equipoise of evidence granted by Mr. Hume, and conceded by himself, is not altogether fair; because it does not adroit what Is obviously true, that in regard to some kinds of testimony, the evidence is so certain, that we might as soon doubt of our own existence as of the truth of the facts attested. Now, this being the case, there was no propriety in representing all testimony as being involved in some degree of uncertainty.

Again, what is here said of testimony will apply just as fully to what we ourselves witness, and for the truth of which we have the testimony of our own senses. I mean, that if the argument of our author is at all valid, it will prove, that if we saw the ice remain unmelted in the heat, and beheld it ever so often; and found that thousands around us received the same impression, we must not credit our own senses, nor believe what we saw with our own eyes; because, however certain this kind of, evidence may be, it cannot be more certain, than the principle, that the same causes will uniformly produce the same effects. Therefore, although we should, under all manner of circumstances, see such events, they could not be believed; for to believe them would be a logical absurdity. And thus, would these men, by their metaphysics, reason us out of the evidence of our very eye-sight. I know, indeed, that neither Hume, nor the author whose reasoning, we are now considering, have pushed the argument to this its just consequence; but I would defy any man to show, that it is not as applicable to the evidence of the senses as to that derived from testimony. Now, as the kind of evidence which will invariably command assent, is not learned by metaphysical reasoning, but by experience, I would leave the matter to be decided by every man of impartial judgment, for himself. Every man knows, whether or not, he would believe his own eyes, if lie should see ice remain unmelted in 200 degrees of temperature, according to Fahrenheit: or would be say, it seems to be so, but it cannot be true, because it contradicts a self-evident principle, “that the same causes must always be followed by the same effects.” To which a man of plain, unsophisticated common sense would reply, “I must believe my own senses; if doing so contradicts a thousand abstract principles, I care not—‘seeing is believing.’” And the same may be said in regard to testimony. Suppose a thousand persons entirely disinterested to aver, that they had seen ice remain unmelted in a very high temperature, we could not but believe them, account for the fact as we might. But we have already proved, that believing in such an event violates no maxim, but only supposes that some extraordinary power or cause is in operation; and when it is understood, that this deviation from the laws of nature is intended to confirm the declarations of some person who claims to be a messenger of God, there is not only no absurdity in the thing; but all presumption against the probability of such supernatural interposition is removed, as has been shown in the argument on that subject.

It might also be demonstrated, that upon the principles of this author, not only would it be absurd, upon any evidence, to believe in a fact which involved a real deviation from the laws of nature, but in any one which was entirely different from all our own experience of the laws of nature. For if it would be absurd to believe, on the testimony of thousands of unconnected witnesses that ice did not melt in a certain case when placed in the fire; then it was altogether rational for the king of Siam, and all others in similar circumstances, to disbelieve the fact, that water had been known to become as hard as a stone so that men and animals could walk upon it. Persons so situated never could know that. such an effect existed but by testimony; yet as this testimony contradicted all their own experience about the laws of nature, in relation to water, they ought rather to reject the testimony, however strong, than to credit a fact which seemed to involve a deviation from “the sequence of causes and effects,” to use the language f this author. And thus we should be reduced to the necessity of rejecting all facts not consonant to our own personal experience; for to receive them on the ground of testimony, would be to violate the principle, that causation is uniform.

But the zeal of our author to establish his favorite point, has led him, not only to assert, that a deviation from the regular succession of the laws of nature was incredible, on the ground of testimony, but that it is, in the nature of things. impossible. In this assertion, he certainly may lay claim to originality; for I believe no one before him, not even Hume, has gone so far, in bold affirmation. His words are—“An event is impossible which contradicts our experience, or which implies that the same causes have produced different effects, or the same effects been preceded by different causes. Thus, when we pronounce that it was impossible for a piece of ice to remain in the midst of burning coals without being dissolved,. our conclusion involves a complete knowledge of this particular effect of fire on ice.”

And he is so confident that this is the true import of the word impossible, that he says, “If I am not greatly deceived, the acutest reasoner, the closest thinker, the most subtle analyser of words, will find himself unable to produce any other meaning of the term, impossible, than that which is here assigned to it.” But he seems to have felt that he had gone too far in this dogmatical, and I must say, irrational assertion; for in a note he gives himself, another, and one of the true meanings of the word, impossible. But as confident assertion, accompanied by no proof nor reason, is sufficiently answered by a confident denial, I would take the liberty of saying, therefore, that if I am not greatly mistaken, no accurate philologist will admit, that this is the true meaning of the word, impossible. And certainly, men of plain common sense, never can be persuaded, that it is impossible for the succession of events according to the laws of nature, to be changed. It is true, when we confine our ideas to the mere powers and qualities of nature, we do assert that their effects will be uniform, and that it is impossible that the same causes should produce different effects; but when we extend our views to the Great FIRST CAUSE, it is not only absurd, but impious, to assert, that he cannot suspend or alter the laws of nature. Nothing is impossible to him which does not imply a contradiction, or is not repugnant to his attributes.

