Of God and His Creatures
An Annotated Translation
(With some Abridgement)
of the
SVMMA CONTRA GENTILES
Of SAINT
THOMAS AQUINAS
By
JOSEPH RICKABY, S.J.,
M.A. Lond: B.Sc. Oxon.,
Author of “Aquinas Ethicus” &c. &c.
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LEONIS XIII
SACERDOTIS MAGNI
QUI IN VITA SUA SUFFULSIT DOMUM
ET IN DIEBUS SUIS CORROBORAVIT TEMPLUM
Preface
SOME years ago, a priest of singularly long and varied experience urged me to write “a book about God.” He said that wrong and imperfect notions of God lay at the root of all our religious difficulties. Professor Lewis Campbell says the same thing in his own way in his work, Religion in Greek Literature, where he declares that the age needs “a new definition of God.” Thinking the need over, I turned to the Summa contra Gentiles. I was led to it by the Encyclical of Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, urging the study of St Thomas. A further motive, quite unexpected, was supplied by the University of Oxford in 1902 placing the Summa Contra Gentiles on the list of subjects which a candidate may at his option offer in the Final Honour School of Literae Humaniores, -- a very unlikely book to be offered so long as it remains simply as St Thomas wrote it. Lastly I remembered that I had in 1892 published under the name of Aquinas Ethicus a translation of the principal portions of the second part of St Thomas’s Summa Theologica: thus I might be reckoned some thing of an expert in the difficult art of finding English equivalents for scholastic Latin.
There are two ways of behaving towards St Thomas’s writings, analogous to two several treatments of a church still standing, in which the saint might have worshipped. One way is to hand the edifice over to some Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments: they will keep it locked to the vulgar, while admitting some occasional connoisseur: they will do their utmost to preserve every stone identically the same that the mediaeval builder laid. And the Opera Omnia of St Thomas, handsomely bound, may fill a library shelf, whence a volume is occasionally taken down for the sole purpose of knowing what St Thomas said and no more. Another thirteenth-century church may stand, a parish church still, in daily use; an ancient monument, and something besides; a present-day house of prayer, meeting the needs of a twentieth-century congregation; and for that purpose refitted, repainted, restored, repaired and modernised; having had that done to it which its mediaeval architects would have done, had they lived in our time. Nothing is more remarkable in our old English churches than the sturdy self-confidence, and the good taste also lasting for some centuries, with which each successive age has superimposed its own style upon the architecture of its predecessors. If St Thomas’s works are to serve modern uses, they must pass from their old Latinity into modern speech: their conclusions must be tested by all the subtlety of present-day science, physical, psychological, historical; maintained, wherever maintainable, but altered, where tenable no longer. Thus only can St Thomas keep his place as a living teacher of mankind.
For the history of the Contra Gentiles I refer the reader to the folio
edition printed at the Propaganda Press in 1878 cura et studio Petri Antonii
Uccellii, pp. xiii-xxxlx. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) came to the University
of Paris in 1245, and there for three years heard the lectures of Albertus Magnus,
taking his Bachelor’s degree in 1248. He returned to the University in 1253, took
his Master’s degree in 1257, and thereupon lectured in theology for two or three
years, leaving the University in 1259 or 1260. He wrote the Summa contra Gentiles
in Italy, under the pontificate of Urban IV (1261-1264), at the request of St Raymund
of Pennafort. He went for the third time to the University of Paris in 1269, finally
returning to Italy in 1271. Though the Summa contra
The Summa contra Gentiles is in the unique position of a classic whereof the author’s manuscript is still in great part extant. It is now in the Vatican Library. The manuscript consists of strips of parchment, of various shades of colour, contained in an old parchment cover to which they were originally stitched. The writing is in double columns, minute and difficult to decipher, abounding in abbreviations, often passing into a kind of shorthand. Through many passages a line is drawn in sign of erasure: but these remain not less legible than the rest, and are printed as foot notes in the Propaganda edition: they do not appear in the present translation. To my mind, these erasures furnish the best proof of the authenticity of the autograph, which is questioned by S. E. Fretté, editor of Divi Thomae Opera Omnia (Vivès, Paris, 1874), vol. XII, preface iv-vi. An inscription on the cover states that the manuscript is the autograph of St Thomas, and that it was brought from Naples to the Dominican convent at Bergamo in 1354: whence its name of the ‘Bergamo autograph.’ Many leaves were lost in the sack of the convent by the armies of the first French Revolution; and the whole of Book IV is missing.
The frequent erasures of the Saint himself lend some countenance to the omissions of his translator. Re-reading his manuscript in the twentieth century, St Thomas would have been not less ready than he showed himself in the thirteenth century to fulfil the Horatian precept, saepe stylum vertas.
J. R.
Pope’s Hall, Oxford, Michaelmas 1905
Nihil obstat: T. M. TAAFFE S.J., Censor deputatus
Imprimatur: GULIELMUS PRAEPOSITUS JOHNSON, Vicarius Generalis
Westmonasterii, die 12 Septembris 1905
BOOK I
CHAPTER I—The Function of the Wise Man
My mouth shall discuss truth, and my lips shall detest the
ungodly (
ACCORDING to established popular usage, which the Philosopher considers should
be our guide in the naming of things, they are called ‘wise’ who put things in their
right
Now the last end of everything is that which is intended by the prime author
or mover thereof. The prime author and mover of the universe is intelligence, as
will be shown later (B. II, Chap. XXIII, XXIV). Therefore the last end of the universe
must be the good of the intelligence, and that is truth. Truth then must be the
final end of the whole universe; and about the consideration of that end
It is one and the same function to embrace either of two contraries and to repel the other. Hence, as it is the function of the wise man to discuss truth, particularly of the first beginning, so it is his also to impugn the contrary error. Suitably therefore is the double function of the wise man displayed in the words above quoted from the Sapiential Book, namely, to study, and upon study to speak out the truth of God, which of all other is most properly called truth, and this is referred to in the words, My mouth shall discuss truth, and to impugn error contrary to truth, as referred to in the words, And my lips shall detest the ungodly.
CHAPTER II—Of the Author’s Purpose
OF all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the more perfect, the more sublime,
the more useful, and the more agreeable. The more perfect, because in so far as
a man gives himself up to the pursuit of wisdom, to that extent he enjoys already
some portion of true happiness. Blessed is the man that shall dwell in wisdom
(
But on two accounts it is difficult to proceed against each particular error: first, because the sacrilegious utterances of our various erring opponents are not so well known to us as to enable us to find reasons, drawn from their own words, for the confutation of their errors: for such was the method of the ancient doctors in confuting the errors of the Gentiles, whose tenets they were readily able to know, having either been Gentiles themselves, or at least having lived among Gentiles and been instructed in their doctrines. Secondly, because some of them, as Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognising the authority of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New. But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to. But in the things of God natural reason is often at a loss.
CHAPTER III—That the Truths which we confess concerning God fall under two Modes or Categories
BECAUSE not every truth admits of the same mode of manifestation, and “a well-educated
man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of
the thing admits,” as is very well remarked by the Philosopher (Eth. Nicom.
I, 1094b), we must first show what mode of proof is possible for the truth that
we have now before us. The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two
modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as
that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can
attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration
under the guidance of the light of natural reason. That there are points of absolute
intelligibility in God altogether beyond the compass of human reason, most manifestly
appears. For since the leading principle of all knowledge of any given subject-matter
is an understanding of the thing’s innermost being, or substance — according to
the doctrine of the Philosopher, that the essence is the principle of demonstration
— it follows that the mode of our knowledge of the substance must be the mode of
knowledge of whatever we know about the substance. Hence if the human understanding
comprehends the substance of anything, as of a stone or triangle, none of the points
of intelligibility about that thing will exceed the capacity of human reason.
The same thing may be understood from consideration of degrees of intelligibility.
The same thing manifestly appears from the incapacity which we daily experience in the observation of nature. We are ignorant of very many properties of the things of sense; and of the properties that our senses do apprehend, in most cases we cannot perfectly discover the reason. Much more is it beyond the competence of human reason to investigate all the points of intelligibility in that supreme excellent and transcendent substance of God. Consonant with this is the saying of the Philosopher, that “as the eyes of bats are to the light of the sun, so is the intelligence of our soul to the things most manifest by nature” (Aristotle, Metaphysics I, min. l).
To this truth Holy Scripture also bears testimony. For it is said: Perchance
thou wilt seize upon the traces of God, and fully discover the Almighty (
CHAPTER IV—That it is an advantage for the Truths of God, known by Natural Reason, to be proposed to men to be believed on faith
IF a truth of this nature were left to the sole enquiry of reason, three disadvantages
would follow. One is that the knowledge of God would be confined to few. The discovery
of truth is the fruit of studious enquiry. From this very many are hindered. Some
are hindered by a constitutional unfitness, their natures being ill-disposed to
the acquisition of knowledge. They could never arrive by study to the highest grade
of human knowledge, which consists in the knowledge of God. Others are hindered
by the needs of business and the ties of the management of property. There must
be in human society some men devoted to temporal affairs. These could not possibly
spend time enough in the learned lessons of speculative enquiry to arrive at the
highest point of human enquiry, the knowledge of God. Some again are hindered by
sloth. The knowledge of the truths that reason can investigate concerning God presupposes
much previous knowledge. Indeed almost the entire study of philosophy is directed
to the knowledge of God. Hence, of all parts of philosophy, that part stands over
to be learnt last, which consists of metaphysics dealing with points of Divinity.
Another disadvantage is that such as did arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would take a long time over it, on account of the profundity of such truth, and the many prerequisites to the study, and also because in youth and early manhood, the soul, tossed to and fro on the waves of passion, is not fit for the study of such high truth: only in settled age does the soul become prudent and scientific, as the Philosopher says. Thus, if the only way open to the knowledge of God were the way of reason, the human race would dwell long in thick darkness of ignorance: as the knowledge of God, the best instrument for making men perfect and good, would accrue only to a few, and to those few after a considerable lapse of time.
A third disadvantage is that, owing to the infirmity of our judgement and the
perturbing force of imagination, there is some admixture of error in most of the
investigations of human reason. This would be a reason to many for continuing to
doubt even of the most accurate demonstrations, not perceiving the force of the
demonstration, and seeing the divers judgements of divers persons who have the name
of being wise men. Besides, in the midst of much demonstrated truth there is sometimes
an element of error, not demonstrated but asserted on the strength of some plausible
and sophistic reasoning that is taken for a demonstration. And therefore it was
necessary for the real truth concerning divine things to be presented to men with
fixed certainty by way of faith. Wholesome therefore is the arrangement of divine
clemency, whereby things even that reason can investigate are commanded to be held
on faith, so that all might easily be partakers of the knowledge of God, and that
without doubt and error.
Hence it is said: Now ye walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their
own notions, having the understanding darkened (
CHAPTER V—That it is an advantage for things that cannot he searched out by Reason to be proposed as Tenets of Faith
SOME may possibly think that points which reason is unable to investigate ought not to be proposed to man to believe, since Divine Wisdom provides for every being according to the measure of its nature; and therefore we must show the necessity of things even that transcend reason being proposed by God to man for his belief.
1. One proof is this. No one strives with any earnestness of desire after anything,
unless it be known to him beforehand. Since, then, as will be traced out in the
following pages (B. III, Chap. CXLVIII), Divine Providence directs men to a higher
good than human frailty can experience in the present life, the mental faculties
ought to be evoked and led onward to something higher than our reason can attain
at present, learning thereby to desire something and earnestly to tend to something
that transcends the entire state of the present life. And such is the special function
of the Christian religion, which stands alone in its promise of spiritual and eternal
goods, whereas the Old Law, carrying temporal promises, proposed few tenets that
transcended the enquiry of human reason.
2. Also another advantage is thence derived, to wit, the repression of presumption,
which is the mother of error. For there are some so presumptuous of their own genius
as to think that they can measure with their understanding the whole nature of the
Godhead, thinking all that to be true which seems true to them, and that to be false
which does not seem true to them.
3. There is also another evident advantage in this, that any knowledge, however
imperfect, of the noblest objects confers a very high perfection on the soul. And
therefore, though human reason cannot fully grasp truths above reason, nevertheless
it is much perfected by holding such truths after some fashion at least by faith.
And therefore it is said: Many things beyond the understanding of man are shown
to thee (
CHAPTER VI—That there is no lightmindedness in assenting to Truths of Faith, although they are above Reason
THE Divine Wisdom, that knows all things most fully, has deigned to reveal these
her secrets to men, and in proof of them has displayed works beyond the competence
of all natural powers, in the wonderful cure of diseases, in the raising of the
dead, and what is more wonderful still, in such inspiration of human minds as that
simple and ignorant persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Ghost, have gained
in an instant the height of wisdom and eloquence.
CHAPTER VII—That the Truth of reason is not contrary to the Truth of Christian Faith
THE natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true: it is impossible to
think of their being otherwise. Nor a gain is it permissible to believe that the
tenets of faith are false, being so evidently confirmed by God.
2. Whatever is put into the disciple’s mind by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless the teacher is teaching dishonestly, which would be a wicked thing to say of God. But the knowledge of principles naturally known is put into us by God, seeing that God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore these principles also are contained in the Divine Wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to these principles is contrary to Divine Wisdom, and cannot be of God.
3. Contrary reasons fetter our intellect fast, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If therefore contrary informations were sent us by God, our intellect would be thereby hindered from knowledge of the truth: but such hindrance cannot be of God.
4. What is natural cannot be changed while nature remains.
And therefore the Apostle says: The word is near in thy heart and in thy mouth, that is, the
word of faith which we preach (
CHAPTER VIII—Of the Relation of Human Reason to the first Truth of Faith
THE things of sense, from whence human reason takes its beginning of knowledge,
retain in themselves some trace of imitation of God, inasmuch as they are, and are
good; yet so imperfect is this trace that it proves wholly insufficient to declare
the substance of God Himself. Since every agent acts to the producing of its own
likeness, effects in their several ways bear some likeness to their causes: nevertheless
the effect does not always attain to the perfect likeness of the agent that produces
it. In regard then to
CHAPTER IX—The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work
THERE is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study:
one that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry
of reason. This truth of things divine I do not call twofold on the part of God,
who is one simple Truth, but on the part of our knowledge, as our cognitive faculty
has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine things. To the declaration therefore
of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative reasons that may serve
to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth
of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons,
but to refute his reasonings against the truth, which we may hope to do, since natural
reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The special mode of refutation
to be employed against an opponent of this second sort of truth is by alleging the
authority of Scripture confirmed from heaven by miracles. There are however some
probable reasons available for the declaration of this truth, to the exercise and
consolation of the faithful, but not to the convincing of opponents, because the
mere insufficiency of such reasoning would rather confirm them in their error, they
thinking that we assented to the truth of faith for reasons so weak.
According then to the manner indicated we will bend our endeavour, first, to the manifestation of that truth which faith professes and reason searches out, alleging reasons demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the books of philosophers and saints, for the establishment of the truth and the confutation of the opponent. Then, to proceed from what is more to what is less manifest in our regard, we will pass to the manifestation of that truth which transcends reason, solving the arguments of opponents, and by probable reasons and authorities, so far as God shall enable us, declaring the truth of faith.
Taking therefore the way of reason to the pursuit of truths that human reason can search out regarding God,
the first consideration that meets us is of the attributes of God in Himself; secondly
of the coming forth of creatures from God; thirdly of the order of creatures to
God as to their last end.
CHAPTER X—Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God cannot he proved, being a Self-evident Truth
THIS opinion rests on the following grounds:
1. Those truths are self-evident which are recognised at once, as soon as the terms in which they are expressed are known. Such a truth is the assertion that God exists: for by the name ‘God’ we understand something greater than which nothing can be thought. This notion is formed in the understanding by whoever hears and understands the name ‘God,’ so that God must already exist at least in the mind. Now He cannot exist in the mind only: for what is in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only; but nothing is greater than God, as the very meaning of the name shows: it follows that the existence of God is a self evident truth, being evidenced by the mere meaning of the name.
2. The existence of a being is conceivable, that could not be conceived not to exist; such a being is evidently greater than another that could be conceived not to exist. Thus then something greater than God is conceivable if He could be conceived not to exist; but anything ‘greater than God’ is against the meaning of the name ‘God.’ It remains then that the existence of God is a self-evident truth.
3. Those propositions are most self-evident which are either identities, as ‘Man
is man,’ or in which the predicates are included in the definitions of the subjects,
as ‘Man is an animal.’ But in God of all beings this is found true, that His existence
is His essence, as will be shown later (Chap. XXII); and thus there is one and the
same answer to the question ‘What is He?’ and ‘Whether He is.’
4. Things naturally known are self-evident: for the knowledge of them is not attained by enquiry and study. But the existence of God is naturally known, since the desire of man tends naturally to God as to his last end, as will be shown further on (B. III, Chap. XXV).
5. That must be self-evident whereby all other things are known; but such is God; for as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual cognition.
CHAPTER XI—Rejection of the aforesaid Opinion, and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons
THE above opinion arises partly from custom, men being accustomed from the beginning to hear and invoke the name of God. Custom, especially that which is from the beginning, takes the place of nature; hence notions wherewith the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known and self-evident. Partly also it owes its origin to the neglect of a distinction between what is self-evident of itself absolutely and what is self-evident relatively to us. Absolutely indeed the existence of God is self-evident, since God’s essence is His existence. But since we cannot mentally conceive God’s essence, his existence is not self-evident relatively to us.
1. Nor is the existence of God necessarily self-evident as soon as the meaning
of the name ‘God’ is known. First, because it is not evident, even to all who admit
the existence of God, that God is something greater than which nothing can be conceived,
since many of the ancients said that this world was God. Then granting that universal
usage understands by the name ‘God’ something greater than which nothing can be
conceived, it will not follow that there exists in rerum natura something greater
than which nothing can be conceived. For ‘thing’ and “notion implied in the name
of the thing” must answer to one another. From the conception in the mind of what
is declared by this name ‘God’ it does not follow that God exists otherwise than
in the mind. Hence there will be no necessity either of that something, greater
than which nothing can be conceived, existing otherwise than in the mind; and from
this it does not follow that there is anything in rerum natura greater than
which nothing can be conceived. And so the supposition of the nonexistence of God
goes untouched. For the possibility of our thought outrunning the greatness of any
given object, whether of the actual or of the ideal order, has nothing in it to
vex the soul of any one except of him alone who already grants the existence
in rerum natura of something than which nothing can be conceived greater.
2. Nor is it necessary for something greater than God to be conceivable, if His non-existence is conceivable. For the possibility of conceiving Him not to exist does not arise from the imperfection or uncertainty of His Being, since His Being is of itself most manifest, but from the infirmity of our understanding, which cannot discern Him as He is of Himself, but only by the effects which He produces; and so it is brought by reasoning to the knowledge of Him.
3. As it is self-evident to us that the whole is greater than its part, so the
existence of God is most self-evident to them that see the divine essence, inasmuch
as His essence is His existence. But because we cannot see His essence, we are brought
to the knowledge of His existence, not by what He is in Himself but by the effects
which He works.
4. Man knows God naturally as he desires Him naturally. Now man desires Him naturally inasmuch as he naturally desires happiness, which is a certain likeness to the divine goodness. Thus it is not necessary that God, considered in Himself, should be naturally known to man, but a certain likeness of God. Hence man must be led to a knowledge of God through the likenesses of Him that are found in the effects which He works.
5. God is that wherein all things are known, not as though other things could not be known without His being known first, as happens in the case of self-evident principles, but because through His influence all knowledge is caused in us.
CHAPTER XII—Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot be demonstrated
THE falseness of this opinion is shown to us as well by the art of demonstration,
which teaches us to argue causes from effects, as also by the order of the sciences,
for if there be no knowable substance above sensible substances, there will be no
science above physical science; as also by the efforts of philosophers, directed
to the proof of the existence of God; as also by apostolic truth asserting: The
invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made (
The axiom that in God essence and existence are the same is to be understood of
the existence whereby God subsists in Himself, the manner of which is unknown to
us, as also is His essence; not of the existence which signifies an affirmative
judgement of the understanding. For in the form of such affirmative judgement the
fact that there is a God falls under demonstration; as our mind is led by
demonstrative reasons to form such a proposition declaratory of the existence of
God.
CHAPTER XIII—Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God
WE will put first the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to prove the existence of God from the consideration of motion as follows.
Everything that is in motion is put and kept in motion by some other thing. It
is evident to sense that there are beings in motion. A thing is in motion because
something else puts and keeps it in motion. That mover therefore either is itself
in motion or not. If it is not in motion, our point is gained which we proposed
to prove, namely, that we must posit something which moves other things without
being itself in motion, and this we call God. But if the mover is itself in motion,
then it is moved by some other mover. Either then we have to go on to infinity,
or we must come to some mover which is motionless; but it is impossible to go on
to infinity, therefore we must posit some motionless prime mover. In this argument
there are two propositions to be proved: that everything which is in motion is put
and kept in motion by something else; and that in the series of movers and things
moved it is impossible to go on to infinity. I refrain from translating the rest of this lengthy argument, based upon the
treacherous foundation of Aristotelian Physics. See Aristotle, Physics, vii,
viii Metaphysics, xi, 7. Whoever will derive an argument for the divine existence
from the mechanism of the heavens must take his principles from Newton, not from
Aristotle. Besides Motion he must take account of Force and Energy, not to say of
Cosmic Evolution. He must know not only the motion of impact, as when a row of ninepins
knock one another down from a push given to the first, but also the motion that
is set up by gravitation. Aristotle knew nothing of gravitation; and only half knew
the inertia of matter declared by Newton’s first law of motion. He supposed that
motion, of its own nature, not only needed starting but also needed continual keeping
up by some continually acting cause. He did not know that the question with a moving
body is, not what there is to keep it in motion, but what there is to stop it. It would be a mistake to represent the Aristotelian argument of the Prime Mover
as referring to some primitive push, or some rotary motion started in the primitive
nebula, at the first creation of matter. Matter, to Aristotle, to Plato, and to
the Greeks generally, is eternal, not created. I need hardly add that between an
immovable Prime Mover and a Personal God a wide gulf intervenes which Aristotle
does not bridge over. See however Chapter XXIII of this Book. The whole idea of a Prime Mover has vanished from modern physics. The whole universe,
as we know it, is a congeries of sun-and-planet systems — some of them apparently
still in process of formation — arranged possibly in the shape of a huge convex
lens. These bodies act and react on each other. And besides these molar motions
there are also molecular motions quite as real. The causes of these motions are
innumerable forces. The study of them carries us back to consider the ‘primitive
collocation’ of the forces of the universe, a collocation whereby they were arranged
in a ‘position of advantage,’ so that out of their interaction has ensued this orderly
world, and in it our earth, fit habitation for living things. On this ‘primitive
collocation,’ Father Bödder writes (Natural Theology, p. 56): “Although we
have nothing to say against the assumption made by astronomers, that our cosmic
system resulted from the condensation and division of a primitive rotating nebula;
yet we cannot admit this nebula without observing that there must have been a
first arrangement of the material elements which constituted it, one which already
contained the present system, or else the said system could never have resulted
from it. Now this first arrangement was neither the effect of the forces of matter,
nor was it essential to matter. . . . Therefore if we would explain the origin of
that system without violation of reason, we are forced to say that its first beginning,
nebular or otherwise, is due to an intelligent cause.” To this effect he adds this
quotation from Huxley (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, II, 201, 202):
“The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more
firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena
of the universe are consequences, and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy
of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular
arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe.” Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, I translate “Everything in motion is
put and kept in motion by another”: such is the sense of St Thomas and of Aristotle.
The ab alio however is not in Aristotle. His words are: “Everything in motion
must be put and kept in motion by something” (Phys. vii, 1); and he adds:
“Everything in local motion is moved either by itself or by another” (Physics,
vii, 2) Things that had souls he thought were moved by themselves, and especially
the heavenly bodies, which were guided by some sort of animating soul in perpetual
circular motion. St Thomas (B. III, Chap. LXXXVII, in the Latin) has his doubts
as to the heavenly bodies being animated. He considers however (B. III, Chap. LXXXII)
“that sublunary bodies are ruled by God through the heavenly bodies.” Taking ‘movement’ for ‘local motion,’ the argument of the Prime Mover, for a
modern mind, resolves itself into the question of ‘primitive collocation.’ Some
collocation is presupposed to every mechanical problem. ‘Why this collocation rather
than that?” is a question answerable only either by a regressus in infinitum
(Q.E.A.) or by an invocation of Mind and Design. The argument however may, avail
itself of a wider meaning of motus, namely, change; and contend that, at
the back of the changes apparent everywhere, there must he some Changeless Being,
author and guide of this changing universe. So presented, it is sometimes called
the ‘argument from contingent to necessary being.’
The Philosopher also goes about in another way to show that it is impossible
to proceed to infinity in the series of efficient causes, but we must come to one
first cause, and this we call God. The way is more or less as follows. In every
series of efficient causes, the first term is cause of the intermediate, and the
intermediate is cause of the last. But if in efficient causes there is a process
to infinity, none of the causes will be the first: therefore all the others will
be taken away which are intermediate. But that is manifestly not the case; therefore
we must posit the existence of some first efficient cause, which is God.
Another argument is brought by St John Damascene (De Fid. Orthod. I, 3),
thus: It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to fall into one harmonious
order always or for the most part, except under some one guidance, assigning to
each and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we see things of different
natures falling into harmonious order, not rarely and fortuitously, but always or
for the most part. Therefore there must be some Power by whose providence the world
is governed; and that we call God.
CHAPTER XIV—That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation
AFTER showing that there is a First Being, whom we call God, we must enquire into
the conditions of His existence. We must use the method of negative differentiation,
particularly in the consideration of the divine substance. For the divine substance,
by its immensity, transcends every form that our intellect can realise; and thus
we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we have some sort of knowledge
of it by knowing what it is not. St Gregory Nazianzen, in one of his poems, calls God “one and all
things and nothing.” In the Summa Theologica, B. I, q. 13, art. 2, St Thomas guards his statement
thus: “Of the names that are predicated of God absolutely and affirmatively, as
‘good,’ ‘wise,’ and the like, some have said that all such names are invented rather
to remove something from God than to posit anything in Him. . . . . But this account
is unsatisfactory. . . . And therefore we must say otherwise, that such names do
signify the divine substance . . . . but fail to represent it perfectly. . . . None
of them is a perfect expression of the substance of God, but each of them signifies
it imperfectly, as creatures also represent it imperfectly.”
To proceed therefore in the knowledge of God by way of negative differentiation,
let us take as a principle what has been shown in a previous chapter, that God is
altogether immovable, which is confirmed also by the authority of Holy Scripture.
For it is said: I am the Lord and change not (
CHAPTER XV—That God is Eternal
THE beginning of anything and its ceasing to be is brought about by motion or change.
But it has been shown that God is altogether unchangeable: He is therefore eternal,
without beginning or end.
2. Those things alone are measured by time which are in motion, inasmuch as time
is an enumeration of motion.
3. If at some time God was not, and afterwards was, He was brought forth by some cause from not being to being. But not by Himself, because what is not cannot do anything. But if by another, that other is prior to Him. But it has been shown that God is the First Cause; therefore He did not begin to be: hence neither will He cease to be; because what always has been has the force of being always.
4. We see in the world some things which are possible to be and not to be. But
everything that is possible to be has a cause: for seeing that of itself it is open
to two alternatives, being and not being; if being is to be assigned to it, that
must be from some cause. But we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of causes:
therefore we must posit something that necessarily is. Now everything necessary
either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere,
Hence the Psalmist: But thou, O Lord, abidest for ever: thou art the self-same,
and thy years shall not fail (
CHAPTER XVI—That in God there is no Passive Potentiality
EVERYTHING that has in its substance an admixture of potentiality, to the extent that it has potentiality is liable not to be: because what can be, can also not be. But God in Himself cannot not be, seeing that He is everlasting; therefore there is in God no potentiality.
2. Although in order of time that which is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes
in actuality, is in potentiality before it is in actuality, yet, absolutely speaking,
actuality is prior to potentiality,
4. Everything acts inasmuch as it is in actuality.
6. We see that there is that in the world which passes from potentiality to actuality.
But it does not educe itself from potentiality to actuality, because what is in
potentiality is not as yet, and therefore cannot act. Therefore there must be some
other prior thing, whereby this thing may be brought out from potentiality to actuality.
And again, if this further thing is going out from potentiality to actuality, there
must be posited before it yet some other thing, whereby it may be reduced to actuality.
But this process cannot go on for ever: therefore we must come to something that
is only in actuality, and nowise in potentiality; and that we call God.
CHAPTER XVIII—That in God there is no Composition
IN every compound there must be actuality and potentiality. For a plurality of things
cannot become one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality. For things
that are not one absolutely, are not actually united except by being in a manner
tied up together or driven together: in which case the parts thus got together are
in potentiality in respect of union; for they combine actually, after having been
potentially combinable. But in God there is no potentiality: therefore there is
not in Him any composition.
3. Every compound is potentially soluble in respect of its being compound, although in some cases there may be some other fact that stands in the way of dissolution. But what is soluble is in potentiality not to be, which cannot be said of God, seeing that He is of Himself a necessary Being.
CHAPTER XX—That God is Incorporeal
EVERY corporeal thing, being extended, is compound and has parts. But God is not compound: therefore He is not anything corporeal.
5. According to the order of objects is the order and distinction of powers:
therefore above all sensible objects there is some intelligible object,
With this demonstrated truth divine authority also agrees. For it is said: God
is a spirit (
Hereby is destroyed the error of the first natural philosophers, who posited none but material causes. The Gentiles also are refuted, who set up the elements of the world, and the powers therein existing, for gods; also the follies of the Anthropomorphite heretics, who figured God under bodily lineaments; also of the Manicheans, who thought God was an infinite substance of light diffused through infinite space. The occasion of all these errors was that, in thinking of divine things, men came under the influence of the imagination, which can be cognisant only of bodily likeness. And therefore we must transcend imagination in the study of things incorporeal.
CHAPTER XXI—That God is His own Essence
IN everything that is not its own essence, quiddity, or nature, there must be some composition. For since in everything its own essence is contained, — if in anything there were contained nothing but its essence, the whole of that thing would be its essence, and so itself would be its own essence. If then anything is not its own essence, there must be something in that thing besides its essence, and so there must be in it composition. Hence also the essence in compound things is spoken of as a part, as humanity in man. But it has been shown that in God there is no composition. God therefore is His own essence.
2. That alone is reckoned to be beyond the essence of a thing, which does not enter into its definition: for the definition declares what the thing essentially is. But the accidents of a thing are the only points about it which fall not within the definition: therefore the accidents are the only points about a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as will be shown (Chap. XXIII): therefore there is nothing in Him besides His essence.
3. The forms that are not predicable of subsistent things, whether in the universal
or in the singular, are forms that do not of themselves subsist singly, individualised
in themselves. It is not said that Socrates or man or animal is whiteness; because
whiteness is not anything subsisting singly in itself, but is individualised by
the substance in which it exists. Also the essences or quiddities of genera or species
are individualised according to the definite matter of this or that individual,
although the generic or specific quiddity includes form and matter in general: hence
it is not said that Socrates or man is humanity. But the Divine Essence is something
existing singly by itself, and individualised in itself, as will be shown (Chap.
XLII). The Divine Essence therefore is predicated of God in such a way that it can
be said: ‘God is His own essence.’
CHAPTER XXII—That in God Existence and Essence is the same
IT has been shown above (Chap. XV, n. 4) that there is an Existence which of itself necessarily is; and that is God. If this existence, which necessarily is, is contained in some essence not identical with it, then either it is dissonant and at variance with that essence, as subsistent existence is at variance with the essence of whiteness; or it is consonant with and akin to that essence, as existence in something other than itself is consonant with whiteness. In the former case, the existence which of itself necessarily is will not attach to that essence, any more than subsistent existence will attach to whiteness. In the latter case, either such existence must depend on the essence, or both existence and essence depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the existence. The former two suppositions are against the idea of a being which of itself necessarily is; because, if it depends on another thing, it no longer is necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that that essence is accidental and adventitious to the thing which of itself necessarily is; because all that follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it; and thus the supposed essence will not be the essence at all. God therefore has no essence that is not His existence.
2. Everything is by its own existence. Whatever then is not its own existence does not of itself necessarily exist. But God does of Himself necessarily exist: therefore God is His own existence.
4. ‘Existence’ denotes a certain actuality: for a thing is not said to ‘be’ for
what it is potentially, but for what it is actually. But everything to which there
attaches an actuality, existing as something different from it, stands to the same
as potentiality to actuality. If then the divine essence is something else than
its own existence, it follows that essence and existence in God stand to one another
as potentiality and actuality. But it has been shown that in God there is nothing
of potentiality (Chap. XVI), but that He is pure actuality. Therefore God’s essence
is not anything else but His existence. This distinction of actuality and potentiality is
the saving of philosophy. Even physical science in our
day has found ‘potential’ a convenient term. The
distinction is heedlessly abolished by those who put
activity for being, and seem to think that the human
mind itself would perish the moment it ceased to
act, as though there could be no reality that was not
actualised. But perfect actuality can be nothing less
than God: so that if actuality alone exists without
potentiality, God alone exists. Nature by the institution
of sleep teaches us to distinguish the potential
from the actual. If mind may be dormant and yet
not cease to be, so may the objects of mind be dormant —
unobserved by human sense, unpictured in
human imagination, unrecalled in human memory,
or even wholly out of the ken of human knowledge,
— and still really and truly be, as “permanent
possibilities of sensation” or of cognition. This phrase of
J. S. Mill is felicitous, if we remember, as he did
not, that a “permanent possibility” is something
raised above nothingness. Here then we have the
confutation of idealism, of Berkeley and Kant and
all their tribe. Phenomena, or appearances, cannot
be actual to man except as objects of sensation or
other human cognition: but they may very well be
and are potential, observable though unobserved, out
of all human mind. Potentiality however cannot be
mere potentiality: it must rest on something actual.
The actuality on which potential phenomena, appearances
or accidents rest, is the substance in which
they inhere. The horns then of idealism are broken. Subject
is not percipere; object is not
percipi. If any one claims
the liberty of using such a terminology, he must at
least be brought to an admission that there is much
of Mind which is not subject in his sense, and much
of Matter that is not object. Mind and Matter are
like sea and land, two vast potentialities. They meet
on the coast-line: but the coast-line of percipere and
percipi is far from being the whole reality.
5. Everything that cannot be except by the concurrence of several things is compound.
But nothing in which essence is one thing, and existence
This sublime truth was taught by the Lord to Moses (
CHAPTER XXIII—That in God there is no Accident
EVERYTHING that is in a thing accidentally has a cause for its being therein, seeing
that it is beside the essence of the thing wherein it is. If then there is anything
in God accidentally, this must be by some cause. Either therefore the cause of the
accident is the Divinity itself, or something else. If something else, that something
must act upon the divine substance: for nothing induces any form, whether substantial
or accidental, in any recipient, except by acting in some way upon it, because acting
is nothing else than making something actually be, which is by a form. Thus God
will be acted upon and moved by some agent, which is against the conclusions of
Chapter XIII. But if the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident supposed
to be in it, then, — inasmuch as it cannot possibly be the cause of it in so far
as it is the recipient of it, because at that rate the same thing in the same respect
would actualise itself, — then this accident, supposed to be in God, needs must
be received by Him in one respect and caused by Him in another, even as things corporeal
receive their proper accidents by the virtue of their matter, and cause them by
their form. Thus then God will be compound, the contrary of which has been above
proved.
4. In whatever thing anything is accidentally, that thing is in some way changeable in its nature: for accident as such may be and may not be in the thing in which it is. If then God has anything attaching to Him accidentally, it follows that He is changeable, the contrary of which has above been proved (Chap. XIII, XV).
5. A thing into which an accident enters, is not all and everything that is contained
in itself: because accident is not of the essence of the subject. But God is whatever
He has in Himself. Therefore in God there is no accident. — The premises are proved
thus. Everything is found more excellently in cause than in effect.
Hence Augustine (De Trinitate, v, c. 4, n. 5): “There is nothing accidental
in God, because there is nothing changeable or perishable.” The showing forth of
this truth is the confutation of sundry Saracen jurists, who suppose certain “ideas”
superadded to the Divine Essence.
CHAPTER XXIV—That the Existence of God cannot he characterised by the addition of any Substantial Differentia
IT is impossible for anything actually to be, unless all things exist whereby its
substantial being is characterised. An animal cannot actually be without being either
a rational or an irrational animal. Hence the Platonists, in positing Ideas, did
not posit self-existent Ideas of genera, seeing that genera are characterised
and brought to specific being by addition of essential differentias; but they posited
self-existent Ideas of species alone, seeing that for the (further) characterising
of species (in the individuals belonging to it) there is no need of essential differentias.
2. Everything that needs something superadded to enable it to be, is in potentiality in respect of that addition. Now the divine substance is not in any way in potentiality, as has been shown (Chap. XVI), but God’s own substance is God’s own being. Therefore His existence cannot be characterised by any superadded substantial characteristic.
CHAPTER XXV—That God is not in any Genus
EVERYTHING that is in any genus has something in it whereby the nature of the genus is characterised and reduced to species: for there is nothing in the genus that is not in some species of it. But this is impossible in God, as has been shown in the previous chapter.
2. If God is in any genus, He is either in the genus of accident or the genus
of substance. He is not in the genus of accident, for an accident cannot be the
first being and the first cause. Again, He cannot be in the genus of substance:
for the substance that is a genus is not mere existence
3. Whatever is in a genus differs in point of existence from other things that
are in the same genus: otherwise genus would not be predicated of several things.
But all things that are in the same genus must agree in the quiddity, or essence,
of the genus: because of them all genus is predicated so as to answer the question
what (quid) each thing is.
4. Everything is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity. But the quiddity
of God is His own mere (full) existence
Hence it is also apparent that God cannot be defined, because every definition
is by genus and differentias. It is apparent also that there can be no demonstration
of God except through some effect of His production: because the principle of demonstration
is a definition of the thing defined.
CHAPTER XXVI—That God is not the formal or abstract being of all things
THINGS are not distinguished from one another in so far as they all have being,
because in this they all agree. If therefore things do differ from one another,
either ‘being’ itself must be specified by certain added differentias, so that different
things have a different specific being; or
4. What is common to many is not anything over and above the many except in thought alone. For example, ‘animal’ is not anything over and above Socrates and Plato and other animals, except in the mind that apprehends the form of ‘animal’ despoiled of all individualising and specifying marks: for what is really animal is man: otherwise it would follow that in Plato there were several animals, to wit, animal in general, and man in general, and Plato himself. Much less then is bare being in general anything over and above all existing things, except in the mind alone. If then God be being in general, God will be nothing more than a logical entity, something that exists in the mind alone.
This error is set aside by the teaching of Holy Scripture, which confesses God
lofty and high (
What has led men into this error is a piece of faulty reasoning. For, seeing
that what is common to many is specialised and individualised by addition, they
reckoned that the divine being, to which no addition is made, was not any individual
being, but was the general being of all things: failing to observe that what is
common or universal cannot really exist without addition, but merely is viewed by
the mind without addition. ‘Animal’ cannot be without ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’
as a differentia, although it may be thought of without these differentias. This statement, along with the previous
(n. 4), is St Thomas’s repudiation of
ultra-realism, a doctrine with which the schoolmen are often charged, as though
they gave the objects of universal concepts, as universal, a place in rerum natura.
The neo-Kantian school, identifying reality with thought, may be more open to the
accusation. Is not the old mediaeval strife about ‘universals’ still being waged
under other names? Modern scholars make a great difficulty of admitting that the “common element”
in a number of similar objects, e.g., of dogs, can be thought of without addition
of colour, size, and other points, which go to individualise this dog. Take all
those points away, they say, and you have nothing left. Certainly you have no picture
in the imagination left. But cursory, rapid thinking, — and such is our usual thinking,
— is done without any picture in the imagination; we think vaguely, or, as Cardinal
Newman in the Grammar of Assent calls it, “notionally.” Only in vivid thought
is a sensible picture in the imagination formed, and the apprehension becomes what
Newman calls “real.” The object then appears with its individualising features upon
the imaginative canvas, the mind meanwhile remarking to itself that this figure,
e.g., of this dog, is a specimen or type, to which other objects will conform with
various differences.
CHAPTER XXVIII—That God is Universal Perfection
AS all perfection and nobility is in a thing inasmuch as the thing is, so every defect is in a thing inasmuch as the thing in some manner is not. As then God has being in its totality, so not-being is totally removed from Him, because the measure in which a thing has being is the measure of its removal from not-being. Therefore all defect is absent from God: He is therefore universal perfection.
2. Everything imperfect must proceed from something perfect: therefore the First Being must be most perfect.
3. Everything is perfect inasmuch as it is in actuality; imperfect, inasmuch
as it is in potentiality, with privation of actuality. That then which is nowise
in potentiality, but is pure actuality, must be most perfect; and such is God.
4. Nothing acts except inasmuch as it is in actuality: action therefore follows the measure of actuality in the agent. It is impossible therefore for any effect that is brought into being by action to be of a nobler actuality than is the actuality of the agent. It is possible though for the actuality of the effect to be less perfect than the actuality of the acting cause, inasmuch as action may be weakened on the part of the object to which it is terminated, or upon which it is spent. Now in the category of efficient causation everything is reducible ultimately to one cause, which is God, of whom are all things. Everything therefore that actually is in any other thing must be found in God much more eminently than in the thing itself; God then is most perfect.
Hence the answer given to Moses by the Lord, when he sought to see the divine
face or glory: I will show thee all good (
CHAPTER XXIX—How Likeness to God may be found in Creatures
EFFECTS disproportionate to their causes do not agree with them in name and essence.
And yet some likeness must be found between such effects and their causes: for it
is of the nature of an agent to do something like itself. Thus also God gives to
creatures all their perfections; and thereby He has with all creatures a likeness,
and an unlikeness at the same time. For this point of likeness, however, it is more
proper to say that the creature is like God than that God is like the creature. For that is said
CHAPTER XXX—What Names can be predicated of God
WE may further consider what may be said or not said of God, or what may be said
of Him only, what again may be said of God and at the same time also of other beings.
Inasmuch as every perfection of the creature may be found in God, although in another
and a more excellent way, it follows that whatever names absolutely denote perfection
without defect, are predicated of God and of other beings, as for instance, ‘goodness,’
‘wisdom,’ ‘being,’ and the like. But whatever names denote such perfection with
the addition of a mode proper to creatures, cannot be predicated of God except by
way of similitude and metaphor, whereby the attributes of one thing are wont to
be adapted to another, as when a man is called a ‘block’ for the denseness of his
understanding. Of this sort are all names imposed to denote the species of a created
thing, as ‘man,’ and ’stone’: for to every species is due its own proper mode of
perfection and being. In like manner also whatever names denote properties that
are caused in things by their proper specific principles,
CHAPTER XXXI—That the Plurality of divine Names is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of the Divine Being predicated of God and of other Beings
THE perfections proper to other things in respect of their several forms must be
attributed to God in respect of His productivity alone, which productivity is no
other than His essence. Thus then God is called ‘wise,’ not only in respect of His
producing wisdom, but because, in so far as we are wise, we imitate in some measure
His productivity, which makes us wise. But He is not called ’stone,’ though He has
made stones, because in the name of ’stone’ is understood a determinate mode of
being wherein a stone is distinguished from God. Still a stone is an imitation of
God its cause, in being, in goodness, and other such respects. Something of the
sort may be found in the cognitive and active powers of man. The intellect by its
one power knows all that the sentient part knows by several powers, and. much more
besides. Also, the higher the intellect, the more it can know by one effort, to
which knowledge an inferior intellect does not attain without many efforts. Again,
the royal power extends to all those particulars to which the divers powers under
it are directed. Thus also God by His one simple being possesses all manner of perfection, all
that other beings compass by divers faculties — yea, much more. Hereby the need
is clear of many names predicated of God: for as we cannot know Him naturally otherwise
than by arriving at Him from the effects which He produces, the names whereby we
denote His perfections must be several and diverse, answering to the diverse perfections
that are found in things. But if we could understand His essence as it is in itself,
and adapt to it a name proper to it, we should express it by one name only, as is
promised to those who shall behold Him in essence: In that day there shall be
one Lord, and his name shall be one (
CHAPTER XXXII—That nothing is predicated of God and other beings synonymously
AN effect that does not receive a form specifically like the form whereby the agent
acts, is incapable of receiving in synonymous predication the name taken from that
form.
3. Everything that is predicated of several things synonymously, is either
6. Whatever is predicated of things so as to imply that one thing precedes and the other is consequent and dependent on the former, is certainly not predicated synonymously. Now nothing is predicated of God and of other beings as though they stood in the same rank, but it is implied that one precedes, and the other is consequent and dependent. Of God all predicates are predicated essentially. He is called ‘being’ to denote that He is essence itself; and ‘good,’ to denote that He is goodness itself. But of other beings predications are made to denote participation. Thus Socrates is called ‘a man,’ not that he is humanity itself, but one having humanity. It is impossible therefore for any predicate to be applied synonymously and in the same sense to God and other beings.
CHAPTER XXXIII—That it is not at all true that the application of common Predicates to God and to Creatures involves nothing beyond a mere Identity of Name
WHERE there is a mere accidental identity of name, there is no order or respect
implied of one thing to another, but quite by accident one name is applied to several
different things. But this is not the case with the names applied to God and to
creatures: for in such a community of names we have regard to the order of cause
and effect (Chap. XXIX, XXXII).
2. Moreover, there is some manner of likeness of creatures to God (Chap. XXIX).
3. When there is no more than a mere identity of name between several things, we cannot be led from one of them to the knowledge of another; but from the attributes found in creatures we are led to a knowledge of the attributes of God (Chap. XXX, XXXI).
5. There is no use predicating any name of any thing unless by the name we come to understand something about the thing. But if names are predicated of God and creatures by a mere coincidence of sound, we understand by those names nothing whatever about God, seeing that the significations of those names are known to us only inasmuch as they apply to creatures: there would at that rate be no use in saying or proving of God that God is a good being, or anything else of the sort.
If it is said that by such names we only know of God what He is not — in that,
e.g., He is called ‘living’ as not being of the genus of inanimate things — at
least it must be allowed that the predicate ‘living,’ applied to God and to creatures,
agrees in the negation of the inanimate, and thus will be something more than a
bare coincidence of name.
CHAPTER XXXIV—That the things that are said God and Creatures are said analogously
THUS then from the foregoing arguments the conclusion remains that things said alike
of God and of other beings are not said either in quite the same sense, or in a
totally different sense, but in an analogous sense, that is, in point of order or
regard to some one object. And this happens in two ways: in one way inasmuch as
many things have regard to one particular, as in regard to the one point of health
an animal is called ‘healthy’ as being the subject of health medicine is called
‘healthful’ as being productive of health; food is ‘healthy,’ being preservative
of health; urine, as being a sign of health: in another way, inasmuch as we consider
the order or regard of two things, not to any third thing, but to one of the two,
as ‘being’ is predicated of substance and accident inasmuch as accident is referred
to substance, not that substance and accident are referred to any third thing. Such
names then as are predicated of God and of other beings are not predicated analogously
in the former way of analogy — for then we should have to posit something before
God — but in the latter way.
In this matter of analogous predication we find sometimes the same order in point
of name and in point of thing named, sometimes not the same. The order of naming
follows the order of knowing, because the name is a sign of an intelligible concept.
When then that which is prior in point of fact happens to be also prior in point
of knowledge, there is one and the same priority alike in point of the concept answering
to the name and of the nature of the thing named. Thus substance is prior to accident
by nature, inasmuch as substance is the cause of accident;
CHAPTER XXXV—That the several Names predicated of God are not synonymous
THOUGH the names predicated of God signify the same thing, still they are not synonymous, because they do not signify the same point of view. For just as divers realities are by divers forms assimilated to the one simple reality, which is God, so our understanding by divers concepts is in some sort assimilated to Him, inasmuch as, by several different points of view, taken from the perfections of creatures, it is brought to the knowledge of Him. And therefore our understanding is not at fault in forming many concepts of one thing; because that simple divine being is such that things can be assimilated to it in many divers forms. According to these divers conceptions the understanding invents divers names, an assigns them to God — names which, though they denote one and the same thing, yet clearly are not synonymous, since they are not assigned from the same point of view. The same meaning does not attach to the name in all these cases, seeing that the name signifies the concept of the understanding before it signifies the thing understood.
CHAPTER XXXVI—That the Propositions which our Understanding forms of God are not void of meaning
FOR all the absolute simplicity of God, not in vain does our understanding form
propositions concerning Him, putting together and putting asunder.
CHAPTER XXXVIII—That God is His own Goodness
EVERY good thing, that is not its own goodness, is called good by participation.
But what is called good by participation presupposes something else before itself,
whence it has received the character of goodness. This process cannot go to infinity,
as there is no processus in infinitum in a series of final causes: for the
infinite is inconsistent with any end, while good bears the character of an end.
4. What is, may partake of something; but sheer being can partake of nothing.
For that which partakes, is potentiality: but being is actuality. But God is sheer
being, as has been proved (Chap. XXII): He
is not then good by participation, but essentially so.
5. Every simple being has its existence and what it is, in one:
The same reasoning shows that no other good thing is its own goodness: wherefore
it is said: None is good but God alone (
CHAPTER XXXIX—That in God there can be no Evil
ESSENTIAL being, and essential goodness, and all other things that bear the name of ‘essential,’ contain no admixture of any foreign element; although a thing that is good may contain something else besides being and goodness, for there is nothing to prevent the subject of one perfection being the subject also of another. Everything is contained within the bounds of its essential idea in such sort as to render it incapable of containing within itself any foreign element. But God is goodness, not merely good. There cannot therefore be in Him anything that is not goodness, and so evil cannot be in Him at all.
3. As God is His own being, nothing can be said of God that signifies participation.
If therefore evil could be predicated of Him, the predication would not signify
participation, but essence. Now evil cannot be predicated of any being so as to
be the essence of any: for to an essentially evil thing there would be wanting being,
since being is good.
5. A thing is perfect in so far as it is in actuality: therefore it will be imperfect inasmuch as it is failing in actuality. Evil therefore is either a privation, or includes a privation, or is nothing. But the subject of privation is potentiality; and that cannot be in God: therefore neither can evil.
This truth also Holy Scripture confirms, saying: God is light, and there is
no darkness in Him, (
CHAPTER XL—That God is the Good of all Good
GOD in His goodness includes all goodnesses, and thus is the good of all good.
2. God is good by essence: all other beings by participation: therefore nothing can be called good except inasmuch as it bears some likeness to the divine goodness. He is therefore the good of all good.
Hence it is said of the Divine Wisdom: There came to me all good things along with it
(
From this it is further shown that God is the sovereign good (Chap. XLI.
THERE cannot possibly be two sovereign goods. But God is the sovereign good. Therefore there is but one God.
2. God is all-perfect, wanting in no perfection. If then there are several gods, there must be several thus perfect beings. But that is impossible: for if to none of them is wanting any perfection, nor is there any admixture of imperfection in any, there will be nothing to distinguish them one from another.
7. If there are two beings, each necessarily existent, they must agree in point of necessary existence. Therefore they must be distinguished by some addition made to one only or to both of them; and thus either one or both must be composite. But no composite being exists necessarily of itself, as has been shown above (Chap. XVIII). Therefore there cannot be several necessary beings, nor several gods.
9. If there are two gods, this name ‘God’ is predicated of each either in the
same sense or in different senses. If in different senses, that does not touch the
present question: for there is nothing to prevent anything from being called by
any name in a sense different from that in which the name is ordinarily borne, if
common parlance so allows.
12. If there are many gods, the nature of godhead cannot be numerically one in each. There must be therefore something to distinguish the divine nature in this and that god: but that is impossible, since the divine nature does not admit of addition or difference, whether in the way of points essential or of points accidental (Chap. XXIII, XXIV).
13. Abstract being is one only: thus whiteness, if there were any whiteness in
the abstract, would be one only. But God is abstract being itself, seeing that He
is His own being (Chap. XXII). By abstract here is meant ideal, in the Platonic sense: thus
ens abstractum answers to αὔτὸ τὸ ὄν.
It is not abstract in the sense of indeterminate: it is not that thinnest of abstractions,
being in general. It is being, sheer, simple, and full. See Chap. XXV note §, XXVI. In fact
ens abstractum here is tantamount to ens perfectum: cf. the argument
about ‘perfectum bonum, III, Chap. XLVIII, 5. But probably this argument is not St Thomas’s at all. It is wanting in the Bergamo
autograph in the Vatican library.
This declaration of the divine unity we can also gather from Holy Writ. For it
is said: Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord (
By this truth the Gentiles are set aside in their assertion of a multitude of
gods. Yet it must be allowed that many of them proclaimed the existence of one supreme
God, by whom all the other beings to whom they gave the name of gods had been created.
CHAPTER XLIII—That God is Infinite
INFINITY cannot be attributed to God on the score of multitude, seeing there is but one God. Nor on the score of quantitative extension, seeing He is incorporeal. It remains to consider whether infinity belongs to Him in point of spiritual greatness. Spiritual greatness may be either in power or in goodness (or completeness) of nature. Of these two greatnesses the one follows upon the other: for by the fact of a thing being in actuality it is capable of action. According then to the completeness of its actuality is the measure of the greatness of its power. Thus it follows that spiritual beings are called great according to the measure of their completeness, as Augustine says: “In things in which greatness goes not by bulk, being greater means being better” (De Trinit. vi, 9). But in God infinity can be understood negatively only, inasmuch as there is no term or limit to His perfection. And so infinity ought to be attributed to God.
2. Every actuality inhering in another takes limitation from that wherein it
is: for what is in another is therein according to the measure of the recipient.
4. Actuality is more perfect, the less admixture it has of potentiality. Every actuality, wherewith potentiality is blended, has bounds set to its perfection: while that which is without any blend of potentiality is without bounds to its perfection. But God is pure actuality without potentiality (Chap. XVI), and therefore infinite.
6. There cannot be conceived any mode in which any perfection can be had more perfectly than by him, who is perfect by his essence, and whose being is his own goodness. But such is God: therefore anything better or more perfect than God is inconceivable. He is therefore infinite in goodness.
7. Our intellect, in understanding anything, reaches out to infinity; a sign whereof is this, that, given any finite quantity, our intellect can think of something greater. But this direction of our intellect to the infinite would be in vain, if there were not something intelligible that is infinite. There must therefore be some infinite intelligible reality, which is necessarily the greatest of realities; and this we call God.
8. An effect cannot reach beyond its cause: now our understanding cannot come
but of God, who is the First Cause. If then our understanding can conceive something
greater than any finite being, the conclusion remains that God is not finite.
9. Every agent shows greater power in action, the further from actuality is the potentiality which it reduces to actuality, as there is need of greater power to warm water than to warm air. But that which is not at all, is infinitely distant from actuality, and is not in any way in potentiality: therefore if the world was made a fact from being previously no fact at all, the power of the Maker must be infinite.
This argument avails to prove the infinity of the divine power even to
the mind of those who assume the eternity of the world. For they acknowledge
To this truth Holy Scripture bears witness: Great
is the Lord and exceedingly to he praised, and of his greatness there is no end
(
CHAPTER XLIV—That God has Understanding
IN no order of causes is it found that an intelligent cause is the instrument of an unintelligent one. But all causes in the world stand to the prime mover, which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since then in the world there are found many intelligent causes, the prime mover cannot possibly cause unintelligently.
5. No perfection is wanting in God that is found in any kind of beings (Chap. XXVIII): nor
does any manner of composition result in Him for all that (Chap. XVIII). But
among the perfections of creatures the highest is the possession of understanding:
for by understanding a thing is in a manner all things, having in itself the perfections
of all things.
6. Everything that tends definitely to an end, either fixes its own end, or has
its end fixed for it by another: otherwise it would not tend rather to this end
than to that. But the operations of nature tend to definite ends: the gains of nature
are not made by chance: for if they were, they would not be the rule, but the exception,
for chance is of exceptional cases. Since then physical agents do not fix their
own end, because they have no idea of an end, they must have an end fixed for them
by another, who is the author of nature. But He could not fix an end for nature,
had He not Himself understanding.
7. Everything imperfect is derived from something perfect: for perfection is
naturally prior to imperfection, as actuality to potentiality. The
‘forms’ here spoken of (not the human soul) are entities denoted by abstract
names, as beauty, dexterity, squareness. They exist only in particular substances,
and in each case imperfectly according to the imperfections of that in which they
exist. Thus beauty is marred by the age, bodily infirmities and accidents, of any
beautiful living being. No living being on earth is ideally beautiful. Is then every
ideal ‘form’ something that practically cannot be? St Thomas thinks not. Recognising
that the ideal cannot be except in a mind, he thereupon posits ideals which are
themselves minds — self-conscious ideals, and these are the angels. The Platonic
ideas, or ideals, are thus brought into rerum natura as angels, one angel
being the self-conscious ideal of one quality, as, perhaps, of swiftness,
another of another, as, perhaps, of accuracy. Thus he says in II, 93: “Separate
substances (i.e., angels) are certain essences existing by themselves (quidditates
subsistentes).” This essence, existing by itself, and conscious of itself —
existing therefore in a mind, its own mind, as all ideal being needs to exist in
a mind — this ideal essence, I say, is not limited, as forms are limited in the
material universe, by being reduced to the particular. An angel, says St Thomas
(Contra Gent., II, 93), is not reduced to the particular as one individual
of many in a species: each angel is a species by himself, a living, conscious specific
essence, sole of its kind. Thus among angels there are particular species, but not
particular individuals of a species: this or that species is this or that individual,
containing an ample measure, though not a divine fulness, of the specific essence.
St Thomas does not say that specific forms necessarily exist by themselves: he does
not teach the necessary existence of angels: all he argues is that, if these forms
exist by themselves at all (si sint subsistentes), they must be self-conscious
and intelligent beings. The utmost that he can be said to contend for is that angels
are a fitting complement of the universe (II, 91). All that is absolutely necessary
is the existence of a Supreme Being, who virtually contains in Himself all perfections
which are represented in our minds by various abstract forms; a Being who is the
Actuality of all ideal perfection (Chap. XXVIII). The argument then in the text is: ‘Imperfect forms are apparent everywhere in
the material creation. Imperfect forms must come of perfect forms; perfect forms
are ideal forms: ideal forms can exist nowhere but in the mind: if these ideal forms
exist anywhere by themselves, they must themselves be minds conscious of what they
are: such self-conscious ideals are the angels: anyhow, whether existing by themselves
or not, ideals must be represented in one Perfect Mind: God therefore is Mind.’
The argument is Platonic; or rather, Neoplatonist, as the making of the ideals into
angels shows. It is rather a probable intuition than an argument. As an argument,
it has many difficulties. St Thomas cannot have meant to say that any angel was
living perfect beauty, or living perfect wisdom, for then it would be God: but perhaps
we might have a living perfect fragrance, or a living perfect agility; and we may
suppose that only these minor perfections, which do not carry all other perfections
with them, are personified in the angels, and that only in an imperfect way. Omitting the theory of angels, which will recur again (Book II, Chap. LV, XCVIII,
with notes) we may formulate the matter finally thus: The ideal must be realised
somewhere. It is realisable only in mind. Now whatever we may think of angels, and
their intermediate realisation of ideals, we must arrive ultimately at one mind
that realises the whole ideal order. That one grand realiser and realisation of
all ideals is the Mind of God.
This truth also is in the confession of Catholic faith: for it is said: He
is wise of heart and mighty of power (
CHAPTER XLV—That in God the Understanding is His very Essence
TO understand is an act of an intelligent being, existing in that being, not passing
out to anything external, as the act of warming passes out to the object warmed:
5. Every substance is for the sake of its activity. If therefore the activity
of God is anything else than the divine substance, His end will be something
From the act of understanding in God being identical with His being, it follows necessarily that the act of His understanding is absolutely eternal and invariable, exists in actuality only, and has all the other attributes that have been proved of the divine being. God then is not potentially intelligent, nor does He begin anew to understand anything, nor does He undergo any change or composition in the process of understanding.
CHAPTER XLVI—That God understands by nothing else than by His own Essence
UNDERSTANDING is brought actually to understand by an impression made on the understanding, just as sense comes actually to feel by an impression made on sense. The impression made on the understanding then is to the understanding as actuality to potentiality. If therefore the divine understanding came to understand by any impression made on the understanding other than the understanding itself, the understanding would be in potentiality towards that impression, which, it has been shown, cannot be (Chap. XVI, XVII).
3. Any impression on the understanding that is in the understanding over and above its essence, has an accidental being: by reason of which fact our knowledge reckons as an accident. But there can be no accident in God. Therefore there is not in His understanding any impression besides the divine essence itself.
CHAPTER XLVII—That God perfectly understands Himself
WHEN by an impression on the understanding that power is brought to bear on its object, the perfection of the intellectual act depends on two things: one is the perfect conformity of the impression with the thing understood: the other is the perfect fixing of the impression on the understanding: which perfection is the greater, the greater the power of the understanding to understand. Now the mere divine essence, which is the intelligible representation whereby the divine understanding understands, is absolutely one and the same with God Himself and with the understanding of God. God therefore knows Himself most perfectly.
6. The perfections of all creatures are found at their best in God. But of perfections found in creatures the greatest is to understand God: seeing that the intellectual nature is pre-eminent above other natures, and the perfection of intellect is the act of understanding, and the noblest object of understanding is God. God therefore understands Himself perfectly.
This also is confirmed by divine authority, for the Apostle says: The spirit
of God searcheth into even the deep things of God (
CHAPTER XLVIII—That God primarily and essentially knows Himself alone
THE Understanding is in potentiality in regard of its object, in so far as it is a different thing from that object. If therefore the primary and essential object of divine understanding be something different from God, it will follow that God is in potentiality in respect of some other thing, which is impossible (Chap. XVI).
5. A thing understood is the perfection of him who understands it: for an understanding
is perfected by actually understanding, which means being made one with the object
understood.
CHAPTER XLIX—That God knows other things besides Himself
WE are said to know a thing when we know its cause. But God Himself by His essence is the cause of being to others. Since therefore He knows His own essence most fully, we must suppose that He knows also other beings.
3. Whoever knows anything perfectly, knows all that can be truly said of that thing, and all its natural attributes. But a natural attribute of God is to be cause of other things. Since then He perfectly knows Himself, He knows that He is a cause: which could not be unless He knew something also of what He has caused, which is something different from Himself, for nothing is its own cause.
Gathering together these two conclusions, it appears that God knows Himself as
the primary and essential object of His knowledge, and other things as seen in His
essence.
CHAPTER L—That God has a particular Knowledge of all things
EVERY agent that acts by understanding has a knowledge of what it does, reaching
to the particular nature of the thing produced; because the knowledge of the maker
determines the form of the thing made. But God is cause of things by His understanding,
seeing that in Him to be and to understand are one. But everything acts inasmuch
as it is in actuality. God therefore knows in particular, as distinct from other
things, whatever He causes to be.
3. The collocation of things, distinct and separate, cannot be by chance, for
it is in regular order. This collocation of things, then, distinct and separate
from one another, must be due to the intention of some cause. It cannot be due to
the intention of any cause that acts by physical necessity, because physical nature
is determined to one line of acton. Thus of no agent, that acts by physical necessity,
can the intention reach to many distinct effects, inasmuch as they are distinct.
4. Whatever God knows, He knows most perfectly: for there is in Him all perfection (Chap. XXVIII). Now what is known only in general is not known perfectly: the main points of the thing are not known, the finishing touches of its perfection, whereby its proper being is completely realised and brought out. Such mere general knowledge is rather a perfectible than a perfect knowledge of a thing. If therefore God in knowing His essence knows all things in their universality, He must also have a particular knowledge of things.
8. Whoever knows any nature, knows whether that nature be communicable: for he
would not know perfectly the nature of ‘animal,’ who did not know that it was communicable
to many. But the divine nature is communicable by likeness. God therefore knows
in how many ways anything may exist like unto His essence. Hence arises the diversity
of types, inasmuch as they imitate in divers ways the divine essence. God therefore
has a knowledge of things according to their several particular types.
This also we are taught by the authority of canonical Scripture. God saw all
things that he had made, and they were very good (
CHAPTER LI—Some Discussion of the Question how there is in the Divine Understanding a Multitude of Objects
THIS multitude cannot be taken to mean that many objects of understanding have a
distinct being in God. For these objects of understanding would be either the same
with the divine essence, and at that rate multitude would be posited in the essence
of God, a doctrine above rejected on many grounds (Chap. XXXI); or
they would be additions made to the divine essence, and at that rate there would
be in God some accident, which we have above shown to be an impossibility (Chap.
XXXIII). Nor
again can there be posited any separate existence of these intelligible forms,
CHAPTER LII—Reasons to show how the Multitude of intelligible Ideal Forms has no Existence except in the Divine Understanding
IT is not to be supposed that the multitude of intelligible ideal forms is in any other understanding save the divine, say, the understanding of an angel. For in that case the divine understanding would depend, at least for some portion of its activity, upon some secondary intellect, which is impossible: for as substances are of God, so also all that is in substances: hence for the being of any of these forms in any secondary intellect there is prerequired an act of the divine intelligence, whereby God is cause.
2. It is impossible for one intellect to perform an intellectual operation by virtue of another intellect being disposed to that operation: that intellect itself must operate, which is disposed so to do. The fact then of many intelligible forms being in some secondary intellect cannot account for the prime intellect knowing the multitude of such forms.
CHAPTER LIII—How there is in God a Multitude of Objects of Understanding
AN external object, coming to be an object of our understanding, does not thereby
exist in our understanding in its own proper nature: but the impression (species)
of it must be in our understanding, and by that impression our understanding is
actualised, or comes actually to understand. The understanding, actualised and ‘informed’
by such an impression, understands the ‘thing in itself.’ The act of understanding
is immanent in the mind, and at the same time in relation with the thing understood,
inasmuch as the aforesaid ‘impression,’ which is the starting-point of the intellectual
activity, is a likeness of the thing understood. Thus informed by the impression
(species) of the thing, the understanding in act goes on to form in itself
what we may call an ‘intellectual expression’ (intentio) of the thing. This
expression is the idea (ratio, λόγος) of the thing,
But the divine mind understands by virtue of no impression other than its own
essence (Chap. XLVI). At the same time the divine essence is the likeness of all things. It
follows therefore that the concept of the divine understanding itself, which is
the Divine Word, is at once a likeness of God Himself understood, and also a likeness
of all things whereof the divine essence is a likeness. Thus then by one intelligible
impression (species intelligibilis), which the divine essence, and by one
intellectual recognition (intentio intellecta), which is the Divine Word,
many several objects may be understood by God. Few modern readers, I fear, will read this explanation with the same zest which
St Thomas evidently felt in writing it. Kantian idealism on the one hand, and physical
science on the other, have averted the modern mind — is it for ever? — from
species intelligibilis and intentio intellecta, or verbum mentale.
Accidents, scientifically considered, as colour, odour, shape, are not to us what
they were to the mediaeval schoolman. We busy ourselves with the sensation of colour,
the effect on retina and brain and inner consciousness, and further with the vibrations
from without that are apt to set up such a sensation in a creature organised as
man is. And at the back of colour we discern with the mind’s eye, what the bodily
eye is insensible to, a colourless, invisible molecular structure, and a complication
of interacting forces all but infinite in multitude, all but infinitesimal in power.
Whoever would rehabilitate Thomist philosophy to the requirements of modern science,
has before him work for a lifetime, no old man’s labour. One thing however I will
say about the ‘likeness’ (similitudo) here said to obtain between the thing
in itself and our impression or idea of the thing. There can be no question here
of any such likeness as obtains between a portrait, or photograph, and the person
who sits for it. What can be maintained on behalf of Realistic Dualism is this,
that between the impression or idea in consciousness and the thing in itself there
is a certain correlation or proportion, inasmuch as the thing in itself, striking
our senses and thereby our understanding, is apt to induce in us certain sensations
and consequent ideas. These aptitudes, or potentialities, relative to man, are the
objective properties, or accidents, of the thing in itself as cognizable by man.
This doctrine is simply an extension to all substance of a conclusion generally
received in respect to those interesting substances whom we call our friends and
acquaintances. We have impressions and ideas of them, gathered from their conversation
and their dealings with us. We trust that our friends are at heart such as their
conversation represents them. If they are not, they are false and deceitful, or
at least unknowable and unlovable persons; and there is an end of friendship. But
assuming that our fellow-men, or some of them, as things in themselves, answer to
our impressions and ideas of them, what of horses and dogs, and the lower sentient
creation generally? What again of plants, of minerals and gases? Are they not all
so many potential energies, to some extent impressing us, but in great measure beyond
us, and even when away from us still real? And in the ascending scale, what of angels
and of God? These are interesting questions to all except the solipsist. Abandon
solipsism, and any extreme form of idealism becomes impossible; nay, it may be found
necessary to come to terms with Realistic Dualism. Does not monism spell solipsism? I have translated similitudo ‘likeness,’ but the
intelligent reader will take it to mean no more than
‘proportion,’ or ‘correspondence,’ of the impression or
idea in the mind with the thing in itself. ‘Things in
themselves’ are knowable in point of their aptitudes in
our regard, aptitudes which remain potential, and do not
drop to zero, when not exercised. If any one will
venture on the fatal denial of potentiality, and assume
that, as in God, so also in the creatures of God, nothing
is but what is actualised, no logic can save him from the
last excesses of pantheism.
CHAPTER LIV—That the Divine Essence, being One, is the proper Likeness and Type of all things Intelligible
BUT again it may seem to some difficult or impossible that one and the same simple being, as the divine essence, should be the proper type (propria ratio) and likeness of different things. For as different things are distinguished by means of their proper forms, it needs must be that what is like one thing according to its proper form should be found unlike to another.
True indeed, different things may have one point of likeness in so far as they have one common feature, as man and ass, inasmuch as they are animals. If it were by mere discernment of common features that God knew things, it would follow that He had not a particular but only a general knowledge of things (contrary to Chap. L). To return then to a proper and particular knowledge, of which there is here question.
The act of knowledge is according to the mode in which the likeness of the known object
is in the knowing mind: for the likeness of the known object in the knowing mind
is as the form by which that mind is set to act. If therefore God has a proper and
particular knowledge of many different things, He must be the proper and particular
type of each. We have to enquire how that can be.
As the Philosopher says, the forms of things, and the definitions which mark such
forms, are like numbers, in which the addition or subtraction of unity varies the
species of the number. So in definitions: one differentia subtracted or added varies
the species: thus ‘sentient substance’ varies in species by the addition
of ‘irrational’ or ‘rational.’ But in instances of ‘the many in one’
the condition of the understanding is not as the condition of concrete nature. The
nature of a concrete being does not admit of the severance of elements, the union
of which is requisite to the existence of that being: thus animal nature will not
endure if the soul be removed from the body. But the understanding can sometimes
take separately elements that in actual being are united, when one of them does
not enter into the concept of the other; thus in ‘three’ it may consider ‘two’ only,
and in ‘rational animal’ the ’sentient’ element alone. Hence the understanding may
take what is inclusive of many elements for a proper specimen of many, by apprehending
some of them without others. It may take ‘ten’ as a proper specimen of nine by subtraction
of one unit, and absolutely as a proper specimen of all the numbers included in
‘ten.’ So also in ‘man’ it might recognise a proper type of ‘irrational animal’
as such, and of all the species of ‘irrational animal,’ unless these species involved
some positive differentias.
And from this point of view Augustine says that God has made man in one plan
and horse on another; and that the plans or types of things exist severally in the
divine mind (De div. quaest., LXXXIII, 46). And herein also is defensible
in some sort the opinion of Plato, who supposes Ideas, according to which all beings
in the material world are formed. This explains how God knows types, but not His knowledge of existing individuals,
as John, this tree, my violin. Incidentally, to take a favourite thought of Newman’s, as all possible creation
exists typically in the divine essence, so the Catholic faith contains all the truths,
speculative and practical, of all religions and all moralities, minus their
negations, in which, so far as they are false, their falsehood lies.
CHAPTER LV—That God understands all things at once and together
THE reason why our understanding cannot understand many things together in one act
is because in the act of understanding the mind becomes one with the object understood;
2. The faculty of knowledge does not know anything actually without some attention and advertence. Hence the phantasms, stored in the sensorium, are at times not actually in the imagination, because no attention is given to them. We do not discern together a multitude of things to which we do not attend together: but things that necessarily fall under one and the same advertence and attention, are necessarily understood together. Thus whoever institutes a comparison of two things, directs his attention to both and discerns both together. But all things that are in the divine knowledge must necessarily fall under one advertence; for God is attentive to behold His essence perfectly, which is to see it to the whole reach of its virtual content, which includes all things. God therefore, in beholding His essence, discerns at once all things that are.
6. Every mind that understands one thing after another, is sometimes potentially intelligent, sometimes actually so; for while it understands the first thing actually, it understands the second potentially. But the divine mind is never potentially intelligent, but always actually: it does not, then, understand things in succession, but all at once.
Holy Scripture witnesses to this truth, saying that with God there is no change
nor shadow of vicissitude (
CHAPTER LVI—That there is no Habitual Knowledge in God
IN whatever minds there is habitual knowledge, not all things are known together: but some things are known actually, others habitually. But in God all things are known actually (Chap. LV).
2. He who has a habit of knowledge, and is not adverting to what he knows, is in a manner in potentiality, although otherwise than as he was before he understood at all: but the divine mind is nowise in potentiality.
3. In every mind that knows anything habitually, the mind’s essence is different
from its intellectual activity, which is the act of attentive thought. To such a
mind, in habitual knowledge, activity is lacking, though the essence of the mind
itself cannot be lacking.
4. A mind that knows habitually only, is not in its ultimate perfection: hence that best of goods, happiness, is not taken to be in habit but in act. If then God is habitually knowing, He will not be all-perfect (contrary to Chap. XXVIII).
5. As shown in chapter XLVI, God
has understanding by His essence, not by any intelligible forms superadded to His
essence. But every mind in habitual knowledge understands by some such forms: for
a habit is either a predisposition of the mind to receive mental impressions, or
forms, whereby it comes actually to understand; or it is an orderly aggregation of such forms,
6. A habit is a quality: but in God there can be neither quality nor any other accident (Chap. XXIII): habitual knowledge therefore is not proper to God.
Because the mental state of thinking,
or willing, or acting habitually only, is like the state of a sleeper, David says,
by way of removing all habitual states from God: Lo, he shall not slumber or
sleep who keepeth Israel (
CHAPTER LVII—That the Knowledge of God is not a Reasoned Knowledge
OUR thought is then reasoned, when we pass from one object of thought to another,
as in making syllogisms from principles to conclusions. Reasoning or arguing does
not consist in seeing how a conclusion follows from premises by inspection of both
together. That is not argument, but judging of argument.
2. Every reasoner intues principles with one thought, and the conclusion with another. There would be no need to proceed to a conclusion from the consideration of premises, if the mere consideration of the premises at once laid the conclusion bare. But God knows all things by one act which is His essence (Chap. LV). His knowledge therefore is not argumentative.
3. All argumentative knowledge has something of actuality and something of potentiality, for conclusions are potentially in premises. But in the divine mind potentiality has no place.
5. Things that are known naturally are known without reasoning, as appears in the case of first principles. But in God there can be no knowledge that is not natural, nay, essential: for His knowledge is His essence.
7. Only in its highest advance does the inferior touch upon the superior. But
the highest advance of our knowledge is not reasoning, but intuition (intellectus),
which is the starting-point of reasoning. God’s knowledge then is not ‘rational,’
in the sense of ‘argumentative,’ but intuitive only.
8. Reasoning means a lack of intuition: the divine knowledge therefore is not reasoned.
If any should take it amiss that God cannot make a syllogism, let them mark that He has the knowledge how to make syllogisms as one judging of them, not as one arguing syllogistically.
To this there is witness of Holy Scripture in the text: All things are
CHAPTER LVIII—That God does not understand by Combination and Separation of Ideas
THINGS mentally combinable and separable are naturally considered by the mind apart
from one another: for there would be no need of their combination and separation,
if by the mere apprehension of a thing as being it were at once understood what
was in it or not in it.
3. A mind that combines and separates, forms different judgements by different combinations. For a mental combination does not go beyond the terms of the combination. Hence, in the combination, or affirmative judgement (compositione), whereby the mind judges that man is an animal, it does not judge that a triangle is a figure. Now combination or separation is an operation of the mind. If God therefore views things by mentally combining and separating them, His mental act will not be one only but manifold; and so His essence will not be one only.
Not for this however must we say that He is ignorant of tenable propositions: for His one and simple essence is the pattern of all things manifold and compound; and so by it God knows the whole multitude and complexity as well of actual nature as of the ideal world (tam naturae quam rationis).
This is in consonance with the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said,
For my thoughts are not your thoughts (
CHAPTER LIX—That the Truth to be found in Propositions is not excluded from God
THOUGH the knowledge of the divine mind is not after the manner of combination
and separation of ideas in affirmative and negative propositions, nevertheless there
is not excluded from it that truth which, according to the Philosopher, obtains
only in such combinations and separations.
TRUTH is a perfection of the understanding and of its act. But the understanding of God is His substance; and the very act of understanding, as it is the being of God, is perfect as the being of God is perfect, not by any superadded perfection, but by itself. It remains therefore that the divine substance is truth itself.
4. Though truth is properly not in things but in the mind, nevertheless a thing
is sometimes called true, inasmuch as it properly attains the actuality of its proper
nature. Hence Avicenna says that the truth of a thing is a property of the fixed
and appointed being of each thing, inasmuch as such a thing is naturally apt to
create a true impression of itself, and inasmuch as it expresses the proper idea
of itself in the divine mind.
This is also confirmed by the authority of our Lord saying of Himself: I am
the way and the truth and the life (
CHAPTER LXI—That God is pure Truth
THE understanding is not liable to error in its knowledge of abstract being, as
neither is sense in dealing with the proper object of each sense.
3. The intellect does not err over first principles, but over reasoned conclusions
from first principles. But the divine intellect is not reasoning or argumentative
(Chap. LVII),
and is therefore not liable to deception.
4. The higher any cognitive faculty is, the more universal and far-reaching is
its proper object: hence what sight is cognisant of accidentally,
5. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the understanding in knowing. It never happens that the understanding utters anything false, but its utterance is always true, when prompted by any intellectual virtue; for it is the part of virtue to render an act good, and to utter truth is the good act of the understanding. But the divine mind, being the acme of perfection, is more perfect by its nature than the human mind by any habit of virtue.
6. The knowledge of the human mind is in a manner caused by things: hence it
comes to be that things knowable are the measure of human knowledge: for the judgement
of the mind is true, because the thing is so. But the divine mind by its knowledge
is the cause of things.
Hence it is said: God is truthful (
CHAPTER LXII—That the Truth of God is the First and Sovereign Truth
THE standard in every genus is the most perfect instance of the genus. But the divine truth is the standard of all truth. The truth of our mind is measured by the object outside the mind: our understanding is called true, inasmuch as it is in accordance with that object. And again the truth of the object is measured by its accordance with the divine mind, which is the cause of all things (B. II, Chap. XXIV), as the truth of artificial objects is measured by the art of the artificer. Since then God is the first understanding and the first object of understanding, the truth of every understanding must be measured by His truth, as everything is measured by the first and best of its kind.
CHAPTER LXIII—The Arguments of those who wish to withdraw from God the Knowledge of Individual
Things
THE first argument is drawn from the very condition of individuality. For as matter
(materia signata)
2. The second argument is that individual things do not always exist. Either then they will always be known by God, or they will sometimes be known and sometimes not known. The former alternative is impossible, because there can be no knowledge of that which is not: for knowledge is only of things true, and things that are not cannot be true. The second alternative is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine mind is absolutely invariable (Chap. XLV).
3. The third argument is from the consideration that not all individual things come of necessity, but some are by contingency: hence there can be no certain knowledge of them except when they exist. For that knowledge is certain, which is infallible: but all knowledge of contingent being is fallible while the thing is still in the future; for the opposite may happen of that which is held in cognition: for if the opposite could not happen, the thing would be a necessity: hence there can be no science in us of future contingencies, only a conjectural reckoning. On the other hand we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is most certain and infallible (Chap. LXI). It is also impossible for God to begin to know anything, by reason of His immutability. From this it seems to follow that He does not know individual contingencies.
4. The fourth argument is from this, that some individual effects have their cause in will. Now an effect, before it is produced, can be known only in its cause: for so only can it have being before it begins to have being in itself. But the motions of the will can be known with certainty by none other than the willing agent, in whose power they are. It is impossible therefore that God should have certain knowledge of such individual effects as derive their causation from a created will.
5. The fifth argument is from the infinite multitude of individual things. The infinite as such is unknown: for all that is known is measured in a manner by the comprehension of the knower, measurement being nothing else than a marking out and ascertaining of the thing measured: hence every art repudiates infinities. But individual existences are infinite, at least potentially.
6. The sixth argument is from the vileness of individual things. As the nobility of knowledge is weighed according to the nobility of the thing known, so the vileness also of the thing known seems to redound to the vileness of the knowledge. Therefore the excellent nobility of the divine mind does not permit of God knowing sundry most vile things that have individual existence.
7. The seventh argument is from the evil that is found in sundry individual things.
Since the object known is in some manner in the knowing mind, and evil is impossible
in God, it seems to follow that God can have no knowledge at all of evil and privation:
only the mind that is in potentiality can know that, as privation can be only in
potentiality.
CHAPTER LXIV—A list of things to be said concerning the Divine Knowledge
TO the exclusion of the above error we will show first that the divine mind does know individual things; secondly, that it knows things which actually are not; thirdly, that it knows future contingencies with infallible knowledge; fourthly, that it knows the motions of the will; fifthly, that it knows infinite things; sixthly, that it knows the vilest and least of things that be; seventhly, that it knows evils and all manner of privations or defects.
CHAPTER LXV—That God Knows Individual Things
GOD knows things in so far as He is the cause of them. But the substantial effects of divine causation are individual things, universals not being substantial things, but having being only in individuals.
2. Since God’s cognitive act is His essence, He must know all that is in any way in His essence; and as this essence is the first and universal principle of being and the prime origin of all, it virtually contains in itself all things that in any way whatsoever have being.
5. In the gradation of faculties it is commonly found that the higher faculty extends to more terms, and yet is one; while the range of the lower faculty extends to fewer terms, and even over them it is multiplied, as we see in the case of imagination and sense, for the single power of the imagination extends to all that the five senses take cognisance of, and to more. But the cognitive faculty in God is higher than in man: whatever therefore man knows by the various faculties of understanding, imagination and sense, God is cognisant of by His one simple intuition. God therefore is apt to know the individual things that we grasp by sense and imagination.
6. The divine mind, unlike ours, does not gather its knowledge from things, but rather by its knowledge is the cause of things; and thus its knowledge of things is a practical knowledge. But practical knowledge is not perfect unless it descends to individual cases: for the end of practical knowledge is work, which is done on individuals.
9. As the Philosopher argues against Empedocles, God would be very wanting in wisdom, if He did not know individual instances, which even men know.
This truth is established also by the authority of Holy Scripture, for it is
said: There is no creature invisible in his sight: also the contrary error
is excluded by the text: Say not, I shall be hidden from God; and from the height
of heaven who shall mind me? (
From what has been said it is evident how the objection to the contrary (Chap. LXIII, 1) is inconclusive: for though the mental presentation whereby divine understanding understands is immaterial, it is still a type both of matter and form, as being the prime productive principle of both.
CHAPTER LXVI—That God knows things which are not
THE knowledge of the divine mind stands to things as the knowledge of the artificer to the products of his art. But the artificer by the knowledge of his art knows even those products of it which are not yet produced.
3. God knows other things besides Himself by His essence, inasmuch as His essence is the type of other things that come forth from Him (Chap. LIV). But since the essence of God is infinitely perfect (Chap. XLIII), while of every other thing the being and perfection is limited, it is impossible for the whole sum of other things to equal the perfection of the divine essence. Therefore the representative power of that essence extends to many more things than the things that are. As then God knows entirely the power and perfection of His essence, His knowledge reaches not only to things that are, but also to things that are not.
6. The understanding of God has no succession, as neither has His being: it is
all together, ever abiding, which is the essential notion of eternity, whereas the
duration of time extends by succession of before and after. The proportion of eternity
to the whole duration of time is as the proportion of an indivisible point to a
continuous surface, — not of that indivisible point which is a term of the surface,
and is not in every part of its continuous extent: for to such a point an instant
of time bears resemblance; but of that indivisible point which lies outside of the
surface, and yet co-exists with every part or point of its continuous extent:
By these reasons it appears that God has knowledge of nonentities. But all nonentities
do not stand in the same regard to His knowledge. Things that neither are, nor shall
be, nor have been, are known by God as possible to His power: hence He does not
know them as being anywise in themselves, but only as being within the compass of
divine power. These sort of things are said by some to be known by God with the
‘knowledge of simple understanding’ (notitia simplicis intelligentiae). But
as for those things that are present, past, or future to us, God knows them as they
are within the compass of His power; and as they are within the compass of their
own several created causes; and as they are in themselves; and the knowledge of
such things is called the ‘knowledge of vision’ (notitia visionis). For of
the things that are not yet with us,
To this the authority of Holy Scripture also gives testimony: All things are
known to the Lord our God before their creation; as also, after they are fully made,
he regardeth all (
CHAPTER LXVII—That God knows Individual Contingent Events
HENCE we may gather some inkling of how God has had an infallible knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it still be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present may be a certitude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every [one] of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.
2. A contingent event differs from a necessary event in point of the way in which
each is contained in its cause. A contingent event is so contained in its cause
as that it either may not or may ensue therefrom:
3. As from a necessary cause the effect follows with certainty, with like certainty
does it follow from a contingent cause, when the cause is complete, provided no
hindrance be placed. But as God knows all things (Chap. L). He knows
not only the causes of contingent events, but like-wise the means whereby they may
be hindered from coming off. He knows therefore with certitude whether they are
going to come off or not.
6. The knowledge of God would not be true and perfect, if things did not happen
in the way that God apprehends them to happen. But God, cognisant as He is of all
being of which He is the principle, knows every event, not only in itself, but also
in its dependence on any proximate causes on which it happens to depend: but the
dependence of contingent events upon their proximate causes involves their ensuing
upon them contingently.
7. When it is said, ‘God knows, or knew, this coming event,’ an intervening medium
is supposed between the divine knowledge and the thing known, to wit, the time to
which the utterance points, in respect to which that which is said to be known by
God is in the future. But really it is not in the future in respect of the divine
knowledge, which existing in the instant of eternity is present to all things. In
respect of such knowledge, if we set aside the time of speaking, it is impossible
to say that so-and-so is known as non-existent; and the question never arises as
to whether the thing possibly may never occur. As thus known, it should be said
to be seen by God as already present in its existence. Under this aspect, the question
of the possibility of the thing never coming to be can no longer be raised: what
already is, in respect of that present instant cannot but be. The fallacy then arises
from this, that the time at which we speak, when we say ‘God knows,’ co-exists with
eternity; or again the last time that is marked when we say ‘God knew’; and thus
a relation of time, past or present, to future is attributed to eternity, which
attribution does not hold; and thus we have fallacia
accidentis.
8. Since everything is known by God as seen by Him in the present, the necessity
of that being true which God knows is like the necessity of Socrates’s sitting from
the fact of his being seen seated. This is not necessary absolutely, ‘by necessity
of the consequent,’ as the phrase is, but conditionally, or ‘by necessity of the
consequence.’ For this conditional proposition is necessary: ‘He is sitting, if
he is seen seated.’ Change the conditional proposition into a categorical of this
form: ‘What is seen sitting, is necessarily seated’: it is clear that the proposition
is true as a phrase, where its elements are taken together (compositam),
but false as a fact, when its elements are separated (divisam).
