τηρήσῃ] No longer τελέσῃ. The more formal word is appropriate here.

πταίσῃ, trip or stumble] As iii. 2 bis. It is incipient falling (Romans xi. 11): cf. Deut. vii. 25. Common in Philo.

γέγονεν πάντων, is become (makes himself) guilty of all] Ἔνοχος is used with genitive or dative of crimes, or punishments, or, as here, precepts. Properly speaking it means simply “bound by,” “subject to,” “coming under.”

The force of πάντων is determined by ἑνί: it is all separate points or items that make up the Law.

Various Jewish writings contain sayings like this verse (Schöttg. 1016 ff.); as Shabbath (R. Jochanan): “If a man do all (of the 39 works prescribed by Moses), but omit one, he is guilty for all and each.” There is nothing in the O. T. exactly answering to this: but Deut. xxvii. 26, after the various specific curses on Mt Ebal, ends with “Cursed be he that confirmeth not (all) the words of this law to do them,” where the LXX. and Samar. insert πᾶσιν, and St Paul (Gal. iii. 10) so quotes the passage. The insertion is partially supported by Deut. xi. 32 (taken with vv. 26, 28) as Delitzsch points out. The same principle of the Law being one whole is implied in Mt v. 18 f., ἰῶτα ἓν ἢ μία κεραία . . . μίαν τ. ἐντολῶν τούτων τ. ἐλαχίστων.

¹¹ὁ γὰρ εἰπών μὴ μοιχεύσῃς εἶπεν καὶ μὴ φονεύσεις· εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύσεις φονεύσεις δέ, γέγονας παραβάτης νόμου.

11. ὁ γὰρ εἰπών κ.τ.λ.] It is very unlikely that the two commandments are chosen at random, as though both were unconnected with προσωπολημψία. If this were the case, there would be no clear and coherent course of thought. It is quite possible that Μὴ μοιχεύσῃς implies that such sins as adultery were really avoided and condemned by those who dishonoured the poor; and that they made their condemnation of fleshly sins an excuse for indulgence towards spiritual sins. At all events Μὴ φονεύσεις is directly connected with the matter in hand, because murder is only the extreme outcome of want of love to neighbours or brethren. Our Lord (Mt. v. 21-26) had carried back murder to the expression of anger (cf. Jam. i. 19 f.), and though St Paul (Rom. xiii. 8, 9) had carried back all commandments of the second table alike to love of the neighbours, the 6th was evidently the most direct expression of the principle common to all, for (v. 10) “love worketh no ill to a neighbour.”

¹²οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας μέλλοντες κρίνεσθαι.

12. οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε, so speak ye, and so do] The two chief spheres of shewing forth love or its absence. We have had them paired already in i. 19-21 contrasted with 22-25, i. 26 contrasted with 27; and are now going to have them on a larger scale, in inverted order, ii. 14-26 contrasted with iii. 1-12. Both are exemplified in the treatment of the poor in the synagogues, the contemptuous language accompanying the loveless acts.

ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας, as by a law of liberty] This use of διὰ with κρίνεσθαι is singular, though disguised by the ambiguity of “by,” which denotes κατά with acc., or ὑπό with gen. (cf. Jn vii. 51, “Doth our law judge a man?”), as well as διὰ with gen. Apparently it comes from Rom. ii. 12, ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἧμαρτον διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται, where it apparently means “on terms of,” “in a state depending on,” and corresponds to some other peculiar uses of διὰ by St Paul, as διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς (Rom. ii. 27); δι᾽ ἀκροβυστίας (iv. 11); διὰ προσκόμματος (xiv. 20); (?) διὰ δόξης (2 Cor. iii. 11); (?) δι᾽ ἐπαγγελίας (Gal. iii. 18). Thus the sense would seem to be not that the law of liberty is the standard or the instrument by which they are to be judged, but that they are to be judged as men who have lived in an atmosphere, as it were, of a law of liberty, and subject to its conditions. The two conceptions are closely related, but διὰ seems to lay stress chiefly on the present state rather than on the future judgment. It is probably for this reason that διὰ νόμου ἐλ. stands before μέλλοντες.