The conclusion which is rational on this subject, is, that all things are possible to God, and whatever is possible may be believed on sufficient testimony; which testimony, however, must be strong, in proportion to the improbability of the. event to be confirmed.

NOTE B.

Mohammed asserted, that while he was in his bed one night, the Angel Gabriel knocked at his door, and that when he went out, he saw him with seventy pair of expanded wings, whiter than snow, and clearer than chrystal. The angel informed him that he had come to conduct him to heaven; and directed him to mount an animal, which stood ready at the door, and which was between the nature of an ass and a mule. They name of this beast was Alborak, in color whiter than milk, and swift as lightning. But when the prophet went to mount, the animal proved refractory, and he could not seat himself upon its back, until he promised it a place in Paradise.

The journey from Mecca to Jerusalem was performed in the twinkling of an eye. When he arrived at the latter place, the departed prophets and saints came forth to meet him, and saluted him. Here, he found a ladder of light, and tying Alborak to a rock, he followed Gabriel on the ladder, until they arrived at the first heaven, where admittance was readily granted by the porter, when he was told by Gabriel, that the person who accompanied him, was Mohammed, the prophet of God. Here, he met an old decrepit man, who it seems was no other than our father Adam; and who greatly rejoiced at having so distinguished a son. He saw also innumerable angels, in the shape of birds, beasts, and men. This heaven was made of pure silver, and he saw the stars suspended from it, by chains of gold.

In like manner, he ascended to the second heaven, a distance of five hundred years journey, which was of pure gold, and contained twice as many angels as the former. Here, he met Noah. Thence he proceeded to the third, which was made of precious stones, where he met Abraham. The fourth was all of emerald, where he met Joseph, the son of Jacob. In the fifth, which was of adamant, lie met Moses. In the sixth, which was of carbuncle, he saw John the Baptist. In the seventh which was made of divine light, he saw Jesus Christ, and commended himself to his prayers. All the persons he had seen before, however, begged an interest in his prayers. Here Gabriel informed him, that he could go no further, and he proceeded alone, through snow and water, until he came near the throne of God, when he heard a voice, saying, “O Mohammed, salute thy Creator!” He was not permitted to come near the throne of the Almighty, on the right side of which he saw inscribed the sentence, there is no God but God, and Mohammed is his prophet; which is the fundamental article of the Mohammedan creed.

After being permitted to bold a long conversation with the Creator, he returned as he came, and found Alborak ready to convey him home, on whose back he swiftly glided again to Mecca. All this happened in the space of the tenth part of a night.

In the third heaven, he says, he saw an angel of so great a size, that the distance between his eyes, was of seventy thou. sand days journey. This was the angel of death, who has a large table before him on which he is ever writing and blotting out; whenever a name is blotted, the person immediately dies. He speaks also of another angel, in the sixth heaven; which had seventy thousand heads and as many tongues.

NOTE C.

The Abbe Paris was the oldest son of a counsellor of Paris, but being much inclined to a life of devotion, he relinquished his patrimony to his younger brother, and retired to an obscure part of Paris, where he spent his life in severe penance, and in charitable exertions, for the relief of the distressed poor, He was buried in the ground of the church of St. Medard, near the wall, where his brother erected a tomb-stone over the grave. To this spot many poor people, who knew his manner of life, came to perform their devotions, as much, probably out of feelings of gratitude, as any thing else. Some among the devotees who attended at this place, professed that they experienced a salutary change in their ailments. This being noised abroad, as the Abbe had been a jealous Jansenist, all who were of this party encouraged the idea of miracles having been performed; and multitudes who were indisposed, were induced to go to the tomb of the saint; and some, as they confessed before a competent tribunal, were persuaded to feign diseases which they never bad. It is a fact, however, that the greater part received no benefit, and that more diseases were produced than were cured; for, soon, many of the worshippers were seized with convulsions, from which procceeded the sect of Convulsionists, which attracted attention for many years. It was soon found expedient to close up the tomb; but cures were still said to be performed by the saint, on persons in distant places. The Jesuits exerted themselves to discredit the whole business, and the Archbishop of Paris had a judicial investigation made of a number of the most remarkable cases, the results of which were various, and often ludicrous. A young woman, said to have been cured at the tomb of blindness and lameness, was proved to have been neither blind nor lame. A man with diseased eyes was relieved, but it appeared that he was then using powerful medicine, and that after all, his eyes were not entirely healed. A certain Abbe who had the misfortune to have one of his legs shorter than the other, was persuaded that he experienced a sensible elongation of the defective limb, but on measurement no increase could be discovered. A woman in the same situation danced on the tomb daily, to obtain an elongation of a defective limb, and was persuaded that she received benefit; but it was ascertained, that she would have to dance there fifty-four years, before the cure would be effected, at the rate at which it was proceeding; but for the unfortunate Abbe, seventy-two years would have, been requisite. In short, the whole number of cures, after examination, was reduced to eight or nine, all of which can be easily accounted for, on natural principles; and in several of these instances, the cures were not perfect.

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