That God knows future contingencies is shown also by the authority of Holy Scripture:
for it is said of Divine Wisdom, It knows signs and portents beforehand, and
the issues of times and ages (
CHAPTER LXVIII—That God knows the Motions of the Will
GOD knows the thoughts of minds and the volitions of hearts in virtue of their cause, as He is Himself the universal principle of being. All that in any way is, is known by God in His knowledge of His own essence (Chap. XLIX). Now there is a certain reality in the soul, and again a certain reality in things outside the soul. The reality in the soul is that which is in the will or thought. God knows all these varieties of reality.
3. As God by knowing His own being knows the being of everything, so by knowing His own act of understanding and will He knows every thought and volition.
5. God knows intelligent substances not less well than He knows or we know sensible substances, seeing that intelligent substances are more knowable, as being better actualised.
This is confirmed by the testimony of Holy Scripture: — God searcher
of hearts and reins (
The dominion of the will over its own acts, whereby it has it in its power to
will and not to will, is inconsistent with will-force being determined to one fixed
mode of action: it is inconsistent also with the violent interference of any external
agency; but it is not inconsistent with the influence of that Higher Cause, from
whence it is given to the will both to be and to act. And thus in the First Cause,
that is, in God, there remains a causal influence over the motions of the will,
such that, in knowing Himself, God is able to know these motions.
CHAPTER LXIX—That God knows infinite things
BY knowing Himself as the cause of things, He knows things other than Himself (Chap. XLIX). But
He is the cause of infinite things, if beings are infinite, for He is the cause
of all things that are.
2. God knows His own power perfectly (Chap. XLIX). But power cannot be perfectly known, unless all the objects to which it extends are known, since according to that extent the amount of the power may be said to be determined. But His power being infinite (Chap. XLIII) extends to things infinite, and therefore also His knowledge.
3. If the knowledge of God extends to all things that in any sort of way are,
He must not only know actual being, but also potential being. But in the physical
world there is potential infinity, though not actual infinity, as the Philosopher
proves. God therefore knows infinite things, in the way that unity, which is the
principle of number, would know infinite species of number if it knew whatever is
in its potentiality: for unity is in promise and potency every number.
4. God in His essence, as in a sort of exemplar medium, knows other things. But as He is a being of infinite perfection, there can be modelled upon Him infinite copies with finite perfections, because no one of these copies, nor any number of them put together, can come up to the perfection of their exemplar; and thus there always remains some new way for any copy taken to imitate Him.
10. The infinite defies knowledge in so far as it defies counting. To count the parts of the infinite is an intrinsic impossibility, as involving a contradiction. To know a thing by enumeration of its parts is characteristic of a mind that knows part after part successively, not of a mind that comprehends the several parts together. Since then the divine mind knows all things together without succession, it has no more difficulty in knowing things infinite than in knowing things finite.
11. All quantity consists in a certain multiplication of parts; and therefore
number is the first of quantities.
In accordance with this is what is said in
From what has been said it is clear why our mind does not know the infinite as
the divine mind does. Our mind differs from the divine mind in four respects; and
they make all the difference. The first is that our mind is simply finite, the divine
mind infinite. The second is that as our mind knows different things by different
impressions, it cannot extend to an infinity of things, as the divine mind can.
The third results in this way, that as our mind is cognisant of different things
by different impressions, it cannot be actually cognisant of a multitude of things
at the same time;
It is also clear how the saying of the Philosopher, that the infinite, as infinite,
is unknowable, is in no opposition with the opinion now put forth: because the notion
of infinity attaches to quantity; consequently, for infinite to be known as infinite,
it would have to be known by the measurement of its parts, for that is the proper
way of knowing quantity: but God does not know the infinite in that way. Hence,
so to say, God does not know the infinite inasmuch as it is infinite, but inasmuch
as, to His knowledge, it is as though it were finite.
It is to be observed however that God does not know an infinity of things with
the ‘knowledge of vision,’ because infinite things neither actually are, nor have
been, nor shall be, since, according to the Catholic faith, there are not infinite
generations either in point of time past or in point of time to come. But He does
know an infinity of things with the ‘knowledge of simple understanding’: for He
knows infinite things that neither are, nor have been, nor shall be, and yet are
in the power of the creature; The reference is to the fifth argument objected in Chap.
LXIII, which might take this form: The infinite is unknowable. But particular things are infinite. Therefore particular things are unknowable — even to God. The major, which St Thomas speaks of denying, is really the minor premise of
this syllogism.
CHAPTER LXX—That God knows Base and Mean Things
THE stronger an active power is, to the more remote objects does it extend its action. But the power of the divine mind in knowing things is likened to active power: since the divine mind knows, not by receiving aught from things, but rather by pouring its influence upon things. Since then God’s mind is of infinite power in understanding (Chap. XLIII), its knowledge must extend to the remotest objects. But the degree of nobility or baseness in all things is determined by nearness to or distance from God, who is the fulness of nobility. Therefore the very vilest things in being are known to God on account of the exceeding great power of His understanding.
2. Everything that is, in so far as it has place in the category of substance
or quality, is in actuality: it is some sort of likeness of the prime actuality,
and is ennobled thereby. Even potential being, from its reference to actuality shares
in nobility, and so comes to have the name of ‘being.’ It follows that every being,
considered in itself, is noble; and is only mean and vile in comparison with some other being, nobler still. But the noblest
3. The good of the order of the universe is nobler than any part of the universe. If then God knows any other noble nature, most of all must He know the order of the universe. But this cannot be known without taking cognisance at once of things nobler and things baser: for in the mutual distances and relations of these things the order of the universe consists.
4. The vileness of the objects of knowledge does not of itself redound on to the knower; for it is of the essence of knowledge that the knower should contain within himself impressions of the object known according to his own mode and manner. Accidentally however the vileness of the objects known may redound upon the knower, either because in knowing base and mean things he is withdrawn from the thought of nobler things, or because from the consideration of such vile objects he is inclined to some undue affections: which cannot be the case with God.
5. A power is not judged to be small, which extends to small things, but only that which is limited to small things. A knowledge therefore that ranges alike over things noble and things mean, is not to be judged mean; but that knowledge is mean, which ranges only over mean things, as is the case with us: for we make different studies of divine and of human things, and there is a different science of each. But with God it is not so; for with the same knowledge and the same glance He views Himself and all other beings.
With this agrees what is said of the Divine Wisdom: It findeth place everywhere
on account of its purity, and nothing defiled stealeth in to corrupt it (
CHAPTER LXXI—That God knows Evil Things
WHEN good is known, the opposite evil is known. But God knows all particular good things, to which evil things are opposed: therefore God knows evil things.
2. The ideas of contraries, as ideas in the mind, are not contrary to one another:
otherwise they could not be together in the mind, or be known together: the idea
therefore whereby evil is known is not inconsistent with good, but rather belongs
to the idea of good (ratio qua cognoscitur malum ad rationem boni pertinet). “Evil is not knowable by itself, because it is of the essence of evil to be a
privation of good; and thus it can neither be defined nor known except through good”
(Sum. Theol., I, q. 14, art. 10, ad 4). “Vinegar and oil,” as Aeschylus says (Agam. 322-3), “poured into the same
vessel, stand apart in unfriendly separation.” But in the vessel of the mind contraries
do not indeed blend, but stand together, and even call for one another’s presence,
as elements mutually complementary. Thus, though darkness excludes light, and good
evil, the idea of darkness is complementary to that of light, and the idea of evil
complementary to that of good. This difference between the ideal and the actual
order, that in actuality, contraries are mutually exclusive, while as thoughts they
are mutually complementary, I do not remember to have seen noticed elsewhere.
3. Truth is the good of the understanding: for an understanding is called good
inasmuch as it knows the truth. But truth is not only to the effect
4. God knows the distinction of things (Chap. L). But in the notion of distinction there is negation: for those things are distinct, of which one is not another: hence the first things that are of themselves distinct, mutually involve the exclusion of one another, by reason of which fast negative propositions are immediately verified of them, e.g., ‘No quantity is a substance.’ God then knows negation. But privation is a sort of negation: He therefore knows privation, and consequently evil, which is nothing else than a privation of due perfection.
8. In us the knowledge of evil things is never blameworthy in mere point of knowledge, that is in the judgement that is passed about evil things, but accidentally, inasmuch as by the observation of evil things one is sometimes inclined to evil. But that cannot be in God; and therefore there is nothing to prevent His knowing evil.
With this agrees what is said, that Evil surpasseth not [God’s] wisdom
(
It is to be observed however that if God’s knowledge were so limited as that
His knowledge of Himself did not involve His knowing other beings of finite and
partial goodness, at that rate He would nowise know privation or evil: because to
the good which is God Himself there is no privation opposed, since privation and
its opposite are naturally about the same object; and so to that which is pure actuality
no privation is opposed, and consequently no evil either. Hence on the supposition
that God knows Himself alone, by knowing the excellences of His own being, He will
not know evil.
It must be further observed that as God, without any argumentative process, knows other beings by knowing Himself, so there is no need of His knowledge being argumentative in coming to the knowledge of evil things through good things: for good is as it were the ground of the knowledge of evil, evil being nothing else than privation of good: hence what is evil is known through what is good as things are known through their definitions, not as conclusions through their premises.
CHAPTER LXXII—That God has a Will
FROM the fact that God has understanding, it follows that He has a will. Since good apprehended in understanding is the proper object of the will, understood good, as such, must be willed good. But anything understood involves an understanding mind. A mind then that understands good, must, as such, be a mind that wills good.
3. What is consequent upon all being, is a property of being, as such. Such a
property must be found in its perfection in the first and greatest of beings. Now
it is a property of all being to seek its own perfection and the preservation of
its own existence. Every being does this in its own way: intelligent beings, by
their will: animals, by their sensitive appetite: unconscious nature, by a certain
physical nisus.
4. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful to the understanding mind. But God has understanding and a most perfect act thereof (Chap. XLIV): therefore that act yields Him the utmost delight. But as sensible delight is through the concupiscible appetite, so is intellectual delight through the will. God then has a will.
This will of God the testimonies of Holy Scripture confess: All things whatsoever
he hath willed, the Lord hath done (
CHAPTER LXXIII—That the Will of God is His Essence
GOD has will inasmuch as He has understanding. But He has understanding by His essence (Chap. XLIV, XLV), and therefore will in like manner.
2. The act of will is the perfection of the agent willing. But the divine being is of itself most perfect, and admits of no superadded perfection (Chap. XXIII): therefore in God the act of His willing is the act of His being.
3. As every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality, God, being pure actuality, must act by His essence. But to will is an act of God: therefore God must will by His essence.
4. If will were anything superadded to the divine substance, that substance being
complete in being, it would follow that will was something adventitious to it as
an accident to a subject; also that the divine substance stood to the divine will
as potentiality to actuality; and that there was composition in God: all of which
positions have been rejected (Chap. XVI, XVIII,
XXIII).
CHAPTER LXXIV—That the Object of the Will of God in the First Place is God Himself
GOOD understood is the object of the will. But what is understood by God in the first place is the divine essence: therefore the divine essence is the first object of the divine will.
3. The object in the first place willed is the cause of willing to every willing agent. For when we say, ‘I wish to walk for the benefit of my health,’ we consider that we are assigning a cause; and if we are further asked, ‘Why do you wish to benefit your health?’ we shall go on assigning causes until we come to the final end, which is the object willed in the first place, and is in itself the cause of all our willing. If then God wills anything else than Himself in the first place, it will follow that that ’something else’ is to Him a cause of willing. But His willing is His being (Chap. LXXIII), Therefore something else will be the cause of His being, which is contrary to the notion of the First Being.
CHAPTER LXXV—That God in willing Himself wills also other things besides Himself
EVERY one desires the perfection of that which for its own sake he wills and loves: for the things which we love for their own sakes we wish to be excellent, and ever better and better, and to be multiplied as much as possible. But God wills and loves His essence for its own sake. Now that essence is not augmentable and multipliable in itself (Chap. XLII), but can be multiplied only in its likeness, which is shared by many. God therefore wills the multitude of things, inasmuch as He wills and loves His own perfection.
3. Whoever loves anything in itself and for itself, wills consequently all things in which that thing is found: as he who loves sweetness in itself must love all sweet things. But God wills and loves His own being in itself and for itself; and all other being is a sort of participation by likeness of His being.
6. The will follows the understanding. But God with His understanding understands Himself in the first place, and in Himself understands all other things: therefore in like manner He wills Himself in the first place, and in willing Himself wills all other things.
This is confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: Thou lovest all things
that are, and hatest nothing of the things that thou hast made (
CHAPTER LXXVI—That with one and the same Act of the Will God wills Himself and all other Beings
EVERY power tends by one and the same activity to its object and to that which makes
the said object an object to such a power, as with the same vision we see light
and the colour which is made actually visible by light. But when we wish a thing
for an end, and for that alone, that which is desired for the end receives from the end its character of an
2. What is perfectly known and desired, is known and desired to the whole extent of its motive power. But a final end is a motive not only inasmuch as it is desired in itself, but also inasmuch as other things are rendered desirable for its sake. He therefore who perfectly desires an end, desires it in both these ways. But it is impossible to suppose any volitional act of God, by which He should will Himself, and not will Himself perfectly: since there is nothing imperfect in God. By every act therefore by which He wills Himself, He wills Himself and other things for His own sake absolutely; and other things besides Himself He does not will except inasmuch as He wills Himself.
3. As promises are to conclusions in things speculative, so is the end to the means in things practical and desirable: for as we know conclusions by premises, so from the end in view proceeds both the desire and the carrying out of the means. If then one were to wish the end apart, and the means apart, by two separate acts, there would be a process from step to step in his volition (Chap. LVII). But this is impossible in God, who is beyond all movement.
7. To will belongs to God inasmuch as He has understanding. As then by one act He understands Himself and other beings, inasmuch as His essence is the pattern of them all, so by one act He wills Himself and all other beings, inasmuch as His goodness is the type of all goodness.
CHAPTER LXXVII—That the Multitude of the Objects of God’s Will is not inconsistent with the Simplicity of His Substance
GOD wills other things inasmuch as He wills His own goodness (Chap. LXXV). Things then come under the will of God according as they are included in His goodness. But in His goodness all things are one: for they are in Him according to the mode that befits Him; material things, immaterially; and things many, in union (Chap. LV, LVIII). Thus the multitude of the objects of the divine will does not multiply the divine substance.
CHAPTER LXXVIII—That the Divine Will reaches to the good of Individual Existences
THE excellence of order in the universe appears in two ways, first, inasmuch as the whole universe is referred to something beyond the universe, as an army to its leader: secondly, inasmuch as the parts of the universe are referred to one another, like the parts of an army; and the second order is for the sake of the first. But God, in willing Himself as an end, wills other things in their reference to Him as an end. He wills therefore the excellence of order in the universe in reference to Himself, and the excellence of order in the universe in mutual reference of its parts to one another. But the excellence of order is made up of the good of individual existences.
This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture: God saw the light, that it
was good (
CHAPTER LXXIX—That God wills things even that as yet are not
SOME one might perhaps think that God wills only the things that are: for correlatives go together; and if one perishes, the other perishes; if then willing supposes a relation of the willing subject to the object willed, none can will any but things that are. Besides, the will and its objects are to one another as Creator and creature: now God cannot be called Creator, or Lord, or Father, except of things that are: neither then can He be said to will any but things that are. And it may be further argued, that if the divine will is invariable, as is the divine being, and wills only actual existences, it wills nothing but what always is.
Let us say then in answer to these objections, that as good apprehended by the
intellect moves the will, the act of the will must follow the condition of the mental
apprehension. Now the mind apprehends the thing, not only as it is in the mind,
but also as it is in its own nature: for we not only know that the thing is understood
by us (for that is the meaning of its being ‘in the mind’), but also that the thing
exists, or has existed, or is to exist in its own nature. Though then at the time
the thing has no being other than in the mind, still the mind stands related to
it, not as it is in the mind, but as it is in its own nature, which the mind apprehends.
Therefore the relation of the divine will to a non-existent thing is to the thing
according as it is in its own nature, attached to some certain time, and not merely
to the thing as it is in the knowledge of God. For God wills the thing, that is
not now, to be in some certain time: He does not merely will it inasmuch as He Himself
understands it.
Nor is the relation of the will to its object similar to the relation of Creator
to creature, of Maker to made, of Lord to subject. For will, being an immanent act,
does not involve the actual external existence of the thing willed:
CHAPTER LXXX—That God of necessity wills His own Being and His own Goodness
GOD wills His own being and His own goodness as His first object and reason for willing all other things (Chap. LXXIV), and this He wills in everything that He does will. Nor is it possible for Him to will it merely potentially: He must will it actually, as His willing is His being.
4. All things, in so far as they have existence, are likened to God, who is the first and greatest being. But all things, in so far as they have existence, cherish their own being naturally in such manner as they can. Much more therefore does God cherish His own being naturally.
CHAPTER LXXXI—That God does not of necessity love other things than Himself
A WILL does not of necessity tend to the means to an end, if the end can be had without those means. Since then the divine Goodness can be without other beings, — nay, other beings make no addition to it, — God is under no necessity of willing other things from the fact of His willing His own goodness.
2. Since good, understood to be such, is the proper object of the will, the will
may fasten on any object conceived by the intellect in which the notion of good
is fulfilled. Hence though the being of anything, as such, is good, and its not-being,
as such, is evil; still the very not- being of a thing may become an object to the
will, though not of necessity, by reason of some notion of good fulfilled: for it
is good for a thing to be, even though some other thing is
not.
3. God in willing His own goodness wills also other things than Himself as sharing His goodness. But since the divine goodness is infinite, and partakable in infinite ways, if by the willing of His own goodness He of necessity willed the beings that partake of it, the absurdity would follow that He must will the existence of infinite creatures sharing His goodness in infinite ways: because, if He willed them, those creatures would exist, since His will is the principle of being to creatures.
We must consider therefore why God of necessity knows other beings than Himself, and
yet does not of necessity will them to exist, notwithstanding that His understanding
and willing of Himself involves His understanding and willing other beings. The
reason of it is this: an intelligent agent’s understanding anything arises from
a certain condition of the understanding, — for by a thing being actually understood
its likeness is in the mind: but a volitional agent’s willing anything arises from
a certain condition of the object willed, — for we will a thing either because
it is an end, or because it is a means to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily
requires that all things should so be in God as to be understood in Him. But the
divine goodness does not of necessity require that other things should exist to
be referred to Him as means to an end; and therefore it is necessary
CHAPTER LXXXII—Arguments against the aforesaid Doctrine and Solutions of the same
THESE awkward consequences seem to follow, if any things that God wills He does not will of necessity.
1. If the will of God in respect of certain objects of will is not determined by any of them, it seems to be indifferent. But every faculty that indifferent is in a manner in potentiality.
2. Since potential being, as such, is naturally changeable, — for what can be
can also not be, — it follows that the divine will is variable.
4. Since what hangs loose, indifferent between two alternatives, does not tend to one rather than to the other, unless it be determined by one or other, either God wills none of the things to which He is indifferent, or He is determined by one or other of them, in which case there must be something antecedent to God to determine Him.
But none of the above objections can stand.
1. The indifference, or indeterminateness, of a faculty may be attributable either
to the faculty itself or to its object. To the faculty itself, when its indeterminateness
comes from its not having yet attained to its perfection. This argues imperfection
in the faculty, and an unfulfilled potentiality, as we see in the mind of a doubter,
who has not yet attained to premises sufficient to determine him to take either
of two sides. To the object of the faculty, when the perfect working of the faculty
does not depend on its adoption of either alternative, and yet either alternative
may be adopted, as when art may employ different instruments to do the same work
equally well. This argues no imperfection in the faculty, but rather its pre-eminent
excellence, inasmuch as it rises superior to both opposing alternatives, and therefore
is indifferent to both and determined by neither. Such is the position of the divine
will with respect to things other than itself. Its perfection depends on none of
them; being as it is intimately conjoined with its own last end and final perfection.
2. In the divine will there is no potentiality. Unnecessitated, it prefers one alternative to another respecting the creatures which it causes to be. It is not to be looked upon as being in a potential attitude to both alternatives, so as first to be potentially willing both, and then to be actually willing one. It is for ever actually willing whatever it wills, as well its own self as the creatures which are the objects of its causation. But whatever creature God wills to exist, that creature stands in no necessary relation to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will.
4. We cannot admit that either the divine will wills none of the effects of its causation, or that its volition is determined by some exterior object. The proper object of the will is good apprehended as such by the understanding. Now the divine understanding apprehends, not only the divine being, or divine goodness, but other good things likewise (Chap. XLIX); and it apprehends them as likenesses of the divine goodness and essence, not as constituent elements of the same. Thus the divine will tends to them as things becoming its goodness, not as things necessary to its goodness. So it happens also in our will: which, when it inclines to a thing as absolutely necessary to its end, tends to it with a certain necessity; but when it tends to a thing solely on account of its comeliness and appropriateness, does not tend to it necessarily.
CHAPTER LXXXIII—That God wills anything else than Himself with an Hypothetical Necessity
IN every unchangeable being, whatever once is, cannot afterwards cease to be. Since then God’s will is unchangeable, supposing Him to will anything, He cannot on that supposition not will it.
2. Everything eternal is necessary. But God’s will for the causation of any effect is eternal: for, as His being, so His willing is measured by eternity. That will therefore is necessary, yet not absolutely so, since the will of God has no necessary connexion with this objection willed. It is therefore necessary hypothetically, on a supposition.
3. Whatever God once could do, He can still. His power does not grow less, as
neither does His essence. But He cannot now not-will what He is already supposed
to have willed, because His will cannot change: therefore He never could not-will
whatever He once willed (nunquam potuit non velle quidquid voluit).
4. Whoever wills anything, necessarily wills all that is necessarily requisite
to that purpose, unless there be some defect on his part, either by ignorance, or
because his will sometimes is drawn away by some passion from a right choice of
means to the end: nothing of which can be said of God. If God then in willing Himself
wills anything else besides Himself, He needs must will all that is necessarily
required to the effecting of the thing willed, as it is necessary that God should
will the being of a rational soul, if He wills the being of a man. And, possibly, the human shape, if He wishes the being of a rational animal.
Or is a rational animal possible in the shape of a pig? Who shall reckon or particularise
the essential connexions and repugnances of things? How much, that we might wish
to cast out, cleaves to nature and must be, if natural things are to be at all!
How thoughtlessly may we murmur at God for not severing two elements essentially
inseparable, or not conjoining two others mutually repugnant! Is it possible under
any circumstances, or under what circumstances, for man’s final happiness to be
secured without toil and trial, a crown without a cross? This is not a difficult chapter, but it suggests a great difficulty: how God,
willing from eternity this present creation, is perfectly the same God as He might
have been from eternity willing no such thing; of how, there being not the slightest
entitative difference between God willing to create and God having no such
will, creation, which was nothing to begin with, ever came to be rather than not
to be. The difficulty has its foundation in this, that, within our experience, every
new effect involves some antecedent change either in the agent or in the matter
acted upon. The more powerful the agent, the less change is required, as when a
strong man with little or no effort lifts a weight, which a weaker one would have
to strain himself to raise from the ground. Hence we may faintly surmise how ‘in
the limit’ an Almighty agent would act without being in the least altered by his
action from the being that he would have been, had he remained at rest. Not that
I take this suggestion to remove the whole difficulty.
CHAPTER LXXXIV—That the Will of God is not of things in themselves Impossible
THOSE things are in themselves impossible, which involve an inconsistency, as that man should be an ass, which involves the rational being irrational. But what is inconsistent with a thing, excludes some one of the conditions requisite to it, as being an ass excludes a man’s reason. If therefore God necessarily wills the things requisite to that which by supposition He does will, it is impossible for Him to will what is inconsistent therewith.
2. God, in willing His own being, wills all other things, that He does will, in so far as they have some likeness to it. But in so far as anything is inconsistent with the notion of being as such, there cannot stand therein any likeness to the first or divine being, which is the fountain of being. God therefore cannot will anything that is inconsistent with the notion of being as such, as that anything should be at once being and not being, that affirmation and negation should be true together, or any other such essential impossibility, inconsistency, and implied contradiction.
3. What is no object of the intellect, can be no object of the will. But essential impossibilities, involving notions mutually inconsistent, are no objects of intellect, except perchance through the error of a mind that does not understand the proprieties of things, which cannot be said of God.
CHAPTER LXXXV—That the Divine Will does not take away Contingency from things
HYPOTHETICAL necessity in the cause cannot lead to absolute necessity in the effect.
But God’s will about a creature is not absolutely necessary, but hypothetically
so (Chap. LXXXIII). Therefore the divine will is no argument of absolute necessity in
creatures. But only this absolute necessity excludes contingency: for even a contingent
fact may be extended either way into an hypothetical necessity: thus it is necessary
that Socrates moves, if he runs. It does not therefore follow that a thing happens
of necessity, if God wills it: all that holds is the necessary truth of this conditional:
‘If God wills anything, the thing will be’: but the ‘consequent’ (as distinguished
from the ‘consequence’) need not be a necessary truth.
CHAPTER LXXXVI—That Reason can be assigned for the Divine Will
THE end is a reason for willing the means. But God wills His own goodness as an end, and all things else as means thereto: His goodness therefore is a reason why He wills other things different from Himself.
2. The good of a part is ordained to the end of the good of the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect. But things become objects of the divine will according as they stand in the order of goodness. It follows that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills every good of any part of the universe.
3. Supposing that God wills anything, it follows of necessity that He wills the means requisite thereto. But what lays on others a necessity for doing a thing, is a reason for doing it. Therefore the accomplishment of a purpose, to which such and such means are requisite, is a reason to God for willing those means.
We may therefore proceed as follows. God wishes man to have reason, to the end
that he may be man: He wishes man to be, to the end of the completion of the universe:
He wishes the good of the universe to be, because it befits His own goodness.
CHAPTER LXXXVII—That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will
THOUGH some reason may be assigned for the divine will, yet it does not follow that there is any cause of that will’s volition. For the cause of volition is the end in view: now the end in view of the divine will is its own goodness: that then is God’s cause of willing, which is also His own act of willing. But of other objects willed by God none is to God a cause of willing, but one of them is cause to another of its being referred to the divine goodness, and thus God is understood to will one for the sake of another. But clearly we must suppose no passing from point to point of God’s will, where there is only one act, as shown above of the divine intellect (Chap. LVII). For God by one act wills His own goodness and all other things, as His action is His essence.
By this and the previous chapter the error is excluded of some who
say that all things proceed from God by sheer will, so that no reason is to be rendered
of anything that He does beyond the fact that God so wills. Which position is even
contrary to divine Scripture, which tells us that God has done all things according
to the order of His wisdom: Thou hast done all
CHAPTER LXXXVIII—That there is a Free Will in God
GOD does not necessarily will things outside Himself (Chap. LXXXI).
3. Will is of the end: choice of the means.
4. Man by free will is said to be master of his own acts. But this mastery belongs
most of all to the Prime Agent, whose act depends on no other.
CHAPTER LXXXIX—That there are no Passions in God
PASSION is not in the intellectual appetite, but only in the sensitive. But in God there is no sensitive appetite, as there is no sensible knowedge.
2. Every passion involves some bodily alteration,
3. In every passion the subject is more or less drawn out of his essential condition
or connatural disposition: which is not possible in the unchangeable God.
4. Every passion fixes determinedly on some one object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. Passion, like physical nature, rushes blindly at some one thing: that is why passion needs repressing and regulating by reason. But the divine will is not determined of itself to any one object in creation: but proceeds according to the order of its wisdom (Chap. LXXXII).
5. Every passion is the passion of a subject that is in potentiality. But God is altogether free from potentiality, being pure actuality.
Thus every passion, generically as such, is removed from God. But certain passions are removed from God, not only generically, but also specifically. For every passion takes its species from its object: if then an object is altogether unbefitting for God, the passion specified by that object is removed from God also on specific grounds. Such a passion is Sadness and Grief, the object of which is evil already attaching to the sufferer. Hope, again, though it has good for its object, is not of good obtained, but to be obtained, a relation to good which is unbefitting for God by reason of His so great perfection, to which addition is impossible. Much more does that perfection exclude any potentiality in the way of evil. But Fear regards an evil that may be imminent. In two ways then Fear, specifically as such, is removed from God, both because it supposes a subject that is in potentiality, and because it has for its object some evil that may come to be in the subject. Regret again, or Repentance, is repugnant to God, as well because it is a species of sadness, as also because it involves a change of will.
Moreover, without an error of the intellectual faculty, it is impossible for
good to be mistaken for evil. And only in respect of private advantages is it possible
for the loss of one being to be the gain of another. But to the general good nothing
is lost by the good of any private member; but every private good goes to fill in
the public good.
It is part of the same procedure to be sad at good and to desire evil. Such sadness arises from good being accounted evil: such desire, from evil being accounted good. Now Anger is desire of the evil of another for vengeance’ sake. Anger then is far from God by reason of its species, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also because it is a desire of vengeance, conceived for sadness at an injury done one.
CHAPTER XC—That there is in God Delight and Joy
THERE are some passions which, though they do not befit God as passions, nevertheless,
so far as their specific nature is considered, do not involve anything inconsistent
with divine perfection. Of the number of these is Delight and Joy. Joy is of present
good. Neither by reason of its object, which is good, nor by reason of the relation
in which the object, good actually possessed, stands to the subject, does joy specifically
contain anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Hence it is manifest that
joy or Delight has being properly in God. For as good and evil apprehended is the
object of the sensitive appetite, so also is it of the intellectual appetite, or
will. It is the ordinary function of both appetites to pursue good and to shun evil,
either real or apparent, except that the object of the intellectual appetite is
wider than that of the sensitive, inasmuch as the intellectual appetite regards
good and evil simply, while the sensitive appetite regards good and evil felt by
sense; as also the object of intellect is wider than the object of sense. But the
activities of appetite are specified by their objects. There exist therefore in
the intellectual appetite, or will, activities specifically similar to the activities
of the sensitive appetite, and differing only in this, that in the sensitive appetite
they are passions on account of the implication of a bodily organ, but in the intellectual
appetite they are simple activities.
2. Joy and Delight are a sort of rest of the will in its object. But God
3. Delight is the perfection of activity, perfecting activity as bloom does youth.
4. Everything naturally feels joy over what is like itself, except accidentally, inasmuch as the likeness hinders one’s own gain, and ‘two of a trade’ quarrel. But every good thing is some likeness of the divine goodness, and nothing is lost to God by the good of His creature. Therefore God rejoices in good everywhere.
Joy and Delight differ in our consideration: for Delight arises out of good really
conjoined with the subject; while Joy does not require this real conjunction, but
the mere resting of the will on an agreeable object is sufficient for it.
CHAPTER XCI—That there is Love in God.
IT is of the essential idea of love, that whoever loves wishes the good of the object loved. But God wishes His own good and the good of other beings (Chap. LXXV); and in this respect He loves Himself and other beings.
2. It is a requisite of true love to love the good of another inasmuch as it is his good. But God loves the good of every being as it is the good of that being, though He does also subordinate one being to the profit of another.
3. The essential idea of love seems to be this, that the affection of one tends to another as to a being who is in some way one with himself. The greater the bond of union, the more intense is the love. And again the more intimately bound up with the lover the bond of union is, the stronger the love. But that bond whereby all things are united with God, namely, His goodness, of which all things are imitations, is to God the greatest and most intimate of bonds, seeing that He is Himself His own goodness. There is therefore in God a love, not only true, but most perfect and strong.
But some might be of opinion that God does not love one object more than another;
for a higher and a lower degree of intensity of affection is characteristic of a
changeable nature, and cannot be attributed to God, from whom all change is utterly
removed. Besides, wherever else there is mention of any divine activity, there is
no question of more and less: thus one thing is not known by God more than another.
In answer to this difficulty we must observe that whereas other activities of the
soul are concerned with one object only, love alone seems to tend to two. For love
wishes something to somebody: hence the things that we desire, we are properly said
to ‘desire,’ not to ‘love,’ but in them we rather love ourselves for whom we desire
them. Every divine act then is of one and the same intensity; but love may be said to admit of ‘greater
Hence it appears that of our affections there is none that can properly be in
God except joy and love, though even these are in Him not by way of passion, as
they are in us. That there is in God joy or delight is confirmed by the authority
of Holy Scripture. I was delighted day by day playing before him, says the
Divine Wisdom, which is God (
But even other affections (affectiones), which
are specifically inconsistent with divine perfection, are predicated in Holy Writ
of God, not properly but metaphorically, on account of likeness of effects. Thus
sometimes the will in following out the order of wisdom tends to the same effect
to which one might be inclined by a passion, which would argue a certain imperfection:
for the judge punishes from a sense of justice, as an angry man under the promptings
of anger. So sometimes God is said to be ‘angry,’ inasmuch as in the order of His
wisdom He means to punish some one: When his anger shall blaze out suddenly
(
CHAPTER XCII—In what sense Virtues can be posited in God
AS the divine goodness comprehends within itself in a certain way all goodnesses, and virtue is a sort of goodness, the divine goodness must contain all virtues after a manner proper to itself. But no virtue is predicated as an attribute of God after the manner of a habit, as virtues are in us. For it does not befit God to be good by anything superadded to Him, but only by His essence, since He is absolutely simple. Nor again does He act by anything superadded to His essence, as His essence is His being (Chap. XLV). Virtue therefore in God is not any habit, but His own essence.
2. A habit is an imperfect actuality, half-way between potentiality and
Since human virtues are for the guidance of human life, and human life is twofold,
contemplative and active, the virtues of the active life, inasmuch as they perfect
this present life, cannot be attributed to God: for the active life of man consists
in the use of material goods, which are not assignable to God. Again, these virtues
perfect human conduct in political society: hence they do not seem much to concern
those who keep aloof from political society: much less can they befit God, whose
conversation and life is far removed from the manner and custom of human life.
CHAPTER XCIII—That in God there are the Virtues which regulate Action
THERE are virtues directing the active life of man, which are not concerned with passions, but with actions, as truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, art. Since virtue is specified by its object, and the actions which are the objects of these virtues are not inconsistent with the divine perfection, neither is there in such virtues, specifically considered, anything to exclude them from the perfection of God.
3. Of things that come to have being from God, the proper plan of them all is
in the divine understanding (Chap. LXVI). But the plan of a thing to
be made in the mind of the maker is Art: hence the Philosopher says that Art is
“the right notion of things to be made.” There is therefore properly Art in God,
and therefore it is said: Wisdom, artificer of all, taught me (
4. Again, the divine will, in things outside God, is determined by His knowledge
(Chap. LXXXII). But knowledge directing the will to act is Prudence:
because, according to the Philosopher, Prudence is “the right notion of things to
be done.” There is therefore Prudence in God; and hence it is said: With him
is prudence (
5. From the fact of God wishing anything, He wishes the requisites of that thing.
But the points requisite to the perfection of each several thing are due to that
thing: there is therefore in God Justice, the function of which is to distribute
to each his own. Hence it is said: The Lord is just, and hath loved justice
(
6. As shown above (Chapp. LXXIV, LXXV), the last end,
for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on the means to that
end, neither in point of being nor in point of well-being. Hence God does not wish
to communicate His goodness for any gain that may accrue to Himself thereby, but
simply because the mere communication befits Him as the fountain of goodness. But
to give, not from any advantage expected from the gift, but out of sheer goodness
and the fitness of giving, is an act of Liberality. God therefore is in the highest
degree liberal;
7. All things that receive being from God, necessarily bear His likeness, in
so far as they are, and are good, and have their proper archetypes in the divine
understanding (Chap. LIV). But this belongs to the virtue of Truth,
that every one should manifest himself in his deeds and words for such as he really
is. There is therefore in God the virtue of Truth.
In point of exchange, the proper act of commutative justice, justice does not
befit God, since He receives no advantage from any one; hence, Who hath first
given to him, and recompense shall be made him? (
To judge of things to be done, or to give a thing, or make a distribution, is not
proper to man alone, but belongs to any and every intellectual being. Inasmuch therefore
as the aforesaid actions are considered in their generality, they have their apt
place even in divinity: for as man is the distributer of human goods, as of money
or honour, so is God of all the goods of the universe. The aforesaid virtues therefore
are of wider extension in God than in man: for as the justice of man is to a city
or family, so is the justice of God to the entire universe: hence the divine virtues
are said to be archetypes of ours. But other virtues, which do not properly become
God, have no archetype in the divine nature, but only, as is the case with corporeal
things generally, in the divine wisdom, which contains the proper notions of all
things.
CHAPTER XCIV—That the Contemplative (Intellectual) Virtues are in God
IF Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the highest causes; and God chiefly knows
Himself, and knows nothing except by knowing Himself, as the first cause of all
(Chap. XLVI), it is evident that Wisdom ought to be attributed to God
in the first place. Hence it is said: He is wise of heart (
2. If Knowledge (Science) is an acquaintance with a thing through its proper
cause, and God knows the order of all causes and effects, and thereby the several
proper causes of individual things (Chapp. LXV, LXVII),
it is manifest that Knowledge (Science) is properly in God; hence God is the
Lord of sciences (
3. If the immaterial cognition of things, attained without discussion, is
CHAPTER XCV—That God cannot will Evil
EVERY act of God is an act of virtue, since Ills virtue is His essence (Chap. XCII).
2. The will cannot will evil except by some error coming to be in the reason,
at least in the matter of the particular choice there and then made. For as the
object of the will is good, apprehended as such, the will cannot tend to evil unless
evil be somehow proposed to it as good; and that cannot be without error.
3. God is the sovereign good, admitting no intermixture of evil (Chap. LXI).
4. Evil cannot befall the will except by its being turned away from its end. But
the divine will cannot be turned away from its end, being unable to will except
by willing itself (Chap. LXXV). It cannot therefore will evil; and thus
free will in it is naturally established in good. This is the meaning of the texts:
God is faithful and without iniquity (
CHAPTER XCVI—That God hates nothing
AS love is to good, so is hatred to evil; we wish good to them whom we love, and evil to them whom we hate. If then the will of God cannot be inclined to evil, as has been shown (Chap. XCV), it is impossible for Him to hate anything.
2. The will of God tends to things other than Himself inasmuch as, by willing and loving His own being and goodness, He wishes it to be diffused as far as is possible by communication of His likeness. This then is what God wills in beings other than Himself, that there be in them the likeness of His goodness. Therefore God wills the good of everything, and hates nothing.
4. What is found naturally in all active causes, must be found especially in
the Prime Agent. But all agents in their own way love the effects which they themselves
produce, as parents their children, poets their own poems, craftsmen their works.
Much more therefore is God removed from hating anything, seeing that He is cause
of all.
Hence it is said: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing of the
things that Thou hast made (
Some things however God is said, to hate figuratively (similitudinarie),
and that in two ways. The first way is this, that God, in loving things and willing
their good to be, wills their evil not to be: hence He is said to have hatred of
evils, for the things we wish not to be we are said to hate. So it is said: Think
no evil in your hearts every one of you against his friend, and love no lying oath:
for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord (
CHAPTER XCVII—That God is Living
IT has been shown that God is intelligent and willing: but to understand and will are functions of a living being only.
2. Life is attributed to beings inasmuch as they appear to move of themselves,
and not to be moved by another. Therefore things that seem to move of themselves,
the moving powers of which the vulgar do not perceive, are figuratively said to
live, as we speak of the ‘living’ (running) water of a flowing stream, but not so
of a cistern or stagnant pool; and we call ‘quicksilver’ that which seems to have
a motion of its own. This is mere popular speech, for properly those things alone
move of themselves, which do so by virtue of their composition of a moving force
and matter moved, as things with souls; hence these alone are properly said to live:
3. The divine being contains the perfection of all being (Chap. XXVIII). But living is perfect being; hence animate things in the scale of being take precedence of inanimate. With God then to be is to live.
This too is confirmed by authority
of divine Scripture: I will raise to heaven my hand, and swear by my right hand,
and say: I live for ever (
CHAPTER XCVIII—That God is His own Life
IN living things, to live is to be: for a living thing is said to be alive inasmuch
as it has a soul; and by that soul, as by its own proper form, it has being: living
in fact is nothing else than living being, arising out of a living form.
2. To understand is to live: but God is His own act of understanding (Chap. XLV).
3. If God is living, there must be life in Him. If then He is not His own life,
there will be something in Him that is not Himself,
And this is the text: I am life ( This text may be not so immediately applicable as it seems, if it be the utterance,
not of God as God, ad intra, but of God made Man, communicator of a divine
life to His elect, ad extra. See my notes on Be that application as it may, the conclusion of this chapter, and so many similar
conclusions in this book, amount to this: that God is one self-conscious act, the
realisation of the whole ideal order, of life, of wisdom, of power, of goodness,
of necessary being, — what Plato was groping after (
CHAPTER XCIX—That the Life of God is everlasting
IT is impossible for God to cease to live, since Himself He is His own life (Chap. XCVIII).
2. Everything that at one time is and at another time is not, has existence through some cause. But the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine being. God is therefore not at one time living and at another not living, but always lives.
3. In every activity the agent remains, although sometimes the activity passes in succession: hence in motion the moving body remains the same in subject throughout the whole course of the motion, although not the same in our consideration. Where then the action is the agent himself, nothing there can pass in succession, but all must be together at once. But God’s act of understanding and living is God Himself (Chapp. XLV, XCVIII): therefore His life has no succession, but is all together at once, and everlasting.
Hence it is said: This is the true God and life everlasting (
HAPPINESS is the proper good of every intellectual nature. Since then God is an intellectual being, happiness will be His proper good. But God in regard of His proper good is not as a being that is still tending to a proper good not yet possessed: that is the way with a nature changeable and in potentiality; but God is in the position of a being that already possesses its proper good. Therefore He not only desires happiness, as we do, but is in the enjoyment of happiness.
2. The thing above all others desired or willed by an intellectual nature is
the most perfect thing in that nature, and that is its happiness. But the most perfect
thing in each is its most perfect activity: for power and habit are perfected by
activity: hence the Philosopher says that happiness is a perfect activity.
3. Boethius says that happiness is a state made perfect by a gathering of all good things. But such is the divine perfection, which includes all perfection in one single view (Chapp. XXVIII, LIV).
4. He is happy, who is sufficient for himself and wants nothing. But God has no need of other things, seeing that His perfection depends on nothing external to Himself; and when He wills other things for Himself as for an end, it is not that He needs them, but only that this reference befits His goodness.
5. It is impossible for God to wish for anything impossible (Chap. LXXXIV). Again it is impossible for anything to come in to Him which as yet He has not, seeing that He is nowise in potentiality (Chap. XVI). Therefore He cannot wish to have what He has not: therefore He has whatever He wishes; and He wishes nothing evil (Chap. XCV). Therefore He is happy, according to the definition given by some, that “he is happy who has what he wishes and wishes nothing evil.”
His happiness the Holy Scriptures declare: Whom he will show in his own time,
the blessed and powerful one (
CHAPTER CI—That God Is His own Happiness
GOD’S happiness is the act of His understanding (Chap. C). But that very act of God’s understanding is His substance (Chap. XLV). He therefore is His own happiness.
CHAPTER CII—That the Happiness of God is most perfect, and exceeds all other happiness
WHERE there is greater love, there is greater delight in the attainment of the object loved. But every being, other things being equal, loves itself more than it loves anything else: a sign of which is that, the nearer anything is to oneself, the more it is naturally loved. God therefore takes greater delight in His happiness, which is Himself, than other blessed ones in their happiness, which is not what they are.
3. What is by essence, ranks above what is by participation. But God is happy by His essence, a prerogative that can belong to no other: for nothing else but God can be the sovereign good; and thus whatever else is happy must be happy by participation from Him. The divine happiness therefore exceeds all other happiness.
4. Perfect happiness consists in an act of the understanding. But no other act
of understanding can compare with God’s act: as is clear, not only from this that
it is a subsistent act,
5. The more a thing is brought to unity, the more perfect is its power and excellence. But an activity that works in succession, is divided by different divisions of time: in no way then can its perfection be compared to the perfection of an activity that is without succession, all present together, especially if it does not pass in an instant but abides to eternity. Now the divine act of understanding is without succession, existing all together for eternity: whereas our act of understanding is in succession by the accidental attachment to it of continuity and time. Therefore the divine happiness infinitely exceeds human happiness, as the duration of eternity exceeds the ‘now in flux’ of time (nunc temporis fluens).
6. The fatigue and various occupations whereby our contemplation in this life is necessarily interrupted, — in which contemplation whatever happiness there is for man in this life chiefly consists, — and the errors and doubts and various mishaps to which the present life is subject, show that human happiness, in this life particularly, can in no way compare with the happiness of God.
7. The perfection of the divine happiness may be gathered from this, that it embraces all happinesses according to the most perfect mode of each. By way of contemplative happiness, it has a perfect and perpetual view of God Himself and of other beings. By way of active life, it has the government, not of one man, or of one house, or of one city, or of one kingdom, but of the whole universe. Truly, the false happiness of earth is but a shadow of that perfect happiness. For it consists, according to Boethius, in five things, in pleasure, riches, power, dignity and fame. God then has a most excellent delight of Himself, and a universal joy of all good things, without admixture of contrary element. For riches, He has absolute self-sufficiency of all good. For power, He has infinite might. For dignity, He has primacy and rule over all beings. For fame, He has the admiration of every understanding that in any sort knows Him.
To Him then, who is singularly blessed, be honour and glory
for ever and ever, Amen.
CHAPTER BOOK II
GOD THE ORIGIN OF CREATURES
CHAPTER I—Connexion of what follows with what has gone before.
THERE can be no perfect knowledge of anything unless its activity be known: for
from the mode of activity proper to a thing, and the species to which it belongs,
the measure and quality of its power is estimated; and the power shows the nature
of the thing, for each thing is naturally active according to the nature with which
it is actually endowed.
CHAPTER IV—That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Creatures from Different Standpoints
HUMAN philosophy considers creatures as they are in themselves: hence we find
different divisions of philosophy according to the different classes of things.
But Christian faith considers them, not in themselves, but inasmuch as they represent
the majesty of God, and in one way or another are directed to God, as it is said:
Of the glory of the Lord his work is full: hath not the Lord made his saints
to tell of his wonders? (
CHAPTER V—Order of Matters to be Treated
THE order of our treatise will be to deal first with the production and bringing of things into being (Chapp VI-XXXVIII); secondly with the distinction of things (Chapp. XXXIX-XLV); thirdly, with the nature of things thus produced and distinct so far as it appertains to the truth of faith (Chapp. XLVI-CI).
CHAPTER VI—That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence
IN inferior agents it is a sign of attained perfection, when they can produce their own likeness. But God is sovereignly perfect (B.I. Chap. XXVIII). Therefore it belongs to Him to make some being like Himself in actual existence.
6. The more perfect any principle of activity is, the wider its sphere of action. But that pure actuality, which is God, is more perfect than actuality mingled with potentiality, such as is in us. Now actuality is the principle of action. Since then by the actuality which is in us, we are not only capable of immanent acts, such as understanding and willing, but also of acts tending to exterior things and productive of effects, much more can God, by virtue of His actuality, not only understand and will, but also produce an effect.
Hence it is said: Who maketh great and wonderful and inscrutable
works without number (
CHAPTER VII—That there is in God Active Power
AS passive power, or passivity, follows upon being in potentiality, so active power follows upon being in actuality; for everything acts by being in actuality, and is acted upon by being in potentiality. But it belongs to God to be in actuality; and therefore there is suitably ascribed to Him active power, but not passive power.
Hence it is said: Thou art powerful, O Lord (
CHAPTER VIII—That God’s Power is His Substance
ACTIVE power belongs to the perfection of a thing. But every divine perfection is contained in God’s own being (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). God’s power therefore is not different from his being. But God is His own being (B. I, Chap. XXII); He is therefore His own power.
4. In things the powers of which are not their substance, the said powers are
accidents.
CHAPTER IX—That God’s Power is His Action
GOD’S power is His substance, as has been shown in the previous chapter: also
His action is His substance, as has been shown of His intellectual activity (B.
I, Chap. XLV), and the same argument holds of His other activities.
Therefore in God power and action are not two different things.
2. The action of any being is a complement of its power; for it stands to power
as the second actuality to the first.
4. Any action that is not the agent’s very substance is in the agent as an accident in its subject. But in God there can be nothing accidental. Therefore in God His action is none other than His substance and His power.
CHAPTER X—In what manner Power is said to be in God
SINCE the divine action is nothing else than the divine power, it is manifest
that power is not said to be in God as a principle of His action (for nothing is
the principle of itself), but as a principle of the thing made or done: also that
when power is said to be in God in respect of the things made or done by Him, this
is a predication of objective fact: but when it is said to be in Him in respect
of His own action, such predication regards only our way of viewing things, inasmuch
as our understanding views under two different concepts God’s power and God’s action.
CHAPTER XI—That something is predicated of God in relation to Creatures
SINCE power is proper to God in respect of the effects of His production, and power ranks as a principle, and a principle is so called in relation to its derivative; it is clear that something may be predicated of God in relation to the effects of His production.
2. It is unintelligible how one thing can be made a subject of predication in relation to another thing, unless contrariwise the other thing be made a subject of predication in relation to it. But other beings are made subjects of predication in relation to God, as when it is said that they have their being from God and depend on Him. God therefore must be made a subject of predication in relation to creatures.
3. Likeness is a relation. But God, as other agents, acts to the production of His own likeness.
4. Knowledge is predicated in relation to the thing known. But God has knowledge of other beings.
5. Whatever is first and sovereign, is so in relation to others, But God is the first being and the sovereign good.
CHAPTER XII—That the Relations, predicated of God in regard to Creatures, are not really
in God
THESE relations cannot be in God as accidents in a subject, seeing that in God there is no accident (B. I, Chap XXIII). Nor again can they be in the very substance of God: for then the substance of God in its very essence would be referred to another; but what is referred to another for its very essence, in a manner depends on that other, as it can neither be nor be understood without it; but this would make the substance of God dependent on another being, foreign to itself.
2. God is the first measure of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). He is to them as the object is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. But though the object is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the object known, but only in the knowledge of it. The object is said to be in relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.
3. The aforesaid relations are predicated of God, not only in respect of things
that actually are, but also in respect of things that potentially are, because of
them also He has knowledge, and in respect of them He is called both first being
and sovereign good. But what actually is bears no real relation to what is not actually
but potentially. Now God is not otherwise related to things that actually are than
to things that potentially are, because he is not changed by producing anything. This
doctrine is not devoid of difficulties. Love and hatred are certain relative affections. Can it be then that God has no more love for me, now that He has created me, than
He would have had for me as a mere possible creature never to be realised? no more
hatred of the sin that I have committed than of the sin that I might commit? Not
so, for God loves more where He sees more of His own, and hates more that which
is in greater opposition to Himself. There is more of God in an existing reality
than in a possible one; and sin is in greater opposition to God for being actually
committed. Hence greater love and greater hatred. Is not God then more closely related
to actualities than to potentialities? But, St Thomas would contend, the relation,
even though closer, still remains conceptual. God is not really affected by my existing,
or by anything of my doing.
4. To whatsoever is added anything fresh, the thing receiving that addition must
be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now sundry fresh relations are predicated
of God, as that He is lord or ruler of this thing newly come into being. If then
any relation were predicated as really existing in God, it would follow that something
fresh was added to God, and therefore that He had suffered some change, either essential
or accidental, contrary to what was shown above (B. I, Chapp. XXIII,
XXIV)
CHAPTER XIII—How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God
IT cannot be said that the aforesaid relations are things existing outside of
God.
Hence it is also clear that the aforesaid relations are not predicated of God in the same way that other things are predicated of God: for all other things, as wisdom or will, are predicated of His essence, while the aforesaid relations are by no means so predicated, but only according to our mode of thought. And yet our thought is not at fault: for, by the very fact of our mind knowing that the relations of effects of divine power have God himself for their term it predicates some things of Him relatively.
CHAPTER XIV—That the Predication of many Relations of God is no prejudice to the Simplicity and Singleness of His Being
IT is no prejudice to the simplicity of God’s being that many relations are predicated
of Him, not as denoting anything affecting His essence, but according to our mode
of thought. For our mind, understanding many things, may very well be related in
manifold ways to a being that is in itself
CHAPTER XV—That God is to all things the Cause of their being
HAVING shown (Chap VI) that God is to some things the cause of their
being, we must further show that nothing out of God has being except of Him. Every
attribute that attaches to anything otherwise than as constituting its essence,
attaches to it through some cause, as whiteness to man.
2. What belongs to a thing by its nature, and is not dependent on any causation
from without, cannot suffer diminution or defect. For if anything essential is withdrawn
from or added to nature, that nature, so increased or diminished, will give place
to another. If on the other hand the nature is left entire, and something else is
found to have suffered diminution, it is clear that what has been so diminished
does not absolutely depend on that nature, but on some other cause, by removal of
which it is diminished. Whatever property therefore attaches to a thing less in
one instance than in others, does not attach to that thing in mere virtue of its
nature, but from the concurrence of some other cause. The cause of all effects in
a particular kind will be that whereof the kind is predicated to the utmost. Thus
we see that the hottest body is the cause of heat in all hot bodies, and the brightest
body the cause of brightness in all bright bodies. But God is in the highest degree
‘being’ (B. I, Chap. XIII). He then is the cause of all things whereof
‘being’ is predicated.
3. The order of causes must answer to the order of effects, since effects are proportionate to their causes. Hence, as special effects are traced to special causes, so any common feature of those special effects must be traced to some common cause. Thus, over and above the particular causes of this or that generation, the sun is the universal cause of all generation; and the king is the universal cause of government in his kingdom, over the officials of the kingdom, and also over the officials of individual cities. But being is common to all things. There must then be over all causes some Cause to whom it belongs to give being.
4. What is by essence, is the cause of all that is by participation, as fire is the cause of all things fiery, as such. But God is being by His essence because He is pure being; while every other being is being by participation, because there can only be one being that is its own existence (B. I, Chapp. XXII, XLII). God therefore is cause of being to all other beings.
5. Everything that is possible to be and not to be, has some cause: because,
looked at by itself, it is indifferent either way; and thus there must be something
else that determines it one way. Hence, as a process to infinity is impossible,
there must be some necessary being that is cause of all things which are possible
to be and not to be.
6. God in His actuality and perfection includes the perfections of all things (B. I, Chap. XXVIII); and thus He is virtually all. He is therefore the apt producing cause of all.
This conclusion is confirmed by divine authority: for it is said: Who made
heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are therein (
CHAPTER XVI—That God has brought things into being out of nothing
TO every effect produced by God there is either something pre-existent or not. If not, the thesis stands, that God produces some effect out of nothing pre-existent. If anything pre-exists, we either have a process to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to something primitive, which does not presuppose anything else previous to it. Now this primitive something cannot be God Himself, for God is not the material out of which anything is made (B. I, Chap. XVI): nor can it be any other being, distinct from God and uncaused by God (Chap. XV).
3. The more universal the effect, the higher the cause: for the higher the cause,
the wider its range of efficiency. Now being is more universal than motion. Therefore
above any cause that acts only by moving and transmitting must be that cause which
is the first principle of being; and that we have shown to be God (B. I, Chap.
XIII). God therefore does not act merely by moving and transmuting:
whereas every cause that can only bring things into
4. It is not proper to the universal cause of being, as such, to act only by movement and change: for not by movement and change is being, as such, made out of not-being, as such, but ‘being this’ is made out of ‘not being this.’ But God is the universal principle of being (Chap. XV). Therefore it is not proper to Him to act only by movement or change, or to need pre-existent material to make anything.
5. Every agent has a term of action like itself, for its acts inasmuch as it
is in actuality. Given then an agent in actuality by some form inherent in it, and
not to the whole extent of its substance,
10. Between actuality and potentiality such an order obtains, that, though in
one and the same being, which is sometimes in potentiality sometimes in actuality,
potentiality is prior in time to actuality (although actuality is prior in nature),
yet, absolutely speaking, actuality must be prior to potentiality, as is clear from
this, that potentiality is not reduced to actuality except by some actual being.
But matter is being in potentiality.
This truth divine Scripture confirms, saying: In the beginning God created
heaven and earth (
Hereby is confuted the error of the ancient philosophers, who supposed no cause
at all for matter, since in the actions of particular agents they always saw some
matter pre-existent to every action. Hence they took up the common opinion, that
nothing is made out of nothing, which indeed is true of the actions of particular
agents. But they had not yet arrived at a knowledge of the universal agent, the
active cause of all being, whose causative action does not necessarily suppose any
pre-existent material.
CHAPTER XVII—That Creation is not a Movement nor a Change
EVERY movement or change is the actualisation of something that was in potentiality, as such: but in this action of creation there is nothing pre-existent in potentiality to become the object of the action.
2. The extremes of movement or change fall under the same order,
3. In every change or movement there must be something coming to be otherwise than as it was before. But where the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there cannot be any permanent residuum, now in this condition, now in that: because such a residuum would not be produced, but presupposed to production.
CHAPTER XVIII—Solution of Arguments against Creation
HENCE appears the futility of arguments against creation drawn from the nature
of movement or change, — as that creation must be in some subject, or that non-being
must be transmuted into being: for creation is not a change, but is the mere dependence
of created being on the principle by which it is set up, and so comes under the
category of relation: hence the subject of creation may very well be said
to be the thing created.
CHAPTER XIX—That Creation is not Successive
SUCCESSION is proper to movement. But creation is not movement. Therefore there is in it no succession.
2. In every successive movement there is some medium between the extremes. But between being and not-being, which are the extremes in creation, there can be no medium, and therefore no succession.
3. In every making, in which there is succession, the process of being made is
before the state of achieved completion. But this cannot happen in creation, because,
for the process of being made to precede the achieved completion of the creature,
there would be required some subject in which the process might take place. Such
a subject cannot be the creature itself, of whose creation we are speaking, because
that creature is not till the state of its achieved completion is realised.
Nor can it be the Maker, because to be in movement is an actuality, not of mover,
but of moved. And as for the process of being made having for its subject any pre-existing
material, that
5. Successive stages in the making of things become necessary, owing to defect of the matter, which is not sufficiently disposed from the first for the reception of the form. Hence, when the matter is already perfectly disposed for the form, it receives it in an instant. Thus because a transparent medium is always in final disposition for light, it lights up at once in the presence of any actually shining thing. Now in creation nothing is prerequisite on the part of the matter, nor is anything wanting to the agent for action. It follows that creation takes place in an instant: a thing is at once in the act of being created and is created, as light is at once being shed and is shining.
CHAPTER XXI—That it belongs to God alone to create
SINCE the order of actions is according to the order of agents, and the action is nobler of the nobler agent, the first and highest action must be proper to the first and highest agent. But creation is the first and highest action, presupposing no other, and in all others presupposed. Therefore creation is the proper action of God alone, who is the highest agent.
2. Nothing else is the universal cause of being but God (Chap. XV).
3. Effects answer proportionally to their causes. Thus actual effects we attribute
to actual causes, potential effects to potential causes, particular effects to particular
causes, and universal effects to universal causes. Now the first thing caused is
‘being,’ as we see by its presence in all things. Therefore the proper cause of
‘being,’ simply as such, is the first and universal agent, which is God. Other agents
are not causes of ‘being,’ simply as such, but causes of ‘being this,’ as ‘man’
or ‘white’: but ‘being,’ simply as such, is caused by creation, which presupposes
nothing, because nothing can be outside of the extension of ‘being,’ simply as such.
Other productions result in ‘being this,’ or ‘being of this quality’: for out of
pre-existent being is made ‘being this,’ or ‘being of this quality.’ τόδε τι, or τοιόνδε τι, as Aristotle would say, the former expressing
some particular substance, as ‘this steam,’ the latter some particular quality,
as ‘the whiteness of these washed garments.’ The argument lies open to this difficulty. — Effects answer proportionally to
their causes: but ‘being, simply as such,’ is an abstract effect: therefore it answers
to an abstract cause: which argues the Creator to be an abstract Being: now abstract
Being is mere mental fiction. — St Thomas would not admit this Nominalist position,
that abstract Being is mere mental fiction. Force, Energy, Work, Life, surely are
not mere mental fictions, and yet they are abstract beings. Abstract Being does
not exist as abstract: it is a reality in these and these particulars. St Thomas,
in one place, if indeed the argument is really his, calls God an abstract Being:
see B. I, Chap. XLII, n. 13, with note. He means that God is a Being of ideal perfection.
God is ideal Being, actualised: He is the actuality of ideality. To say that God gives being to things is by no
means to deny that He gives also particular determinations
of being. The first being was created under certain
particular determinations. Once created, created agents
act and react, modifying these determinations. But
Being, as such, they can neither give nor take away.
They can neither create nor annihilate anything.
Matter is indestructible; and the light of intelligence,
once kindled by the Creator’s touch, burns for eternity.
6. Every agent that acts as an instrument completes the action of the principal
agent by some action proper and connatural to itself, as a saw operates to the making
of a stool by cutting. If then there be any nature that operates to creation as
an instrument of the prime creator, this being must operate through some action
due and proper to its own nature. Now the effect answering to the proper action
of an instrument is prior in the way of production to the effect answering to the
principal agent; hence it is that the final end answers to the principal agent:
Hereby is destroyed the error of certain philosophers, who said that God created the first spirit, and by it was created the second, and so in order to the last.
CHAPTER XXII—That God is Almighty
AS creation is the work of God alone, so whatever beings are producible only
by creation must be immediately produced by Him. Such are all spirits,
2. Every perfect active power is co-extensive with and covers all cases of its own proper effect: thus perfect building power would extend to everything that could be called a house. But the divine power is of itself the cause of being, and being is its proper effect. Therefore that power extends to all things that are not inconsistent with the idea of being: for if the divine power were available only for one particular effect, it would not be the ordinary cause of being, as such, but cause of ‘this being.’ Now what is inconsistent with the idea of ‘being’ is the opposite of ‘being,’ which is ‘not-being.’ God then can do all things that do not include in themselves the element of not-being, that is to say, that do not involve a contradiction.
3. Every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. According then to the mode of actuality of each agent in the mode of its active power. Now God is perfect actuality, having in Himself the perfections of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII): therefore His active power extends to all things that are not inconsistent with actual being.
5. There are three ways in which an effect may not be in the power of an agent.
In one way, because it has no affinity or likeness to the agent, for every agent
acts to the production of its own likeness somehow:
This also is taught by divine Scripture as a tenet of faith. I am God Almighty,
walk before me and be perfect (
Hereby is excluded the error of sundry philosophers, who have laid it down that
God can do nothing except according to the course of nature. On such it is said:
As though the Almighty had no power, they reckoned of him (
CHAPTER XXIII—That God’s Action in Creation is not of Physical Necessity, but of Free Choice of Will
THE power of every necessary agent is determined and limited to one effect. That
is the reason why all physical effects always come out in the same way, unless there
be some interference: but acts of the will not so. But the divine power is not directed
to one effect only (Chap. XXII). God then does not act by physical necessity,
but by will.
2. Whatever does not involve a contradiction, is within the range of the divine
power. But many things that do not exist in creation would still involve no contradiction
if they did exist. This is most evidently the case in regard of the number and size
and distances of the stars and other bodies. They would present no contradiction,
no intrinsic absurdity, if they were arranged on another plan. Many things therefore
lie within the range of divine power, that are not found in nature. But whoever
does some and leaves out others of the things that he can do, acts by choice of
will and not by physical necessity.
4. Since God’s action is His substance (B. I, Chap. LXXIII), the divine action cannot come under the category of those acts that are ‘transient’ and not in the agent, but must be an act ‘immanent’ in the agent, such as are acts of knowing and desiring, and none other. God therefore acts and operates by knowing and willing.
6. A self-determined agent is prior to an agent determined from without: for all that is determined from without is reducible to what is self-determined, or we should have process to infinity. But he who is not master of his own action is not self-determined: for he acts as led by another, not as his own leader. The prime agent then must act in such a way as to remain master of his own action. But no one is master of his own action except he be a voluntary agent.
7. Will-action is naturally prior to physical action: for that is naturally prior
which is more perfect, albeit in the individual it be posterior in time. But will-action
is the more perfect, as within our experience voluntary agents
8. Where will-action and physical action go together, will-action represents the higher power and uses the other as an instrument. But the divine power is supreme, and therefore must act by will-action, not under physical necessity.
This truth also divine Scripture teaches us. All things, whatsoever he hath
willed, the Lord hath done (
CHAPTER XXIV—That God acts by His Wisdom
THE will is moved by some apprehension.
2. Every agent acts in so far as it has within it something corresponding to the effect to be produced. But in every voluntary agent, as such, what corresponds to the effect to be produced is some intellectual presentation of the same. Were there no more than a mere physical disposition to produce the effect, the agent could act only to one effect, because for one physical cause there is only one physical mode of operation (ratio naturalis unius est una tantum). Every voluntary agent therefore produces its effect according to the mode of intellectual operation proper to itself. But God acts by willing, and therefore it is by the wisdom of His intellect that he brings things into being.
3. The function of wisdom is to set things in order. Now the setting of things
in order can be effected only through a knowledge of the relation and proportion
of the said things to one another, and to some higher thing which is the end and
purpose of them all: for the mutual order of things to one another is founded upon
their order to the end which they are to serve. But it is proper to intelligence
alone to know the mutual relations and proportions of things. Again, it is proper
to wisdom to judge of things as they stand to their highest cause.
All this is confirmed by divine authority, for it is said: Thou has made
Hereby is excluded the error of some who said that all things depend on the absolute will of God, independent of any reason.
CHAPTER XXV—In what sense some things are said to be Impossible to the Almighty
IN God there is active power, but no potentiality. Now possibility is spoken of both as involving active power and as involving potentiality. Those things then are impossible to God, the possibility of which would mean in Him potentiality. Examples: God cannot be any material thing: He cannot suffer change, nor defect, nor fatigue, nor forgetfulness, nor defeat, nor violence, nor repentance, anger, or sadness.
Again, since the object and effect of active power is some produced reality,
it must be said to be impossible for God to make or produce anything inconsistent
with the notion of ‘reality,’ or ‘being,’ as such, or inconsistent with the notion
of a reality that is ‘made,’ or ‘produced,’ inasmuch as it is ‘made,’ or ‘produced.’
Examples: God cannot make one and the same thing together to be and not to be. He
cannot make opposite attributes to be in the same subject in the same respect. He
cannot make a thing wanting in any of its essential constituents, while the thing
itself remains: for instance, a man without a soul.
CHAPTER XXVI—That the Divine Understanding is not limited to certain fixed Effects
NOW that it has been shown (Chap. XXIII) that the divine power does not act of physical necessity, but by understanding and will, lest any one should think that God’s understanding or knowledge extend only to certain fixed effects, and that thus God acts under stress of ignorance, though not under stress of physical constraint, it remains to show that His knowledge or understanding is bounded by no limits in its view of effects.
2. We have shown above (B. I, Chap. XLIII) the infinity of the divine
essence. Now the plane of the infinite can never be reached by any piling up of
finite quantities, because the infinite infinitely transcends any finite quantities
however many, even though they were infinite in number.
4. If the causality of the divine understanding were limited, as a necessary agent, to any effects, it would be to those effects which God actually brings into being. But it has been shown above (B. I, Chap. LXVI) that God understands even things that neither are nor shall be nor have been.
5. The divine knowledge stands to the things produced by God as the knowledge of an artist to the knowledge of his art. But every art extends to all that can possibly be contained under the kind of things subject to that art, as the art of building to all houses. But the kind of thing subject to the divine art is ‘being’ (genus subjectum divinae artis est ens), since God by His understanding is the universal principal of being (Chapp. XXI, XXIV). Therefore the divine understanding extends its causality to all things that are not inconsistent with the notion of ‘being,’ and is not limited to certain fixed effects.
Hence it is said: Great is our Lord, and great his power,
and of his wisdom; there is no reckoning by number (
Hereby is excluded the position of some philosophers who said
that from God’s understanding of Himself there emanates a certain arrangement of
things in the universe, as though He did not deal with creatures at His discretion
fixing the limits of each creature and arranging the whole universe, as the Catholic
faith professes. It is to be observed however that, though the divine understanding
is not limited to certain effects, God nevertheless has determined to Himself fixed
effects to be produced in due order by His wisdom, as it is said: Thou hast disposed
all things in measure, number and weight ( This common Hegelian position is that the world is necessary
to God, and the whole arrangement of the universe likewise an a priori necessity,
nothing else being possible: in fact that the term ‘actual being’ includes at once
all that is and all that ever could be, while the terms ‘possible,’ ‘necessary,’
‘contingent,’ express nothing whatever but certain limitations of our field of view.
Neither Hegel, nor any sane man who believes in a God at all, could ever suppose
that there were things, producible in themselves, which could not be produced because
God did not know of them. One wonders what opponents St Thomas could have met guilty
of this absurdity. Ex hypothesi God is a Being whose mental vision extends everywhere;
so that what God has no idea of, must be blank nonsense, and impossible as nonsensical.
To Hegelians, however, God is exhausted in the production, or evolution of the universe:
He gives being, and that of necessity, to all things whatsoever to which He possibly
can give being: nothing realisable, or actualisable, remains behind, nothing potential.
St Thomas meets this by insisting that God is infinite, and therefore inexhaustible;
ten thousand such worlds as this would not exhaust His capacity of production; and
over them all He would still remain, immeasurably exalted, distinct, independent,
supreme. There is however something, — we cannot call it a limitation, but we may
call it a condition of divine intelligence and creative power, — a condition less
regarded by St Thomas, but forcibly commending itself to us, upon six centuries
longer experience of the prevalence of evil on earth. Fewer combinations, far fewer
perhaps, than St Thomas thought possible, and our short-sighted impatience might
crave for as remedial, may be really possible at all. The range of intrinsic impossibilities
may extend considerably, beyond the abstract regions of logic and mathematics, into
the land of concrete physical realities, one reality, if existent, necessarily involving,
or necessarily barring, the existence of some other reality. Such necessity, such
there be, is no limitation of divine power or divine intelligence. God still discerns
endless possibilities, and can do whatever He discerns as possible; but much that
men take for possibility is rendered on this hypothesis sheer absurdity, — as impossible,
let us say, as a ‘spiritual elephant.’ We wonder why God does not mend matters,
as we would mend them, had we His power. Had we His power, we should also have His
intelligence, and discern that there is no riding out of our troubles on the backs
of spiritual elephants. There is some hint of the matter of this note in Chapp.
XXIX, XXX following.
CHAPTER XXVIII—That God has not brought things into being in discharge of any Debt of Justice
JUSTICE is to another, rendering him his due. But, antecedently to the universal production of all things, nothing can be presupposed to which anything is due.
2. An act of justice must be preceded by some act, whereby something is made
another’s own; and that act, whereby first something is made another’s own, cannot
be an act of justice.
3. No man owes anything to another, except inasmuch as he in some way depends on him, receiving something from him. Thus every man is in his neighbour’s debt on God’s account; from whom we have received all things. But God depends on none, and needs nothing of any.
5. Though nothing created precedes the universal production of all things, something uncreated does precede it: for the divine goodness precedes as the end and prime motive of creation, according to Augustine, who says: “Because God is good, we exist” (De Verb. Apost. Serm. 13). But the divine goodness needs nothing external for its perfection. Nor is it necessary, for all that God wills His own goodness, that He should will the production of things other than Himself. God wills His own goodness necessarily, but He does not necessarily will other things. Therefore the production of creatures is not a debt of necessity to the divine goodness. But, taking justice in the wider sense of the term, there may be said to be justice in the creation of the world, inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness.
7. But if we consider the divine plan, according as God has planned it in His understanding and will to bring things into being, from that point of view the production of things does proceed from the necessity of the divine plan (B. I, Chap. LXXXIII): for it is impossible for God to have planned the doing of anything, and afterwards not to do it. Thus fulfilment is necessarily due to His every plan. But this debt is not sufficient to constitute a claim of justice, properly so called, in the action of God creating the world: for justice, properly so called, is not of self to self.
Hence it is said: Who hath first given to Him, and recompense
shall be made him? (
Hereby is shut out the error of some who have tried to prove that God can do no otherwise than as He does, because He can do no otherwise than as He owes, or ought.
CHAPTER XXIX—How in the Production of a Creature there may be found a debt of Justice in respect of the necessary Sequence of something posterior upon something prior
I SPEAK here of what is prior, not in order of time merely, but by nature. The
debt is not absolute, but conditional, of the form: ‘If this is to be, this must
go before.’ According to this necessity a triple debt is found in the production
of creatures. First, when the conditional proceeds from the whole universe of things
to some particular part requisite for the perfection of the universe. Thus, if God
willed the universe to be such as it is, it was due that He should make the sun
and water and the like, without which the universe cannot be.
On these explanations of the meaning of the term ‘debt’ and ‘due,’ natural justice is found in the universe both in respect of the creation of things and in respect of their propagation; and therefore God is said to have established and to govern all things justly and reasonably. Thus then is shut out a two-fold error: on the one hand of those who would limit the divine power, saying that God can do only as He does, because so He is bound to do; on the other, of those who say that all things follow on His sheer will, and that no other reason is to be sought or assigned in creation than that God wills it so.
CHAPTER XXX—How Absolute Necessity may have place in Creation
ALTHOUGH all things depend on the will of God as their first cause, and this first cause is not necessitated in its operation except on the supposition of its own purpose, not for that however is absolute necessity excluded from creation, need we aver that all things are contingent.
1. There are things in creation which simply and absolutely must be. Those things
simply and absolutely must be, in which there is no possibility of their not being.
Some things are so brought into being by God that there is in their nature a potentiality
of not being: which happens from this, that the matter in them is in potentiality
to receive another form. Those things then in which either there is no matter, or,
if there is any, it is not open to receive another form, have no potentiality of
not being: such things then simply and absolutely must be. If it be said that things
which are of nothing,
By “beings in which there is no matter,” St Thomas
meant pure spirits. By “beings in which the matter is not open to receive another
form,” he meant the heavenly bodies: if he had written in our time, he might be
well taken to mean those primitive atoms or molecules, which have been termed “the
building stones of the universe.” He has in his eye the whole class of natural objects,
animate and inanimate, that can neither destroy themselves nor ever be destroyed
and broken up by any of the ordinary processes of nature, but are permanent from
age to age, whether existing apart or in composition. In the physical order, of
which St Thomas here speaks, the existence of these beings is “absolutely necessary”;
no physical force can destroy them. One might say the same of the total store of
energy in the universe, according to the principle of the ‘conservation of energy.’ St Thomas’s acquaintance with Plato was through the Neo-Platonists; and their favourite
Dialogue was the Timaeus, the following passage of which (Tim. 41) well illustrates
his meaning. The Platonic Demiurge is addressing the minor deities whom he has compounded,
them and their offspring: “Ye gods, god born, works of my fatherhood and constructive
power, what has been made by me is indissoluble, so long as it has my consent to
its being. Whatever is bound and put together may indeed be loosened: but it were
ill done to undo a work fairly compacted and well made. Therefore, made as ye are,
ye are not absolutely beyond death and dissolution: still ye shall never be dissolved
nor meet the doom of death, finding in my will a tie greater even and more potent
than the ties wherewith your being was originally bound together.”
4. The further a thing is distant from the self-existent, that is, from God, the nigher it is to not being; and the nigher it is to God, the further it is withdrawn from not being. Those things therefore which are nighest to God, and therefore furthest removed from not being, — in order that the hierarchy of being (ordo rerum) may be complete, — must be such as to have in themselves no potentiality of not being, or in other words, their being must be absolutely necessary.
We observe therefore that, considering the universe of creatures as they depend on the first principles
of all things, we find that they depend on the will (of God), — not as necessarily
arising therefrom, except by an hypothetical, or consequent necessity, as has been
explained (Chap. XXVIII). But, compared with proximate and created principles,
CHAPTER XXXI—That it is not necessary for Creatures to have existed from
Eternity St Thomas’s position in these eight chapters, XXXI-XXXVIII, is that the existence
of creatures from eternity can neither be proved nor disproved by philosophy. He
considers it certain from revelation, and from revelation only, that creation has
not been from eternity. This excited the surprise and indignation of some, who were
confident that their a priori arguments, which see in Chap. XXXVIII, proved to a
demonstration the impossibility of any creation from eternity. Against them St Thomas
directed one of his Opuscula, n. xxiii, De Æternitate Mundi, contra Murmurantes. The eternity of creation was a leading principle with that master of thought
in St Thomas’s day, and for many succeeding centuries, Averroes the Commentator,
of whom we shall have much to say presently.
IF either the entire universe or any single creature necessarily exists, this
necessity must arise either from the being itself or from some other being. From
the being itself it cannot arise: for every being must be from the first being;
and what has not being of itself, cannot necessarily exist of itself.
3. It is not necessary for God to will creation to be at all (B. I, Chap. LXXXI):
therefore it is not necessary for God to will creation always to have been.
CHAPTER XXXII, XXXV—Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of God, with Answers to the same
ARG. 1. Every agent that is not always in action, suffers some change when it comes to act. But God suffers no change, but is ever in act in the same way; and from His action created things come to be: therefore they always have been.
Reply (Chap. XXXV). There is no need of God suffering any change for fresh effects of His power coming to be. Novelty of effect can only indicate change in the agent in so far as it shows novelty of action. Any new action in the agent implies some change in the same, at least a change from rest to activity. But a fresh effect of God’s power does not indicate any new action in God, since His action is His essence (B. I, Chap. XLV).
Arg. 2. The action of God is eternal: therefore the things created by God have been from eternity.
Reply. That does not follow. For, as shown above (Chap. XXIII),
though God acts voluntarily in creation, yet it does not follow that there need
be any action on His part intermediate between the act of His will and the effect
of the same, as in us the action of our motor activities is so intermediate. With
God to understand and will is to produce; and the effect produced follows
Arg. 3. Given a sufficient cause, the effect will ensue: otherwise it would be possible, when the cause was posited, for the effect either to be or not to be. At that rate, the sequence of effect upon cause would be possible and no more. But what is possible requires something to reduce it to act: we should have therefore to suppose a cause whereby the effect was reduced to act, and thus the first cause would not be sufficient. But God is the sufficient cause of the production of creatures: otherwise He must be in potentiality, and become a cause by some addition, which is clearly absurd.
Reply. Though God is the sufficient cause of the production and bringing
forth of creatures into being, yet the effect of His production need not be taken
to be eternal. For, given a sufficient cause, there follows its effect, but not
an effect alien from the cause. Now the proper effect of the will is that that should
be which the will wants. If it were anything else than what the will wanted, not
the proper effect of the cause would be secured, but a foreign effect. Now as the
will wishes that this should be of this or that nature, so
it also wishes that it should be at this or that time. Hence, for
will to be a sufficient cause, it is requisite that the effect should be when the
will wishes it to be. The case is otherwise with physical agencies: they cannot
wait: physical action takes place according as nature is ready for it: there the
effect must follow at once upon the complete being of the cause.
Arg. 4. A voluntary agent does not delay the execution of his purpose
except in expectation of some future condition not yet realised. And this unfulfilled
futurity is sometimes in the agent himself, as when maturity of active power or
the removal of some hindrance is the condition expected: sometimes it is without
the agent, as when there is expected the presence of some one before whom the action
is to take place, or the arrival of some opportune time that is not yet come. A
complete volition is at once carried into effect by the executive power, except
for some defect in that power. Thus at the command of the will a limb is at once
moved, unless there be some break-down in the motor apparatus. Therefore, when any
one wishes to do a thing and it is not at once done, that must be either for some
defect of power, the removal of which has to be waited for, or because of the incompleteness
of the volition to do the thing. I call it ‘completeness of volition,’ when there
is a will absolutely to do the thing, anyhow. The volition I say is ‘incomplete,’
when there is no will absolutely to do the thing, but the will is conditioned on
the existence of some circumstance not yet present, or the withdrawal of some present
impediment. But certainly, whatever God now wills to be, He
Reply. The object of the divine will is not the mere being of the creature,
but its being at a certain time. What is thus willed, namely, the being of the creature
at that time, is not delayed: because the creature began to exist then exactly when
God from eternity arranged that it should begin to exist.
Arg. 5. An intellectual agent does not prefer one alternative to another
except for some superiority of the one over the other. But where there is no difference,
there can be no superiority. But between one non-existence and another non-existence
there can be no difference, nor is one non-existence preferable to another.
Reply. It is impossible to mark any difference of parts of any duration
antecedent to the beginning of all creation, as the fifth objection supposed that
we could do.
Arg. 6. Means to the end have their necessity from the end, especially
in voluntary actions.
Reply. Though the end of the divine will can be none other than the divine
goodness, still the divine will has not to work to bring this goodness into being,
in the way that the artist works to set up the product of his art, since the divine
goodness is eternal and unchangeable and incapable of addition. Nor does God work
for His goodness as for an end to be won for Himself, as a king works to win a city:
for God is His own goodness. He works for this end, only inasmuch as He produces
an effect which is to share in the end. In such a production of things for an end,
the uniform attitude of end to agent is not to be considered reason enough for an
everlasting work. Rather we should consider the bearing of the end on the effect
produced to serve it. The one evinced necessity is that of the production of the
effect in the manner better calculated to serve the end for which it is produced.
Arg. 7. Since all things, so far as they have being, share in the goodness
of God; the longer they exist, the more they share of that goodness: hence also
the perpetual being of the species is said to be divine. Etymologically, species
(in-spicere) is what εἶδος (ἰδεῖν)
is in Greek. Species is scholastic Latin for εἶδος.
Now εἶδος meant one thing in Plato, and another in Aristotle.
Species labours under a similar ambiguity. In the objection
now under consideration, the words of which are esse perpetuum speciei dicitur
divinum esse, the language is rather Platonic than Aristotelian. Individual
men, John, Peter, Martin, pass away: but the species, or idea, of ‘man’ is perpetual
and divine, an abiding type of possible creation, founded upon the divine essence
and known in the divine understanding eternally. These archetypical ideas, —
intelligibilia St Thomas calls them, — have been discussed
already (B.I, Chapp. LI–LIV). The following account
of them will commend itself to all Christian lovers of Plato. “God contains in Himself in exuberant fulness that delights or can give pleasure.
All the perfection that is divided among creatures, is found united in Him; and
He is all things, He is the uncreated being of all things, inasmuch as He is the
archetype and exemplar of them all. He had in His eternal knowledge the divine plans
and ideas of the things that He made; and whatever was created by Him was for ever
known by Him, has always lived in His mind, and always shall live there. Hence the
Gospel says: What was made, in Him was life (
Reply. It was proper for the creature, in such likeness as became it, to represent the divine goodness. Such representation cannot be by way of equality: it can only be in such way as the higher and greater is represented by the lower and less. Now the excess of the divine goodness above the creature is best expressed by this, that creatures have not always been in existence: for thereby it appears that all other beings but God Himself have God for the author of their being; and that His power is not tied to producing effects of one particular character, as physical nature produces physical effects, but that He is a voluntary and intelligent agent.
CHAPTERS XXXIII, XXXVI—Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part Creatures, with answers to the same
ARG. 1. There are creatures in which there is no potentiality of not being (see Chap. XXX): it is impossible for them not to be, and therefore they always must be.
Reply (Chap. XXXVI). The necessity of such creatures being is only a relative
necessity, as shown above (Chap. XXX): it does not involve the creature’s
always having been: it does not follow upon its substance: but when the creature
is already established in being, this necessity involves the impossibility of its
not-being.
Arg. 3. Every change must either go on everlastingly, or have some other change preceding it. But change always has been: therefore also changeable things: therefore creatures.
Reply. It has already been shown (Chapp. XII, XVII)
that without any change in God, the agent, He may act to the production of a new
thing, that has not always been. But if a new thing may be produced by Him, He may
also originate a process of change.
Arg. 5. If time is perpetual, motion must be perpetual, time being the
‘record of motion.’
Reply. This argument rather supposes than proves the eternity of motion.
The reason why the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the
past is because any given phase of motion is the beginning and end of different
phases. There is no showing that every instant must be of this character, unless
it be assumed that every given phase of time comes between motion going before and
motion following after, which is tantamount to assuming the perpetuity of motion.
Assuming on the contrary that motion is not perpetual, one may say that the first
instant of time is the beginning of the future, and not the end of any past instant.
Even in any particular case of motion we may mark a phase which is the beginning
only of movement and not the end of any: otherwise every particular case of motion
would be perpetual, which is impossible.
Arg. 6. If time has not always been, we may mark a non-existence of time prior to its being. In like manner, if it is not always to be, we may mark a non-existence of it subsequent to its being. But priority and subsequence in point of duration cannot be unless time is; and at that rate time must have been before it was, and shall be after it has ceased, which is absurd. Time then must be eternal. But time is an accident, and cannot be without a subject. But the subject of it is not God, who is above time and beyond motion (B. I, Chapp. XIII, XV). The only alternative left is that some created substance must be eternal.
Reply. There is nothing in this argument to evince that the very supposition
of time not being supposes that time is (read, Si ponitur tempus non esse, ponatur
esse). For when we speak of something prior to the being of time, we do not
thereby assert any real part of time, but only an imaginary part. When we say, ‘Time
has being after not being’, we mean that there was no instant of time before this
present marked instant: as when we say that there is nothing above the stellar universe,
we do not mean that there is any place beyond the stellar universe, which may be
spoken of as ‘above’ it, but that above it there is no ‘place’ at all.
CHAPTER XXXIV, XXXVII—Reasons alleged for the Eternity of the World on the part of the Creative Process itself, with Answers to the same
ARG. 1. It is the common opinion of all philosophers, and therefore it
must be true, that nothing is made of nothing (Aristotle, Physics, B. I,
Chapp. VII, VIII). Whatever is made, then, must be made
of something; and that again, if it is made at all, must be made of something else.
But this process cannot go on to infinity; and therefore we must come to something
that was not made. But every being that has not always been must have been made.
Therefore that out of which all things are first made must be something everlasting.
That cannot be God, because He cannot be
Reply (Chap. XXXVII). The common position of philosophers, that nothing
is made of nothing, is true of the sort of making that they considered. For all
our knowledge begins in sense, which is of singular objects; and human investigation
has advanced from particular to general considerations. Hence, in studying the beginning
of things, men gave their attention to the making of particular things in detail.
The making of one sort of being out of another sort is the making of some particular
being, inasmuch as it is ‘this being,’ not as it is ‘being’ generally: for some
prior being there was that now is changed into ‘this being.’ But entering more deeply
into the origin of things, philosophers came finally to consider the issuing of
all created being from one first cause (Chapp. XV, XVI).
In this origin of all created being from God, it is impossible to allow any making
out of pre-existent material: for such making out of pre-existent material would
not be a making of the whole being of the creature. This first making of the universe
was not attained to in the thought of the early physicists, whose common opinion
it was that nothing was made of nothing: or if any did attain to it, they considered
that such a term as ‘making’ did not properly apply to it, since the name ‘making’
implies movement or change,
Arg. 2. Everything that takes a new being is now otherwise than as it was before: that must come about by some movement or change: but all movement or change is in some subject: therefore before anything is made there must be some subject of motion.
Reply. The notion of motion or change is foisted in here to no purpose: for what nowise is, is not anywise, and affords no hold for the conclusion that, when it begins to be, it is otherwise than as it was before.
These then are the reasons which some hold to as demonstrative, and necessarily
evincing that creatures have always existed, wherein they contradict the Catholic
faith, which teaches that nothing but God has always existed, and that all else
has had a beginning of being except the one eternal God. Thus then it evidently
appears that there is nothing to traverse our assertion, that the world has not
always existed. And this the Catholic faith teaches: In the beginning God created
heaven and earth (
CHAPTER XXXVIII—Arguments wherewith some try to show that the World is not Eternal, and Solutions of the same
ARG. 1. God is the cause of all things (Chap. XV). But a cause must be prior in duration to the effects of its action.
Reply. That is true of things that act by motion, for the effect is not till the termination of the motion: but with causes that act instantaneously there is no such necessity.
Arg. 2. Since the whole of being is created by God, it cannot be said to be made out of any being: whence the conclusion follows that it is made out of nothing, and consequently that it has existence after not existing.
Reply. To the notion of being made out of something, if that is
not admitted one must supply the contradictory notion: which contradictory notion
is not being made out of anything. Observe, it is not being made out of
nothing, except in the former sense of not being made out of
anything.
Arg. 3. It is not possible to pass through infinity. But if the world always had been, infinity would have been passed through by this time, there being infinite days, or daily rounds of the sun, if the world always has been.