A law of liberty, exactly as i. 25: viz. Christ’s Law, as distinguished from the Mosaic. The transition from the Mosaic Law in vv. 10, 11 to the Christian Law here corresponds precisely to the transition in the Sermon on the Mount from the one jot or tittle, one of these least commandments of Mt. v. 18 f., to “Except your righteousness etc.” of Mt. v. 20, where the exceeding righteousness of the Christian disciple consists not in the performance of a greater number of positive precepts than the Scribes and Pharisees, but in the inner subjection of the spirit to the law of love, taking possession not of individual acts or abstinences, but of the whole life.

The whole passage implies that under the unity of the external law there lies a much deeper unity of the spiritual law. If the whole external law was broken by the murderous conduct of a man who kept himself clean from adultery, much more was wrong done to the whole spiritual and free law of love by the attempt to keep any part of conduct exempt from it.

¹³ἡ γὰρ κρίσις ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος· κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεον κρίσεως.

13. ἡ γὰρ κρίσις] To be interpreted by κρίνεσθαι: the Divine judgment: cf. v. 9.

ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος, without mercy to him that hath shewed no mercy] The requital is in kind, cf. Mt. vii. 1, 2, and the parable of the Two Debtors, Mt. xviii. 21-35, esp. 33. Here not love but mercy or pity is named. It is quite possible that St James is not thinking exclusively of the treatment of the poor in the synagogue, but going on to a wider range of kindred conduct (cf. i. 27), and the absence of tenderness which is a common mark of the Pharisaical or perverted religious spirit. But in any case the word is in place, for while love is the universal fundamental attitude between man and man according to the Divine plan of the world, the characteristic form which love takes when directed to the poor is pity. To suffer with their suffering is the test of its reality.

κατακαυχᾶται, glorieth against] This is the true as well as the common reading: another ancient reading is κατακαυχάσθω, and another, less attested, κατακαυχᾶσθε. The abrupt introduction of this apophthegm gave rise to various conjunctions, δέ the best attested, also (T. R.) καὶ, also quoniam or “for.”

The verb itself recurs iii. 14, and is found Rom. xi. 18; also three times in LXX., scarcely at all elsewhere. The sense of the image will depend on the interpretation of ἔλεος and κρίσεως. The opposition of the two words is singular, because they are coupled in the O. T., Ps. ci. (c.) 1; (LXX. xxxiii. (xxxii.) 5); virtually Hos. xii. 6; Mic. vi. 8; Zech. vii. 9. In these places κρίσις, מִשְׁפָּט, means the quality by which justice is done, as by an actual or virtual judge. ἔλεος is in like manner coupled with righteousness, and with truth. The same combination with near appears Mt. xxiii. 23 (with faith added), these being the weightier matters of the law neglected by the Scribes and Pharisees. This cannot however be St James’ sense. Except as applied to God’s judgment, he never uses κρίνω, κρίσις, κριτής in a good sense; but always as governed by “Judge not that ye be not judged.” Here, as the previous ἡ κρίσις suggests, there must be at least some reference to the Divine judgment on its condemnatory side, as κρίμα iii. 1, and κριθῆτε v. 9. The image then probably is that κρίσις comes so to speak as the accuser before the tribunal of God, and ἔλεος stands up fearlessly and as it were defiantly to resist the claim. Is it then human or Divine ἔλεος, the plea of the mercy that has been shewn in life or the Divine mercy resisting the Divine condemnation? Probably neither without the other: the two mercies are coupled as in Mt. v. 7, in the Lord’s Prayer, and the Two Debtors.

There is a somewhat similar use of καυχῶμαι (not κατακαυχ.) in Ecclus. xxiv. 1, 2. Schneckenburger well refers for a similar virtual καύχησις to 1 Cor. xv. 55. On the general sense cf. Or. Sib. ii. 81, Ῥύεται ἐκ θανάτου ἔλεος, κρίσις ὅπποτ᾽ ἂν ἔλθῃ.