Reply. An infinite quantity, though not existing in simultaneous actual realisation, may nevertheless be in succession, because every infinite, so taken, is really finite. Any given round of the sun could be passed, because so far the number of them was finite: but when they are all viewed together, on the supposition that the world had always existed, it would be impossible to fix upon any first day, and so to make any transition from that to the present day, since transition always requires two extreme points.
Arg 4. It would follow that addition is made to the infinite, because to past days, or sun-rounds, a new round is daily added.
Reply. There is nothing to hinder addition to the infinite on that side on which it is finite. Supposing time eternal, it must be infinite as preceding, but finite as succeeding, for the present is the limit of the past.
Arg. 5. It would follow in a world always existing that we should have an infinite series of efficient causes, father being cause of child, and grandfather to father, and so to infinity.
Reply. The impossibility of an infinite series of efficient causes, according
to philosophers (Aristotle, Metaph. ii, 2), holds for causes acting together:
because then the effect has to depend on an infinity of co-existent actions;
Arg. 6. It would follow that an infinite multitude exists, to wit, the immortal souls of infinite men who have been in the past.
Reply. This objection is more difficult: nevertheless the argument is
not of much use, because it supposes many things.
Since these reasons, alleged by some to prove that the world has not always existed, are not necessarily conclusive, though they have a certain probability, it is sufficient to touch on them slightly, without insisting too much, that the Catholic faith may not seem to rest on empty reasonings, and not rather on the solid basis of the teaching of God.
CHAPTER XLI—That the Variety of Creatures does not arise from any Contrariety of Prime
Agents St Thomas has seven chapters (XXXIX–XLV) discussing the variety of creatures,
why the universe is not uniform but diversified, and how it has come to consist
of such diverse components. As regards living creatures, the discussion is familiar
to us from Darwin’s Origin of Species and the theory of Evolution. St Thomas
ventures on a larger question, the origin of all species, inanimate as well as animate.
He states and rejects various archaic theories; but the point of supreme interest
to the modern mind is never raised. In all the seven chapters there is not one word
pointing to evolution. I have been driven to make large omissions, omissions which
I feel sure the Saint would have sanctioned, had he been face to face with the cosmogonies
of our day. Life is short art is long: the ground of philosophy must not be cumbered
with obsolete machinery. It is pleaded on St Thomas’s behalf that the question before him is a metaphysical
one, independent altogether of the manner in which actual species have come into existence.
IF the diversity of things proceeds from diversity or contrariety of diverse
agents, this would seem to hold especially of the contrariety of good and evil,
so that all good things should proceed from a good principle, and evils from an
evil principle. Now there is good and evil in all genera. But there cannot be one
first principle of all evils: for the very essence of such a principle would be
evil, and that is impossible. Everything that is, inasmuch as it is a being, must
necessarily be good: for it loves and strives to preserve its own being, a sign
whereof is this fact, that everything fights against its own destruction: now what
all things seek is good. It is impossible therefore for the diversity of things
to arise from two principles, one good and one evil. Done into syllogistic form, the argument might stand thus: What all things seek, even a principle of evil would seek. But all things seek their own self-preservation. Therefore even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. Again, What all things seek, is good. But self-preservation is what all things seek. Therefore self-preservation is good. But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. Therefore a principle of evil would seek some good. But a principle of evil ought to be averse to all good. Therefore a principle of evil is absurd. One wonders whether this is the argument that St Thomas thought of at the table
of St Louis, when he suddenly started up and cried, Ergo conclusum est contra
Manichaeos. But it is difficult to kill a heresy with a syllogism. One might
perhaps distinguish between absolute and relative good; and upon that distinction
urge that the self-preservation, which the evil principle sought, was good relatively
to it only, but evil absolutely for the world. The deepest flaw in the Manichean notion of an Evil Principle is that which is
pointed out in the next argument (n. 9). Moreover every argument which establishes
the unity and infinite perfection of God, is destructive of Manicheism. (Cf. Matter is not evil, as Plato supposed, but its essential capacities for good
are greatly limited; and, where good stops short, evil readily enters in. God does
not override essentialities.
9. What in no manner of way is, is neither good nor evil: while every thing that
is, in so far as it is, is good. A thing can be evil therefore only inasmuch as
it is not-being, that is, privative being;
Hence it is said: I am the Lord, and there is none other, forming light and
creating darkness, making peace and creating evil: I am the Lord doing all these
things (
God is said to make and create evil things, inasmuch as He creates things that
are good in themselves and yet hurtful to others: thus the wolf, though a good thing
naturally in his kind, is evil to the sheep. Hence it is said: Shall there be
evil in the city that the Lord hath not done? (
Hereby is excluded the error of those who suppose two primitive contrary principles, good and evil. This error of the early philosophers some evil-minded men have presumed to introduce into Christian teaching, the first of whom was Marcion, and afterwards the Manicheans, who have done most to spread this error.
CHAPTER XLIV—That the Variety of Creatures has not arisen from Variety of Merits and Demerits
ORIGEN in his book περὶ ἀρχῶν says that God out of mere bounty in His first production of creatures made them all equal, all spiritual and rational, and they by free will behaved in various ways, some adhering to God more or less, and others receding from Him more or less; and thus by order of divine justice various grades ensued among spiritual substances, some appearing as angels of various orders, some as human souls also of various states and conditions, some again as demons in various states. He also said that it was through this variety of rational creatures that God instituted a variety also of material creatures, so that the nobler spiritual substances should be united to the nobler bodies, and that in divers other ways the material creation might serve to express the variety of spiritual substances. According to Origen, man, sun, and stars are composed of rational substances united with corresponding bodies. Now all this opinion can be shown to be manifestly false.
1. The better a thing is, the higher place does it hold in the intention of the
agent who produces it. But the best thing in creation is the perfection
2. If all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, we should
have to allow that they do not depend for their activity one on another. What arises
by the concurrence of divers causes working independently of one another is matter
of chance; and thus the diversity and order of creation comes by chance, which is
impossible.
12. Since a spiritual creature, or angel, does not deserve to be degraded except for sin, — and it is degraded from its high, invisible estate, by being united with a visible body, — it seems that visible bodies have been added to these spiritual creatures because of sin; which comes near to the error of the Manicheans, who laid it down that the visible creation proceeded from an evil principle.
Origen seems not to have given sufficient weight to the consideration that, when we give, not in discharge of any debt, but out of liberality, it is not contrary to justice if we give in unequal measure: but God brought things into being under no debt, but of sheer liberality (Chap. XXVIII): therefore the variety of creatures does not presuppose variety of merits.
CHAPTER XLV—The Real Prime Cause of the Variety of Creatures.
SINCE every agent intends to induce its own likeness in the effect, so far as
the effect can receive it, an agent will do this more perfectly the more perfect
itself is. But God is the most perfect of agents: therefore it will belong to Him
to induce His likeness in creation most perfectly, so far as befits created nature.
2. As the things that are made of any material are contained in the potentiality
of the material, so the things done by any agent must be in the active power of
the agent. But the potentiality of the material would not
3. A creature approaches more perfectly to the likeness of God by being not only
good itself, but able to act for the good of others. But no creature could do anything
for the good of another creature, unless there were plurality and inequality among
creatures, because the agent must be other than the patient and in a position of
advantage (honorabilius) over it.
5. The goodness of the species transcends the goodness of the individual.
7. To a work contrived by sovereign goodness there ought not to be lacking the height of perfection proper to it. But the good of order in variety is better than the isolated good of any one of the things that enter into the order: therefore the good of order ought not to be wanting to the work of God; which good could not be, if there were no diversity and inequality of creatures. There is then diversity and inequality between creatures, not by chance, not from diversity of elements, not by the intervention of any (inferior) cause, or consideration of merit, but by the special intention of God, wishing to give the creature such perfection as it was capable of having.
Hence it is said, God saw all things that he had made,
and they were very good (
CHAPTER XLVI—That it was necessary for the Perfection of the Universe that there should be some Intellectual Natures
THIS then being the cause of the diversity among creatures, it remains now to treat of the several distinct creatures themselves as we proposed to do in the third part of this book (Chap. V). And we will show first that by the disposition of Divine Providence assigning perfection to creatures in the way best befitting them, it was consonant with reason that some intellectual creatures should be placed at the head of creation.
5. Nothing else moves God to the production of creatures but His own goodness,
which He has wished to communicate to other beings according to the manner of their
assimilation to Himself (B. I, Chap. LXXXVII). Now the likeness of one
thing may be found in another in two ways: in one way in point of natural being,
as the likeness of heat is found in the body heated; in another way in point of
knowledge, as the likeness of fire (perceived) is in sight or touch. In order then
that the likeness of God might be in creatures
6. In all comely arrangements of things, the attitude of the secondary to the
last imitates the attitude of the first to all, as well secondary as last, though
the imitation is not always perfect. Now God comprehends in Himself all creatures
(B. I, Chapp. XXV, LI, LIV); and this is represented
in material creatures, although in another way: for the higher body comprehends
and contains the lower, according to quantitative extension;
CHAPTER XLVII—That Subsistent Intelligences are Voluntary Agents
GOOD is what all things yearn after, and in all beings there is a craving (appetitus)
for good. In beings unendowed with any sort of cognition, this craving is called
‘physical appetite’ (appetitus naturalis).
CHAPTER XLVIII—That Subsistent Intelligences have Free Will
THEY must be free, if they have dominion over their own acts.
2. A free agent is an agent that is cause of its own action (sui
causa, sibi causa agendi). Agents that are determined (moventur)
and act only inasmuch as they are determined by others, are not causes of their
own acts. Only self-determining agents (moventia seipsa)
have liberty of action; and these alone are guided in their action by judgement.
A self-determining agent is made up of two elements, one determining and another
determined. The element determined is the appetite; and that is determined either
by intellect, or by phantasy, or by sense: for to these powers it belongs to judge.
Of such self-determining agents, those alone judge freely which determine their
own judgement. But no faculty of judging determines its own judgement unless it
reflects upon its own act. If then it is to determine itself to judge, it must know
its own judgement; and that knowledge belongs to intellect alone. Irrational animals
then have a sort of free determination, or action, but not a free judgement (sunt
quodammodo liberi quidem motus, sive actionis, non autem liberi judicii):
3. An apprehension becomes a motive according as the thing apprehended takes
the form of something good or suitable. In agents that determine their own movements,
4. No movement or action follows from a general concept except by the medium
of some particular apprehension, as all movement and action deals with particulars.
Now the understanding naturally apprehends the universal. In order then that movement
or any manner of action may follow upon the intellectual apprehension, the universal
concept of the understanding must be applied to particular objects. But the universal
contains in potentiality many particular objects. Therefore the application of the
intellectual concept may be made to many divers objects; and consequently the judgement
of the understanding about things to be done is not determined to one thing only.
5. Some agents are without liberty of judgement, either because they have no
judgement at all, as is the case with things that have no knowledge, as stones and
plants, or because they have a judgement naturally determined to one effect, as
irrational animals. For by natural reckoning
CHAPTER XLIX—That Subsistent Intelligence is not Corporeal
IF the understanding were a corporeal substance, intelligible ideas of things would be received in it only as representing individual things. At that rate, the understanding would have no conception of the universal, but only of the particular, which is manifestly false.
4. If the understanding were a corporeal substance, its action would not transcend the order of corporeal things, and therefore it would understand nothing but corporeal things, which is manifestly false, for we do understand many things that are not corporeal.
5. There can be no infinite power in any finite body: but the power of the understanding is in a manner infinite in the exercise of intelligence: for it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its logical extension.
7 and 8.
Hence Holy Scripture calls intelligent subsistent beings by the name of ‘spirits,’ using
of them the style which it is wont to use for the incorporeal Deity, according to
the text, God is a Spirit (
Hereby is excluded the error of the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no
substance but corporeal substance: which opinion some have endeavoured to foist
into the Christian faith, saying that the soul is an effigy of the body, a sort
of outline contour of the human body.
CHAPTER LII—That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is a Difference between Existence and Essence
THOUGH subsistent intelligences are not corporeal, nor compounded of matter and
form, nor existent as material
4. Whatsoever reality subsists of and by itself, nothing attaches to that reality
except what is proper to being as being. For what is said of any reality not as
such, does not belong to that reality otherwise than accidentally by reason of the
subject:
5. The substance of every reality is a being of itself and not through another.
Hence actual illumination is not of the substance of air, because it accrues to
it through another. But to every created reality existence accrues through another,
otherwise it would not be a creature. Therefore of no created substance is it true
to say that its existence is its substance.
Hence in
CHAPTER LIII—That in Created Subsistent Intelligences there is Actuality and Potentiality
IN whatever being there are found two elements, the one complementary to the other, the proportion of the one element to the other is as the proportion of potential to actual: for nothing is completed except by its own actuality. But in a created intelligent subsistent being there are two elements, the substance itself and the existence thereof which is not the same thing as the substance. Now that existence is the complement of the existing substance: for everything actually exists by having existence. It follows that in every one of the aforesaid substances there is a composition of actuality and potentiality.
2. What is in any being, and comes of the agent that produced it, must be the actuality of that being: for it is an agent’s function to make a thing be in actuality. But, as shown above (Chap. XV), all other substances have their existence of the prime agent: indeed their being created substances consists precisely in this, that they have their existence of another. Existence itself therefore is in these created substances as a sort of actualisation of the same. But that in which actuality is received is potentiality: for actuality is such in relation to potentiality. In every created subsistent being therefore there is potentiality and actuality.
CHAPTER LV—That Subsistent Intelligences are Imperishable
WHAT ordinarily and of itself attaches to a thing, inheres in it necessarily
and invariably and inseparably, as roundness ordinarily and of itself inheres in
a circle, but in a bit of brass metal only incidentally.
8. Everything that perishes, perishes by suffering something. Destruction is
a sort of suffering. But no subsistent intelligence can suffer any impression such
as to lead to its destruction. For to suffer is to receive something; and whatever
is received in a subsistent intelligence must be received according to the manner
of the same: that is to say, it must be received as an intelligible impression.
But whatever is so received in a subsistent intelligence, goes to perfect that intelligence,
not to destroy it: for the intelligible is the perfection of the intelligent. A
subsistent intelligence therefore is indestructible.
10. The intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect: hence the understanding
in the act of understanding, and its term, or object in the act of being understood,
are one.
13. It is impossible for a natural desire to be void of object, for nature does nothing in vain. But every intelligence naturally desires perpetuity of being, not only perpetuity of being in the species, but in the individual: which is thus shown. The natural desire which some creatures have arises from conscious apprehension: thus the wolf naturally desires the killing of the animals on which he feeds, and man naturally desires happiness. Other creatures, without any conscious apprehension, are led by the inclination of primitive physical tendencies, which is called in some ‘physical appetite.’ The natural desire of being is contained under both modes: the proof of which is that creatures devoid of any sort of cognitive faculty resist destructive agencies to the full strength of their natural constitution, while creatures possessed of any manner of cognitive faculty resist the same according to the mode of their cognition. Those creatures therefore, devoid of cognition, who have in their natural constitution strength enough to preserve perpetual being, so as to remain always the same numerically, have a natural appetite for perpetuity of being even in respect of sameness of number: while those whose natural constitution has not strength for this, but only for preservation of perpetuity of being in respect of sameness of species, also have a natural appetite for perpetuity. This difference then must be noted in those creatures whose desire of being is attended with cognition, that they who do not know being except in the present time, desire it for the present time, but not for ever, because they have no apprehension of everlasting existence: still they desire the perpetual being of their species, a desire unattended with cognition, because the generative power, which serves that end, is preliminary to and does not come under cognition. Those then that do know and apprehend perpetual being as such, desire the same with a natural desire. But this is the case with all subsistent intelligences. All such subsistent intelligences therefore have a natural desire of everlasting being. Therefore they cannot possibly cease to be.
13. All things that begin to be, and afterwards cease to be, have both their beginning and their ceasing from the same power: for the same is the power to make to be and to make not to be. But subsistent intelligences could not begin to be except through the power of the prime agent. Therefore neither is there any power to make them cease to be except in the prime agent, inasmuch as that agent may cease to pour being into them. But in respect of this power alone nothing can be called perishable; as well because things are called necessary or contingent in respect of the power that is in them, not in respect of the power of God (Chap. XXX), as also because God, the author of nature, does not withdraw from things that which is proper to their nature; and it has been shown that it is proper to intellectual natures to be perpetual.
CHAPTER LVI, LXIX—How a Subsistent Intelligence may be united with a Body, with a Solution of the Arguments alleged to prove that a Subsistent Intelligence cannot be united with a Body as its Form
A SUBSISTENT intelligence cannot be united with a body by any manner of combination:
for combined elements, when the combination is complete, do not remain actually,
but virtually only: for if they remained actually, it would not be a combination,
but a mere mechanical mixture.
It is likewise evident that a subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a
body by any manner of contact, properly so called. For contact is only of bodies:
those things are in contact, the extremities of which are together,
Still there is one mode of contact whereby a subsistent intelligence may be mingled
with a body. For natural bodies in touching one another involve a change, and thus
are united together, not only in their quantitative extremities, but also by likeness
of one same quality or form, the one in pressing its form on the other. And though,
if we regard only quantitative extremities, the contact must be mutual in all cases,
yet, if we consider action and passion, there will be found some cases of touching
without being touched, and some cases of being touched without touching. Any cases
that may be found of contact without contact in quantitative extremities must still
be ca]led instances of contact, inasmuch as they are instances of action: thus we
say that he who saddens another ‘touches’ him.
This contact is not quantitative but virtual, and differs from bodily contact
in three respects. First, because in this contact the indivisible can touch the
divisible, which cannot happen in bodily contact: for only that which is indivisible
can be touched by a point,
Elements united by such contact are not absolutely one: they are one in action
and in being acted upon, which does not involve absolute oneness of being. Such
absolute oneness may be in three ways: in the way of indivisibility, in the way
of continuity, and in the way of natural unity. Now out of a subsistent intelligence
and a body there cannot be made an indivisible unity: it must be a compound of two
things. Nor again a continuous unity, because the parts of a continuum are quantitative.
It remains to be enquired whether out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there
can result such a unity as means oneness of nature.
Arg. 1. Of two actually existent substances no one being can be made: for the actuality of every being is that whereby it is distinguished from another being. But a subsistent intelligence is an actually existing substance: so likewise is a body. Apparently therefore no one being can be made of a subsistent intelligence and a body.
Arg. 2. Form and matter are contained under the same genus: for every genus is divided into actual and potential. But a subsistent intelligence and a body are of different genera.
Arg. 3. All that is in matter must be material. But if subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, the being of such intelligence must be in matter: for there is no being of the form beyond the being of the matter. It follows that a subsistent intelligence could not be immaterial, as supposed.
Arg. 4. It is impossible for anything having its being in a body to be
apart from the body. But intelligence is shown to be apart from the body, as it
is neither the body itself nor a bodily faculty.
Arg. 5. Whatever has being in common with the body, must also have activity in common with the body: for the active power of a thing cannot be more exalted than its essence. But if a subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, one being must be common to it and the body: for out of form and matter there results absolute unity, which is unity in being. At that rate the activity of a subsistent intelligence, united as a form to the body, will be exerted in common with the body, and its faculty will be a bodily (or organic) faculty: positions which we regard as impossible.
(Chap. LXIX). It is not difficult to solve the objections alleged against the aforesaid union.
Reply 1. The first objection contains a false supposition: for body and
soul are not two actually existing substances, but out of the two of them is made
one substance actually existing: for a man’s body is not the same in actuality when
the soul is present as when it is absent: it is the soul that gives actual being.
Reply 2. As for the second objection, that form and matter are contained under the same genus, it is not true in the sense that both are species of one genus, but inasmuch as both are elements of the same species. Thus then a subsistent intelligence and a body, which as separate existences would be species of different genera, in their union belong to one genus as elements of the same.
Reply 3. Nor need a subsistent intelligence be a material form, notwithstanding that its existence is in matter: for though in matter, it is not immersed in matter, or wholly comprised in matter.
Reply 4. Nor yet does the union of a subsistent intelligence with a body
by its being that body’s form stand in the way of intelligence being separable from
body.
Reply 5. Nor is it necessary, as was argued in the fifth place, that if the soul in its substance is the form of the body, its every operation should be through the body, and thus its every faculty should be the actuation of some part of the body: for the human soul is not one of those forms which are entirely immersed in matter, but of all forms it is the most exalted above matter: hence it is capable of a certain activity without the body, being not dependent on the body in its action, as neither in its being is it dependent on the body.
CHAPTER LVII—Plato’s Theory of the Union of the Intellectual Soul with the Body
MOVED by these and the like objections, some have said that no subsistent intelligence
can possibly be the form of a body. But because the nature of man of itself seemed
to give the lie to this statement, inasmuch as man is seen to be composed of an
intellectual soul and a body, they have thought out various ways to save the nature
of man and adjust their theory to fact. Plato therefore and his followers laid it
down that the intellectual soul is not united with the body as form with matter,
but only as the mover is with the moved, saying that the soul is in the body as
a sailor in his boat:
But this reasoning may be met by the following reply on behalf of Plato’s view. — There is no difficulty, it will be said, in mover and moved having the same act, notwithstanding their difference in being: for motion is at once the act of the moving force, from which it is, and the act of the thing moved, in which it is. Thus then, on Plato’s theory, the aforesaid activities may be common to soul and body, belonging to the soul as the moving force, and to the body as the thing moved. But this explanation cannot hold for the following reasons.
1. As the Philosopher proves (De Anima, II), sensation results by the
sentient subject being moved or impressed by external sensible things: hence a man
cannot have a sensation without some external sensible thing,
2. Though motion is the common act of moving force and object moved, still it
is one activity to impart motion and another to receive motion: hence the two several
categories of action and passion. If then in sensation the sentient soul stands
for the agent, and the body for the patient, there will be one activity of the soul
and another of the body. The sentient soul therefore will have an activity and proper
motion of its own: it will have therefore its own subsistence: therefore, when the
body perishes, it will not cease to be.
3. A body moved does not take its species according to the power that moves it.
If therefore the soul is only united to the body as mover to moved, the body and
its parts do not take their species from the soul: therefore, when the soul departs,
the body and the parts thereof will remain of the same species. But this is manifestly
false: for flesh and bone and hands and such parts, after the departure of the soul,
do not retain their own names
6. If the soul is united with the body only as mover with moved, it will be in
the power of the soul to go out of the body when it wishes, and, when it wishes,
to reunite itself with the body.
That the soul is united with the body as the proper form of the same, is thus proved.
That whereby a thing emerges from potential to actual being, is its form and actuality.
But by the soul the body emerges from potentiality to actuality: for the being of
a living thing is its life: moreover the seed before animation is only potentially
alive, and by the soul it is made actually alive:
Again: as part is to part, so is the whole sentient soul to the whole body. But sight is the form and actuality
of the eye:
CHAPTER LVIII—That Vegetative, Sentient, and Intelligent are not in man Three Souls
PLATO lays it down that not one and the same soul is in us at once intelligent,
sentient, and vegetative.
1. Attributes of the same subject representing different forms are predicated
of one another accidentally: thus ‘white’ is said to be ‘musical’ accidentally,
inasmuch as whiteness and music happen both to be in Socrates. If then the intelligent,
sentient, and vegetative soul are different powers or forms in us, then the attributes
that we have according to these forms will be predicated of one another accidentally.
But according to the intelligent soul we are called ‘men,’ according to the sentient
‘animals,’ according to the vegetative ‘living.’ This then will be an accidental
predication, ‘man is an animal,’ or ‘an animal is a living creature.’ But on the
contrary these are cases of essential predication: for man, as man, is an animal;
and an animal,
2. A thing has unity from the same principle whence it has being, for unity is
consequent upon being. Since then everything has being from its form, it will have
unity also from its form. If therefore there are posited in man several souls, as
so many forms, man will not be one being but several. Nor will the order of the
forms to one another, one ensuing upon the other, suffice for the unity of man:
for unity in point of orderly succession is not absolute unity: such unity of order
in fact is the loosest of unities.
4. If man, as Plato held, is not a compound of soul and body, but is a soul using a body; either this is understood of the intelligent soul, or of the three souls, if there are three, or of two of them. If of three, or two, it follows that man is not one, but two, or three: for he is three souls, or at least two. But if this is understood of the intelligent soul alone, so that the sentient soul is to be taken for the form of the body, and the intelligent soul, using the animate and sentient body, is to be man, there will still ensue awkward consequences, to wit, that man is not an animal, but uses an animal; and that man does not feel, but uses a thing that does feel.
5. Of two or three there cannot be made one without anything to unite them, unless
one of them stands to the other as actuality to potentiality: for so of matter and
form there is made one without any external bond to bind them together. But if in
man there are several souls, they do not stand to one another as matter and form,
but they are all supposed to be actualities and principles of action. If then they
are to be united to make one man, or one animal, there must be something to unite
them. This cannot be the body, since rather the body is made one by the soul: the
proof of which fact is that, when the soul departs, the body breaks up. It must
be some more formal principle that makes of those several entities one; and this
will be rather the soul than those several entities which are united by it. If this
again has several parts, and is not one in itself, there must further be something
to unite those parts. As we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come to something
which is in itself one; and this of all things is the soul.
CHAPTER LIX—That the Potential Intellect of Man is not a Spirit subsisting apart from
Matter These chapters, LIX–LXXVIII, are the most abtruse in the whole work. They are
founded on the scholastic theory of the origin of ideas, which again is based on
Aristotle, De anima, III, Chapp. IV, V. The theory first presupposes the
doctrine of matter and form, of which there is a fair]y good account in Grote’s
Aristotle, vol. II, pp. 181-196. Grote goes on to expose the Aristotelian
doctrine of Nous (intellectus), as he understands it. In this exposition
two points are noteworthy. (1) No account is taken of St Thomas’s distinction between
potential (possibilis) and ‘passive’ (passivus) intellect. (2) A view
is ascribed to Aristotle, closely allied to the views which Averroes and Avicenna
ascribe to him, views which St Thomas laboriously combats as being neither Aristotelian
nor correct. If these Mohammedan commentators, with Grote and many moderns, are
right, Aristotle cannot be claimed as a believer in personal immortality. Still
the fact that Plato steadily held the individual soul to be immortal, joined to
the fact that Aristotle, who was forward enough in contradicting his master, nowhere
explicitly contradicts him on this head, — as also the obscurity of the language
of the De anima, — “may give us pause.” For any understanding of what follows it is necessary to distinguish the ‘passive
intellect’ (intellectus passivus, νοῦς παθητικός), the ‘potential
intellect’ (intellectus possibilis, νοῦς δυνατός, or
ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς), and the ‘active intellect’
(intellectus agens, νοῦς ποιητικός). 1. ‘Passive intellect’ is not intellect at all. It is found in the higher dumb
animals; and is only called ‘intellect’ by a sort of brevet rank, because being
the highest power of the sensitive soul, it comes closest to intellect and ministers
to it most nearly. St Thomas calls it in dumb animals vis aestimativa; in
man, vis cognativa and ratio particularis. It has no English name,
but may be defined: ‘an instinct whereby the sentient soul directly recognises a
sensible object as a particular something here and now present.’ See Father Bödder’s
Psychologia, pp. 71-79, who apposite]y cites Cardinal Newman’s Grammar
of Assent, pp. 107 sq. See too Silvester Maurus, Commentary on Aristotle,
De anima, lib. III, cap. iv (ed. Lethielleux, Paris, 1886, tom. IV, pp. 94, 95).
Aristotle tells us of this faculty that it perishes with the body, but that its
operation is an indispensable preliminary to all human understanding,
ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός,
κα͍ὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ (De anima III, v, ult.) 2. Much more important is the ‘potential intellect,’ —
intellectus possibilis,
a term occurring again and again in all the writings of the schoolmen, being founded
on one word of Aristotle, De anima III, iv, 3,
μηδ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν οὐδεμίαν
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ταύτην ὅτι δυνατόν
(nor has it any other natural property than
this, that it is able, capable, potential). It is defined by Maurus (l.c.): “the
intellect inasmuch as it is capable of being [representatively] made all things,
by receiving intelligible impressions of all things.” An ‘intelligible impression’
differs from a ‘sensible impression’ as the universal from the particular, e.g.
as the triangle in the mind, which stands for any triangle, from the image of this
particular triangle chalked on the board and taken up by sense and phantasy. 3. Of equal scholastic importance is the ‘active intellect,’
intellectus agens,
defined by Maurus: “The intellect inasmuch as it is capable of [representatively]
making all things, by impressing on the potential intellect intelligible impressions
of all things.” The term
νοῦς ποιητκός though not actually found, is implied
in De anima, III, v. The ‘active’ and ‘potential’ intellect together make
up the understanding. The exact extent of the distinction between them is matter
of some dispute (Bödder, Psychologia, pp. 159-163). What ordinary mortals call ‘intellect’ or ‘understanding,’ is the ‘potential
intellect.’ It is called ‘potential’ because it is open to all intellectual impressions,
and, prior to experience, is void of all impression, and has no predisposition of
itself to one impression rather than to another. This by the way seems to militate
against the Kantian doctrine of intellectual ‘categories,’ or ‘forms of mind.’ But
it does not militate against the doctrine of heredity. Heredity works in the body,
in the domain of the sentient soul: we are here concerned with pure intellect. Of
that, Aristotle says it is “impassible [i.e., not directly acted on by matter],
yet apt to receive the intelligible impression, or form; but has no formed impression
upon it, before the process of understanding is set up.” The ‘active intellect’
on the other hand is the act of spontaneous energy, whereby the intellect transforms
the image, sent up to it by sense and phantasy, from particular to universal, making
out of it an ‘intelligible impression.’ A further distinction is drawn between the
‘intelligible impression’ (species intelligibilis impressa)
thus created and received in the mind, and the ‘intelligible expression’ (species
intelligibilis expressa), or precise act whereby the mind understands.
See Bödder, Psychologia, pp. 153-156. This distinction has been already
drawn by St Thomas (B. I, Chap. LIII). For further elucidation see Father Maher’s Psychology, pp. 304-313, ed.
4, who however speaks of intellectus patiens vel possibilis,
and takes no account of the intellectus passivus of St Thomas (B. II, Chap.
LX), probably because it simply is not intellect.
THERE were others who used another invention in maintaining the point, that a
subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body as its form. They say that
the intellect which Aristotle calls ‘potential,’ is a spiritual being, subsisting
apart by itself, and not united with us as a form. And this they endeavour to prove
from the words of Aristotle, who says, speaking of this intellect, that it is “separate,
unmixed with body, simple and impassible,” terms which could not be applied to it,
they say, if it were the form of a
body.
These passages moved Averroes Abu Walid Mohammed Ibn Roschd (Averroes), called by the schoolmen ‘the Commentator,’
as Aristotle was ‘the Philosopher,’ was born at Cordova in 1120, and died in Morocco,
1198. He practised as a physician and a lawyer, and had a place about court, but
was above all things a philosopher and an uncompromising Aristotelian. Fallen into
neglect among his own countrymen, his philosophy embroiled the schools of Western
Europe for four centuries, 1230-1630, at Paris, at Oxford, but particularly at Padua.
Numerous Latin editions were printed. I shall cite the Venice edition of 1574 in
the Bodleian Library, ten volumes. The origin of this dispute about the intellect is to be found in a passage of
Plato, Theatetus, 185: “Being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness
and difference, number . . . . there is no bodily organ for the cognition of these
entities, but the soul by herself regards them; so it appears that the soul regards
some things by herself, and other things through the bodily faculties.” This passage
is the foreshadowing of the celebrated and much disputed chapters, De anima,
III, iv, v. Two words there call for notice: (1) ἀπαθές, meaning unimpressed,
at first hand, by matter; (2) χωριστός, separable, or separate,
on which word the great contention turns. It may apply to the ‘active,’ or to the
‘potential’ intellect: but it matters not to which, for Averroes and St Thomas agree
that the two go together. It may refer to the state after death, and signify that
the intellectual soul is not destroyed by separation from the body: on this point
again there is a general agreement between Averroes and St Thomas. The battle between
them begins when the word is referred to the intellect as it is in this mortal life.
St Thomas takes the term merely to mean ‘capable of operating apart from any bodily
organ,’ — according to the tenor of the passage above quoted from Plato. Averroes
will have it that it means, not only that, but much more than that: the meaning
being according to him, that even while we live on earth, our intellect, ‘potential’
and ‘active,’ is outside of us, and is one and the same numerically for all men. My reading of Averroes has not revealed to me where he places this one separate
universal intellect. He does not make it to be God: thus he says in his Destructio
destructionum (or Refutation of the Refutations of Algazel): “If man only understood
this, then his intellect would be the intellect of the God of glory; and that is
false” (disp. 6, p. 87b). The notion of his day, in which he shared, that the heavenly
bodies have souls, might have tempted him to place νοῦς χωριστός in some
heavenly sphere: that doctrine however belongs to the disciples of Averroes, not
to the master. Renan, Averroes et l’Averroisme, p. 138, gives this explanation:
Une humanité vivante et permanente, tel semble donc être le sens de la théorie
Averroistique de l’unité de l’intellect. L’immortalité de l’intellect actif [and
of the potential intellect with it, on which Averroes chiefly insists] n’est ainsi
autre chose que, la renaissance éternelle de l’humanit’, et la perpetuité de la
civilisation. This interpretation derives support from Averroes’s comments on the
De anima, III (pp. 149-151). Holding as he did the eternity of the world,
he tells us there that the human race is eternal, and that some portion of the human
race is always civilised, —positions set aside by our astronomy and geology, and
at variance with the received anthropology. He says: “There must always be some
philosopher amongst mankind.” I have some hesitation however in agreeing with Renan’s
explanation: because this position, which he attributes to Averroes, is clearly
suicidal, and the Commentator was no fool. If no individual man had a head on his
shoulders, the race would be headless. Averroes (see Chap. LX) does not seem to
allow to the individual man, as man, any higher faculty than a faculty proper to
the sentient soul: how can a race of such sentient beings constitute an intelligence?
The intelligence of the race can only mean the intelligence of this man and of that,
combining to form society. But it is difficult to form any rational conception of
νοῦς χωριστός as Averroes understood it. If Renan ’s interpretation be taken,
then when Averroes speaks (De anima, III, p. 161) of the “active and potential
intellect” as being “eternal substances,” we must understand him to call them eternal
with the eternity of civilised mankind, an eternity which he positively asserts
(De anima, p. 149). The main point of St Thomas’s attack upon the Commentator is his theory of the
continuatio (ittisâl is the Arabic name, much used by the Arabian
mystics), or point of contact between the universal intelligence outside and the
mind of the individual man. Averroes’s words are these (De anima, II, pp.
178, 148b, 185b): “The potential intellect is not conjoined with us primarily and
ordinarily: nay, it is not conjoined with us at all, except inasmuch as it is conjoined
with the forms in our phantasy. . . . Since it has been shown that intellect cannot
be conjoined with all men so as to be multiplied as they are multiplied, it remains
that the said intellect is conjoined with us by conjunction with our intellectual
impressions which are conceptions in the phantasy, that is to say, through that
part of those conceptions which exists in us and serves in a manner as a form. . . .
Since the impressions of speculative intellect are conjoined with us by forms
of phantasy; and the active intellect is conjoined with those intellectual impressions;
and the intellect which takes cognisance of those impressions, that is to say, the
potential intellect, is the same [as the active]: the necessary conclusion is that
the active intellect is conjoined with us by the conjunction of those intellectual
impressions.” See St Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q 76 artt. 1 and 2: where he
explains Averroes thus: “The Commentator says that this union is by means of the
intellectual impression, which has a twofold residence, one in the potential intellect
[universal, eternal, independent of the individual], and another in the impressions
of phantasy, which are in the bodily organs [of the individual; in his phantasy,
or sensory memory, or in the vis cogitativa, an organic faculty allied to
phantasy]. And thus, through this intellectual impression, the potential intellect
is continued and conjoined with the body of the individual man” (art. 1). St Thomas
criticises this theory as follows (art. 2): “So long as the intellect is one, however
all other things are diversified which the intellect uses as instruments, in no
way can Socrates and Plato be called other than one intelligent being. . . . I grant
that if the phantasm, or impression in the phantasy, inasmuch as it is other and
other in you and me, were a form (or idea) of the potential intellect, then your
intellectual activity and mine might be differentiated by the diversity of phantasms
. . . . but the said phantasm is not a form (or idea) of the potential intellect:
an idea in the potential intellect is obtained only by abstraction from phantasms.
If then there were but one intellect for all men, no diversities of phantasms in
this man and that could ever cause a diversity of intellectual activity between
one man and another, as the Commentator pretends.” So far as the Averroistic Potential (and Active) Intellect can be identified
with the Zeitgeist or Educated Opinion of the day, and adapted to Comte’s
theory of progress, the reader will find some discussion of it in my Oxford and
Cambridge Conferences, First Series, pp. 135 sq.; also Political and Moral
Essays, p. 132, note. On De anima, III, the Commentator (p. 149) specifies three kinds of intellect:
“the potential intellect, the active intellect, the acquired
or made intellect: of these three, two are eternal, the active and the potential:
the third is partly producible and perishable, and partly eternal.” By the ‘acquired
intellect’ he appears to mean the ‘passive intellect’ of each individual, inasmuch
as it is illumined by continuatio (ittisâl) with the universal potential
intellect. Does that mean the mind of the individual in so far as it comes abreast
of the zeitgeist? If so, but I cannot feel sure of the conclusion, then Arabian
mysticism ends in positivism.
1. It is easy to see how frivolous and impossible all this construction is. For what has understanding is intelligent; and that of which an intelligible impression is united with the understanding, is understood. The fact that an intelligible impression, united with a (foreign) understanding, comes somehow to be in man, will not render man intelligent; it will merely make him understood by that separately subsisting intelligence.
2. Besides, the impression actually in understanding is the form of the potential
intellect, in the same way that the actual visible appearance is the form of the
visual power, or eye. But the impression actually in understanding is to the phantasms
as the actual visible appearance is to the coloured surface, which is outside the
soul. This similitude is used by Averroes, as also by Aristotle. Therefore the supposed
union of the potential intellect (by means of the intelligible form) with the phantasm
that is in us will resemble the union of the visual power with the colour that is
in the stone. But this union does not make the stone see, but be seen. Therefore
the aforesaid union does not make us understand, but be understood. But, plainly,
it is properly and truly said that man understands: for we should not be investigating the nature
5. The intellect in the act of understanding and the object as represented in
understanding are one, as also the sense in the act of sensation and the object
as represented in sense. But the understanding as apt to understand and its object
as open to representation in understanding are not one, as neither is sense, so
far as it is apt to have sensation, one with its object, so far as that is open
to be represented in sensation.
CHAPTER LX—That Man is not a Member the Human Species by possession of Passive Intellect, but by possession of Potential Intellect
AVERROES endeavours to meet these arguments and to maintain the position aforesaid.
He says accordingly that man differs from dumb animals by what Aristotle calls the
‘passive intellect,’ which is that ‘cogitative power’ (vis cogitativa) proper
to man, in place whereof other animals have a certain ‘estimative power’ (aestimativa).
1. Vital activities stand to the soul as second actualities to the first.
2. An incident of the sensitive part cannot constitute a being in a higher kind
of life than that of the sensitive part, as an incident of the vegetative soul does
not place a being in a higher kind of life than the vegetative life. But it is certain
that phantasy and the faculties consequent thereon, as memory and the like, are
incidents of the sensitive part.
4. The ‘potential intellect’ is proved not to be the actualisation of any corporeal
organ
6. A habit and the act proper to that habit both reside in the same faculty. But to view a thing intellectually, which is the act proper to the habit of knowledge, cannot be an exercise of the faculty called ‘passive intellect,’ but must properly belong to the potential intellect: for the condition of any faculty exercising intelligence is that it should not be an actualisation of any corporeal organ. Therefore the habit of knowledge is not in the passive intellect, but in the potential intellect.
8. Habitual understanding, as our opponent acknowledges, is an effect of the
‘active intellect.’ But the effects of the active intellect are actual representations
in understanding, the proper recipient of which is the potential intellect, to which
the active intellect stands related, as Aristotle says, “as art to material.”
CHAPTER LXI—That the aforesaid Tenet is contrary to the Mind of Aristotle
ARISTOTLE defines soul, “the first actuality of a natural, organic body, potentially
alive”; and adds, “this definition applies universally to every soul.” Nor does
he, as the aforesaid Averroes pretends, put forth this latter remark in a tentative
way, as may be seen from the Greek copies and the translation of Boethius. Afterwards
in the same chapter he adds that there are “certain parts of the soul separable,”
and these are none other than the intellectual parts. The conclusion remains that
the said parts are actualisations of the body. St Thomas
may have seen Greek MSS. of Aristotle in Italy, or at Paris, but I
doubt if he could read them for himself. He is dependent on Latin translations,
often bad ones. See an example in my Aquinas Ethicus, I, p. 111. In his
Opusculum de Unitate Intellectus, he mentions his having seen a thirteenth
and fourteenth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but declines further reference
to them as being “not yet translated into our tongue.” St Thomas and the mediaeval
architects had genius, the fruits of which we still admire: but they had not at
hand the manifold adminicula of the modern builder and the modern scholar.
Nor was Averroes and the Arabian school any better off for Greek than St Thomas
(Renan, p. 48). To this particular explanation of Aristotle however the Commentator would have
been at no loss for a reply. The Greek referred to is De anima, II, i, 6,
8. Aristotle adds (n. 12), after saying that some parts of the soul are not separable
from the body: “There is nothing to prevent some parts of the soul being separable
from the body, because they are actualisations of nothing corporeal.” A conclusion
seems to follow, the very opposite of that which St Thomas draws, and exactly what
Averroes wishes, namely, that the intellectual part of the soul is not the actualisation,
or form, of anything corporeal, but dwells apart from all body. In the above quoted
Opusculum, ‘De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, which I take to be
a later production, St Thomas recognises the force of this reply, and re-adjusts
his position thus: “The intellect is a faculty of the soul, and the soul is the
form of the body: but the power that is called intellect is not the actualisation
of any bodily organ, because the activity of the body has nothing in common with
the activity of intellect.” Intellectus est potentia animae, quae est corporis
forma, licet ipsa potentia, quae est intellectus, non est alicujus organi actus,
quia nihil ipsius operationi communicat corporis operatio (De unitate intellectus,
cap. iii). So also Chap. LXVIII, last paragraph, and in Chap.
LXIX (already translated) the replies nn. 3, 4, p. 117. ln this later explanation St Thomas has the support of Averroes, who says (De
anima, III, p. 149): “But it has not been shown whether the body is perfected
(or actualised) in the same way by all the powers of the soul; or whether there
be some one of those powers whereby the body is not perfected (actualised, or informed).”
I am persuaded that the retention of the paragraph as it stands in the text was
due to an oversight on the part of the author. See note on p. 99
2. Nor is this explanation inconsistent with Aristotle’s words subjoined: “About
the intellect and the speculative faculty the case is not yet clear: but it seems
to be another kind of soul.”
3. Aristotle reckons ‘intellect’ among the ‘faculties’ of the soul.
4. Also, when beginning to speak of the potential intellect, he calls it a part
of the soul, saying: “Concerning the part of the soul whereby the soul has knowledge
and intellectual consciousness.”
5. And still more clearly by what follows, declaring the nature of the potential
intellect: “I call intellect that whereby the soul thinks and under
stands”:
The above tenet (of Averroes) therefore is contrary to the mind of Aristotle
and contrary to the truth: hence it should be rejected as chimerical.
CHAPTER LXII—Against the Opinion of Alexander concerning the Potential
Intellect Alexander of Aphrodisias (there were three towns of that name, one in Caria,
one in Cilicia, and one in Thrace) expounded Aristotle at Athens, A.D. 200. Among
the Greek commentators on the Philosopher he holds the place that Averroes holds
among the Mohammedans: hence his similar surname of
ὁ ἐξηγητής (the commentator).
Averroes, while continually wrangling with Alexander, especially on the nature of
the potential intellect, speaks of him with great regard. In the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries the schools of Northern Italy were filled with eager disputants, Alexandrists
and Averroists. St Thomas in his later Opusculum de unitate intellectus denies
that Alexander held the view which he here ascribes to him: he says that it was
falsely imputed to him by Averroes. Be that as it may, the opinion at present standing
for confutation comes to this. The ‘potential intellect,’ to all intents and purposes,
is identified with what Averroes, and St Thomas with him, calls the ‘passive intellect,’
described in the opening of Chap. LX, which ‘intellect’
is admitted on all hands to be in man, not extrinsic to him. There is a good account of Alexander in a Dissertation by Augustus Elfes, published
at Bonn (Straus) in 1887, entitled Aristotelis doctrina de mente humana, pars
prima, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis et Joannis Philoponi commentationes. Alexander
calls the potential intellect ὑλικός, as in the Latin versions of Averroes
it is called materialis. But with Alexander the potential intellect is a
bodily (organic) faculty: in fact it is silently confounded with the
νοῦς παθητικός
of Aristotle; whereas in Averroes, St Thomas, and (we may add) in Aristotle himself,
it is a spiritual faculty. This is the great mistake of Alexander. He says,
ἐπιτηδειότης
τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὑλικὸς νοῦς,
ἐοικὼς πινακίδι
ἀγράφῳ,—in this agreeing with
Aristotle, De anima, III, iv, 12: who says the potential intellect, to begin
with, is like “a notebook in which nothing is actually written.” The word
ἐπιτηδειότης
appears in St Thomas as praeparatio (predisposition). To meet Aristotle’s
saying that the potential intellect ἀπαθής (unimpressed by material things),
Alexander distinguishes between the predisposition of the tablet to be written on,
and the tablet itself: the tablet, he says, is impressed and changed, but not the
predisposition. This looks like quibbling. Alexander made the ‘active intellect’
one for all men; and even identified it with God. On the other hand, G. Rodier, Aristote, Traité de l’âme (Leroux, Paris,
1900), vol. II, pp. 457, 460, has a clear statement and able defence of Alexander’s
notion of ἐπιτηδειότης.
UPON consideration of these words of Aristotle, Alexander determined the potential
intellect to be some power in us, that so the general definition of soul assigned
by Aristotle might apply to it. But because he could not understand how any subsistent
intelligence could be the form of a body, he supposed the aforesaid faculty of potential
intellect not to be planted in any subsistent intelligence, but to be the result
of some combination of elements in the human body. Thus a definite mode of combination
of the components of the human body puts a man in potentiality to receive the influence
of the active intellect, which is ever in act, and according to him,
3. Aristotle assigns these characteristics to the potential intellect: to be
impressed by the intelligible presentation, to receive intelligible impressions,
to be in potentiality towards them (De anima, III, iv, 11, 12): all which
things cannot be said of any ‘disposition,’ but only of the subject predisposed.
4. An effect cannot stand higher above the material order than its cause. But every cognitive faculty, as such, belongs to the immaterial order. Therefore it is impossible for any cognitive faculty to be caused by a combination of elements. But the potential intellect is the supreme cognitive faculty in us: therefore it is not caused by a combination of elements.
6. No bodily organ can possibly have a share in the act of understanding. But that act is attributed to the soul, or to the man: for we say that the soul understands, or the man through the soul. Therefore there must be in man some principle independent of the body, to be the principle of such an act. But any predisposition, which is the result of a combination of elements, manifestly depends on the body. Therefore no such predisposition can be a principle like the potential intellect, whereby the soul judges and understands.
But if it is said that the principle of the aforesaid operation in us is the intellectual impression actually made by the active intellect, this does not seem to suffice: because when man comes to have actual intellectual cognition from having had such cognition potentially, he needs to understand not merely by some intelligible impression actualising his understanding, but likewise by some intellectual faculty as the principle of such activity. Besides, an impression is not in actual understanding except so far as it is purified from particular and material being. But this cannot happen so long as it remains in any material faculty, that is to say, in any faculty either caused by material principles or actualising a material organ. Therefore there must be posited in us some immaterial intellectual faculty, and that is the potential intellect.
CHAPTER LXIV—That the Soul is not a Harmony
THE maintainers of this view did not mean that the soul is a harmony of sounds, but a harmony of contrary elements, whereof they saw living bodies to be composed. The view is rejected for the following reasons:
1. You may find such a harmony in any body, even a mere chemical compound (corpus
mixtum). A harmony cannot move the body, or govern it, or resist the passions,
as neither can a temperament. Also a harmony, and a temperament also, admits of
degrees. All which considerations go to show that the soul is neither harmony nor
temperament.
2. The notion of harmony rather befits qualities of the body than the soul: thus health is a harmony of humours; strength, of muscles and bones; beauty, of limb and colour. But it is impossible to assign any components, the harmony of which would make sense, or intellect, or other appurtenances of the soul.
3. Harmony may mean either the composition itself or the principle of composition.
Now the soul is not a composition, because then every part of the soul would be
composed of certain parts of the body, an arrangement which cannot be made out.
In like manner the soul is not the principle of composition, because to different
parts of the body there are different principles of composition, or proportions
of elements, which would require the
CHAPTER LXV—That the Soul is not a Body
LIVING beings are composed of matter and form, — of a body, and of a soul which
makes them actually alive. One of these components must be the form, and the other
the matter. But a body cannot be a form, because a body is not in another as in
its matter and subject. Therefore the soul must be the form: therefore it is not
a body.
5. The act of understanding cannot be the act of anything corporeal. But it is an act of the soul. Therefore the intellectual soul at least is not a body.
It is easy to solve the arguments whereby some have endeavoured to prove that the soul is a body. They point such facts as these, — that the son resembles the father even in the accidents of his soul, being generated from the father by severance of bodily substance; and that the soul suffers with the body; and is separated from the body, separation supposing previous bodily contact. Against these instances we observe that bodily temperament is a sort of predisposing cause of affections of the soul: that the soul suffers with the body only accidentally, as being the form of the body: also that the soul is separated from the body, not as touching from touched, but as form from matter; although there is a certain contact possible between an incorporeal being and the body, as has been shown above (Chap. LVI).
Many have been moved to this position by their belief that what is not a material
body has no existence, being unable to transcend the imagination, which deals only
with material bodies. Hence this opinion is proposed in the person of the unwise:
The breath of our nostrils is smoke, and reason a spark in the beating of the
heart (
CHAPTER LXVI—Against those who suppose Intellect and Sense to be the same
SENSE is found in all animals, but animals other than man have no intellect: which is proved by this, that they do not work, like intellectual agents, in diverse and opposite ways, but just as nature moves them fixed and uniform specific activities, as every swallow builds its nest in the same way.
2. Sense is cognisant only of singulars, but intellect is cognisant of universals.
3. Sensory knowledge extends only to bodily things, but intellect takes cognisance of things incorporeal, as wisdom, truth, and the relations between objects.
4. No sense has reflex knowledge of itself and its own activity: the sight does
not see itself, nor see that it sees. But intellect is cognisant of itself, and
knows that it understands. A fifth argument is alleged from Aristotle, De anima, III, iv, 6, which
comes to this: — A sensory organ is damaged by meeting with its object in a high
degree: vivid light is seen, and crashing sounds are heard, but to the damage of
eye and ear; whereas a highly intellectual object, — Aristotelian psychology, for
example, — if understood at all, is understood to the improvement of the understanding;
the understanding, as such, not working through any bodily organ. St Thomas however is far from confining dumb animals to mere sensation. He allows
them sense memory, phantasy, a sort of judgement called vis aestimativa
(notes pp. 122, 125), and a certain power of self-determination (Chap.
XLVIII, n. 2). He denies in the intellect,
free will, the powers of forming general concepts and determining their own judgements,
and the immortality of their souls.
CHAPTER LXVII—Against those who maintain that the Potential Intellect is the
Phantasy
PHANTASY is found in other animals besides man, the proof of which is that, as objects of sense recede from sense, these animals still shun or pursue them. But intellect is not in them, as no work of intelligence appears in their conduct.
2. Phantasy is only of things corporeal and singular; but intellect, of things
universal and incorporeal.
4. Intelligence is not the actualisation of any bodily organ. But phantasy has
a fixed bodily organ.
Hence it is said: Who teacheth us above the beasts of the earth, and above
the fowls of the air instructeth us (
CHAPTER LXVIII—How a Subsistent Intelligence may be the Form of a Body
If a subsistent intelligence is not united with a body merely as its mover, as Plato thought (Chap. LVII); nor is the intellect, whereby man understands, a predisposition in human nature, as Alexander said (Chap. LXII; nor a temperament, as Galen (Chap. LXIII); nor a harmony, as Empedocles (Chap. LXIV); nor a body, nor a sense, nor a phantasy (Chapp. LXV, LXVI, LXVII); it remains that the human soul is a subsistent intelligence, united with the body as its form: which may be thus made manifest.
There are two requisites for one thing to be the substantial form of another.
One requisite is that the form be the principle of substantial being to that whereof
it is the form: I do not mean the effective, but the formal principle,
whereby a thing is and is denominated ‘being.’
It may be objected that a subsistent intelligence cannot communicate its being to a material body in such a way that there shall be one being of the subsistent intelligence and the material body: for things of different kinds have different modes of being, and nobler is the being of the nobler substance. This objection would be in point, if that being were said to belong to that material thing in the same way in which it belongs to that subsistent intelligence. But it is not so: for that being belongs to that material body as to a recipient subject raised to a higher state; while it belongs to that subsistent intelligence as to its principle and by congruence of its own nature.
In this way a wonderful chain of beings is revealed to our study. The lowest
member of the higher genus is always found to border close upon the highest member
of the lower genus. Thus some of the lowest members of the genus of animals attain
to little beyond the life of plants, certain shellfish for instance, which are motionless,
have only the sense of touch, and are attached to the ground like plants. Hence
Dionysius says: “Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the higher to the beginnings
of the lower.”
Above other forms there is found a form, likened to the supramundane substances
in point of understanding, and competent to an activity which is accomplished without
any bodily organ at all; and this is the intellectual soul: for the act of understanding
is not done through any bodily organ. Hence the intellectual soul cannot be totally
encompassed by matter, or immersed in it, as other material forms are: this is shown
by its intellectual activity, wherein bodily matter has no share. The fact however
that the very act of understanding in the human soul needs certain powers that work
through bodily organs, namely, phantasy and sense, is a clear proof that the said
soul is naturally united to the body to make up the human species.
CHAPTER LXIX—Solution of the Arguments alleged to show that a Subsistent Intelligence
cannot be united with a Body as the Form of that Body
The arguments wherewith Averroes endeavours to establish his opinion do not prove that the subsistent intelligence is not united with the body as the form of the same.
1. The words of Aristotle about the potential intellect, that it is “impassible,
unmixed, and separate,”
2. Supposing the substance of the soul to be united in being with the body as
the form of the body, while still the intellect is not the actualisation of any
organ, it does not follow that intellect falls under the law of physical determination,
as do sensible and material things: for we do not suppose intellect to be a harmony,
or function (ratio, γόλος) of any organ, as
Aristotle says that sense is.
3. That Aristotle is saying that the intellect is ‘unmingled,’ or ‘separate,’
does not intend to exclude it from being a part, or faculty, of the soul, which
soul is the form of the whole body, is evident from this passage, where he is arguing
against those who said that there were different parts of the soul in different
parts of the body: — “If the whole soul keeps together the body as a whole, it
is fitting that each part of the soul should keep together some part of the body:
but this looks like an impossibility: for it is difficult even to imagine what part
of the body the intellect shall keep together, or how.” De anima, I, v, 29, where Aristotle seems to assume that intellect is
a part, μόριον, of the soul. Averroes however might have replied that is
a mere argumentum ad hominem against Plato, who did suppose so. In n. 25
however Aristotle says clearly,
τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστί, κ.τ.λ., which
see. But Aristotle is so careless a writer, so regardless of his own injunctions
and definitions, that the minute analysis of his language, far from settling a point,
may be positively misleading. In reading him you have often to think, not so much
of what he says, as of what on his own showing he should say. When St Thomas teaches that the soul is the form of the body by its substance,
but not by the faculty of intelligence, he supposes a real distinction between the
soul and its faculties, a distinction not admitted by the earlier scholastics, sometimes
called ‘Augustinians.’ In his ruling that the intelligence has no corporeal organ,
one naturally thinks of the brain. But the brain, in the Aristotelian system, had
quite another function; it acted as a refrigerator to cool down the vital heat of
the body. See the curious chapter, De partibus animalium, II, 7. St Thomas
however assigned to the brain some share in sensory processes: see
De potentiis animae, cap. iv, quoted in Dr Maher’s
Psychology, pp. 568-9, ed. 4.
CHAPTER LXXIII—That the Potential Intellect is not One and the Same in all Men
HENCE it is plainly shown that there is not one and the same potential intellect,
belonging to all men who are and who shall be and who have been, as Averroes pretends. See Chap. LXXVI.
Alexander, Avicenna, and Averroes, are all at one against St
Thomas, in affirming the one universal intellect. Thus Averroes writes (in Aristot.,
De anima, III, v): “We agree with Alexander in his mode of explaining the
active intellect; and differ from him as to the nature of the potential intellect.”
If Alexander and Avicenna do not expressly affirm the oneness and universality of
the potential intellect, the reason is, because they thought it enough to affirm
the universality of the ‘active intellect’; and did not so clearly as Averroes and
St Thomas (see Chap. LX) mark off from the spiritual ‘potential
intellect’ the organic and perishable ‘passive intellect’
(ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός.
De anima, III, v, 3). In this dispute about the one universal
intellect these two questions should be kept distinct:— A. Do Alexander, Avicenna, and Averroes, or does Aquinas, speak the true mind of Aristotle? B. In point of psychological fact, is the truth with St Thomas or with his three opponents? A. On the former question I observe that there is no complete and coherent account
of νοῦς in Aristotle, so that any commentator who will give such a complete
account is obliged to overshoot his author. The question then comes to this: On
which side is Aristotle’s meaning eked out with least violence to what he actually
says? My opinion is that St Thomas is the better Aristotelian in speaking of the
human soul in this world, and Averroes in speaking of the soul in the next world.
I think that Aristotle would have admitted that the intellectual soul is in the
body, and is individually multiplied in the bodies of individual men. Averroes’s
theory of the continuatio (ittisâl), or union of the individual passive
intellect with the universal potential intellect, is to me far fetched, inconsistent
with the sound sense of Aristotle, a remnant of Moorish mysticism (although Averroes
himself was no mystic) rather than a development of Greek philosophy. But coming
to the existence of the intellectual soul after death, I fear that the following
words of Averroes declare the mind of Aristotle more faithfully than St Thomas’s
doctrine of the permanence of as many separate souls as there have been bodies.
“Of all things the soul is most like light; and as light is divided by the division
of illuminated bodies, and then becomes one when the bodies are taken away, such
is the state of souls in their relation with their bodies” Destructio destructionum,
disp. 1, p. 21, ed. 1574). See note p. 128. B. For a Catholic, the second question is settled by the decree of the fifth
Council of Lateran under Leo X in 1513 against the Averroists of the age: “The soul
is immortal, and individually multipliable, and multiplied according to the multitude
of the bodies into which it is infused.” No Catholic can deny the immortality of
the individual soul, or hold any view subversive of individual responsibility, as
though saint and sinner alike were automata, administered by an intelligence and
will foreign to themselves. The one really Universal Intellect is that of God; and
the Divine Mind works upon our mortal minds, not formally, as a constituent
of them, but efficiently, as guiding them, while respecting their native
liberty. In his work, De animae beatitudine cap. iii, Averroes says very
justly that the active intellect is so called, not merely in an efficient,
but in a formal sense. “The active intellect is a cause in regard of the
potential intellect not only by way of efficiency and movement, but also by way
of final perfection, that is, by way of form and consummation” (p. 151). It would
then be pantheism, which even Averroes avoids, to make God the ‘active intellect’
of the world, in the Aristotelian sense. But God is the efficiently illuminating
intellect of all other intellects. The modus operandi whereby God acts upon
the minds of mortal men, whether indirectly through sensible objects, or in any
more direct way, is an interesting and comparatively unexplored region of psychology.
The intellectual is allowed on all hands to be the universal; and the universal
is our natural avenue to the divine. “Material forms,” says Averroes, “when abstracted
in the soul from their matters, become science and understanding; and understanding
is nothing else than forms abstracted from matter, . . . . nothing else than a comprehension
of things understood, . . . . nothing else than a comprehension of the order of the world”
(Destructio destructionum, disp. 6, p. 86). He goes on to show how intellect
is impeded and retarded by having to study these forms in matter. Mental experience, a witness too little heard in this discussion, reveals to
us this fact, that the more absorbed we are in intellectual occupation, the more
forgetful we are of ourselves. Aristotle places happiness in contemplation; and
contemplation is a process of being universalised and de-individualised. The
πάθη of our animal organism, our bodily needs and apprehensions, drive us back
upon ourselves. Happiness puts us out of ourselves: misery is a painful consciousness
of self. Some such painful isolation in the next world, some state in which the
soul is driven in upon itself, excluded from the universal truth and universal good,
and as it were crushed within its own individuality, may be the penal consequence
of selfishness and sin. Phantastic and objectionable on many points as Averroes is, there is a world
of thought in Averroism; and his great opponent St Thomas owes not a little to the
Commentator. Renan indeed goes the length of saying: Albert (Albertus Magnus)
doit tout à Avicenne; Saint Thomas, comme philosophe, presque tout à l’Averroisme
(Averroes et l’Averroisme p. 236). The reader may consult Roger Bede Vaughan’s St Thomas of Aquin (Longmans,
1871), vol. I, pp. 300, 301, for Averroes’s doctrine of the passive and active intellect;
and vol. II, pp. 799-809, for an analysis of St Thomas’s Opuculum de unitate
intellectus.
A. 1. It has been shown that the substance of the intellect is united with the
human body and is its form (Chap. LVII). But it is impossible for there
A. 2 and 3.
A. 4. A thing has being from that source from whence it has unity: for one and being are inseparable. But everything has being by its own form. Therefore the unity of the thing follows the unity of the form. It is impossible therefore for there to be one form of different individual men. But the form of any individual man is his intellectual soul. It is impossible therefore for there to be one intellect of all men.
But if it is said that the sentient soul of this man is other than the sentient soul of that, and so far forth the two are not one man, though there be one intellect of both, such explanation cannot stand. For the proper activity of every being follows upon and is indicative of its species. But as the proper activity of an animal is to feel, so the proper activity of a man is to understand. As any given individual is an animal in that he has feeling, so is he a man by virtue of the faculty whereby he understands. But the faculty whereby the soul understands, or the man through the soul, is the potential intellect. This individual then is a man by the potential intellect. If then this man has another sentient soul than another man, but not another potential intellect, but one and the same, it follows that they are two animals, but not two men.
B. To these arguments the Commentator replies by saying that the potential intellect is conjoined with us through its own form, namely, through an intelligible impression, one subject of which [is the said potential intellect, and one subject again] is the phantasm existing in us, which differs in different men; and thus the potential intellect is multiplied in different men, not by reason of its substance, but by reason of its form.
The nullity of this reply appears by what has been shown above (Chap. LIX), that it would be impossible for any man to have understanding, if this were the only way in which the potential intellect were conjoined with us. But suppose that the aforesaid conjunction (continuatio) were sufficient to render man intelligent, still the said answer does not solve the arguments already alleged.
B. 1. According to the above exposition, nothing belonging to intellect will remain multiplied as men are multiplied except only the phantasm, or impression in phantasy; and this very phantasm will not be multiplied as it is actually understood, because, as so understood, it is in the potential intellect, and has undergone abstraction of material conditions under the operation of the active intellect; whereas the phantasm, as a potential term of intelligence, does not transcend the grade of the sentient soul.
B. 2. Still the objection holds, that this man will not be differentiated
B. 3. Nothing attains its species by what it is potentially, but by what it is actually.
B. 4. It is the first and not the second perfection
B. 6. That which puts a man in the species of man must be something abiding in the same individual as long as he remains: otherwise the individual would not be always of one and the same species, but now of one species and now of another. But the impressions of phantasy do not remain always the same in the same man; but new impressions come, and previous impressions perish. Therefore the individual man does not attain his species by any such impression: nor is it anything in the phantasy that conjoins him with the formal principle of his species, which is the potential intellect.
C. But if it is said that the individual does not receive his species by the
phantasms themselves, but by the faculties in which the phantasms are, namely, the phantasy, the memory, and the vis cogitativa
which is proper to man, and
which in the De anima, III, v, Aristotle calls the ‘passive intellect,’
C. 1. Since the vis cogitativa operates only upon
particulars, the impressions of which it puts apart and puts together;
C. 2. The cogitative faculty, since it acts through an organ, is not the faculty whereby we understand. But the principle whereby we understand is the principle whereby man is man. Therefore no individual is man by virtue of the cogitative faculty: nor does man by that faculty essentially differ from dumb animals, as the Commentator pretends.
C. 3. The cogitative faculty is united to the potential intellect, the principle
of human intelligence, only by its action of preparing phantasms for the active
intellect to render them actual terms of intelligence and perfections of the potential
intellect. But this preliminary activity of the cogitative
C. 4. If the potential intellect of this and that man were numerically one and the same, the act of understanding would be one and the same in both which is an impossibility.
D. But if it is said that the act of understanding is multiplied according to the diversity of impressions in phantasy, that supposition cannot stand.
D. 3. For the potential intellect understands a man, not as this individual man, but as man simply, according to the specific essence of the race. But this specific essence remains one, however much impressions in phantasy are multiplied, whether in the same man or in different men. Therefore no multiplication of phantasms can be the cause of multiplication of the act of understanding in the potential intellect, considering the same species; and thus we shall still have numerically one action in different men.
D. 4. The proper subject in which the habit of knowledge resides is the potential intellect. But an accident, so long as it remains specifically one, is multiplied only by coming to reside in different subjects. If then the potential intellect is one in all men, any habit of knowledge specifically the same, say, the habit of grammar, must be numerically the same in all men, which is unthinkable.
E. But to this they say that the subject of the habit of knowledge is not the potential intellect, but the passive intellect and the cogitative faculty (Chap. LX): which it cannot be.
E. 1. For, as Aristotle shows in the Ethics (II, i), like acts engender like habits; and like habits reproduce like acts. Now by the acts of the potential intellect there comes to be the habit of knowledge in us; and we are competent for the same acts by possession of the habit of knowledge. Therefore the habit of knowledge is in the potential intellect, not in the passive.
E. 2. Scientific knowledge is of demonstrated conclusions; and demonstrated conclusions,
like their premises, are universal truths.
F. The error of placing the habit of scientific knowledge in the passive intellect seems to have arisen from the observation that men are found more or less apt for the study of science according to the several dispositions of the cogitative faculty and the phantasy.
F. 1. But this aptitude depends on those faculties only as remote conditions:
so it also depends on the complexion of the body, as Aristotle says that men of
delicate touch and soft flesh are clever.
F. 2. The dispositions of the cogitative faculty and the phantasy regard the object:
they regard the phantasm, which is prepared by the efficiency of these faculties
readily to become a term of actual understanding under the action of the active
intellect. But habits do not condition objects: they condition faculties. Thus conditions
that take the edge off terrors
F. 3. If the potential intellect of all men is one, we must suppose that the potential
intellect has always existed, if men have always existed, as Averroists suppose;
and much more the active intellect, because agent is more honourable than patient,
as Aristotle says (De anima, III, v). The tentative
conclusions of the Meno, 85-86, and the poetry of the Phaedrus, passed
into aphorisms among the later Platonists. See Jowett’s Dialogues of Plato,
II, pp. 13-19, ed. 3. Later Platonists, we may say, were more Platonic than Plato.
But it remains a leading line of difference between Plato and Aristotle, that Plato
never gave due recognition, as Aristotle did, to the value of sense experience in
the genesis of science and philosophy. St Thomas’s argument here is this, that if
the human mind is eternal and one, then human knowledge is eternal and one: whence
it follows that, when the individual seems to be learning by the experience of his
senses, he is really only recognising what is in his mind already.
G. But to this the Commentator replies that intellectual presentations reside in a twofold subject: in one subject, from which they have everlasting being, namely, the potential intellect; in another subject, from which they have a recurring new existence, namely, the phantasm, or impression in phantasy. He illustrates this by the comparison of a sight-presentation, which has also a twofold subject, the one subject being the thing outside the soul, the other the visual faculty. But this answer cannot stand.
G. 1. For it is impossible that the action and perfection of the eternal should
depend on anything temporal. But phantasms are temporal things, continually springing
up afresh in us from the experience of the senses. Therefore the intellectual impressions,
whereby the potential intellect is actuated and brought to activity, cannot possibly
depend on phantasms in the way that visual impressions depend on things outside
the soul. It is supposed (ad hominem) that the potential intellect is eternal. —
Yet somehow the argument here seems to miss the point. The Commentator never said
that the presentations in the eternal potential intellect depended on the phantasms
of any individual. He never likened those presentations to the individual’s fleeting
visual impressions of things: but he likened the presentations in the eternal intellect
to things, and the phantasms of the individual to his visual impressions of things. Averroes contended that ‘forms,’ or aspects of things, exist in two ways, in both
eternally: (a) materially, in sensible things, the world being eternal, in which
sensible things these forms are potentially intelligible, being abstracted thence
by intellect: (b) intellectually, in the eternal intellect, which is at once potential
and active. He added that the same forms had an intellectual existence in a third
way, namely, a temporal existence in the mind of this and that individual, which
mind is ‘continued,’ or ‘conjoined’ for a time with the eternal intellect: this
asserted ‘continuation’ of the temporal with the eternal is the theme of contention
between Averroes and St Thomas. St Thomas might refit his argument (as indeed he does presently) by demanding
how intellectual presentations come to be in this supposed one eternal intellect,
whether by abstraction from previous phantasms or not. To say that the potential
intellect had impressions independent of previous phantasms, would put the Commentator
in flat contradiction with Aristotle; e.g., De anima, III, vii, 3, 4: “To
the intellectual soul phantasms are as sense-perceptions: wherefore the soul never
understands without a phantasm.” On the other hand, if phantasms are presupposed,
there must have been phantasms also from eternity: how otherwise could an eternal
mind depend on phantasms for all its content?
G. 2. Nothing receives what it has already got. But before any sensory experience
of mine or yours there were intellectual impressions in the
G. 6 and 7. If the potential intellect receives no intellectual impressions from
the phantasms that are in us, because it has already received them from the phantasms
of those who were before us, then for the like reason we must say that it receives
impressions from the phantasms of no generation of men, whom another generation
has preceded. But every generation has been preceded by some previous generation,
if the world and human society is eternal, as Averroists suppose. Therefore the
potential intellect never receives any impressions from phantasms; and from this
it seems to follow that the potential intellect has no need of phantasms to understand.
But we (nos) understand by the potential intellect. Therefore neither shall
we need sense and phantasm for our understanding: which is manifestly false and
contrary to the opinion of Aristotle.
For the potential intellect, like every other substance, operates according to
the mode of its nature. Now according to its nature it is the form of the body.
Hence it understands immaterial things, but views them in some material medium;
as is shown by the fact that in teaching universal truths particular examples are
alleged, in which what is said may be seen. Therefore the need which the potential
intellect has of the phantasm before receiving the intellectual impression is different
from that which it has after the impression has been received. Before reception,
it needs the phantasm to gather from it the intellectual impression, so that the
phantasm then stands to the potential intellect as an object which moves it. But
after receiving the impression, of which the phantasm is the vehicle, it needs the
phantasm as an instrument or basis of the impression received. Thus by command of
the intellect there is formed in the phantasy a phantasm answering to such and such
an intellectual impression; and in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines
forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.
G. 8. If the potential intellect is one for all men and eternal, by this time there must have been received in it the intellectual impressions of all things that have been known by any men whatsoever. Then, as every one of us understands by the potential intellect, — nay, as the act of understanding in each is the act of that potential intellect understanding, — every one of us must understand all that has been understood by any other men whatsoever.
H. To this the Commentator replies that we do not understand by the potential
intellect except in so far as it is conjoined with us through the impressions in
our phantasy, and that these phantasms are not the same nor
When the potential intellect has been actualised by the reception of an intellectual
impression, it is competent to act of itself: hence we see that, once we have got
the knowledge of a thing, it is in our power to consider it again when we wish:
nor are we at a loss for lack of phantasms, because it is in our power to form phantasms
suitable to the consideration which we wish, unless there happens to be some impediment
on the part of the organ, as in persons out of their mind or in a comatose state.
But if in the potential intellect there are intellectual impressions of all branches
of knowledge, — as we must say, if that intellect is one and eternal, — then the
necessity of phantasms for the potential intellect will be the same as in his case
who already has knowledge, and wishes to study and consider some point of that knowledge,
for that also he could not do without phantasms.
CHAPTER LXXIV—Of the Opinion of Avicenna, who supposed Intellectual Forms not to be
preserved in the Potential Intellect
THE above arguments (against Averroes) seem to be obviated by the theory of Avicenna.
He says that intellectual impressions do not remain in the potential intellect except
just so long as they are being actually understood. Receptione propinqua apprehensioni.
M. l’Abbé Ecalle in his French translation
(Vivés, Paris, 1854) has d’une manière qui est une disposition prochaine à l’apprehension
proprement dite. He takes the form to be in the storehouse of phantasy or memory
before is in the intellectual faculty. I take it to be first seized by the apprehensive
faculty, then consigned to the storehouse, from whence it is brought out again and
re-apprehended at will. So I understand the words that follow, of revival, not of
first apprehension. For a loan of this translation, the only translation that I have seen, I am indebted
to the kindness of the Reverend James Bredin, late Professor of Chemistry at Oscott
College. Avicenna’s theory
tends to make the active intellect from without supply the potential intellect with
intelligible forms: in which case phantasms cease to be necessary as a previous
condition for the acquisition of intellectual ideas; and the arguments in the last
chapter, which suppose such necessity of phantasms, fall to the ground. Averroes
supposed one universal intellect of all men, at once potential and active: he left
the individual, merely as such, nothing higher than the sentient powers. Avicenna
denied to the individual the active intellect, and supposed one universal active
intellect for all mankind. The potential intellect is reduced by his theory to a
momentary impressibility. Avicenna (Abu Ali Ibn-Sina), a native of Persia, lived A.D. 980-1037. Like Averroes,
he was physician and philosopher. I quote from The Psychology of Ibn-Sina translated
by J. M. Macdonald, M.A., Beyruth 1884. Four faculties are distinguished by
Avicenna all of them belonging to the sentient part of the soul: none of them to
the intelligent part. They are called “conceptual faculty,” “imagination,” “judgement,”
“memory.” I. Conceptual faculty. “There is nothing in the conceptual faculty besides
the true forms derived from sense” (p. 28). This seems to correspond to what St
Thomas calls virtus apprehensiva sensibilis, the faculty of sense perception. II. Imagination. “In animals there is a faculty which compounds whatever
forms have been collected in the common sense, and distinguishes between them, and
differentiates them, without the disappearance of the forms from common sense; and
this faculty is named imagination” (p. 28). “The imaginative faculty performs its
actions without perceiving that things are according to its imaginings” (p. 28).
“The imaginative faculty may imagine things other than that which the judgement
considers desirable” (p. 29). If we might assume that this ‘imagination’ is purely
reproductive of sense phantasms, it would answer to the ‘phantasy’ (imaginatio)
which St Thomas ascribes to Avicenna. III. Judgement. “Then in animals there is a faculty which decides decisively
upon a thing, whether it is this or not. And by it the animal flies from that which
is to be guarded against, and seeks that which is desirable. This faculty is called
the judging and the supposing faculty” (pp. 28, 29). It is not difficult
to recognise here that highest faculty of animal nature, called in other animals
vis aestimativa, in man vis cogitativa (Chap. LX). IV. Memory. “Then there is in animals a faculty which preserves the meaning of
that which the faculties have conceived, e.g., that the wolf is an enemy.” It is
a store-house of judgements rather than of sense perceptions: for “the senses do
not perceive the enmity of the wolf; or the love of the child”: only the
vis aestimativa perceives that, “then it treasures them up in this faculty.” It
is not a store-house of fancies, as the “imagination” is: for “this faculty does
not picture anything which the judgement does not approve. This faculty does not
declare anything to be true, but preserves what something else declares to be true.
And this faculty is called the preserving and remembering faculty” (p. 29). All
this answers exactly to the account of “memory” which St Thomas attributes to Avicenna. We come now to the main argument of this chapter, which is Avicenna’s belief
in the ‘active intellect’ as a separate intelligence, working causatively upon the
mind of man, and generating therein universal concepts, such concepts not being
stored in the human mind for future use, but directly created afresh for every recurrence
of them, by the action of this extrinsic intelligence. Against this doctrine of
Avicenna, Averroes writes explicitly (De animae beatitudine, cap. iii, p.
151): Intellectus agens non tantum est causa in intellectu materiali [sc.
possibili] per viam efficientis et motoris, sed per viam ultimae perfectionis, hoc
est, per viam formae et finis. (See note, p. 135.) Averroes united the active
and the potential intellect, and made both eternal: Avicenna and Alexander made
the active intellect alone eternal. Avicenna’s theory of the universal active intellect
is thus given in his own quaint words. — “ The proving of the existence of an intellectual
essence, distinct from bodies, standing in the relation of light to sight, and in
the place of a fountain: and the proving that, when human souls separate from bodies,
they unite with this essence” (Title of Section x, p. 40). Speaking of the belief
in mathematical axioms, he says: “It must be either by the use of sense and experiment,
or by divine continuous overflow, . . . . overflow continuous with the rational soul, and
the rational soul continuous with it. . . . This overflow, which is continuous with
the soul, is an intellectual essence, not a body, not in a body: it stands by itself,
holding the relation to the intellectual soul of light to sight” (pp. 40, 41). “The
soul remains after death ever immortal, joined on to this noble essence, which is
universal intelligence” (p. 42). In Avicenna, as in Averroes, one recognises in the doctrine of ittisâl
however misdirected, that craving for some connexion of man’s intelligence with
a spirit above his own, which a banal materialism or positivism labours to extirpate,
making man highest of beings and (perforce) self-sufficient. That craving is the
root of mysticism; and in the doctrine of the Incarnation, with its corollaries
of grace and sacraments, it has become the animating principle of Christianity.
1. It is a novelty to say that the potential intellect, viewing the impressions
made by singular things in the phantasy, is lit up by the light of the active intellect
to know the universal; and that the action of the lower faculties, phantasy, memory,
and cogitative faculty, fit and prepare the soul to receive the emanation of the
active intellect. This, I say, is novel and strange doctrine: for we see that our
soul is better disposed to receive impressions from intelligences subsisting apart,
the further it is removed from bodily and sensible things: the higher is attained
by receding from the lower. It is not therefore likely that any regarding of bodily
phantasms should dispose our soul to receive the influence of an intelligence subsisting
apart. Plato made a better study of the basis of his position: for he supposed that
sensible appearances do not dispose the soul to receive the influence of separately
subsisting forms, but merely rouse the intellect to consider knowledge that has
been already caused in it by an external principle: for he supposed that from the
beginning knowledge of all things intellectually knowable was caused in our souls
by separately existing forms, or ideas: hence learning, he said, was nothing else
than recollecting. (Wordsworth’s Ode, Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood.)
3. Intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory. If therefore in sensory knowledge there is some power of preserving apprehensions, much more will this be the case in intellectual knowledge.
6. This opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who says that the potential intellect is “the place of ideas”: which is tantamount to saying that it is a “storehouse” of intellectual impressions, to use Avicenna’s own phrase.
The arguments to the contrary are easily solved. For the potential intellect
is perfectly actuated about intellectual impressions when it is actually considering
them: when it is not actually considering them, it is not perfectly actuated about
them, but is in a condition intermediate between potentiality and actuality.
CHAPTER LXXV—Confutation of the Arguments which seem to prove the Unity of the Potential Intellect
ARG. 1. Apparently, every form that is specifically one and numerically multiplied, is individualised by its matter: for things specifically one and numerically many agree in form, and are distinguished according to matter. If then the potential intellect is multiplied according to number in different men, while it remains one in species, it must be multiplied in this and that man by matter, — by the matter which is that man’s body the form of which it is supposed to be. But every form, individualised by matter which it actuates, is a material form: for the being of everything must depend on that on which its individuation depends: for as general constituents are of the essence of the species, so individualising constituents are of the essence of this individual. It follows therefore that the potential intellect is a material form, and consequently that it does not receive any thing, nor do anything, except through a bodily organ: which is contrary to the nature of the potential intellect.
Reply. We confess that the potential intellect is specifically one in
different men, and many according to number, — waiving the point that the constituents
of man are not put into genus and species for what they are in themselves, but for
what they are as constituents of the whole. Still it does not follow that the potential
intellect is a material form, dependent for its being on the body. For as it is
specifically proper to the human soul to be united to a certain species of body,
so any individual soul differs from any other individual soul, in number only, inasmuch
as it is referable to numerically another body. Thus then human souls, — and consequently
the potential intellect, which is a faculty of the human soul, — are individualised
according to bodies, not that the individuation is caused by the bodies.
Arg. 2. If the potential intellect were different in this man and that,
the impression understood would have to be numerically different in this man, while
remaining one in species: for since the proper subject of impressions actually understood
is the potential intellect, when that intellect is multiplied there must be a corresponding
multiplication of intellectual impressions according to the number of different
individuals. But the only impressions or forms which are the same in species and
different in number, are individual forms, which cannot be intellectual forms, because
objects of intellect are universal, not particular. It is impossible therefore for
the potential intellect to be multiplied in different individual men.
Reply. This second argument fails from neglecting to distinguish between
that whereby (quo) we understand, and that which (quod) we understand.
The impression received in the potential intellect is not to be taken for that
which is understood. For as all arts and sciences have for their object-matter
things which are understood, it would follow that the subject-matter of all
sciences was impressions on the potential intellect: which is manifestly false,
for no science has anything to say to such mental impressions except psychology
and metaphysics: though it is true that through those mental impressions there is
known the whole content of all the sciences.
Still it does not follow that, if sciences are of universal truths, universals
should subsist by themselves outside the soul, as Plato supposed. For though for
the truth of knowledge it is necessary that the knowledge should answer to the thing,
still it is not necessary that the mode of the knowledge and the mode of the thing
should be the same: for properties that are united in the thing are sometimes known
separately. Thus one and the same thing is white and sweet: still sight takes cognisance
only of the whiteness, and taste only of the sweetness. Thus again intellect understands
a line drawn in sensible matter apart from that sensible matter, though it might
understand it also along with the sensible matter.
The fact of the intellect understanding the nature of genus and species
It is not therefore necessary that the intellectual impression of this and that
intelligence should be numerically one: for it would follow thereupon that the act
of understanding in them both was also numerically one, since activity follows form,
which is the principle of species: but it is necessary, to the end that one object
should be understood by both minds, that there should be a like impression of one
and the same object in them both. And this is possible enough, although the intellectual
impressions differ in number: for there is no difficulty in having different images
of one thing; hence the contingency of one than being seen by several persons. Individuatio fit per hanc materiam signatam. For
materia signata see B. I, Chap.
LXIII, p. 45, note. The doctrine that matter is the principle of individuation
is one of the most intricate in the scholastic system, and cannot be entered upon
here. Things ‘not actually intelligible’ nevertheless are potentially intelligible:
i.e., they lend themselves to a process of de- particularising under the active
intellect; and so as universals become actual terms of intellect. This is explained
at length in Chap. LXXVII.
But though we have said that the intellectual impression, received in the
Arg. 3. The master transfuses the knowledge which he has into the scholar. Either then the knowledge transfused is the same in number, or different in number, though the same in species. The latter alternative seems impossible: because it supposes the master to cause his own knowledge in the scholar in the same way that an agent causes its own form in another being, by generating a nature specifically like its own; which seems proper to material agents. It must be then that numerically the same knowledge is caused in the scholar that was in the master; which would be impossible, were there not one potential intellect of them both.
Reply. The saying that the knowledge in master and scholar is numerically
one, is partly true and partly not: it is numerically one in point of the thing
known, but not in point of the intellectual impressions whereby the thing is known,
nor in point of the habit of knowledge itself. It is to be observed however that,
as Aristotle (Metaph. VII, ix) teaches, there are arts in whose subject matter
there is not any principle active in producing the effect of the art, as is clear
in the building art: for in wood and stones there is no active power moving to the
erection of a house, but only a passive aptitude. But there is an art in whose subject
matter there is an active principle moving in the direction of the effect of the
art, as is clear in the healing art: for in the sick subject there is an active
principle tending to health. And therefore the effect of the former kind of art
is never produced by nature, but always by art, as every house is a work of art:
A final remark. Since the Commentator makes the passive intellect the residence of habits of knowledge (Chap. LX), the unity of the potential intellect helps not at all to the numerical unity of knowledge in master and scholar: for certainly the passive intellect is not the same in different men, since it is an organic faculty. Hence, on his own showing, this argument does not serve his purpose.
CHAPTER LXXVI—That the Active Intellect is not a separately Subsisting Intelligence, but a Faculty of the Soul
WE may further conclude that neither is the active intellect one in all men,
as Alexander and Avicenna suppose, though they do not suppose the potential intellect
to be one in all men.
4. Plato supposed knowledge in us to be caused by Ideas, which he took to subsist apart by themselves. But clearly the first principle on which our knowledge depends is the active intellect. If therefore the active intellect is something subsisting apart by itself, the difference will be none, or but slight, between this opinion and that of Plato, which the Philosopher rejects.
5. If the active intellect is an intelligence subsisting apart, its action upon
us will either be continual and uninterrupted, or at least we must say that it is
not continued or broken off at our pleasure. Now its action is to make the impressions
on our phantasy actual terms of intelligence. Either therefore it will do this always
or not always. If not always, still it will not do it at our discretion. Either
therefore we must be always in the act of understanding, or it will not be in our
power actually to understand when we wish.
But it may be said that the active intellect, so far as with it lies, is always
in action, but that the impressions in our phantasy are not always becoming actual
terms of intelligence, but only when they are disposed thereto; and they are disposed
thereto by the act of the cogitative faculty, the use of which is in our power;
and therefore actually to understand is in our power; and this is why not all men
understand the things whereof they have the impressions in their phantasy, because
not all have at command a suitable act of the cogitative faculty, but only those
who are accustomed and trained thereto.
9. In the nature of every cause there is contained a principle sufficient for the natural operation of that cause. If the operation consists in action, there is at hand an active principle, as we see in the powers of the vegetative soul in plants. If the operation consists in receiving impressions, there is at hand a passive principle, as we see in the sentient powers of animals. But man is the most perfect of all inferior causes; and his proper and natural operation is to understand, an operation which is not accomplished without a certain receiving of impressions, inasmuch as every understanding is determined by its object; nor again without action, inasmuch as the intellect makes potential into actual terms of understanding. There must therefore be in the nature of man a proper principle of both operations, to wit, both an active and a potential intellect, and neither of them must be separate in being (or physically distinct), from the soul of man.
10. If the active intellect is an intelligence subsisting apart, it is clearly above the nature of man. But any activity which a man exercises by mere virtue of a supernatural cause is a supernatural activity, as the working of miracles, prophecy, and the like effects, which are wrought by men in virtue of a divine endowment. Since then man cannot understand except by means of the active intellect, it follows, supposing that intellect a separately subsistent being, that to understand is not an operation proper and natural to man; and thus man cannot be defined as intellectual or rational.
11. No agent works except by some power which is formally in the agent as a constituent of its being. But the working both of potential and of active intellect is proper to man: for man produces ideas by abstraction from phantasms, and receives in his mind those ideas; operations which it would never occur to us to think of, did we not experience them in ourselves. The principles therefore to which these operations are attributable, namely, the potential and the active intellect, must be faculties formally existing in us.
12. A being that cannot proceed to its own proper business without being moved
thereto by an external principle, is rather driven to act than acts of itself. This
is the case with irrational creatures. Sense, moved by an exterior sensible object,
makes an impression on the phantasy; and so in order the impression proceeds through
all the faculties till it reaches those which move the rest. Now the proper business
of man is to understand; and the prime mover in understanding is the active intellect,
which makes intellectual impressions whereby the potential intellect is impressed; which potential
CHAPTER LXXVII—That it is not impossible for the Potential and the Active Intellect to be united in the one Substance of the Soul
SOME one perhaps may think it impossible for one and the same substance, that
of our soul, to be in potentiality to receive all intellectual impressions (which
is the function of the potential intellect), and to actualise those impressions
(which is the function of the active intellect); since nothing acts as it is in
potentiality to receive, but only as it is in actual readiness to act. But, looking
at the matter rightly, no inconvenience or difficulty will be found in this view
of the union of the active and potential intellect in the one substance of the soul.
For a thing may well be in potentiality in one respect and in actuality in another;
and this we find to be the condition of the intellectual soul in its relation to
phantasms, or impressions in phantasy. For the intellectual soul has something in
actuality, to which the phantasm is in potentiality;
But the intellectual soul does not lie open to receive impressions of the likenesses of things that are in phantasms in the way that the likeness exists in the phantasm, but according as those likenesses are raised to a higher stage, by being abstracted from individualising material conditions and rendered actual objects, or terms, of understanding. And therefore the action of the active intellect upon the phantasms precedes their being received into the potential intellect; and thus the prime agency is not attributable to the phantasms, but to the active intellect.
There are some animals that see better by night than by day, because they have
weak eyes, which are stimulated by a little light, but dazzled by much. And the
case is similar with our understanding, which is “to the clearest truths as the
bat’s eye to the sun” (Aristotle, Metaph. I, Appendix): hence the little
intellectual light that is connatural to us is sufficient for us to understand with.
But that the intellectual light connatural to our soul is sufficient to produce
the action of the active intellect, will be clear to any one who considers the necessity
for positing such an intellect. Our soul is found to be in potentiality to intelligible
objects as sense to sensible objects: for as we are not always having sensations,
so we are not always understanding.
CHAPTER LXXVIII—That it was not the opinion of Aristotle that the Active Intellect
is a separately Subsistent Intelligence, but rather that it is a part of the Soul This chapter
is a running commentary on De anima, III, v, and may be more
profitably presented by a description of its contents than by a translation. 1. On ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας
τὰς διαφοράς (these differences
must also be in the soul), St Thomas points out that the differences in question,
to wit, the potential and the active intellect, are both said to be “in the soul,”
which excludes either of them from being a faculty extrinsic to the soul. 2. On ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει, which in his translation appears as in omni
natura, and which he takes to mean, not as the Greek means, “in all nature,”
but in every natural substance,” he argues that both the ὕλη, or potential
intellect, and the αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, or active intellect, must be in
the natural substance of the soul. 3. Upon the words, used of the active intellect, that it is
ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς
(as a habit, like light), he says that as a habit does not exist
by itself, so neither can, on this showing, the active intellect. He adds that ‘habit’
here does not mean ‘habitual knowledge,’ as when we speak of ‘a habit (i.e., habitual
knowledge) of first principles,’ but a positive endowment, actual and formal, as
opposed to privation and potentiality. 4. Of the four epithets bestowed on the active intellect,
χωριστός, ἀμιγής, ἀπαθής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὤν ἐνεργείᾳ
(separate, unmingled, impassible, by essence being
in act), he observes that the first and second have already been applied to the
potential intellect: see Chap. IV, n. 6, ὁ δὲ χωριστός: IV, 3,
ἀμιγῆ εἶναι . . . . οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι τῳ σώματι. The third, he says, has been applied
to the potential intellect with a distinction (he refers to iv, 5, 6): the potential
intellect is impassible, as not being acted on by matter, having no bodily
organ to receive direct impressions from material things: but it receives impressions
from the active intellect. The fourth, he says, has been flatly denied of the potential
intellect, which is said, iv, 12, to be
δυνάμει πως τὰ νοητά,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν πρίν ἂν νοῇ
(potentially identified with the intelligible forms, but actually
nothing before it understands). He concludes that the word
χωριστός is only
applied to the active intellect in the same sense in which it has already been referred
to the potential intellect, iv, 9,
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός
(the faculty of sense is not without body, but this is separate).
He identifies χωριστός with
ἄνευ σώματος, as meaning ‘operative without
bodily organ.’ 5. On τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι (actual
knowledge is identical with its object), — which means that, inasmuch as objects
of knowledge become present by representation in the mind, the mind in knowing anything
knows itself, — St Thomas blames Averroes for taking this to be true only of the
active intellect: he cites iv, 13,
τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, ἡ γὰρ θεωρητικὴ
ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν
(knower and known
are identical, for speculative science and its object are one), where he says that
Aristotle speaks, not of the active, but of the potential intellect. In the words
ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη
(scientia in acta) St Thomas discovers
a tertium quid, which is neither potential nor active intellect, but a combination
of the two: he calls it intellectus in actu, ‘the intellect as actually understanding,’
the concrete mind at work. 6. On ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί,
ὅλως οὐδὲ χρόνῳ
(potential knowledge is prior in time to actual knowledge in the individual, but
all the world over it is not prior even in time), he is misled by his Latin translation,
qui vero secundum potentiam, as though the Greek had been
ὁ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν νοῦς.
He takes it for a question of priority in time between the potential intellect
and the concrete, actually thinking mind (intellectus in actu). The error
is not serious. 7. Coming to οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ
(it does not at one time think, and at another time not think), he says that this is spoken of the actually
thinking mind, to mark it off from the potential intellect. His conclusion is: “The
mind comes to be actually thinking by being identified with the objects of thought:
hence it is not open to it at times to think and at times not to think.” This may
mean — as undoubtedly it is Aristotle’s meaning: ‘There must be thinking so long
as there are things: but there are always things: therefore there is always thinking.’
Then the question comes: ‘Yes, but whose thinking?’ — to which St Thomas gives
no answer. To interpret with Silvester Maurus, ‘so long as the mind is actually
thinking, it thinks unceasingly,’ is to father no very profound truth upon the Philosopher. 8. Upon χωρισθεὶς δέ ἐστι μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὃπερ ἐστί
(when separated, it
is only that which it is) St. Thomas is altogether thrown out by his Latin, separatum
hoc solum quod vere est (that alone is separate which truly is), as though
χωρισθεὶς (separatum) were the predicate. He takes the meaning to
be that the actually thinking mind in man, inclusive at once of potential and active
intellect, is ‘separate’ in the sense of not operating through a bodily organ. On
τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον (this alone is mortal and everlasting),
all his comment is “as being independent of the body, since it is separate.” On the last sentence,
οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ κ.τ.λ., he makes no comment whatever
in this place, but see Chap. LXXX, arg. 5. No one can seriously contend that, working under such disadvantages, St Thomas
has succeeded in adequately interpreting this, one of the most difficult chapters
in Aristotle. I recommend the reader to study it in G. Rodier’s masterly work,
Aristote, Traité de l’âme, 2 vols., text, translation, and notes (Leroux,
Paris, 1900). I offer these few final remarks. (a) From ἀεὶ γὰρ to
οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, is a parenthesis; as Philoponus
says, τοῦτο ἐν μέσῳ ἔρριψεν. The meaning is, as St Thomas well indicates,
that though in the individual mind knowledge is first potential, then actual, yet
somewhere in the range of being there is an actual knowledge prior to all potential.
This is only carrying out the Aristotelian principle that ultimately the actual
always precedes the potential: ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα
(De anima, III, vii, 1), a principle well put forward by Rodier, vol. II,
p. 490. What actually thinking mind precedes all potentiality of thought, Aristotle
does not tell us in this chapter. (b) The words, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ, ὄτε δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, are to be taken
in close connexion with
τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ, the whole meaning: ‘this mind,
ever essentially active, thinks continually, and not merely at intervals.’ Whether
this refers to the mind of the race, Aristotle agreeing with Averroes that mankind
have existed from eternity, or whether it points to some superhuman intelligence,
is a question which will be debated as long as Aristotle continues to be read. (c) χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, “when separated from the
body [in death, as Rodier rightly explains], it is its proper self, and nothing
else,” — pure νοῦς, apart from phantasy and sensation and bodily organism;
and this pure νοῦς is, in some undefined way, “immortal and everlasting.”
In ἐστὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί I think we may further recognise some slight influence
of a familiar idiom, by which a Greek says that a thing ‘is what it is,’ when he
is either unable or reluctant to enter into further detail. (d) The concluding words mean: ‘We have no memory [after death, of the transactions
of our earthly existence], because though the νοῦς is unaffected by death
(ἀπαθές), yet the passive intellect
[ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς, the cogitative
faculty with the phantasy, see St Thomas, Chap. LX], is
perishable [and perishes with the body], and without this there is no understanding
[of things learnt in life with its concurrence, — cf. De anima, III, viii,
5, ὃταν θεωρῇ ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν].’ This sense seems definitely
fixed as the mind of Aristotle by a previous passage, De anima, I, iv, 12-15:
— “The νοῦς within us seems to be a subsistent being
(οὐσία) and
imperishable. If it could be impaired, it would be impaired most in the feebleness
of old age: whereas, we may say, the case is the same with intellect as with sense:
for if the old man got a young man’s eye, he would see as the young man does. So
old age is not an affection of the soul, but an affection of what contains the soul,
as in drunken bouts and illnesses. Thus the intellectual and speculative faculty
decays when something else in the man decays, but of itself it is imperishable (ἀπαθές).
But the exercise of the cogitative faculty
(τὸ διανοεῖσθαι), and the passions
of love and hate, are not functions of νοῦς, but of this individual organism
that contains νοῦς, as containing it. Therefore when this organism perishes
in death, the soul neither remembers nor loves: for memory and [the passion of]
love were not affections of the intelligent soul, but of the compound organism wherein
soul and matter met, which has not perished: but νοῦς perhaps is something
more divine and imperishable
(ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν
τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν).
CHAPTER LXXIX—That the Human Soul does not Perish with the Body
EVERY intelligent subsisting being is imperishable (Chap. LV): but the human soul is an intelligent subsisting being.
2. Nothing is destroyed by that which makes its perfection. But the perfection
of the human soul consists in a certain withdrawal from the body: for the soul is
perfected by knowledge and virtue: now in knowledge
4. A natural craving cannot be in vain.
6. Intelligible being is more permanent than sensible being. But the substratum
of material bodies (materia prima) is indestructible, much more the potential
intellect, the recipient of intelligible forms. Therefore the human soul, of which
the potential intellect is a part, is indestructible.
8. No form is destroyed except either by the action of the contrary, or by the
destruction of the subject wherein it resides, or by the failure of its cause. Thus
heat is destroyed by the action of cold: by the destruction of the eye the power
of sight is destroyed; and the light of the atmosphere fails by the failure of the
sun’s presence, which was its cause. But the human soul cannot be destroyed by the
action of its contrary, for it has no contrary, since by the potential intellect
the soul is cognitive and receptive of all contraries. Nor again by the destruction
of the subject in which it resides, for it has been shown above that the human soul
is a form not dependent on the body for
9. If the human soul is destroyed by the destruction of the body, it must be
weakened by the weakening of the body. But the fact is that if any faculty of the
soul is weakened by the body being weakened, that is only incidentally, inasmuch
as that faculty of the soul stands in need of a bodily organ, as the sight is weakened
by the weakening of the organ of sight, but only incidentally, as may be shown by
this consideration: if any weakness fell essentially upon the faculty, the faculty
would not be restored by the restoration of the organ; but now we see that however
much the faculty of sight seems weakened, it is restored, if only the organ is restored.
10. The same is evidenced by the very words of Aristotle: “Moving causes pre-exist,
but formal causes are along with the things whereof they are causes: for when a
man is well, then there is health. But whether anything remains afterwards, is a
point to consider: in some cases there may well be something remaining: the soul
is an instance, not the whole soul, but the intelligence: as for the whole soul
remaining, that is perhaps an
impossibility.”
Hereby is banished the error of the impious in whose person it is said: We
were born out of nothingness, and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been
(
CHAPTER LXXX, LXXXI—Arguments of those who wish to prove that the Human Soul perishes with the Body, with Replies to the same
ARG. 1. If human souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of
bodies, as shown above (Chap. LXXV), then when the bodies perish, the
souls cannot remain in their multitude.
Reply. Whatever things are necessarily in conjunction and proportion with
one another, are made many or one together, each by its own cause. If the being
of the one depends on the other, its unity or multiplication also will depend on
the same: otherwise it will depend on some extrinsic cause. Form then and matter
must always be in proportion with one another, and conjoined by a certain natural
tie. Hence matter and form must vary together in point of multiplicity and unity.
If then the form depends on the matter for its being, the multiplication of the
form will depend on the matter, and so will its unity. But if the form is in no
such dependence on the matter, then, — though it will still be necessary for the
form to be multiplied with the multiplication of the matter, — the unity or multiplicity
of the form will not depend on the matter. But it has been shown (Chap.
LXVIII, and note, p. 154, that the human soul is a form not
dependent on matter for its being. Hence it follows that, though souls are multiplied
as the bodies which they inform are multiplied, still the fact of bodies being many
cannot be the cause of souls being many.
Arg. 2. The formal nature (ratio formalis, pp. 111, 116) of things is the cause of their differing in species. But if souls remain many after the perishing of their bodies, they must differ in species, since in souls so remaining the only diversity possible is one of formal nature. But souls do not change their species by the destruction of the body, otherwise they would be destroyed too, for all that changes from species to species is destroyed in the transition. Then they must have been different in species even before they parted from their bodies. But compounds take their species according to their form. So then individual men must differ in species, an awkward conclusion consequent upon the position that souls remain a multitude after their bodies are gone.
Reply. It is not any and every diversity of form that makes a difference
of species. The fact of souls separated from their bodies making a multitude follows
from their forms being different in substance, inasmuch as the substance
Arg. 3. It seems quite impossible, on the theory of those who suppose
the eternity of the world, for human souls to remain in their multitude after the
death of the body. For if the world is from eternity, infinite men have died before
our time. If then the souls of the dead remain after death in their multitude, we
must say that there is now an actual infinity of souls of men previously dead. But
actual infinity is impossible in nature.
Reply. Of supporters of the eternity of the world, some have simply allowed
the impossibility, saying that human souls perish altogether with their bodies.
Others have said that of all souls there remains one spiritual existence which is
common to all, — the active intellect according to some,
Arg. 5. It is impossible for any substance to exist destitute of all activity.
Reply. The assertion that no activity can remain in the soul after its
separation from the body, we say, is incorrect: for those activities remain which
are not exercised through organs, and such are understanding and will. As for activities
exercised through bodily organs, as are the activities of the vegetative and sentient
soul, they do not remain. But we must observe that the soul separated from the body
does not understand in the same way as when united with the body: for everything
acts according as it is. Now though the being of the human soul, while united with
the body, is perfect (absolutum), not depending on the body, still the body
is a sort of housing (stramentum
We may see some indication of this even in living men. When the soul is hampered
by preoccupations about its body, it is less disposed to understand higher things.
Hence the virtue of temperance, withdrawing the soul from bodily delights, helps
especially to make men apt to understand.
But memory, being an act exercised through a bodily organ, as Aristotle shows,
CHAPTER LXXXII—That the Souls of Dumb Animals are not Immortal
NO activity of the sentient part can have place without a body. But in the souls
of dumb animals we find no activity higher than the activities of the sentient part.
That animals neither understand nor reason is apparent from this, that all animals
of the same species behave alike, as being moved by nature, and not acting on any
principle of art: for every swallow makes its nest alike, and every spider its web
alike. Therefore there is no activity in the soul of dumb animals that can possibly
go on without a body.
2. Every form separated from matter is actually understood. Thus the active intellect
makes impressions actually understood, inasmuch as it abstracts them. But if the
soul of a dumb animal remains after the body is gone, it will be a form separated
from matter. Therefore it will be form actually understood. But “in things separated
from matter understanding and understood are the same” (De Anima, III, iv,
13). Therefore the soul of a dumb animal will have understanding, which is impossible.
3. In everything that is apt to arrive at any perfection, there is found a natural
craving after that perfection: for good is what all crave after, everything its
own good. But in dumb animals there is no craving after perpetuity of being except
in the form of perpetuity of the species, inasmuch as they have an instinct of generation,
whereby the species is perpetuated, — and the same is found in plants.
CHAPTER LXXXIII, LXXXIV—Apparent Arguments to show that the Human Soul does not begin with the Body, but has been from Eternity, with Replies to the same
ARG. 1. (A.) What will never cease to be, has a power of being always. But of that which has a power of being always it is never true to say that it is not: for a thing continues in being so far as its power of being extends. What therefore will never cease to be, will never either begin to be.
Reply. The power of a thing does not extend to the past, but to the present or future: hence with regard to past events possibility has no place. Therefore from the fact of the soul having a power of being always it does not follow that the soul always has been, but that it always will be. — Besides, that to which power extends does not follow until the power is presupposed. It cannot therefore be concluded that the soul is always except for the time that comes after it has received the power.
Arg. 2. Truth of the intellectual order is imperishable, eternal, necessary. Now from the imperishableness of intellectual truth the being of the soul is shown to be imperishable. In like manner from the eternity of that truth there may be proved the eternity of the soul.
Reply. The eternity of understood truth may be regarded in two ways, — in point of the object which is understood, and in point of the mind whereby it is understood. From the eternity of understood truth in point of the object, there will follow the eternity of the thing, but not the eternity of the thinker. From the eternity of understood truth in point of the understanding mind, the eternity of that thinking soul will follow. But understood truth is eternal, not in the latter but in the former way. As we have seen, the intellectual impressions, whereby our soul understands truth, come to us fresh from the phantasms through the medium of the active intellect. Hence the conclusion is, not that our soul is eternal, but that those understood truths are founded upon something which is eternal. In fact they are founded upon the First Truth, the universal Cause comprehensive of all truth. To this truth our soul stands related, not as the recipient subject to the form which it receives, but as a thing to its proper end: for truth is the good of the understanding and the end thereof. Now we can gather an argument of the duration of a thing from its end, as we can argue the beginning of a thing from its efficient cause: for what is ordained to an everlasting end must be capable of perpetual duration. Hence the immortality of the soul may be argued from the eternity of intellectual truth, but not the eternity of the soul.
Arg. 3. That is not perfect, to which many of its principal parts are
wanting. If therefore there daily begin to be as many human souls as there are men
born, it is clear that many of its principal parts are daily being added to the
universe, and consequently that very many are still wanting to it. It follows that
the universe is imperfect, which is impossible.
Reply. The perfection of the universe goes by species, not by individuals; and human souls do not differ in species, but only in number (Chap. LXXV).
(B.) Some professing the Catholic faith, but imbued with Platonic doctrines, have taken a middle course [between Platonists, who held that individual souls were from eternity, now united with bodies, now released by turns; and Alexander, Averroes, — and possibly Aristotle himself, — deniers of personal immortality]. These men, seeing that according to the Catholic faith nothing is eternal but God, have supposed human souls not to be eternal, but to have been created with the world, or rather before the visible world, and to be united with bodies recurrently as required. Origen was the first professor of the Christian faith to take up this position, and he has since had many followers. The position seems assailable on these grounds.
1. The soul is united with the body as the form and actualising principle thereof.
Now though actuality is naturally prior to potentiality, yet, in the same subject,
it is posterior to it in time:
2. It is natural to every form to be united to its own proper matter: otherwise the compound of matter and form would be something unnatural. Now that which belongs to a thing according to its nature is assigned to it before that which belongs to it against its nature: for what belongs to a thing against its nature attaches to it incidentally, but what belongs to it according to its nature attaches to it ordinarily; and the incidental is always posterior to the ordinary. It belongs to the soul therefore to be united to the body before being apart from the body.
3. Every part, separated from its whole, is imperfect. But the soul, being the
form (Chap. XLVII), is a part of the human species. Therefore, existing
by itself, apart from the body, it is imperfect. But the perfect is before the imperfect
in the order of natural things. Evolutionists say just the contrary, one great
difference between them and the scholastics. The position is saved by the consideration
that any evolution must be the ordinance of an all-perfect Mind. The Platonists and Origenists, St Thomas’s opponents in this now effete controversy
about the pre-existence of souls, would not have allowed that the soul was the form
of the body, or was imperect without the body, or better for union with it. Rather
they held that for spirit to be united with flesh was to the spirit encumbrance
and punishment. Even Catholics, who confess the soul to be the form of the body,
may still linger over Plato’s words: “Union between soul and body is nowise better
than separation” (Laws, VIII, 821), such union, that is, as obtains in this
mortal life (
(C.) If souls were created without bodies, the question arises how they came
to be united with bodies. It must have been either violently or naturally. If violently,
the union of the soul with the body is unnatural, and man is an unnatural compound
of soul and body, which cannot be true. But if souls are naturally united with bodies,
then they were created with a physical tendency (appetitus naturalis) to
such union. Now a physical tendency works itself out at once, unless something comes
in the way. Souls then should have been united with bodies from the instant of their
creation except for some intervening obstacle. But any obstacle intervening to arrest
a physical tendency, or natural craving, does violence to the same. Therefore it
would have been by violence that souls were for a period separated from their bodies,
which is an awkward conclusion. The second of the Newtonian laws of motion warns us that all physical tendencies
to motion work themselves out concurrently and instantaneously as tendencies.
St Thomas’s reasoning however is beset with this difficulty, that, parted from the
body, the soul, on his showing, still retains a physical tendency to union with
the body: is there any more difficulty, anything of greater violence, in a soul
having to wait for its first union with the body than in its having to wait, as
it certainly does wait for centuries, for its reunion in the resurrection? The two telling arguments against the pre-existence of souls are, first, that
pace Platonis et Origenis it is wholly unproved; secondly, that a spirit,
that had once existed free, would suffer violence by becoming the ‘form’ of a body
under conditions of mortality. There are those who venture to think, although St Thomas does not think so, that
while the soul in the body is properly called an ‘incomplete substance,’ — for
otherwise it would not be the ‘form of the body,’ — yet, parted from the body,
it expands into the completeness of pure intelligence, and has no ‘natural craving’
for union with the body any more. Resurrection then is not within the purview of
philosophy, as it is not the fulfilment of any natural exigence; and, at least in
the resurrection of the just, the soul shall be in the body on quite other conditions
than those under which she now dwells in this prison-house of flesh. But of this
in the fourth Book.
(D.) But if it be said that both states alike are natural to the soul, as well
the state of union with the body as the state of separation, according to difference
(E.) But if it is said that souls are united with bodies neither violently nor naturally, but of their own spontaneous will, that cannot be. For none is willing to come to a worse state except under deception. But the soul is in a higher state away from the body, especially according to the Platonists, who say that by union with the body the soul suffers forgetfulness of what it knew before, and is hindered from the contemplation of pure truth. At that rate it has no willingness to be united with a body except for some deceit practised upon it. Threfore, supposing it to have pre-existed before the body, it would not be united therewith of its own accord.
(F.) But if as an alternative it is said that the soul is united with the body
neither by nature, nor by its own will, but by a divine ordinance, this again does
not appear a suitable arrangement, on the supposition that souls were created before
bodies. For God has established everything according to the proper mode of its nature:
hence it is said: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good
(
(G.) This consideration moved Origen to suppose that when souls, created from the beginning of time, came by divine ordinance to be united with bodies, it was for their punishment. He supposed that they had sinned before they came into bodies, and that according to the amount of their guilt they were united with bodies of various degrees of nobility, shut up in them as in prisons. But this supposition cannot stand for reasons alleged above (Chap. XLIV).
CHAPTER LXXXV—That the Soul is not of the substance of God
The divine substance is eternal, and nothing appertaining to it begins anew to be (B. I, Chap. XV). But the souls of men were not before their bodies (Chap. LXXXIII).
3. Everything out of which anything is made is in potentiality to that which is made out of it. But the substance of God, being pure actuality, is not in potentiality to anything (B. I, Chap. XVI).
4 and 5. That out of which anything is made is in some way changed. Moveover the soul of man is manifestly variable in point of knowledge, virtue, and their opposites. But God is absolutely unchangeable (B. I, Chap. XII): therefore nothing can be made out of Him, nor can the soul be of His substance.
7. Since the divine substance is absolutely indivisible, the soul cannot be of
that substance unless it be the whole substance. But the divine substance cannot
but be one (B. I, Chap. XLII). It would follow that all men have but
one intellectual soul, a conclusion already rejected (Chap. LXXV).
This opinion seems to have had three sources. Some assumed that there was no incorporeal being, and made the chiefest of corporeal substances God. Hence sprang the theory of the Manichean, that God is a sort of corporeal light, pervading all the infinities of space, and that the human soul is a small glimmer of this light. Others have posited the intellect of all men to be one, either active intellect alone, or active and potential combined. And because the ancients called every self-subsistent intelligence a deity, it followed that our soul, or the intellect whereby we understand, had a divine nature. Hence sundry professors of the Christian faith in our time, who assert the separate existence of the active intellect, have said expressly that the active intellect is God. This opinion might also have arisen from the likeness of our soul to God: for intelligence, which is taken to be the chief characteristic of Deity, is found to belong to no substance in the sublunary world except to man alone, on account of his soul.
CHAPTER LXXXVI—That the Human Soul is not transmitted by Generation
Where the activities of active principles suppose the concurrence of a
body, the origination also of such principles supposed bodily
concurrence: for a thing has existence according as it has activity:
everything is active according to its being. But when active
principles have their activities independent of bodily concurrence, the
reverse is the case: the genesis of such principles is not by any
bodily generation. Now the activity of the vegitative and sentient soul
cannot be without bodily concurrence (Chapp. LVII, LXVIII): but the
activity of the intellectual soul has place through no bodily organ
(Chap. LXIX). Therefore the vegitative and
sentient souls are generated by the generation of the body, and date
their existence from the transmission of the male semen, but not
the intellectual soul. The force of this admission will appear in the next two chapters. Two
propositions must be kept apart:— (a) The origin of the intellectual soul of man is synchronous with the
moment of conception. (b) The intellectual soul of man is, as the body of man, simply a
product of conception. St Thomas denies both these propositions. Modern Catholic theologians
usually are content with denying the second only.
2. If the human soul owed its origin to the transmission of the male
semen, that could be only in one of two ways. Either we must
suppose that the soul is actually in the male semen, being as it
were accidentally separated from the soul of the generator as the
semen is separated from the body: — we see something of this
sort in Annelid animals, Annulosa, St Thomas calls them: they are now known as
Annelidae, worms, centipedes, and the like. The cutting of an
Annelid in two is not a case of reproduction. But in the lowest animal
life, that of Amoebae, there is a true reproduction by
‘fissure’; as also in the propagation of plants by cuttings. The kindness of a medical friend suplies me with the following statement: “When the body of an Annelid, say an earthworm, is divided, as by the
stroke of a spade, the animal does not necessarily die, does not
necessarily live. The principal nerve gangia are situated in the head,
and though the severed part, remote from this, so-called, central
nervous system, will have no restorative power and will die, the
segment containing the nerve masses — ‘brain’ — may restore or
reproduce the missing opposite extremity, or a semblance of it. But, if
the injury were very near the head, so that almost all the vital
organs, viscera, etc., were included in the segment remote from the
nerve ganglia, death would occur, not even the nerve ganglia in the
head having the power to restore or reproduce an almost entirely new
body, viscera, blood vessels, etc. So, while one part may live, both
parts may die. It depends upon the amount and importance of the part
or parts to be reproduced, or restored.”
5. It is ridiculous to say that any subsistent intelligence is either divided by division of the body or produced by any corporeal power. But the soul is a subsistent intelligence (Chap. LXVIII). Therefore it can neither be divided by the separation of the semen from the body, nor produced by any active power in the same.
6. If the generation of this is the cause of that coming to be, the destruction of this will be the cause of that ceasing to be. But the destruction of the body is not the cause of the human soul ceasing to be (Chap. LXXIX). Neither then is the generation of the body the cause of the soul commencing to be.
CHAPTER LXXXVII—That the Human Soul is brought into Being by a Creative Act of God
Everything that is brought into being is either generated or created. But the human soul is not generated, either by way of composition of parts or by the generation of the body (Chap. LXXXVI); and yet it comes new into existence, being neither eternal nor pre-existent (Chapp. LXXXIII, LXXXIV): therefore it comes into being by creation. Now, as has been shown above, God alone can create (Chap. XXI).
2. Whatever has existence as subsistent being, is also made in the way that a
subsistent being is made: while whatever has no existence as a subsistent being,
but is attached to something else, is not made separately, but only under condition
of that having been made to which it is attached. But the soul has this peculiarity
to distinguish it from other forms, that it is a
5. The end of a thing answers to its beginning. Now the end of the human soul and its final perfection is, by knowledge and love to transcend the whole order of created things, and attain to its first principle and beginning, which is God. Therefore from God it has properly its first origin.
Holy Scripture seems to insinuate this conclusion: for whereas, speaking of the
origin of other animals, it scribes their souls to other causes, as when it says:
Let the waters produce the creeping thing of living soul (
CHAPTER LXXXVIII, LXXXIX—Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with their
Solution
For the better understanding of the solutions given, we must prefix some exposition
of the order and process of human generation, and of animal generation generally.
First then we must know that that is a false opinion of certain persons who say
that the vital acts which appear in the embryo before its final development (ante
ultimum complementum), come not from any soul or power of soul existing
in it, but from the soul of the mother.
It has been alleged that the soul in its complete essence is in the male
semen from the first, its activities not appearing merely
for want of organs. But that cannot be. For since the soul is united with the body
as a form, it is only united with that body of which it is properly the actualisation.
Now the soul is the actualisation of an organised body. Therefore before the organisation
of the body the soul is in the male semen, not actually,
but virtually. Hence Aristotle says that seed and fruit have life potentially in such a way
It would follow, if the soul were in the male semen from the first, that
the generation of an animal was only by fissure (per decisionem), as is the
case with Annelid animals, that are made two out of one. For if the male semen
has a soul the instant it was cut off from the body,
Nor again can it be said, as some say, that though there is not in the male
semen at its first cutting off
Upon this view it would follow that numerically the same active power was now
a vegetative soul only, and afterwards a sentient soul; and so the substantial form
itself was continually more and more perfected: it would further follow that a substantial
form was educed from potentiality to actuality, not instantaneously, but successively;
and further than generation was a continuous change, as is alteration, — all so
many physical impossibilities. There would ensue even a still more awkward consequence,
that the rational soul was mortal. For no formal constituent added to a perishable
thing makes it naturally imperishable: otherwise the perishable would be changed
into the imperishable, which is impossible, as the two differ in kind. But the substance
of the sentient soul, which is supposed to be incidentally generated when the body
is generated in the process above described, is necessarily perishable with the
perishing of the body. If therefore this soul becomes
Therefore the active power which is cut off, or emitted, with the male semen
from the body, and is called ‘formative,’ In spiritu praedicto,
which I render ‘in the aforesaid
subject’: because the spiritus,
πνεῦμα, or
‘gas’ that made according to Aristotle
τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἀφρῶδές τε καὶ λευκόν,
has been declared by St Thomas to be the ‘proper subject’ in which the ‘formative
power’ inheres. Spiritus was a vague word to a mediaeval writer: it was fraught
with suggestions high and divine. St Thomas would have shrunk from reducing spiritus,
to the mysterious vehicle of the vis formativa seminis, to the banality of
gas. But the πνεῦμα of De gen. animal., II, ii, the authority
on which he relied, is gas pure and simple. As a piece of morphology, all this speculation about πνεῦμα, ἀφρός,
spiritus, spuma, gas and foam, must be swept away. It is false, as we have
seen the analogy of a bisected Annelid to be false. The cutting of a worm in two
is no example of the generative process; and there is no such thing in any semen
as this genetic gas. Chemical and microscopic examination of the mammalian semen
reveal quite another structure and composition. So far as biology sees it, what actually happens in conception is this: — “Wherever
they meet the female ovum, the male spermatozoa surround it, often in dense masses.
Only one spermatozoon however effects an entrance into the ovum, after the following
fashion. The tail is left behind, and the nucleated head with the centrosome passes
into the ovum, generally as a place called the ‘micropyle.’ Certain changes have
been going on in the ovum to anticipate this event, and the renewed nucleus of the
ovum is awaiting developments. This is known as the ‘female pronucleus.’ Certain
changes prepare the nucleated head of the spermatozoon for action, and what is known
as the ‘male pronucleus’ results. The male pronucleus proceeds to fuse with the
female pronucleus, and a new nucleus, the result of the combination, the ‘segmntation
nucleus’ results. Thus the male element and the female element seem to take an equal
part in the formation of the embryo: for immediately after the combined nucleus
is formed, the work of segmentation and formation of the tissues goes on. Though
fertilisation is effected by quite a microscopic quantity, one single spermatozoon
entering the ovum, we must observe that an equally microscopic part of the ovum
is fertilised: for the great bulk of what we call the ovum is made up of nutritive
material, food-yolk, etc.” So far, so clear, much in advance of St Thomas. But concerning any vis formativa,
directrix of this wonderful process of conception and development; and about the
origin and function of soul, vegetative, sentient, and intelligent; we remain shrouded
in the darkness of the thirteenth century. We want a new treatise De anima,
to be written by some Aquinas modernus, who shall be at once a profound Aristotelian
and an expert biologist, and shall consecrate his life to this one study of soul.
He should not neglect the mistaken biology of the original Aquinas and Aristotle.
The mistakes of great minds are suggestive: they are far-reaching in the history
of thought. Thus, as one reads Aristotle, De gen. animal., II, ii, the memory
is carried to St John’s Gospel,
Nor need we be uneasy in admitting the generation of an intermediate product,
the existence of which is presently after broken off, because such transitional
links are not complete in their species, but are on the way to a perfect species;
and therefore they are not engendered to endure, but as stages of being, leading
up to finality in the order of generation. The higher a form is in the scale of
being, and the further it is removed from a mere material form, the more intermediate
forms and intermediate generation must be passed through before the finally perfect
form is reached.
With these principles recognised, it is easy to answer the objections.
Arg. 1. Man being an animal by the possession of a sentient soul, and the notion of ‘animal’ befitting man in the same sense as it befits other animals, it appears that the sentient soul of man is of the same kind as the souls of other animals. But things of the same kind have the same manner of coming to be. Therefore the sentient soul of man, as of other animals, comes to be by the active power that is in the male semen. But the sentient and the intelligent soul in man is one in substance (Chap. LVIII). It appears then that even the intelligent soul is produced by the active power of the semen.
Reply. Though sensitive soul in man and brute agree generically, yet they differ specifically. As the animal, man, differs specifically from other animals by being rational, so the sentient soul of a man differs specifically from the sentient soul of a brute by being also intelligent. The soul therefore of a brute has sentient attributes only, and consequently neither its being nor its activity rises above the order of the body: hence it must be generated with the generation of the body, and perish with its destruction. But the sentient soul in man, over and above its sentient nature, has intellectual power: hence the very substance of this soul must be raised above the bodily order both in being and in activity; and therefore it is neither generated by the generation of the body, nor perishes by its destruction.
Arg. 2. As Aristotle teaches, in point of time the foetus is an animal
before it is a man.
Reply. The sentient soul, whereby the human foetus was an animal, does not last, but its place is taken by a soul that is at once sentient and intelligent.
Arg. 3. The soul, as it is the form of the body, is one being with the body. But unity of thing produced, unity of productive action, and unity of producing agent, all go together. Therefore the one being of soul and body must be the result of one productive action of one productive agent. But confessedly the body is produced by the productive action of the power that is in the male semen. Therefore the soul also, as it is the form of the body, is produced by the same productive action, and not by any separate agency.
Reply. The principle of corresponding unity of produced, production, and
producer, holds good to the exclusion of a plurality of productive agents not acting
in co-ordination with one another. Where they are co-ordinate, several agents have
but one effect. Thus the prime efficient cause acts to the production of the effect
of the secondary efficient cause even more vigorously
Arg. 4. Man generates his own specific likeness by the power that is in the detached semen, which generation means causing the specific form of the generated. The human soul therefore, the specific form of man, is caused by the power in the semen.
Reply. Man generates his specific likeness, inasmuch as the power of his semen operates to prepare for the coming of the final form which gives the species to man.
Arg. 5. If souls are created by God, He puts the last hand to the engendering of children born sometimes of adultery.
Reply. There is no difficulty in that. Not the nature of adulterers is evil, but their will: now the effect which their semen produces is natural, not voluntary: hence there is no difficulty in God’s co-operating to that effect and giving it completeness.
In a book ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa
Arg. 6. Soul and body make one whole, that is, one man. If then the soul is made before the body, or the body before the soul, the same thing will be prior and posterior to itself. Therefore body and soul are made together. But the body begins in the cutting off, or emission, of the semen. Therefore the soul also is brought into being by the same.
Reply. Allowing that the human body is formed before the soul is created, or conversely, still it does not follow that the same man is prior to himself: for man is not his body or his soul. It only follows that one part of him is prior to another part; and in that there is no difficulty: for matter is prior in time to form, — matter, I mean, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form, not inasmuch as it is actually perfected by form, for so it is together with form. The human body then, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to soul, as not yet having the soul, is prior in time to the soul: but, for that time, it is not actually human, only potentially so: but when it is actually human, as being perfected by a human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the soul, but together with it.
Arg. 7. An agent’s activity seems to be imperfect, when he does not produce
and bring the whole thing into being, but only half makes it. If then God brought
the soul into being, while the body was formed by the power of the male semen,
body and soul being the two parts of man, the activities
Reply. Body and soul are both produced by the power of God, though the formation of the body is of God through the intermediate instrumentality of the power of the natural semen, while the soul He produces immediately. Neither does it follow that the action of the power of the semen is imperfect, since it fulfils the purpose of its existence.
Arg. 8. In all things that are engendered of seed, the parts of the thing engendered are all contained together in the seed, though they do not actually appear: as we see that in wheat or in any other send the green blade and stalk and knots and grains and ears are virtually contained in the original seed; and afterwards the seed gathers bulk and expansion by a process of natural consequence leading to its perfection, without taking up any new feature from without. But the soul is part of man. Therefore in the male semen of man the human soul is virtually contained, and it does not take its origin from any exterior cause.
Reply. In seed are virtually contained all things that do not transcend corporeal power, as grass, stalk, knots, and the like: from which there is no concluding that the special element in man which transcends the whole range of corporeal power is virtually contained in the seed.
Arg. 9. Things that have the same development and the same consummation must have the same first origin. But in the generation of man we find the same development and the same consummation: for as the configuration and growth of the limbs advances, the activities of the soul show themselves more and more: for first appears the activity of the sentient soul, and last of all, when the body is complete, the activity of the intelligent soul. Therefore body and soul have the same origin. But the first origin of the body is in the emission of the male semen: such therefore also is the origin of the soul.
Reply. All that this shows is that a certain arrangement of the parts of the body is necessary for the activity of the soul.
Arg. 10. What is conformed to a thing, is set up according to the plan
of that to which it is conformed, as wax takes the impress of a seal. But the body
of man and of every animal is conformed to its own soul, having such disposition
of organs as suits the activities of the power to be exercised through those organs.
The body then is formed by the action of the soul: hence also Aristotle says that
the soul is the efficient cause of the body.
Reply. That the body is conformed and fashioned according to the soul, and that therefore the soul prepares a body like unto itself, is a statement partly true and partly false. Understood of the soul of the generator, it is true: understood of the soul of the generated, it is false. The formation of the body in its prime and principal parts is not due to the soul of the generated, but to the soul of the generator, as has been shown.
Arg. 11. Nothing lives except by a soul. But the male semen is
alive, of which fact there are three indications. In the first place, the semen is cut off
Reply. The semen is not alive actually, but potentially, and has
a soul, not actually, but virtually.
Arg. 12. If the soul is not before the body (Chap.
LXXXIII), nor begins with the liberation of the semen,
it follows that the body is first formed, and afterwards there is infused into it
a soul newly created. But if this is true, it follows further that the soul is for
the body: for what is for another appears after it, as clothes are for men and are
made after them. But that is false: rather the body is for he soul, as the end is
ever the more noble. We must say then that the origin of the soul is simultaneous
with the emission of the semen.
Reply. There are two ways of one thing being ‘for another.’ A thing may
be to serve the activity, or secure the preservation, or otherwise promote the good
of another, presupposing its being; and such things are posterior to that for which
they are, as clothes for the person, or tools for the mechanic. Or a thing may be
‘for another’ in view of that other’s being: what is thus ‘for another’ is prior
to it in time and posterior to it in nature. In this latter way the body is for
the soul, as all matter is for its form. The case would be otherwise, if soul and
body did not make one being, as they say who take the soul not to be the form of
the body.
CHAPTER XCI—That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies
WHEN human bodies perish in death, the substance of the intelligence remains in perpetuity (Chap. LXXIX). Now if the substance of the intelligence that remains is one for all, as some say, it follows necessarily that it has being apart from body; and thus our thesis is proved, that some subsistent intelligence exists apart from a body. But if a multitude of intelligent souls remain after the destruction of their bodies, then some subsistent intelligences will have the property of subsisting without bodies, all the more inasmuch as it has been shown that souls do not pass from one body to another (Chap LXXXIII). But the property of subsisting apart from bodies is an incidental property in souls, since naturally they are the forms of bodies. But what is ordinary must be prior to what is incidental. There must then be some subsistent intelligences naturally prior to souls; and to these intelligences the ordinary property must attach of subsisting without bodies.
3. The higher nature in its lowest manifestation touches the next lower nature
in its highest. But intelligent nature is higher than corporeal, and at the same
time touches it in some part, which is the intelligent soul. As then the body perfected
by the intelligent soul is highest in the genus of bodies,
7. The substance of a thing must be proportionate to its activity, because activity
is the actualisation and perfection of an active substance. But understanding is
the proper activity of an intelligent substance. Therefore an intelligent substance
must be competent for such activity. But understanding is an activity not exercised
through any bodily organ, and not needing the body except in so far as objects of
understanding are borrowed from objects of sense. But that is an imperfect mode
of understanding: the perfect mode of understanding is the understanding of those
objects which are in themselves intelligible: whereas it is an imperfect mode of
understanding when those things only are understood, which are not of themselves
intelligible, but are rendered intelligible by intellect.
CHAPTER XCIII—That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same
Species
INTELLIGENCES subsisting apart are subsistent essences. Now the definition of a thing being the mark of its essence, is the mark of its species. Subsistent essences therefore are subsistent species.
2. Difference in point of form begets difference of species, while difference in point of matter begets difference in number. But intelligences subsisting apart have nothing whatever of matter about them. Therefore it is impossible for them to be several in one species.
4. The multiplication of species adds more nobility and perfection to the universe
than the multiplication of individuals in the same species. But the perfection of
the universe consists principally in intelligences subsisting apart. Therefore it
makes more for the perfection of the universe that there should be many intelligences
different in species than many different in number in the same species.
CHAPTER XCIV—That an Intelligence subsisting apart and a Soul are not of one Species
A DIFFERENT type of being makes a different species. But the being of the human soul and of an intelligence subsisting apart is not of one type: the body can have no share in the being of a separately subsisting intelligence, as it can have in the being of the human soul, united with the body as form with matter.
3. What makes a species by itself cannot be of the same species with that which does not make a species by itself, but is part of a species. Now a separately subsisting intelligence makes a species by itself, but a soul not, it is part of the human species.
4. The species of a thing may be gathered from the activity proper to it: for
activity shows power, and that is an indication of essence. Now the proper activity
of a separately subsisting intelligence and of an intelligent soul is understanding.
But the mode of understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence is quite different
from that of the soul. The soul understands by taking from phantasms: not so the
separately subsisting intelligence, that has no bodily organs in which phantasms
should be.
CHAPTER XCVI—That Intelligences subsisting apart do not gather their Knowledge from Objects of Sense
A HIGHER power must have a higher object. But the intellectual power of a separately
subsisting intelligence is higher than the intellectual power of the human soul,
the latter being lowest in the order of intelligences (Chap. LXXVII).
Now the object of the intelligence of the human soul is a phantasm (Chap.
LX), which is higher in the order of objects than the sensible thing
existing outside and apart from the soul.
3. According to the order of intelligences is the order of terms of intelligence.
But objects that are of themselves terms of intelligence are higher in order than
objects that are terms of intelligence only because we make them so. Of this latter
sort are all terms of intelligence borrowed from sensible things: for sensible things
are not of themselves intelligible: yet these sensible things are the sort of intelligible
things that our intellect understands. A separately subsisting intelligence therefore,
being superior to our intelligence, does not understand the intellectual aspects
of things by gathering
4. The manner of activity proper to a thing corresponds to the manner and nature of its substance. But an intelligence subsisting apart is by itself, away from any body. Therefore its intellectual activity will be conversant with objects not based upon anything corporeal.
From these considerations it appears that in intelligences subsisting apart there is no such thing as active and potential intellect, except perchance by an improper use of those terms. The reason why potential and active intellect are found in our intelligent soul is because it has to gather intellectual knowledge from sensible things: for the active intellect it is that turns the impressions, gathered from sensible things, into terms of intellect: while the potential intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of all forms of sensible things. Since then separately subsisting intellects do not gather their knowledge from sensible things, there is in them no active and potential intellect.
Nor again can distance in place hinder the knowledge of a disembodied soul (animae
separatae). Distance in place ordinarily affects sense, not intellect,
except incidentally, where intellect has to gather its data from sense. For
while there is a definite law of distance according to which sensible objects affect
sense, terms of intellect, as they impress the intellect, are not in place,
but are separate from bodily matter. Since then separately subsistent intelligences
do not gather their intellectual knowledge from sensible things, distance in place
has no effect upon their knowledge.
Plainly too neither is time mingled with the intellectual activity of such beings.
Terms of intellect are as independent of time as they are of place. Time follows
upon local motion, and measures such things only as are in some manner placed in
space; and therefore the understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence is
above time. On the other hand, time is a condition of our intellectual activity,
since we receive knowledge from phantasms that regard a fixed time. Hence to its
judgements affirmative and negative our intelligence always appends a fixed time,
except when it understands the essence of a thing. It understands essence by abstracting
terms of understanding from the conditions of sensible things: hence in that operation
it understands irrespectively of time and other conditions of sensible things. But
it judges affirmatively and negatively by applying forms of understanding, the results
of previous abstraction, to things, and in this application time is necessarily
understood as entering into the combination.
CHAPTER XCVII—That the Mind of an Intelligence subsisting apart is ever in the act of understanding
What is sometimes in actuality, sometimes in potentiality, is measured by time. But the mind of an intelligence subsisting apart is above time (Chap. XCVI). Therefore it is not at times in the act of understanding and at times not.
2. Every living substance has by its nature some actual vital activity always going on in it, although other activities are potential: thus animals are always repairing waste by assimilation of nourishment, though they do not always feel. But separately subsisting intelligences are living substances, and have no other vital activity but that of understanding. Therefore by their nature they must be always actually understanding.
CHAPTER XCVIII—How one separately subsisting Intelligence knows another
AS separately subsisting intelligences understand proper terms of intellect;
and the said intelligences are themselves such terms, — for it is independence
of matter that makes a thing be a proper term of intellect; it follows that separately
subsisting intelligences understand other such intelligences, finding in them their
proper objects. Every such intelligence therefore will know both itself and its
fellows.
A difficulty: Since all knowledge, as it is the knowing mind, is a likeness of the thing known, and one separately subsistent intelligence is like another generically, but differs from it in species (Chap. XCIII), it appears that one does not know another in species, but only so far as the two meet in one common ratio, that of the genus.
Reply. With subsistent beings of a higher order than we are, the knowledge
contained in higher generalities is not incomplete, as it is with us. The likeness
in the mind of ‘animal,’ whereby we know a thing generically only, yields us a less
complete knowledge than the likeness of ‘man,’ whereby we know an entire species.
To know a thing by its genus is to know it imperfectly and, as it were, potentially;
to know it by its species is to know it perfectly and actually. Holding as it does
the lowest rank among subsistent intelligences, our intellect stands in such pressing
need of particular detailed
CHAPTER XCIX—That Intelligences subsisting apart know Material Things, that is to say, the Species of Things Corporeal
SINCE the mind of these intelligences is perfect with all natural endowments,
2. Since the species of things are distinguished like the species of numbers,
CHAPTER C—That Intelligences subsisting apart know Individual Things
INASMUCH as the likenesses representative of things in the mind of a separately subsistent intelligence are more universal than in our mind, and more effectual means of knowledge, such intelligences are instructed by such likenesses of material things not only to the knowledge of material things generically or specifically, as would be the case with our mind, but also to the knowledge of individual existences.
1. The likeness or presentation of a thing in the mind of a separately subsistent intelligence is of far-reaching and universal power, so that, one as that presentation is and immaterial, it can lead to the knowledge of specific principles, and further to the knowledge of individualising or material principles. Thereby the intelligence can become cognisant, not only of the matter of genus and species, but also of that of the individual.
2. What a lower power can do, a higher power can do, but in a more excellent way. Hence where the lower power operates through many agencies, the higher power operates through one only: for the higher a power is, the more it is gathered together and unified, whereas the lower is scattered and multiplied. But the human soul, being of lower rank than the separately subsistent intelligence, takes cognisance of the universal and of the singular by two principles, sense and intellect. The higher and self-subsistent intelligence therefore is cognisant of both in a higher way by one principle, the intellect.
3. Intelligible impressions of things come to our understanding in the opposite
order to that in which they come to the understanding of the separately subsisting
intelligence. To our understanding they come by way of analysis (resolutio),
that is, by abstraction from material and individualising conditions: hence we cannot
know individual things by aid of such intelligible or universal presentations. But
to the understanding of the separately subsisting intelligence intelligible impressions
arrive by way of synthesis (compositio). Such an intelligence has its intelligible
impressions by virtue of its assimilation to the original intelligible presentation
of the divine understanding, which is not abstracted from things but productive
of things, — productive not only of the form, but also of the matter, which is
the principle of individuation. Therefore the impressions in the understanding of
a separately subsisting intelligence regard the whole object, not only the specific
but also the individualising principles. The knowledge of singular and individual
things therefore is not to be withheld from separately subsistent intelligences,
for all that our intellect cannot take cognisance of the singular and individual. In the
days of the schoolmen, as in those of Aristotle, exclusive of philosophy
and theology, one speculative science alone had attained any real development, mathematics.
Philosophers therefore drew their illustrations from mathematics. Now it is true
in mathematics that a perfect comprehension of the universal carries a knowledge
of all subordinate particulars. Whoever comprehended a hexagon completely, would
know all things that ever could be affirmed of any hexagon, as such. And it is only
with the hexagon as such, that is to say with the hexagon as a form, that the mathematician
is concerned: he cares nothing about its material. But in the world of natural history,
while still only the lion, as such, or the fig, as such, is the strict matter of
science: nevertheless this scientific knowledge is only obtainable by observation
and experiment upon actual lions, or figs; and scientific men busy themselves accordingly
about the vicissitudes that do actually overtake such existing things. The most
thorough comprehension of the specific essence of a fig could not instruct a man,
— no, nor an angel either, — on the fact whether there will be a plentiful or
a poor crop of figs in Palestine in the year 1910. This fact, and indeed the whole
course of natural history, — apart from the free acts of God and man, and the effect
of those acts upon material things, is absolutely deducible from a knowledge of
the ‘universal nature’ of physical agents, joined to a knowledge (not contained
in the ‘universal’) of the primitive collocation of materials. But could even angelic
intellect make this stupendous deduction of the whole history of the physical universe
from its primary data? We judge of angels from the analogy of the human mind. The human mind knows what
is called at Oxford ‘the manifold’ of individual material things through the senses.
To the intellect of man, away from sensation, this ‘manifold’ of individuals is
unintelligible, as St Thomas also says it is unintelligible, because intellect always
universalises. How then shall pure intelligence, apart from all faculty of sensation,
know the individual? The analogy, which has been our guide, here breaks down. We
cannot deny to the angel the cognition of individual things: not, I think, even
with St Thomas for our guide, can we give a satisfactory account of how he has that
cognition. If the schoolmen had a fault, it was that of explaining too much: though,
I dare say, they considered many of their explanations merely hypothetical and tentative.
See B. I, Chapp. VIII, IX. In the Summa Theologica, I, q. 55, art. 2, St Thomas more clearly faces the difficulty
of attributing to angels any knowledge of the actual facts of creation. He acknowledges
(art. 1) that the mere consciousness of themselves in their own essential nature
would be insufficient to afford them such knowledge. Therefore he supposes that,
over and above their essential nature, there was stamped upon them at their creation
a multitude of intelligible impressions, innate ideas in fact, corresponding to
the facts of creation; and that by knowing themselves, as thus impressed, they know
the world. Scotus disagrees with St Thomas on this point: indeed it remains a very
open question. St Thomas’s words are (l.c.): “The impressions whereby angels understand are not gathered from things but are
connatural to the said angels. . . . Angels are wholly free from bodies, subsisting
immaterially in intellectual being: and therefore they gain their intellectual perfection
by an intellectual efflux, whereby they received from God presentations of known
things along with their intellectual nature. . . . In the mind of an angel there
are likenesses of creatures, not from the creatures themselves, but from God, who
is the cause of creatures.” But from this it would seem that angels ought to know all future events, a corollary
rejected by St Thomas, q. 57, art. 3.
CHAPTER CI—Whether to Separately Subsisting Intelligences all Points of their Natural Knowledge are Simultaneously Present
Not everything is actually understood, of which there is an intellectual impression actually in the understanding. For since a subsistent intelligence has also a will, and is thereby master of his own acts, it is in his power, when he has got an intellectual impression, to use it by actually understanding it; or, if he has several, to use one of them. Hence also we do not actually consider all things whereof we have knowledge. A subsistent intelligence therefore, knowing by a plurality of impressions, uses the one impression which he wishes, and thereby actually knows at once all things which by one impression he does know. For all things make one intelligible object inasmuch as they are known by one presentation, — as also our understanding knows many things together, when thy are as one by composition or relation with one another. But things that an intelligence knows by different impressions, it does not take cognisance of together. Thus, for one understanding, there is one thing at a time actually understood. There is therefore in the mind of a separately subsisting intelligence a certain succession of acts of understanding; not however movement, properly so called: since it is not a case of actuality succeeding potentiality, but of actuality following upon actuality. But the Divine Mind, knowing all things by the one medium of its essence, and having its act for its essence, understands all things simultaneously: hence in its understanding there is incident no succession, but its act of understanding is entire, simultaneous, perfect, abiding, world without end. Amen.
BOOK III
GOD THE END OF CREATURES
CHAPTER I.—Preface to the Book that Follows
The Lord is a great God, and a great king above all gods. For the Lord will
not reject his people, because in his hands are all the ends of the earth, and the
heights of the mountains he beholdeth. For the sea is his, and he made it, and his
hands have formed the dry land. (
IT has been shown above (B. I, Chap. XIII) that there is one first of beings, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God. Out of the abundance of His perfection He bestows being on all things that exist; and thus He proves to be not only the first of beings, but also the first principle of all. He bestows being on other things, not out of any necessity of his nature, but by the free choice of His will, as has been shown (B. II, Chap. XXIII). Consequently He is master of the things that He has made: for we have dominion over the things that are subject to our will. This His dominion over the things that He has brought into being is a perfect dominion, since in producing them He needs the aid of no exterior agent, nor any subject matter to work upon, seeing that He is the universal efficient cause of all being. Of the things produced by the will of an agent every one is directed by that agent to some end: for some good and some end is the proper object of the will: hence the things that proceed from will must be directed to some end. Everything attains its last end by its own action, which is directed by Him who has given to things the principles whereby they act. It needs must be then that God, who is by nature perfect in Himself and by His power bestows being on all things that are, should be the ruler of all beings, Himself ruled by none: nor is there anything exempt from His government, as there is nothing that does not derive being from Him. He is then perfect in government, as He is perfect in being and causation.
The effect of this government appears variously in various natures according
to the difference between them. Some creatures are brought into being by God to
possess understanding, to bear his likeness and present His image. They not only
are directed, but also direct themselves by proper actions of their own to their
due end. If in the direction of themselves they remain subject to the divine guidance,
they are admitted in course of that guidance to the attainment of their last end.
Other beings, devoid of understanding, do not direct themselves to their own end,
but are directed by another. Some of those are imperishable; and as they can suffer
no defect in their natural being, so in their proper actions they never deflect
one whit from the path that leads to the end prefixed to them, but are indefectibly
subject to the rule of the prime ruler. St Thomas instances “the heavenly bodies, the movements of which ever proceed
uniformly.” So men from Plato’s time to Newton’s contrasted the vicissitudes of
the sublunary world with the uniformity of the heavens above. Newton showed that
the same forces are at work in the starry heavens as on this earth. In our day the
spectroscope has shown that the materials of our earth, or sundry of them, enter
into the composition of the stars. The same instrument reveals stars still in process
of formation, stars even colliding and exploding. There is uniformity in the heavens
above and on the earth beneath: not more in one than in the other. The ancients
under-estimated the regularity and uniformity of nature on earth. Their gaze was
fixed on catastrophes befalling living creatures and man in particular. Yet even
in catastrophes nature is still uniform, although working to an effect which we
had not expected. What crosses our expectations, that we call evil. But what right
have we to expect? Man is not the measure of all things, nor is human expectation
a law to nature. The ‘heavenly body,’ corpus coeleste, built of
matter fully actuated by its form, and therefore imperishable and unchangeable (B.
II, Chap. XXX, n.1, with note: Sum. Theol.
2-2, q. 24, art. 11, corp.), played a great part in the metaphysics and psychology
of the Middle Ages. See Chapp. LXXXII-LXXXVII of this Book. Little did St Thomas
think that if he could have altered the point of view of his eye by some millions
of miles, he would have beheld our planet Earth, the native region of generation
and corruption, turned into a corpus coeleste, serenely resplendent as Venus
and Mars, sweeping out in its orbit with the same accuracy, neither morning star
nor evening star more wonderful. Yet the reader of St Thomas will find him not altogether
credulous of the popular astronomy of his time. He attributes less to the corpus
coeleste than many of his contemporaries.
The Psalmist, filled with God’s spirit, considering this truth , and wishing
to point out to us the divine government of things, first describes to us the perfection
of the first ruler, — of His nature, when he says God; of His power, when
he says, is a great Lord,
Since then in the first Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and in the second of the perfection of God’s power, it remains for us in this third Book to treat of His perfect authority, or dignity, in as much as He is the last end and ruler of all things. This therefore will be our order of procedure, to treat first of God, as the final end of all things; secondly of His universal control, whereby He governs every creature; thirdly of the special control which He exercises in the government of creatures endowed with understanding.
CHAPTER II.—That every Agent acts to some End
IN the case of agents that manifestly act to some end, we call that the end to which
the effort of the agent tends. Gaining that, he is said to gain his end; and missing
that, he is said to miss his intended end. Nor on this point does it make any difference
whether the end be tended to with knowledge or not: for as the target is the end
of the archer, so is it also the end of the path of the arrow.
3. It is impossible for the chain of actions to extend to infinity: there must then be something, in the getting of which the effort of the agent comes to rest. Therefore every agent acts to some end.
6. Actions are open to criticism only so far as they are taken to be done as means to some end. It is not imputed as a fault to any one, if he fails in effecting that for which his work is not intended. A physician is found fault with if he fails in healing, but not a builder or a grammarian. We find fault in points of art, as when a grammarian does not speak correctly; and also in points of nature, as in monstrous births. Therefore both the natural agent, and the agent who acts according to art and with a conscious purpose, acts for an end.
7. To an agent that did not tend to any definite effect, all effects would be indifferent. But what is indifferent to many things, does not do one of them rather than another: hence from an agent open to both sides of an alternative (a contingente ad utrumque) there does not follow any effect, unless by some means it comes to be determined to one above the rest: otherwise it could not act at all. Every agent therefore tends to some definite effect, and that is called its end.
Still there are actions that do not seem to be for any end, as things done for
sport, and acts of contemplation, and things done without advertence, as the stroking
of the beard and the like: from which instances one may suppose that there is such
a thing as an agent acting not for any end. But we must observe that though acts
of contempation are not for any other end, they are an end in themselves: as for
things done in sport, sometimes they are their own end, as when one plays solely
for the amusement that he finds in play; sometimes they are for an end, as when
we play that afterwards we may resume work more vigorously: while things done without
advertence may proceed not from the understanding, but from some phantasy or physical
Hereby is banished the error of certain ancient natural philosophers (Empedocles and Democritus, mentioned in Aristotle, Physics II, ii, 6) who supposed all things to happen by necessity of matter, and eliminated final causes from the universe.
CHAPTER III—That every Agent acts to some Good
THAT to which an agent definitely tends must be suited to it: for it would not tend to the thing except for some suitability to itself. But what is suitable to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts to some good.
6. An intellectual agent acts for an end by determining its own end. A physical
agent, though acting for an end, does not determine its own end, having no idea
of an end, but moves in the direction of an end determined for it by another. Now
an intellectual agent does not fix for itself an end except under some aspect of
good: for a term of intellect is a motive only under an aspect of good, which is
the object of will. Therefore a physical agent also does not move or act to any
end except inasmuch as it is good. Such an agent has its end determined by some
natural appetite or tendency.
7. It is part of the same plan of action to shun evil and to seek good. But all things are found to shun evil. Intellectual agents shun a thing for this reason, that they apprehend its evil: while all physical agents, to the full extent of the power that is in them, resist destruction, because that is the evil of everything. All things therefore act to some good.
CHAPTER IV—That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent
WHAT follows from an action different from what was intended by the agent, manifestly happens beside his intention. But evil is different from good, which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention.
2. Failure in effect and action follows upon some defect in the principles of action, as a halting gait follows upon crookedness of legs. Now an agent acts by whatever of active power he has, not by what defect of active power he suffers; and according as he acts, so does he intend his end. He intends therefore an end answering to his power. Anything therefore that ensues answering to defect of power will be beside the intention of the agent. But such is evil.
4. In agents that act by intellect, or by any sort of judgement,
CHAPTERS V, VI—Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the Same
Chapter VI
FOR the clearer solution of the arguments alleged we must observe that evil may
be considered either in a substance or in some action of a substance. Evil in a
substance consists in its lack of something which it is naturally apt to have and
ought to have. It is no evil to a man not to have wings, because he is not by nature
apt to have them; nor not to have yellow hair, because, though his nature is apt
to have such hair, still that colour of hair is not due to his nature. But it is
an evil to him not to have hands, because he is apt by nature to have them, and
ought to have them, if he is to be perfect; and yet the same is no evil to a bird.
Every privation, properly and strictly speaking, is of something which one is naturally
apt to have and ought to have. The essence of evil consists in privation, thus understood.
Primordial matter, being in potentiality to all forms, is naturally in actuality
without any one particular form that you like to mention.
Arg. 1 (Chap. V). What happens beside the intention of the agent is said
to be ‘matter of luck and chance and rare occurrence.’ These are three technical terms of Aristotelian philosophy. They refer to the
category of coexistence, or coincidence, not to sequence. They are explained by
Aristotle, Physics, II, iv, v, vi: Matter of luck, fortuitum,
τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. Matter of chance, casuale,
τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου. Matter or rare occurrence, ut in paucioribus accidens,
τὸ μὴ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. He tells us (l.c., vi): “Matter of luck is all matter of chance,
but not all the latter is matter of luck. . . . No inanimate thing, nor beast,
nor child, ever does anything by luck, because it is incapable of deliberate
choice. . . . In things done for an end, when the action of some external cause
was not done to bring about what actually happened, we may say that the thing happened
by chance: but those things happen by luck, which happen by chance,
and at the same time rank as objects of choice to persons having the faculty of
choice.”
Reply (Chap. VI). Not everything that is beside the intention of the
Arg. 2. Aristotle (Eth. Nic., III, vii) expressly says that wickedness is voluntary, and proves it from the fact that men do unjust acts voluntarily: but, he adds, it is irrational to pretend that a man voluntarily acting unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or voluntarily committing rape does not wish to be incontinent; and that is why legislators punish wicked men as voluntary evil-doers. It seems then that evil is not irrespective of will or intention.
Reply. Though evil be beside the intention, it is still voluntary, not
as it is in itself, but incidentally. The object of intention is the final
end, willed for its own sake: but the object of volition is also that which
is willed for the sake of something else, though absolutely it would not be willed, The
presence of a dear friend as a guest at my table is to me an object at once
of will and of intention. The presence of a stranger who accompanies
my friend, and without whom my friend would not have come, is to me an object of
will, but not of intention. I should not have invited that gentleman
by himself. Volition then extends to three acts. — (a) Intention, βούλησις
(Eth. Nic. III, iv, 7-9), of
the end willed for its own sake: observe, this use is quite apart from
the distinction made in English philosophy between intention and motive. (b) Choice, προαίρεσις (Eth. Nic. III, iv, 9) of
means to the end. (c) Acceptance of circumstances attached to the end, or more usually
to the means, but not in themselves regarded either as good, as in the
end, or useful, as in the means. I have endeavoured to bring out the practical importance of these distinction
in my Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 31-35, 203-208, 222-224.
Arg. 3. Every process of nature serves as an end intended by nature. But destruction is as much a natural change as production: therefore its end, which is a privation and counts as evil, is intended by nature as much as form and goodness, which are the end of production.
Reply. From what has been said it appears that what is simply evil is altogether contrary to intention in the works of nature, as are monstrous births: but what is not simply evil, but only evil in a particular relation, is not intended by nature in itself, but incidentally.
CHAPTER VII—That Evil is not a Nature or Essence
EVIL is nothing else than a privation of that which a thing is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence, but a negation in a substance.
5. Every essence is natural to some thing. If the essence ranks as a substance,
it is the very nature of the thing. If it ranks as an accident, it must be caused
by the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance,
though perhaps not natural to some other substance. But what is in itself evil cannot
be natural to anything: for the essence of evil is privation of that which is naturally
apt to be in a thing and is due to it. Evil then, being a privation of what is natural,
cannot be natural to anything. Hence whatever is naturally in a thing is good, and
the want of it an evil. No essence then is in itself evil.
6. Whatever has any essence is either itself a form or has a form,
7. Being is divided into actuality and potentiality. Actuality, as such,
8. All being, howsoever it be, is from God (B. II, Chap. VI).
But God is perfect goodness (B. I, Chap. XLI). Since then
evil cannot be the effect of goodness, it is impossible for any being, as being,
to be evil.
Hence it is said: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very
good (
CHAPTERS VIII, IX—Arguments against the aforsesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same
ARG. 1. Evil is a specific difference in certain kinds of things, namely, in moral habits and acts: for as every virtue in its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice in its species is an evil habit; and similarly of acts. Evil therefore is something that gives species to certain things: it is therefore an essence, and natural to some things.
Reply. The reason why good and evil are reckoned specific differences in moral matters, is because moral matters depend on the will: for a thing enters into the sphere of morality inasmuch as it is voluntary. But the object of the will is the end in view and good: hence moral actions are specified by the end for which they are done, as physical actions are from the form of their active principle. Since then good and evil are designated according to due bearing on the end, or the lack of such due bearing, good and evil must be the first differentias marking species in moral matters. But the measure of morality is reason. Therefore things must be called morally good or evil according as they bear on the end which reason determines. Whatever therefore in moral matters derives its species from an end, which is according to reason, is said to be good in its species: while what derives its species from an end contrary to reason, is said to be evil in its species. But that end, though inconsistent with the end which reason assigns, is nevertheless some sort of good, as being pleasurable according to sense, or the like: hence such ends are good in some animals, and even in man when they are moderated by reason; and what is evil for one may very well be good for another. And therefore evil, inasmuch as it is a specific differentia in the genus of moral matters, does not involve anything that is essentially evil, but something that is in itself good, but evil to man inasmuch as it sets aside the order of reason, which is man’s good.
Arg. 4. All that acts is something. But evil acts inasmuch as it is evil: for it understands good and spoils it. Evil therefore, inasmuch as it is evil, is some thing.
Reply. A privation, as such, is no principle of action. Hence it is well said that evil does not fight against good except in the power of good: but in itself it is impotent and weak and originative of no action. Evil is said however to spoil good also formally in itself, as blindness is said to spoil sight, or whiteness to colour a wall.
Arg. 5. Where there is found more and less, there must be an order of things, for negations and privations are not susceptible of more and less. But we find among evils one worse than another. Therefore evil must be some thing.
Reply. Conditions that imply privation are intensified or relaxed as are
inequality and unlikeness: for a thing is more unequal according as it is further
removed from inequality, and more unlike according as it is more removed from likeness:
hence a thing is more evil according as it is a greater privation of good, or at
a greater distance from good.
Arg. 6. Thing and being are convertible terms. But evil is in the world. Therefore it is some thing and nature.
Reply. Evil is said ‘to be’ in the world, not as having any essence, or
existing as a thing, but in the way in which a thing ‘is’ evil precisely by evil,
as blindness, an in the way in which any privation is said ‘to be,’ inasmuch as
an animal ‘is’ blind by blindness. For there are two senses of ‘being’: in one sense
it means the essence of a thing, and is divided into the ten predicaments;
CHAPTER X—That the Cause of Evil is good
WHAT is not, is cause of nothing: every cause must be some being. But evil is not any being (Chapp. VII, IX): therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. If then evil is caused by anything, what causes it must be good.
4. Every cause is either material, formal, efficient, or final. But evil can be neither matter nor form: for it has been shown (Chapp. VII, IX) that both actual being and potential being is good. In like manner evil cannot be an efficient cause, since everything acts according as it is actually and has a form. Nor can it be a final cause, since it is beside the intention (Chap. IV). Evil therefore cannot be the cause of anything; and therefore, if there be any cause of evil, it must be caused by good.
But since good and evil are opposites, and one opposite cannot be cause of another
except accidentally, it follows that good cannot be the active cause of evil except
accidentally. In physics, this accident may happen either on the part of the agent
or on the part of the effect. On the part of the agent, when the agent suffers from
a lack of power, whence it follows that the action is defective and the effect deficient.
But to an agent, as such, it is quite an accident to suffer from a lack of power:
for an agent does not act inasmuch as power is lacking to him, but according as
he has anything of power. Thus then evil is caused accidentally on the part of the
agent, inasmuch as the agent runs short of power: therefore it is said that evil
has not
But in moral matters the case seems to be different. For a flaw in morals does
not follow from any lack of power, seeing that weakness either entirely removes,
or at least diminishes, moral reprehensibleness: for weakness does not deserve the
punishment which is due to fault, but rather compassion and indulgence: to be blameworthy,
a point of conduct must be a voluntary act, not an inevitable necessity. On careful
consideration we find that the case of morals is in some respects like, in some
respects unlike the case of physics. The unlikeness consists in this, that a moral
fault is viewed as consisting in the action alone, not in any effect produced: for
moral virtues are not effective, but active, while arts are effective; and therefore
it has been said that art is at fault in the same way as nature. Moral evil therefore
is not estimated according to the matter and form of the effect, but follows simply
from the agent. Now in moral actions there are found in orderly enumeration four
active principles. One principle is the executive power, namely, the motor power
which moves the limbs to execute the command of the will. This power is moved by
the will, and so the will is another principle. The will is moved by the judgement
of the apprehensive faculty, which judges the particular thing proposed to be good
or bad. — good and bad being the (formal) objects of the will, the
one object of seeking, the other of avoidance. Lastly, the apprehensive faculty
is moved by the thing apprehended. The first active principle then in moral actions
is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive faculty; the third is the
will; the fourth is motor power which executes the command of reason. But the act
of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil;
But this investigation leads us into an apparent difficulty. On the understanding that defect in an act arises from some defect in the principle of action, some defect in the will must be presupposed before there can be any moral fault. If this defect is natural, it is ever inherent in the will; and the consequence is that the will must always do wrong in action, a consequence proved false by the fact of there being such things as acts of virtue. On the other hand, if the defect is voluntary, that is already a moral fault, the cause of which must stand over for further enquiry; and so we shall have a running account to infinity. We must therefore say that the defect pre-existing in the will is no natural necessity, otherwise it would follow that the will sinned in every act: nor again is a thing of chance and ill luck, for at that rate there could be in us no moral fault, since events of chance are unpremeditated and beyond the control of reason. The defect therefore is voluntary, but not a moral fault: so we must suppose to save the account running to infinity.
Now we must consider how that can be. In every active principle the perfection
of its power depends on some superior active principle: for a secondary agent acts
by virtue of the power of the prime agent.
CHAPTER XI—That Evil is founded in some Good
EVIL cannot exist by itself, having no essence (Chap. VII): it must therefore be in some subject: but every subject, being a substance, is some good.
3. A thing is called evil because it does harm: that can only be because it does
harm to good: for to do harm to evil is a good thing, since the undoing of evil
is good. But it would not do harm to good, formally speaking, unless it were in
good:
But since good and evil are opposites, and one opposite cannot be the subject of another, but expels it, it seems at first sight strange if good is said to be the subject of evil. But if the truth is sought out, we shall find nothing strange or awkward in this conclusion. Good is commonly predicated as being is predicated, since every being, as such, is good. It is not strange that not-being should be in being as its subject: for every privation is some not-being, and still its subject is a substance, which is a being. Still not-being has not for its subject the being that is its opposite: thus sight is not the subject in which blindness is, but the animal. So the subject in which evil is, is not the good opposed to it, for that is taken away by the evil, but some other good. Thus the subject of moral evil is natural good: while natural evil, which is a privation of form, is in matter, and matter is good, as also is potential being.
CHAPTER XII—That Evil does not entirely swallow up Good
THE subject of evil must always remain, if evil is to remain. But the subject of evil is good: therefore good always remains.
But on the contingency of evil being infinitely intensified, and good being continually diminished by that intensification of evil, it appears that good may be diminished by evil even to infinity. And the good so diminished must be finite, for infinite good is not capable of evil. It seems then that in time good may be entirely taken away by evil.
This then is the reply. Evil, as we have seen, entirely takes away the good to
which it is opposed, as blindness takes away sight: but there must remain that good
which is the subject of evil, which subject, as such, bears a character of goodness,
inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the actuality of good, whereof it is deprived
by evil.
CHAPTER XIV—That Evil is an Accidental Cause
RUNNING through all the species of causes, we find that evil is a cause accidentally.
In the species of efficient cause, since through the deficiency of power in the
active cause there follows defect in the effect and action. In the species of material
cause, since through the indisposition of the matter there follows a defect in the
product. In the species of formal cause, since to one form there is always annexed
the privation of another form. In the species of final cause, since the evil annexed
to an undue end means the hindering of the end that is due.
CHAPTER XV—That there is not any Sovereign Evil, acting as the Principle of All Evils
A SOVEREIGN evil should be without participation in any good, as that is the sovereign good which is wholly removed from evil. But there cannot be any evil wholly removed from good, since evil is founded on good (Chap. XI).
2. If anything is sovereignly evil, it must be evil by its very essence, as that is sovereignly good which is good by its essence. But evil has no essence (Chap. VII).
3. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. But all evil is caused by good (Chap. X). There is therefore no evil first principle.
5. The incidental must be posterior to the ordinary. But evil happens only incidentally and beside the intention (Chap. IV). Therefore it is impossible for evil to be a first principle.
Hereby is excluded the error of the Manicheans.
CHAPTER XVI—That the End in View of everything is some Good
THAT to which a thing tends when in absence from it, and in which it rests when
in possession of it, is the scope and aim and end in view. But everything, so long
as it lacks the perfection proper to it, moves towards gaining that perfection,
so far as it depends upon itself so to do; and when it has gained that perfection,
therein it rests.
4. Things that are aware of an end and things that are unaware of an end are
alike ordained to an end, with this difference, that things that are aware of an
end tend to an end of themselves, while things that are unaware of an end tend to
an end under the direction of another, as appears in the case of archer and arrow.
But things that are aware of an end are always ordained to good for their end: for
the will, which is the appetite of a fore-known end, never tends to anything except
under the aspect of good, which is its object.
CHAPTER XVII—That all Things are ordained to one End, which is God
THE sovereign good, which is God, is the cause of goodness in all good things.
He is therefore also the cause of every end being an end, since whatever is an end
is such inasmuch as it is good. But that whereby another thing has an attribute,
has more of that attribute itself.
4. In every series of ends the last end must be the end of all the ends preceding. But we find all things arranged in various grades of goodness under our sovereign good, which is the cause of all goodness; and thereby, since good bears the character of an end, all things are ordered under God as ends preceding under their last end.
5. Private good is subordinated to the end of the common good: for the being of a part is for the sake of the being of the whole: hence the good of the race is more godlike than the good of the individual man. But the sovereign good, which is God, is the common good, since the good of the whole community depends on Him: while the goodness which marks any given thing is its own private good, and also the good of other things which depend upon it. All things therefore are subordinate to the end of one good, which is God.
7. The last end of every producer, in so far as he is a producer, is himself: for the things produced by us we use for ourselves; and if ever a man makes anything for another man, that is referred to his own good, — his utility, his pleasure, or his honour. But God is the productive cause of all things, either immediately or mediately. And therefore He is the end of all.
Hence it is said: God hath wrought all things for himself (
CHAPTER XVIII—How God is the End of all Things
GOD is at once the last end of all things, and is nevertheless before all things in being. There is an end which, while holding the first place in causation according as it is in intention, is nevertheless posterior in being; and this is the case with every end that an agent establishes by his action, as the physician establishes health by his action in the sick man, which health nevertheless is his end. There is again an end which is prior in causation, and also is prior in being: such an end one aims at winning by one’s actions or movement, as a king hopes to win a city by fighting. God then is the end of things, as being something which everything has to gain in its own way.
2. God is the last end of things and the prime agent of all (Chap. XVII). But an end established by the action of an agent cannot be the prime agent: rather it is the effect produced by the agent. God therefore cannot be the end of things as though He were anything established in being thereby, but only as some pre-existent object for them to attain.
4. An effect tends to an end in the same way that the producer of the effect acts for that end. But God, the first producer of all things, does not act in view of acquiring anything by His action, but in view of bestowing something by His action: for He is not in potentiality to acquire anything, but only in perfect actuality, whereby He can give and bestow. Things then are not directed to God as though God were an end unto which any accretion or acquisition were to be made: they are directed to Him so that in their own way they may gain from God God Himself, since He Himself is their end.
CHAPTER XIX—That all Things aim at Likeness to God
ALL things evidently have a natural appetite for being, and resist destructive agencies wherever they are threatened with them. But all things have being inasmuch as they are likened to God, who is the essential subsistent Being, all other things having being only by participation. All things therefore have an appetite for likeness to God, making that their last end.
4. All created things are some sort of image of the prime agent, God: for every
agent acts to the production of its own likeness:
CHAPTER XX—How Things copy the Divine Goodness
NOT all creatures are established in one and the same degree of goodness. The
substance of some is form and actuality, — that is to say, something which, in
point of essence, has the attribute of actual being and goodness.
We likewise find an order of goodness among the parts of a substance composed
of matter and form. For since matter, considered in itself, is potential being,
Yet in another way does the goodness of the creature fall short of the divine
goodness. As has been said, God possesses the highest perfection of goodness in
his mere being: but a created thing does not possess its perfection in point of
one attribute only, but in point of many: for what is united in the highest is multiple
and manifold in the lowest.
CHAPTER XXI—That Things aim at Likeness to God in being Causes of other Things
A THING must be first perfect in itself before it can cause another thing. The
last perfection to supervene upon a thing is its becoming the cause of other things.
While then a creature tends by many ways to the likeness of God, the last way left
open to it is to seek the divine likeness by being the cause of other things, according
to what the Apostle says, We are God’s coadjutors (
CHAPTER XXIV—That all Things seek good, even Things devoid of Consciousness
AS the heavenly sphere is moved by a subsistent intelligence (Chap. XXIII), and
the movement of the heavenly sphere is directed to generation in sublunary creatures,
the generations and and movements of these sublunary creatures must originate in
the thought of that subsistent intelligence. Now the intention of the prime agent
and of the instrument is bent upon the same end. The heavenly spheres then (coelum)
are the cause
Thus it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, devoid of intelligence, move
and act for an end. For they tend to their end, being directed thereto by a subsistent
intelligence, in the way that an arrow tends to its end, directed by the archer:
as the arrow from the impulse of the archer, so do natural bodies receive their
inclination to their natural ends from natural moving causes, whence they derive
their forms and virtues and motions. Hence it is plain that every work of nature
is the work of a subsistent intelligence.
CHAPTER XXV—That the End of every Subsistent Intelligence is to understand God
THE proper act of everything is its end, as being its second perfection:
But one may say: ‘It is true that the last end of a subsistent intelligence consists in understanding the best intelligible object, still the best intelligible object, absolutely speaking, is not the best object for this or that subsistent intelligence; but the higher any subsistent intelligence is, the higher is its best intelligible object; and therefore the highest subsistent intelligence created has for its best intelligible object that which is best absolutely; hence its happiness will be in understanding God; but the happiness of a lower subsistent intelligence will be to understand some lower intelligible object, which is at the same time the highest of the objects that can be understood by it. And particularly it seems to be the lot of the human understanding, on account of its weakness, not to understand the absolutely best intelligible object: for in respect of the knowledge of that truth of which there is most to be known the human intellect is as the bat’s eye to the sun.
Nevertheless it may be manifestly shown that the end of every subsistent intelligence, even the lowest, is to understand God. For (a) the final end of all beings, to which they tend, is God (Chap. XVIII. But the human understanding, however it be lowest in the order of subsistent intelligences, is nevertheless superior to all beings devoid of understanding. Since then the nobler substance has not the ignobler end, God Himself will be the end also of the human understanding. But every intelligent being gains its last end by understanding it. Therefore it is by understanding that the human intellect attains God as its end.
(c). Everything most of all desires its own last end. But the human mind is moved
to more desire and love and delight over the knowledge of divine things, little
as it can discern about them, than over the perfect knowledge that it has of the
lowest things.
(e). All sciences and arts and practical faculties are attractive only for the
sake of something else: for in them the end is not knowledge but production of a
work. But speculative sciences are attractive for their own sake, for their end
is sheer knowledge. Nor is there found any action in human life, with the exception
of speculative study, which is not directed to some other and further end. Even
actions done in sport, which seem to be done in view of no end, have a due end,
which is refreshment of mind, to enable us thereby to return stronger to serious
occupations: otherwise we should play always, if play was sought for its own sake,
which would be unbefitting.
(f). In all series of agents and causes of change the end of the prime agent
and mover must be the ultimate end of all, as the end of a general is the end of
all the soldiers who serve under him. But among all the component parts of man we
find the intellect to be the superior moving power: for the intellect moves the
appetite, putting its object before it; and the intellectual appetite, or will,
moves the sensible appetites, the irascible and concupiscible: hence we do not obey
concupiscence except under the command of the will.
(g). There is a natural desire in all men of knowing the causes of the things
that they see. It was through wonder at seeing things, the causes of which were
unseen, that men first began to philosophise. Nor does enquiry cease until we arrive
at the first cause: then we consider our knowledge perfect, when we know the first
cause. Man then naturally desires so to know the first cause as his last end.
Hence it is said: This is eternal life, that they know thee, the only true
God (
CHAPTER XXVI—That Happiness does not consist in any Act of the Will
SINCE a subsistent intelligence in its activity arrives at God, not by understanding alone, but also by an act of the will desiring and loving Him and taking delight in Him, some one may think that the last end and final felicity of man is not in knowing God, but rather in loving Him, or exercising some other act of the will upon Him; especially seeing that the object of the will is good, which bears the character of an end, whereas truth, which is the object of the intellect, does not bear the character of an end except in so far as it (ipsum) too is good. Hence it seems that man does not attain his last end by an act of intellect, but rather by an act of will. But this position is manifestly proved to be untenable.
1. Happiness, being the peculiar good of an intelligent nature, must attach to the intelligent nature on the side of something that is peculiar to it. But appetite is not peculiar to intelligent nature, but is found in all things, though diversely in diverse beings: which diversity however arises from the different ways in which they stand to consciousness. Things wholly devoid of consciousness have only natural appetite, or physical tendency. Things that have sensitive consciousness have sensible appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible are included. Things that have intellectual consciousness have an appetite proportionate to that consciousness, namely, the will. The will therefore, as being an appetite, is not a peculiar appurtenance of an intelligent nature, except so far as it is dependent on the intelligence: but intelligence in itself is peculiar to an intelligent nature. Happiness therefore consists in an act of the intellect substantially and principally rather than in an act of the will.
2. In all powers that are moved by their objects the objects are naturally prior to the acts of those powers. But such a power is the will, for the desirable object moves desire. The object therefore of the will is naturally prior to the act. The prime object of will then precedes every act of will. No act of will therefore can be the prime object of volition. But the prime object of will is the last end, which is happiness. Happiness therefore cannot possibly be itself an act of will.
3. In all powers that can reflect on their own acts, the act of that power must
first fix on some object, and then fix on its own act. For if the intellect understands
that it understands, we must suppose that it first understands some thing, and afterwards
understands its own understanding of that thing: for the act of understanding, which
the intellect understands, means the understanding of some object. Hence we must
either proceed to infinity; or, coming to some first object of understanding, this
object, we must say, will not be a sheer act of understanding, but some intelligible
thing. Similarly
4. Everything has the truth of its nature by having the constituents of its substance: for a real man differs from a painted one by the constituents of the substance of man. But true happiness does not differ from false happiness in respect of the act of will: for the will is in the same attitude of desire, or love, or delight, whatever the object proposed to it for its sovereign good, true or false: but whether the object so proposed be the true sovereign good or a counterfeit, that difference is decided by intellect. Happiness therefore consists essentially in intellect rather than in any act of will.
5. If any act of will were happiness itself, that act would be either desire or love or delight. Now it is impossible for desire to be the last end: for desire obtains inasmuch as the will tends to something which it has not yet got: but such straining after the absent is inconsistent with the idea of an achieved last end. Love again cannot be the last end: for good is loved not only in its presence but also in its absence: for it is from love that good not possessed is sought for by desire. And though the love of good already attained is more perfect, that access of perfection is to be ascribed to the attainment and established possession of the good loved. The attainment of good then, which is the end, is a different thing from the love of good, which love is imperfect before attainment, and perfect after attainment. In like manner neither is delight the last end: for the very possession of good is the cause of delight, while we either feel the good now possessed, or remember the good possessed before, or hope for the good to be possessed in future: delight therefore is not the last end. No act of will therefore can be the substance of happiness.
6. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable of itself. But that is false: for it makes a difference what delight is desired, considering the object from which delight ensues: for the delight which follows upon good and desirable activities is good and desirable: but that which follows upon evil activities is evil and to be shunned. Delight therefore has its goodness and desirability from something beyond itself. Therefore it is not itself the final end, happiness.
7. The right order of things coincides with the order of nature, for natural things are ordained to their end without mistakes. But in natural things delight is for activity, and not the other way about: for we see that nature has attached delight to those activities of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends, as in the use of food, which is ordained to the preservation of the individual, and in the intercourse of the sexes, which is ordained to the preservation of the species: for if delight were not in attendance, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. It is impossible therefore for delight to be the final end.
8. Delight seems to be nothing else than a rest of the will in some befitting
good, as desire is an inclination of the will to the gaining of some good. Now it
is ridiculous to say that the end of movement is not the coming to be in one’s proper
place, but the satisfaction of the inclination whereby one tended to go there. If
the principle aim of nature were the satisfaction of the inclination, it would never
give the inclination. It gives the inclination, that thereby one may tend to one’s
proper place: when that end is gained, there
9. If any exterior thing is to be any one’s end, we must assign the title of last end to that activity whereby the thing is first gained: thus to people who make money their end, the getting of the money is the end, not the love or desire of it. But the last end of a subsistent intelligence is God. That activity then in man makes the substance of his happiness, whereby he first attains to God. But that is the activity of understanding: for we cannot will what we do not understand. The final happiness of man then substantially consists in knowing God by the understanding, and not in any act of the will.
From what has been said we may solve the objections to the contrary. The fact of the sovereign good being the object of the will does not necessitate sovereign good being substantially the act of the will itself, as was the tenor of the argument first proposed: nay, from the fact of its being the first object, it follows that it is not the act.
Arg. 2. The last perfection of activity is delight, which perfects activity
as beauty does youth.