It is however probable that in so far as St James contemplates this sense of the defying of judgment by mercy, it is only as a particular case of a universal truth. That is, he may mean that this final triumph of mercy proceeds from the previous and inherent superiority of mercy to κρίσις, human as well as Divine, answering to the superiority of mercy to sacrifice (Mt. ix. 13; xii. 7). Mercy is greater and better than human κρίσις in this narrower sense (an echo of κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν in v. 4), just as the Gospel is greater and better than the Law: and they who recognise and act on this truth become recipients of the Divine mercy, and have passed beyond condemnation by the Divine judgment in so far as it is embodied in the Law.

Unless this sense is present, it is difficult to account for the absence of δέ. Since there is no conjunction, this clause can hardly be merely antithetical to the preceding, but must supply its foundation: the quoniam gives the truer connexion, though not the whole of it.

¹⁴Τί ὄφελος, ἀδελφοί μου, ἐὰν πίστιν λέγῃ τις ἔχειν ἔργα δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ; μὴ δύναται ἡ πίστις σῶσαι αὐτόν;

14. We now come to the section on faith and works.

ἀδελφοί μου] Marking a fresh appeal, though closely connected with what precedes.

ἐὰν πίστιν λέγῃ τις ἔχειν, if a man say he hath faith] We have already had (i. 22 ff.) hearing without doing: here we have believing without doing. We have also had a spurious θρησκεία: here we have a spurious πίστις. The profession of a πίστις has been already presumed in ii. 1, where St James implies that the true faith of Jesus Christ was absent or defective. Our Lord in St Luke’s account of the explanation of the Parable of the Sower (viii. 13) had spoken of a temporary believing, which fell away in time of πειρασμός. The expression of it is “Lord, Lord”; and the fἔργα μὴ ἔχῃ here exactly answers to Lk. vi. 46 (καὶ οὐ ποιεῖτε ἃ λέγω), just as the listening to words without doing in i. 22 f. answers to Mt. vii. 24, 26. The hearing the word, which is also spoken of in the Parable of the Sower, is the first step of reception; and belief marks another step: the failure may take place at either stage.

It is to be observed that here at least St James does not say ἐὰν πίστιν ἔχῃ τις but ἐ. π. λέγῃ τις ἔχειν: it is not faith without works but the profession of faith without works that thus far is pronounced unprofitable.

There is no reason for referring this spurious claim to faith to a Jewish origin. There is no clear evidence for anything answering to it among the Jews. It would on the other hand be a natural accompaniment of a slackening Christian devotion. “Faith” or “believing” was emphatically the Christian watchword, hardly less prominent in the first three Gospels than in St Paul or St John. And the corruption of the Christian type of religion would need reprobation by the authority of one in St James’ position quite as much as the corruption of so much of the Jewish type of religion as the Jewish Christians retained. The question of justification introduces a fresh element; but we do not reach that till v. 21.

ἡ πίστις] Naturally “the faith,” “that faith,” the faith which is compatible with the absence of works. The phrase doubtless implies that there was something to which the name might in some sense be given; though it is not what St James recognises as genuine faith.

σῶσαι] As i. 21.

¹⁵ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ γυμνοὶ ὑπάρχωσιν καὶ λειπόμενοι τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς,

15. This verse shews the connexion with what precedes. The examples of deficient works to which St James at once flies are taken from the treatment of the poor, quite as much as all that has been said about places in the synagogues.

ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ] The explicit notice of both sexes brings out two degrees, as it were, in the helplessness which craved the sympathy and support of Christians. The women, as in the special example of the widows in i. 27, would have all the needs and difficulties of the men, and the additional needs and difficulties falling naturally to their sex, especially in ancient times.

The term “brother” “sister,” repeated from i. 9, calls attention to the special ties between those who by believing in the Son had acquired a closer and deeper tie of brotherhood as alike children of the Father. There was a true sense in which it was applied to all mankind: but in those days when the little community was surrounded by a more or less hostile population, the specially Christian sense had peculiar force. Christ too had in this connexion spoken of His own brethren, Mt. xxv. 35 f., 40, 42 f.

γυμνοί, naked] In the conventional sense of Scripture, as needing clothing, corresponding to the next phrase on the need of food.

ὑπάρχωσιν] Ὑπάρχω denotes not simple being, but being in a state or condition as distinguished from what is temporary or accidental: it is used properly with reference to antecedent states. Often it means what one is by nature: but that specially strong force comes from the context. The prior continuity is the main thing. Hence what is implied here is that not some casual poverty but habitual poverty is meant.