Reply. There are two ways of being a perfection to a thing. In one way
there is a perfection to a thing already complete in its species: in another way
there is a perfection going to make up the species. Thus the perfection of a house,
considered as complete in its species, is that use for which the house is intended,
namely, being inhabited: hence this should be put in the definition of a house,
if the definition is to be adequate. A perfection going to make up the species of
a house may be one of the constituents and substantial principles of the species:
or it may be something that goes to the preservation of the species, as the buttresses
made to prop the house up: lastly, under this head we must count whatever makes
the house more comely for use, as its beauty. That therefore which is the perfection
of a thing, considered as already complete in its species, is the end of a thing,
as being inhabited is the end of a house. And in like manner the proper activity
of each thing, which is a sort of use of it, is the end of the thing. But the perfections
which go to make up the species are not the end of the thing: rather the thing is
their end. Thus matter and form are for the species. In like manner the perfections
that preserve a thing in its species, as health and nutrition, though they perfect
the animal, are not the end of its existence, but rather the other way about. Those
perfections also whereby a thing is fitted to discharge the proper activities of
its species and gain its due end more becomingly, are not the end of the thing,
but rather the other way about, e.g., a man’s beauty and bodily strength, and other
accomplishments, of which the philosopher says that they minister to happiness instrumentally.
Arg. 3. Delight seems to be so desired for its own sake as never to be
desired for the sake of anything else: for it is foolish to ask of any one why [he]
wishes to be delighted.
Reply. Delight, though it is not the last end, is still a concomitant of the last end, since from the attainment of the last end delight supervenes.
Arg. 4. In the desire of the last end there is the greatest agreement amongst all men, because it is natural. But more seek delight than knowledge. Therefore it seems that delight is the end rather than knowledge.
Reply. There are not more seekers of the delight that there is in knowing than there are seekers of knowledge: but there are more seekers after sensible delights than there are seekers of intellectual knowledge and the delight thence ensuing; and the reason is because external things are more known to the majority of men, as human knowledge starts from objects of sense.
Arg. 5. The will seems to be a higher power than the understanding: for the will moves the understanding to its end: for when there is the will so to do, then it is that the understanding actually considers the knowledge which it habitually possesses. The action therefore of the will seems to be nobler than the action of the understanding; and therefore the final end of happiness seems in the act of will rather than in the act of understanding.
Reply. It is manifestly false to say that the will is higher than the understanding as moving it; for primarily and ordinarily the understanding moves the will. The will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the good apprehended: but the will moves the understanding, we may say, incidentally, inasmuch as the act of understanding itself is apprehended as good and so is desired by the will. Hence it follows that the understanding actually understands, and in this has the start of the will; for never would the will desire to understand, unless first the understanding apprehended the act of understanding itself as good. And again the will moves the understanding to actual activity in the way in which an efficient cause is said to move: but the understanding moves the will in the way in which a final cause moves, for good understood is the end of the will. Now the efficient cause is posterior in motion to the final cause, for the efficient cause moves only for the sake of the final cause. Hence it appears that, absolutely speaking, the understanding is higher than the will, but the will is higher than the understanding accidentally and in a qualified sense.
CHAPTER XXVII—That the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures
ACCORDING to the order of nature, pleasure is for the sake of activity, and not the other way about. If therefore certain activities are not the final end, the pleasures ensuing upon these activities are neither the final end nor accessories of the final end. But certainly the activities on which bodily pleasures follow are not the final end: for they are directed to other obvious ends, the preservation of the body and the begetting of offspring. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the final end, nor accessories of the final end, and happiness is not to be placed in them.
3. Happiness is a good proper to man: dumb animals cannot be called happy except
by an abuse of language.
4. The final end of a thing is noblest and best of all that appertains to the
thing.
5. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being conjoined with things lower than himself, but in his conjunction with something above him.
7. In all things that are said to be ‘ordinarily’ (per se), ‘more’ follows upon
‘more,’ if ‘absolutely’ goes with ‘absolutely.’ If then bodily pleasures were good
in themselves,
8. If human happiness consisted in bodily pleasures, it would be a more praiseworthy
act of virtue to take such pleasures than to abstain from them.
9. The last end of everything is God (Chap. XVIII). That then must be laid down to be the last end of man, whereby he most closely approaches to God. But bodily pleasures injure a man from any close approach to God: for God is approached by contemplation, and the aforesaid pleasures are a hindrance to contemplation.
Hereby is excluded the error of the Epicureans, who placed the happiness of man
in these pleasures: in whose person Solomon says: This seemed to me good, that
man should eat and drink and make merry on the fruit of his toil (
CHAPTER XXVIII, XXIX—That Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory
THE last end and happiness of man is his most perfect activity (Chap.
XXVI). But the honour paid to a man does not consist in
any act of his own, but in the act of another towards him.
2. That is not the last end, which is good and desirable on account of something else. But such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured except for some other good thing existing in him.
4. Even bad men may be honoured. It is better then to become worthy of honour than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not the highest good of man.
Hence it appears that neither does man’s chief good consist in glory, or celebrity of fame. For glory, according to Cicero, is “a frequent mention of a man with praise”; or according to St Augustine, “brilliant notoriety with praise” (clara notitia cum laude). So then men wish for notoriety, attended with praise and a certain brilliance, that they may be honoured by those to whom they become known. Glory then is sought for the sake of honour. If then honour is not the highest good, much less is glory.
CHAPTER XXX—That Man’s Happiness does not consist in Riches
RICHES are not desired except for the sake of something else: for of themselves they do no good, but only as we use them. But the highest good is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else.
2. The possession or preservation of those things cannot be the highest good, which benefit man most in being parted with. But such is the use of riches, to spend.
3. The act of liberality and munificence, the virtues that deal with money, is
more praiseworthy, in that money is parted with, than that money is got. Man’s happiness
therefore does not consist in the possession of riches.
4. That in the gaining of which man’s chief good lies must be some thing better than man. But man is better than his riches, which are things ordained to his use.
5. The highest good of man is not subject to fortune: for fortuitous events happen
without effort of reason, whereas man must gain his proper end by reason. But fortune
has great place in the gaining of riches.
CHAPTER XXXI—That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power
A MAN is called good inasmuch as he attains to the sovereign good. But inasmuch as
he has power he is not called either good or evil: for he is not good who can do
good things, nor is a man evil of being able to do evil things. Therefore the highest
good does not consist in being powerful.
3. All power is over another (ad alterum). But the highest good is not over another.
CHAPTER XXXII—That Happiness does not consist in the Goods of the Body
THE soul is better than the body. Therefore the good of the soul, as understanding and the like, is better than the good of the body. The good of the body therefore is not the highest good of man.
3. These goods are common to man and other animals: but happiness is the proper good of man alone.
4. For goods of the body, many animals are better off than man: some are swifter, some are stronger, and so of the rest. If in these things the highest good consisted, man would not be the most excellent of animals.
CHAPTER XXXIV—That the Final Happiness Man does not consist in Acts of the Moral Virtues
HUMAN happiness, if it is final, is not referable to any further end. But all moral acts are referable to something further: thus acts of fortitude in war are directed to securing victory and peace: acts of justice to the preservation of peace amongst men by every one remaining in quiet possession of his own.
2. Moral virtues aim at the observance of the golden mean in passions and in the disposal of external things. But the moderation of the passions or of external things cannot possibly be the final end of human life, since these very passions and external things are referable to something else.
3. Man is man by the possession of reason; and therefore happiness, his proper
good, must regard what is proper to reason. But that is more proper to reason which
reason has in itself than what it does in another. Since then the good of moral
virtue is something which reason establishes in things other than itself, moral
virtue cannot be the best thing in man, which is happiness. See Ethics and Natural Law,
p. 8, n. 4; and p. 76, n. 4. When Milton says in the Comus Virtue alone is happiness below, he cannot reasonably mean that moral virtue is formally and
precisely happiness, but only that it is indispensable to happiness, and presupposed,
as the base of a tower is presupposed to the spire. Moral virtue is more indispensable,
but happiness is better. But the privation of happiness is a less evil than the
privation of moral virtue. So it is less evil to have the spire blown down than
to have the tower on which it rests blown up, although the spire is higher and nobler
than the substructure. The doctrine of this chapter is in Aristotle, Nic. Eth. X, viii.
CHAPTER XXXVII—That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God
IF then the final happiness of man does not consist in those exterior advantages
which are called goods of fortune, nor in goods of the body, nor in goods of the
soul in its sentient part, nor in the intellectual part in respect of the moral
virtues, nor in the virtues of the practical intellect, called art and prudence,
it remains that the final happiness of man consists in the contemplation of truth.
This act alone in man is proper to him, and is in no way shared by any other being
in this world. This is sought for its own sake, and is directed to no other end
beyond itself. By this act man is united in likeness with pure spirits, and even
comes to know them in a certain way. For this act also man is more self-sufficient,
having less need of external things. I have pointed out this subordination
of practice to theory in Practical and Moral Essays, pp. 154, 155, cf. article
10, pp. 11-13. St Thomas proceeds to instance three kinds of contemplation. (A) Intuition
of first principles. This is enjoyed by every man, educated and uneducated,
who has the ordinary use of reason. Needless to say, it is not happiness, or all
men would be happy. (B) Scientific Knowledge, the property of the educated.
But the objects of science are creatures; and man requires for his happiness to
contemplate something higher and nobler. (C) Wisdom, which is defined (in
B. I, Ch. I: “The knowledge of things by their highest
causes.” In this wisdom, taken for the contemplation of God, the beginning
and last end of all, human happiness will be found to consist. (A) is further suggestive of Chap. XXXVIII, in which it is shown that the plain
man’s rational knowledge of God is not happiness: while (B) and (C) together suggest
Chap. XXXIX, which shows that the philosopher’s knowledge of God is not happiness
either. Chapter XL proves the same of the Christian’s knowledge of God by faith.
Chapter XLVII shows that we enjoy no vision of God on earth. Chapter XLVIII, that
happiness is not on earth. Finally, Chap. L argues that nothing short of the immediate
vision of God makes the happiness of angels and of human souls in heaven.
Now it is impossible for human happiness to consist in that contemplation which
is by intuition of first principles, — a very imperfect study of things, as being
the most general, and not amounting to more than a potential knowledge: it is in
fact not the end but the beginning of human study: it is supplied to us by nature,
and not by any close investigation of truth. Nor can happiness consist in the sciences,
the object-matter of which is the meanest things, whereas happiness should be an
activity of intellect dealing with the noblest objects of intelligence. Therefore
the conclusion remains that the final happiness of man consists in contemplation
guided by wisdom to the study of the things of God. Thus we have reached by way
of induction the same conclusion that was formerly established by deductive reasoning,
CHAPTER XXXVIII—That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the majority of Mankind
THERE is a certain general and vague knowledge of God in the minds of practically, all men, whether it be by the fact of God’s existence being a self-evident truth, as some think (B. I, Chap. X); or, as seems more likely, because natural reasoning leads a man promptly to some sort of knowledge of God: for men seeing that natural things follow a certain course and order, and further considering that order cannot be without an ordainer, they perceive generally that there is some ordainer of the things which we see. But who or what manner of being the ordainer of nature is, and whether He be one or many, cannot be gathered off-hand from this slight study. Thus, seeing a man move and do other acts, we perceive that there is in him a cause of these activities, which is not in other things; and this cause we call the soul; and still we do not yet know what the soul is, whether it is anything corporeal or not, or how it performs the aforesaid acts. Now such knowledge as this cannot possibly suffice for happiness.
1. For happiness must be an activity without defect. But this knowledge is susceptible of admixture of many errors: thus some have believed that the ordainer of mundane events is no other than the heavenly bodies: hence they have affirmed the heavenly bodies to be gods. Others have said the same of the elements, thinking that their natural movements and activities come not from any controlling power outside them, but that they control other things. Others, believing that human acts are not subject to any other than human control, have called those men who control other men gods. Such knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.
3. No one is blameworthy for not possessing happiness: nay, men who have it not,
and go on tending to it, are praised. But lack of the aforesaid knowledge of God
renders a man particularly blameworthy. It is a great indication of dulness of perception
in a man, when he perceives not such manifest signs of God; just as any one would
be counted lacking in perception, who, seeing a man, did not understand that he
had a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalms (
4. Knowledge of a thing in general, not descending into any details, is a very imperfect knowledge, as would be the knowledge of man merely as something that moves. By such knowledge a thing is known potentially only, for details are potentially contained in generalities. But happiness, being a perfect activity and the supreme good of man, must turn upon what is actual and not merely potential.
CHAPTER XXXIX—That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God which is to be had by Demonstration
AGAIN there is another knowledge of God, higher than the last mentioned: this
knowledge is acquired by demonstration, by means of which we come nearer to a proper
knowledge of Him, since demonstration removes from Him many attributes, by removal
of which the mind discerns God standing apart from other beings. Thus demonstration
shows God to be unchangeable, eternal, incorporeal, absolutely simple, one. A proper
knowledge of an object is arrived at, not only by affirmations, but also by
1. The individuals of a species arrive at the end and perfection of that species for the most part; and natural developments have place always or for the most part, though they fail in a minority of instances through something coming in to mar them. But happiness is the end and perfection of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. Happiness then is a common good, possible to accrue to all men, except in cases where an obstacle arises to deprive some of it. But few they are who arrive at this knowledge of God by way of demonstration, on account of the difficulties mentioned above (B. I, Chap. IV). Such scientific knowledge then is not the essence of human happiness.
3. Happiness excludes all misery. But deception and error is a great part of
misery. Now in the knowledge of God by demonstration manifold error may be mingled,
as is clear in the case of many who have found out some truths about God in that
way, and further following their own ideas, in the failure of demonstration, have
fallen into many sorts of error. And if any have found truth in the things of God
so perfectly by the way of demonstration as that no error has entered their minds,
such men certainly have been very few: a rarity of attainment which does not befit
happiness, happiness being the common end of all.
4. Happiness consists in perfect activity. Now for the perfection of the activity of knowledge certainty is required: but the aforesaid knowledge has much of uncertainty.
CHAPTER XL—That Happiness does not consist in the Knowledge of God by Faith
HAPPINESS is the perfect activity of the human intellect (Chap. XXVI). But in the knowledge that is of faith, though there is high perfection on the part of the object so apprehended, there is great imperfection on the side of intellect, for intellect does not understand that to which it assents in believing.
2. Final happiness does not consist principally in any act of will (Chap. XXVI). But in the knowledge of faith the will has a leading part: for the understanding assents by faith to the things proposed to it, because it wills to do so, without being necessarily drawn by the direct evidence of truth.
3. He who believes, yields assent to things proposed to him by another, which himself he does not see: hence the knowledge of faith is more like hearing than seeing. Since then happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith.
4. Happiness being the last end, all natural desire is thereby appeased. But the knowledge of faith, far from appeasing desire, rather excites it, since every one desires to see that which he believes.
CHAPTERS XLI–XLV “A separately subsistent intelligence,” writes St Thomas (Chap. XLI), “by knowing
its own essence, knows both what is above it and what is below it, particularly
if what is above it is also its cause, since the likeness of the cause must be found
in the effect. Hence, since God is the cause of all created subsistent intelligences,
they, by knowing their own essences, know by some sort of vision (per modum visionis
cujusdam) even God Himself: for a thing is known by intellect in a manner of
vision, when its likeness exists in intellect: whatever intellect then apprehends
a separately subsistent intelligence, and knows the same in its essential nature,
sees God in a higher way than is possible by any of the modes of cognition already
mentioned.” Know an angel, then, or pure spirit, in his essence, and you will thereby
have a higher knowledge of God than any that you could attain by any other speculation
of science or philosophy. Consequently, if the knowledge of God be happiness, happiness,
it seems, will best open to us men, if we can find some method of reading the innermost
natures of angels. Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl A.D. 200), Avempace (Ibn-Badja,
d. 1138), and Averroes (Ibn-Roschd, d. 1198), each was quoted in St Thomas’s day
as the author of a method enabling men to do this, methods which St Thomas elaborately
confutes in these chapters. Avempace’s plan was to study the speculative sciences,
and thence forming abstract generalisations, one higher than the other, — or perhaps
he meant (what is by no means the same thing) one fuller of ‘content’ than the other,
— to ascend to the cognition of pure intelligence. St Thomas describes the process
in scholastic terms, thus; “to extract the quiddity of everything which is not its
own quiddity; and if that quiddity has a quiddity, again to abstract the quiddity
of that quiddity, till we come to a stand somewhere, arriving by the method of analysis
at the knowledge of the quiddity of a being, subsisting apart, which has not another
quiddity” (Chap. XLI): which words perhaps need some explanation. “The quiddity
of a thing which is not its own quiddity” means then an essence, or essential quality,
which is shared by many subjects, and is not all embodied in one subject, constituting
that subject entirely. Thus prudence is in Cato, and in many others besides. Cato
is not all prudence: he is not the embodiment of sheer prudence and nothing else.
Prudence then in Cato is a quiddity which is not its own quiddity. St Thomas well
observes that Avempace’s method is Platonic Idealism revived. He adds that, starting
as our abstractions must, from sensible objects, we can never attain to a view of
the essential nature of a pure spirit. “If by understanding of the natures and quiddities
of sensible things, we arrive at an understanding of separately subsistent intelligences,
that understanding of such intelligences must be reached through some one of the
speculative sciences. But we do not see how this is to be done: for there is no
speculative science which teaches concerning any one of the separately subsistent
intelligences what it is in essence, but only the fact of its existence” (Chap.
XLI). — Averroes, as might have been expected, proceeds upon his favourite notion
of the continuatio, or conjunction of the individual mind with the one vast
intelligence, active and potential, that is without (B. II, Chap.
LX). St Thomas’s summary of the Commentator’s views ends
thus — (it is a very free paraphrase of Averroes’s words as they appear in the
Latin of the Venice edition of 1574, pp. 186, 187): “This perfect progress towards
conjunction with the supreme intelligence comes of zealous study of the speculative
sciences, whereby true intellectual notions are acquired, and false opinions are
excluded, such opinions lying beyond the line of this progress, like monstrous births
outside of the line of the operation of nature. To this advance men help one another
by helping one another in the speculative sciences. When then all things now potentially
intelligible come to be in us actually understood, then the active intellect: will
be perfectly conjoined with us as a form, and we shall understand by it perfectly.
Hence, since it belongs to the active intellect to understand substances existing
apart, we shall then understand those separately subsistent beings as we now understand
the notions of speculative science; and this will be man’s final happiness, in which
man shall be as a god” (Chap. XLIII). If any one used such language in our time, we should understand him to mean by
continuatio, or union with the supreme intelligence,
as regards the individual, his instruction up to the level of the science of his
age; and as regards the age itself, the maintenance of the level of science reached
by the previous generation, and the further raising of that level. But it is not
safe to make out an ancient author to have meant exactly what his words would mean,
if spoken now. St Thomas gives a reference to the commentary of Averroes on Aristotle,
De anima, III, a reference which I have duly followed up. I find that Averroes
quotes Alexander and Avempace, disagreeing with them both. St Thomas, I believe,
is indebted to Averroes for his knowledge of Alexander and Avempace. Now nowhere
in Averroes, nor in either of the two authors whom he quotes, do I find any reference
whatever to separate substances personified as thinking intelligences, or angels,
— nor, for that matter, in Aristotle either. The discussion had its origin in an
unfulfilled promise of Aristotle (De Anima III, vii, 10) to enquire,
ἆρα ἐνδέχεται
τῶν κεχωρισμένων
τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν
μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους;
(is it possible for the mind, without being itself separate from extended body,
to understand any of the things that are so separated?) To interpret
τὰ κεχωρισμένα
to mean ‘pure spirits’ seems going a long way beyond Aristotle, who probably meant
no more than ‘products of high abstraction’: nor did Averroes, commenting on the
third book of the De anima, or Alexander, or Avempace, as quoted in that
commentary, mean anything more. The transformation of these high abstractions (κεχωρισμένα)
into thinking beings, pure spirits, or angels, was, I conjecture, the work of the
Neo-Averroists, whom St Thomas encountered at the University of Paris. It is with
these Averroists, not with Averroes him self, that St Thomas mainly contends in
these chapters. The argument is intricate, the theory which it impugns obsolete,
nor is it worth while further to detain the modern reader with the discussion. No
man now living expects to ‘pick the brains’ of angels, and so find happiness in
this life by sharing an angel’s natural knowledge of God. Nor did Averroes, so far
as his comments on the De anima show, dream of anything so absurd. Lest any one should think the expression ‘to pick the brains of angels’ a travesty,
I quote the Latin of St Thomas: Si igitur per cognitionem intellectivam,
quae est ex phantasmatibus, possit pervenire aliquis nostrum ad intelligendas substantias
separatas, possibile erit quod aliquis in hac vita intelligat ipsas substantias
separatas, et per consequens videndo ipsas substantias separatas participabis modum
illius cognitionis quo substantia separata intelligens se intelligit Deum
(Chap. XLI). This is the translation: “If then by intellectual knowledge, got out of impressions
on the phantasy, any one of us could arrive to understand subsistent beings existing
apart [i.e., pure spirits], it would be possible for one in this life to understand
those same pure spirits, and consequently by seeing [in his mind’s eye] those pure
spirits he would share in the mode of that knowledge whereby a pure spirit, understanding
itself, understands God.” I need hardly remind the reader that St Thomas himself
rejects this notion, and is, I think, mistaken in attributing it to Averroes.
CHAPTER XLVI—That the Soul in this life does not understand itself by itself
AN apparent difficulty may be alleged against what has been said from some words
of Augustine, which require careful treatment. He says (De Trinitate, IX,
iii): “As the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by the senses of the body,
so of incorporeal things by itself: therefore it knows itself by itself, because
itself is incorporeal.” By these words it appears that our mind understands itself
by itself, and, understanding itself, understands separately subsistent intelligences,
or pure spirits, which would militate against what has been shown above. But it
is clear that such is not the mind of Augustine. For he says (De Trinitate,
X, ix, 12) of the soul seeking knowledge of itself: “Let it not then seek to find
(cernere) itself as though it were absent, but let
its care be to discern (discernere) itself as it is
present: let it not observe itself as though it did not know itself but let it distinguish
itself from that other thing which it has mistaken for itself.” Whence he gives
us to understand that the soul of itself knows itself as present, but not as distinct
from other things; and therefore he says (De Trin. X, x) that some have erred
in not distinguishing the soul from things that are different from it. But by the
knowledge of a thing in its essence the thing is known as distinct from other things:
hence definition, which marks the essence of a thing, distinguishes the thing defined
from all other things. Augustine then did not mean that the soul of itself knows
its own essence. So then, according to the thought of Augustine, our mind of itself
knows itself, inasmuch as it knows concerning itself that it exists: for by the
very perceiving of itself to act it perceives itself to be. But it acts of itself.
Therefore of itself it knows concerning itself that it exists.
1. But it cannot be said that the soul of itself knows concerning itself what it essentially is. For a cognitive faculty comes to be actually cognisant by there being in it the object which is known. If the object is in it potentially, it knows potentially: if the object is in it actually, it is actually cognisant: if in an intermediate way, it is habitually cognisant. But the soul is always present to itself actually, and never potentially or habitually only. If then the soul of itself knows itself by its essence, it must ever have an intellectual view of itself, what it essentially is, which clearly is not the case.
2 and 3. If the soul of itself knows itself in its essence, every man, having
a soul, knows the essence of the soul: which clearly is not the case, for many
So then, by knowing itself, the soul is led to know concerning separately subsistent intelligences the fact of their existence, but not what they are essentially, which would mean understanding their substances. For whereas we know, either by demonstration or by faith, concerning these pure spirits that they are intelligent subsistent beings, in neither way could we gather this knowledge but for the fact that our soul knows from itself the meaning of intelligent being. Hence we must use our knowledge of the intelligence of our own soul as a starting-point for all that we can know of separately subsistent intelligences. But even granting that by speculative sciences we could arrive at a knowledge of the essence of our own soul, it does not follow that we could thereby arrive at a knowledge of all that is knowable about pure spirits; for our intelligence falls far short of the intelligence of a pure spirit. A knowledge of the essence of our own soul might lead to a knowledge of some remote higher genus of pure spirits: but that would not be an understanding of their substances.
CHAPTER XLVII—That we cannot in this life see God as He essentially is
If the connatural dependence of our understanding on phantasms prevents us in this life from understanding other pure spirits, much less can we in this life see the divine essence, which transcends all angels. Of this fact the following may also be taken as an indication: the higher our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more it is abstracted from sensible things: but the final terminus to which contemplation can possibly arrive is the divine substance: therefore the mind that sees the divine substance must be totally divorced from bodily senses, either by death or by some rapture. Hence it is said in the person of God: No man shall see me and live (Exod. xxxiii, 20). Whereas in Holy Scripture some are said to have seen God, that must be understood to have been inasmuch as by some vision of the phantasy or corporeal appearance the presence of divine power was shown.
Certain words of Augustine raise a difficulty in this matter. Thus he says (De
Trinitate, IX, vii) : “In the eternal truth, whence all corporeal creatures
are, we see with our mind’s eye the form according to which we are, and according
to which we execute anything truly and rightly either in ourselves or in corporeal
things.” Also he says (Confess. I, xxv): “If both of us see that what you
say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I pray, do we see it?
Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both of us in that unchangeable truth which
is above our minds.” And to the like effect (De Trin. XII, ii): “It belongs
to the higher reason to judge of these bodily things according to aspects (rationes)
eternal and everlasting, which certainly would not be unchangeable, were they not
above the human mind.” But aspects unchangeable and everlasting cannot be elsewhere
than in God, since, according to Catholic faith,
On the other hand it is incredible that in the above words Augustine should mean to assert that
in this life we can understand God as He essentially is, seeing that in his book
De videndo Deum he says the contrary.
Though the human mind represents the likeness of God more closely than lower
creatures, still such knowledge of God as can be gathered from the human mind does
not transcend that kind of knowledge which is borrowed from sensible objects, since
the soul knows her own essential nature by understanding the nature of things of
sense (Chap. XLVI).
CHAPTER XLVIII—That the Final Happiness of Man is not in this Life
IF then human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God whereby He is commonly known by all or most men according to some vague estimate, nor again in the knowledge of God whereby He is known demonstratively in speculative science, nor in the knowledge of God whereby He is known by faith, as has been shown above (Chapp. XXXVIII-XL); if again it is impossible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God so as to know Him in His essence, or to understand other pure spirits, and thereby attain to a nearer knowledge of God (Chapp. XLI-XLVI); and still final happiness must be placed in some knowledge of God (Ch. XXXVII); it follows that it is impossible for the final happiness of man to be in this life.
2. The last end of man bounds his natural desire, so that, when that is reached,
nothing further is sought: for if there is still a tendency to something else, the
end of rest is not yet gained. But that cannot be in this life: for the more one
understands, the more is the desire of understanding. natural to all men, increased.
3. When one gains happiness, he gains also stability and rest. All have this
idea of happiness, that it involves stability as a necessary condition: hence the
philosopher says that we do not take man for a chameleon.
4. It seems unfitting and irrational that the period of development should be
great and the period of duration small: for it would follow that nature for the
greater part of its time went without its final perfection. Hence we see that animals
that live for a short time take a short time in arriving at maturity. But if human
happiness consists in perfect activity according to perfect virtue, whether intellectual
or moral, such happiness cannot accrue to man till after a long lapse of time; and
this is especially apparent in speculative activity, in which the happiness of man
is ultimately placed. For scarcely in extreme age can a man arrive [at] a perfect
view of scientific truth;
5. That is the perfect good of happiness, which is absolutely free from admixture
of evil, as that is perfect whiteness, which is absolutely unmingled
6. Man naturally shrinks from death, and is sad at the thought of it. Yet man
must die, and therefore cannot be perfectly happy while here he lives.
7. Happiness consists, not in habit, but in activity: for habits are for the
sake of acts. But it is impossible in this life to do any act continually.
8. The more a thing is desired and loved, the greater grief and sadness does its loss bring. But if final happiness be in this world, it will certainly be lost, at least by death; and it is uncertain whether it will last till death, since to any man there may possibly happen in this life diseases totally debarring him from any virtuous activity, such as insanity. Such happiness therefore must always have a natural pendent of sadness.
But it may be replied that whereas happiness is the good of an intelligent nature,
true and perfect happiness belongs to those in whom intelligent nature is found
in its perfection, that is, in pure spirits;
Now it is demonstrable that the aforesaid answer is not to the undoing of the
arguments above alleged.
(b) It is impossible for a natural desire to be empty and vain: for nature does
nothing in vain. But the desire of nature (for happiness) would be empty and vain,
if it never possibly could be fulfilled. Therefore this natural desire of man is
fulfillable. But not in this life. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life.
Alexander and Averroes laid it down that the final happiness of man is not in
such knowledge as is possible to man through the speculative sciences, but in a
knowledge gained by conjunction with a separately subsistent intelligence, which
conjunction they conceived to be possible to man in this life. But because Aristotle
saw that there was no other knowledge for man in this life than that which is through
the speculative sciences, he supposed man not to gain perfect happiness, but a limited
measure of happiness suited to his state. In all which investigation it sufficiently
appears how hard pressed on this side and on that these fine geniuses (praeclara
ingenia) were. From this stress of difficulty we shall find escape in
positing, according to the proofs already given, that man can arrive at true happiness
after this life, the soul of man being immortal.
Therefore the Lord promises us reward in heaven (
CHAPTER XLIX—That the Knowledge which Pure Spirits have of God through knowing their own Essence does not carry with it a Vision of the Essence of God
WE must further enquire whether this very knowledge, whereby separately subsistent
intelligences and souls after death know God through knowing their own essences,
suffices for their own happiness. For the investigation of this truth we must first
show that the divine essence is not known by any such mode of knowledge. In no way
can the essence of a cause be known in its effect, unless the effect be the adequate
expression of the whole power of the cause.
2. An intelligible likeness, whereby a thing is understood in its substance must
be of the same species as that thing, or rather it must be its species, — thus
the form of a house in the architect’s mind is the same species as the form of the
house which is in matter, or rather it is its species, — for by the species of
man you do not understand the essence of ass or horse.
3. Everything created is bounded within the limits of some genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself every perfection of entire being (B. I, Chapp. XXVIII, XLIII). It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen through any created medium.
Nevertheless a pure spirit by knowing its own substance knows the existence of
God, and that God is the cause of all, and eminent above all, and removed (remotus)
from all, not only from all things that are, but from all that the created mind
can conceive. To this knowledge of God we also may attain in some sort: for from
the effects of His creation we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause
(sustaining principle) of other beings, super-eminent above other beings, and removed
from all. And this is the highest perfection of our knowledge in this life: hence
Dionysius says (De mystica theologia c. 2) that “we are united with God as
with the unknown”; which comes about in this way, that we know of God what He is
not, but what He is remains absolutely unknown. And to show the ignorance of this
most sublime knowledge it is said of Moses that he drew nigh to the darkness
in which God was ( See
Ch. XXXIX, and B. I, Ch. XIV,
note. In later life, St Thomas wrote more cautiously on this subject. What he means
is this. I call God, let us say, ‘intelligent.’ And so He is intelligent. He is,
if I may use a vulgar expression, ‘getting on that way’ which I call the way of
intelligence; only, He goes so on in it, that the poor little beginning of intelligence,
which is all that I can master and appreciate as such, is wholly unfit to stand
for His infinite intelligence. — To put the same in a more learned way. God to
me is not bounded in this, which I understand, but he is this-like, and
still more this-like to infinity. To express the fact, I may call God, and truly
call Him, this (e.g., ‘intelligent’); but I may as truly (though not always
as safely to unintelligent ears) deny the same of Him, merely meaning by the denial
that the this, though the best and truest word we have, is a wholly inadequate
expression to contain and represent Him, who “is not mere Being, but even beyond
Being in dignity and power” (Plato, Rep. 509 b). Here we have what St Thomas
(B. I, Ch. XIV) calls via remotionis.
But because an inferior nature at its height attains only to the lowest grade of the nature superior to it, this knowledge must be more excellent in pure spirits than in us. For (a) the nearer and more express the effect, the more evidently apparent the existence of the cause. But pure spirits, that know God through themselves, are nearer and more express likenesses of God than the effects through which we know God.
(c) High dignity better appears, when we know to what other high dignities it stands preferred. Thus a clown, knowing the king to be the chief man in the kingdom, but for the rest knowing only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has to do, does not know the king’s pre-eminence so well as another, who knows the dignity of all the princes of the realm. But we men know only some of the lowest of things that are. Though then we know that God is high above all beings, still we do not know the height of the Divine Majesty as the angels know it, who know the highest order of beings and God’s elevation above them all.
CHAPTER L—That the desire of Pure Intelligences does not rest satisfied in the Natural Knowledge which they have of God
EVERYTHING that is imperfect in any species desires to gain the perfection of
that species. He who has an opinion about a thing, opinion being an imperfect knowledge
of the thing, is thereby egged on to desire a scientific knowledge of the thing.
2. The knowledge of effects kindles the desire of knowing the cause: this search after causes set men upon philosophising. Therefore the desire of knowing, naturally implanted in all intelligent beings, does not rest unless, after finding out the substances of things made, they come also [etiam, not etiamsi] to know the cause on which those substances depend. By the fact then of pure spirits knowing that God is the cause of all the substances which they see, the natural desire in them does not rest unless they come also to see the substance of God Himself.
4. Nothing finite can set to rest the desire of intelligence. Given any finite thing, intelligence always sets to work to apprehend something beyond it. But the height and power of every created substance is finite. Therefore the intelligence of a created spirit rests not in the knowledge of any created substances, however excellent, but tends still further in a natural desire to understand that substance which is of infinite height and excellence, namely, the divine substance (Chap. XLIII).
6. The nearer a thing is to the goal, the greater is its desire. But the
Hereby it sufficiently appears that final happiness is to be sought in no other
source than in activity of intellect, since no desire carries so high as the desire
of understanding truth. All our other desires, be they of pleasure or of anything
else desirable by man, may rest in other objects; but the aforesaid desire rests
not until it arrives at God, on whom all creation hinges and who made it all. Hence
Wisdom aptly says: I dwell in the heights of heaven, and my throne is in the
pillar of a cloud ( A well-known difficulty arises from this chapter.
If pure spirits and disembodied souls, for there is question of both here, have
a natural desire of seeing the substance, essence, or what Holy Writ calls the face
of God, which sight is called by theologians the ‘beatific vision’; and this natural
desire of the beatific vision points to a corresponding possibility of realisation;
then either this vision can be attained by natural means, a piece of ultra-Pelagianism
which St Thomas is the first to repudiate (Chapp. LII,
LIII); or men and angels, as such, require to be raised to
the supernatural state, and could never possibly have been left by God to the mere
intrinsic powers of their nature, a position virtually Pelagian, as making grace
a requisite of nature, — a position formally condemned by the Church in Baius (Michael
Le Bay of Louvain) and Jansenius, and rejected by all modern Catholic theologians,
who insist on the absolute possibility of what they call a ’state of pure (mere)
nature.’ Three Popes, in 1567, 1579, 1641, condemned this proposition of Baius:
“It is an opinion excogitated by vain and otiose men, according to the folly of
philosophers, that man in his first origin was the recipient of gifts superadded
to his nature, and so was elevated by the divine bounty and adopted to be a son
of God.” Baius meant that these gifts of adoption and sonship were proper to human
nature. Again this saying of Quesnel is condemned in the Bull Unigenitus of 1713:
“The grace of God is a consequence of nature, and was due to nature sound and whole.”
This matter is lucidly explained in Father Harper’s Peace through the Truth,
First Series, pp. 293-296. I have written upon the subject, Ethics and Natural
Law, pp. 21-25; Oxford and Cambridge Conferences, First Series, pp. 211—217,
253-257. But how deliver St Thomas from the dilemma? The usual escape is by saying that
he writes, not of human souls and angels as they are from the pure view of philosophy,
in puris naturalibus, but as they actually are in
the historical order of Providence, elevated to the supernatural state, destined
and fitted by God’s gratuitous bounty to see Him ultimately face to face. But the
Saint’s arguments in this chapter are purely rational and philosophical, containing
not the slightest reference to any fact presupposed from revelation. >Or shall we say that he deals only in εἰκότα,
arguments of congruity, but not of necessity, or as he says (B. I, Ch.
IX), rationes verisimiles ad fidelium exercitium
et consolationem? Against this interpretation it is to be considered
that the chapter is an essential link in a long chain of arguments (Chapp. XXVI-LIV)
evidently meant for a demonstrated theory of happiness. I think we should consider what St Thomas would have said to the following reply
to the argumentation of this chapter. There is no natural desire of that which created nature, as such, is not capable
of attaining in any shape or form. But created nature, as such, is not capable of attaining, in any shape or
form to the vision of God face to face: therefore. This difficulty I doubt if St Thomas ever raised to himself, or had brought before
him. It came into prominence three or four centuries later in the disputes with
Baius and Jansenius. Had St Thomas been confronted with it, I am confident that
he would have met it as Catholic theologians now do. He would have acknowledged
that angels and human spirits, in their mere natural condition, would find satisfaction
and perfect natural happiness in a vision of God mediate and indirect. He might
possibly still argue a certain congruity in such intelligent creatures being raised
to the supernatural state and made capable of seeing God. He might and he might
not, for such elevation is a stupendous advance upon nature; and the vision of God,
but for its being a revealed fact, would be beyond any creature’s dream. It hath
not entered into the heart of man to conceive (
CHAPTER LI—How God is seen as He essentially is
AS shown above (Chap. XLIX), the divine substance cannot
be seen by the intellect in any created presentation. Hence, if God’s essence is
to be seen, the intelligence must see it in the divine essence itself, so that in
such vision the divine essence shall be at once the object which is seen and that
whereby it is seen.
This is the immediate vision of God that is promised us in Scripture: We see
now in a glass darkly, but then face to face (i Cor. xiii, 2): a text absurd
to take in a corporeal sense, as though we could imagine a bodily face in Deity
itself, whereas it has been shown that God is incorporeal (B. I, Chap.
XX). Nor again is it possible for us with our bodily face
to see God, since the bodily sense of sight, implanted in our face, can be only
of bodily things. Thus then shalt we see God face to face, in that we shall have
an immediate vision of Him, as of a man whom we see face to face. By this vision
we are singularly assimilated to God, and are partakers in His happiness: for this
is His happiness, that He essentially understands His own substance. Hence it is
said: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He
is (
CHAPTER LII—That no Created Substance can of its natural power arrive to see God as He essentially is
THE property of a higher nature cannot be attained by a lower nature except by the action of that higher nature to which it properly belongs. But to see God by the divine essence is the property of the divine nature: for it is proper to every agent to act by its own proper form. Therefore no subsistent intelligence can see God by the divine essence except through the action of God bringing it about.
5. To see the substance of God transcends the limits of every created nature: for it is proper to every intelligent created nature to understand according to the mode of its substance: but the divine substance is not intelligible according to the mode of any created substance (Chap. XLIX).
Hence it is said: The grace of God is life everlasting (
CHAPTER LIII—That a Created Intelligence needs some influx of Divine Light to see God in His Essence
IT is impossible for that which is the proper form of one thing to become the form of another thing, unless that latter thing comes to partake of some likeness to the former. But the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intelligence, and is proportioned to it: for in God these three are one, that which understands, that whereby it understands, and that which is understood. It is impossible therefore for the very essence of God to become an intelligible form to any created intellect otherwise than by the said intellect coming to be partaker in some likeness to God.
3. If two things, not previously united, come afterwards to be united, this must be either by a change in both or by a change in one of them. If therefore any created intellect begins anew to see the essence of God, the divine essence must be conjoined anew with that intellect by way of intelligible presentation. But it is impossible for the divine essence to change; and therefore such union must begin by some change in the created intellect, that is to say, by its making some new acquisition.
But because we arrive at the knowledge of things intelligible through things sensible, we also transfer the names of sensible cognition to intelligible cognition, and particularly the properties of sight, which among senses is the nobler and more spiritual and more akin to intellect: hence intellectual knowledge itself is called sight, or vision. And because bodily vision is not accomplished except through light, the means whereby intellectual vision is fulfilled borrow the name of light. That disposition therefore whereby a created intelligence is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance is called the ‘light of glory.’
This is the light of which it is said: In thy light we shall see light
(
CHAPTER LIV—Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions
ARG. 1. No access of light to the eye can elevate the sight to see things that transcend the natural faculty of bodily vision. But the divine substance transcends the entire capacity of created intelligence, even more than intellect transcends the capacity of sense. Therefore no light can supervene upon any created intelligence, to elevate it to the capacity of seeing the divine substance.
Reply. The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of created intelligence
as though it were something altogether alien from it, as sound is alien
Arg. 2. That light which is received in the created intelligence is itself created, and therefore falling infinitely short of God. Therefore no such light can raise the creature to the vision of the divine substance.
Reply. This light raises the creature to the vision of God, not that there
is no interval between it and the divine substance, but it does so in virtue of
the power which it receives from God to such effect, although in its own being it
falls infinitely short of God. For this created light does not conjoin the intelligence
with God in point of being, but only in point of understanding.
Arg. 4. What is created, may very well be connatural with some created thing. If then that light is created, there may be some created intelligence, which by its own connatural light will see the divine substance, contrary to what has been shown (Chap. XLII).
Reply. The vision of the divine substance exceeds all natural faculty: hence the light whereby a created intelligence is perfected to the vision of the divine substance must be supernatural.
Arg. 6. There must be proportion between the intelligence and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between a created intelligence, perfected in the aforesaid light, and the divine substance, since the distance between them still remains infinite.
Reply. So there is a proportion between a created intelligence and God
as an object of understanding, not a proportion implying any commensurateness of
being, but a proportion implying a reference of one to the other, as matter is referred
to form, or cause to effect. Thus there may well be a proportion between the creature
and God, as the understanding is referred to the understood, or the effect to the
cause.
Some have been moved by these and the like arguments to lay down the statement
that God is never to be seen by any created intelligence. But this position, besides
taking away the true happiness of the rational creature, which cannot be except
in the vision of the divine substance, as has been shown (Chap.
LI), is also in contradiction with the authority of Holy Scripture,
and is to be rejected as false and heretical.
CHAPTER LV—That the Created Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance
THE aforesaid light is a principle of divine knowledge, since by it the created intelligence is elevated to see the divine substance. Therefore the mode of divine vision must be commensurate with the intensity of the aforesaid light. But the aforesaid light falls far short in intensity of the brightness of the divine understanding. It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen by such light so perfectly as the divine understanding sees it. The divine understanding sees that substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: for the truth of the divine substance and the clearness of the divine understanding are equal, nay are one. It is impossible therefore for created intelligence through the aforesaid light to see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. But everything that is comprehended by any knowing mind is known by it as perfectly as it is knowable. Thus he who knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, taking it as a matter of opinion on probable grounds because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend that truth: he alone comprehends it, who knows it as matter of science, through the medium of a demonstration showing cause. It is impossible therefore for any created intelligence to comprehend the divine substance.
2. Finite power cannot compass in its activity an infinite object. But the divine substance is infinite in comparison with every created intellect, since every created intellect is bounded within the limits of a certain species.
When it is said that the divine substance is seen but not comprehended by created
intelligence, the meaning is not that something of it is seen and something not
seen, since the divine substance is absolutely simple: what is meant is that it
is not seen perfectly so far as it is visible. In the same way he who holds a demonstrable
conclusion as a matter of opinion, is said to know it but not to comprehend it,
because he does not know it perfectly, that is, scientifically, though there is
no part of it that he does not know.
CHAPTER LVI—That no Created Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him
THEN only does the knowledge of a principle necessitate the knowledge of all its effects, when the principle is thoroughly comprehended by the understanding: for so a principle is known to the whole extent of its power, all its effects being known as caused by it. But through the divine essence other things are known as effects from their cause. Since then created intelligence cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, there is no necessity for it in seeing the divine substance to see all things that can be known thereby.
3. The extent of any power is measured by the objects to which it reaches. To
know then all the objects to which any power reaches is to comprehend the power
itself. But the divine power, being infinite, can be comprehended
5. No cognitive faculty knows anything except under the aspect of its proper
object: thus by sight we know things only as coloured. Now the proper object of
intelligence is whatever is in the substance of a thing.
It may be objected that God’s substance is something greater than all that He can make, or understand, or will beyond Himself; and that therefore, if a created intelligence can see the substance of God, much more can it know all that God through Himself either understands or wills or can do. But on careful study we see that it is not one and the same thing for an object to be known in itself and known in its cause. There are things easy enough to know in themselves, but not easily known in their causes. Though it is true that it is a grander thing to have understanding of the divine substance than to understand anything else, knowable in itself, away from that substance, still it is more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance, and in it to see its effects, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects. Now the seeing of the divine substance may be without comprehension of it: but to have all things rendered intelligible through that substance and actually known, that cannot come about without comprehension.
CHAPTER LVII—That every Intelligence of every grade can be partaker of the vision of God
SINCE it is by supernatural light that a created intelligence is raised to the
vision of the divine substance, there is no created intelligence so low in its nature
as to be incapable of being raised to this vision. For that light cannot be connatural
to any creature (Chap. LIV), but transcends the faculty of
every created nature. But what is done by supernatural power is not hindered by
diversity of nature, since divine power is infinite.
2. The distance from God of the intelligence highest in order of nature is infinite
in respect of perfection and goodness: whereas the distance of that intelligence
from the very lowest intelligence is finite, for between finite and finite there
cannot be infinite distance. The distance therefore between the lowest created intelligence
and the highest is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest
created intelligence and God. But what is as nothing can make no sensible variation,
as the distance between the centre of the earth and our point of vision is as nothing
in comparison with the distance between our point of vision and the eighth sphere,
compared with which the whole earth counts as a point;
3. Every intelligence naturally desires the vision of the divine substance (Chapp. XXV, L ). But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Any and every created intelligence then can arrive at the vision of the divine substance; and inferiority of nature is no impediment.
Hence the Lord promises to man the glory of the angels: They shall be as the
angels of God in Heaven (
CHAPTER LVIII—That one may see God more perfectly than another
THE light of glory raises to the vision of God in this, that it is a certain likeness to the divine understanding (Chap. LIII). But a thing may be likened to God with more or less of closeness. Therefore one may see the divine substance with more or less of perfection.
4. The end must correspond to the means taken to gain it. But not all subsistent intelligences are equally prepared for their end, which is the vision of the divine substance: for some are of greater virtue, some of less, virtue being the way to happiness. Therefore there must be a diversity in their vision of God.
Hence it is said: in my Father’s House there are many mansions (
CHAPTER LIX—How they who see the Divine Substance see all things
SINCE the vision of the divine substance is the final end of every subsistent
intelligence, and the natural desire of every being is at rest when it has attained
to its final end, the natural desire of every intelligence that sees the divine
substance must be perfectly set at rest. But it is the mind’s natural desire to
know the genera and species and capabilities of all things and the whole order of
the universe, as is shown by the zeal of mankind in trying to find out all these
things.
2. In this is the difference between sense and intellect, as shown in De anima, III, iv, that sense is spoilt or impaired by brilliant or intense sensible objects, so that afterwards it is unable to appreciate similar objects of lower degree: but intellect, not being spoilt or checked by its object, but simply perfected, after understanding an object in which there is more to understand, is not less but better able to understand other objects which afford less scope for understanding. But the highest in the category of intelligible beings is the divine substance. When then an understanding is raised by divine light to see the substance of God, much more is it perfected by the same light to understand all other objects in nature.
4. Though of those who see God one sees Him more perfectly than an other, every one nevertheless sees Him with such perfection as to fill all his natural capacity, nay, the vision transcends all natural capacity (Chap. LII). Every one therefore, seeing the divine substance, must know in that substance all things to which his natural capacity extends. But the natural capacity of every intelligence extends to the knowledge of all genera and species and the order of creation. These things therefore every one of those who see God will know in the divine substance.
Hence to Moses asking for a sight of the divine substance the Lord replied:
I will show thee all good (
But on careful reflection upon what has been said it appears that they who see
the divine substance in one way know all things, and in one way they do not. If
by ‘all things’ is meant whatever belongs to the perfection of the universe, the
arguments alleged prove that they do see all things.
But if by ‘all things’ is meant all things that God knows by seeing His essence,
no created intelligence sees all things in the substance of God, as has been shown
above (Chap. LVI).
CHAPTER LX—That they who see God see all things in Him at once
SINCE it has been shown that a created intelligence in seeing the divine substance
understands therein all the species of things; since moreover all things that are
seen by one presentation must be seen together by one vision; it necessarily follows
that the intelligence which sees the divine substance views all things, not successively,
but simultaneously. Hence Augustine says (De Trinitate XV, xvi): “Our thoughts
will not then be unstable, coming and going from one thing to another, but we shall
see all our knowledge together at one glance.”
CHAPTER LXI—That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting
ETERNITY differs from time in this, that time has being in succession, but the being of eternity is all present together. But in the sight of God there is no succession: all things that are seen in that vision are seen at one glance. That vision therefore is accomplished in a certain participation of eternity. That vision also is a certain life: for activity of intellect is a life. Therefore by that sight the created intelligence is partaker of life everlasting.
4. The intellectual soul is created on the confines of eternity and time: because it is last in order of intelligences, and yet its substance is raised above corporeal matter, being independent of the same. But its action, inasmuch as it touches inferior things that are in time, is temporal. Therefore, inasmuch as it touches superior things that are above time, its action partakes of eternity. Such is especially the vision whereby it sees the divine substance. Therefore by such vision it enters into participation of eternity, and sees God in the same way as any other created intelligence.
Hence the Lord says: This is life everlasting, to know thee the only true
God (
CHAPTER LXII—That they who see God will see Him for ever
WHATEVER now is, and now is not, is measured by time. But the vision that makes the happiness of intellectual creatures is not in time, but in eternity (Chap. LXI). It is impossible therefore that from the moment one becomes partaker of it he should ever lose it.
2. An intelligent creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural
desire is set at rest. But as it naturally desires happiness, so it naturally desires
perpetuity of happiness: for, being perpetual in its substance, whatever
3. Everything that is loved in the having of it brings sadness, if we know that
at some time we must part with it. But the beatific vision, being of all things
most delightful and most desired, is of all things most loved by them who have it.
They could not therefore be otherwise than saddened, if they knew that at some time
they were to lose it. But if it were not meant to last for ever, they would be aware
of the fact: for in seeing the divine substance, they also see other things that
naturally are (Chap. LIX).
6. It is impossible for one to wish to resign a good thing that he enjoys, except
for some evil that he discerns in the enjoyment of that good, or because he reckons
it a hindrance to greater good. But in the enjoyment of the beatific vision there
can be no evil, since it is the best thing to which an intelligent creature can
attain: nor can he who enjoys that vision possibly think that there is any evil
in it, or anything better than it, since the vision of that sovereign truth excludes
all false judgement.
5. Nothing that is viewed with wonder can grow tedious: as long as it is an object of wonder, the desire of seeing it remains. But the divine substance is always viewed with wonder by any created intelligence, since no created intelligence can comprehend it. Therefore such intelligence can never find that vision tedious.
9. The nearer a thing comes to God, who is wholly unchangeable, the less changeable it is and the more enduring. But no creature can draw nearer to God than that which beholds His substance. The intelligent creature then gains in the vision of God a certain immutability, and cannot fall from that vision.
Hence it is said: Blessed are they who dwell in thy house, O Lord: they shall
praise thee for ever and ever (
CHAPTER LXIII—How in that Final Happiness every Desire of Man is fulfilled
FROM what has been said it evidently appears that in that final happiness which
comes of the vision of God every human desire is fulfilled, according to the text:
Who filleth thy desire with good things (
2. There is also a desire which a man has in keeping with his rational
3. Upon civil life there follow certain goods which a man needs for his social
and political activities. Thus there is honour and high estate, the inordinate desire
of which makes men intriguing
4. Another object of desire following upon civil life is celebrity of fame, by
inordinate desire of which men are said to be covetous of vain glory. By that divine
vision the blessed become celebrated, not before men, who may deceive and be deceived,
but in the most true knowledge of God and of all their companions in bliss. And
therefore that happiness is very frequently termed ‘glory’ in Holy Scripture, as
in
5. There is also another thing desirable in civil society, namely, riches, by
inordinate craving and love for which men become illiberal and unjust. But in that
blissful state there is sufficiency of all good things, inasmuch as the Blessed
enjoy Him who comprises the perfection of them: wherefore it is said: All good
things came to me with her (
6. There is also a third desire in man, common to him with other animals, the
desire of pleasurable enjoyments, which men pursue in the life of pleasure, and
thereby become intemperate and incontinent.
7. There is also a natural desire common to all things, in that they all desire
self-preservation, so far as possible; by the immoderation of which desire men are
rendered timid and spare themselves too much from labours. This desire also shall
be perfectly fulfilled when the Blessed attain to perfect everlasting duration,
secure from all hurt, according to the text: They shall not hunger nor thirst
any more, neither shall the sun fall upon them, nor any heat (
Thus it appears that by the vision of God subsistent intelligences gain true
happiness, in which every desire is wholly laid to rest, and in which there is abundant
sufficiency of all good things, which Aristotle considers a requisite of happiness.
CHAPTER LXIV—That God governs things by His Providence
THE foregoing conclusions sufficiently show that God is the end of all things. Hence it may be further gathered that by His providence He governs and rules all things. For whatever things are referred to an end, are all subject to His management to whom principally that end belongs, as appears in an army: for all the components of the army and all their works are referred to one last end, the good of the general, which is victory, and therefore it belongs to the general to govern the whole army. In like manner the art which is concerned with the end gives commands and laws to the art which is concerned with the means, as politics to the art of war, the art of war to the management of cavalry, navigation to shipbuilding. Since therefore all things are referred to an end, which is the divine goodness (Chapp. XVII, XVIII), God, to whom that goodness principally belongs, — as being His own substance, possessed, understood, and loved, — must have the chief control of all things.
5. Things that are distinct in their natures do not combine into one system, unless they be bound up in one by one directing control (ab uno ordinante). But in the universe there are things, having distinct and contrary natures, which nevertheless all combine in one system, some things taking up the activities of other things, some things being aided or even wrought by others. There must then be one ordainer and governor of the universe.
8. Every agent that intends an end cares more for that which is nearer to the
last end. But the last end of the divine will is the divine goodness, and the nearest
thing to that in creation is the goodness of the order of the entire universe, that
being the end to which every particular good of this or that thing is referred,
as the less perfect is referred to the more perfect, and every part is for its whole.
What therefore God most cares for in creation is the order of the universe:
Hence Holy Scripture ascribes the course of events to the divine command:
CHAPTER LXV—That God preserves things in being
FROM God’s governing all things by His providence it follows that He preserves
them in being.
5. As a work of art presupposes a work of nature, so a work of nature presupposes
a work of God creating: for the material of artificial things is from nature, and
the material of natural things is through creation of God. But artificial things
are preserved in being by virtue of natural things, as a house by the solidity of
its stones. Therefore natural things are not preserved in being otherwise than through
the power of God. By way of illustrating the importance of physical science to the theologian,
I note two propositions of St Thomas in the fourth argument, here omitted: (a) “No corporeal thing acts otherwise than through being in motion.” So Aristotle,
Physics, VIII, v. (b) “It is impossible for the motion of anything to continue, when the motor
action of the moving cause ceases to be.” The first proposition has not been reconciled with the laws of gravitation and
of electric and magnetic attraction: the second is a denial of the inertia of matter.
St Thomas took them both from Aristotle.
6. The impression made by an agent does not remain in the effect when the action
of the agent ceases, unless that impression turns into and becomes part of the nature
of the effect. Thus the forms and properties of things generated remain in them
to the end, after the generation is done, because they are made natural to the things:
in like manner habits are difficult to change, because they turn into nature. But
dispositions, bodily impressions, and emotions, though they remain for some little
while after the action of the agent, do not remain permanently: they find place
in the subject as being on the way to become part of its nature.
7. Concerning the origin of things there are two theories, one of faith, that things had a first commencement, and were then brought into being by God; the other the theory of sundry philosophers, that things have emanated (fluxerint) from God from all eternity. On either theory we must say that things are preserved in being by God. For if things are brought into being by God after not being, the being of things must be consequent upon the divine will; and similarly their not being, because He has permitted things not to be when He willed and made things to be when He willed. Things therefore are, so long as He wills them to be. His will then is the upholder of creation. On the other hand, if things have emanated from God from all eternity, it is impossible to assign any time or instant in which first they emanated from God. Either then they were never produced by God at all, or their being is continually coming forth from God so long as they exist.
Hence it is said: Bearing up all things by the word of his power (
Hereby is excluded the theory of some Doctors of the Law of the Moors, who, by
way of sustaining the position that the world needs the preserving hand of God,
have supposed all forms to be accidents,
CHAPTER LXVI—That nothing gives Being except in as much as it acts in the Power of God
NOTHING gives being except in so much as it is an actual being. But God preserves things in actuality.
5. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. But among all effects
the first is being: all other things, as they proceed from their cause, are determinations
of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the prime agent, and all other
things act inasmuch as they act in the power of the prime agent. Secondary agents,
which are in a manner particular determinants of the action of the prime agent,
have for the proper effects of their action other perfections determinant of being.
6. What is essentially of a certain nature, is properly the cause of that which
comes to have that nature only by participation.
Hence it is said: God created all things to be (
CHAPTER LXVII—That God is the Cause of Activity in all Active Agents
AS God not only gave being to things when they first began to be, but also causes being in them so long as they exist (Chap. LXV); so He did not once for all furnish them with active powers, but continually causes those powers in them, so that, if the divine influx were to cease, all activity would cease.
Hence it is said: Thou hast wrought all our works in us, O Lord (
CHAPTER LVIII—That God is everywhere and in all things
AN incorporeal thing is said to be in a thing by contact of power. Therefore if there be anything incorporeal fraught with infinite power, that must be everywhere. But it has been shown (B. I Chap. XLIII) that God has infinite power. He is therefore everywhere.
4. Since God is the universal cause of all being, in whatever region being can be found there must be the divine presence.
6. An efficient cause must be together with its proximate and immediate effect. But in everything there is some effect which must be set down for the proximate and immediate effect of God’s power: for God alone can create (B. II, Chap. XXI); and in everything there is something caused by creation, — in corporeal things, primordial matter; in incorporeal beings, their simple essences (B. II, Chapp. XV, sq). God then must be in all things, especially since the things which He has once produced from not-being to being He continually and always preserves in being (Chap. LXV).
Hence it is said: I fill heaven and earth (
God is indivisible, and wholly out of the category of the continuous: hence He
is not determined to one place, great or small, by the necessity of His essence,
seeing that He is from eternity before all place: but by the immensity of His power
He reaches all things that are in place, since He is the universal cause of being.
Thus then He is whole everywhere, reaching all things by His undivided power.
CHAPTER LVIX—Of the Opinion of those who withdraw from Natural Things their Proper Actions
SOME have taken an occasion of going wrong by thinking that no creature has any
action in the production of natural effects, — thus that fire does not warm, but
God causes heat where fire is present. So Avicebron
1. If no inferior cause, and especially no corporeal cause, does any work, but God works alone in all agencies, and God does not change by working in different agencies; no difference of effect will follow from the difference of agencies in which God works: but that is false by the testimony of sense.
2. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom for anything to be to no purpose in the works of the wise. But if created things in no way work to the production of effects, but God alone works all effects immediately, to no purpose are other things employed by Him.
3. To grant the main thing is to grant the accessories. But actually to do follows upon actually to be: thus God is at once pure actuality and the first cause. If then God has communicated to other beings His likeness in respect of being, it follows that He has communicated to them His likeness in respect of action.
4. To detract from the perfection of creatures is to detract from the perfection
of the divine power. But if no creature has any action in the production of any
effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature:
5. God is the sovereign good (B. I, Chap. XLI). Therefore it belongs to Him to do the best. But it is better for good conferred on one to be common to many than for it to be confined to that one: for common good always proves to be more godlike than the good of the individual. But the good of one comes to be common to many when it is derived from one to many, which cannot be except in so far as the agent diffuses it to others by a proper action of its own. God then has communicated His goodness in such a way that one creature can transmit to others the good which it has received.
6. To take away order from creation is to take away the best thing that there is in creation: for while individual things in themselves are good, the conjunction of them all is best by reason of the order in the universe: for the whole is ever better than the parts and is the end of the parts. But if actions are denied to things, the order of things to one another is taken away: for things differing in their natures are not tied up in the unity of one system otherwise than by this, that some act and some are acted upon.
7. If effects are not produced by the action of creatures, but only by the action
of God, it is impossible for the power of any creature to be manifested by its effect:
for an effect shows the power of the cause only by reason of the action, which proceeds
from the power and is terminated to the effect. But the nature of a cause is not
known through its effect except in so far as through its effect its power is known
which follows upon its nature.
Some Doctors of the Moorish Law are said to bring an argument to show that accidents
are not traceable to the action of bodies, the ground of the argument being this,
that an accident does not pass from subject to subject: hence they count it an impossibility
for heat to pass from a hot body to another body heated by it, but they say that
all such accidents are created by God. Now this is a ridiculous proof to assign
of a body not acting, to point to the fact that no accident passes from subject
to subject. When it is said that one hot body heats another, it is not meant that
numerically the same heat, which is in the heating body, passes to the body heated;
but that by virtue of the heat, which is in the heating body, numerically another
heat comes to be in the heated body actually, which was in it before potentially.
For a natural agent does not transfer its own form to another subject, but reduces
the subject upon which it acts from potentiality to actuality.
CHAPTER LXX—How the Same Effect is from God and from a Natural Agent
SOME find it difficult to understand how natural effects are attributable At once to God and to a natural agent. For (Arg. 1) one action, it seems, cannot proceed from two agents. If then the action, by which a natural effect is produced, proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God.
Arg. 2. When an action can be sufficiently done by one, it is superfluous to have it done by more: we see that nature does not do through two instruments what she can do through one. Since then the divine power is sufficient to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ also natural powers for the production of those same effects. Or if the natural power sufficiently produces its own effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act to the same effect.
Arg. 3. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce.
Upon consideration, these arguments are not difficult. Reply 1. The power
of the inferior agent depends upon the power of the superior agent, inasmuch as
the superior agent gives to the inferior the power whereby it acts, or preserves
that power, or applies it to action; as a workman applies a tool to its proper effect,
frequently however without giving the tool the form whereby it acts,
Reply 2. Though a natural thing produces its own effect, it is not superfluous
for God to produce it, because the natural thing does not produce it except in the
power of God. Nor is it superfluous, while God can of Himself produce all natural
effects, for them to be produced by other causes: this
CHAPTER LXXI—That the Divine Providence is not wholly inconsistent with the presence of Evil in Creation
PERFECT goodness could not be in creation if there were not found an order of
goodness among creatures, some being better than others: or else all possible grades
of goodness would not be filled up; nor would any creature be like God in having
pre-eminence over another.
3. The best rule in any government is to provide for everything under government
according to the mode of its nature: just administration consists in this. As then
it would be contrary to any rational plan of human administration for the civil
government to debar its subjects from acting according to their offices and conditions
of life, except perhaps in an occasional hour of emergency, so it would be contrary
to the plan of divine government not to allow creatures to act according to the
mode of their several natures. But by the very fact of creatures so acting there
follows destruction and evil in the world, since by reason of mutual contrariety
and inconsistency one thing is destructive of another.
5. There are
many good things in creation which would find no place there, unless evils were
there also. Thus there would be no patience of the just, if there were not the malice
of persecutors: no room for vindictive justice,
6. The good of the whole takes precedence of the good of the part. It belongs then to a prudent ruler to neglect some defect of goodness in the part for the increase of goodness in the whole, as an architect buries the foundation under the earth for the strengthening of the whole house. But if evil were removed from certain portions of the universe, much perfection would be lost to the universe, the beauty of which consists in the orderly blending of things good and evil (pulcritudo ex ordinata bonorum et malorum adunatione consurgit), while evil things have their origin in the breaking down of good things, and still from them good things again take their rise by the providence of the ruler, as an interval of silence makes music sweet.
7. Other things, and particularly inferior things, are ordained to the end of the good of man. But if there were no evils in the world, much good would be lost to man, as well in respect of knowledge, as also in respect of desire and love of good: for good is better known in contrast with evil; and while evil results come about, we more ardently deire good results: as sick men best know what a blessing health is.
Therefore it is said: Making peace and creating evil (
Boethius (De consolatione, Lib. I, prosa 4) introduces a philosopher asking the question: ‘If there is a God, how comes evil?’. The argument should be turned the other way: ‘If there is evil, there is a God.’ For there would be no evil, if the order of goodness were taken away, the privation of which is evil; and this order would not be, if God were not.
Hereby is taken away the occasion of the error of the Manicheans, who supposed two primary agents, good and evil, as though evil could not have place under the providence of a good God.
We have also the solution of a doubt raised by some, whether evil actions are of God. Since it has been shown (Chap. LXVI) that every agent produces its action inasmuch as it acts by divine power, and that thereby God is the cause of all effects and of all actions (Chap. LXVII); and since it has been further shown (Chap. X) that in things subject to divine providence evil and deficiency happens from some condition of secondary causes, in which there may be defect; it is clear that evil actions, inasmuch as they are defective, are not of God, but of defective proximate causes; but so far as the action and entity contained in them goes, they must be of God, — as lameness is of motive power, so far as it has anything of motion, but so far as it has anything of defect, it comes of curvature of the leg.
CHAPTER LXXII—That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with an element of Contingency in Creation Cf. I, Chapp. LXVII (with notes), LXXXV. The contingent, συμβεβηκός, is that
which is, but might not be (Aristotle, Physics, VIII, v). The term is still
of interest to the logician, and to the psychologist, who concerns himself with
the freedom of the will, but has lost all interest in physical science, except in
the cognate sense of accidental.
AS divine providence does not exclude all evil from creation, neither does it exclude contingency, or impose necessity upon all things. The operation of providence does not exclude secondary causes, but is fulfilled by them, inasmuch as they act in the power of God. Now effects are called ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’ according to their proximate causes, not according to their remote causes. Since then among proximate causes there are many that may fail, not all effects subject to providence will be necessary, but many will be contingent.
6. On the part of divine providence no hindrance will be put to the failure of
the power of created things, or to an obstacle arising through the resistance of
something coming in the way. But from such failure and such resistance the contingency
occurs of a natural cause not always acting in the same way, but sometimes failing
to do what it is naturally competent to do; and so natural effects do not come about
of necessity. But a ‘natural cause,’ or physical agent, as such (res naturalis),
as distinguished from a moral agent, does always act in the same way under the
same circumstances. It is the circumstances that vary, not the behaviour of
the natural cause. Compare Newton’s second law of motion. And so natural, or physical,
events come about under an hypothetical necessity. They always happen in the same
way, if the antecedents, positive and negative, are the same. In this chapter St Thomas is concerned to obviate a difficulty unlikely to occur
to modern minds, — how it is consistent with divine providence for terrestrial
events, such as the weather, the growth of the crops, the healthy development of
animals, not to run in regular calculable cycles, like the ordinary celestial phenomena,
sunrise and sunset, equinox and solstice, the waxing and waning of the moon. From
Plato and Aristotle to Newton, celestial phenomena were ‘necessary,’ terrestrial
‘contingent.’ The real difference is one of simplicity and plurality of causes.
Professor Stewart, Notes on Nicomachean Ethics, vol. II, p. 9, writes: “There
is no contingency in things, but there is often failure on the part of organic beings
to cope with the complexity of the necessary laws which thing obey”: a remark which
is true, so far as things do obey necessary laws. But there is a contingency in
acts of free will, and in things so far as they are consequent upon such acts. To
take another point of view. Contingency, like chance, has been predicated of co-existences,
or coincidences, rather than of sequences; and necessity has been made out for sequence
better than for co-existence. The study of co-existences carries us far back into
the dim past, even to that ‘primitive collocation of materials,’ which, it is argued,
must have been the work of intelligence and free will. Cf. B. I, Chap.
XIII: B. III, Chap. XCIV, with notes.
CHAPTER LXXIII—That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Freedom of the Will
THE government of every prudent governor is ordained to the perfection of the
things governed, to the gaining, or increasing, of maintenance of that perfection.
An element of perfection then is more worthy of being preserved by providence than
an element of imperfection and defect. But in inanimate things the contingency of
causes comes of imperfection and defect: for by their nature they are determined
to one effect, which they always gain, unless there be some let or hindrance arising
either from limitation of power, or the interference of some external agent, or
indisposition of subject-matter; and on this account natural causes in their action
are not indifferent to either side of an alternative, but for the most part produce
their effects uniformly, while they fail in a minority of instances.
2. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their several modes.
But a thing’s mode of action depends upon its form, which is the principle of action.
But the form whereby a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: for the will acts
through a form apprehended by the intellect; and the intellect has not one determined
form of effect under its consideration, but essentially embraces a multitude of
forms;
3. The last end of every creature is to attain to a likeness to God (Chap. XVII): therefore it would be contrary to providence to withdraw from a creature that whereby it attains the divine likeness. But a voluntary agent attains the divine likeness by acting freely, as it has been shown that there is free will in God (B. I, Chap. LXXXVIII).
4. Providence tends to multiply good things in the subjects of its government.
But if free will were taken away, many good things would be withdrawn. The praise
of human virtue would be taken away, which is nullified where good is not done freely:
the justice of rewards and punishments would be taken away, if man did not do good
and evil freely: wariness and circumspection in counsel would be taken away, as
there would be no need of taking counsel about things done under necessity. It would
be therefore contrary to the plan of providence to withdraw the liberty of the will.
Hence it is said: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand
of his own counsel: before man is life and death, whatever he shall please shall
be given him (
Hereby is excluded the error of the Stoics, who said that all things arose of necessity, according to an indefeasible order, which the Greeks called ymarmene (εἱμαρμένη).
CHAPTER LXXIV—That Divine Providence is not inconsistent with Fortune and Chance
THE multitude and diversity of causes proceeds from the order of divine providence
and arrangement. Supposing an arrangement of many causes, one must sometimes combine
with another, so as either to hinder or help it in producing its effect. A chance
event arises from a coincidence of two or more causes, in that an end not intended
is gained by the coming in of some collateral cause, as the finding of a debtor
by him who went to market to make a purchase, when his debtor also came to market.
Hence it is said: I saw that the race was not to the swift . . . . but that
occasion and chance are in all things (
CHAPTER LXXV—That the Providence of God is exercised over Individual and Contingent Things
IF God has no care of these individual things, that is either because He does not know them, or because He has no power over them, or because He has no will to take care of them. But it has been shown above (B. I, Chap. LXV) that God has knowledge of individual things. Nor can it be said that He has no power to take care of them, seeing that His power is infinite (B. II, Chap. XXII). Nor again that God has no wilt to govern them, seeing that the object of His will is universally all good (B. I, Chap. LXXVIII).
3. This common attribute is found in productive causes, that they have a care
of the things that they produce, as animals naturally nourish their young. God thereof
has care of the things of which He is the cause. But He is the cause even of these
particular things (B. II, Chap. XV), and therefore He has
care of them.
5. It would be a foolish providence not to take care of those things without which the objects of one’s care could not exist. But certainly, if all particulars were to fail, universals could not remain. If then God has care of the universal only, and neglects the individual altogether, His providence must be foolish and imperfect. But if it is said that God has care of individuals so far as to see that they are maintained in being, but no further, that answer cannot stand. For all that befalls individuals has some bearing on their preservation or destruction. If therefore God has care of individuals so far as to see to their preservation, He must have care of all that befalls them.
7. This is the difference between speculative and practical knowledge, that speculative knowledge and all that concerns such knowledge is wrought out in generalities, whereas the sphere of practical knowledge is the particular. For the end of practical knowledge is truth, which consists primarily and ordinarily in the immaterial and universal, while the end of practical knowledge is action, which deals with particular facts. Hence the physician does not attend man in general, but this man; and to the care of the individual man the whole science of medicine is directed. But providence, being directive of things to their end, must be a department of practical knowledge. Thus the providence of God would be very imperfect, if it stopped short at the universal, and did not reach individual cases.
8. The perfection of speculative knowledge lies in the universal rather than
9. Since God is the cause of being, as such (B. II, Chap. XV),
He must also be the provider of being, as such. Whatever then in any way is, falls
under His providence. But singular things are beings, and indeed more so than universals,
because universals do not subsist by themselves, but are only in singulars.
Hence it is said: Two sparrows are sold for a farthing; and not one of them
falls to the ground without your Father (
CHAPTER LXXVI—That the Providence of God watches immediately over all Individual Things
IN matters of human administration, the higher administrator confines his care to the arrangement of general main issues, and leaves details to his subordinates, and that on account of his personal limitations, because, as for the state and condition of lesser things, he is either ignorant of them, or he cannot afford the labour and length of time that would be necessary to arrange for them. But such limitations are far from God: it is no labour for Him to understand, and it takes Him no time, since in understanding Himself He understands all things else (B. I, Chap. XLIX).
4. In human administrations, the industry and care of the lower officials arranges
matters left to their charge by their chief. Their chief does not bestow upon them
their faculty of industry and care, but merely allows it free play. If the industry
and care came from their superior, the arrangement would be the superior’s arrangement;
and they would not be authors of the arrangement, but carriers of it into execution.
But we have seen (B. I, Chap. LI: B. III, Chap.
LXVII) that all wisdom and intelligence comes from God above;
nor can any intellect understand anything except in the power of God, nor any agent
do anything except in the same power. God Himself therefore by His providence immediately
disposes all things; and whoever are called providers under Him, are executors of
His providence.
7. If God does not by Himself take immediate care of lower individualities, that
must be either because He despises them, or because He fears to sully His dignity,
as some say.
Hence it is said: Thou hast done the things of old and hast devised one thing
after another (
CHAPTER LXXVII—That the arrangements of Divine Providence are carried into execution by means of Secondary Causes
IT belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and diversity of servants to carry his command into execution, the height and greatness of his lordship appearing by the multitude of persons of various ranks who are subject to him: but no dignity of any ruler is comparable with the dignity of the divine government: it is suitable therefore that the arrangements of divine providence be carried into execution by divers grades of agents.
6. As the cause is superior to the effect, the order of causes is nobler than that of effects: in that order therefore the perfection of divine providence is better shown. But if there were not intermediate causes carrying divine providence into execution, there would be in creation no order of causes, but only of effects. The perfection therefore of divine providence requires that there should be intermediate causes carrying it into execution.
Hence it is said: Bless the Lord, all his powers, ye ministers that do his
word (
CHAPTER LXXVIII—That Intelligent Creatures are the Medium through which other Creatures are governed by God
SINCE the preservation of order in creation is a concern of divine providence,
and it is a congruous order to descend by steps of due proportion from highest to
lowest,
CHAPTER LXXXI—Of the Subordination of Men one to another
SINCE man is endowed with understanding and sense and bodily power, these faculties
are arranged in order in him by the disposition of divine providence according to
the plan of the order that obtains in the universe, bodily power being put under
that of sense and intellect as carrying out their command, and the sentient faculty
itself under the faculty of intellect. And similar is the order between man and
man. Men pre-eminent in understanding naturally take the command; while men poor
in understanding, but of great bodily strength, seem by nature designate for servants,
as Aristotle says in his Politics,
CHAPTER LXXXVIII—That other Subsistent Intelligences cannot be direct Causes of our Elections
and Volitions In Chapp. LXXXII-LXXXVII St Thomas argues that the heavenly bodies, which he
says are “perfect without blending of contraries, being neither light nor heavy,
nor hot nor cold,” are the instruments whereby God prompts and controls all movement
and change in material bodies on earth: that nevertheless they exercise no direct
action upon the human understanding, which is something nobler than they, as the
incorporeal is nobler than the incorporeal: nor are they arbiters of human will
and conduct, except remotely and by occasion, as they affect the human body, under
which affection the will makes its free choice: nor do they even determine the course
of other terrestrial events absolutely, since much depends upon the condition and
capacities of terrestrial physical causes. Repeatedly in this work St Thomas shows his grievous misgivings as to the later
Platonic position, that stars are animals and heavenly spheres have souls. He considered
that the stars and their containing spheres, if they were not themselves animate,
were moved by angels, which is another thing. Cf. Plato Rep. X, 616 C, sq.
NOR is it to be thought that the souls of the heavens, if any such souls there
be, or any other separately subsisting created intelligences, can directly thrust
a volition in upon us, or be the cause of our choice. For the actions of all creatures
are contained in the order of divine providence, and cannot act contrary to the
conditions of action which providence has laid down.
4. “The violent is that the origin whereof is from without, without the subject
of violence in any way contributing thereto.”
Hence it is said: The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord: he shall turn
it whithersoever he will (
CHAPTER LXXXIX—That the Motion of the Will is caused by God, and not merely by the Power of the Will
SOME, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without
prejudice to the freedom of the will,
1. But this theory runs manifestly counter to texts of Holy Scripture. For it
is said: All our works thou hast wrought in us, O Lord (
2. Nothing can act in its own strength unless it act also in the power of God (Chap. LXVI): therefore man cannot use the will-power given to him except in so far as he acts in the power of God.
4. God is the cause of all action, and works in every agent (Chap. LXX): therefore He is cause of the motives of the will.
CHAPTER XC—That Human Choices and Volitions are subject to Divine Providence
THE government of providence proceeds from the divine love where with God loves
His creatures. Love consists chiefly in the lover wishing good to the loved one.
The more God loves things, then, the more they fall under His providence. This Holy
Writ teaches, saying: God guards all that love him (Ps. cxliv, 20); and the
Philosopher also teaches that God has especial care of those who love understanding,
and considers them His friends.
6. The inward good endowments of man, which depend on his will and choice, are more proper to man than external endowments, as the gaining of riches: hence it is according to the former that man is said to be good, not according to the latter. If then human choices and motions of the will do not fall under divine providence, but only external advantages, it will be more true to say that human affairs are beyond providence than that they are under providence.
CHAPTER XCI—How Human Things are reduced to Higher Causes
FROM what has been shown above we are able to gather how human things are reducible to higher causes, and do not proceed by chance. For choices and motives of wills are arranged immediately by God: human intellectual knowledge is directed by God through the intermediate agency of angels: corporeal events, whether interior (to the human body) or exterior, that serve the need of man, are adjusted by God through the intermediate agency of angels and of the heavenly bodies.
All this arrangement proceeds upon one general axiom, which is this: ‘Everything
manifold and mutable and liable to fail may be reduced to some principle uniform
and immutable and unfailing.’
In like manner our intelligence is liable to multiplicity, inasmuch as we gather
intelligible truth from many sensible objects. It is also mutable, inasmuch as it
proceeds by reasoning from one point to another, passing from known to unknown.
It is also defectible from the admixture of phantasy and sense, as the errors of
mankind show. But the cognitions of the angels are uniform, as they receive the
knowledge of truth from the one fountain of truth, God (B. II, Chapp.
XCVIII, C, with notes). It is also
immutable, because not by any argument from effects to causes, nor from causes to
effects, but by simple intuition do they gaze upon the pure truth of things. It
is also indefectible, since they discern the very natures of things, or their quiddities
in themselves, about which quiddities intelligence cannot err, as neither can sense
err about the primary objects of the several senses. But we learn the quiddities
(essences) of things from their accidents and effects. Our intellectual knowledge
then must be regulated by the knowledge of the angels.
Again, about human bodies and the exterior things which men use, it is manifest
that there is in them the multiplicity of mixture and contrariety; and that they
do not always move in the same way, because their motions cannot be continuous;
and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption. But the heavenly bodies
are uniform, as being simple and made up without any contrariety of elements. Their
motions also are uniform, continuous, and always executed in the same way: nor can
there be in them corruption or alteration. Hence our bodies, and other things that
come under our use, must necessarily be regulated by the motion of the heavenly
bodies.
CHAPTER XCII—In what sense one is said to be Fortunate, and how Man is aided by Higher Causes
GOOD fortune is said to befall a man, when something good happens to him beyond
his intention, as when one digging a field finds a treasure that he was not looking
for. Now an agent may do something beyond his own intention, and yet not beyond
the intention of some agent whom he is under: as if a master were to bid a servant
to go to some place, to which he had sent another servant without the first servant
knowing of it, the meeting with his fellow-servant would be beyond the intention
of the servant sent, and yet not beyond the intention of the master sending: in
reference to the servant it will be luck and chance, but not in reference to the
master, — to him it is an arrangement. Since then man is subordinate in body to
the forces of physical nature (corporibus coelestibus),
subordinate in intellect to the angels, and subordinate in will to God, a thing
may happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order
of physical nature (corporum coelestium), or according
to the arrangement of angels, or again of God. But though God alone works directly
upon man’s choice, yet the action of an angel does something for that choice by
way of persuasion, while the action of the heavenly body (of the forces of physical
nature) does something by way of predisposition, inasmuch as the bodily impressions
of the heavenly bodies (physical forces) upon our bodies predispose us to certain
choices.
But here a difference is to be noted. For the action of the angel and of the
physical force (corporis coelestis) merely predisposes
the man to choose, but the action of God accomplishes the choice. And since the
predisposition that comes of the bodily affection, or of the persuasion of the understanding,
does not induce necessity of choice, man does not always choose that which his guardian
angel intends, nor that to which physical nature (corpus coeleste)
inclines, but man always chooses that which God works in his will.
It is further to be observed that good or ill fortune may befall a man as a matter
of luck, so far as his intention goes, and so far as the working of
CHAPTER XCIII—Of Fate, whether there be such a thing, and if so, what it is
SOME when they say that all things are done by fate, mean by fate the destiny
CHAPTER XCIV—Of the Certainty of Divine Providence
IT will be necessary now to repeat some of the things that have been said before, to make it evident that (a) nothing escapes divine providence, and the order of divine providence can nowise be changed; and yet (b) it does not follow that the events which happen under divine providence all happen of necessity.
(a) Our first point of study is this, that as God is the cause of all existing things, conferring being on them all, the order of His providence must embrace all things: for He must grant preservation to those to whom He has granted existence, and bestow on them perfection in the attainment of their last end. In the case of every one who has to provide for others there are two things to observe, the pre-arranging of the order intended and the setting of the pre-arranged order on foot. The former is an exercise of intellectual ability, the latter of practical. The difference between the two is this, that in the pre-arrangement of order the providence is more perfect, the further the arrangement can be extended even to the least details: there would be not many parts of prudence in him who was competent only to arrange generalities: but in the carrying of the order out into effect the providence of the ruler is marked by greater dignity and completeness the more general it is, and the more numerous the subordinate functionaries through whom he fulfils his design, for the very marshalling of those functionaries makes a great part of the foreseen arrangement. Divine providence, therefore, being absolutely perfect (B. I, Chap. XXVIII), arranges all things by the eternal forethought of its wisdom, down to the smallest details, no matter how trifling they appear. And all agents that do any work act as instruments in His hands, and minister in obedience to Him, to the unfolding of that order of providence in creation which He has from eternity devised. But if all things that act must necessarily minister to Him in their action, it is impossible for any agent to hinder the execution of divine providence by acting contrary to it. Nor is it possible for divine providence to be hindered by the defect of any agent or patient, since all active or passive power in creation is caused according to the divine arrangement. Again it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be hindered by any change of providence, since God is wholly unchangeable (B. I, Chap. XV). The conclusion remains, that the divine provision cannot be annulled.
(b) Now to our second point of study. Every agent intends good, and better so
far as it can (Chap. III). But good and better do not have
place in the same way in a whole and in its parts. In the whole the good is the
entire effect arising out of the order and composition of the parts: hence it is
better for the whole that there should be inequality among the parts, without which
inequality the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, than that all the parts
should be equal, every one of them attaining to the rank of the noblest part. And
yet, considered by itself, every part of lower rank would be better if it were in
the rank of some superior part. Thus in the human body the foot would be a more
dignified part of man if it had the beauty and power of the eye; but the whole body
would be worse off for lacking the office of the foot. The scope and aim therefore
of the particular agent is not the same as that of the universal agent. The particular
agent tends to the good of the part absolutely, and makes the best of it that it
can; but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole: hence a defect may
be beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention
of the universal agent. It is the intention of the particular agent that its effect
should be perfect to the utmost possible in its kind: but it is the intention of
the universal agent that this effect be carried to a certain degree
Hence it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: ‘If God has foreseen this thing in the future, it will be.’ But it will be as God has provided that it shall be; and supposing that He has provided that it shall be contingently, it follows infallibly that it will be contingently, and not necessarily.
Cicero (De divinatione ii, 8) has this argument: ‘If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain; but if so, all things happen by fate, nothing is left in our power, and there is no such thing as free will.’ A frivolous argument, for since not only effects are subject to divine providence, but also causes, and modes of being, it follows that though all things happen by divine providence, some things are so foreseen by God as that they are done freely by us.
Nor can the defectibility of secondary causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, take away the certainty of divine providence: for since God works in all things, it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to keep them from failing.
The Philosopher shows ‘No cause,’ when you consider the case in the abstract, but how if it be taken
in the concrete, a man going to look for water in a region infested with robbers? In speaking of a ‘necessary cause’ St Thomas is in fact thinking of a physical
cause which is not likely to be counteracted, or to have any of its requisite conditions
fail, e.g., the rotation of the earth producing sun-rise. In speaking of a contingent
cause, — so far as the phrase may be used without bringing free will into the field,
— he has in view a physical cause, the action of which may readily be counteracted
by the interference of other physical causes, or may fail of effect because some
one of its many requisite conditions is not present. A contingent physical cause,
uninterfered with and having all its conditions present, works as a necessary cause.
CHAPTERS XCV, XCVI—That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer
AS the immutability of divine providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it bar the utility of prayer. For prayer is not poured out to God that the eternal arrangement of providence may be changed, — that is impossible, — but that man may gain what he desires of God. It is fitting for God to assent to the pious desires of His rational creatures, not that our desires move the immutability of God, but it is an outcome of His goodness suitably to carry out what we desire.
4. It is proper for friends to will the same thing. Now God loves His creature (B. I, Chap. XCI) and every creature all the more that the said creature has a share in His goodness, which is the prime and principal object of God’s love. But, of all creatures, the rational creature most perfectly partakes in the divine goodness. God therefore wills the fulfilment of the desires of the rational creature. And His will is effective of things.
5. The goodness of the creature is derived in point of likeness from the goodness
of God. But it is a point of special commendation in men, not to deny assent to
just requests: thereupon they are called ‘liberal,’ ‘clement,’ ‘merciful and kind.’
This therefore is a very great function of divine goodness, to hear pious prayers.
Hence it is said: He will do the will of them that fear him, and hear their
prayers and save them (
Thus a twofold error concerning prayer is excluded. Some have said that there
is no fruit of prayer. This was said as well on the part of those who denied divine
providence, as the Epicureans did; as also on the part of those who withdrew human
affairs from divine providence, as some of the Peripatetics did; as also on the
part of those who thought that all things happen of necessity, as the Stoics did.
From all these tenets it would follow that prayer is fruitless, and consequently
all divine worship in vain:
There were others on the contrary who said that the divine arrangement was reversible
by prayer. And the prima facie rendering of certain
texts of scripture seems to favour this view. Thus, after Isaias by divine command
had said to King Ezechias: Put thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not
live; yet upon Ezechias’s prayer the word of the Lord came to Isaias, saying:
Go and tell Ezechias: I have heard thy prayer, lo I will add to thy days fifteen
years (
On careful consideration it will appear that all mistakes in this matter arise
from failing to note the difference between the system of the universe and any particular
system (universalem ordinem et particularem). There
is nothing to hinder any particular system being changed, whether by prayer or by
any other means; for there is that existing beyond the bounds of the system which
is capable of changing it. But beyond the system that embraces all things nothing
can be posited whereby such system could possibly be changed, depending as it does
on the universal cause. Therefore the Stoics laid it down
Prayers then avail, not as changing a system arranged from eternity, but as being
themselves part of that system. And there is no difficulty in the efficacy of prayer
changing the particular system of some inferior cause, by the doing of God, who
overpasses all causes, and who consequently is not bound by the necessity of any
system depending on any cause; but on the contrary every necessity of system dependent
on any inferior cause is checked by Him, as having been instituted by Him.
CHAPTER XCVI—That God does not hear all Prayers
THERE is no anomaly in the prayers of petitioners being sometimes not granted
by God. For God fulfils the desires of His rational creature inasmuch as that creature
desires good: but sometimes it happens that what is asked is not true but seeming
good, which is simply evil: such a prayer is not within the hearing of God. Hence
it is said: Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss (
2. It is suitable that God should fulfil our desires in so far as He moves us
to desire. If therefore the movement of desire on our part is not kept up by earnestness
in prayer, there is nothing to be surprised at if the prayer does not gain its due
effect. Hence the Lord [St Luke] says: We ought always to pray and not to faint
(
3. It befits God to hear the prayer of the rational creature inasmuch as
4. God hears the prayers of the pious on the ground of friendship. He then who
turns away from the friendship of God is not worthy to have his prayer heard.
It happens sometimes that for very friendship one denies his friend’s petition,
knowing it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him, as a physician
refuses what his patient asks for. No wonder then if God, who fulfils the desires
put before Him by His rational creature for the love that He bears to that creature,
fails sometimes to fulfil the petition of those whom He singularly loves, that He
may fulfil it otherwise with something more helpful to the salvation of the petitioner,
as we read in
CHAPTER XCVII—How the Arrangements of Providence follow a Plan
GOD by His providence directs all things to the end of the divine goodness, not
that anything accrues as an addition to His goodness by the things that He makes,
but His aim is the impression of the likeness of His goodness so far as possible
on creation. But inasmuch as every created substance must fall short of the perfection
of the divine goodness, it was needful to have diversity in things for the more
perfect communication of the divine goodness, that what cannot perfectly be represented
by one created exemplar, might be represented by divers such exemplars in divers
ways in a more perfect manner. Thus man multiplies his words to express by divers
expressions the conception of his mind, which cannot all be put in one word.
From the diversity of forms follows a difference of activities, and further a diversity of agents and patients, properties and accidents.
Evidently then it is not without reason that divine providence distributes to
creatures different accidents and actions and impressions and allocations. Hence
it is said: The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, hath established the heavens
in prudence. By his wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick
with dew (
As it is necessary for one wishing to build a house to look out for timber, but his looking out for pitch-pine (ligna abietina) depends on his mere will, not on his plan of building a house; so it is necessary for God to love His own goodness, but it does not thence necessarily follow that He should wish to have that goodness represented by creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without that. Hence the bringing of creatures into being depends on the mere will of God, although it is done in consideration of the divine goodness. Supposing however that God wishes to communicate His goodness by way of similitude as far as possible, it logically follows thence that there should be creatures of different sorts: but it does not follow of necessity that creatures should be of this or that grade of perfection, or exist in this or that number. But supposing that it is in the divine will to wish this number in creation, and this grade of perfection in each creature, it thence follows logically that creation be in such and such form, and such and such matter; and so of further consequences. Manifestly then providence disposes of things according to a certain plan, and yet this plan presupposes the divine will.
What has been said shuts out two errors, the error of those who believe that
all things follow mere will without reason, which is the error of sundry Doctors
of the Mohammedan law, as Rabbi Moses says; according to whose teaching, the only
difference between fire warming and fire freezing is God’s so willing the former
alternative;
There are certain words of Holy Scripture which appear to put down all things
to the mere will of God. Their meaning is not to take away all rational character
from the dispensations of Providence, but to show that the will of God is the first
principle of all things. Such texts are: All things, whatsoever he hath willed,
the Lord hath done (
Thus in answer to the question, Why? asked of any natural effect, we can
render a reason from some proximate cause, yet so that we reduce all things to the
prime cause. Thus if it is asked why wood gets hot in presence of fire, it is answered
[etc., etc., in terms of Aristotelian physics], and so on till we come to the will
of God [who willed to create matter and energy, such as we know them, from the beginning].
Hence whoever answers the question, why the wood got hot, Because God has willed
it so, answers appropriately, if he intends to carry back the question to the prime
cause; but inappropriately, if he intends to exclude all other causes. If asked,
‘Why does the train start at 6.30?’ I should answer, ‘Because the traffic
manager has so arranged it.’ He might have taken the train off, or put it at another
hour, or, with the concurrence of the Directors, have suspended traffic altogether.
The Time Tables represent the Manager’s will: yet by no means his arbitrary will.
A Time Table drawn up at hap-hazard would result in a block of the whole line: it
would not work. The Time Tables consequently are drawn up with much care and forethought
for the natures of trains and the exigencies of traffic. The Manager controls actualities,
but not possibilities and conveniences. He must make his actual appointments tally
with what he finds possible and convenient. In like manner all actuality in creatures depends on the mere will of God. And
God need not will to create anything at all. He might have acquiesced in His own
existence, with nothing but Himself alone in any way existing. So says St Thomas,
and so the Catholic Church, in opposition to the determinist idealism of Hegel,
who makes the universe and its on-goings consist of the irreversible thoughts and
thought-processes of Deity. On the other hand God’s power of creating is not an
arbitrary power to create anything and everything that a foolish fancy may call
up. He cannot give reality to intrinsic absurdities. He cannot, we may venture to
think, create a race of mortal men without stomachs, or animals whose natural food
should be stones, or a circle having the properties of a cycloid, or a politician
licensed to lie. If He creates, He must create according to the eternal exemplars,
the natures of things, as He views them in order of possibility in Himself. These
eternal exemplars, or ‘intelligible essences’ as the schoolmen call them, represent
whatever of truth there was in Plato’s Ideas. They are founded upon the divine nature,
as imitable outside of God: they are discerned in the divine intellect: they do
not depend, formally speaking, on the divine will. God’s will and decree does not
make and unmake possibilities. These intelligibilia, on the lines of which creation
must take place, if creation there is to be at all, are treated of in B. I, Chapp.
XLIX–LIV. They were ignored by the ultra-Nominalists, who
took all meaning out of the phrase ‘the nature of things,’ and, like those ‘doctors
of the Mohammedan law’ whom St Thomas mentions, ascribed all events without distinction
to the arbitrary will of the Creator. With these archetypal Ideas, according to which creation is laid out, and athwart
of which it cannot run, we are very imperfectly acquainted. Consequently our predication
cannot travel far, when we undertake to pronounce what things are intrinsically
possible and what impossible, what things absolutely God could do, and what things
He absolutely could not. More things probably are intrinsically impossible than
we are aware of. Among the meshes of this necessary system of the nature of things
(a necessity founded upon the divine nature itself) the divine will ranges free,
electing to actualise this possibility in creation, and to leave that unactualised. From this chapter of St Thomas I have been constrained to excise much obsolete
physics. To examine the plan of creation, in an age when men knew nothing of physical
nature, microscopic and telescopic, molecular and sidereal, beyond what their unassisted
senses could detect, and knew that little ill, — was a laudable effort, but could
lead to no more than provisional results. A modern Aquinas, dwelling, as St Thomas
loved to dwell, on the variety of creation and the differences of things, cannot
but feel himself in face of the question, how all these differences arose; whether
they were explicit in the first creation, or whether, out of a creation originally
homogeneous, things came to be differentiated by a primitive plastic power, called
Evolution, which has turned out an oak, or a sycamore, to be head and representative
of one line of development, and a lion, or an eagle, of another. And, if he chooses
Evolution, he will have to consider the part of God’s providence therein. This chapter should be read in the light of the teleological Psalm ciii, and
of St Thomas’s own declaration of his purpose in B. II, Chap.
IV. In the untranslated portion occurs this curious aphorism:
“The first thing aimed at in creatures is their multiplication (prima
ratio in creaturis est eorum numerositas), and to the gaining and securing
of this end all things else seem to be subordinate.”
CHAPTER XCIX—God can work beyond the Order laid down for Creatures, and produce Effects without Proximate Causes
SINCE accidents follow upon the substantial principles of the thing, he who immediately
produces the substance of a thing must be able immediately to work in the thing
whatever effects follow upon substantial existence. But God by creation has brought
all things immediately into being. He can therefore immediately move anything to
any effect without intermediate causes.
But if any one says that, once God has fixed an orderly course of events, He
cannot change it without changing Himself; and that He would change Himself, if
ever He worked in the world to the production of effects apart from their own proper
causes, such a saying may be refuted by a study of nature. For the orderly course
of events fixed by God, if we look at it as it obtains in creation, will be found
to hold for the most part, but not everywhere or always:
CHAPTER C—That the things which God does beyond the Order of Nature are not contrary to Nature
SINCE God is prime agent, all things inferior to Him are as His instruments.
But instruments are made to serve the end of the prime agent, according as they
are moved by Him: therefore it is not contrary to, but very much in accordance with,
the nature of the instrument, for it to be moved by the prime agent. Neither is
it contrary to nature for created things to be moved in any way whatsoever (qualitercunque)
by God: for they were made to serve Him.
4. The first measure of every being and of every nature is God, seeing that He
is the first being and canse of being to all. And since everything must be judged
by its measure, that must be called ‘natural’ to a thing whereby it is conformed
to its measure, or standard. That then will be natural to a thing, which has been
put into it by God. Therefore, though something
Provided
it be not essentially incompatible with what was ‘put in’ originally.
But if bovine nature be the original endowment, civil status and capacity cannot
possibly ‘impressed’ upon that. I hope I may insist upon this without disrespect to St Thomas, — nay, without
departure from his further and inner mind (Chap. XCVII), here
not so clearly expressed, bent as he was for the nonce upon explaining the Augustinian
quotation with which he concludes. In these days, when the great philosophic difficulty
against theism is the prevalence of evil, it is of the first importance to beware
of any theistic statement which seems to represent God as mere Will, arbitrary,
unconditioned, and untrammelled by any regard to the eternal fitnesses and possibilities
of nature. In the presence of evils such as we daily experience, to ally such sheer,
imperious, overruling and overwhelming Will with Goodness, is a task which one shrinks
from contemplating. Happily, it is not the task of the philosopher and the Christian.
No lord paramount θυμὸς or
βούλησις can run counter to the
εἴδη. If we might put words into the mouth
of our Creator, words suggested by our great dramatist, we might fancy God saying: That alone ‘doth become a God,’ which is consonant with the
εἴδη, or fixed intelligible natures of things,
which are the expression of His nature as imitable beyond Himself God is “the first
measure of every being and of every nature” by virtue of what He is in Himself in
His own being and His own nature, not by mere virtue of His will.
5. All creatures stand to God as the products of art to the artist (B. II, Chap. XXIV). Hence all nature may be called an artistic product of divine workmanship (artificiatum divinae artis). But it is not contrary to the notion of workmanship for the artist to work something to a different effect in his work, even after he has given it the first form. Neither then is it contrary to nature if God works something in natural things to a different effect from that which the ordinary course of nature involves.
Hence Augustine says: “God, the Creator and Founder of all natures, does nothing
contrary to nature, because to every creature that is natural which He makes so,
of whom is all measure, number and order of nature.
CHAPTER 101—THINGS that are done occasionally by divine power outside of the usual established
order of events are commonly called miracles (wonders). We wonder when we see an
effect and do not know the cause. And because one and the same cause is sometimes
known to some and unknown to others, it happens that of the witnesses of the effect
some wonder and some do not wonder: thus an astronomer does not wonder at seeing
an eclipse of the sun, at which a person that is ignorant of astronomy cannot help
wondering.
Of these miracles there are several ranks and orders. Miracles of the highest
rank are those in which something is done by God that nature can
CHAPTER CII—That God alone works Miracles
WHAT is entirely subject to established order cannot work beyond that order. But every creature is subject to the order which God has established in nature. No creature therefore can work beyond this order, which working beyond the order of nature is the meaning of working miracles.
2. When any finite power works the proper effect to which it is determined, that is no miracle, though it may surprise one who does not understand the operation. But the power of every creature is limited to some definite effect, or effects. Whatever therefore is done by the power of any creature cannot properly be called a miracle. But what is done by the power of God, infinite and incomprehensible, is properly a miracle.
3. Every creature in its action requires some subject to act upon: for it belongs to God alone to make a thing out of nothing (B. II, Chap. XXI). But nothing that requires a subject for its action can act except to the production of those effects to which that subject is in potentiality: for the work of action upon a subject is to educe that subject from potentiality to actuality. As then a creature can never create, so it can never act upon a thing except to the production of that which is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles done by divine power a thing is done, which is not in the potentiality of that upon which it is done, as in the raising of the dead.
Hence it is said of God: Who doth great wonderful works alone (
CHAPTER CIII—How Separately Subsisting Spirits work certain Wonders, which yet are not true Miracles
IT was the theory of Avicenna that matter is far more obedient to spiritual agencies
than to the action of contraries in nature. Hence he goes on to say that upon the
suggestion of these spiritual agents there sometimes follows an effect in the lower
world, such as rain, or the cure of some sick person, without the coming in of any
intermediate corporeal agency. He instances the change wrought in the body by the
mere suggestion of a strong impression of phantasy, as when one walking upon a plank
set aloft easily falls, because his fear pictures a fall to him, whereas he would
not fall if the same plank were laid on the ground, giving him no occasion to fear.
Again it is notorious that upon the mere suggestion of the soul the body grows hot,
as in desire or anger, or is chilled, as in fear. Sometimes too a strong suggestion
brings on an illness, a fever, or even leprosy. Thereupon Avicenna says that if
the soul is pure, not subject to bodily passions, and strong in its suggestive power,
not only its own body will obey its suggestion, but even foreign bodies, even to
the healing of the sick upon suggestion made by it.
The fact is, a created spirit has no power of its own to induce any form upon
corporeal matter otherwise than by setting some body into local motion. This much
is in the power of a created spirit, to make a body obey it to the extent of moving
locally. So by moving a body locally an angel can employ natural agents to the production
of certain effects. But such action is not miraculous, properly speaking.
CHAPTER CIV—That the Works of Magicians are not due solely to the Influence of the Heavenly Spheres
CHAPTER CV—Whence the performances of Magicians derive their Efficacy
MAGICIANS in their performances use certain words with a meaning to the production
of definite effects. Now a word, as meaning something, has no power except from
some understanding, the understanding either of him who utters the word or of him
to whom it is uttered: from the understanding of the utterer, in the case where
a word is of such power that by the idea which it contains it is apt to produce
real effects, the idea being applied to the production of those effects by the ministry
of the voice: from the understanding of the person addressed, in the case when the
hearer is induced to do something by the reception into his understanding of the
idea conveyed by the word. Now it cannot be said that those words, uttered by magicians
with a meaning, have their efficacy from the understanding of him who utters them.
For, since power follows upon essence, difference of power argues a difference of
essential principle. But we find the condition of the understanding of men generally
to be such that it is more true to say that its cognition is caused by things than
that any idea which it conceives can be the cause of things. If then there are any
men who by words expressive of the concept of their understanding can change things
one into another, and do that by power of their own (res possint
transmutare propria virtute), they must be beings of another species
from ordinary mortals, and cannot be called men in the sense in which others are
men (dicentur aequivoce homines).
Besides, in the ceremonies of this art they employ certain characters and geometrical
figures. But a figure is no principle of action, imparted or received:
CHAPTER CVI—That the Subsistent Intelligence, which lends Efficacy to Magical Performances,
is not Good in both Categories of Being
IT remains to be further investigated, what that intelligent nature is, by whose power these operations are carried into effect. To begin with, it is apparent that it is no good and praiseworthy nature. For it is not the behaviour of an intelligence well disposed to lend countenance to acts contrary to virtue. But that is what is done by magical arts: they usually serve to bring about adulteries, thefts, killing, and the like evil practices. Hence they who use such arts are called ‘evil practitioners’ (malefici).
3. The working of a benignant intelligence is to bring men to the proper good things of men, which are the good things of reason: but to draw men away from those good things, and allure them to trifles, is the conduct of an intelligence of a perverse bent. Now by these magical arts men make no profit in the good things of reason, which are sciences and virtues, but only in such trifles as the finding of things stolen, the catching of robbers, and the like.
4. There seems to be a certain grimace and character of unreasonableness attaching to the proceedings of the aforesaid arts. Thus they require an agent who abstains from sexual intercourse, and yet they are frequently employed for the procurement of sexual intercourse in its illicit forms.
6. As it belongs to the good to lead on to goodness, one might expect any right-minded intelligence to lead on to truth, truth being the proper good of the understanding. But the proceedings of magicians are generally of a character to mock men and deceive them.
8. It is not the way of a rightly ordered intelligence, supposing it to be a superior being, to take orders from an inferior; or, supposing it to be an inferior, to suffer itself to be entreated as though it were a superior being. But magicians invoke those whose assistance they use, with supplication, as though they were superior beings; and then, when they have come, they command them as though they were inferiors.
CHAPTER CVII—That the Subsistent Intelligence, whose aid is employed in Magic, is not Evil
by Nature
WHATEVER is in things must be either cause or caused: otherwise it would not
be in relation with other things. The subsistent beings in question then are either
causes only or they are also caused. If they are causes only, evil cannot be cause
of anything except incidentally (Chap. XIV); and everything
incidental must be reducible to that which is ordinary:
4. Nothing can exist unless it has existence from the first being, and the first being is the sovereign good (B. II, Chap. XV). But since every being, as such, acts to the production of its own likeness, all things that come of the first being must be good.
7. Since the will tends to good grasped by the understanding, and finds therein its natural and proper object and end, it is impossible for any subsistent intelligence to have by nature a bad will, unless the understanding in it naturally is mistaken in its judgement of what is good. But no understanding can be so mistaken: for false judgements in acts of the understanding are like monsters in the physical universe, which are not according to nature, but out of the way of nature: for the good of the understanding and its natural end is the knowledge of truth.
This is also confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said,
Every creature is good (
Hereby is excluded the error of the Manicheans, who suppose that these subsistent intelligences, commonly called demons or devils, are naturally evil.
Porphyry tells in his Letter to Anebo
CHAPTER CIX—That in Spirits there may be Sin, and how
AS there is an order in active causes, so also in final causes, requiring that
the secondary end should be subordinate to the primary, as the secondary agent depends
on the primary. Now every will naturally wishes that which is the proper good of
the person willing, namely, his own perfect well-being; and the will cannot possibly
will aught to the contrary of this. If we can find a voluntary agent, whose good
is a final end, such as not to be contained under the order leading to any other
end, but rather all other ends being contained in the order leading up to it, —
in such a voluntary agent there can be no fault of the will. Such a voluntary agent
is God, whose being is sovereign goodness, which is the final end. In God then there
can be no fault of the will. But in any other voluntary agent, whose proper good
must necessarily be contained in the order leading to some other good, a sin of
the will may occur, — considering the agent as he is in his own nature. Every
voluntary agent loves himself. God, having none higher than Himself, is
not called upon to subordinate His love of Himself to any other love. But angels,
or man, while naturally, necessarily, and rightly loving himself, is further called
upon to subordinate his love of himself to the love of God. This further call he
may fail to comply with: then he sins. The argument in the text is directed against the Platonists, who ascribed all
sinful tendency to the body, and consequently could see no possibility of sin in
a pure spirit, or angel, and thus came to reject the Christian dogma of the fall
of the angels.
Further we may note that when any one’s proper good is subordinate to several
higher powers, it is open to a voluntary agent to withdraw himself from his subordination
to one superior, and not relinquish his subordination to another, be that other
the superior or the inferior of the first. Thus a soldier, being subordinate at
once to the king and to the general of the army, may
This is the difference between man and a pure spirit, that in the one being of
man there are several appetitive faculties, one subordinate to another: this is
not the case in pure spirits, although one of them is under another. But in man,
however the inferior appetite may swerve from due subordination, any sin that occurs
occurs in his will. As then it would be a sin in pure spirits for any inferior amongst
them to swerve from due subordination to a superior, while that superior remained
in subordination to God; so in the one person of man sin may occur in two ways:
in one way by the human will not subordinating its own good to God, and that sin
man has in common with the pure spirit; in another way by the good of the lower
appetite not being regulated according to the higher, as when the pleasures of the
flesh, to which the concupiscible appetite tends, are willed not in accordance with
reason; and this sin does not occur in pure spirits.
CHAPTERS CVIII, CX—Arguments seeming to prove that Sin is impossible to Spirits, with Solutions of the same
ARG. 1. Every other cognitive faculty but the understanding makes use of living
bodily organs. In pure spirits therefore it is impossible for there to be any cognitive
faculty but the understanding; and whatever they take cognisance of, they have understanding
of.
Arg. 2. In us there occurs sin of the will in respect of matters about which we have true knowledge of their general bearings, but on a particular point our judgement is hampered by some passion fettering the reason. But these passions cannot be in spiritual beings, because such passions belong to the sensitive part, and that has no action without a bodily organ. Having therefore a right knowledge in general, the will of a pure spirit cannot tend to evil by any defed of knowledge in particular.
Arg. 3. No cognitive faculty is deceived about its own proper object, but only
about some object foreign to it: thus sight is not deceived in judging of colours,
but when a man undertakes by sight to judge of tastes, then deception occurs. Now
the proper object of understanding is the essence of a thing.
Reply to Arguments 1, 2, 3. We are not obliged to say that there was any error
in the understanding of a pure spirit, in the shape of a false judgement, judging
that to be good which is not good: the mistake, such as it was, lay in not attending
to the higher good, to which the spirit’s private good ought to have been referred:
the reason of which inattention [read inconsiderationis ratio]
may have been the inward turning of the will upon the spirit’s private good:
Arg. 5. Since appetite or desire tends to nothing but its own proper good, it
seems impossible for desire to go astray in the case when the person desiring has
one only definite good to desire. The reason why sin is incident to our desire is
the composition of our nature, a compound of the spiritual and the corporeal, occasioning
a multiplicity of things to be good for us, one thing being good for us in mind
and another in body. Of this variety of good things the less important has to be
subordinated to the more important. Hence sin of the will arises in us when we neglect
that order, and go after what is good for us under a certain qualification, discarding
what is good for us absolutely. But in pure spirits there is no such composition,
no diversity
Reply. The angel who sinned did not go after any other good than the one good
that was proper to him: but his sin lay in this, that he dropped the higher good
to which he should have subordinated himself As we sin by pursuing the lower goods
of the body away from the order of reason, so the devil sinned by not referring
his own excellence to the excellence of God.
Arg. 6. In us, sin of the will arises out of excess or defect, while virtue lies in the mean between them. But pure spirits can pursue only intellectual good things, in which things no excess is possible, for of themselves they are in the mean between excess and defect, as truth is in the mean between two errors.
Reply. The devil passed the mean of virtue inasmuch as he did not submit himself to a superior order; and thus he gave himself more than his due, and to God less than His due.
CHAPTER CXII—That Rational Creatures are governed by Providence for their own sakes, and
other Creatures in reference to them
THE very condition of intellectual nature, whereby it is mistress of its own acts, requires the care of Providence, providing for it for its own sake: while the condition of other creatures, that have no dominion over their own act, indicates that care is taken of them not for themselves, but for their subordination to other beings. For what is worked by another is in the rank of an instrument: while what works by itself is in the rank of a prime agent. Now an instrument is not sought for its own sake, but for the use of the prime agent: hence all diligence of workmanship applied to instruments must have its end and final point of reference in the prime agent. On the other hand all care taken about a prime agent, as such, is for its own sake.
2. What has dominion over its own act, is free in acting. For he is free, who is a cause to himself of what he does: whereas a power driven by another under necessity to work is subject to slavery. Thus the intellectual nature alone is free, while every other creature is naturally subject to slavery. But under every government the freemen are provided for for their own sakes, while of slaves this care is taken that they have being for the use of the free.
3. In a system making for an end, any parts of the system that cannot gain the
end of themselves must be subordinate to other parts that do gain the end and stand
in immediate relation to it. Thus the end of an army is victory, which the soldiers
gain by their proper act of fighting: the soldiers alone are in request in the army
for their own sakes; all others in other employments in the army, such as grooms
or armourers, are in request for the sake of the soldiers. But the final end of
the universe being God, the intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself by
knowing Him and loving Him (Chap. XXV). Intelligent nature
therefore alone in the universe is in
6. Everything is naturally made to behave as it actually does behave in the course of nature. Now we find in the actual course of nature that an intelligent subsistent being converts all other things to his own use, either to the perfection of his intellect, by contemplating truth in them, or to the execution of works of his power and development of his science, as an artist develops the conception of his art in bodily material; or again to the sustenance of his body, united as that is to an intellectual soul.
Nor is it contrary to the conclusion of the aforesaid reasons, that all the parts of the universe are subordinate to the perfection of the whole. For that subordination means that one serves another: thus there is no inconsistency in saying that unintelligent natures serve the intelligent, and at the same time serve the perfection of the universe: for if those things were wanting which subsistent intelligence requires for its perfection, the universe would not be complete.
By saying that subsistent intelligences are guided by divine providence for their
own sakes, we do not mean to deny that they are further referable to God and to
the perfection of the universe. They are cared for for their own sakes, and other
things for their sake, in this sense, that the good things which are given them
by divine providence are not given them for the profit of any other creature:
Hence it is said: Look not on sun and moon and stars besides, to be led astray
with delusion and to worship what the Lord thy God hath created for the service
of all nations under heaven (
Hereby is excluded the error of those who lay it down that it is a sin for man
to kill dumb animals: for by the natural order of divine providence they are referred
to the use of man: hence without injustice man uses them either by killing them
or in any other way: wherefore God said to Noe: As green herbs have I given you
all flesh (
CHAPTER CXIII—That the acts of the Rational Creature are guided by God, not merely to the realisation of the Specific Type, but also to the realisation of the Individual
EVERYTHING is reckoned to exist for the sake of its activity, activity being the final perfection of a thing. Thus then everything, so far as it comes under divine providence, is guided by God to its proper act. But a rational creature subject to providence is governed and provided for as an individual for its own sake, not merely for the sake of the species, as is the case with other perishable creatures (Chap. CXII). Thus then rational creatures alone are guided by God to their acts, not merely specific but individual.
2. Whatever things are guided in their acts only in what appertains to the species,
such things have not the choice of doing or not doing: for what is consequent upon
the species is common and natural to all individuals contained under the species;
and what is natural is not in our power.
3. In whatsoever beings there are found actions over and above such as fall in with the common inclination of the species, such beings must be regulated by divine providence in their actions with some guidance beyond that which is extended to the species. But in the rational creature many actions appear, which the inclination of the species is not sufficient to account for, as is shown by their being not alike in all, but various in various individuals.
4. The rational creature alone is capable of being guided to its acts not merely
specifically but individually: for by the gift of understanding and reason it is
able to discern the diversity of good and evil according as is befitting to diverse
individuals, times and places.
5. The rational creature is not only governed by divine providence, but is also capable to some extent of grasping the notion of providence, whereas other creatures share in providence merely by being subject to providence. Thus the rational creature is partaker in providence, not merely by being governed, but by governing: for it governs itself by its own acts, and also other beings. But every lower providence is subject to the supreme providence of God. Therefore the government of the acts of the rational creature, in so far as they are personal acts, belongs to divine providence.
6. The personal acts of the rational creature are properly the acts that come
from a rational soul. Now the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in
the species, as other creatures are, but also in the individual. The acts therefore
of the rational creature are guided by divine providence, not only as they belong
to the species, but also as they are personal acts.
CHAPTER CXIV—That it was necessary for a Law to be given to Man by God
THE acts of irrational creatures, as they belong to the species, are guided by God according to a natural inclination, consequent upon the nature of the species. Therefore, over and above that, there must be given to men something to guide them in their personal acts, and that we call ‘law.’
3 and 4. To them is a law fittingly given, who know what they are about, and
have the alternative of doing a thing or leaving it undone. But that is proper to
the rational creature only. Therefore the rational creature alone is conceptible
of law.
Hence it is said: I will give my law in their hearts (
CHAPTER CXV—That the main purpose of the Divine Law is to subordinate Man to God
THE end which God intends is Himself.
2. The end of every human creature is to adhere to God, for in that his happiness consists.
4. That should be the main purpose of a law, from which the law derives its efficacy. But the law given by God has efficacy among men from the fact that man is suited to God. This therefore ought to be the chief precept in the divine law, that the human mind should adhere to God.
Hence it is said: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God ask of thee
but that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in his ways, and love him and serve
the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and thy whole soul? (
CHAPTER CXVI—That the End of the Divine Law is the Love of God
THE main intention of the divine law is that man should adhere to God; and man
adheres to God chiefly by love. There are two powers whereby man may cleave to God,
his understanding and his will. By the lower faculties of his soul man cannot cleave
to God, but adheres to lower things. Now the adhesion that is of the understanding
is completed by that which is of the will: for by the will man comes to rest in
what the understanding apprehends. The will cleaves to a thing either
2. The end of every law, and particularly of the divine law, is to make men good. Now a man is called good from having a good will: for the will it is which reduces to act whatever good there is in the man: but the will is good by willing good, and particularly the chief good, which is the end: the more then the will wills this good, the better the man is. Therefore the will of the sovereign good, which is God, is what most of all makes men good, and is principally intended in the divine law.
3. The law aims at making men virtuous: but it is a condition of virtue that the virtuous person should act firmly and with pleasure; and love it is that best makes us do a thing firmly and with delight.
Therefore it is said: The end of the commandment is charity (
CHAPTER CXVII—That by the Divine Law we are directed to the Love of our Neighbour
THERE should be a union of affection among those who have one common end:
2. Whoever loves another, must in consequence also love those whom that other
loves and who are united with him.
3. Since man is naturally a social animal, he needs to be helped by other men to gain his proper end; and this is most aptly done by mutual love prevailing amongst men.
4. To attend to divine things, a man needs tranquillity and peace. Now the things that might trouble peace are most effectually taken away by mutual love. Since then the law of God orders men to attend to divine things, mutual love amongst men must necessarily be a provision of the divine law.
5. The divine law is given to man to bear out the natural law.
Hence it is said: This is my commandment, that ye love one another (
CHAPTER CXVIII—That by Divine Law men are obliged to a Right Faith
AS sight by the bodily eye is the principle of the bodily passion of love, so the beginning of spiritual love must be the intellectual vision of some object of the same. But the vision of that spiritual object of understanding, which is God, cannot be had at present by us except through faith, because God exceeds our natural reason, especially if we consider Him in that regard under which our happiness consists in enjoying Him.
2. The divine law directs man to be entirely subject to God. But as man will is subjected to God by loving Him, so his understanding is subjected to Him by believing Him, — but not by believing anything false, because no falsehood can be proposed to man by God, who is the truth: hence he who believes anything false does not believe God.
3. Whoever holds an erroneous view about a thing, touching the essence of the
thing, does not know the thing. Thus if any one were to fix on the notion of irrational
animal, and take that to be man, he would not know man. The case would be otherwise,
if he was mistaken only about some of the accidents of man. But in the case of compound
beings, though he who errs about any of the essentials of a thing does not know
the thing, absolutely speaking, still he knows it in a sort of a way: thus he who
thinks man to be an irrational animal knows him generically: but in the case of
simple beings this cannot be, — any error shuts out entirely all knowledge of the
thing. But God is to the utmost degree simple. Therefore whoever errs about God
does not know God. Thus he who believes God to be corporeal has no sort of knowledge
of God, but apprehends something else instead of God.
Hence it is said: Without faith it is impossible to please God (
CHAPTER CXIX—That by certain Sensible Rites our mind is directed to God
BECAUSE it is connatural to man to gather his knowledge through the senses, and
most difficult for him to transcend sensible things God has provided for man that
even in sensible things there should be made for him a commemoration of things divine.
To this end sensible sacrifices have been instituted, which man offers to God, not
as though God needed them, but to bring home to man the lesson that he ought to
offer himself and all he has to God, his end, Creator, Ruler, and Lord of all. There
are also exercised upon man certain hallowings through certain sensible things,
whereby man is washed, or anointed, or given to eat and drink, along with the utterance
(prolatione) of audible words, to represent to man
by these sensible signs the augmentation of spiritual gifts wrought in him from
without, namely, by God, whose name is expressed in audible words. Also certain
sensible rites are performed by men, not to rouse God to action,
Hence it is not surprising that the [Manichean] heretics, who say that God is not the author of our body, blame these bodily observances being paid to God. In which censure they evidently fail to remember that they themselves are men, not seeing that sensible representations are necessary to us for inward knowledge and affection. For it is experimentally shown that our soul is excited by bodily acts to think and feel: hence we properly use such acts to raise our mind to God.
In the payment of these bodily observances the cult, or worship,
of God is said to consist. For we are said to cultivate those objects to
which we pay attention by our works. Now we busy ourselves in paying attention to
the things of God, not as though we were of service to Him, as is the case
when we are said to tend, or cultivate, other things by our attentions,
but because such actions are of service to ourselves, enabling us to come
nearer to God.
Hence the worship of God is also called religion, because by such acts a
Hence also religion has received the name of piety, for piety is that whereby we pay due honour to parents: hence aptly the honour paid to God, parent of all, is taken to be a part of piety, and they who oppose the worship of God are called impious.
But because not only is God cause and origin of our being, but our whole being
is in His power, and all that is in us is His due, and thereby He is truly our Lord
and Master, therefore what we perform in honour of God is called service.
Now God is our master not by accident, as one man is another’s master, but by nature;
and therefore the service that we owe to God is quite different from that whereby
we are accidentally subject to a man, the dominion of man over man being partial,
and derivative from God. Hence the service specially due to God is called among
the Greeks latria.
CHAPTER CXX—That the Worship of Latria is to be paid to God alone
THERE have been some who have thought that this worship should be paid not only
to the first principle of all things, but also to all creatures that are above men.
Hence, while considering God to be the one prime and universal principle of all
things, they have still thought it right to pay latria, first after God,
to the subsistent intelligences in the heavens, which they also called gods, whether
they existed entirely apart from bodies or were the souls of spheres or stars. Secondly,
also to certain subsistent intelligences which they believed to be united to bodies
of air, and called them genii (daimones): because
they believed them to be above men, as a body of air is above a body of earth, they
insisted that these intelligences also were to be worshipped by men with divine
worship, and in comparison with men they said that they were gods, as being intermediate
between men and gods. And because they believed that the souls of good men, by the
fact of their separation from bodies, passed to a higher state than the state of
the present life, they considered that divine worship should be paid also to the
souls of the dead, whom they called ἥρωες, or manes. Some again,
taking God to be the soul of the universe, have believed that the worship proper
to Godhead is to be paid to the whole universe and to all its parts, not however
for the sake of the material part, but for the sake of the soul, which they said
was God, as honour is paid to a wise man, not for his body but for his mind. Some
again used to say that even things naturally below man still should be worshipped
by man with divine honours, inasmuch as some portion of the power of a higher nature
is communicated to
1. But it is irrational in men who posit one only separate first principle, to pay divine worship to another. For we pay worship to God, not as though He needed it, but to strengthen in ourselves by sensible signs a true opinion about God. Now the opinion that God is one, exalted above all, cannot be strengthened in us by sensible signs except by our paying him some separate and peculiar tribute, which we call divine worship. Evidently then true opinion about the one principle is weakened, if divine worship is paid to several.
2. This exterior worship is necessary for man, to the end that man’s soul may conceive a spiritual reverence for God. But custom goes a long way in moving the mind of man: for we are more easily moved to that to which we are accustomed. Now the custom among men is that the honour that is paid to him who holds the highest place in the commonwealth, as to the king or emperor, is paid to none other. Therefore there should be a worship that is paid to none other than the one principle of the universe; and that we call the worship of latria.
3. If the worship of latria is due to another merely because he is superior, and not because he is supreme, it would follow that one man should pay latria to another man, and one angel to another angel, seeing that among men, and also among angels, one is superior to another. And since among men he who is superior on one point is inferior on another, it would follow that men should interchange latria in their mutual dealings, which is absurd.
4. Man ought to pay God something special in recognition of the special benefit of his creation; and that is the worship of latria.
5. Latria means service, and service is due to the master. Now he is properly and truly called master, who lays down to others precepts of conduct, and himself takes a precept of conduct from none: for he who executes the arrangement of a superior is rather minister than master. But God’s providence disposes all things to their due actions: hence in Holy Writ the angels and the heavenly bodies are said to minister both to God, whose ordinance they execute, and to us, to whose benefit their actions tend. Therefore the worship of latria, due to the sovereign master, is to be paid only to the sovereign principle of the universe.
6. Among all acts of latria, a unique rank belongs to sacrifice: for genuflections, prostrations and other such marks of honour may be paid even to man, although with another intention than they are paid to God: but no one ever thought to offer sacrifice except to him whom he regarded as God, or affected so to regard. The outward rite of sacrifice represents the inward true sacrifice, whereby the human mind offers itself to God, as to the principle of its creation, the author of its activity, the term of its happiness. Therefore to God alone should man offer sacrifice and the worship of latria, and not to any created spirits whatsoever.
Hence it is said: He shall be slain who offers sacrifice to any gods but to
CHAPTER CXXI—That the Divine Law directs man to a Rational Use of Corporeal and Sensible Things
AS man’s mind may be raised to God by corporeal and sensible things, provided
that they are duly used to show reverence to God, so also the undue use of them
either totally withdraws the mind from God, fixing the final intention of the will
upon inferior things,
2. As man’s mind is subordinate to God, so his body is subordinate to his soul, and his lower powers to his reason. It belongs therefore to divine providence, the plan of which, as proposed by God to man, is the divine law, to see that all things keep their order. Therefore that divine law must so direct man as that his lower powers shall be subject to his reason, and his body to his soul, and exterior things shall serve his necessity.
4. Every lawgiver must comprise in his legislation those enactments without which
the law could not be observed. Now law being set over reason,
Hence it is said: Your reasonable service (
Hereby is excluded the error of such as say that those acts alone are sinful, whereby our neighbour is either hurt or shocked.
CHAPTER CXXII—Of the reason for which Simple Fornication is a Sin by Divine Law, and of the Natural Institution of Marriage
HENCE appears the folly of those who say that simple fornication is not a sin.
We must seek a solution from what has been said before: for it has been said (Chapp. XVI, LXIV) that God has care of everything according to that which is good for it. Now it is good for everything to gain its end, and evil for it to be diverted from its due end. But as in the whole so also in the parts, our study should be that every part of man and every act of his may attain its due end. Now though the semen is superfluous for the preservation of the individual, yet it is necessary to him for the propagation of the species: while other excretions, such as excrement, urine, sweat, and the like, are needful for no further purpose: hence the only good that comes to man of them is by their removal from the body. But that is not the object in the emission of the semen, but rather the profit of generation, to which the union of the sexes is directed. But in vain would be the generation of man unless due nurture followed, without which the offspring generated could not endure. The emission of the semen then ought to be so directed as that both the proper generation may ensue and the education of the offspring be secured.
Hence it is clear that every emission of the semen is contrary to the good of man, which takes place in a way whereby generation is impossible; and if this is done on purpose, it must be a sin. I mean a way in which generation is impossible in itself as is the case in every emission of the semen without the natural union of male and female: wherefore such sins are called ’sins against nature.’ But if it is by accident that generation cannot follow from the emission of the semen, the act is not against nature on that account, nor is it sinful; the case of the woman being barren would be a case in point.
Likewise it must be against the good of man for the semen
to be emitted under conditions which, allowing generation to ensue, nevertheless bar the
A further consideration is, that in the human species the young need not only bodily nutrition, as animals do, but also the training of the soul. Other animals have their natural instincts (suas prudentias) to provide for themselves: but man lives by reason, which [read quam] takes the experience of a long time to arrive at discretion. Hence children need instruction by the confirmed experience of their parents: nor are they capable of such instruction as soon as they are born, but after a long time, the time in fact taken to arrive at the years of discretion. For this instruction again a long time is needed; and then moreover, because of the assaults of passion, whereby the judgement of prudence is thwarted, there is need not of instruction only, but also of repression. For this purpose the woman by herself is not competent, but at this point especially there is requisite the concurrence of the man, in whom there is at once reason more perfect to instruct, and force more potent to chastise. Therefore in the human race the advancement of the young in good must last, not for a short time, as in birds, but for a long period of life. Hence, whereas it is necessary in all animals for the male to stand by the female for such time as the father’s concurrence is requisite for bringing up of the progeny, it is natural for man to be tied to the society of one fixed woman for a long period, not a short one. This social tie we call marriage. Marriage then is natural to man, and an irregular connexion outside of marriage is contrary to the good of man; and therefore fornication must be sinful.
Nor yet should it be counted a slight sin for one to procure the emission of
the semen irrespective of the due purpose of generation and rearing of issue,
on the pretence that it is a slight sin, or no sin at all, to apply any part of
one’s body to another use than that to which it is naturally ordained, as if, for
example, one were to walk on his hands, or do with his feet something
The above assertions are confirmed by divine authority. The unlawfulness of any
emission of semen, upon which offspring cannot be
consequent, is evident from such texts as these: Thou shalt not lie with mankind
as with womankind: Thou shalt not lie with any beast (
Hereby is refuted the error of those who say that there is no more sin in the emission of the semen than in the ejection of other superfluous products from the body.
CHAPTER CXXIII—That Marriage ought to be Indissoluble
LOOKING at the matter rightly, one must see that the aforesaid reasons not only argue a long duration for that natural human partnership of male and female, which we call marriage, but further imply that the partnership ought to be lifelong.
1. Property is a means to the preservation of human life. And because natural
life cannot be preserved in one and the same person of the father living on for
all time, nature arranges for its preservation by the son succeeding his father
in likeness of species: wherefore it is appropriate that the son should succeed
his father in his property. It is natural therefore that the father’s interest in
his son should continue to the end of his life, and that father and mother should
dwell together to the end.
2. Woman is taken into partnership with man for the need of childbearing: therefore when the fertility and beauty of woman ceases, there is a bar against her being taken up by another man. If then a man, taking a woman to wife in the time of her youth, when beauty and fertility wait upon her, could send her away when she was advanced in years, he would do the woman harm, contrary to natural equity.
3. It is manifestly absurd for the woman to be able to send away the man, seeing
that woman is naturally subject to the rule of man, and it is not in the power of
a subject to run away from control. It being then against the order of nature for
the woman to be allowed to desert the man, if the man were
4. Men show a natural anxiety to be sure of their own offspring; and whatever stands in the way of that assurance runs counter to the natural instinct of the race. But if the man could send away the woman, or the woman the man, and form a connexion with another, certainty as to parentage would be difficult, when a woman had intercourse first with one man and then with another.
5. The greater the love, the more need for it to be firm and lasting. But the
love of man and woman is counted strongest of all; seeing that they are united,
not only in the union of the sexes, which even among beasts makes a sweet partnership,
but also for the sharing in common of all domestic life, as a sign whereof a man
leaves even father and mother for the sake of his wife (
6. Of natural acts, generation alone is directed to the good of (the specific)
nature: for eating and the separation from the body of other excretions concern
the individual, but generation has to do with the preservation of the species. Hence,
as law is instituted for the common good, the function of procreation ought to be
regulated by laws divine and human. Now the laws laid down ought to proceed on the
basis of the dictate of nature (ex naturali instinctu),
if they are human laws, as in the exact sciences every human discovery takes its
origin from principles naturally known: but if they are divine laws, they not only
develop the dictate of nature, but also make up the deficiency of what nature dictates,
as dogmas divinely revealed surpass the capacity of natural reason. Since then there
is in the human species a natural exigency for the union of male and female to be
one and indivisible, such unity and indissolubility must needs be ordained by human
law. To that ordinance the divine law adds a supernatural reason, derived from the
significancy of marriage as a type of the inseparable union of Christ with His Church,
which is one as He is one.
Hence it is said: But I say to you that whoever putteth away his wife, except
for fornication, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and he that marrieth
her that is put away, committeth adultery (
Divorce was reckoned an impropriety also among the ancient Romans, of whom Valerius
Maximus (De memor. dictis, II, 1) relates that they believed that the marriage
tie ought not to be broken off even for barrenness.
Hereby the custom is banned of putting away wives, which however in the Old Law was permitted to the Jews for their hardness of heart, because they were prone to the killing of their wives: so the less evil was permitted to keep out the greater.
CHAPTER CXXIV—That Marriage ought to be between one Man and one Woman
ONE general reason holds for all animals, which is this, that every animal desires free enjoyment of the pleasure of sexual union as of eating: which freedom is impeded by there being either several males to one female, or the other way about: and therefore animals fight alike for food and for sexual jealousy. But in men there is a special reason, inasmuch as man naturally desires to be sure of his own offspring. But here a difference comes in. Both of the above mentioned reasons hold for the case of the cohabitation of one female with several males: but the second reason does not hold against the cohabitation of one male with several females, — I mean certainty in point of parentage is not in that case prevented. But the first reason makes against it: for as the free enjoyment of the female is taken from the male, if the female has another partner, so the same free enjoyment is taken from the female, if the male has more than one partner.
2. In every species of animal in which the sire takes any interest in the offspring,
one male keeps company with one female only, as in all birds that rear their young
in common: for one male could not avail for several females as a helper in the rearing
of their progeny: whereas in animals in which the males take no interest in the
offspring, one male consorts with several females promiscuously, and the female
with several males, as appears in dogs, poultry, and the like.
3 and 4. The reason why a wife is not allowed more than one husband at a time
is because otherwise paternity would be uncertain. If then while the wife has one
husband only, the husband has more than one wife, there
5. From one man having several wives there arises discord at the domestic hearth, as experience shows.
Hence it is said: They shall be two in one flesh (
CHAPTER CXXV—That Marriage ought not to take place between Kindred
SINCE in marriage there is a union of different persons, those persons who ought
to reckon themselves as one because of their being of one stock, are properly excluded
from intermarrying, that they may love one another more ardently on the mere ground
of their common origin.
2. Since the intercourse of man and wife carries with it a certain natural shame,
those persons should be prevented from such intercourse who owe one another a mutual
reverence on account of the tie of blood. And this is the reason touched on in
3. Excessive indulgence in sexual pleasures makes for the corruption of good manners: for such pleasures of all others most absorb the mind and hinder the right exercise of reason. But such excessive indulgence would ensue, if the intercourse of the sexes were allowed among persons who must necessarily dwell under the same roof, where the occasion of such intercourse could not be withdrawn.
5. In human society the widening of friendships is of the first importance. That
is done by the marriage tie being formed with strangers.
It is to be observed that as that inclination is ‘natural,’ which works upon
objects as they usually occur, so law too is framed for what usually happens. Thus
it is no derogation from the reasons above alleged, that in some particular case
the venture may turn out otherwise: for the good of the individual ought to be overlooked
in view of the good of the many, since the good of the multitude is ever more divine
than the good of the individual.
CHAPTER CXXVI—That not all Sexual Intercourse is Sin
THE members of the body being the instruments of the soul, the end of every member is the use of it, as in the case of any other instrument. But there are members of the body the use of which is for the intercourse of the sexes: that therefore is their end. But that which is the end of any natural thing cannot be in itself evil, because the things of nature are ordinances of divine providence. Therefore the intercourse of the sexes cannot be in itself evil.
3. Natural inclinations are put into things by God, who is the prime mover of all. Therefore it is impossible for the natural inclination of any species to be directed to an object in itself evil. But in all full-grown animals there is a natural inclination to sexual union, which union therefore cannot be in itself evil.
4. That without which something good and excellent cannot be, is not in itself
evil.
Hence it is said: She sinneth not, if she marry (
Hereby is excluded the error of those who totally condemn marriage, which some
do because they believe that temporal things proceed not from a good but from an
evil principle.
CHAPTER CXXVII—That of no Food is the Use Sinful in itself
EVERYTHING is done rationally, when it is directed according to its due bearing upon a due end. But the due end of the taking of food is the preservation of the health by nourishment. Therefore whatever food can serve that end, may be taken without sin.
2. Of no thing is the use evil in itself unless the thing itself be evil in itself.
3. To apply things to the purpose for which they exist is not in itself evil.
But plants exist for the sake of animals, some animals for the sake of
4. The defect which makes sin redounds from soul to body, but not backwards from
body to soul: for by sin we mean a disorder of the will. But articles of food concern
the body immediately, not the soul. Therefore the taking of various foods cannot
be in itself a sin, except in so far as it is inconsistent with rectitude of will.
And that may come to be in several ways: in one way by some inconsistency with the
proper end of food, as when for the pleasure of eating one uses food that disagrees
with health either in kind or in quantity. Another way would be when the food becomes
not the condition of him who eats it, or of the society in which he lives, as when
one is more nice in his food than his means will allow, or violates the social conventions
of those with whom he sits at table. A third way would be in the case of certain
foods prohibited by some special law: thus in the Old Law sundry meats were forbidden
for what they signified; and in Egypt of old the eating of beef was prohibited,
lest agriculture should suffer;
Hence the Lord says: Not what entereth in at the mouth defiles a man (
Hereby is excluded the error of some, who, as Augustine says, “most arrogantly
called themselves Apostolics, because they did not receive into their communion
married men and proprietors, such as are many monks and clerks whom the Catholic
Church now contains: these people are heretics, because, separating themselves from
the Church, they think that there is no hope for other persons who make use of what
they do without” (De haeresibus, c. 40).
CHAPTER CXXVIII—How the Law of God relates a man to his Neighbour
OF all things that man makes use of, the chief are other men. Man is naturally a social animal, needing many things that the individual cannot procure by himself. The divine law therefore must needs instruct man to live according to the order of reason in his relations with other men.
2. The end of the divine law is to bring man to cleave to God. Now man is aided
thereto by his fellow-man, as well in point of knowledge as in point of affection:
for men help one another in the knowledge of the truth, and one incites another
to good and restrains him from evil. Hence it is said: Iron is sharpened by iron,
and man sharpens the face of his friend (
There is then orderly concord amongst men, when to each there is rendered his
own, which is the act of justice; and therefore it is said: The work of justice
is peace (
CHAPTER CXXIX—That the things commanded by the Divine Law are Right, not only because the Law enacts them, but also according to Nature
BY the precepts of the divine law the human mind is subordinated to God, and all the rest of man is subordinated to reason. But this is just what natural order requires, that the inferior be subject to the superior. Therefore the things commanded by the divine law are in themselves naturally right.
2. Divine providence has endowed men with a natural tribunal of reason (naturale
judicatorium rationis), to be the ruling principle of their proper activities.
But natural principles are ordained to natural purposes. There are
3. Where there is a definite nature, there must be definite activities proper
to that nature: for the proper activity of every nature is consequent upon the nature.
Now it is certain that men’s nature is definite.
4. Wherever a thing is natural to any one, any other thing also is natural, without which the first thing cannot be had, for nature fails not in necessities. But it is natural to man to be a social animal. Those things therefore naturally befit man, without which the maintenance of human society would be impossible. Such things are the securing to every man of his own, and abstinence from wrongdoing. Some points therefore of human conduct are naturally right.
5. The use of lower creatures to meet the need of human life is a natural property of man. Now there is a certain measure in which the use of the aforesaid creatures is helpful to human life. If this measure is transgressed, as in the disorderly taking of food, it results in harm to man. There are therefore certain human acts naturally appropriate, and others naturally inappropriate.
6. In the natural order man’s body is for his soul, and the lower powers of the soul for reason. It is therefore naturally right for man so to manage his body and the lower faculties of his soul as that the act and good of reason may least of all be hindered, but rather helped. Mismanagement in this regard must naturally be sinful. We count therefore as things naturally evil carousings and revellings and the disorderly indulgence of the sexual instinct, whereby the act of reason is impeded and subjected to the passions, which do not leave the judgement of the reason free.
7. To every man those things are naturally befitting, whereby he tends to his natural end; and the contraries are naturally unbefitting. But God is the end to which man is ordained by nature (Chap. CXV). Those things therefore are naturally right, whereby man is led to the knowledge and love of God; and the contraries are naturally evil for man.
Hence it is said: The judgements of the Lord are righteous, having their justification
in themselves (
Hereby is excluded the tenet of those who say that things just and right are the creation of positive law.
CHAPTER CXXX—That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government
THE father has care of the child, not only in his relations with other men, as
the king has care of him, but also in his individual concerns, as has been shown
above of God (Chap. XCIII). And this with good reason, for
a parent is like God in giving natural origin to a human being. Hence divine and
paternal government extend to the individual, not merely as a member of society,
but as a person subsisting in his own nature by himself. The two governments differ
however in this, that paternal government can extend only to the things that appear
in man externally, but divine government reaches also to interior acts and dispositions.
For no man can take cognisance of things hidden from him: the secrets of hearts
are hidden from men, though open to God (B. I, Chap. LIX).
God therefore takes account of man not only as to his exterior behaviour, but also
as to his inward affections, what he means to do, and what he intends to gain by
doing it. Of such points man takes no cognisance, except so far as by outward acts
the inward disposition is shown.
Every one has care of things according as they belong to him: for solicitude
about things that are no affair of yours is blamed as meddlesomeness. But one man
belongs to another’s charge otherwise than as he belongs to God. One man belongs
to another either by natural origin and bodily descent, or by some combination in
external works. But man belongs to God inasmuch as he has his origin from Him, which
origin means a certain likeness to God: for every being acts to the production of
its own likeness. Now man has more of the likeness of God in his soul than in his
body, and most of all in his mind.
Hence it is said: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God ask of thee,
except that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in his ways? (
But because the human mind is naturally more imperfect than other intellectual
natures; and the more perfect a thing is, the more energy it shows in tending to
its end; it appears that the human mind is naturally weaker in tending to God, the
end of all, than are the higher minds of the angels. This weakness shows itself
on two points. First, in the deficiency of intellectual power in the human soul,
as compared with higher intelligences, so that it cannot go straight to intellectual
truth as it is in itself (Chapp. XLI, CXIX).
Secondly, in the obstacles that keep it back from throwing itself with all its force
upon God; obstacles on the part of the body, which claims care for sustenance and
repose; and again obstacles on the part of the lower powers of the soul, inasmuch
as the excitements of phantasy and the perturbations of passion trouble that interior
peace, which is so necessary for the mind freely to throw itself upon God. These
obstacles cannot be wholly removed by man from his path, so long as he lives in
this mortal body: for he has to attend to the things necessary for this mortal life,
and is thereby hindered from always actually tending to God. But the aforesaid hindrances
should be so far got under that there should be in man’s mind an intention at least,
directed to God without interruption;
For both these purposes man needs to live at peace and concord with his fellow-men.
For man needs to be aided by man, as well to the preservation of life and limb,
as also to the end that one man may inflame and incite and instruct another to yearn
after God. In the absence of peace and concord, man’s mind must be disquieted by
contentions and fighting, and hindered from aspiring to God. And therefore the divine
law has made provision for the preservation of peace and concord amongst men by
the practice of justice. It commands that to every man be rendered his due, as honour
to parents: that none be harmed or hindered in the enjoyment of the good that belongs
to him, whether by word, — hence the prohibition of false witness, —
But it is not enough for peace and concord to be preserved among men by precepts of justice, unless there be a further consolidation of mutual love. Justice provides for men to the extent that one shall not get in the way of another, but not to the extent of one helping another in his need. One may happen to need another’s aid in cases in which none is bound to him by any debt of justice, or where the person so bound does not render any aid. Thus there came to be need of an additional precept of mutual love amongst men, so that one should aid another even beyond his obligations in justice.
Hence it is said: His commandment we have received, that whoever loveth God
should also love his brother (
It is evident that love suffices for the fulfilment of the works of justice.
Hence it is said: Love is the fulfilment of the law (
But because the aforesaid precepts of justice require their completion in the
love of one’s neighbour, and that depends on the love of God; and when love is gone,
and faith and charity are also gone, the human mind cannot duly tend to God; it
follows that the observance of the precepts of the aforesaid virtues is necessarily
required of man, and by the neglect of them man is entirely thrown out of his subordination
to God. Now human life takes its denomination from the end to which it is directed.
They who constitute their last end in pleasures are said to lead a life of pleasure.
They who constitute their last end in the contemplation of truth are said to lead
a contemplative life: hence whosoever constitute their last end in the enjoyment
of God, their life is an adherence to God, which is absolutely the life of man,
for to that end man is naturally ordained (Chap. XXXVII).
On other ends man’s life is dependent only in a qualified sense, inasmuch as such
ends are not imposed on man by nature, but by his own choice.
As one necessary condition for the flight of the mind to God is peace with neighbours,
with whom man has to live in society and be aided by them, so another necessary
condition is peace and good order of the elements within man himself. We observe
that there are two ways in which the free flight of the mind to God may be hindered.
One way is by the intensification of the acts of the lower powers. When one power
comes vigorously into action, it draws to itself the interest of man, which cannot
be scattered over many objects simultaneously: hence another power must be either stopped from
In another way the movement of the mind to God may be hindered on the part of the mind itself, by its occupation with other things: for one power cannot be in perfect activity over several objects simultaneously.
But since the mind at times uses the inferior powers as obedient instruments,
and can occupy itself with several objects, when they all bear upon one and all
help to apprehend that one, we must understand that the mind is then only hindered
from its flight to God by the lower powers, or by its own occupation with other
objects, when those powers or those objects bear not at all on the mind’s movement
to God: otherwise, far from being hindrances, they may be positive helps to the
free flight of man’s mind to his Creator.
Indeed man cannot altogether avoid occupying his mind about other things, by
the fact that he must be solicitous about the necessaries of his bodily life. There
are however among men various degrees of this solicitude. The first degree of solicitude
extends just so far as the common measure of human life requires. It involves the
providing of necessaries for self, wife, children, and other persons belonging to
oneself according to one’s state. This degree of solicitude is lawful, and may be
said to be connatural to man.
The second degree is reached when a man is more solicitous about the aforesaid
things of the body than the common measure of human life requires according to his
state, without however this solicitude going so far as to withdraw him from his
subordination to God, or making him transgress the commandments of justice and charity.
There is evidently sin in this, since the man exceeds his proper measure; yet not
mortal sin, since he undertakes nothing contrary to the precepts of justice and
charity. His sin is called ‘venial,’ as being readily ‘pardonable,’ — as well because,
for one who keeps his face set towards his last end, any error that he may make
is easily put straight, — thus in speculative sciences any one who has a true conception
of principles may thereby easily correct such errors as he may fall into in drawing
conclusions; and the end in view in the things of action is like the first principle
in things of speculation, — as also because to one steady in friendship any delinquency
is readily forgiven, — as also because it is no easy matter absolutely to observe
due measure and exceed in nothing. Hence whoever does not cast away from his heart
the rule of reason, which is laid down by the end in view, even though he does not
altogether observe rectitude in the things which have to be regulated by that rule,
is not over-much to be blamed, but deserves pardon.
The third degree is when the solicitude for temporals grows so great as
The fourth degree is when contrariwise man’s solicitude for worldly things stops
short of the common measure of human life. If this is owing to remissness and flabbiness
of mind, or to any undue eagerness,
CHAPTER CXXXI—Of the Counsels that are given in the Divine Law
BECAUSE the best part for man is to fix his mind on God and divine things, and it is impossible for man to busy himself with intense ardour in a number of different directions, there are given in the divine law counsels for enabling the human mind to take a more free flight to God. These counsels withdraw men from the occupations of the present life, so far as is possible for men still living on earth. Such withdrawal is not so necessary to justice as that justice cannot be without it: for virtue and justice is not done away with by man’s making use of corporeal and earthly things according to the order of reason: therefore these admonitions of the divine law are called counsels, and not commandments, inasmuch as they advise a man to drop things less good for things that are better.
Human solicitude busies itself about the common measure of human life in three
chief particulars. First, about one’s own person, what one is to do or where to
live; secondly, about persons related to oneself, especially wife and children;
thirdly, about the procurement of exterior things, needful for the support of life.
For cutting off solicitude about exterior things there is given in the divine law
the counsel of poverty, which prompts to the casting away of the things of this
world. Hence the Lord says: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast
and give to the poor, and come, follow me (
Because the highest perfection of human life consists in the mind of man being detached from other things and fixed on God, and the three counsels aforesaid seem singularly to dispose the mind to this detachment, we may see in them proper adjuncts of a state of perfection, not that they themselves constitute perfection, but inasmuch as they are dispositions to perfection, which consists in the union of the detached soul with God. This is expressly shown in the words of our Lord counselling poverty: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow me, — where He places the perfection of life in the following of Him.
They may also be called effects and signs of perfection. For when the mind is
strongly possessed with love and desire of anything, it thereupon counts other things
as quite secondary: so from man’s mind being carried with fervent love and desire
to divine things, wherein its perfection consists, the consequence is a casting
off of all that might retard its movement to God, — care of property, affection
for wife and children, and even love of one’s own self. This is signified by the
words of Scripture: If a man shall give the whole substance of his house in exchange
for love, he will account it nothing (Cant. viii, 7): Having found one precious
pearl, he went and sold all that he had, and acquired it (
Since then the three counsels aforesaid are dispositions to perfection, and effects of perfection, and signs of the same, they who make the three corresponding vows to God are properly said to be in a state of perfection. The perfection to which they dispose the mind consists in the free converse of the soul with God. Hence they who make profession of the aforesaid vows are called ‘religious,’ as dedicating themselves and all that is theirs to God by a manner of sacrifice, extending to property by poverty, to the body by continence, and to the will by obedience: for religion consists in the worship of God (Chap. CXIX).
CHAPTERS CXXXII, CXXXV—Arguments against Voluntary Poverty, with Replies
THERE have been found persons to condemn voluntary poverty, thereby going against
the teaching of the gospel, Of these Vigilantius was the first. He has had imitators,
men making themselves out to be doctors of the law, not understanding either
what they say or about what they affirm (
Arg. 1. Animals that cannot find the necessaries of life at any time of
the year, have a natural instinct for gathering such necessaries at a time when
Reply. Still it is not necessary for every one to be busy with this task of gathering: as even among bees not all have the same duty, some gather honey, others make cells out of wax, — to say nothing of the queen-bees being exempt from all such occupations. And so it must be with men: for many things being necessary to human life, for which one man by himself cannot suffice, different functions have to be undertaken by different men, — some have to labour in the fields, some to tend cattle, and some to build. And because human life needs not only corporal but also spiritual aids, some have to devote themselves to spiritual things for the benefit of the rest; and these persons should be set free from the care of temporals.
Arg. 2. As every one is bound by natural law to preserve his life, so also his exterior substance, as being the means whereby life is preserved.
Reply. For them who relinquish temporal things there still remains every likelihood and hope of finding the sustenance necessary for life, either through their own labour, or the benefactions of others, whether in the shape of possessions held in common or of food daily given: for what we can do through our friends, in a manner we can do of ourselves, as the Philosopher says (Eth. Nic. VIII, xi).
Arg. 3. Man is by nature a social animal. But society cannot be maintained among men except on a system of mutual aid. To take their part in this system of aid they render themselves incapable, who fling away their exterior substance.
Reply. It is a greater thing to aid another in spirituals than in temporals, spiritual things being the more necessary to the end of final happiness. Hence he who by voluntary poverty strips himself of the ability to aid others in temporals, in order to the acquirement of spiritual good, whereby he may aid others to better advantage, does nothing against the good of human society.
Arg. 4. If it is an evil thing to have worldly substance, a good thing to rid neighbours of evil, and an evil thing to lead them into evil, it follows that to give any of the substance of this world to a needy person is evil, and to take away such substance from him who has it is good: which is absurd. It is therefore a good thing to have worldly substance, and to fling it entirely away by voluntary poverty is evil.
Reply. Wealth is a good thing for man, so far as it is directed to rational
good, but not in itself:
Arg. 5. Occasions of evil are to be shunned. But poverty is an occasion of evil, leading men on to thefts, flatteries, perjuries, and the like.
Reply. Neither riches, nor poverty, nor any other exterior condition is
of itself the good of man. Such things are good only as tending to the good of
Arg. 6. Virtue, lying in the mean, is spoilt by either extreme. There is a virtue called liberality, which consists in giving where one should give, and holding one’s hand where one should hold it. On the side of defect is the vice of stinginess, which holds its hand in all cases indiscriminately. On the side of excess is the vice of lavish giving away of everything, as is done by those who embrace voluntary poverty, a vice akin to prodigality.
Reply. The golden mean is not determined according to quantity of exterior
goods, but according to the rule of reason. Hence sometimes it happens that what
is extreme in quantity of some exterior commodity is the mean according to the rule
of reason. There is none who tends to great things more than the magnanimous man,
or who in expenditure surpasses the munificent, or princely man.
CHAPTERS CXXXIII, CXXXVI—Of various Modes of Living adopted by the Votaries of Voluntary Poverty
FIRST MODE. The first mode is for the possessions of all to be sold, and all
to live in common on [the capital fund accumulated by] the price, as was done under
the Apostles at Jerusalem: As many as had possessions in lands or houses sold
them, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles, and division was made to each
according to the need of each (
Criticism. It is not easy to induce many men with great possessions to take up this mode of life; and if the amount realised out of the possessions of a few rich is divided among many recipients, it will not last long.
Reply. This mode will do, but not for a long time. And therefore we do not read of the Apostles instituting this inode of living when they passed to the nations among whom the Church was to take root and endure.
Second Mode. To have possessions in common, sufficient to provide for all members of the community out of what the property brings in, as is done in most monasteries.
Criticism. Earthly possessions breed solicitude, as well for the gathering in of the returns as also for the defence of them against acts of fraud and violence; and this solicitude is all the greater as greater possessions are required for the support of many. In this way then the end of voluntary poverty is defeated, at least in the case of many, who have the procuratorship of these possessions. Besides, common possession is wont to be a source of discord.
Reply. The administration of these common possessions may be left to
Third mode. To live by the labour of one’s hands, as St Paul did and advised
others to do. We have not eaten bread of any one for nothing, but in labour and
fatigue, night and day working, not to be a burden to any of you: not that we had
not authority to act otherwise, but to present ourselves to you as a model for you
to imitate: for when we were with you, we laid down to you the rule, if any man
not work, neither let him eat (
Criticism. It seems folly for one to abandon what is necessary, and afterwards
try to get it back again by labour. Moreover, whereas the end of the counsel of
voluntary poverty is the readier following of Christ in freedom from worldly solicitudes,
earning one’s livelihood by one’s own labour is a matter of more anxiety than living
on the possessions which one had before, especially if they were a modest competency.
And the Lord seems to forbid manual labour to His disciples in the text: Behold
the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap: consider the lilies
of the field how they grow, they labour not, neither do they spin (
Reply. In the case of rich men, their possessions involve solicitude in
getting them or keeping them; and the heart of the owner is drawn to them; inconveniences
which do not happen to one whose sole object is to gain his daily bread by the labour
of his hands. Little time is sufficient, and little solicitude is necessary, for
gaining by the labour of one’s hands enough to support nature: but for gathering
riches and superfluities, as craftsmen in the world propose, much time has to be
spent and much solicitude shown. Our Lord in the Gospel has not forbidden labour
of the hands, but anxiety of mind about the necessaries of life. He did not say,
Do not labour, but, Be not solicitous. And this precept He enforces
by an argument from less to greater. For if divine providence sustains birds and
lilies, which are of inferior condition, and cannot labour at those works whereby
men get their livelihood, much more will it provide for men, who are of worthier
condition, and to whom it has given ability to win their livelihood by their own
labours. It is the exception for a man not to be able to win enough to live upon
by the labour of his hands; and an institution is not to be rejected for exceptional
cases. The remedy is, for him whose labour is not enough to keep him, to be helped
out either by others of the same society, who can make more by their labour than
is necessary for them, or by others who are well off. Nor need those who are content
with little spend much time in seeking a livelihood by the labour of their hands:
so they are not much hindered from spiritual works, especially
Fourth mode. To live on the alms contributed by others, who retain their wealth.
This seems to have been the method observed by our Lord: for it is said that sundry
women followed Christ, and ministered to him out of their means (
Criticism. It seems irrational for one to abandon his own and live on
an other’s property, — or for one to receive of another and pay him back nothing
in return. There is no impropriety in ministers of the altar and preachers, to whom
the people are indebted for doctrine and other divine gifts, receiving support at
their hands: for the labourer is worthy of his hire, as the Lord says (
Reply. There is no impropriety in him being supported by the alms of others,
who has abandoned his own possessions for the sake of something that turns to the
profit of others. Were this not so, human society could not go on. If every one
busied himself only about his own affairs, there would be no one to minister to
the general advantage. The best thing then for human society (hominum societati)
is that they who neglect the care of their own interests to serve the general advantage,
should be supported by those whose advantage they serve. Therefore do soldiers live
on pay provided by others, and civil rulers are provided for out of the common fund.
But they who embrace voluntary poverty to follow Christ, certainly abandon what
they have to serve the common advantage, enlightening the people by wisdom, learning
and example, or sustaining them by their prayer and intercession. Hence there is
nothing base in their living on what they get from others, seeing that they make
a greater return, receiving temporals and helping others in spirituals. Hence the
Apostle says: Let your abundance in temporals supply their want, that their abundance
in spirituals also may supply your want (
There is, no doubt, a certain humiliation in begging, as having a thing done to you is less honourable than doing it, and receiving than giving, and obeying royal power than governing and reigning. The spontaneous embracing of humiliations is a practice of humility, not in any and every case, but when it is done for a needful purpose: for humility, being a virtue, does nothing indiscreetly. It is then not humility but folly to embrace any and every humiliation: but where virtue calls for a thing to be done, it belongs to humility not to shrink from doing it for the humiliation that goes with it, for instance, not to refuse some mean service where charity calls upon you so to help your neighbour. Thus then where begging is requisite for the perfection of a life of poverty, it is a point of humility to bear this humiliation. Sometimes too, even where our own duty does not require us to embrace humiliations, it is an act of virtue to take them up in order to encourage others by our example more easily to bear what is incumbent on them: for a general sometimes will do the office of a common soldier to encourage the rest. Sometimes again we may make a virtuous use of humiliations as a medicine. Thus if any one’s mind is prone to undue self-exaltation, he may with advantage make a moderate use of humiliations, either self-imposed or imposed by others, so to check the elation of his spirit by putting himself on a level with the lowest class of the community in the doing of mean offices.
Fifth mode. There have also been some who said that the votaries of a perfect
life should take no thought either for begging or labouring or laying up anything
for themselves, but should exped their sustenance from God alone, according to the
texts, Be not solicitous, and, Take no thought for the morrow (
Criticism. This seems quite an irrational proceeding. For it is foolish
to wish an end and omit the means ordained to that end. Now to the end of eating
there is ordained some human care of providing oneself with food. They then who
cannot live without eating ought to have some solicitude about seeking their food.
There follows also a strange absurdity: for by parity of reasoning one might say
that he will not walk, or open his mouth to eat, or avoid a stone falling, or a
sword striking him, but expect God to do all, which is tantamount to tempting God.
Reply. It is quite an irrational error to suppose that all solicitude about making a livelihood is forbidden by the Lord. Every action requires care: if then a man ought to have no solicitude about temporal things, it follows that he should do nothing temporal, which is neither a possible nor a reasonable course. For God has prescribed to every being actions according to the peculiarity of its nature. Man, being made up of a nature at once spiritual and corporeal, must by divine ordinance exercise bodily actions; and at the same time have spiritual aims; and he is the more perfect, the more spiritual his aims are. But it is not a mode of perfection proper to man to omit bodily action: bodily actions serve necessary purposes in the preservation of life; and whoever omits them neglects his life, which he is bound to preserve. To look for aid from God in matters in which one can help oneself by one’s own action, and so to leave that action out, is a piece of folly and a tempting of God: for it is proper to the divine goodness to provide for things, not immediately by doing everything itself, but by moving other things to their own proper action (Chap. LXXVII). We must not then omit the means of helping ourselves, and expect God to help us in defect of all action of our own: that is inconsistent with the divine ordinance and with His goodness.
But because, though it rests with us to act, still that our actions shall attain their due end does not rest with us, owing to obstacles that may arise, the success that each one shall have in his action comes under divine arrangement. The Lord then lays it down that we ought not to be solicitous for what does not belong to us, that is, for the success of our actions: but He has not forbidden us to be solicitous about what does belong to us, that is, for the work which we ourselves do. It is not then to act against the precept of the Lord, to feel solicitude for the things which have to be done; but he goes against the precept, who is solicitous for what may turn out even when (etiam si) he does all that is in his power to do, and takes due precautions beforehand (praemittat) to meet the contingency of such untoward events.
When that is done, we ought to hope in God’s providence, by whom even the birds
and herbs are sustained.
CHAPTER CXXXIV—In what the Good of Poverty consists
LET us observe in riches what is to be thought of poverty. Exterior riches are
necessary to the good of virtue inasmuch as by them we support the body and succour
other people. Means to an end must derive their goodness from the end. Exterior
riches therefore must be some sort of a good to man, still not a principal but a
secondary good: for the principal good is the end, — other things are good as subordinate
to the end. Therefore it has been held that the virtues are the greatest of good
things to man, and exterior riches the least. Now the means to any end must be checked
by the requirements of that end.
But there are virtues of the active life and virtues of the contemplative life;
and these two orders of virtues make use of riches in different ways. The contemplative
virtues need riches solely for the sustenance of nature:
Poverty then is praiseworthy, inasmuch as it delivers a man from the vices in
which some men are entangled by riches. Again, inasmuch as it removes the solicitude
that goes with wealth, it is useful to some persons, namely, to those who have the
gift of occupying themselves with better things; but hurtful to others, who, set
free from this solicitude, busy themselves about worse things.
CHAPTER CXXXVII—Arguments against Perpetual Continence, with Replies
ARG. 1. The good of the species is more godlike than the good of the individual. He then who abstains altogether from the act whereby the species is perpetuated, sins more than he would by abstaining from the act whereby the individual is preserved, namely, eating and drinking.
Reply. Things that belong to the necessity of the individual stand on a different footing from things that belong to the necessity of the community. In the necessities of the individual, individual provision must be made: everyone must make use of meat and drink. But in the necessities of the community it is neither needful nor possible for the office of meeting such needs to be assigned to every individual. Many things are necessary to a multitude of men, which no one individual can attend to: therefore there must be different offices for different persons, as in the body the several members have their several functions. Since then procreation is not a necessity of the individual, but a necessity of the species, there is no need for all men to be procreants; but some men may abstain, and devote themselves to other offices, as to the life of a soldier or a contemplative.
Arg. 2. By divine ordinance there are given to man members apt for procreation, and a force of appetite inciting him thereto: whoever then altogether abstains from procreation seems to resist the ordinance of God.
Reply. Divine providence gives to man endowments necessary for the species
as a whole: still there is no call upon every individual man to make use of every
one of these endowments. Thus man has a building capacity and a fighting capacity:
yet all men need not be builders or soldiers; neither need every one apply himself
to procreation.
Arg. 3. If it is good for one man to lead a life of continence, it is
better for many so to do, and the best thing of all would be for all to do it: so
the human race would become extinct.
Reply. From things necessary to the community, though it be better for individuals to abstain, when one is given to better things, still it is not good for all to abstain. This is apparent in the order of the universe. Though a pure spirit is better than a bodily substance, still that would not be a better but a more imperfect universe, in which there were pure spirits alone. Though the eye is better than the foot, it would not be a perfect animal that had not both eye and foot. So neither would the state of the commonwealth of man kind be perfect, unless there were some applied to acts of procreation, and others abstaining from such acts and given to contemplation.
Arg. 4. Chastity, like other virtues, lies in the mean. Therefore he acts
against virtue, who altogether abstains from the gratification of his appetites.
Reply. This objection has been already solved in treating of poverty (Chapp.
CXXXII, CXXXV, Arg. 6). Irrational abstinence from all [lawful]
sexual pleasures is called the vice of insensibility: but a rational abstinence
[from all even lawful forms of such gratification] is a virtue exceeding the common
measure of man, for it puts man in some sort of participation of the likeness of
God. Hence virginity is said to be allied to angels. Celibacy can be justified
on mere natural and rational grounds in this sense,
that no cogent reasons are apparent making it a man’s duty under ordinary circumstances
to marry. But celibacy does not amount to a virtue except when it is embraced on
supernatural grounds, that is to say, on grounds of faith and love of God in Christ. The chapter next translated is the justification of the vow of obedience.
But though we say in general that it is better for one individual to observe
continence than to use marriage, it may very well be that for some other individual
the second course is the better. Hence the Lord says: Not all men take this word:
whoever can take, let him take (
CHAPTER CXXXIX—Against those who find fault with Vows
SOME have taken it for a folly to bind oneself by vow to obey another, or to observe any practice: for there is more of virtue in a good act as there is more of freedom: hence the praiseworthiness of virtuous acts seems to be diminished by their being done under necessity of obedience or vow.
But these cavillers seem to be ignorant of the nature of necessity. For there
is a twofold necessity: a necessity of constraint, and this diminishes the praiseworthiness
of virtuous acts, as telling against their voluntariness: for that is done under
constraint, which is contrary to the will. There is again a necessity springing
out of interior inclination; and this, far from diminishing, increases the credit
of a virtuous act: for it makes the will tend to the act of virtue all the more
earnestly. For evidently, the more perfect the habit of virtue is, with all the
more force does it urge the will to the act of virtue and leaves it less chance
of swerving. Nay, if it attains to the highest pitch of perfection, it induces a
sort of necessity of well-doing, as will appear in the case of the Blessed, who
cannot sin (B. IV, Chap. XCII); nor yet is there anything
thereby lost either to the freedom of the wilt or to the goodness of the act. There
is another necessity derived from the bearing of the means on
From yet another point of view the fulfilment of a vow, or of a superior’s commands,
for God’s sake, is worthy of greater praise or reward. For as one act may be an
act of two vices, in that the act of one vice is directed to the end of another
vice, e.g., when one steals to commit fornication, in which case the act is specifically
one of avarice, but intentionally one of lust, Celibacy can be justified on mere natural and rational grounds in this sense,
that no cogent reasons are apparent making it a man’s duty under ordinary circumstances
to marry. But celibacy does not amount to a virtue except when it is embraced on
supernatural grounds, that is to say, on grounds of faith and love of God in Christ. The chapter next translated is the justification of the vow of obedience.
If any one does anything for God, he offers the act to God, such as it is: but if he does it under a vow, he offers to God not only the act but also the power: thus he clearly has the intention of rendering to God some greater service. Therefore his act will be the more virtuous by reason of the greater good intended, even though another shows himself more fervent in the execution.
Moreover, the will that goes before a deed, virtually endures throughout the
whole course of the doing of it; and renders it praiseworthy, even when the agent
in the execution of his work is not thinking of the purpose for which he began:
for it is not necessary for him who has undertaken a journey for God’s sake, to
be actually thinking of God at every step of the journey. But clearly he who has
vowed to do a thing has willed it more intensely than another who simply has a purpose
of doing it; because he has not only willed
CHAPTER CXL—That neither all Good Works nor all Sins are Equal
COUNSELS are not given except of the better good. But in the divine law there are given counsels of poverty and continency: these then are better than the use of matrimony and the possession of temporal estate, which things however are quite consistent with virtuous action.
2. Acts are specified by their objects. The better therefore the object, the more virtuous will be the act according to its species. But the end is better than the means thereto; and in the category of means the better is that which comes nearer to the end. Therefore among human acts that is the best, which tends straight to God, the last end; and after that, an act is better in its species according as its object is nearer to God.
3. Good is in human acts according as they are regulated by reason. But some
acts come nearer to reason than others: acts which are acts of reason itself have
more of the good of reason in them than the acts of the lower powers commanded by
reason.
4. The commandments of the law are best fulfilled by love (Chap. CXXVIII). But one man may do his duty out of greater love than another.
6. The better act is the act of the better virtue. But one virtue is better than another: thus munificence is better than liberality, and high-souled conduct in a high position (magnanimitas) than decency in a lowly state (moderantia, i.e., μετριότης).
Hence it is said: He who joineth his virgin in marriage doth well: but he
who joineth her not doth better (
By the same reasons it appears that not all sins are equal: for one sin goes
wider of the last end than another sin, is a greater perversion of the order of
reason, and does greater harm to one’s neighbour. Hence it is said: Thou hast
done more wicked things than they in all thy ways (
But there may seem to be some reason in the position that all virtuous
Or again it may be argued that all sins are equal, because sin in human acts
comes solely of overpassing the rule of reason: but he overpasses the rule of reason
who swerves from it in a small matter, equally with him who swerves from it in a
great one; just as, if a line be drawn, not to be overstepped, it comes to the same
thing in court whether the trespasser has overstepped it little or much; or as a
boxer is cast, once he has gone outside the limits of the ring, little or much:
so then, once a man has overstepped the bounds of reason, the amount of his transgression
makes no difference. On careful consideration, however, it appears that in all cases
where perfection and goodness consists in a certain conformity to measure, the evil
will be the greater, the greater the departure from that due conformity. Thus health
consists in a due blending of humours, and beauty in a due proportion of features
and limbs, and truth in a conformity of thought or speech to fact. The greater the
unevenness of humours, the greater the sickness: the greater the incongruity of
features or limbs, the greater the ugliness; and the greater the departure from
truth, the greater the falsehood: thus the reckoning is not so false that brings
in 5 for 3 as that which brings in 100 for 3. But the good of virtue consists in
a certain conformity to measure: for virtue is a mean, according to due limitation
under the circumstances, between contrary vices. Wickedness then is greater, the
further it is out of this harmony. Nor is transgressing the limits of virtue like
transgressing bounds fixed by a court. For virtue being of itself good, the transgression
of it is of itself evil; and therefore the greater the departure from virtue, the
greater the evil. But the transgression of a limit fixed by a court is not of itself
evil, but only accidentally so, inasmuch as it is forbidden. But in these accidental
connexions, though the being of one thing at all follows upon another’s being at
all, it does not follow that the being of the one thing in a higher degree follows
upon the other’s coming to be in a higher degree. Thus if a white body is musical,
it does not follow that the whiter the body, the more musical: but it does follow
that if whiteness is distinctive of vision, a stronger whiteness wilt be more distinctive.
A noteworthy difference between sins is that between mortal and venial sin. A
mortal sin is one that deprives the soul of spiritual life. The essence of spiritual
life consists in two things, according to the likeness of natural life. Just as
the body lives naturally by its union with the soul, which is the principle of life;
and again, quickened by the soul, the body moves of itself, while a dead body either
remains immovable, or is moved only by an exterior
The theology
of the Catholic Church on this point stands as follows in the light
of controversies and decisions subsequent to the age of St Thomas. (a) A man in mortal sin may do acts of natural virtue, such as
even the heathen do ( (b) He may also do supernaturally good acts by aid of ‘an exterior
principle,’ i.e., the actual grace sent him by God. This St Thomas presently declares
(Chap. CLVII). (c) These supernatural acts, done by a soul in deadly sin, need
not proceed from fear alone: they may be motived by hope, by some sense of shame
or gratitude, or even by some initial love of God (Council of Trent, Sess. 6, Cap. vi). (d) An act of perfect love of God is excluded by the supposition
of the soul being still in mortal sin: for when a man in mortal sin is led on by
grace to make such an act, which is possible enough, his sin is instantly taken away. Nor is St Thomas in disagreement with these propositions. See Sum. Theol.
1a-2ae, q. 71, art. 4; 2a-2ae, q. 23, art. 7 ad 1 (Aquinas Ethicus, I, 199, 355). On the other hand, the Church has condemned the following (a) Of Michael Le Bay: “Everything that the sinner, or the state
of sin, does is a sin. He is of the party of Pelagius, who recognises any natural
goodness, that is, any goodness arising from the mere power of nature.” (b) Of Paschal Quesnel, the Jansenist: “What remains to the soul
that has lost God and His grace, but sin and the consequences of sin, a proud poverty
and a lazy indigence, that is, a general incapacity for labour, prayer, or any good
work?” (Denziger, Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum, nn. 680, 915, 917,
1216.)
CHAPTER CXLI—That a Man’s Acts are punished or rewarded by God
TO him it belongs to punish or reward, to whom it belongs to lay down the law. But it belongs to divine providence to lay down the law for men (Chap. CXIV): therefore also to punish or reward.
2. Whenever there is due order to an end, that order must lead to the end, and departure from that order must shut out the end: for things that are according to an end derive their necessity from the end, in such way that they must be, if the end is to follow, and while they are without impediment, the end ensues. But God has imposed upon men’s acts an order in respect of their final good. If then that order is duly laid down, it must be that they who walk according to it shall gain their final good, that is, be rewarded, and they who depart from that order by sin shall be shut out from their final good, that is, punished.
3. As physical things are subject to the order of divine providence, so also
human acts. In regard to both the one and the other the due order may be observed,
or it may be transgressed. But there is this difference, that the observation or
transgression of the due order lies in the power of the human will, but not in the
power of physical things. As then in physical things, when due order is observed
in them, there follows of natural necessity their preservation and good, but their
destruction and evil when the due and natural order is departed from; so in human
things it needs must be that when a man voluntarily observes the order of law by
Heaven imposed upon him,
4. It is part of the perfection of God’s goodness to have no part of nature in disorder. Hence we see in the physical world that every evil is part of an orderly arrangement to some good, as the killing of the sheep is the feeding of the wolf. Since then human acts are subject to the order of divine providence as well as physical events, the evil that happens in human acts must lead up in an orderly way to good. But this is most aptly brought about by the punishment of sins: for thus excesses beyond the due amount are embraced under the order of justice, which restores equality. Man exceeds the due degree and proper amount by preference of his own will to that of God, satisfying himself against the ordinance of God: this inequality is removed by his being compelled to suffer something against his will according to the same ordinance.
6. Divine providence has arranged things so that one shall profit another. But it is most fitting for man to be advanced to his final good as well by the good as by the evil of his fellow-man, being excited to do well by seeing well-doers rewarded, and withheld from evil-doing by seeing evil-doers punished.
Hence it is said: I am the Lord thy God . . . . visiting the iniquities of
the fathers upon the children . . . . and doing mercy a thousandfold upon them that
love me and keep my commandments (
CHAPTER CXLII—Of the Difference and Order of Punishments
EVIL is the privation of good: hence the order and difference of punishments
must be according to the difference and order of good things. The chief good and
final end of man is happiness: the higher good for him then is that which comes
nearer to this end. Coming nearest to it of all is virtue, and whatever else advances
man to good acts leading to happiness: next is a due disposition of reason and of
the powers subject to it: after that, soundness of bodily health, which is necessary
to unfettered action: lastly, exterior goods, as accessory aids to virtue.
But because it belongs to the idea of pain not only that it should be a privation
of good, but also that it should be contrary to the will, and not every man’s will
esteems goods as they really are, but sometimes the privation of the greater good
is less contrary to the will, and therefore seems less of a punishment, it so comes
about that the majority of men, esteeming sensible and corporeal things more and
knowing them better than the good things of the intellect and the spirit, dread
corporeal penalties more than spiritual ones: thus in their estimation the order
of punishments is the very reverse of that aforesaid. With them, injuries to the
body and losses of exterior things make the greatest punishment: but as for disorder
of the soul and loss of virtue and forfeiture of the enjoyment of God, in which
the final happiness of man consists, all this they count little or nothing. Hence
it is that they do not consider the sins of men to be punished by God, because they
see usually sinners enjoying good health and the blessings of exterior fortune,
of which sometimes virtuous men are deprived. This ought not to appear surprising
to persons who look straight at the facts. For since all exterior things are referable
to things interior, and the body to the soul, exterior and corporeal good things
are really good for man in so far as they turn to the good of reason within him;
and turn to his evil so far as they hinder that good of reason. Now God, the disposer
of all things, knows the measure of human virtue: hence He sometimes supplies a
virtuous man with corporeal and exterior good things to aid his virtue, and does
him a favour in so doing: sometimes again He withdraws the aforesaid things, considering
them to be an obstacle to man’s virtue and enjoyment of God. Where they are such
an obstacle, exterior good things turn to a man’s prejudice, and the loss of them
to his gain. If then punishment in every case means the infliction of some evil,
and it is not an evil for a man to be deprived of exterior and corporeal good things
so far as is conducive to his advancement in virtue, such deprivation will not be
a punishment to a virtuous man: on the other hand a real punishment to the wicked
will be the concession to them of exterior goods, whereby they are incited to evil.
Hence it is said: The creatures of God are turned to hate, and to a temptation
to the souls of men, and a trap for the feet of the unwise (
CHAPTER CXLIII—That not all Punishments nor all Rewards are Equal
AS there are degrees in virtuous actions and in sins (Chap. CXL), so there must be degrees of rewards and punishments: for so the equality of distributive justice requires, that unequal returns be made for unequal services.