λειπόμενοι, in lack of] With the gen. just as in i. 5. In this sense of outward destitution Just. Mart. uses it absolutely. Ap. i. 67, οἱ ἔχοντες τοῖς λειπομένοις πᾶσιν ἐπικουροῦμεν; and again, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικουρεῖ ὀρφανοῖς τε καὶ χήραις, καὶ τοῖς διὰ νόσον ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν λειπομένοις.

Omit ὦσιν after λειπόμενοι; the participle instead of λείπωνται continues the indication of ὑπάρχωσιν, expressing a habitual condition, not an accidental want of food.

τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς] Simply the food needed day by day, daily food.

¹⁶εἴπῃ δέ τις αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν Ὑπάγετε ἐν εἰρήνῃ, θερμαίνεσθε καὶ χορτάζεσθε, μὴ δῶτε δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος, τί ὄφελος;

16. εἴπῃ δέ τις αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν] He first begins indefinitely, “if a man say to them,” and then after αὐτοῖς adds ἐξ ὑμῶν, implying that such a speech would really be the speech expressive of the temper of their own minds, though only one here or there might have the boldness to put it into these words.

Ὑπάγετε ἐν ειρήνῃ, Go in peace] A common Jewish farewell (Judg. xviii. 6 etc.: and used by our Lord Lk. vii. 50 etc.): here a dismissal, a sending away, in euphemistic and seemly form.

θερμαίνεσθε καὶ χορτάζεσθε, be ye warmed and filled] These words are usually taken as imperatives. Plumptre ingeniously suggests that they are indicatives; the unreal assertion that the poor are warmed and fed being a repetition of the unreal assertion that they had faith when they shewed such a lack of love. But it is difficult to get this sense out of the words as actually put into the mouth of the speaker, not as another’s description of his act. We must therefore keep to the imperative sense. It is not a mere substitution for the optative, “I hope you may somehow get warmed and fed,” but an exhortation to go and get for themselves the means of doing this. It reminds us to a certain extent of “Send the multitude away that they may buy for themselves victuals” (Mt. xiv. 15 and parallels). Not that there is any clear reflexive force in the middle, which is probably rather a passive, or at least not distinguish-able from such: but it does lie in the use of the imperative. The use of the present tenses, not aorists, goes with ὑπάρχωσιν and λειπόμενοι, as marking the reference to a continuous state, “get your food and clothing now and always.”

θερμαίνω, χορτάζω. Two strong words seem to be purposely chosen. “Warming” (Heb. and LXX.) is spoken of as an effect of clothes: Job xxxi. 20; Hag. i. 6 (cf. 1 Kin. i. i). Plut. Symp. 691 D speaks of the same garment as warming in winter, cooling in summer. Galen, V. M. S. ii. (ap. Wetst.) speaks of it as a common incorrect custom to speak of a thing as warming, because it hinders chilling.

χορτάζω, originally of pasturing cattle, is used in late Greek of feeding men: but usually, perhaps always, with the sense of feeding to the full, satisfying.

Thus the warm garments and satisfying food correspond to ἐν εἰρήνῃ.

μὴ δῶτε δὲ, and yet ye give not] Transition to the full plural. Though one alone might be ready to speak the words, the general line of conduct was common to a large number.

τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος, the things needful to the body] Ἐπιτήδειος is properly what is convenient or fitting, useful. But τὰ ἐπιτήδ. by usage are ordinary necessaries, sometimes called τὰ ἀνάγκαια ἐπιτήδεια.

τοῦ σώματος has force in relation to the following comparison (οὕτως καὶ). It is an appeal to an example from the obvious realm “of the body.”

¹⁷οὕτως καὶ ἡ πίστις, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ ἔργα, νεκρά ἐστιν καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν.