Hence it is said: According to the measure of the sin shall also be the measure
of the stripes (
CHAPTER CXLIV—Of the Punishment due to Mortal and Venial Sins respectively in regard to the Last End
MAN may sin in either of two ways, either so that the intention of his mind be
quite turned away from subordination to God, the final good, and that is a mortal
sin: or otherwise so that, while the mind’s intention remains fixed on the final
end, some obstacle is put in the way to retard its free movement to the end, and
that is a venial sin. A fine
se divertit but not avertit. Let O be the origin of co-ordinates, representing man’s start in life. Let
f be the last end. Let p be the position of a soul in venial sin;
q the position of a soul in mortal sin. It will be seen that the soul at
p has travelled praeter finem, not contra finem:it will have to
he reduced to order by penance and pain, represented by the value of the ordinate
p p’ along the axis of Y. On the other hand, q represents a soul that
has wandered away in a negative direction, quite contra finem: if it leaves
the body at that point, that soul is lost. By penance it has to be brought back
to the origin at O, and so on to the positive side. Thus represented at the last
day, by points moving to the left and to the right along the axis of X, as well
as upwards along Y, the histories of human lives must make figures of wonderful
complexity.
3. When any one attains a good thing that he was not intending, that is by luck and chance. If then he whose intention is turned away from the last end were to gain that last end, it would be by luck and chance, — which is an absurd thing to suppose, seeing that the last end is a good of intelligence, and luck and chance are inconsistent with intelligent action, because chance events come about without the direction of intelligence: it is absurd then to suppose intelligence gaining its end by an unintelligent method. He then will not gain his end, who by sinning mortally has his intention turned away from his last end.
5. In an orderly course of means leading up to an end such a relation obtains that, if the end is or is to be, the means thereto must be: if the means to the end are not forthcoming, neither will the end be forthcoming: for if the end could be secured without the means to the end being taken, it would be labour lost to seek the end by the taking of such means. But it is by arts of virtue, the chief element in which is an intention of the due end, that man attains to his last end and happiness (Chap. CXLI). Whoever then acts against virtue, and turns his back on his last end, it is proper for him to suffer deprivation of that end.
Hence it is said: Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity (
CHAPTER CXLV—That the Punishment whereby one is deprived of his Last End is Interminable
THERE is no privation except of that which naturally belongs to the subject:
a puppy at birth cannot be said to lie under any privation of sight. But man is
not apt to attain his last end in this life (Chap. XLVIII).
Therefore any privation of such end must come as a punishment after this life. But
after this life there remains to man no ability of gaining his last end, since it
is through the body that he gains perfection alike in knowledge and in virtue.
3. Natural equity seems to require every one to be deprived of the good against which he takes action, as thereby he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence by process of civil justice whoever offends against the commonwealth is deprived of the society of the commonwealth altogether, either by death or by perpetual banishment. Nor is the time taken by his offence considered, but the power against which he has offended. He then who sins against his last end and against charity, which is the foundation of the society of the Blessed and of wayfarers on the road to Blessedness, ought to be punished eternally, though his sin took only a short space of time.
4. In the divine judgement the will is taken for the deed: because as men see what is done outwardly, so does God view the hearts of men. But whoever for the sake of some temporal good has turned himself away from the final end, which is possessed for ever, has preferred the temporal enjoyment of that good to the eternal enjoyment of the last end: much more then, it clearly appears, would he have willed the enjoyment of that temporal good for all eternity. Therefore according to the divine judgement he ought to be punished as though he had gone on sinning for eternity. And beyond question, for eternal sin eternal punishment is due.
Hence it is said: These shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just
into life everlasting (
Hereby is excluded the error of them who say that the punishment of the wicked
will at some time come to an end. This position seems to have had its foundation
in the position of certain philosophers
In reply it must be allowed that punishments are inflicted by God, not for their
own sake, as though God took delight in them, but for the sake of something else,
namely, in view of the order which He wishes to impose on creatures, in which order
the good of the universe consists (B. II, Chap. XLV). The
order of the universe requires all things to be dispensed by God in due proportion,
in weight, number, and measure (
But even though one were to allow that all punishments are applied to the amendment
of vices, and to no other purpose, not on that account are we obliged to suppose
that all punishments are purgatorial and terminable. For even by human laws some
men are punished by death, not for their amendment, but for the amendment of others:
hence it is said: For the scourging of the pestilent man, the fool shall be wiser
(
CHAPTER CXLVI—That Sins are punished also by the experience of something Painful
PUNISHMENT ought to be proportionate to the fault. But in a fault not only is there an aversion of the mind from the last end, but also an undue conversion of it to other objects as ends. Not only then should the sinner be punished by exclusion from the end, but also by other things turning to his pain.
2. No one is afraid to lose what he does not desire to gain. They then who have their will turned away from their last end, have no fear of being shut out from it. Consequently that mere exclusion would not be enough to call them off from sinning. Some other punishment then must be employed, which sinners may fear.
3. One who puts to undue use the means to a certain end, not only is deprived of the end, but incurs some other hurt besides. Thus inordinate taking of food not only does not bring health, but further induces sickness. But whoever sets up his rest in creatures does not use them as he ought: he does not refer them to their last end. Not only then ought he to be punished by going without happiness, but also by experiencing some pain from creatures.
Hence divine Scripture not only threatens sinners with exclusion from glory,
but also with affliction in other ways. Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting
fire (
CHAPTER CXLVII—That it is Lawful for judges to inflict Punishments
MEN who on earth are set over others are ministers of divine providence. But it is the order of providence that the wicked be punished.
4. Good stands in no need of evil, but the other way about (Chap. XI). Whatever
then is of necessity for the preservation of good, cannot be of itself evil.
5. The common good is better than the good of the individual. There fore some
particular good must be withdrawn for the preservation of the common good. But the
life of certain pestilent fellows is a hindrance to the common good, that is, to
the concord of human society. Such persons therefore are to be withdrawn by death
from the society of men. Writing later, St Thomas saw the need of qualifying this argument, which, taken
absolutely, would make short shrift of lunatics and troublesome invalids generally,
and would consecrate the principle of lynch-law. He puts in therefore these two
qualifications (1) “Man by sinning withdraws from the order of reason, and thereby falls from
human dignity, so far as that consists in man being naturally free and existent
for his own sake; and falls in a manner into the state of servitude proper to beasts. . . .
And therefore, though to kill a man, while he abides in his native dignity,
be a thing of itself evil, yet to kill a man who is a sinner may be good, as to
kill a beast.” (2) “A beast is naturally distinguishable from a man: hence on this point there
is no need of judgement. . . . But a sinner is not naturally distinguishable from
just men; and therefore he needs a public judgement to make him out, and determine
whether he ought to be slain for the benefit of the common weal.” The student should read the whole of Sum. Theol. 2a-2ae, q. 64, art. 2 and 3
(Aquinas Ethicus, II, pp. 40-42), whence these extracts are taken.
Hence the Apostle says: He beareth not the sword in vain (
Hereby is excluded the error of those who say that corporal punishments are unlawful,
and quote in support of their error such texts as, Thou shalt not kill (
The fate of the wicked being open to conversion so long as they live does not preclude their being open also to the just punishment of death. Indeed the danger threatening the community from their life is greater and more certain than the good expected by their conversion. Besides, in the hour of death, they have every facility for turning to God by repentance. And if they are so obstinate that even in the hour of death their heart will not go back upon its wickedness, a fairly probable reckoning may be made that they never would have returned to a better mind.
CHAPTER CXLVIII—That Man stands in need of Divine Grace for the Gaining of Happiness
IT has already been shown (Chapp. CXI–CXIII)
that divine providence disposes of rational creatures otherwise than of other things,
inasmuch as their nature stands on a different footing from that of others. It remains
to be shown that also in view of the dignity of their end divine providence employs
a higher method of government in their regard. Their nature clearly fits them for
a higher end. As being intelligent, they can attain to intelligible truth, which
other creatures cannot. So far as they attain this truth by their own natural activity,
God provides for them otherwise than for other creatures, giving them understanding
and reason, and further the gift of speech, whereby they can aid one another in
the knowledge of truth. But beyond this, the last end of man is fixed in a certain
knowledge of truth which exceeds his natural faculties, so that it is given to him
to see the First Truth in itself.
2. A thing of inferior nature cannot be brought to that which is proper to a
superior nature except by the virtue and action of the said superior nature. Thus
the moon, which has no light of its own, is made luminous by the virtue and action
of the sun.
5. There are many impediments in the way of man’s arriving at his end. He is impeded by the weakness of his reason, which is easily dragged into error, and so erring he is thrown off the right way of arriving at his end. He is impeded by the passions of the sensitive portion of his nature, and by the tastes which drag him to sensible and inferior things. The more he clings to such things, the further he is separated from his last end: for these things are below man, whereas his end is high above him. He is impeded also very frequently by infirmity of body from the performance of the acts of virtue which carry him on to his end. Man therefore needs the divine assistance, lest with such impediments in his way, he fail altogether in the gaining of his last end.
Hence it is said: No man can come to me, unless the Father, who hath sent
me, draw him (
Hereby is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who said that man could merit the glory of God by sheer free will of his own.
CHAPTER CXLIV—That the Divine Assistance does not compel a Man to Virtue
DIVINE providence provides for all things according to their mode of existence (Chap. LXXIII, n. 2). But it is proper to man and to every rational creature to act voluntarily and to be master of his own acts; and compulsion is contrary to voluntariness.
3. It is by will that man is directed to a final end: for the good and the final
end is the object of will. And the divine assistance is vouchsafed us for this special
purpose, that we may attain to our final end. That aid therefore does not exclude
the act of our will: on the contrary, it is precisely the act of our will that the
divine assistance produces in us: hence the Apostle says: It is God who worketh
in us both to will and to act according to the good will
4. Man arrives at his last end by acts of virtue. But acts done under compulsion are not acts of virtue, for in virtue the chief thing is choice.
Hence it is said: Consider that to-day the Lord hath put forth in thy sight
life and good, and on the other hand death and evil, that thou mayest love the Lord
thy God and walk in his ways. But f thy heart is turned away, and thou wilt not
hear, etc. (
CHAPTER CL—That Man cannot Merit beforehand the said Assistance
EVERYTHING stands as matter
Hence it is said: Not by the works of justice that we have done, but according
to his own mercy he hath saved us (
Hereby is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who said that the divine assistance is given us in consideration of our deservings; and that, while the beginning of our justification is of ourselves, the consummation of it is of God.
CHAPTER CLI—That the aforesaid Assistance is called ‘Grace,’ and what
is the meaning of ‘Grace constituting a State of Grace’
BECAUSE what is given to another without any previous deserts of his is said
to be given gratis, and because the divine aid given to man anticipates all human
deserving, it follows that this aid is given to man gratis, and therefore is aptly
called by the name of ‘grace.’ Hence the Apostle says: If by grace, it is not
now of works, otherwise grace is no more grace (
There is also another reason why the aforesaid assistance of God has received
the name of ‘grace.’ One person is said to be ‘in the good graces’ of another, because
he is well loved by him. Now it is of the essence of love that he who loves should
wish good and do good to him whom he loves. God indeed wishes and does good to all
His creatures, for the very being of the creature and its every perfection is of
God willing and working it (B. I, Chapp. XXIX,
XXX: B. II, Chap. XV): hence it is said:
Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things that thou hast
made (
This grace, in the man in the state of grace, must be a form and perfection of him who has it.
1. That whereby a man is directed to an end must be in continual relation with
him: for the mover works change continually until the body moved attains the term
of its motion.
2. The love of God is causative of the good that is in us, as the love of man is called forth and caused by some good that is in the object of his love. But man is excited to special love by some special good pre-existent in the object. Therefore where there is posited a special love of God for man, there must consequently be posited some special good conferred by God on man. Since then the grace that constitutes the State of grace denotes a special love of God for man, there must be likewise denoted some special goodness and perfection thereby existing in man.
3. Everything is ordained to an end suited to it according to the character of its form: for of different species there are different ends. But the end to which man is directed by the assistance of divine grace is something above human nature. Therefore there must be superadded to man some supernatural form and perfection, whereby he may be aptly ordained to the aforesaid end.
4. Man ought to arrive at his last end by dint of activities of his own. Now everything is active in virtue of some form of its own. In order then that man may be brought to his last end by activities of his own, there must be superadded to him some form, to validate his activities for the gaining of his last end.
5. Divine providence provides for all according to the mode of their nature.
But it is a mode proper to man to require for the perfection of his actions, over
and above his natural powers, certain perfections in the shape of habits, whereby
he may do good, and do it well, connaturally, readily, and pleasantly.
Hence in Scripture the grace of God is spoken of as light: Ye were once darkness,
but now light in the Lord (
Hereby is set aside the opinion of some who say that the grace of God is no positive
quality in man (nihil in homine ponit), as no positive quality is ascribed
to the courtier who is said to be in the good graces of the King, but rather to
the King who has an affection for him. We see how this mistake arose, from failing
to observe the difference between divine love and human love: for divine love is
causative of the good that it loves in another, but not so human love.
CHAPTER CLII—That the Grace which constitutes the State of Grace causes in us the Love of God
THE grace which constitutes the state of grace is an effect of God’s love. But the proper effect of God’s love in man is to make man love God: for the chief effort of the lover is laid out in drawing the beloved to the love of him; and unless that succeeds, the love must be broken off.
2. There must be some union between those who have one end in view, as citizens
in one State, and soldiers ranked together on the battlefield. But the final end
to which man is led by the assistance of divine grace is the vision of God as He
essentially is, which is proper to God Himself; and so God shares this final good
with man. Man then cannot be led on to this end unless he is united with God by
conformity of will, the proper effect
3. The grace that constitutes the state of grace must principally perfect the heart. But the principal perfection of the heart is love. The proof of that is, that every motion of the heart starts from love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, except for some good that he loves; nor loathes, nor fears, nor is sad, or angry, except about something contrary to the good that he loves.
4. The form whereby a thing is referred to any end assimilates that thing in
a manner to the end: thus a body by the form of heaviness acquires a likeness and
conformity to the place to which it naturally moves.
5. A requisite of perfect work is that the work be done steadily and regularly. That is just the effect of love, which makes even hard and grievous tasks seem light. Since then the grace that constitutes the state of grace goes to perfect our works, the said grace must establish the love of God within us.
Hence the Apostle says: The charity of God is spread abroad in our hearts
by the Holy Ghost who is given to us (
CHAPTER CLIII—That Divine Grace causes in us Faith
THE movement of grace, guiding us to our last end, is voluntary, not violent (Chap.
CXLIX). But there can be no voluntary movement towards an
object unless the object be known. Therefore grace must afford us a knowledge of
our last end. But such knowledge cannot be by open vision in our present state (Chap.
XLVIII): therefore it must be by faith.
2. In every knowing mind, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of nature: hence an angel, a man, and a dumb animal have different modes of knowledge according to their differences of natures. But, for the gaining of his last end, man has a perfection superadded to him, over and above his nature, namely, grace. Therefore there must also be superadded to him a knowledge, over and above his natural knowledge, and that is the knowledge of faith, which is of things not discerned by natural reason.
3. As when wood is first warmed by fire, the fire does not take kindly to the
wood; but finally, when the wood is all ablaze, the fire becomes as it were connatural
to the wood and a part of its very being: or as when a pupil is taught by a master,
he must, to start with, take in the ideas of the master, not as understanding them
of himself, but in the spirit of one ready to accept on another’s word things beyond
his capacity; and so in the end, when his education is advanced, he will be able
to understand those things: in like manner, before we arrive at our final end, which
is the clear vision of the
4. See further, B. I, Chapp. IV, V.
Hence the Apostle says: By grace ye are saved through faith; and that not
of yourselves, for it is the gift of God (
Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that the beginning of faith in us was not of God, but of ourselves.
CHAPTER CLIV—That Divine Grace causes in us a Hope of future Blessedness
IN every lover there is caused a desire of union with his loved one, so far as may be: hence it is most delightful to live in the society of those whom one loves. As then by grace man is made a lover of God, there must be caused in him a desire of union with God, so far as may be. But faith, which is caused of grace, declares the possibility of a union of man with God in perfect fruition, wherein blessedness consists. Consequently the desire of this fruition follows upon the love of God. But desire is a troublesome thing, without hope of attainment. It was proper therefore that in men, in whom the love of God and faith in Him was caused by grace, there should be caused also the hope of attaining to future blessedness.
3. Virtue, the way to blessedness, is paved with difficulties: hence the need of hope.
4. No one stirs to reach an end, which he reckons it impossible to compass.
Hence it is said: He hath regenerated us unto a living hope (
CHAPTER CLV—Of Graces given gratuitously
SINCE the things done by God are done in order (Chapp. LXXVII–LXXX),
a certain order had to be followed in the manifestation of the truths of faith,
so that some should receive those truths immediately from God, others receive of
them, and so in order even to the last. The invisible good things, the vision of
which makes the happiness of the blessed, and which are the objects of faith, are
first revealed by God to the blessed angels by open vision: then by the ministry
of angels they are manifested by God to certain men,
Now because those who receive a revelation from God ought in the order of divine
enactment to instruct others, there needed to be further communicated to them the
grace of speech. Hence it is said: The Lord hath given me a learned tongue
(
But because any announcement put forth requires confirmation before it can be
received, — unless indeed it is self-evident, and the truths of faith are not evident
to human reason, — there was need of something to confirm the announcements of
the preachers of the faith. But, inasmuch as they transcend reason, they could not
be confirmed by any demonstrative process of reasoning from first principles. The
means therefore to show that the announcements of these preachers came from God
was the evidence of works done by them such as none other than God could do, healing
the sick, and other miracles. Hence the Lord, sending his disciples to preach, said:
Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils (
In the aforesaid effects of grace we observe a certain difference. Though the
name of ‘grace’ applies to them all, inasmuch as they are given ‘gratuitously’ without
any preceding merit, nevertheless the working of love alone has a further claim
to the name of ‘grace,’ as constituting the subject in ‘the state of grace,’ or
in ‘the good graces of God’ (gratum Deo facit): for
it is said: I love them that love me (
There is another difference to be observed in these workings of grace,
CHAPTER CLVI—That Man needs the Assistance of Divine Grace
to persevere in Good
THE power of free will regards matters of election: but a matter of election
is some particular thing to be done; and a particular thing to be done is what is
here and now:
3. Though man is master of his act, he is not master of his natural powers; and
therefore, though he is free to will or not will a thing, still his willing cannot
make his will in the act of willing adhere immovably to the thing willed or chosen.
But the immovable adherence of the will to good is requisite for perseverance: perseverance
therefore is not in the power of free will. Is immovable adherence of the will to good requisite for perseverance, or is
it sufficient that in each successive trial the will be not actually moved? Is perseverance distinguishable from what is sometimes called ‘confirmation in
grace’?
Hence it is said: He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto
the day of Christ Jesus (
Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that free will is sufficient for man for his perseverance in good, and that there is no need of the assistance of grace for the purpose.
As free will is not sufficient for perseverance in good without the help of God given from without, so neither is any infused habit. For in the state of our present life the habits infused into us of God do not totally take away from our free will its fickleness and liability to evil, although they do to some extent establish the free will in good. And therefore, when we say that man needs the aid of grace for final perseverance, we do not mean that, over and above the habitual grace first infused into him for the doing of good acts, there is infused into him another habitual grace enabling him to persevere; but we mean that, when he has got all the gratuitous habits that he ever is to have, man still needs some aid of divine providence governing him from without.
CHAPTER CLVII—That he who falls from Grace by Sin may be recovered again by Grace
IT belongs to the same power to continue and to repair after interruption, as
is the case with the powers of nature in regard of bodily health. But man perseveres
in good by the aid of divine grace: therefore, if he has fallen by sin, he may be
recovered by help of the same grace.
2. An agent that requires no predisposition of its subject, can imprint its effect on its subject, howsoever disposed. But God, requiring no predisposition of the subject of His action, when the subject is corporeal, — as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead to life, — does not require any previous merit either in the will for the conferring of His grace, which is given without merits (Chap. CXLIX). Therefore even after a man has fallen from grace by sin, God can confer on him the grace that puts the recipient in the state of grace, whereby sins are taken away.
5. In the works of God there is nothing in vain, as neither in the works of nature,
for nature has this prerogative of God. Now it would be in vain for anything to
move with no chance of arriving at its term. Whatever naturally moves to a certain
end, must be somehow competent to get there.
6. There exists in nature no potentiality, which cannot be reduced to act by
some natural active power. Much less is there in the human soul any potentiality,
which is not reducible to act by the active power of God. But
Therefore it is said: Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white
as Snow (
Hereby is refuted the error of the Novatians, who said that man cannot obtain
pardon for sins committed after baptism.
CHAPTER CLVIII—That Man cannot be delivered from Sin except by Grace
BY mortal sin man is turned away from his last end. And to that last end he is set on his way only by grace.
2. Offence is removed only by love.
Hence it is said: It is I who blot out thine iniquities for my own sake
(
Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that man can rise from sin by free will.
CHAPTER CLIX—How Man is delivered from Sin
BECAUSE man cannot return to one opposite without retiring from the other, to
return to the state of righteousness he must withdraw from sin, whereby he had declined
from righteousness. And because it is chiefly by the will that man is set on the
way to his last end, or turned away therefrom, he must not only withdraw from sin
in exterior act by ceasing to sin, but he must further withdraw in will, that so
he may rise again by grace. Now withdrawal of the will from sin means at once repentance
for the past and a resolution to avoid sin in future. For if a man did not purpose
to cease from sin, sin as it is in itself (or sin in general) would not be contrary
to his will. If he were minded to cease from sin, but had no sorrow for sin past,
that same particular sin of which he was guilty would not be against his will.
When then man by grace has obtained pardon for his sin and has been restored
to the state of grace, he still remains bound by God’s justice to some punishment
for his sin. If of his own will he exacts this punishment of himself, he is thereby
said to ‘make satisfaction’ to God, inasmuch as by punishing himself for his sin
he fulfils with labour and pain the order instituted of heaven, which order he had
transgressed by sinning and following his own will. But if he does not exact this
punishment of himself it will be inflicted by God, since the domain of divine providence
cannot be suffered to lie in disorder. The punishment in that case will not be called
’satisfactory,’ since it will not be of the choice of the sufferer, but it will
be called ‘purificatory,’ or ‘purgatorial,’ because he will be purified and purged
by another punishing him; and so whatever was inordinate in him will be brought
back to due order. Hence the Apostle says: If we were to judge ourselves, we
should not be judged: but while we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord, that
we may not be condemned with this world (
Nevertheless, in the process of conversion, the disgust for sin and the fixing
of the affections on God may be so intense as that there shall remain no outstanding
liability to punishment. For the punishment which one suffers after the forgiveness
of sin is necessary to bring the mind to cleave more firmly to good, — punishments
being medicines, — as also for the observance of the order of justice in the punishment
of the sinner. But love of God, especially when it is vehement and strong, is sufficient
to establish man’s mind in good; and intense disgust for a past fault carries with
it great sorrow for the same. Hence by the vehemence of the love of God and hatred
for sin there is excluded any further need of satisfactory or purgatorial punishment.
But what we do through our friends we are reckoned to do of ourselves, inasmuch
as friendship makes two one in heart, and this is especially true of the love of
charity: therefore, as a man may make satisfaction to God of himself, so also may
he do it through another, especially in case of necessity: for the punishment which
his friend suffers on his account he reckons as his own punishment; and thus punishment
is not wanting to him in that he has compassion for the sufferings of his friend,
and that all the more for his being the cause of his friend’s suffering. And again
the affection of charity in him who suffers for his friend makes his satisfaction
more acceptable to God than it would be if he were suffering for his own doings:
for the one is an effort of spontaneous charity, the other an acquiescence in necessity.
Hence we learn that one man may make satisfaction for another, provided both of
them be in charity. Hence the saying of the Apostle: Bear ye one another’s burdens,
and so ye shall fulfil the law of Christ (
CHAPTER CLX—That it is reasonably reckoned a Man’s own Fault if he be not converted to God, although he cannot be converted without Grace
SINCE no one can be set on the way to his last end without the aid of divine
grace, or without it have the necessary means of reaching that end, as are faith,
hope, love and perseverance, some might think that man is not to blame for being
destitute of these gifts, especially seeing that he cannot merit the assistance
of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: for none is responsible
for that which depends on another. But allow this, and many absurdities follow.
It follows that the man who has neither faith nor hope nor love of God, nor perseverance
in good, still does not deserve punishment: whereas it is expressly said: He
that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him
(John iii, 36). And since none reaches the end of happiness without the aforesaid
endowments, it would follow further that there are some who neither attain to happiness
nor yet suffer punishment of God: the contrary whereof is shown from what will be
said to all present at the judgement of God: Come . . . . possess ye the kingdom
prepared for you, or, Depart . . . . into everlasting fire (
To solve this doubt, we must observe that though one can neither merit divine
grace beforehand, nor acquire it by movement of his free will, still he can hinder
himself from receiving it: for it is said of some: They have said unto God, ‘Depart
from us, we will not have the knowledge of thy ways’ ( Of the eternal lot of such as, wilfully
sinning against the light, reject the known truth of their Saviour, there never
can he any doubt. The doubt and difficulty begins when we turn to others, who never
have heard of Christ, or who, however much they have heard of Him, never seem to
have gathered tidings sufficient and adequate to their minds. Their situation, to
the Christian thinker who mixes in modern life and knows men, is one of the darkest
regions of his theology. He can but fall back on his Lord’s precept: Judge not
( On the dichotomy, St Thomas himself habitually views the Christian in every man; and hardly conceives,
still less can be considered here to discuss, the position of him who is not a Christian
and a Catholic.
CHAPTER CLXI—That a Man already in Mortal Sin cannot avoid more Mortal Sin without Grace
WHEN it is said that it is in the power of free will to avoid putting obstacles
to grace, that saying is to be understood of those in whom the natural faculty is
unimpaired by sin.
Moreover, when the mind is inclined to a thing, it is no longer impartial between two alternatives. And that to which the mind is more inclined it chooses, unless by a rational discussion, not unattended with trouble, it is withdrawn from taking that side: hence sudden emergencies afford the best sign of the inward bent of the mind. But it is impossible for the mind of man to be so continually watchful as rationally to discuss whatever it ought to do or not to do. Consequently the mind will at times choose that to which it is inclined by the present inclination: so, if the inclination be to sin, it will not stand long clear of sin, thereby putting an obstacle in the way of grace, unless it be brought back to the state of righteousness.
Further we must consider the assaults of passion, the allurements of sense, the endless occasions of evil-doing, the ready incitements of sin, sure to prevail, unless the will be withheld from them by a firm adherence to the last end, which is the work of grace.
Hence appears the folly of the Pelagian view, that a man in sin can go on avoiding further sins without grace. On the contrary the Lord bids us pray: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.
But though persons in sin cannot of their own power help putting obstacles in
the way of grace, unless they be forestalled by some aid of grace,
CHAPTER CLXII—That some Men God delivers from Sin, and some He leaves in Sin
THOUGH the sinner raises an obstacle to grace, and by the exigence of the order
of things ought not to receive grace, nevertheless, inasmuch as God can work setting
aside the connatural order of things, as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises
the dead, He sometimes out of the abundance of His goodness forestalls by the assistance
of His grace even those who raise an obstacle to it, turning them away from evil
and converting them to good. And as He does not give sight to all the blind, nor
heal all the sick, that in those whom He heals the work of His power may appear,
and in the others the order of nature may be observed, so He does not forestall
by His aid all who hinder grace, to their turning away from evil and conversion
to good, but some He so forestalls, wishing in them His mercy to appear, while in
others He would have the order of justice made manifest. May we not however observe that as in the natural order of things God has provided,
in the acquired skill of physicians and surgeons, certain ordinary means for healing
the sick and even giving sight to the blind, so in the supernatural order He has
provided an ordinary means for the justification of the sinner in the Sacraments
of Baptism and Penance? Miracles are exceptional, but the forgiveness of sins is
part of the Church’s daily ministry; and the gratia praeveniens, necessary
to bring the sinner to avail himself of this ministry, has to be presupposed as
part of the institution. The fuller and fuller recognition of this consoling truth
is a typical instance of the ‘development’ of the mind of the Church. On the texts from Romans quoted here cf. Notes on St Paul pp. 393-397.
But when, of men who are enthralled in the same sins, God forestalls and converts
some, and endures, or permits, others to go their way according to the order of
things, we should not enquire the reason why He converts these and not those: for
that depends on His sheer will, just as from His sheer will it proceeded that, when
all things were made out of nothing, some things were made in a position of greater
advantage than others (digniora).
Hereby is refuted the error of Origen, who said that the reason why some were converted to God, and not others, was to be sought in divers works that their souls had done before they were united with their bodies, a theory already set aside (B. II, Chapp. XLIV, LXXXIII).
CHAPTER CLXIII—That God is Cause of Sin to no Man
THOUGH there are some sinners whom God does not convert to Himself, but leaves them in their sins according to their deserts, still He does not induce them to sin.
1. Men sin by deviating from God their last end. But as every agent acts to its own proper and befitting end, it is impossible for God’s action to avert any from their ultimate end in God.
2. Good cannot be the cause of evil, nor God the cause of sin.
3. All the wisdom and goodness of man is derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, being a likeness thereof. But it is repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of man to make any one to sin: therefore much more to divine wisdom and goodness.
4. A fault always arises from some defect of the proximate agent, not from any
defect of the prime agent. Thus the fault of limping comes from some defect of the
shin-bone, not from the locomotor power, from which power however is whatever perfection
of movement appears in the limping. But the proximate agent of human sin is the
will. The sinful defect then is from the will of man, not from God, who is the prime
agent, of whom however is whatever point of perfect action appears in the act of
sin.
Hence it is said: Say not, He himself hath led me astray: for he hath no use
for sinful men: He hath commanded none to do impiously, and he hath not given to
any man license to sin (
Still there are passages of Scripture, from which it might seem that God is to
some men the cause of sin. Thus it is said: I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh
and his servants (
CHAPTER CLXIV—Of Predestination, Reprobation, and Divine Election
SINCE it has been shown that by the action of God some are guided to their last
end with the aid of grace, while others, bereft of that same aid of grace, fall
away from their last end; and at the same time all things that are done by God are
from eternity foreseen and ordained by His wisdom, as has also been shown, it needs
must be that the aforesaid distinction of men has been from eternity ordained of
God. Inasmuch therefore as He has from eternity pre-ordained some to be guided to
the last end, He is said to have ‘predestined’ them. Hence the Apostle says:
Who hath predestined us to the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of his
will (
But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be
shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination,
is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further
fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that
are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the
effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause
of another.
BOOK IV
OF GOD IN HIS REVELATION
BOOK IV
OF GOD IN HIS REVELATION
CHAPTER I—Preface
LO, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; and whereas
we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, who shall be able to look upon
the thunder of his greatness? (
But the weakness of our understanding prevents us from knowing these
We know so much more of the ways of creatures than was known in St Thomas’s time,
so much more of history and antiquities, so much more astronomy, dynamics, chemistry,
molecular physics, biology: has there been any proportionate increase in our knowledge
of God? Has theology grown with the growth of other sciences? The question is one
to furnish matter for a long and curious dissertation, in which the results, professedly
arrived at, would differ widely according to the various theological preconceptions,
whether of faith or prejudice, with which the several writers took up their pens.
Yet an outline statement of results may be hazarded. Growth in truth must surely
bring out truth. If theology has gained nothing by the advance of ’science,’ either
’science’ or theology must be condemned. Theology then has gained in at least three
respects. It has gained in the overthrow of superstition, notably astrology and
witchcraft. It has gained in a better appreciation of everything which, for want
of a better name, I must call ‘vastness’ in God, — His immensity, filling all stellar
space; His incomprehensibility; His all-embracing, all-sustaining wisdom; and His
tremendous power. Once more, theology has gained in kindliness. Harshness and narrowness
of sympathy so often proceed, not from any particular love of truth or zeal for
justice, but simply from want of experience, — from the inexperience of a youthful
and untravelled mind. With the weight of past ages upon us, the youngest of the
really educated in our theological schools is no longer young in the depreciatory
sense of that term. We have found out that men and women are not the easy subjects
of moral dissection that unpractised eyes take them for. We recognise the wisdom
of the Judge who made proclamation to the bystanders in court, Judge not
( Accidentally, a quarrel has arisen between theology and modern science. This
quarrel marks no intrinsic opposition: it is the fault of persons. Revealed theology
is essentially a distinct kingdom from secular science. But it is a frontier kingdom;
and the two kingdoms cannot but have relations with one another. These relations
have been unfriendly, not without some fault on both sides. Theologians have repeated
what other theologians have said before them, not considering the advance of physical
science, or of history, since the authors whom they follow lived and wrote. Now
if it were mere matter of dogmatic, or revealed, theology, this disregard of physics
would be justified; but when it is question of providing, say, a biological setting
for a theological truth, this neglect of modern progress in biology becomes deplorable.
On the other hand, it goes without saying that some votaries of physics, or history,
or criticism, cherish an acrimonious hatred for divine revelation, and even the
very name of God; and chiefly value science as a weapon of offence against theology,
— thereby assuming a mental attitude the reverse of scientific. For the provisional
adjustment of the contested frontier, we seem to require a sort of boundary commission
of physicists, historians, critics, philosophers, and theologians working with one
common endeavour, as the Jesuit rule lays it down, ut suus veritati
sit locus, non ut in ea re superiores videantur. Such a commission would
sit permanently in a Catholic University, if ever such an institution could be planted
anywhere in the British Isles.
Feeble and inadequate then being any knowledge to which man could arrive by these
ways, God has revealed to men facts about Himself which surpass human understanding;
in which revelation there is observed an order of gradual transition from imperfect
to perfect. In man’s present state, in which
This triple knowledge is suggested by the text above quoted from Job. These
things that have been said are but a part of his ways, applies to that knowledge
whereby our understanding ascends by way of creatures to a knowledge of God. And
because we know these ways but imperfectly, that is rightly put in, but a part,
for we know in part (
The words of the above text are adapted to our purpose: for whereas in the previous
books we have spoken of divine things according as natural
CHAPTER II—Of Generation, Paternity, and Sonship in God
WE find in the New Testament frequent attestations that Jesus Christ is the Son
of God:
And because the names of ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are consequent upon some generative
process, Scripture has not omitted to speak of divine generation,
CHAPTER III—That the Son of God is God
WE must not however fail to observe that divine Scripture uses the above names
also to denote the creation of things: thus it is said: Who is the father of
rain? or who hath begotten the drops of dew? From whose womb hath ice gone forth,
and who hath begotten the frost from heaven? (
CHAPTERS IV, IX—The Opinion
of Photinus touching the Son of God, and its rejection
IT is customary in Scripture for those who are justified by divine grace to be
called sons of God, —
But careful study of the words of Holy Scripture shows that there is not that
meaning in them which these Photinians have supposed. For when
Again, among the rest who had the grace of God, Moses had it abundantly, of whom
it is said: The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to
his friend (
The like argument may be gathered from many other places of Scripture, where
Christ is styled ‘Son of God’ in a singular manner above others, as at His baptism,
This is my beloved Son (
Furthermore, in the Holy Scriptures some works are set down as so peculiarly
proper to God as to be never attributable to any one else, e.g., the sanctification
of souls and the forgiveness of sins: for it is said, I am the Lord who sanctify
you (
As for those testimonies of Scripture whereby the Photinians endeavoured to show
that Christ is not God by nature, they do not serve their purpose: for we confess
in Christ the Son of God after the Incarnation two natures, a human and a divine:
hence there are predicated of Him at once attributes proper to God, by reason of
His divine nature, and attributes seeming to involve some defect, or shortcoming,
by reason of His human nature. Thus His saying, All power is given to me,
does not mean that He then received the power as a new thing to Him, but that the
power, which, the Son of God had enjoyed from all eternity, had now begun to appear
in the same Son made man, by the victory which He had gained over death by rising
again.
Nor does the Apostle (
CHAPTER V—Rejection of the Opinion of Sabellius concerning the Son of God
BECAUSE it is a fixed idea in the mind of all who think rightly of God, that
there can be but one God by nature, some, conceiving from the Scriptures the belief
that Christ is truly and by nature God and the Son of God, have confessed that Christ,
the Son of God, and God the Father are one God; and yet have not allowed that there
was any ‘God the Son,’ so called according to His nature from eternity, but have
held that God received the denomination of Sonship from the time that He was born
of the Virgin Mary. Thus all things that Christ suffered in the flesh they attributed
to God the Father. This was the opinion of the Sabellans, who were also called ‘Patripassians,’
because they asserted that the Father had suffered, and that the Father Himself
was Christ. The peculiarity of this doctrine was
The falsity of this position is manifest from Scripture authority. For Christ
in the Scriptures is not only called the Son of the Virgin, but also the Son of
God. But it cannot be that the same person should be son of himself, or that the
same should give existence and receive it. We observe also that after the Incarnation
the Father gives testimony of the Son: This is my beloved Son (Matt. iii,
17): thereby pointing to His person. Christ therefore is in person other than His
Father.
CHAPTER VI—Of the Opinion of Arius concerning
the Son of God
WHEREAS it is not in accordance with sacred doctrine to say, with Photinus, that
the Son of God took His beginning from Mary; or, with Sabellius, that the eternal
God and Father began to be the Son by taking flesh; there were others who took the
view, which Scripture teaches, that the Son of God was before the Incarnation and
even before the creation of the world; but because the Son is other than the Father,
they accounted Him to be not of the same nature with the Father: for they could
not understand, nor would they believe, that any two beings, distinct in person,
had the same essence and nature. And because, according to the doctrine of faith,
alone of natures the nature of God the Father is believed to be eternal, they believed
that the nature of the Son was not from eternity, although the Son was before other
creatures. And because all that is not eternal is made out of nothing and created
by God, they declared that the Son of God was made out of nothing and is a creature.
But because they were driven by the authority of Scripture to call the Son also
God, they said that He was one with God the Father, not by nature, but by a union
of wills, and by participation in the likeness of God beyond other creatures. Hence,
as the highest creatures, the angels are called in Scripture ‘gods’ and ’sons of
God,’ — e.g., Where werst thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the
sons of God shouted for joy? (
CHAPTER VII—Rejection of Arius’s Position
HOLY Scripture calls Christ ‘Son of God’ and the angels ’sons of God,’ yet not
in the same sense. To which of the angels did he ever say: Thou art my Son, this
day have I begotten thee? (
2. If Christ were called ‘Son’ in the same sense as all the angels and saints,
He would not be Only-begotten, however much, for the excellence of His nature
above the rest, He might be called first-born (
5. Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed
for ever (
7. No creature receives the whole fulness of the divine goodness: but in Christ
there dwells all the fulness of the Godhead (
8. An angel’s mind falls far short of the divine mind: but the mind of Christ
in point of knowledge does not fall short of the divine mind: for in Him are
hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (
9. All things whatsoever that the Father hath are mine; All mine are thine,
and thine are mine (
10. In
11. The Jews sought to kill him because he said that God was his Father, making
himself equal to God (
13. No created substance represents God in His substance: for whatever appears
of the perfection of any creature is less than what God is: hence through no creature
can the essence of God be known. But the Son represents the Father; for the Apostle
says of Him that He is the image of the invisible God (
19. Our final happiness is in God alone; and to Him alone the honour of latria
is to be paid (B. III, Chap. CXX). But our happiness is in
God the Son: This is life everlasting, that they know thee, and him whom thou
hast sent, Jesus Christ (
Taught by these and similar evidences of Holy Scripture, the Catholic Church
confesses Christ to be the true and natural Son of God, co-eternal and equal with
the Father; true God, of the same essence and nature with the Father; begotten,
not created, nor made. Hence it appears that the faith of the Catholic Church alone
truly confesses generation in God, referring the generation of the Son to the fact
of His receiving the divine nature of the Father. Other teachers heretically refer
this generation to a nature extraneous to Godhead, — Photinus and Sabellius to
a human nature; Arius not to a human indeed, but still to a created nature, more honorable
CHAPTER VIII—Explanation of the Texts which Arius used to allege for himself
THAT they may know thee, the only true God (
2. In the text, Whom in his own time he will show forth, who is blessed and
alone powerful, King of Kings and Lord of Lords (
3. The sense of the text, the Father is greater than I (
4. Then the Son also himself shall be subject to him who subjected to him
all things.
5. By the Father being said to give to the Son (
6. Hence it appears how the Son is said to be taught (
7. The text, The Son cannot do anything of himself (
8. All the texts about the Father giving commandment to the Son, and the Son
obeying the Father, or praying to the Father, are to be understood of the Son as
He is subject to His Father, which is only in point of the humanity which He has
assumed (
10. His saying, To sit on my right or left hand is not mine to give you, but
to them for whom it is prepared (
11. Nor from the text: Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no, not the angels
of heaven, nor the Son, but my Father alone (
CHAPTER 12—How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God
WISDOM in man is a habit whereby our mind is perfected in the knowledge of the
highest truths: such are divine truths. Wisdom in God is His knowledge of Himself.
But because He does not know Himself by any presentation of Himself other than His
essence, and His act of understanding is His essence, the wisdom of God cannot be
a habit, but is the very essence of God. But the Son of God is the Word and Concept
of God understanding Himself. The Word of God, thus conceived, is properly called
‘begotten Wisdom’: — hence the Apostle names Christ the wisdom of God (
CHAPTER XVII—That the Holy Ghost is true God
A TEMPLE is consecrated to none but God: hence it is said: The Lord in his
holy temple (
2. The service of latria (B. III, Chap. CXX) is
paid by holy men to God alone (
3. To sanctify men is a work proper to God: I am the Lord who sanctify you
(
4. As the life of the body is by the soul, so the soul’s life of justice is by
God: hence the Lord says: As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the
Father, so whosoever eateth me, the same shall also live by me (
7. The Spirit searcheth all things, even the profound things of God. For what
man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of man that is in him? So the things
also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God (
8. According to the above comparison, the Holy Ghost is to God as a man’s spirit to man. But a man’s spirit is intrinsic to man, not of a foreign nature, but part of him. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not of a nature extrinsic to Deity.
11. Evidently from Holy Scripture it was God who spoke by the prophets, as it
is said: I will hear what the Lord God speaketh in me (
17. The Holy Ghost is expressly called God in the text: Ananias, why hath
Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? . . . . Thou hast not lied to
men, but to God (
23. Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are
diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations,
but the same God, who worketh all in all. . . . But all these things one and the
same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will (
CHAPTER XVIII—That the Holy Ghost is a Subsistent Person
BUT inasmuch as some have maintained that the Holy Ghost is not a subsistent Person, but is either the divinity of the Father and the Son (cf. St Aug. de haeresibus, n. 52), or some accidental perfection of the mind given us by God, as wisdom, or charity, or other such created accidents, we must evince the contrary.
1. Accidental forms do not properly work, but the subject that has them works
according to the arbitrement of his own will: thus a wise man uses wisdom when he
wills. But the Holy Ghost works according to the arbitrement of His own will (
2. The Holy Ghost is not to be accounted an accidental perfection of the human
mind, seeing that He is the cause of such perfections: for the charity of God
is spread abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us (
3. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and receives from the
Son (
4. Scripture speaks of the Holy Ghost as of a subsistent Person: The Holy
Ghost said to them: Set aside for me Barnabas and Saul for the work unto which I
have taken them: . . . . and they, sent by the Holy Ghost, went (
5. The Father and the Son being subsistent Persons and of divine nature, the
Holy Ghost would not be numbered with them (
CHAPTER XX—Of the Effects which the Scriptures attribute to the Holy Ghost in respect of the whole Creation
THE love wherewith God loves His own goodness is the cause of the creation of
things (B. I, Chap. LXXXVI); and it is laid down that the
Holy Ghost proceeds as the love wherewith God loves Himself. Therefore the Holy
Ghost is the principle of the creation of things; and this is signified in
Life also particularly appears in movement. As then impulse and movement by reason
of love are proper to the Holy Spirit, so too is life fitly attributed to Him, as
it is said: It is the Spirit that quickeneth (
CHAPTER XXI—Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in Scripture in the way of Gifts bestowed on the Rational Creature
SINCE the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have the same power, as they have the same
essence, everything that God works in us must be by the efficient causation of Father,
Son and Holy Ghost together. But the word of wisdom, sent us by God, whereby we
know God, is properly representative of the Son; and the love, wherewith we love
God, is properly representative of the Holy Ghost. Thus the charity that is in us,
though it is the effect of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is in a certain special aspect
said to be in us through the Holy Ghost. But since divine effects not only begin
by divine operation, but are also sustained in being by the same, and nothing operates
where it is not
It is a point of friendship to reveal one’s secrets to one’s friend: for as friendship
unites affections, and makes of two as it were one heart, a man may well seem not
to have uttered beyond his own heart what he has revealed to his friend. Hence the
Lord says to His disciples: I will not call you servants, but friends, because
all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you (
And because good will towards a person leads at times to the adoption of him
as a son, that so the inheritance may belong to him, the adoption of the sons of
God is properly attributed to the Holy Ghost: Ye have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, wherein we cry, Abba, Father (
Again, by admission to friendship all offence is removed. Since then we are rendered
sons of God through the Holy Ghost, through Him also our sins are forgiven us by
God; and therefore the Lord says: Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins ye shall
forgive, they are forgiven them (
CHAPTER XXII—Of the Effects attributed to the Holy Ghost in the attraction of the Rational Creature to God
IT is a mark of friendship to take delight in the company of one’s friend, to
rejoice at what he says and does, and to find in him comfort and consolation against
all troubles: hence it is in our griefs especially that we fly to our friends for
comfort. Since then the Holy Ghost renders us friends of God, making Him to dwell
in us and we in Him, we have through the same Holy Spirit joy in God and comfort
under all the adversities and assaults of the world: hence it is said: Give me
back the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with thy guiding Spirit (
Another mark of friendship is to fall in with a friend’s wishes. Now God’s wishes
are unfolded to us by His commandments, the keeping of which therefore is part of
our love of God : If ye love me, keep my commandments (
CHAPTER XXIII—Replies to Arguments alleged against the Divinity of the Holy Ghost
CHAP. XVI. It was the position of Arius that the Son and Holy Ghost were creatures,
the Son however being greater than the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost being His
minister, even as he said the Son was to the Father.
Chap. XXIII. 2. He shall not speak of himself but whatsoever things he shall
hear, he shall speak (
3. The Son of God is said to have been sent in this sense, that He appeared to
man in visible flesh; and, thus came to be in the world in a new way, in which He
had not been before, namely, visibly, although He had always been there invisibly
as God. And the Son’s doing this came to Him of His Father: hence in this respect
He is said to be ’sent’ by the Father. In like manner the Holy Ghost too appeared
visibly both in the appearance of a dove over Christ in His baptism, and in fiery
tongues over the Apostles; and though He did not become a dove or fire, still He
appeared under such visible appearances as signs of Himself. And thus He too came to be in a
4. Nor is the Holy Ghost excluded from the Divinity by the occasional mention
of the Father and the Son without the Holy Ghost (
7. Habitually in Holy Scripture the language of human passion is applied to God
(B. I, Chapp. LXXXIX–LXCI). Thus it
is said: The Lord was angered in fury against his people (
8. Another customary phraseology of Holy Scripture is the attributing of that
to God, which He produces in man. So it is said: The Spirit himself asketh for
us with unspeakable groanings (
9. Since the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love wherewith God loves Himself; and
since God loves with the same love Himself and other beings for the sake of His
own goodness (B. I Chapp. LXXV, LXXVI);
it is clear that the love wherewith God loves us belongs to the Holy Ghost. In like
manner also the love wherewith we love God. In respect of both these loves the Holy
Ghost is well said to be given. In respect of the love wherewith God loves us, He
may be said to be given, in the sense in which one is said to give his love to another,
when he begins to love him. Only, be it observed, there is no beginning in time
for God’s love of any one, if we regard the act of
11. It is reasonable that in the case of the divine nature alone nature should be communicated in more modes than the one mode of generation. In God alone act and being are identical: hence since there is in God, as in every intelligent nature, both intelligence and will, alike that which proceeds in Him as intelligence, to wit, the Word, and that proceeds in Him as love and will, to wit, Love, must have divine being and be God; thus as well the Son as the Holy Ghost is true God.
CHAPTER XXIV—That the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Son
IF any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not of him (
2. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son: When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will
send you from the Father (
3. The Son says of the Holy Ghost: He shall glorify me, because he shall receive
of mine (
7. The Son is from the Father, and so too is the Holy Ghost. The Father then must be related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost as a principle to that which is of the principle. Now He is related to the Son in the way of paternity, but not so to the Holy Ghost, otherwise the Holy Ghost would be the Son. There must then be in the Father another relation, which relates Him to the Holy Ghost; and that relation is called ’spiration.’ In like manner, as there is in the Son a relation which relates Him to the Father, and is called ‘filiation,’ there must be in the Holy Ghost too a relation which relates Him to the Father, and is called ‘procession.’ And thus in point of the origin of the Son from the Father there are two relations, one in the originator, the other in the originated, namely, paternity and filiation; and other two in point of the origin of the Holy Ghost, namely spiration and procession. Now paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, but belong to the one person of the Father, because they are not opposed one to the other. Neither then would filiation and procession constitute two persons, but would belong to one person, but for the fact of their being opposed one to the other. But it is impossible to assign any other opposition than that which is in point of origin. There must then be an opposition in point of origin between the Son and the Holy Ghost, so that one is from the other.
10. If the rejoinder is made that the processions of Son and Holy Ghost differ in principle, inasmuch as the Father produces the Son by mode of understanding, as the Word, and produces the Holy Ghost by mode of will, as Love, the opponent must go on to say that according to the difference of understanding and will in God the Father there are two distinct processions and two distinct beings so proceeding. But will and understanding in God the Father are not distinguished with a real but only with a mental distinction (B. I, Chapp. XLV, LXXIII). Consequently the two processions and the two beings so proceeding must differ only by a mental distinction. But things that differ only by a mental distinction are predicable of one another: thus it is true to say that God’s will is His understanding, and His understanding is His will. It will be true then to say that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and the Son the Holy Ghost, which is the impious position of Sabellius. Therefore, to maintain the distinction between Holy Ghost and Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by mode of understanding and the Holy Ghost by mode of will, unless we further go on to say that the Holy Ghost is of the Son.
13. The Father and the Son, being one in essence, differ only in this, that He is the Father, and He the Son. Everything else is common to Father and Son. But being the origin of the Holy Ghost lies outside of the relationship of paternity and filiation: for the relation whereby the Father is Father differs from the relation whereby the Father is the origin of the Holy Ghost. Being the origin then of the Holy Ghost is something common to Father and Son.
CHAPTER XXVI—That there are only Three Persons in the Godhead, Father and Son and Holy Ghost
FROM all that has been said we gather that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one God, being distinct from one another by relations alone. The Father is distinguished by the relation of paternity and by being born of none: the Son is distinguished from the Father by the relationship of filiation: the Father and Son from the Holy Ghost by spiration; and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son by the procession of love whereby He proceeds from both. Besides these three Persons it is impossible to assign in the divine nature any fourth Person.
1. The three divine Persons, agreeing in essence, can be distinguished only by
the relation of origin. These relations of origin cannot obtain in respect of any
process tending to things without, as whatever proceeded without would not be co-essential
with its origin; but the process must all stay within. Now such a process, abiding
within its origin, is found only in the act of understanding and will.
2. The divine Persons must be distinguished according to their mode of procession. Now the mode of personal procession can be but threefold. There may be a mode of not proceeding at all, which is proper to the Father; or of proceeding from one who does not proceed, which is proper to the Son; or of proceeding from one who does proceed, which is proper to the Holy Ghost. It is impossible therefore to assign more than three Persons.
3. If any objicient says that, the Son being perfect God, there is in Him perfect
intellectual power, whereby He can produce a Word; and in like manner the Holy Ghost,
being infinite goodness, which is a principle of communication,
A likeness of the divine Trinity is observable in the human mind. That mind,
by actually understanding itself, conceives its ‘word’ in itself, which ‘word’ is
nothing else than what is called the ‘intellectual expression (intentio
intellecta, cf. B. I, Chap. LIII) existing in the
mind; which mind, going on to love itself, produces itself in the will as an object
loved. Further it does not proceed, but is confined and complete in a circle, returning
by love to its own substance, whence the process originally began by formation of
the ‘intellectual expression’ of that substance. There is however a process going
out to exterior effects, as the mind for love of itself proceeds to some action
beyond itself. Thus we remark in the mind three things: the mind itself, whence
the process starts within its own nature; the mind conceived in the understanding;
and the mind loved in the will. And so we have seen that there is in the divine
nature a God unbegotten, the Father, the origin of the entire procession of Deity;
and a God begotten after the manner of a ‘word’ conceived in the understanding,
namely, the Son; and a God proceeding by mode of love, who is the Holy Ghost: beyond
Him there is no further procession within the divine nature, but only a proceeding
to exterior effects. But the representation of the divine Trinity in us falls short,
in regard of Father, Son and Holy Ghost being one nature, and each of them a perfect
Person.
CHAPTER XXVII—Of the Incarnation of the Word according to the Tradition of Holy Scripture
OF all the works of God, the mystery of the Incarnation most transcends reason.
Nothing more astonishing could be imagined as done by God than that the true God
and Son of God should become true man. To this chief of wonders all other wonders
are subordinate. We confess this wonderful Incarnation under the teaching of divine
authority,
CHAPTER XXVIII—Of the Error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation
PHOTINUS and others pretend that the divinity was in Christ, not by nature, but
by a high degree of participation in divine glory, which He had merited by His works.
But on this theory it would not be true that God had taken flesh so as to become
man, but rather that a fleshly man had become God. It would not be true that
the Word was made flesh (
CHAPTER XXIX—Of the Error of the Manicheans concerning the Incarnation
THE Manicheans said that the Son of God took not a real but an apparent body;
and that the things which He did as man, — being born, eating, drinking, walking,
suffering, and being buried, — were not done in reality, but in show. To begin
with, this theory robs Scripture of all authority. For since a show of flesh is
not flesh, nor a show of walking walking, the Scripture lies when it says, The
Word was made flesh, if the flesh was only apparent: it lies when it says that
Jesus Christ walked, ate, was dead and buried, if these things happened only in
fantastic appearance. But if even in a small matter the authority of Holy Scripture
is derogated from,
Some one may say that the veracity of Holy Scripture in relating appearance for
reality is saved by this consideration, that the appearances of things are called
figuratively and in a sense by the names of the things themselves, as a painted
man is called in a sense a man. But though this is true, yet it is not the way of
Holy Scripture to give the whole history of one transaction in this ambiguous way,
without there being other passages of Holy Scripture from whence the truth may be
manifestly gathered. Otherwise there would follow, not the instruction but the deception
of men: whereas the Apostle says that whatsoever things are written, are written
for our instruction (
When divine truths are conveyed in Scripture under figurative language, no error
can thence arise, as well from the homely character of the similitudes used, which
shows that they are but similitudes; as also because what in some places is hidden
under similitudes, in others is revealed by plain speaking. But there is no Scripture
authority to derogate from the literal truth of all that we read about the humanity
of Christ. When the Apostle says: God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful
flesh (
Moreover there are passages in which Holy Scripture expressly bars the suspicion
of Christ being a mere appearance,
CHAPTERS XXXII, XXXIII—Of the Error of Arius and Apollinaris concerning the Soul of Christ
ARIUS held that Christ had no soul, but assumed flesh alone, to which the Divinity
stood in the place of a soul. In this he was followed by Apollinaris. Apollinaris
however was brought to confess that Christ had a sensitive soul; but he averred
that the Divinity stood to that sensitive soul in place of mind and intellect (S.
Aug. de haeresibus, 55).
1. It is impossible for the Word of God to be the form of a body.
2. Take away what is of the essence of man, and a true man cannot remain. But
manifestly the soul is the chief constituent of the essence of man, being his form.
If Christ then had not a soul, He was not true man, though the Apostle calls Him
such: One mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (
4. What is generated of any living being cannot be called its offspring, unless
it come forth in the same species. But if Christ had no soul, He would not be of
the same species with other men: for things that differ in ‘form’ cannot be of the
same species. At that rate Christ could not be called the Son of Mary, or she His
mother: which however is asserted in Scripture (
5. Express mention is made of the soul of Christ,
9. The body stands to the soul as matter to form, and as the instrument to the
prime agent. But matter must be proportionate to form, and the instrument to the
prime agent. Therefore according to the diversity of souls there must also be a
diversity of bodies. And this is apparent even to sense: for in different animals
we find different arrangements of limbs, adapted to different dispositions of souls.
CHAPTER XXXIV—Of the Error of Theodore of Mopsuestia concerning the Union of the Word with Man
BY the foregoing chapters it appears that neither was the divine nature wanting
to Christ, as Photinus said; nor a true human body, according to the error of the
Manicheans; nor again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris supposed. These three
substances then meet in Christ, the Divinity, a human soul, and a true human body.
It remains to enquire, according to the evidence of Scripture, what is to be thought
of the union
The great feature in the theology of the fourth and fifth centuries was the opposition
between the school of Alexandria, allegorical, mystical, Oriental, and the school
of Antioch, matter-of-fact, literal, accurate, Western-minded. There were Saints
and Doctors of both schools, and heretics in both, the latter carrying the tendencies
of their respective schools to excess. From Alexandria came Origen, Athanasius,
Cyril, Arius, Apollinaris, Dioscorus. From Antioch, John Chrysostom, Theodoret,
Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius. Theodore in his early career was a friend of
St John Chrysostom, who addressed to him the still extant treatise, Ad Theodorum
lapsum, against the forsaking of monastic life. He was a priest with Chrysostom
at Antioch, then in 392 bishop of Mopsuestia (Μόψου
ἑστία) in Cilicia, and died in his bishopric in 428, three years before the
Council of Ephesus. Theodore was a voluminous writer and biblical commentator, fond
of the literal sense, hating allegories. He was a vigorous opponent of Arius, and
especially of Apollinaris. On the other hand, he countenanced the Pelagians, and
wrote against St Jerome and St Augustine. Theodore, like Bishop Jansenius of Ypres,
enjoyed the reputation of orthodoxy all his life, and died in the peace of the Church.
As the Jansenists took up the book of Jansenius, drew their heresy from it, and
involved themselves and it in a final condemnation; so the Nestorians fell back
upon Theodore, the protagonist of the Antiochene school. Thus Theodore and his works
came to be condemned in the fifth General Council, the second of Constantinople
in 553. Since their condemnation, the greater part of them have perished. Nestorius, a Syrian, educated at Antioch, became bishop of Constantinople in
428, the year of Theodore’s death. He was condemned and deposed in the Council of
Ephesus in 431. Nestorianism is the most rationalistic, and in that way the acutest,
of all heretical perversions of the Incarnation. At this day, east and west, beyond
the visible pale of the Catholic Church, thousands of professing Christians are,
consciously or unconsciously, Nestorians.
They said that a human soul and a human body were naturally united in Christ
to constitute one man of the same species and nature with other men; and that in
this man God dwelt as in His temple by grace, as He does in other holy men. Hence
He said Himself: Dissolve this temple, and in three days I will raise it up:
which the Evangelist explains: He spoke of the temple of his body (
1. Any thoughtful person may see that this theory cannot stand with the truth
of the Incarnation. The theory holds that the Word of God was united with the Man
Christ only by the indwelling of grace and consequent union of wills. But the indwelling
of the Word of God in man does not mean the Word of God being Incarnate: for the
Word of God and God Himself dwelt in all the saints from the beginning of the world,
according to the text: Ye are the temple of the living God, as God says: I will
dwell in them (
3. Everything that is made anything is that which it is made, as what is made
man is man, and what is made white is white. But the Word of God has been made man
(
4. No one would say, ‘I am running,’ when some one else was running, except perhaps
figuratively, meaning that another was running in his place. But that man who
is called Jesus (
6. To ascend into heaven is clearly an attribute of Christ as man, who in
their sight was taken up (
11. Though a man be called ‘Lord’ by participation in the divine dominion, still
no man, nor any creature whatever, can be called ‘the Lord of glory’: because the
glory of happiness to come is something which God alone by
12. Scripture attributes suffering and death to the only-begotten Son of God:
He spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all (
17. The word was made flesh (
19.
24. The man Christ, speaking of Himself, says many divine and supernatural things,
as, I will raise him up at the last day (
26. In him all things were made (
27. The same conclusion appears in
The opinion of Nestorius on the mystery of the Incarnation differs little from the opinion of Photinus. Both asserted that the man Christ was God only through the indwelling of grace. Photinus said that Christ merited the name and glory of Godhead by His passion and good works. Nestorius avowed that He had this name and glory from the first instant of His conception on account of the full and ample indwelling of God in Him. But concerning the eternal generation of the Word they differ considerably; Nestorius confessing it, Photinus denying it entirely.
CHAPTER XXXV—Against the Error of Eutyches
EUTYCHES,
1. In Christ Jesus there was a Body, and a natural Soul, and the Divinity. The
Body of Christ, even after the union, was not the Divinity of the Word: for the
Body of Christ, even after the union, was passible, visible to bodily eyes, and
distinct in lineaments and limbs, all of which attributes are alien to the Divinity
of the Word. In like manner the Soul of Christ after union was distinct from the
Divinity of the Word, because the Soul of Christ, even after the union, was affected
by the passions of sadness and grief and anger (
2. Being in the form of God, he took the form of a servant (
3. If we suppose a blending of both natures, divine and human, neither would remain, but some third thing; and thus Christ would be neither God nor man. Eutyches then cannot be understood to mean that one nature was made out of the two. He can only mean that after union only one of the natures remained. Either then in Christ only the divine nature remained, and what seemed in Him human was merely phenomenal, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into a human nature, as Apollinaris said: against both of whom we have argued above (Chapp. XXIX, XXXI).
5. When one nature is constituted of two permanent components, these components are either bodily parts, like the limbs of an animal, a case not in point here, or they are matter and form, like body and soul: but God is not matter, nor can He stand to any matter in the relation of form. Therefore in Christ, true God and true Man, there cannot be one nature only.
7. Where there is no agreement in nature, there is no specific likeness. If then
the nature of Christ is a compound of divine and human, there will be no specific
likeness between Him and us, contrary to the saying of the Apostle: He ought
in all things to be made like to his brethren (
9. Even this saying of Eutyches seems inconsistent with the faith, that there were two natures in Christ before the union: for as human nature is made up of body and soul, it would follow that either the soul, or the body of Christ, or both, existed before the Incarnation, which is evidently false.
CHAPTER XXXVI—Of the Error
of Macarius of Antioch, who posited one Operation only and one Will only in Christ
TO every nature there is a proper activity: for the form is the principle of activity, and different natures have different forms and different acts. If then in Christ there is only one operation, there must be in Him only one nature: but to hold that is the Eutychian heresy.
2. There is in Christ a perfect divine nature, whereby He is consubstantial with the Father; and a perfect human nature, whereby He is of one species with us. But it is part of the perfection of the divine nature to have a will (B. I, Chap. LXXII); and part of the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a man is capable of free choice. There must therefore be two wills in Christ.
3. If in Christ there is no other will than the will of the Word, by parity of reasoning there can be in Him no understanding but the understanding of the Word: thus we are brought back to the position of Apollinaris (Chap. XXXII).
4. If there was only one will in Christ, that must have been the divine will:
for the Word could not have lost the divine will, which he had from eternity. But
it does not belong to the divine will to merit. Thus then Christ would have merited
neither for Himself nor for us by His passion, contrary to the teaching of the Apostle:
He was made obedient unto death, therefore hath God exalted him (
6. In one ordinary man, though he be one in person, there are nevertheless
7. The authority of Scripture shows plainly two wills in Christ: Not to do
my will, but the will of Him that sent me (
8. And in like manner of operations, or activities, — there was in Christ one
operation common to Him with the Father, of which He says: Whatsoever things
the Father doeth, the same the Son doeth also (
Monothelism appears to have sprung from the inability of its authors to distinguish
between what is absolutely one and what is one in subordination to another. They
saw that the human will in Christ was altogether subordinate to the divine will,
so that Christ willed nothing with His human will otherwise than as the divine will
predisposed Him to will.
CHAPTER XXXIX—The Doctrine of Catholic Faith concerning the Incarnation
ACCORDING to the tradition of Catholic faith we must say that in Christ there
is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect human nature, made up of a rational
soul and human flesh; and that these two natures are united in Christ, not by mere
indwelling of the one in the other, or in any accidental way, as a man is united
with his garment, but in unity of one person. For since Holy Scripture without any
distinction assigns the things of God to the Man Christ, and the things of the Man
Christ to God, He must be one and the same person, of whom both varieties of attributes
are predicable. But because opposite attributes are not predicable of one and the
same subject in the same respect, and there is an opposition between the divine
and human attributes that are predicated of Christ, — as that He is passible and
impassible, dead and immortal, and the like, — these divine and human attributes
must be predicated of Christ in different respects. If we consider that of which
these opposite attributes are predicated, we shall find no distinction to draw,
but unity appears there. But considering that according to which these several predications
are made, there we shall see the need of drawing a distinction.
Thus also it appears how, though the Son is incarnate, it does not follow that the Father or the Holy Ghost is incarnate: for the incarnation does not have place in respect of that unity of nature wherein in the three Persons agree, but in respect of person and suppositum, wherein the three Persons are distinct. Thus as in the Trinity there is a plurality of persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there is one person subsisting in a plurality of natures.
CHAPTER XLI—Some further Elucidation of the Incarnation
EUTYCHES made the union of God and man a union of nature: Nestorius, a union neither of nature nor of person: the Catholic faith makes it a union of person, not of nature. To forestall objections, we need to form clear notions of what it is to be united ‘in nature,’ and what it is to be united ‘in person.’
Those things then are united ‘in nature,’ which combine to constitute the integrity
of some specific type, as soul and body are united to constitute the specific type
of ‘animal.’ Once a specific type is set up in its integrity, no foreign element
can be united with it in unity of nature without the breaking up of that specific
type.
Now some have reckoned the union of God and man in Christ to be after the manner
of things united ‘in unity of nature.’ Thus Arius and Apollinaris and Eutyches.
But that is quite an impossibility. For the nature of the Word is a sovereignly
perfect whole from all eternity, incapable of alteration or change: nothing foreign
to the divine nature, — no human nature, nor any element of human nature, — can
possibly come to thrust itself into that unity.
We must therefore lay it down that the union of the Word with the Man was such, that neither was one nature compounded out of two; nor was the union of the Word with human nature like the union of a substance with something exterior to it and standing in an accidental relation to it, like the relation of a man to his garment and his house: but the Word must be considered to subsist in human nature as in a nature made properly its own, so that that Body is truly the Body of the Word of God, and that Soul the Soul of the Word of God, and the Word of God truly is man. And though such union cannot be perfectly explained by mortal man, still we will endeavour, according to our capacity and ability, to say something towards the building up of faith and the defence of this mystery of faith against unbelievers.
In all creation there is nothing so like this union as the union of soul and
body. So the Athanasian Creed has it: “As the rational soul and flesh is one man,
so God and man is one Christ.”
The aforesaid examples however are not alleged as though a perfect likeness were to be looked for in them. We must understand how easy it was for the Word of God to unite Himself with human nature in a union far more sublime and intimate than that of the soul with any ‘proper instrument.’
CHAPTER XL, XLIX—Objections against the Faith of the Incarnation, with Replies
ARG. 1. If God has taken flesh, He must be either changed into a body, or be some power resident in a body.
Reply 1. The Incarnation does not mean either the conversion of the Word into flesh, or the union of the Word with a human body as the form of the same.
Arg. 2. If the person of the Word of God acquires a new subsistence in a human nature, it must undergo a substantial change, as everything is changed that acquires a new nature.
Reply 2. The change is not in the Word of God, but in the human nature assumed by the Word.
Arg. 3. If the personality of the Word of God has become the personality of a human nature, it follows that since the Incarnation the Word of God has not been everywhere, as that human nature is not everywhere.
Reply 3. Personality does not extend beyond the bounds of that nature from which it has its subsistence. But the Word of God has not its subsistence from its human nature, but rather draws that human nature to its own subsistence or personality: for it does not subsist through it, but in it.
Arg. 4. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, substance, or nature. It seems impossible therefore for one person to subsist in two natures.
Reply 4. The assertion is true, if you speak of the nature whereby a thing has being, absolutely speaking; and so, absolutely speaking, the Word of God has being by the divine nature alone, not by the human nature. But by the human nature it has being as Man.
Arg. 8. Soul and body in Christ are of not less potency than they are in other men. But their union in other men constitutes a person: therefore also in Christ.
Reply 8. The human soul and body in Christ being drawn into the personality
of the Word, and not constituting another person besides the person of the Word,
does not mark a diminution of potency, but a greater excellence. Everything is better
for being united to what is more excellent than itself, better than it was, or would
be, if it stood by itself.
Arg. 10. This man, who is Christ, considered merely as made up of soul and body, is a substance: but not a universal, therefore a particular substance: therefore a person.
Reply 10. Yes, He is a person, but no other person than the person of
the Word: because the human nature has been so assumed by the person of the Word
that the Word subsists as well in the human as in the divine nature: but what subsists
in human nature is ‘this man’: therefore the Word Himself is spoken of
Arg. 11. If the personality of the divine and human nature in Christ is the same, divine personality must be part of the notion of the Man who is Christ. But it is not part of the notion of other men. Therefore the application of the common term ‘man’ to Christ and to other men is an instance of the use of the same term not in the same sense; and thus He will not be of the same species with us.
Reply 11. Variation of the sense of a term comes from diversity of form
connoted, not from diversity of person denoted. The term ‘man’ does not vary in
sense by denoting sometimes Plato, sometimes Socrates.
CHAPTER XLIV—That the Human Nature, assumed by the Word, was perfect in Soul and Body in the instant of Conception
THE Word of God took a body through the medium of a rational soul: for the body
of man is not more assumable by God than other bodies except for the rational soul.
4. The body which the Word assumed was formed from the first instant of conception,
because it would have been against the fitness of things for the Word of God to
have assumed anything that was formless. Moreover the soul, like any other natural
form, requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter of the soul is an organised
body: for “the soul is the actualisation of an organic, natural body, that is in
potentiality to life.” The links of St Thomas’s argument are these: (a) The Word was made flesh the very instant that His Humanity was conceived,
the very instant that Mary spoke the word: Be it done to me according to thy
word. (b) The Word would not take flesh otherwise than by assuming a body there
and then animated with a rational soul. (c) A rational soul cannot inform a body not yet developed to human shape.
In the ordinary course of human embryonic development, the embryo at conception,
being incapable even of a sentient, still more of a rational soul, is animated with
a vegetative soul, which after some days gives place to a sentient soul, and that
after more days are expired, and the foetus is come to human shape, is finally replaced
by a rational soul: all which process is drawn out at length in B. II, Chapp.
LXXXVIII, LXXXIX. (d) This ordinary process of nature had to be set aside in the formation
of Mary’s miraculous Child. His Body was complete from the first, a fit receptacle
for a rational soul. His Body consequently did not develop, it simply grew. Now the link (c) of this chain is broken by modern Catholic theologians.
They see no difficulty in a rational soul informing a body not yet developed to
human shape. They hold that the rational soul is always infused in the very instant
of conception. Thereupon they conclude that the way of formation of Christ’s body,
after conception, in no way differed from that of other human bodies,
nihil differens fuisse a reliquis foetibus humanis (Pesch,
Praelectiones Dogmaticae, vol. IV, p. 85, ed. 1896). Scripture is silent on the subject; modern biology would be amazed at such a
mode of growth as St Thomas and Suarez after him suppose; and miracles, as Suarez
himself here owns, are not to be multiplied without necessity or high congruity
(Suarez, De mysteriis Christi, disp. II, sect. 2, nn. 2, 4). This discussion has an extrinsic interest as illustrating two several views of
another mighty development, that of Church government and doctrine. The development
of the Bridegroom may well be the pattern of that of the Bride. Accepting St Thomas’s supposition of the three successive souls, as a supposition
not yet quite exploded, there is still some doubt as to his conclusion, in point
of link (b). The Word remained united with the dead Body of Christ, from
whence all soul was departed: might it not then unite itself with a living Body
into which in due course of nature a rational soul was soon to come?
CHAPTER XLV—That Christ was born of a Virgin without prejudice to His true and natural Humanity
GOD’S power being infinite, and all other causes deriving their efficacy from that, any effect produced by any cause may be produced by God without aid of that cause, and yet be of the same species and nature as though it had been produced in the ordinary way. As then the natural power of the human semen produces a true man, having the species and nature of a man, so the divine power, which has given that power to the semen, may produce the effect of that power, without calling the cause into activity, and so constitute a true man, having the species and nature of a man. Nor is anything lost to the dignity of the Mother of Christ by the virgin conception and birth: there is nothing in that to prevent her being called the Mother of the Son of God: for by the working of divine power she supplied the matter physically requisite for the generation of the body of Christ: which is all that a mother need do.
CHAPTERS XLVI, XLVII—That Christ was conceived by the Holy Ghost
THOUGH every divine activity, whereby anything is done in creatures, is common
to the entire Trinity, nevertheless the formation of the body of Christ is appropriately
attributed to the Holy Ghost: for in Scripture every grace is wont to be attributed
to the Holy Ghost, since what is given gratuitously is reckoned to be bestowed out
of the love of the giver;
CHAPTER LIV—Of the Incarnation as part of the Fitness of Things
BY the fact of God having willed to unite human nature to Himself in unity of
person, it is plainly shown to men that man can be intellectually united with God
and see Him with an immediate vision. It was therefore very fitting for God to assume
human nature, thereby to lift up man’s hope to happiness. Hence since the Incarnation
men have begun to aspire more after happiness, as Christ Himself says: I have
come that they may have life and have it more abundantly (
2. Although in certain respects man is inferior to some other creatures, and
in some respects is likened to the very lowest, yet in respect of the end for which
he is created nothing is higher than man but God alone: for in God alone does the
perfect happiness of man consist. This dignity of man, requiring to find happiness
in the immediate vision of God, is most aptly shown by God’s immediate assumption
of human nature. The Incarnation
3. Since the perfect happiness of man lies in a knowledge of God beyond the natural
capacity of any created intelligence (B. III, Chap. LII),
there was wanted for man in this life a sort of foretaste of this knowledge to guide
him to the fulness of it; and that foretaste is by faith (B. III, Chapp.
XL, CLIII). But this knowledge of faith,
whereby a man is guided to his last end, ought to be of the highest certitude: to
which perfect certitude man needed to be instructed by God Himself made man. So
it is said: No man hath seen God ever: the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom
of the Father, he hath told us (
4. Since the perfect happiness of man consists in the enjoyment of God, it was requisite for man’s heart to be disposed to desire this enjoyment. But the desire of enjoying anything springs from the love of it. Therefore it was requisite for man, making his way to perfect happiness, to be induced to love God. Now nothing induces us to love any one so much as the experience of his love for us. Nor could God’s love for man have been more effectually demonstrated to man than by God’s willing to be united with man in unity of person: for this is just the property of love, to unite the lover with the loved.
5. Friendship resting on a certain equality, persons very unequal cannot be conjoined in friendship. To promote familiar friendship then between man and God, it was expedient that God should become man, “that while we know God in visible form, we may thereby be borne on to the love of His invisible perfections ” (Mass of Christmas Day).
6. For the strengthening of man in virtue it was requisite that he should receive
doctrine and examples of virtue from God made man, since of mere men even the holiest
are found at fault sometimes. I have given you an example, that as I have done
so ye also do (
8. The tradition of the Church teaches us that the whole human race has been
infected by sin. And it is part of the order of divine justice that sin should not
be forgiven without satisfaction. But no mere man was able to satisfy for the sin
of all mankind, since every mere man is something less than the whole multitude
of mankind. For the deliverance then of mankind from their common sin, it was requisite
for one to make satisfaction, who was at once man, so that satisfaction should be
expected of him, and something above man, so that his merit should be sufficient
to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race. Now in the order of happiness there
is nothing greater than man but God alone: for though the angels are higher in condition
of nature, they are not higher in respect to their final end, because they are made
happy with the same happiness as man.
CHAPTER LV—Points of Reply to Difficulties touching the Economy of the Incarnation
WE must bear in mind that, so immovable is the divine goodness in its perfection, that nothing is lost to God, however near any creature is raised to Him: the gain is to the creature.
3. Man being a compound of a spiritual and a corporeal nature, and thereby, we may say, occupying the borderland of two natures, all creation seems to be interested in whatever is done for man’s salvation. Lower corporeal creatures make for his use, and are in some sort of subjection to him: while the higher spiritual creation, the angelic, has in common with man its attainment of the last end. This argues a certain appropriateness in the universal Cause of all creatures taking to Himself in unity of person that creature whereby He is more readily in touch with all the rest of creation.
4. Sin in man admits of expiation, because man’s choice is not immovably fixed on its object, but may be perverted from good to evil, and from evil brought back to good; and the like is the case of man’s reason, which, gathering the truth from sensible appearances and signs, can find its way to either side of a conclusion. But an angel has a fixed discernment of things through simple intuition; and as he is fixed in his apprehension, so is he fixed also in his choice. Hence he either does not take to evil at all; or if he does take to evil, he takes to it irrevocably, and his sin admits of no expiation. Since then the expiation of sin was the chief cause of the Incarnation, it was more fitting for human nature than for angelic nature to be assumed by God.
7. Though all created good is a small thing, compared with the divine goodness, still there can be nothing greater in creation than the salvation of the rational creature, which consists in the enjoyment of that divine goodness. And since the salvation of man has followed from the Incarnation of God, it cannot be said that that Incarnation has brought only slight profit to the world. Nor need all men be saved by the Incarnation, but they only who by faith and the sacraments of faith adhere to the Incarnation.
8. The Incarnation was manifested to man by sufficient evidences. There is no
more fitting way of manifesting Godhead than by the performance of acts proper to
God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the course of nature (naturae
leges), by doing something above that nature of which Himself is the
author. Works overriding the ordinary course of nature (opera
quae supra leges naturae fiunt) are the aptest evidences of divine being.
Such works Christ did; and by these works He argued His Divinity. When asked,
Art thou he that is to come? He replied, The blind see, the lame walk, the
lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again (
9. Human nature is so conditioned as not to be apt to be led to perfection at
once; but it must be led by the hand through stages of imperfection, so to arrive
at perfection at last, as we see in the training of children. If great and unheard-of
truths were proposed to a multitude, they would not grasp them immediately: their
only chance is to become accustomed to such truths by mastering lesser truths first.
Thus it was fitting for the human race to receive their first instruction in the
things of salvation by light and rudimentary lessons (levia et
minora documenta), delivered by the patriarchs, the law and the prophets;
and that finally in the consummation of ages the perfect doctrine of Christ should
be set forth on earth. When the fulness of time was come, God sent his Son
(
12. It was not expedient for the Incarnate God in this world to live in wealth
and high honour: first, because the object of His coming was to withdraw the minds
of men from their attachment to earthly things, and to raise them to things heavenly,
for which purpose He found it necessary to draw men by His example to a contempt
of riches: secondly, because if He had abounded in riches, and had been set in some
high position, His divine doings would have been ascribed rather to secular power
than to the virtue of the Divinity. This indeed forms the most efficacious argument
of His Divinity, that without aid of secular power He has changed the whole world
for the better.
13. God’s commandment to men is of works of virtue; and the more perfectly any
one performs an act of virtue, the more he obeys God. Now of all virtues charity
is the chief: all others are referred to it. Christ’s obedience to God consisted
most of all in His perfect fulfilment of the act of charity: for greater charity
than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends (
15. Though God has no wish for the death of men, yet He has a wish for virtue; and by virtue man meets death bravely, and exposes himself to danger of death for charity. Thus God had a wish for the death of Christ, inasmuch as Christ took upon Himself that death out of charity, and bravely endured it.
17. It is well said that Christ wished to suffer the death of the cross in order to give an example of humility. The virtue of humility consists in keeping oneself within one’s own bounds, not reaching out to things above one, but submitting to one’s superior. Thus humility cannot befit God, who has no superior, but is above all. Whenever any one subjects himself out of humility to an equal or any inferior, that is because he takes that equal or inferior to be his superior in some respect. Though then the virtue of humility cannot attach to Christ in His divine nature, yet it may attach to Him in his human nature. And His divinity renders His humility all the more praiseworthy: for the dignity of the person adds to the merit of humility; and there can be no greater dignity to a man than his being God. Hence the highest praise attaches to the humility of the Man God, who, to wean men’s hearts from worldly glory to the love of divine glory, chose to endure a death of no ordinary sort, but a death of the deepest ignominy.
19. It was necessary for Christ to suffer (
20. Although when it is a question of punishing sins, he must be punished who
has sinned, nevertheless, when it is a question of making satisfaction, one may
bear another’s penalty. When punishment is inflicted for sin, his iniquity is put
into the scale who has sinned: but when satisfaction is made by the offender’s voluntary
taking upon himself a penalty to appease him whom he has offended, account is taken
in that case of the affection and good will of him who makes the satisfaction. And
this appears best in the case of one taking upon himself a penalty instead of another,
and God accepting the satisfaction of one for another (B. III, Chap.
CLIX ad fin.)
25. Though the death of Christ is sufficient satisfaction for original sin, there
is nothing incongruous in the miseries consequent
26. Each individual must seek the remedies that make for his own salvation. The
death of Christ is a universal cause of salvation, as the sin of the first man was
a universal cause of damnation.
CHAPTER L—That Original Sin is transmitted from our First Parent to his Posterity
THIS expressly appears from the words of the Apostle: As by one man sin came
into the world, and by sin death, so death passed on to all men, seeing that all
have sinned (
Moreover, the common custom of the Church is to administer baptism to new-born
children. But there would be no purpose in such administration, unless there were
sin in them. If it is said that the purpose of infant baptism is not the cleansing
of sin, but the arriving at the kingdom of God, the saying is nonsensical. They
who say so, appeal to our Lord’s words: Unless a man be born again of water and
the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (
CHAPTERS LI, LII—Arguments against Original Sin, with Replies
CHAP. LII — Before dealing with objections, we must premise that there are apparent
in mankind certain probable signs of original sin, as we can argue fault from penalty.
Now the human race generally suffers various penalties, corporal and spiritual.
Among corporal penalties the chief is death, to which all the others lead up, as
hunger, thirst, and the like. Among spiritual penalties the chief is the weak hold
that reason takes of man, so that man with difficulty arrives at the knowledge of
truth, easily falls into error, and cannot altogether surmount his bestial appetites,
but often has his mind clouded by them. Some one may say that these defects, corporal
and spiritual, are not penal, but natural. But looking at the thing rightly, and
supposing divine providence, which to all varieties of perfection has adapted subjects
apt to take up each variety,
Arg. 1. The son shall not bear the
iniquity of his father (
Reply 1. There is a difference between what affects one individual and
what affects the nature of a whole species: for by partaking in the species many
men are as one man, as Porphyry says. The sin then that belongs to one individual
is not imputable to another individual, unless he sins too, because the one is personally
distinct from the other. But any sin touching the specific nature itself may without
difficulty be propagated from one to another, as the specific nature is imparted
by one to others [by generation]. The difficulty of this interesting passage is its seeming to place original sin
in the privation of original justice, as above defined: whereas baptism, cleansing
as it does from original sin, does not impart original justice, but sanctifying
grace. Original sin is the privation of sanctifying grace, under the explanations
given in note, p. 379. God’s sentence upon Adam has worked
like an attainder upon a nobleman guilty of treason. The title is taken away from
the family. We are by nature and birth a family of commoners, and worse than commoners,
for we ought to be noble, and are not, because of the brand of treason resting upon
our race. So we are τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς ( There is no difficulty in the text of Ezechiel, which refers to the sins of the
people to whom the prophet was sent; and describes the providence of God, not over
Adam, but over his posterity.
Arg. 5. What is natural is no sin, as it is not the mole’s fault for being blind.
Reply 5. The defects above mentioned are transmitted by natural origin, inasmuch as nature is destitute of the aid of grace, which had been conferred upon nature in our first parent, and was meant to pass from him to posterity along with nature; and, inasmuch as this destitution has arisen from a voluntary sin, the defect so consequent comes to bear the character of a fault. Thus these defects are at once culpable, as referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and natural, as referred to a nature now destitute [of original justice].
Arg. 6. A defect in a work of nature happens only through defect of some natural principle.
Reply 6. There is a defect of principle, namely, of the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its first creation; which gift was in a manner ‘natural,’ not that it was caused by the principles of nature, but because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature.
Arg. 9. The good of nature is not taken away by sin: hence even in devils their natural excellences remain. Therefore the origin of human generation, which is an act of nature, cannot have been vitiated by sin.
Reply 9. By sin there is not taken away from man the good of nature which
belongs to his natural species, but a good of nature which was superadded by grace.
10. The gift, not belonging to the essence of the species, was nevertheless bestowed by God gratuitously on the first man, that from him it might pass to the entire species: in like manner the sin, which is the privation of that gift, passes to the entire species.
11. Though by the sacraments of grace one is so cleansed from original sin that
it is not imputed to him as a fault, — and this is what is meant by saying that
he is personally delivered from that sin, — yet he is not altogether
healed; Non tamen totaliter sanatur. Though there is nothing
in this passage of St Thomas inconsistent with the Council of Trent, Sess. 5, Can.
5, still I scarcely think that the Saint would have written this phrase had that
canon been framed in his time. The Council insists on the axiom that there is nothing
in the baptised that God hates (in renatis nihil odit Deus). But waiving the question of language and formularies, St Thomas here stands on
two affirmations which every Catholic must affirm with him: (1) that the baptised
Christian, though cleansed from original sin, is not endowed with ‘original justice,’
as above defined: (2) that the children of baptised parents are conceived and born
in original sin.
CHAPTER LVI—Of the Need of Sacraments
THE death of Christ is the universal cause of man’s salvation: but a universal cause has to be applied to particular effects. Thus it was found necessary for certain remedies to be administered to men by way of bringing Christ’s death into proximate connexion with them. Such remedies are the Sacraments of the Church. And these remedies had to be administered with certain visible signs: — first, because God provides for man, as for other beings, according to his condition; and it is the condition of man’s nature to be led through sensible things to things spiritual and intelligible: secondly, because instruments must be proportioned to the prime cause; and the prime and universal cause of man’s salvation is the Word Incarnate: it was convenient therefore that the remedies, through which that universal cause reaches men, should resemble the cause in this, that divine power works invisibly through visible signs.
Hereby is excluded the error of certain heretics, who wish all visible sacramental
signs swept away; and no wonder, for they take all visible things to be of their
own nature evil, and the work of an evil author (B. III, Chap.
XV).
These visible sacramental signs are the instruments of a God Incarnate and Crucified (instrumenta Dei incarnati et passi).
CHAPTER LVII—Of the Difference between the Sacraments of the Old and of the New Law
THESE Sacraments, having their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, which they
represent, must fall in and correspond with the salvation wrought by Christ. Before
the Incarnation and Passion of Christ this salvation was promised, but not accomplished:
it was wrought by the Incarnation and Passion of the Word. Therefore the Sacraments
that preceded the Incarnation of Christ must have been such as to signify and promise
salvation:
This avoids the error of the Jews, who believe that the sacred rites of the Law
must be observed for ever, because they were instituted by God, who repents not
and changes not. There is no change or repentance about an arrangement, which arranges
for different things to be done according to the fitness of different times; as
the father of a family gives different commands to his son in his nonage and when
he is come of age.
CHAPTER LVIII—Of the Number of the Sacraments of the New Law
THE remedies that provide
for spiritual life are marked off, one from another, according to the pattern of
corporal life. Now in respect of corporal life we find two classes of subjects.
There are some who propagate and regulate corporal life in others, and some in
whom corporal life is propagated and regulated. To this corporal and natural
life three things are ordinarily necessary, and a fourth thing incidentally so.