17. οὕτως καὶ, even so] What is the precise comparison? i.e. what is it that in vv. 15, 16 is compared to faith as being liable to be dead? The result spoken of is that the body is, as a matter of fact, chilled and starved if it has not necessaries. Presently, in v. 26, St James says, in a similar comparison about the deadness of faith without works, that the body without spirit is dead. One is tempted to assume that he meant the love or beneficence is dead if it contents itself with words. But there would be no real image there, merely a repetition of the dead faith in a particular application. Moreover τί ὄφελος points not to the unreality of the beneficence but to the absence of result in the way of starvation prevented. Apparently the comparison is to the words spoken: they are dead words inasmuch as they produce no effect on the supposed need. This is Grotius’ explanation, and although not altogether satisfactory, it seems to be the best. Most commentators overlook the need of explanation altogether. Wetstein quotes from Plaut. Epidic. i. 2. 13 f. A man asks another for money: the reply is “If I had it, I certainly would not refuse it”; and then comes the rejoinder, Nam quid to igitur rettulit Beneficum ease oratione, si ad rem auxilium emortuum est?

ἔχῃ ἔργα, have works] A remarkable phrase, but very expressive of St James’ true meaning. The works are not something added on to the faith, but elements of it, parts of itself.

νεκρά ἐστιν, is dead] Again the same, not merely “useless” or “unacceptable” but “dead.” It is no question of faith v. works, but whether faith is faith if it has no works.

καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, in itself] This brings out the same yet more emphatically, “in and by itself,” not merely in relation to other things, not merely in its utility, so to speak; but in its own very and inherent nature.

¹⁸ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις;ἔχεις;] ἔχεις κἁγὼ ἔργα ἔχω. δεῖξόν μοι τὴν πίστιν σου χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, κάγώ σοι δείξω ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν.

18. ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις, But some one will say] An extremely difficult verse, The natural way of taking ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is as the words of an objector, and then it is difficult to see how the next words could be put into an objector’s mouth. It is then suggested that the τις is virtually St James himself, like “so that a man shall say etc.” (Ps. lviii. 11) as often wrongly interpreted (the true meaning being “men shall say”); but this is very unnatural from every point of view. Accordingly it is often now supposed that a third person is introduced, mainly on St James’ side. This however only lessens, by no means removes, the difficulty. (1) It is very unlike St James to favour the broad positive statement addressed to those whom he is rebuking, “Thou hast faith, and I have works”; (2) ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is a most unlikely phrase for introducing one who is more for than against the writer; and (3) the supposed speaker disappears thenceforward, and it is difficult to see what good purpose would be served by this momentary introduction.

Not only the most natural but the only natural way to understand ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is as introducing an objector, one of the persons rebuked (τις . . . ἐξ ὑμῶν), as in 1 Cor. xv. 35 (cf. Rom. ix. 19; xi. 19). Indeed it is difficult otherwise to understand the σύ, of v. 19, ὦ ἄνθ. κενέ of 20, and βλέπεις of 22, but especially 20. In 24 there is a return to the plural in ὁρᾶτε, but the intermediate singular 2nd person singles out someone for rebuke, who can be no other than the τις of 18, for the τις of 16 belongs exclusively to the illustration.

A very fair and, to say the least, not improbable sense may then be obtained by taking Σύ to ἔχω alone as put into the objector’s mouth, the rest of the verse being taken as St James’ own reply; and further by taking Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις by itself as a question. Questions of this kind are very common in St James, and 19 is best so interpreted. The sense will then be “Thou, James, hast thou faith, that thing which thou slightest in me? I for my part as well as thou (κἀγώ) have works”; that is, “I do not allow that I have no works, I have works (sc. works of the law) in addition to my faith: can you conversely say that you have faith in addition to your works?” St James’ reply then attacks the notion that faith and works are two separate things. All turns on χωρίς, which does not mean simply “without,” but “apart from,” “separated from.” “Shew me,” he says, “thy faith apart from the works, the works that properly belong to it and should characterise it”; implying that this is an impossibility; “and I will shew thee by my works the faith, the faith belonging to them and inspiring them.” That is, he turns the tables, and pleads that it is he alone, not the antagonist, who can shew both. The form δεῖξόν μοι . . . κάγώ σοι δείξω occurs Theoph. Ant. i. 2, Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν φῇς Δεῖξόν μοι τὸν θεόν σου, κἀγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἄν Δεῖξόν μοι τὸν ἄνθρωπόν σου κἀγώ σοι δείξω τὸν θεόν μου; where two impossibilities are set against each other: but in St James the κἀγώ σοι is positive, not merely contingent on the other shewing. The whole is little more than a paraphrase of “By their fruits ye shall know them.”

¹⁹σὺ πιστεύεις ὅτι εἶς θεὸς ἔστινθεὸς ἔστιν] ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν; καλῶς ποιεῖς· καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσιν καὶ φρίσσουσιν

19. σὺ πιστεύεις, thou believest, dost thou not?] The sense is not very different whether we take it as indicative or interrogative: but interrogative is more forcible.

ὅτι εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν, that there is (exists) one God] MSS. much divided. The best attested readings are εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν and εἶς ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν (or, inverted, in the common form, εἶς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς). The second (and third) would mean “that God is one.’ Cf. Deut. vi. 4 etc. On the whole it is more probable that St James is not singling out the detached affirmation of unity, but taking all together thefirst article in the creed of Jew and Christian alike, an article not first only but fundamental. The meaning apparently is “you claim to have a belief detached from works, though you claim likewise to have works independently: well, what is that belief? Take it in its simplest and most fundamental form, the belief that there is One God. A belief without works necessarily consists in belief in a proposition; belief not in One God, but that there is One God. Well, so far so good: thou doest well.”

καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσιν, the devils also believe this] Καὶ is of course not “and” but “also,” they as well as thou.

πιστεύουσιν] Sc. this, believe that this is true.

τὰ δαιμόνια] Here as in the Gospels we must not think simply of “powers of evil,” as such, but of the πνεύματα πονηρά or ἀκάθαρτα by which those called demoniacs were possessed. The reference is probably to the Gospel narratives, “What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art thou come to destroy us? We know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God” (Mk i. 24 etc.).

φρίσσουσιν, shudder] Properly the same as the Latin horror, the standing of hair on end with fear. Specially used of awe of a mysterious Divine power, as often of the adepts in the Greek mysteries. Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 251 A, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε καὶ τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεὸν σέβεται. It is something at once more distant and more prostrate than worship. Cf. Ast on the above p. 449 and Wytt. on Plut. ii. 26B. An Orphic fragment quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. v. 724 and Euseb. P.E. xiii. 13 (Hermann pp. 453 f.) on God: Δαίμονες ὃν φρίσσουσι, θεῶν δὲ δέδοικεν ὅμιλος; an oracle ap. Lact. de ira Dei xxiii. (and in Latin Aug. Civ. Dei xix. 23), Wolff Proph. Orac. p. 143:

and a magical invocation (Ὀνειροπομπὸς Ἀγαθοκλεῦς (sic) in A. Dieterich Papyrus magica Mus. Lugd. Bat. p. 800: Lips. 1888), Θώθ, ὅν πᾶς θεὸς προσκυνεῖ καὶ πᾶς δαίμων φρίσσει. There is thus no force of “and yet” in καί before φρ.: it is rather “their belief” is so strong and undeniable that it ends in a kind of strong homage. It is a proof that they believe, not something done in spite of it.

Thus the force of the clause lies on the word δαιμόνια (cf. δαιμονιώδης iii. 15). A belief such as this, even though its contents are so true and important as a belief in One God, cannot be a very Divine thing when it can be shared by the δαιμόνια.

The whole then turns on the real nature of the belief or faith supposed, and Bede seems to have understood it rightly, when, taking up language of Augustine, he says: “Sed nec Deum credere et contremiscere magnum est, si non et in eum credatur, hoc est si non ejus in corde amor teneatur. Aliud est enim credere illi, aliud credere illum, aliud credere in illum. Credere illi est credere vera esse quae loquitur: credere illum credere quod ipse sit Deus: credere in ilium est diligere illum. Credere vera esse quae loquitur multi et mali possunt, credunt enim esse vera, et nolunt ea facere, quia ad operandum pigri sunt. Credere autem ipsum esse Deum, hoc et daemones potuerunt. Credere vero in Deum soli novere qui diligunt Deum, qui non solo nomine sunt Christiani sed et factis et vita.” (For reff. to Aug. see Pearson Creed p. 16.)