First, a living thing must receive life by generation or birth. Secondly, it
must attain by augmentation to due quantity and strength. The third necessity is
of nourishment. These three, generation, growth, and nutrition, are ordinary
necessities, since bodily life cannot go on without them. But because bodily
life may receive a check by sickness, there comes to be incidentally a fourth
necessity, the healing of a living thing when it is sick. So in spiritual life
the first thing is spiritual generation by Baptism: the second is spiritual
growth leading to perfect strength by the Sacrament of Confirmation: the third
is spiritual nourishment by the Sacrament of the Eucharist: there remains a
fourth, which is spiritual healing, either of the soul alone by the Sacrament of
Penance, or of the soul first, and thence derivatively, when it is expedient, of
the body also, by Extreme Unction. These Sacraments then concern those subjects
in whom spiritual life is propagated and preserved. Again, the propagators and
regulators of bodily life are assorted according to a twofold division, namely,
according to natural origin, which belongs to parents, and according to civil
government, whereby the peace of human life is preserved, and that belongs to
kings and princes. So then it is in spiritual life: there are some propagators
and conservators of spiritual life by means of spiritual ministration only, and
to that ministration belongs the Sacrament of Order: there are others who
propagate and preserve at once corporal and spiritual life together, and that is
done by the Sacrament of Matrimony, whereby man
THE generation of a living thing is a change from not living to life.
With the acquisition of a new form there goes also the acquisition of the activity consequent upon that form; and therefore the baptised become immediately capable of spiritual actions, such as the reception of the other Sacraments. Also there is due to them a position suited to the spiritual life: that position is everlasting happiness: and therefore the baptised, if they die fresh from baptism, are immediately caught up into bliss: hence it is said that baptism opens the gate of heaven.
One and the same thing can be generated only once: therefore, as Baptism is a spiritual generation, one man is to be baptised only once. The infection that came through Adam defiles a man only once: hence Baptism, which is directed mainly against that infection, ought not to be repeated. Also, once a thing is consecrated, so long as it lasts, it ought not to be consecrated again, lest the consecration should appear to be of no avail: hence Baptism, as it is a consecration of the person baptised, ought not to be repeated.
THE perfection of spiritual strength consists in a man’s daring to confess the
faith of Christ before any persons whatsoever, undeterred by any shame or intimidation.
This Sacrament then, whereby spiritual strength is conferred on the regenerate man,
constitutes him a champion of the faith of Christ. And because those who fight under
a Prince wear his badge, persons confirmed are signed with the sign of Christ, whereby
He fought and conquered. They receive this sign on their foreheads, to signify that
they do not blush publicly to confess the faith of Christ. The signing is done with
a composition of oil and balsam, called ‘chrism,’ not unreasonably. By the oil is
denoted the power of the Holy Ghost, whereby Christ is termed ‘anointed’ [
BECAUSE spiritual effects are produced on the pattern of visible effects, it was fitting that our spiritual nourishment should be given us under the appearances of those things that men commonly use for their bodily nourishment, namely bread and wine. And for the further correspondence of spiritual signs with bodily effects, in the spiritual regeneration of Baptism the mystery of the Word Incarnate is united with us otherwise than as it is united in this Sacrament of the Eucharist, which is our spiritual nourishment. In Baptism the Word Incarnate is only virtually contained, but in the Sacrament of the Eucharist we confess Him to be contained substantially, as nourishment must be substantially united with the nourished.
And because the completion of our salvation was wrought by Christ’s passion and
death, whereby His Blood was separated from His Body, therefore the Sacrament of
His Body is given us separately under the species of bread, and His Blood under
the species of wine.
CHAPTER LXIII—Of the Conversion of Bread into the Body of Christ
IT is impossible for the true Body of Christ to begin to be in this Sacrament
by local motion, because then it would cease to be in heaven, upon every consecration
of this Sacrament; as also because this Sacrament could not then be consecrated
except in one place, since one local motion can only have one terminus; also because
local motion cannot be instantaneous, but takes time. Therefore its presence must
be due to the conversion of the substance of bread into the substance of His Body,
and of the substance of wine into the substance of His Blood. This shows the falseness
of the opinion of those who say that the substance of bread co-exists with the substance
of the Body of Christ in this Sacrament;
We must observe that the conversion of bread into the Body of Christ falls under
a different category from all natural conversions. In every natural conversion the
subject remains, and in that subject different forms succeed one another: hence
these are called ‘formal conversions.’ But in this conversion subject passes into
subject, while the accidents remain: hence this conversion is termed ’substantial.’
Now we have to consider how subject is changed into subject, a change which nature
cannot effect. Every operation of nature presupposes matter, whereby subjects are
individuated; hence nature cannot make this subject become that, as for instance,
this finger that finger. But matter lies wholly under the power of God, since by
that power it is brought into being: hence it may be brought about by divine power
that one individual substance shall be converted into another pre-existing substance.
By the power of a natural agent, the operation of which extends only to the producing
of a change of form and presupposes the existence of the subject of change, this
whole is converted into that whole with variation of species and form. Many will find these scholastic explanations harder to accept than transubstantiation
itself. The dogma is guaranteed by the Catholic Church. The explanations of the
dogma lie beyond the domain alike of faith, of sensible experience, and of physical
science. They rest on a structure of abstruse metaphysics, into which there enter
elements much open to debate, as the ‘principle of individuation.’ At the same time,
any one who will have it that transubstantiation is philosophically absurd, may
well be asked whether he has mastered these scholastic subtleties, and has his reply
ready to dispel them. All that a Catholic need care to do is to point out, as Newman
does (note, p. 391), how by reason of the very obscurity
of the subject arguments against the possibility of transubstantiation cannot be
cogent and apodictic. We are not bound to have forthcoming positive evidence of
that possibility. We take the fact from the teaching of the Church, and leave
the how to God. When physical science has said its last word on the constitution
of matter; when psychology and metaphysics have finally disposed of substance and
accident, ‘things in themselves’ and phenomena; we shall then be not quite so ill
equipped as we are at present for speculating on the philosophy of transubstantiation. Meanwhile, one important point seems to have escaped notice. Faith does not raise
the question of any substance being converted into any other substance,
but only of the substances of bread and wine being converted into the substance
of the Body and Blood of Christ. Now the Body and Blood of Christ are the Body and
Blood of God, and consequently hold a unique position among substances. God’s Body
may well ’supercomprehend,’ so to speak, all lower material substances; and be able,
after unseating any of them from the throne where it sits queen, surrounded by attendant
accidents, itself occupy that same throne in the midst of those same accidents.
We cannot safely conclude thereupon that any other material substance is capable
of doing the like. It does not follow, to borrow St Thomas’s own illustration, that
because bread and wine can be changed into the Body and Blood of Christ, therefore,
of my two fingers, one can be changed into the other. Of the intrinsic possibility
of this latter conversion, — and not even God can effect intrinsic impossibilities,
— I confess I entertain the gravest doubts. And Catholic faith allows me to doubt
it. Vasquez (tom. 3, disp. 184) discusses an quaelibet res in
quamlibet aliam converti possit.
This then is one reason for the accident of bread remaining, that something may be found permanent under the conversion. Another reason is this. If the substance of bread was converted into the Body of Christ, and the accidents of bread also passed away, there would not ensue upon such conversion the being of the Body of Christ in substance where the bread was before: for nothing would be left to refer the Body of Christ to that place. But since the dimensions of bread (quantitas dimensiva panis), whereby the bread held this particular place, remain after conversion, while the substance of bread is changed into the Body of Christ, the Body of Christ comes to be under the dimensions of bread, and in a manner to occupy the place of the bread by means of the said dimensions.
CHAPTER LXIV—An Answer to Difficulties raised in respect of Place
IN this Sacrament something is present by force of conversion, and something
by natural concomitance. By force of conversion there is present that which is the
immediate term into which conversion is made. Such under the species of bread is
the Body of Christ, into which the substance of bread is converted by the words,
This is my body. Such again under the species of wine is the Blood of Christ,
when it is said, This is the chalice of my blood. By natural concomitance
all other things are there, which, though conversion is not made into them, nevertheless
are really united with the term into which conversion is made. Clearly, the term
into which conversion of the bread is made is not the Divinity of Christ, nor His
Soul: nevertheless the Soul and the Divinity of Christ are under the species of
bread, because of the real union of them both with the Body of Christ. If during
the three days that Christ lay dead this Sacrament had been celebrated, the Soul
of Christ would not have been under the species of bread, because it was not really united
Hereby we have an answer to the difficulty of the incommensurateness of the Body
of Christ with the space taken up by the bread. The substance of the bread is converted
directly into the substance of the Body of Christ: but the dimensions of the Body
of Christ are in the Sacrament by natural concomitance, not by force of conversion,
since the dimensions of the bread remain.
And so of the plurality of places. By its own proper dimensions the Body of Christ is in one place only; but by means of the dimensions of the bread that passes into it, the Body of Christ is in as many places as there are places in which the mystery of this conversion is celebrated, — not divided into parts, but whole in each: for every consecrated bread is converted into the whole Body of Christ.
CHAPTER LXV—The Difficulty of the Accidents remaining
IT cannot be denied that the accidents of bread and wine do remain, as the infallible
testimony of the senses assures us. Nor is the Body and Blood of Christ affected
by them, since that could not be without change in Him, and He is not susceptible
of such accidents. It follows that they remain without subject. Nor is their so
remaining an impossibility to the divine power. The same rule applies to the production
of things and to their conservation in being. The power of God can produce the effects
of any secondary causes whatsoever without the causes themselves, because that power
is infinite, and supplies to all secondary causes the power in which they act: hence
it can preserve in being the effects of secondary causes without the causes. Thus
in this Sacrament it preserves the accident in being, after removing the substance
that preserves it.
CHAPTER LXVI—What happens when the Sacramental Species pass away
FOR the removal of this doubt there has been invented a famous theory (famosa
positio), which is held by many. They say that when this Sacrament comes
to be changed in the ordinary process of digestion or to be burnt, or otherwise
destroyed, the accidents are not converted into substance, but there returns by
miracle the substance of bread that had been before, and out of that are generated
the products into which this Sacrament is found to turn. But this theory cannot
stand at all. It seems better to say that in the consecration there is miraculously
conferred upon the accidents the power of subsistence, which is proper to substance:
hence they can do all things, and have all things done to them, that the substance
itself could do, or have done to it, if it were there: hence without any new miracle
they can nourish, or be reduced to ashes, in the same mode and order as if the substance
of bread and wine were there. The Real Presence is attached,
not to the chemical elements of bread and wine, still less to any ultimate atoms,
molecules, electrons, or the like, but to the visible appearances of bread and wine.
When these appearances disappear, the Real Presence is gone and the question is,
what has happened to what is left. St Thomas here, and Sum. Theol. 3, q.
77, art. 5, seems to hold that what is left continues in the miraculous state of
accidents functioning as substance to the end of time. But may we not plead against
the saint his own words, that at that rate “by the frequent use of this mystery
much of the corporeal nature originally created would have been reduced,” not exactly
to “nothing,” but to a state bordering on nothingness? (Chap.
LXIII.) This solution is not commonly taken. See Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae,
vol. VI, pp. 311, 312. Also that wary theologian, Cardinal Franzelin, writes: “When the accidents are
so changed that naturally they would no longer point to the substance of bread and
wine, but to some other, it becomes necessary for the Body and Blood of Christ no
longer to remain under them. Were they to remain, it would be no longer the Sacrament
instituted by Christ under the appearances of bread and wine. When this substance
of the Body and Blood of Christ ceases to be under the changed accidents, those
changed accidents connaturally require some substance to answer to them. As then
upon the sufficient organisation of the foetus the creation and infusion of the
soul follows according to a natural law laid down by God, so when the accidents
are specifically changed and the Real Presence ceases, there follows the creation
of a corresponding substance under those new accidents, and that, we may say, connaturally,
according to a constant law laid down by God. This is equivalent to the restitution
of the matter that was before consecration (De Eucharistia, pp. 240 sq. 293).
CHAPTER LXVII—Answer to the Difficulty raised in respect of the Breaking of the Host
IT has been said above (Chap. LXIV) that the substance
of the Body of Christ is in this Sacrament by virtue of the Sacrament [Sacramental
words]: but the dimensions of the Body of Christ are there by the natural concomitance
which they have with the substance. This is quite the opposite way to that in which
a body naturally is in place.
But substantial being and quantitative being do not stand in the same way related
to that in which they are. Quantitative being is in a whole, but is not whole in
each part: it is part in part, and whole in the whole. Read
Spirit of Aristotle: “Thomas, your explanations are harder to accept than
the doctrine which you undertook to explain.” Spirit of Aquinas: “My dear sir, take all this explanation as child’s
play on my part: for, as Paul says, when I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood
as a child, I thought as a child: but now I am become a man, and see face to face,
I have put away the things of a child.” Surely we may call the things of a child all mere human speculations on
a mystery so incomprehensible as the Holy Eucharist. I have nothing to say against
the wisdom of the school, but it does not make transubstantiation one whit clearer
to me. I remain in Cardinal Newman’s frame of mind, when he wrote: “I cannot tell how it is, but I say: Why should it not be? What’s to hinder it?
What do I know of substance or matter? Just as much as the greatest philosophers,
and that is nothing at all . . . . The Catholic doctrine leaves phenomena alone.
It does not say that the phenomena go: on the contrary, it says that they remain:
nor does it say that the same phenomena are in several places at once. It deals
with what no one on earth knows anything about, the material substances themselves”
(Apologia, p. 239, ed. 1895). The Cardinal in this passage writes in the easy epistolary style which he often
affects, not in the solemn and strict phraseology of a legal document, civil or
ecclesiastical. Newman knew, as well as any man, that substance is the reality that
underlies appearances, the objective unity of those appearances, the noumenon, or
thing in itself. We know that, and we say that; and, thanks to that modicum of knowledge,
transubstantiation is not to us a vox nihili: but
how much more do we know? and how far does that slight concept of substance carry
towards a comprehensive understanding of transubstantiation?
CHAPTER LXVIII—The Explanation of a Text
NOR is there anything contrary to the tradition of the Church in the word of
the Lord saying to the disciples, who seemed scandalised: The words that I have
spoken to you are spirit and life (
CHAPTER LXIX—Of the kind of Bread and Wine that ought to be used for the Consecration of this Sacrament
THOSE conditions must be observed which are essential for bread and wine to be.
That alone is called wine, which is liquor pressed out of grapes:
This shuts out the error of some heretics who say that this Sacrament cannot
be celebrated in unleavened bread: a position plainly upset by the authority of
the gospel, where we read (
CHAPTER LXX—That it is possible
for a man to sin after receiving Sacramental Grace St Thomas, characteristically, proves his thesis by
four a
priori arguments, and one of testimonies from Scripture. We may rest
satisfied with the one too common argument of experience. He continues: “Hereby
is excluded the error of certain heretics (St Jerome, Contra Jovin. Chap.
XXXI, says it was an error of Jovinian), that man, after receiving the grace of
the Holy Ghost, cannot sin; and that if he sins, he never had the grace of the Holy
Ghost.” The only possibility of heresy in such a plain matter is by taking sanctifying
grace to consist in nothing else than election and predestination to glory (cf.
B. III, Chap. CLXIV). In the tautological sense that all
whom God foresees in the ranks of the Blessed will be finally Blessed, it is true
to say that ‘once elect, always elect.’ But it would be heresy to say that sin is
never imputed to the elect. Oliver Cromwell, dying, asked a minister, whether it
was possible to fall from grace. The Calvinist minister at his bedside said that
it was not possible. “Then,” said the dying man, “I am safe, for I was in grace
once.” How did he know that? Was it provable from a baptismal register? Not to a
Calvinist. St Thomas concludes the chapter thus: “The text
CHAPTER LXXI—That a man who
sins after the Grace of the Sacraments may be converted to Grace
HEREBY is excluded the error of the Novatians, who denied pardon to sinners after
baptism.
CHAPTER LXXII—Of the need of the Sacrament of Penance, and of the Parts thereof
THE Sacrament of Penance is a spiritual cure. As sick men are healed, not by being
born again, but by some reaction (alteratio) set up
in their system; so, of sins committed after baptism, men are healed by the spiritual
reaction of Penance, not by repetition of the spiritual regeneration of Baptism.
Now a bodily cure is sometimes worked entirely from within by the mere effort of
nature; sometimes from within and from without at the same time, when nature is
aided by the benefit of medicine. But the cure is never wrought entirely from without:
there still remain in the patient certain elements of life, which go to cause health
in him.
The first loss that man sustains by sin is a wrong bent given to his mind, whereby
it is turned away from the unchangeable good, which is God, and turned to sin.
This re-ordering of the mind, which consists in Contrition, comes from within,
from free will aided by divine grace. But because the merit of Christ, suffering
for mankind, is the operative principle in the expiation of all sins (Chap.
LV), a man who would be delivered from sin must not only adhere
in mind to God, but also to the mediator between God and men, the man Christ
Jesus (
But since the infliction of punishment for fault requires a trial, the penitent
Hereby is excluded the error of certain persons, who said that a man could obtain pardon of his sins without confession and purpose of confession; or that the prelates of the Church could dispense a sinner from the obligation of confession. The prelates of the Church have no power to frustrate the keys of the Church, in which their whole power is contained; nor to enable a man to obtain forgiveness of his sins without the Sacrament which has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ: only Christ, the institutor and author of the Sacraments, can do that. The prelates of the Church can no more dispense a man from confession and absolution in order to remission of sin than they can dispense him from baptism in order to salvation.
But this is a point to observe. Baptism may be efficacious to the remission of
sin before it is actually received, while one purposes to receive it: though afterwards
it takes fuller effect in the gaining of grace and the remission of guilt, when
it actually is received. And sometimes
Thus it is clear that the minister of the Church in the use of the keys exercises
judicial functions. But to none is judgement committed except over persons subject
to his court. Hence it is not any and every priest that can absolve any and every
subject from sin:
CHAPTER LXXIII—Of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction
BY dispensation of divine justice, the sickness of the soul, which is sin, sometimes
passes to the body.
This Sacrament is not to be given to all sick persons, but only to such as seem
to be near to death from sickness. If they recover, this Sacrament may be administered
to them again, if they are again reduced to the like state. For the unction of this
Sacrament is not an unction of consecration, like the unction of Confirmation, the
ablution of Baptism, and certain other unctions, which are never repeated, because
the consecration always remains so long as the thing consecrated lasts: but the
anointing in this Sacramentis for healing,
Though some are in a state near to death without sickness, as are persons condemned
to death, and they would need the spiritual effects of this Sacrament, still this
Sacrament is not to be given to them, but only to the sick, since it is given under
the form of bodily medicine, and bodily medicine is not proper except for one bodily
sick. For in the administration of Sacraments their signification must be observed.
Oil is the special matter of this Sacrament, because it is of efficacy for bodily healing by mitigation of pains, as water, which washes bodies, is the matter of the Sacrament in which spiritual cleansing is performed. And as bodily healing must go to the root of the malady, so this unction is applied to those parts of the body from which the malady of sin proceeds, as are the organs of sense.
And because through this Sacrament sins are forgiven, and sin is not forgiven
except through grace, clearly grace is conferred in this Sacrament. Nor is a bishop
necessary to give this Sacrament, since the Sacrament does not bestow any excellence
of state, as do those Sacraments in which a bishop is the minister.
CHAPTER LXXIV—Of the Sacrament of Order
SINCE Christ intended to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, He needed
to institute other men as ministers to Himself, who should dispense the Sacraments
to the faithful. Hence He committed to His disciples the consecration of His Body
and Blood, saying: Do this in memory of me (
Nor can it be said that this power was given to the disciples of Christ not to
be transmitted to others. It was given unto edification (
Among Sacraments the noblest, and that which sets the crown on the rest, is the
Sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore the power of Order must be considered chiefly
in relation to this Sacrament: for everything is ruled by the end for which it is
made. Now the power that gives perfection, also prepares the matter to receive it.
CHAPTER LXXV—Of the Distinction of Orders
SINCE the power of Order is principally directed to the consecration of the Body
of Christ, and its administration to the faithful, and the cleansing of the faithful
from sin, there must be some chief Order, the power of which extends chiefly to
these objects; and that is the Order of Priesthood. There must be other Orders to
serve the chief Order by one way or another preparing its matter; and these are
the Orders of Ministers. The power of Priesthood extending to two objects, the consecration
of the Body of Christ, and the rendering the faithful by absolution from sin fit
to receive the Eucharist, the lower Orders must serve the Priesthood either in both
or in one of these respects. The lower Orders serve the Priesthood only in preparing
the people [for the Eucharist]. This the Doorkeepers do by shutting out unbelievers
from the company of the faithful: the Lectors by instructing the catechumens in
the rudiments of the faith, — hence the Scripture of the Old Testament is committed
to their reading: the Exorcists by cleansing those who are already instructed, if
in any way they are hindered by the devil from the reception of the Sacraments.
CHAPTER LXXVI—Of the Episcopal Dignity, and that therein one Bishop is Supreme
THERE must be some power of higher ministry in the Church to administer the Sacrament
of Order; and this is the episcopal power,
1. Though populations are different in different dioceses and cities, still,
as there is one Church, there must be one Christian people. As then in the spiritual
people of one Church there is required one Bishop, who is Head of all that people;
so in the whole Christian people it is requisite that there be one Head of the whole
Church.
2. One requisite of the unity of the Church is the agreement of all the faithful
in faith. When questions of faith arise, the Church would be rent by diversity of
judgements, were it not preserved in unity by the judgement of one. But in things
necessary Christ is not wanting to His Church, which He has loved, and has shed
His blood for it: since even of the Synagogue the Lord says: What is there that
I ought further to have done for my vineyard and have not done it.? (
3. None can doubt that the government of the Church is excellently well arranged,
arranged as it is by Him through whom kings reign and lawgivers enact just things
(
But if any will have it that the one Head and one Shepherd is Christ, as being
the one Spouse of the one Church, his view is inadequate to the facts. For though
clearly Christ Himself gives effect to the Sacraments of the Church, — He it is
who baptises, He forgives sins, He is the true Priest who has offered Himself on
the altar of the cross, and by His power His Body is daily consecrated at our altars,
— nevertheless, because He was not to be present in bodily shape with all His faithful,
He chose ministers and would dispense His gifts to His faithful people through their
hands. And by reason of the same future absence it was needful for Him to issue
His commission to some one to take care of this universal Church in His stead.
Hereby is cast out the presumptuous error of some, who endeavour to withdraw themselves from obedience and subjection to Peter, not recognising his successor, the Roman Pontiff, for the pastor of the Universal Church.
CHAPTER LXXVII—That Sacraments can be administered even by Wicked Ministers
NO agent can do anything in what is beyond his competence, unless he gets power
from elsewhere: thus the mayor
5. One man cannot judge of the goodness or wickedness of another man: that is
proper to God alone, who searches the secrets of hearts. If then the wickedness
of the minister could hinder the effect of the Sacrament, it would be impossible
for a man to have a sure confidence of his salvation:
Hence the Lord says: The Scribes and Pharisees have come to sit in the chair
of Moses: whatever things therefore they say to you, observe and do: but according
to their works do ye not (
Hereby is cast out the error of those who say that all good men can administer
the Sacraments, and no bad men.
CHAPTER LXXVIII—Of the Sacrament of Matrimony
THOUGH by the Sacraments men are restored to grace, they are not immediately
restored to immortality. Since then the faithful people needs to be perpetuated
to the end of the world, this has to be done by generation. Now generation works
to many ends: to the perpetuity of the species, to the perpetuity of the political
commonwealth, and to the perpetuity of the Church. Hence it comes to be ruled and
guided by different powers. As it works to the good of nature in the perpetuity
of the species, it is guided to that end by nature so inclining; and in that respect
it is called ‘a function of nature.’ As it works to social and political good, it
is subject to the ordinance of the civil law. As it works to the good of the Church,
it must be subject to Church government. But the things that are administered to
the people by the ministers of the Church, are called Sacraments.
Now the figure must correspond to the reality which it signifies. But the union
of Christ with His Church is of one Bridegroom with one Bride to be kept for ever.
For of the Church it is said: One is my beloved, my perfect one (
CHAPTER LXXIX—That through Christ the Resurrection of our Bodies will take place
AS we have been delivered by Christ from the penalties incurred by the death
of the first man; and as by the sin of the first man there has been bequeathed to
us not only sin, but also death, which is the punishment of sin; we must by Christ
be delivered from both these consequences, both from guilt and from sin (
But some do not believe in the resurrection of the body; and what is said in
Scripture on that subject they perversely understand of a spiritual resurrection
from the death of sin to grace: which error is reproved by the Apostle in Hymenaeus
and Philetus ( See the context, The great proof of our corporeal resurrection is the corporeal resurrection of
Christ: the first fruits, Christ, then they that are Christ’s at his coming,
Reason too gives evident support to the resurrection of the flesh. — 1. The souls of men are immortal (B. II, Chap. LXXIX). But the soul is naturally united with the body, being essentially the form of the body (B. II, Chap. LVII). Therefore it is against the nature of the soul to be without the body. But nothing that is against nature can be lasting. Therefore the soul will not be for ever without the body. Thus the immortality of the soul seems to require the resurrection of the body.
2. The natural desire of man tends to happiness, or final perfection (B. III, Chap. XXIV). Whoever is wanting in any point proper to his perfect well-being, has not yet attained to perfect happiness: his desire is not yet perfectly laid to rest. Now the soul separate from the body is in a sense imperfect, as is every part away from its whole, for the soul is part of human nature.
3. Reward and punishment are due to men both in soul and in body. But in this
life they cannot attain to the reward of final happiness (B. III, Chap.
Many of us remain quite
unconvinced by these a priori
reasons. We believe in the resurrection of the body as a revealed doctrine. But
we look upon it as not susceptible of a priori proof:
in other words not like the immortality of the soul, a property incident to human
nature as such. The body will rise again, because God has been pleased to place
man in a supernatural state, and in Christ to renew the privileges of that state,
one of those privileges being, as St Thomas points out, the final deliverance of
the body from death. Of the three arguments last given in the text, the first two
rest upon the assumption that the soul, which is the ‘form’ of the body in man’s
mortal life, becomes after death a nude ‘form’ crying for its ‘matter.’ The assumption
is not incontrovertible. After death, the change of the soul lifewards can scarcely
be less than the change of the body deathwards. The disembodied spirit must be mightily
translated to higher existence, if, bereft of its senses, it still lives and energises
and understands, and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition
which no Catholic theologian will allow (see Chap. XCI). Who shall define this higher
existence? Who knows and can tell us that such elevation does not mean a fulness
of spiritual nature, independent henceforth of matter and organs of sense? But if
so independent, how shall the soul ever return to be the form of a body? It shall
not return to be the form of an animal body, but of a spiritual body ( Of the two philosophies that have most affected Christian thought, Platonism
makes for the immortality of the soul, but against the resurrection of the body.
Aristotelianism raises a difficulty against the immortality of the soul: how shall
the ‘form’ continue when the ‘matter’ is gone? But that obstacle surmounted, Aristotelianism
favours the resurrection, as St Thomas’s arguments show. Cf. II, Chap.
LXXXI
CHAPTER LXXXI—Some Points of Reply to Difficulties on the Resurrection
IN the first creation of human nature God endowed the human body with an attribute
over and above what was due to it by the natural principles of its constitution,
namely, with a certain imperishability, to adapt it to its form, that as the life
of the soul is perpetual, so the body might perpetually live by the soul. Granting
that this imperishability was not natural in regard of the active principle,
None of the essential elements in man is altogether annihilated in death. The
rational soul, the ‘form’ of man, remains after death. The matter also remains,
which was subject to that form. So by the union of numerically the same soul with
numerically the same matter, numerically the same man will be restored. I add by way of note
the sequel in the text. The refinements of scholasticism
have their place in the history of human thought. “Corporeity may be taken in two senses. In one way as it is the substantial form
of a body, according as that body has its place in the genus of substance. Taken
thus, the corporeity of any body is nothing else than its substantial form, in respect
of which the body is classified according to genus and species: by virtue of this
substantial form it is due to a bodily thing to exist in three dimensions. For there
are not different substantial forms in one and the same thing; one form, to place
it in the highest genus, say, of ’substance’; and another to place it in the proximate
genus, say, of ‘corporeal’ or ‘animal substance’; and a third to put it in the species,
say, of ‘man’ or ‘horse’: for if the first form made it a substance, the forms that
followed would supervene upon something that was already in actuality and subsisting
in nature; and thus the latter forms would not make it an individual thing, but
would be in a subject that was already an individual thing, as is the case with
accidental forms. Corporeity, therefore, considered as the substantial form in man,
can be no other than the rational soul, which requires in its matter the possession
of three dimensions: for it is the actualising principle of a body. In another way
corporeity is taken to mean the accidental form whereby a body is said to be in
the genus of quantity; and taken thus, corporeity is nothing else than the three
dimensions which make the essence of a body. Though then this corporeity falls away
to nothing when the human body rots, that cannot hinder the body from rising again
numerically the same, since corporeity in the first sense does not fall away to
nothing, but remains the same.”
What does not bar numerical unity in a man while he lives on uninterruptedly,
clearly can be no bar to the identity of the risen man with the man that was. In
a man’s body while he lives, there are not always the same parts in respect of matter,
but only in respect of species. In respect of matter there is a flux and reflux
of parts: still that fact does not bar the man’s numerical unity from the beginning
to the end of his life. We have an example in a fire, which, while it goes on burning,
is called numerically one, because its species remains, though the wood is burnt
out and fresh wood supplied. So it is in the human body: for the form and species
(kind) of the several parts continues unbroken throughout life, but the matter of
the parts is dissolved by the natural heat, and new matter accrues by nourishment.
But the man is not numerically different by the difference of his component parts
at different ages, although it is true that the material composition of the man
at one stage of his life is not his material composition at another. So then, for
numerically the same man to rise again, it is not requisite for all the material
that ever entered into his composition throughout the whole course of his life to
be gathered together and resumed, but just so much of it as suffices to make up
his proper bulk and stature. We may expect that to be resumed by preference, which
was more perfect in the species and form of humanity.
The resurrection is natural in respect of its end and term, inasmuch as it is natural to the soul to be united to the body: but its efficient cause is not any agency of nature, but the divine power alone.
All men will rise again, though not all have adhered by faith to Christ, or have
received His Sacraments. For the Son of God assumed human nature, in order to restore
it: the defect of nature then shall be made good in all, inasmuch as all shall return
from death to life: but the defect shall not be perfectly made good except in such
as have adhered to Christ, either by their own act believing in Him, or at least
by the Sacrament of faith.
CHAPTER LXXXII—That Men shall rise again Immortal
THAT cannot be said to have been destroyed, which is to go on for ever. If then
men were to rise again always with the prospect of another death, in no way could
death be said to have been destroyed by the death of Christ. But it has been destroyed,
— for the present, causally, as was foretold: I will be thy death, O death (
3. The effect is like its cause. But the resurrection of Christ is the cause
of our resurrection; and Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more (
Hence it is said: The Lord shall cast out death for ever (
Hereby entrance is denied to the error of certain Gentiles of old, who believed
that times and temporal events recurred in cycles. For example, in that age one
Plato, a philosopher in the city of Athens, and in the school that is called Academic,
taught his scholars thus, that in the course of countless revolving ages, recurring
at long but fixed intervals, the same Plato, and the same city, and the same school,
and the same scholars would recur, and so would be repeated again and again in the
course of countless ages. — Virgil, Eclogue, iv, 34-36. The fancy, we cannot call it the doctrine, appears in the mythus
of Plato, Politicus, 270 sq. The distant way in which St Thomas speaks of Plato is in strong
contrast with his familiar mention of ‘the Philosopher.’ See B. II, Chap. LVII,
note, p. 118.
CHAPTER LXXXIII—That in the Resurrection there will be no use of Food or Intercourse of the Sexes
WHEN our perishable life is over, those things which serve the needs of a perishable
existence must also come to an end. One such thing is food, which serves to supply
the waste of the body.
The use of the intercourse of the sexes is for generation. If then such intercourse
is to continue after the resurrection, unless it is to continue to no purpose, many
men will come to exist after the resurrection, who did not exist before.
But if any one says that in the risen Saints there will be use of food and sexual
intercourse, not for the preservation of the individual and of the species, but
solely for the pleasure that goes with such acts, to the end that no pleasure may
be lacking in man’s final reward, — such a saying is fraught with many absurdities.
In the first place, the life of the risen Saints will be better ordered than our
present life. But in this present life it is a disorderly
As for the alleged example of Adam, the perfection of Adam was personal, but
human nature was not yet entirely perfect, as the race of mankind was not yet multiplied.
Adam then was constituted in the perfection proper to the origin of the human race,
for the multiplication of which he needed to beget children, and consequently to
make use of food.
The Scripture texts that seem to promise the use of food after the resurrection,
are to be understood in a spiritual sense. What is said in the
Hence we may finally conclude that all the activities of the active life shall
cease, as they all bear upon the use of food, and the getting of children, and other
necessities of a perishable existence. Alone left in the risen Saints shall be the
occupation of the contemplative life: wherefore it is said of the contemplative
Mary: Mary hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken from her
(
CHAPTER LXXXIV—That Risen Bodies shall be of the same Nature as before
SOME have supposed that in the resurrection our bodies are transformed into spirit,
because the Apostle says: There is sown an animal body, there shall rise a spiritual
body (
1. Our resurrection shall be on the model of the resurrection of Christ, who
will reform the body of our humiliation, so that it shall become conformable to
the body of his glory (
5. For numerically the same man to rise again, his essential parts must be numerically
the same. If then the body of the risen man shall not consist of these muscles and
these bones of which it is now composed, the risen man will not be numerically the
same.
6. The supposition of the body passing into a spirit is altogether impossible: for those things only pass into one another which have some matter in common [cf. Chap. LXIII].
7. If the body passes into a spiritual substance, it must either pass into that spiritual substance which is the soul, or into some other. If into that which is the soul, then in the resurrection there will be nothing in man but soul, and he will be exactly as he was before the resurrection. But if into another spiritual substance, then two spiritual substances will be one in nature, which is impossible, since every spiritual substance subsists by itself.
9. He who rises again must be an animal, if he is to be a man.
CHAPTER LXXXV—That the Bodies of the Risen shall be otherwise organised than before
THOUGH the bodies of the risen are to be of the same species with our present
bodies, still they will be otherwise organised (aliam dispositionem habebunt);
and chiefly in this, that all the bodies of the risen, of good men and evil men
alike, will be incorruptible. For that, three reasons may be assigned. First, in
respect of the end of the resurrection, which is reward or punishment for the things
done in the body; and both the one and the other is to be everlasting (B. III, Chapp.
LXII, CXLV).
This body, now corruptible, will be rendered incorruptible in such sort that
the soul shall have perfect control over it, giving it life.
CHAPTER LXXXVI—Of the Qualities of Glorified Bodies
BRIGHTNESS. Though by the merit of Christ the defect of nature [i.e., death]
is taken away from all, good and bad alike, at the resurrection, there will still
remain a difference between the good and bad in their personal attributes. It is
of the essence of nature that the human soul be the form of the body, quickening
it and preserving it in being; while by personal acts the soul deserves to be raised
to the glory of the vision of God, or to be shut out from the order of this glory
through its own fault. The bodies of all men alike will be organised as befits the
soul, so that the soul shall be an imperishable form giving imperishable being to
the body, because to this effect the power of God will entirely subject the matter
of the human body to the human soul.
II. Agility. The soul that shall enjoy the vision of God, being conjoined
to its last end, will find its desire fulfilled in all things. And because the body
moves at the desire of the soul, the body in this case will absolutely obey the
beck of the spirit in its every command to move: hence the bodies of the risen will
be agile; and this is what the Apostle means, when he says: It is sown in weakness:
it shall rise in power (
III. Impassibility. As the soul that enjoys God will have its desire fulfilled in respect of the gaining of all good, so also in respect of the removal of all evil. The body therefore, being made perfect in proportion to the soul, shall be free from all evil, actual and potential. As for actuality, there will be in the risen no corruption, no deformity, no defect. In point of potentiality, the risen Saints will be beyond the possibility of suffering aught that could give them pain: they will thus be impassible. Still this does not bar in them that sensibility which is proper to sentient beings: for they will use the senses to their delight in things that are not inconsistent with their state of incorruption. This impassibility is declared by the Apostle: It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.
IV. Subtlety. The fourth property is usually called ’subtlety’. St Thomas does not use the
name, but indicates what is meant by it in the next chapter (Chap.
LXXXVI), where he assigns as the “place of glorified bodies”
the region above all the heavens ( Is the heaven of glorified bodies in some remote star? Or is it in some unknown
dimensions of space? There is a mystery in that cloud which received him
out of their sight (
It appears by what has been said that the risen body shall be bright and shining, incapable of suffering, moving without difficulty and labour, and most perfectly actuated by its form.
CHAPTER LXXXVIII—Of Sex and Age in the Resurrection
STILL we must not suppose, what some have thought, that female sex has no place
in the bodies of the risen Saints. For since resurrection means the reparation of
the defects of nature, nothing of what makes for the perfection of nature will be
withdrawn from the bodies of the risen. Now among other organs that belong to the
integrity of the human body are those which minister to generation as well in male
as in female. These organs therefore will rise again in both. Nor is this conclusion
impaired by the fact that there will be no longer any use of these organs (Chap.
LXXXIII). If that were any ground for their absence from the
risen body, all the organs bearing on digestion and nutrition should be absent,
for there will not be any use for them either: thus great part of the organs proper
to man would be wanting in the risen body. We conclude that all such organs will
be there, even organs of which the function has ceased: these will not be there
without a purpose, since they will serve to make up the restored integrity of the
natural body.
Neither is the weakness of the female sex inconsistent with the perfection of
the resurrection. Such weakness is no departure from nature, but is intended by
nature.
Again, all must rise at the age of Christ,
CHAPTER LXXXIX—Of the quality of Risen Bodies in the Lost
THE bodies of those who are to be lost must be proportionate to their souls.
Now the souls of the wicked have a nature which is good, as created by God: but
the will in them will be disorderly, falling short of its proper end. Their bodies
therefore, so far as nature goes, will be restored to entirety: thus they will rise
at a perfect age without any diminution of organs or limbs, and without any defect
or detriment, which any malformation or sickness may have brought on. Hence the
Apostle says: The dead shall rise incorrupt (
Some may think it impossible for the bodies of the wicked to be liable to suffering,
and yet not liable to disintegration, since every impression suffered, when it goes
beyond the common, takes off from the substance: so we see that if a body is long
kept in the fire, it will be entirely consumed; and when pain becomes unusually
intense, the soul is separated from the body. But all this happens on the supposition
of the transmutability of matter from form to form. Now the human body, after the
resurrection, will not be transmutable from form to form, either in the good or
in the wicked; because in both it will be entirely perfected by the soul in respect
of its natural being.
CHAPTER XC—How Incorporeal Subsistent Spirits suffer from Corporeal Fire, and are befittingly punished with Corporeal Punishments
WE must not suppose that incorporeal subsistent spirits, — as the devil, and
the souls of the lost before the resurrection, — can suffer from fire any disintegration
of their physical being, or other change, such as our perishable bodies suffer from
fire. For incorporeal substances have not a corporeal nature, to be changed by corporeal
things. Nor are they susceptible of sensible forms except intellectually; and such
intellectual impression is not penal, but rather perfective and pleasurable.
1. Every sin of the rational creature comes of its not submitting in obedience to God. Now punishment ought to correspond and be in proportion to offence, so that the will may be penally afflicted by enduring something the very reverse of what it sinfully loved. Therefore it is a proper punishment for a sinful rational nature to find itself subject by a sort of ‘constriction’ to bodily things inferior to itself.
2. The pain of sense answers to the offence in respect of its being an inordinate turning to some changeable good, as the pain of loss answers to the offence in respect of its being a turning away from the Unchangeable Good (B. III, Chap. CXLVI). But the rational creature, and particularly the human soul, sins by inordinate turning to bodily things. Therefore it is a befitting punishment for it to be afflicted by bodily things.
Though the promises in Scripture of corporal rewards, like meat and drink (
CHAPTER XCI—That Souls enter upon Punishment or Reward immediately after their Separation from their Bodies
THERE can be no reason for deferring reward or punishment beyond the time at which the soul is first capable of receiving either the one or the other, that is, as soon as it leaves the body.
2. In this life is the state of merit and demerit: hence the present life is
compared to a warfare and to the days of a hired labourer: Man’s life is a warfare
upon the earth, and his days as those of a day-labourer (
3. The order of punishment and reward follows that of offence and merit. Now it is only through the soul that merit and demerit appertain to the body: for nothing is meritorious or demeritorious except for being voluntary. Therefore reward and punishment properly pass from the soul to the body, not to the soul for the body’s sake. There is no reason therefore why the resumption of bodies should be waited for in the punishing or rewarding of souls: nay, it seems fitting rather that souls, in which fault or merit had a prior place, should have a priority likewise of punishment or reward.
Hereby is refuted the error of sundry Greeks, who say that before the resurrection
of their bodies souls neither mount up to heaven nor are plunged into hell.
But we must observe that there may be some impediment on the part of the good
in the way of their souls receiving their final reward in the vision of God immediately
upon their departure from the body. To that vision,
CHAPTER XCII—That the Souls of the Saints after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Good
SO long as a soul can change from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in
a state of combat and warfare: it has to be careful in resisting evil, not to be
overcome by it, or in endeavouring to set itself free from it. But so soon as the
soul is separated from the body, it will be no longer in the state of warfare or
combat, but of receiving reward or punishment, according as it has lawfully fought
or unlawfully.
3. Naturally the rational creature desires to be happy: hence it cannot will
not to be happy: still its will may turn aside from that in which true happiness
consists, or, in other words, it may have a perverse will: this comes of the object
of true happiness not being apprehended as such, but some other object in its stead,
4. Whoever has enough in what he has, seeks nothing else beyond. But whoever is finally blessed has enough in the object of true happiness, and therefore seeks nothing that is not in keeping with that object. Now the only way in which the will can be perverse is by willing something inconsistent with the object of true happiness.
5. Sin never befalls the will without some ignorance in the understanding [cf.
B. III, Chap. X]: hence it is said, They are mistaken who
do evil (
6. Our soul can err about conclusions before it is brought back to first principles.
When the knowledge of conclusions is carried back to first principles, we have scientific
knowledge which cannot be false.
CHAPTER XCIII—That the Souls of the Wicked after Death have their Will immutably fixed on Evil
THE very disorder of the will is a punishment and a very great affliction, because insomuch as a person has a disordered will, everything that is done rightly displeases him: thus it will displease the damned to see the will of God fulfilled in all things, that will which they have sinfully resisted.
3. The will is changed from sin to goodness only by the grace of God (B. III, Chapp. CLVII, CLVIII). But as the souls of the good are admitted to a perfect participation in the divine goodness, so the souls of the damned are totally excluded from grace.
4. As the good, living in the flesh, make God the ultimate end of all their doings
and desires, so the wicked set up their rest in some undue end which turns them
away from God. But the disembodied spirits of the good will immovably cling to the
end which they have set before themselves in this life, namely, God. Therefore the
souls of the wicked will immovably cling to the end which they too have chosen for
themselves.
CHAPTER XCIV—Of the Immutability of the Will of Souls detained in Purgatory
BUT because there are souls which in the instant of their parting do not arrive at happiness, and yet are not damned, we must show that even these souls cannot change their purpose after parting from their bodies; and the proof is this: — the souls of the blessed and of the lost have their will immutably fixed according to the end to which they have adhered. But the souls that carry with them into the next world some matter for purgatory are not ultimately in a different case from the blessed, for they die in charity, whereby we adhere to God as to our last end. Therefore they too will have their will immutably fixed.
CHAPTER XCV—Of the General Cause of Immutability in all Souls after their Separation from the Body
THE end is in matters of desire like the first principles of demonstration in
the abstract sciences. These principles are naturally known, and any error concerning
them could come only from a perversion of nature [verging on idiotcy]: hence a man
could not be moved from a true understanding of such principles to a false one,
or from a false to a true, except through some change in his nature. It is impossible
for those who go wrong over first principles to be brought right by other and more
certain principles; or for any one to be beguiled from a true understanding of such
principles by other principles more plausible. So it is in regard of the last end.
Every one has a natural desire of the last end; and the possession of a rational
nature, generically as such, carries with it a craving for happiness: but the desire
of happiness and the last end in this or that shape and aspect comes from a special
disposition of nature: hence the Philosopher says that as the individual is himself,
so does the end appear to him.
Nor is such fixedness of will inconsistent with free will. The act of free will
is to choose, and choice is of means to the end, not of the last end. Concerning angels’ wills, good and bad, St Thomas writes (Sum. Theol.
I, q. 64, art. 2): “Appetitive power is proportioned to apprehensive. Now an angel’s apprehension
differs from a man’s in this, that the angel apprehends a thing at a glance, by
one fixed intuition; man by a course of reasoning, inclining him to opposite conclusions.
Hence man’s will adheres to an object unsteadily, but an angel’s fixedly and immovably.”
See above, Chap. LV, § 4. Thus naturally there is no repentance for fallen angels.
Nor is it to be thought that when souls resume their bodies at the resurrection, they lose the unchangeableness of their will, for in the resurrection bodies will be organised to suit the requirements of the soul (Chapp. LXXXVI, LXXXIX): souls then will not be changed by re-entering their bodies, but will remain permanently what they were.
CHAPTER CXVI—Of the Last Judgement
THERE is a twofold retribution for the things that a man has done in life, one
for his soul immediately upon its separation from the body, another at the resurrection
of the body. The first retribution is to individuals severally, as individuals severally
die: the second is to all men together, as all men shall rise together. Therefore
there must be a twofold judgement: one of individuals, regarding the soul; another
a general judgement, rendering to all men their due in soul and body. And because
Christ in His Humanity, wherein He suffered and rose again, has merited for us resurrection
and life everlasting, it belongs to Him to exercise that judgement whereby risen
men are rewarded or punished, for so it is said of Him: He hath given him authority
to exercise judgement, because he is the Son of Man (
CHAPTER XCVII—Of the State of the World after the Judgement
IT needs must be that the motion of the heavens shall cease; and therefore it
is said that time shall be no more ( Perhaps this celebrated text simply means that there shall be no further delay
in the coming of the judgement. Time and motion could only cease together. Science has sometimes dreamt of a final condition of things in which the machinery
of the universe shall be completely run down, the energies of nature so dislocated
as no longer to furnish any potentiality of organic life, a uniform temperature
established everywhere, suns cooled, planetary revolutions stopped, the realisation
in fact of the ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα, or universal
deadlock, which was the Greek notion of a mindless chaos. Things may come to this
final impasse, or they may not, science cannot tell. But there remains God’s promise
to re-establish (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι,
gather up under a new head) all things in Christ (
A WORD in conclusion from the translator, or restorer. There has
been present in my mind throughout my task the figure which I employed in the preface,
of the restoration of a thirteenth-century church. I find myself surrounded with
débris which I have found it necessary to remove from the structure of the Contra
Gentiles: — Ptolemaic astronomy pervading the work even to the last chapter;
a theory of divine providence adapted to this obsolete astronomy (B. III, Chapp.
XXII, XXIII, LXXXII, XCI, XCII); an incorrect view of motion (B. I, Chap. XIII);
archaic embryology (B. II, Chapp. LXXXVI, LXXXIX); total ignorance of chemistry,
and even of the existence of molecular physics: deficient scholarship, leading at
times to incorrect exegesis (B. IV, Chap. VII, § 5: Chap. XVII, § 2: Chap. XXXIV
in
It may be asked: Seeing that St Thomas is so often at fault in matter where his doctrines have come under the test of modern experimental science and criticism, what confidence can be reposed in him on other points, where his conclusions lie beyond the reach of experience? To a Catholic the answer is simple enough; and it shall be given in St Thomas’s own words: “Our faith reposes on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who have written the Canonical Books, not on any revelation that may have been made to other Doctors” (Sum. Theol. I, q. 8 ad 2, — the context is worth reading). Our confidence is limited in conclusions of mere reason, by whomsoever drawn: our confidence is unlimited in matters of faith, as taught by the Church (B. I, Chapp. III–VI). The practical value of the Summa contra Gentiles lies in its exposition of the origin, nature, duty, and destiny of man, according to the scheme of Catholic Christianity. That scheme stands whole and entire in the twentieth century as it stood in the thirteenth: in that, there is nothing to alter in the Contra Gentiles: it is as practical a book as ever it was. The débris are the débris of now worn-out human learning, which St Thomas used as the best procurable in his day, to encase and protect the structure of faith. Or, to express myself in terms of the philosophy of our day, dogma has not changed, but our ‘apperception’ of it, or the ‘mental system’ into which we receive it. So the Summa contra Gentiles stands, like the contemporary edifices of Ely and Lincoln: it stands, and it will stand, because it was built by a Saint and a man of genius on the rock of faith.
The Summa contra Gentiles is an historical monument of the first importance for the history of philosophy. In the variety of its contents, it is a perfect encyclopaedia of the learning of the day. By it we can fix the high water mark of thirteenth-century thought: — for it contains the lectures of a Doctor second to none in the greatest school of thought then flourishing, the University of Paris. It is by the study of such books that one enters into the mental life of the period at which they were written; not by the hasty perusal of Histories of Philosophy. No student of the Contra Gentiles is likely to acquiesce in the statement, that the Middle Ages were a time when mankind seemed to have lost the power of thinking for themselves. Mediaeval people thought for themselves, thoughts curiously different from ours, and profitable for us to study.
Lastly, the Summa contra Gentiles is μέγα τεκμήριον — considering the ravages of six and a half centuries of time upon what was once the most harmonious blending of faith with the science of the day, — it is a fact of solemn admonition to all Doctors and Professors of Philosophy and Theology within the Church of Christ, that they should be at least as solicitous as an English Dean and Chapter now are, for the keeping in yearly repair of the great edifice given over to their custody; that they should regard with watchful and intelligent eyes the advance of history, anthropology, criticism and physical science; and that in their own special sciences they should welcome, and make every sane endeavour to promote, what since 1845 has been known as the Development of Doctrine.
Indexes
Index of Scripture References
Genesis
1:1 1:1 1:2 1:4 1:20 1:26 1:31 1:31 1:31 1:31 1:31 1:31 2:7 2:24 2:24 6:6-7 9:3 17:1 18 22:12 32:20
Exodus
3:13-14 3:14 3:14 7:1 10:1 12:15 17:15 19:16 20:5-6 20:13 20:21 22:18 22:20 32:10 33:11 33:19 33:19 33:19 33:20 34:34
Leviticus
18 18:22-23 19:13 20:8 22:9 26:12
Numbers
Deuteronomy
4:6 4:19 6:4 6:4 6:13 6:13 10:12 10:12 22:6-7 23:17 25:2 30:15-18 32:4 32:40
2 Kingdoms
1 Kings
Job
4:13 5:9 7:1 9:4 9:4 9:7 9:12 10:10-11 11:7 11:7-9 11:11 12:13 12:13 12:16 19:25 21:7 21:7 21:14 22:14 22:17 26:14 34:10 35:11 36:26 38:4-7 38:28 41:2 41:2 42:2
Psalms
2:7 2:7 2:7 2:13 5:7 7:10 8 8:4-6 8:8 10:5 10:7 10:8 11:2 13 16:5 18:1 18:10 23:10 35:9 35:10 44:7-8 49:1 50:14 53 61:13 68:6 70:18-19 73:3 75 77:25 81 81:1 81:6 81:6 83:5 84:9 85:8 88:9 88:27 88:27 88:33-38 91 93:11 94 95:5 96:8 101:13-28 101:18 102:5 102:21 103:2 103:24 103:24 103:24 103:28 103:30 104 104:31 105:40 111:3 112 118:151 120:4 124:1 134:6 134:6 134:6 135:4 138:6 138:8 144:3 144:5 144:9 145:6 146:5 148:3 148:6 148:8 151:8
Proverbs
3:19 3:19-20 7:7 8:15 8:17 8:22 8:24 8:24-25 8:30 9:3 9:5 9:5 10:12 11:11 11:29 15:11 16:4 17:2 19:22 19:25 21:1 22:10 24:5-6 27:17 28:9 30:4
Ecclesiastes
1:9 3:11 3:19 4:9-12 5:17 8:17 9:11 10:5-6 12:7
Song of Solomon
Isaiah
1:15 1:18 5:4 6:1 6:1 6:10 9:6 9:7 11:9 14:13 24:16 25:6 25:8 26:9 26:12 26:12 32:17 35:8 38:1-5 40 43:25 43:25 45:6-7 45:6-7 45:6-7 45:7 49:10 50:4 54:1 54:5 55:8 59:15-16 60:19 61:1 63:17 65:13 65:17-18 66:9 66:24
Jeremiah
1:5 7:16 17:5 18:7-8 19:13 23:5-6 23:24 30:33 31:3 33:16 51:9
Lamentations
Ezekiel
1:4 1:8 8:3 8:16 9:9 16:47 18:20 28:12-13 28:17
Daniel
Hosea
Joel
Amos
Jonah
Habakkuk
Zechariah
Malachi
Matthew
1:21 1:21 3:17 5:12 5:35 5:47 6:24 6:25 6:26 6:28 6:34 6:34 7:1 7:1 7:8 7:23 9:1-8 10:8 10:10 10:20 10:29 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:29 12:31 13:30 13:42 13:43 13:46 14:26-27 15:11 16:16 16:19 16:19 18:10 18:10 19 19:6 19:9 19:11-12 19:21 20:22 20:23 22:30 22:30 22:30 22:37-38 22:39 22:40 23:2 24:36 25:6 25:31-46 25:33 25:34-41 25:41 25:41 25:46 26:8 26:17 26:31 26:38 26:64 27:56 28:6 28:11-15 28:18 28:19 28:19 28:20 28:20 28:20
Mark
1:1 2:16 3:5 4:38 9:44 10:18 11:12 11:17 13:32 13:32 14:12 14:34 15:40 16:6 16:16
Luke
1:28 1:37 1:42 1:43 2:5 2:33 2:40 2:52 2:52 3:10-14 4:2 4:3 7:22 8:2-3 8:14 10:42 11:13 11:21 12:16-21 14:18 15:31 18:1 18:19 19:42 20:36 20:36 21:15 22:7 22:19 22:29 22:29 22:29 22:32 22:42 22:42 22:42 22:44 24:3 24:37-39 24:39 24:46
John
1:1 1:3 1:3-4 1:3-4 1:8 1:12 1:14 1:14 1:14 1:14 1:14 1:14 1:14 1:14 1:18 1:18 1:18 1:29 1:29 2:19 2:25 3:1 3:3-5 3:5 3:5 3:13 3:13 3:16 3:18 3:35 3:35 3:35 4:6 4:24 4:24 4:24 5:18 5:19 5:19 5:19 5:20 5:21 5:22 5:23 5:25-29 5:27 6:37 6:38 6:38 6:38 6:39 6:40 6:44 6:58 6:63 6:63 6:63 6:64 8:29 8:29 8:58 9:11 10:10 10:16 10:16 10:18 10:27 10:28 10:29 10:30 10:30 10:34 10:35 11:25 12:27 13:1 13:15 14:2 14:6 14:6 14:6 14:15 14:16 14:21 14:23 14:28 14:28 14:31 15:4 15:10 15:12 15:12 15:13 15:15 15:15 15:26 15:26 15:26 16:2 16:5 16:13 16:13 16:14 16:14 16:15 16:15 16:25 16:27 16:28 17:2 17:3 17:3 17:3 17:3 17:3 17:10 17:11 17:12 17:24 17:37 18:9 18:28 18:37 19:25 19:25 19:35 20:2 20:17 20:19 20:22 20:23 20:31 21:1
Acts
1:9 1:9 1:11 1:13 1:16 2:4 2:4 2:4 2:24-32 2:36 2:36 2:36 2:36 3:38 4:6 4:10 4:12 4:33 4:34-35 5:3-4 5:28 5:32 7:42 7:53 9:31 10:38 10:38 10:40-41 10:42 10:44-46 10:44-46 13:2 13:4 13:32-33 15:28 17:27 17:30 17:31 17:32 24:15
Romans
1:1 1:3 1:3-4 1:7 1:20 1:28 1:29 2:7-8 3:4 3:4 3:25 4:12 4:17 4:25 4:25 5:5 5:5 5:8 5:12 5:13 5:18 6:3 6:3-11 6:6 6:9 6:12 6:12 6:14 6:16-20 6:23 6:33 7:9 7:24 8:1 8:2 8:3 8:9 8:14 8:15 8:15 8:17 8:18 8:21-39 8:24 8:26 8:29 8:32 9:5 9:5 9:16 9:19 9:19 9:21 9:22-23 10:8 10:17 11:6 11:16 11:35 11:35 11:35-36 11:36 12:1 12:19 13:4 13:10 13:10 14 14:17 15:4 15:27
1 Corinthians
1:24 1:24 2:8 2:9 2:10 2:10 2:10-11 2:10-11 2:11 2:11 2:14 3:9 3:10 3:16 3:16 3:17 5:7-8 6:10 6:11 6:15 6:17 6:18 6:19 7:7 7:10 7:25-33 7:36 7:38 8 8:6 8:6 8:6 9:9 9:14 10:19-28 10:20 11:7 11:31 12 12 12:4-6 12:7-11 12:8 12:11 12:11 13:8-12 13:9 13:9 13:12 13:13 14 14 14 15:14-15 15:20 15:23 15:24-25 15:26 15:40 15:42 15:42-50 15:43 15:43 15:44 15:44 15:44 15:44 15:44 15:44 15:49 15:50 15:50 15:51 15:51 15:51 15:51 15:52 15:53 15:53
2 Corinthians
1:21-22 3:6 3:17 5:4 6:7 6:16 8 8:14 9 12:7-9 13 13:10 13:13
Galatians
2:19-20 3:19 3:24-25 4:4 4:4 4:4 4:4 4:6 5:18 5:24 6:2
Ephesians
1:4 1:5 1:6 1:10 1:11 1:13-14 2:3 2:3 2:5-6 2:8 4:4-6 4:5 4:10 4:10 4:10 4:13 4:13 4:13 4:13 4:17-18 4:30 5:8 5:14 5:22-33 5:22-33 5:23-31 5:23-32 5:32 5:32 85:8
Philippians
1:6 2:3-11 2:5-11 2:6 2:6 2:6 2:6-7 2:6-11 2:7 2:7 2:7 2:7-8 2:8 2:8-9 2:8-9 2:9 2:13 2:13 2:13 3:3 3:8 3:18 3:19 3:20 3:21
Colossians
1:15 1:16 1:18 2:3 2:3 2:9 3:1
1 Thessalonians
2 Thessalonians
1 Timothy
1:5 1:7 1:17 1:17 2:4 2:5 2:5 3:2 4:3-4 4:4 4:4 6:8 6:9-10 6:15 6:15
2 Timothy
Titus
Hebrews
1:1 1:1 1:3 1:3 1:3 1:5 1:6 1:6 1:8-9 2:2 2:3-4 2:3-4 2:9 2:10 2:11 2:17 3:5 4:13 4:13 4:13 5:7 5:7 5:7-10 5:13-14 6:4 6:6 9 9:28 9:28 10 11:6 12:1 13:12 13:17
James
1:1 1:5 1:6 1:13 1:17 1:17 2:10 4:3 5:14-15
1 Peter
2 Peter
1 John
1:1 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5 3:1 3:2 3:2 3:2 3:6 3:9 3:9 3:17 4:9 4:13 4:16 4:16 4:21 4:21 5:4 5:7 5:8 5:20 5:20
Jude
Revelation
2:17 3:12 5:9 7:16 10:4 10:6 14:13 19:7 19:13 19:16 20:6 21:1 21:2 21:2 21:17 21:23 21:24 21:27 22:2 22:13
Tobit
Judith
Wisdom of Solomon
1:14 2:2 2:2 2:9 3:7 6:21 7:11 7:11 7:21 7:24-25 7:25 7:30 8:1 8:8 8:16 11:2 11:21 11:21 11:25 11:25 14:8 14:11 14:21
Sirach
1:1 1:10 3:23 10:18 11:14 14:22 15:12 15:14-17 15:18 15:21 16:16 23:28 23:29 24:7 33:15 39:24-25 42:16-17 43:35
Index of Greek Words and Phrases
- πάρεσιν ἁμαρτημάτων: 1
- ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῃ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος—τὸ πνευ̂μά ἐστιν τὸ ζωοποιοῦν—τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὸ αἷμα: 1
- (ψυχή) μὴ πᾶσα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς, πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως: 1
- Μόψου ἑστία: 1
- Νοῦς: 1
- αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν: 1
- αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὐσία: 1
- αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι: 1
- αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν: 1
- αὑτοῦ ἔνεκα: 1
- αὔτὸ τὸ ὄν: 1
- βούλησις: 1 2 3
- γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μηδενός: 1
- γόλος: 1
- δαίμονες: 1
- δαίμων: 1 2
- διακριτικὸν ὀψέως: 1
- διά: 1
- διάνοεῖσθαι: 1
- διάνοια: 1 2
- δουλεύειν τῇ γῇ: 1
- δυνάμει πως τὰ νοητά, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν πρίν ἂν νοῇ: 1
- δἰ οὗ ἕκαστον, κἀκεῖνο μᾶλλον: 1
- δύναμις καὶ κίνησις: 1
- εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν: 1
- εἰκότα: 1
- εἰς ἄπειρον: 1
- εἱμαρμένη: 1
- εἴδη: 1 2 3
- εἶδος: 1 2 3
- εἶδος : 1
- εὐτυχής: 1
- εὐφραίνεσθαι: 1
- θεοῦ: 1 2 3
- θερμὸς ἀήρ: 1
- θεωρεῖν, θεωρία: 1
- θεωρητικὸς βίος: 1
- θεωρία: 1
- θεός μέγας κύριος: 1
- θεῷ: 1 2
- θυμὸς: 1
- θυμός: 1 2 3 4 5
- θυοός: 1
- θύραθεν: 1
- καθόλου δὲ καὶ ἐξ οὗ φύσις, καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ φύσις, τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον ἔχει φύσιν, οἷον φυτὸν ἢ ζῷον: 1
- καθ᾽ οὗ: 1
- καθ᾽ ὅ: 1
- καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ: 1
- καὶ ἐσμέν: 1
- κεχαριτωμένη: 1
- κεχωρισμένα: 1
- κρᾶσις: 1
- κένωσις: 1
- κύριος: 1
- λατρεύοντες: 1
- λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον: 1
- λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καί ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή: 1
- λόγος: 1 2 3
- λόγῳ: 1
- μετανοήσατε καὶ βαπρισθήτω ἔκαστος: 1
- μετριότης: 1
- μηδ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν οὐδεμίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ταύτην ὅτι δυνατόν: 1
- μυστήριον: 1
- μέγα τεκμήριον: 1
- μίξις: 1
- μόριον: 1
- νοεῖν: 1
- νοῦς: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
- νοῦς δυνατός: 1
- νοῦς παθητικός: 1 2
- νοῦς ποιητικός: 1
- νοῦς ποιητκός: 1
- νοῦς χωριστός: 1 2 3 4 5
- νοῦς, θυμός, ἐπιθυμία: 1
- νόμος: 1
- οἰ θεῷ τῷ πνεύματι λατρεύοντες: 1
- οἰ πνεύματι θεοῦ λατρεύοντες: 1
- οἰ πνεύματι θεῷ λατρεύοντες: 1
- οἰκουμένη: 1
- οὐ γενόμενον ἐξ οὐδενός: 1
- οὐ μνημονεύομεν δὲ κ.τ.λ.: 1
- οὐδὲ χρόνῳ: 1
- οὐσία: 1
- οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ: 1
- οὗτος: 1
- παθητικὸς νοῦς: 1
- παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός: 1
- πελάνῳ μυχόθεν βασιλείῳ: 1
- περιττοί, περίεργοι: 1
- περὶ δε᾽ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ,: 1
- περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως: 1
- περὶ ἀρχῶν: 1
- πνευματικῶς: 1
- πνεύματι, τουτέστιν, πνευματικῶς: 1
- πνεῦμα: 1 2 3
- πνεῦμα, ἀφρός: 1
- πνέυματι: 1
- ποιεῖ γόνιμα τὰ σπέρματα: 1
- προαίρεσις: 1 2 3
- πάθη: 1 2
- πάθος: 1
- πάντες οὐ κοιμησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγήσομεθα: 1
- πέρας: 1
- πῶς: 1
- συγκριτικόν: 1
- συμβεβηκός: 1
- συμβεβηκότα: 1
- σχολή: 1
- σῶμα ψυχικόν: 1
- τεθεοποιημένον: 1
- το ἀποβεβληκὸς: 1
- τοιόνδε τι: 1
- τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον: 1
- τοῦτο ἐν μέσῳ ἔρριψεν: 1
- τρίγωνα: 1
- τρίτος ἄνθρωπος: 1
- τὰ κεχωρισμένα: 1
- τάξις: 1
- τὲλος: 1
- τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς: 1
- τέλος: 1 2 3
- τὸ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ νενοῆσθαι: 1
- τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, ἡ γὰρ θεωρητικὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν: 1
- τὸ αὐτόματον: 1
- τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστί, κ.τ.λ.: 1
- τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὣσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον: 1
- τὸ διανοεῖσθαι: 1 2
- τὸ δὲ καὶ θεωροῦντες δημωυργοῦμεν καὶ πρὸς λήμματα θεωροῦμεν.: 1
- τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι: 1
- τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός: 1
- τὸ μὴ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: 1
- τὸ νοεῖν: 1
- τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: 1
- τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχήν: 1
- τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου: 1
- τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης: 1
- τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἀφρῶδές τε καὶ λευκόν: 1
- τὸν ἀληθινόν: 1 2
- τό: 1
- τόδε τι: 1
- τόπος: 1
- τόπος, τὸ πρῶτον περιέχον σωμάτων ἑκάστων: 1
- τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ: 1
- τῇδε λατρεύω πέτρᾳ: 1
- τῷ ἀληθινῷ: 1
- υἱοπάτωρ: 1
- φαντασία: 1
- φαρμακούς: 1
- φωτισθέντας: 1
- φύσει: 1 2
- φύσει δοῦλοι: 1
- φύσις: 1 2 3 4 5 6
- χαρά: 1
- χορηγία: 1
- χριστός: 1
- χωρισθεὶς: 1
- χωρισθεὶς δέ ἐστι μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὃπερ ἐστί: 1
- χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί: 1
- χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής: 1
- χωριστός: 1 2 3 4
- χωριστός, ἀμιγής, ἀπαθής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὤν ἐνεργείᾳ: 1
- χώρα: 1
- χῶρεῖν: 1
- ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος: 1
- ἀεὶ γὰρ: 1
- ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς: 1
- ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ, ὄτε δὲ οὐ νοεῖ: 1
- ἀμιγῆ: 1
- ἀμιγῆ εἶναι . . . . οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι τῳ σώματι: 1
- ἀνακαινίζειν: 1 2
- ἀνακαινώσεως: 1
- ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι: 1
- ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς: 1
- ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμίγῆ εἰναι ἳνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· διὸ οὐδὲ μεμίχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι: 1
- ἀπαθές: 1 2 3 4
- ἀπαθής: 1
- ἀπόδειξις: 1
- ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως: 1
- ἀσχολία: 1
- ἁρπαγμόν: 1
- ἄλογοι: 1
- ἄνευ σώματος: 1
- ἆρα ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους: 1
- ἐκένωσεν: 1
- ἐλεύθερος ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν: 1
- ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ ἀφρώδει: 1
- ἐμποιεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο (τὸ ἄρρεν) τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ψυχὴν ἢ δἰ αὑτοῦ ἢ διὰ τῆς γονῆς: 1
- ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ ὑιῷ αὐτοῦ: 1
- ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει: 1
- ἐντελέχεια: 1 2 3
- ἐξ: 1
- ἐπιθυμητικόν: 1 2
- ἐπιθυμία: 1 2
- ἐπιθυμίαι: 1
- ἐπιτηδειότης: 1 2
- ἐπιτηδειότης τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὑλικὸς νοῦς, ἐοικὼς πινακίδι ἀγράφῳ: 1
- ἐπιτηδεώτης: 1
- ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα: 1
- ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐκ τοῦ θήλεος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκτοῦ ἄρρενος· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ οὐσία σώματός τινός ἐστι: 1
- ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ σπέρμα κοινὸν πνεύματος καὶ ὕδατος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμά ἐστιν θερμὸς ἀήρ . . . . διὸ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ὅτι ἐξ ὕδατος παχὺ δὲ καὶ λευκὸν διὰ το μεμῖχθαι πνεῦμα . . . . αἴτιον δὲ τῆς λευκότητος τοῦ σπέρματος ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ γονὴ ἀφρός, ὁ δὲ ἀφρός λευκόν: 1
- ἐστὶ μὲν ὁμοίως καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὐρεῖν: 1
- ἐστὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί: 1
- ἐχαρίτωσεν ἡμᾶς: 1
- ἔμψυχον εἶδος: 1
- ἠδονή: 1
- ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως οὐδὲ χρόνῳ: 1
- ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη: 1
- ἡ τύχη: 1
- ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις: 1
- ἡλικία καθεστῶσα: 1
- ἥδεσθαι: 1
- ἥρωες: 1
- ἰδεῖν: 1
- ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι : 1
- ἰσάγγελος: 1
- ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς: 1
- ὁ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν νοῦς: 1
- ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν: 1
- ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα: 1
- ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν: 1
- ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός: 1
- ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, κα͍ὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ: 1
- ὁ δὲ χωριστός: 1
- ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς: 1
- ὁ πνευματομάχος: 1
- ὁ ἐξηγητής: 1
- ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα: 1
- ὁμωνύμως: 1
- ὁρισθέντος: 1
- ὃταν θεωρῇ ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν: 1
- ὅ: 1
- ὅτι: 1
- ὑλικός: 1
- ὑπεριδών: 1
- ὕλη: 1
- ὕλην μὲν οὖν παρέχει τὸ θῆλυ, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως ὁ ἄρρην: 1
- ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς: 1
- ᾧ: 1
Index of Latin Words and Phrases
- Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo: 1
- et sumus in vero, in filio ejus: 1
- gratia gratum faciens: 1
- paenalitates consequentes: 1
- quam: 1
- A Domino factum est istud: 1
- A priori: 1
- Ad ejus apprehensionem: 1
- Adminiculantibus utimur ad virtutem: 1
- Amoebae: 1
- Anima in ipsum perfecte dominabitur quantum ad hoc quod ipsum vivificet: 1
- Annelidae: 1
- Annulosa: 1
- Appetitum naturalem: 1
- Bona quaecunque aliquis vult in ordine ad bonum finem, bene vult: 1
- Capere: 1
- Christus si non Deus, non bonus: 1
- Circa ejus finis considerationem: 1
- Compositionem intellectus.: 1
- Concretionem habens: 1
- Contra determinatam veritatem. Determinare: 1
- Corpora indivisibilia: 1
- Corpus effigiatum, sicut corpus exterius figuratum: 1
- De aeternis non judicat praetor: 1
- De minimis non curat praetor: 1
- De paraparitione evangelii: 1
- De partibus animalium: 1
- De potentiis animae: 1
- De unitate intellectus: 1
- Destructio destructionum: 1 2
- Destructivum totius humanae philosophiae et politicae considerationis: 1
- Deus igitur est maxime liberalis: 1
- Deus magnus Dominus: 1
- Ens privativum: 1
- Ergo conclusum est contra Manichaeos: 1
- Et intelligit Aristoteles per intellectum passibilem ipsam virtutem cogitativam: 1
- Ex hypothesi: 1
- Fallacia accidentis: 1
- Fiduciam certam de sua salute: 1
- Filioque: 1
- Gratia gratum faciens: 1
- Hic est verus Deus: 1
- In aetate Christi: 1
- In spiritu praedicto: 1
- In substantiis separatis: 1
- Individuatio fit per hanc materiam signatam: 1
- Insunt ut in via ad naturam: 1
- Intellectus: 1
- Intellectus agens non tantum est causa in intellectu materiali: 1
- Intellectus est potentia animae, quae est corporis forma, licet ipsa potentia, quae est intellectus, non est alicujus organi actus, quia nihil ipsius operationi communicat corporis operatio: 1
- Intemperati et incontinentes: 1
- Intentiones: 1
- Ipse est remissio omnium peccatorum: 1
- Liber, qui sui causa est: 1
- Liberum de ratione judicium. : 1
- Materia corporis humani animae humanae subjicietur omnino: 1
- Materia prima: 1
- Materia signata: 1
- Materialiter se habet: 1
- Metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur: 1
- Naturali existimatione: 1
- Naturalia non sunt in nobis: 1
- Naturalis potentia integra: 1
- Nemo metaphysicus quin idem physicus: 1
- Nimis profundae factae sunt cogitationes tuae: 1
- Non enim plura possunt fieri unum, nisi aliquid ibi sit actus et aliquid potentia. Quae enim non sunt unum simpliciter, actu non uniuntur, nisi quasi colligata vel sicut congregata: in quibus etiam ipsae partes congregatae sunt sicut in potentia respectu unionis.: 1
- Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.: 1
- Non propter ejus indistantiam a divino intellectu, sed propter virtutem: 1
- Non tamen totaliter sanatur: 1
- Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur: 1
- Omne vivum ex vivo: 1
- Oportet enim in sacramentis significationem servari: 1
- Oportet igitur processum emanationis a Deo uniri quidem in ipso principio, multiplicari autem secundum res infimas ad quas terminatur: 1
- Opuscula: 1
- Pallis: 1
- Patet eos fuisse paucissimos, quod non congruit felicitati, qui est communis finis.: 1
- Per se: 1
- Per se nota: 1
- Philosophia prima: 1
- Potentia passiva: 1
- Propter quod est unumquodque, et illud magis: 1
- Quae ex tota materia sua constant: 1
- Quare consilium erit ad divinam Messiae naturam probandam argumenta conquiri alia et meliora et clariora: 1
- Quia decet bonitatem ipsius.: 1
- Quis sapiens et intelliget haec?: 1
- Quod Deus est Amor: 1
- Quod quid est: 1
- Ratio: 1 2
- Ratione unum. : 1
- Receptione propinqua apprehensioni: 1
- Saracenorum in jure loquentium: 1
- Secundum rationem: 1
- Semper hoc Deus operatur, quod homo eligit in sua voluntate: 1
- Semper tamen hoc homo eligit, quod Deus operatur in ejus voluntate: 1
- Sensu capi: 1
- Si igitur per cognitionem intellectivam, quae est ex phantasmatibus, possit pervenire aliquis nostrum ad intelligendas substantias separatas, possibile erit quod aliquis in hac vita intelligat ipsas substantias separatas, et per consequens videndo ipsas substantias separatas participabis modum illius cognitionis quo substantia separata intelligens se intelligit Deum: 1
- Si ponitur tempus non esse, ponatur esse: 1
- Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra, boves: 1
- Sint ut sunt, aut non sint: 1
- Species: 1 2
- Spiritus: 1
- Spiritus Dei: 1
- Stramentum: 1
- Superflui: 1
- Supponitur: 1
- Suppositum: 1
- Talis communicatio vitae: 1
- Ut quidam mentiuntur: 1
- a contingente ad utrumque: 1
- a posteriori: 1 2 3 4 5
- a priori: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
- a priori. : 1
- a se: 1
- ab alio: 1
- absolutum: 1
- accidens desitionis: 1
- accidentia individuantia: 1
- actio in distans: 1
- ad alterum: 1
- ad extra: 1 2
- ad fin: 1
- ad hominem: 1
- ad intra: 1
- ad quam tota terra comparata obtinet locum puncti: 1
- adminicula: 1 2
- adsum: 1
- aestimativa: 1
- aetatis plenitudinis Christi: 1
- affectiones: 1
- aliquid divinitatis participare: 1
- alligatio: 1
- alteratio: 1
- an quaelibet res in quamlibet aliam converti possit: 1
- anaesthesia: 1
- anima vegetativa: 1
- animae separatae: 1
- ante ultimum complementum: 1 2
- appetitus: 1 2
- appetitus naturalis: 1 2 3
- appetitus naturalis et animalis: 1
- appetitus rationalis: 1
- appetitus sensibilis: 1
- appodiacula: 1
- argumentum ad hominem: 1
- artificiatum divinae artis: 1
- auctoritatem: 1
- avertit: 1
- bene fortunatus: 1
- capere: 1
- casuale: 1
- causa: 1
- causa per accidens: 1
- causa per se: 1
- causam per se: 1
- causatio: 1
- causerie: 1
- cernere: 1
- clara notitia cum laude: 1
- coelum: 1 2
- cognitio discursiva: 1
- collocatio: 1
- complexio: 1
- componere et dividere: 1
- compositam: 1
- compositio: 1
- compositione: 1
- confessarius primus: 1
- confessarius secundus: 1
- confusio: 1 2
- congregativum: 1
- congruentia post factum: 1
- congruentia speciei: 1
- conscia plenitudo essendi: 1
- considerare, consideratio: 1
- contactus: 1
- contaminatio: 1
- contemplatio: 1
- continuatio: 1 2 3 4 5 6
- contra negantem principia fustibus est argumentandum: 1
- contrariorum eadem est ratio: 1
- contristans tangit: 1
- corpora: 1
- corpora coelestia: 1
- corpora invisibilia: 1
- corporale: 1 2
- corporibus coelestibus: 1
- corporis coelestis: 1
- corporum coelestium: 1
- corpus: 1
- corpus coeleste: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- corpus mixtum: 1
- decido: 1 2
- decisio: 1 2 3
- decisio seminis: 1
- decisionis: 1
- demonstratio: 1
- deordinatio mentis: 1
- desino: 1
- determinator: 1
- deum natura nihil indiga nostri: 1
- dicentur aequivoce homines: 1
- dicta: 1
- differentia: 1 2 3 4
- differentias: 1
- digniora: 1
- directe: 1
- discernere: 1
- disgregativum visus: 1
- dispositio: 1
- distinctio rerum: 1
- divisam: 1
- electio: 1
- eminenter: 1
- ens abstractissimum: 1
- ens abstractum: 1
- ens est bonum: 1
- ens per accidens: 1
- ens per se: 1
- ens perfectum: 1
- ens plenissimum: 1
- esse: 1 2 3 4
- esse naturale: 1
- esse perpetuum speciei dicitur divinum esse: 1
- esse plenissimum: 1
- esse voluntarium: 1
- esse, posse, agere: 1
- essentia: 1
- et affectum mentis: 1
- et cujus voluntas est immutabilis: 1
- et ex eo: 1
- et sumus in vero, filio ejus: 1
- etiam: 1
- etiam si: 1
- etiamsi: 1
- etsi difficile videatur: 1
- ex hypothesi: 1
- ex institutione ipsius Christi: 1
- ex materia creata informi species diversas produxit: 1
- ex naturali instinctu: 1
- ex re ipsa: 1
- exinanitio: 1
- extrinsecus: 1
- fallacia accidentis: 1
- fallacia compositionis et divisionis: 1
- famosa positio: 1
- fascinationis: 1
- fictionem: 1
- fidelis: 1
- fine se divertit: 1
- finis qui: 1
- finis quo: 1
- fit rationalis: 1
- fluxerint: 1
- forma cadaverica: 1
- formae unius positioni adjuncta est privatio alterius: 1
- formaliter: 1
- fortuitum: 1
- fundus animae: 1 2
- genera: 1 2
- generare regenerandos: 1
- genii: 1
- genus: 1 2
- genus species, differentia, accidens: 1
- genus subjectum divinae artis est ens: 1
- grata facta: 1
- gratia gratis data: 1 2
- gratia gratum faciens: 1
- gratiae suae in qua gratificavit nos: 1
- gratificata: 1
- gratis: 1
- gratum Deo facit: 1
- hoc aliquid: 1
- hoc aliquid et tale: 1
- homo exterior figura: 1
- honorabilius: 1
- hujus cogitativae virtutis: 1
- ignis: 1
- imaginarie visa: 1
- imaginatio: 1 2
- imperium: 1
- in inferioribus: 1
- in omni natura: 1
- in puris naturalibus: 1
- in renatis nihil odit Deus: 1
- in rerum natura: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
- in rustico: 1
- in semine deciso: 1
- in sensu composito: 1 2 3 4
- in sensu diviso: 1 2 3
- inclinatio coelestium corporum: 1
- inconsiderationis ratio: 1
- indoles: 1
- inest ut in via ad gradum: 1
- inhabitatio divinitatis: 1
- instrumenta Dei incarnati et passi: 1
- intellectus: 1 2 3
- intellectus agens: 1
- intellectus in actu: 1
- intellectus passivus: 1 2
- intellectus patiens vel possibilis: 1
- intellectus possibilis: 1 2
- intellectus principiorum: 1
- intelligibilia: 1 2
- intelligitur: 1
- intentio: 1 2 3 4 5
- intentio intellecta: 1 2 3
- intentio ratio: 1
- intentio, inhaesio, desiderium ultimi finis: 1
- intersum: 1
- intrinsecus: 1
- ipsa forma: 1
- ipsa forma subsistens: 1
- ipsa ratio: 1
- ipsum: 1
- ipsum esse: 1 2
- levia et minora documenta: 1
- lex: 1
- ligat: 1
- locus: 1
- locus classicus: 1
- lusus naturae: 1
- lux perpetua: 1
- magis formalia omnibus aliis: 1
- magis sunt nobis manifesta.: 1
- magnanimitas: 1
- malefici: 1
- maleficos: 1
- malum alicujus: 1
- manes: 1
- materia prima: 1 2 3
- materia signata: 1 2
- materiales: 1
- materialis: 1
- media via incedens: 1
- merum arbitrium: 1
- mixtio: 1 2
- moderantia: 1
- modus operandi: 1
- mortalibus aegris: 1
- motio: 1
- motio ipsius coeli ordinatur ad generationem: 1
- motus: 1
- motus primo-primus: 1
- moventia seipsa: 1
- moventur: 1
- munimentum: 1
- natura integra: 1
- naturae leges: 1
- naturale judicatorium rationis: 1
- naturalis appetitus: 1
- naturis: 1
- ne male occupet hodie solicitudo: 1
- necesse est: 1
- nihil differens fuisse a reliquis foetibus humanis: 1
- nihil prohibet: 1
- nisi ab alio quasi sole suo illustrantur: 1
- nisus: 1 2 3 4 5
- notae individuantes: 1
- notitia simplicis intelligentiae: 1
- notitia visionis: 1
- numquid vis? occupo: 1
- nunc temporis fluens: 1
- nunquam potuit non velle quidquid voluit: 1
- objectum quo: 1 2 3
- objectum quod: 1 2 3
- obligatio: 1
- obligatum: 1
- occupo: 1
- opera quae supra leges naturae fiunt: 1
- ordinatio: 1
- ordo rerum: 1
- palla: 1 2 3
- par excellence: 1
- pars concupiscibilis: 1
- pars irascibilis: 1
- participetur: 1
- passivus: 1
- peccatum naturale: 1
- per accidens: 1 2 3 4
- per decisionem: 1 2
- per essentiam: 1
- per grata facta: 1
- per se: 1 2 3 4 5
- per vivum: 1
- percipere: 1 2
- percipiantur: 1
- perfectum bonum: 1
- philosophia prima: 1
- positioni: 1
- positis ponendis: 1
- posse: 1
- possibilis: 1
- potentia: 1
- potestas absolvendi: 1
- praeclara ingenia: 1
- praemittat: 1
- praeparatio: 1 2
- prima facie: 1 2
- prima ratio in creaturis est eorum numerositas: 1
- primum mobile: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- processus in infinitum: 1
- prolatione: 1
- proportio habitudinis: 1
- propria ratio: 1
- propriam: 1
- proprium: 1 2 3
- pulcritudo ex ordinata bonorum et malorum adunatione consurgit: 1
- quae erit habenda in crastino: 1
- qualitercunque: 1
- quantitas dimensiva: 1
- quantitas dimensiva panis: 1
- quanto: 1
- qui ex Patre Filioque procedit: 1
- qui spiritu Deo servimus: 1
- qui spiritu Domini servimus: 1
- qui spiritui Deo servimus: 1 2
- qui vero secundum potentiam: 1
- quid: 1
- quid est: 1
- quid est?: 1
- quidditas, essentia: 1
- quidditates subsistentes: 1
- quo: 1 2
- quod: 1 2
- quod est: 1 2
- ratio: 1 2 3 4 5 6
- ratio formalis: 1 2
- ratio naturalis unius est una tantum: 1
- ratio nominis: 1
- ratio particularis: 1
- ratio qua cognoscitur malum ad rationem boni pertinet: 1
- rationes: 1 2
- rationes bonitatis: 1
- rationes rerum: 1
- rationes verisimiles ad fidelium exercitium et consolationem: 1
- rationibus probatum: 1
- recte: 1
- regressus in infinitum: 1
- relegere: 1
- religare: 1
- religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas: 1
- religio: 1
- religionum nodis animos exsolvere: 1
- remotio: 1
- removens prohibens: 1
- renovari: 1
- repraesentatur: 1
- requiem aeternam: 1
- res: 1 2
- res naturalis: 1
- res nominis: 1
- res possint transmutare propria virtute: 1
- resolutio: 1
- rudissimi idiotae: 1
- sacramenta efficiunt quod figurant: 1
- sacramenta efficiunt quod significant: 1
- sacramentum: 1
- saepe stylum vertas: 1
- sc. vitae et virium vitae ab anima ad corpus: 1
- scientia in acta: 1
- scit ut Deus: 1
- sed non existentiae: 1
- semen: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
- sensorium: 1
- separatum: 1
- separatum hoc solum quod vere est: 1
- si sint subsistentes: 1
- significare: 1
- similitudinarie: 1
- similitudo: 1
- sine operatione principiorum naturae: 1
- sint: 1
- sit: 1 2
- solicitudinem: 1
- solis carnibus humanis pastus: 1
- species: 1 2 3
- species intelligibilis: 1 2 3
- species intelligibilis expressa: 1
- species intelligibilis impressa: 1
- spicere: 1
- spiritus: 1 2 3
- spiritus, spuma: 1
- stramentum: 1
- suas prudentias: 1
- sub alia specie: 1
- sub aliqua specie: 1
- sub ratione boni: 1 2
- substantia separata: 1 2
- substantiam quandam: 1
- sui causa, sibi causa agendi: 1
- sui causâ: 1
- summo rerum vertice: 1
- sunt quodammodo liberi quidem motus, sive actionis, non autem liberi judicii: 1
- supponere pro: 1
- suppositio: 1
- suppositum: 1 2 3 4
- sutor supra crepidam: 1
- suum intellectum esse: 1
- tam naturae quam rationis: 1
- tertium quid: 1
- textus receptus: 1
- tota terra: 1
- totum ens: 1
- traducitur: 1
- transcorporationem ponentes: 1
- tunc: 1
- universalem ordinem et particularem: 1
- ut in paucioribus accidens: 1
- ut suus veritati sit locus, non ut in ea re superiores videantur: 1
- vel ad quidquid aliud sunt homini utilia: 1
- verbum mentale: 1 2
- vestigium, non imago: 1
- via remotionis: 1
- vident Deum totum, sed non totaliter: 1
- virtuosius est bonum in bonitate quam in malitia malum: 1
- virtus apprehensiva sensibilis: 1
- virtus seminis: 1
- vis aestimativa: 1 2 3 4 5 6
- vis cogitativa: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
- vis cognativa: 1
- vis cognoscitiva: 1
- vis formativa: 1 2
- vis formativa seminis: 1
- vis major: 1
- visio intellectus: 1
- voluntas: 1
- vox nihili: 1
- Æstimationem: 1
Index of French Words and Phrases
- Albert: 1
- Dieu: 1
- Une humanité vivante et permanente, tel semble donc être le sens de la théorie Averroistique de l’unité de l’intellect. L’immortalité de l’intellect actif: 1
- amende honorable: 1 2 3
- d’une manière qui est une disposition prochaine à l’apprehension proprement dite: 1
- façon de parler: 1
- n’est ainsi autre chose que, la renaissance éternelle de l’humanit’, et la perpetuité de la civilisation: 1
- élan: 1
Index of Pages of the Print Edition
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420