²⁰θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, ὅτι ἡ πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων ἀργή ἐστιν;

20. θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, but wilt thou gain the knowledge] He is now going to prove his point by reference to Scripture. The words are equivalent to “Do you ask me what proof I have that . . .”

ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, O vain man] Ἄνθρωπε probably in contrast to δαιμόνια, a being who shouldest have such a much better faith than δαιμόνια.

Κενός (by itself) is not at all common as applied to men: it denotes pretentiousness, hollowness accompanying display. Thus Epictet. ii. 19. 8, “But if I am κενός, especially at a banquet, I astonish the visitors by enumerating the writers (on a particular subject)”; iv. 4. 35, κενόν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὑ δεῖ ἐπαιρόμενον. Plutarch Sertor. xxvi. (581 F), “to despise Mallius ὡς κενοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος; Moral. 81 B, agriculturalists like to see ears of corn bending down, but those that are lifted by lightness κενοὺς ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἀλαζόνας; and so of youths intending to philosophise, those who are most κενοί and deficient in βάρος θράσος ἔχουσι, and a gait and walk and countenance full of scorn and contempt. The use of ἄνδρας κενούς (lit. empty) in Judg. ix. 4 does not help. Probably the sense is rather analogous to the Greek sense than identical. It is doubtful whether personal arrogance is intended here. Rather the unreality of the kind of faith professed, a faith which had no inner core to it.

ὅτι ἡ πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων] Probably as before (v. 18) this faith separated from the works belonging to it.

ἀργή, worthless] So best MSS., not νεκρά, which comes from v. 26; ἀργός is worthless, i.e. either not working, idle, lazy, or producing no works in the sense of results, hence useless, fruitless, ineffectual, as 2 Peter i. 8, οὐκ ἀργοὺς οὐδὲ ἀκάρπους; and perhaps Mt. xii. 36, πᾶν ῥῆμα ἀργόν. This sense would suit the context: but as there is an apparent contrast to συνήργει in v. 22, it is better to refer it rather to the act of working than to the result. Τῶν ἔργων are the concrete works capable of being spoken of separately; so that there is no tautology, the working being thought of with reference to the agent, and ἀργή here meaning “inactive,” putting forth no powers.

²¹Αβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἀνενέγκας Ἰσαὰκ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ το θυσιαστήριον;

21. St James comes now to his examples to prove his point.

Αβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν] These words stand first, before οὐκ, in the sense “Take Abraham our father for instance, was not he,” etc. “Abraham our father” in a combination of senses, as the father of the old Israel (Mt. iii. 9, etc.), as the father of the new Israel which had arisen out of the old Israel (claimed by Stephen, Acts vii. 2), and above all as the father of those who have shewn faith (Rom. iv. ii, 12, 16; Gal. iii. 7 ff.). The context seems to shew that this last is chiefly meant. Abraham’s example is important for this purpose just because he was the typical instance of faith.

οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων] The words do not express whether he means that works had a share in it, or that works alone were concerned: but the former sense alone can be reconciled either with the general argument or with the quotation in v. 23.

ἐδικαιώθη] This word is manifestly to be interpreted in the first instance by its O.T. usages. The active voice δικαιόω represents the Piel and Hiphil of צָדַק both causative, to cause to be צַדִּיק (δίκαιος), just as δικαιόω) as applied ethically to persons is properly to make δίκαιος. The passive voice δεκαιοῦσθαι is one of the representatives of the Kal of the same verb, to be צַדִּיק or δίκαιος, a word chiefly though not exclusively used in Job (see especially Isa. xliii. 9, 26; xlv. 25), and sometimes rendered δίκαιος εἰμι, or in English “to be righteous.” So far all is etymologically clear: the active is to make righteous, the passive to be made righteous. But then comes the question, does צַדִּיק or δίκαιος or righteous mean always simply a quality in a man without reference to the recognition of it? Certainly not. Various passages (e.g. Ps. cxliii. 2) express or imply the sense of being righteous in God’s sight, and this is almost the only sense of the active, chiefly with the force “defending the cause of,” “pleading for the righteousness” or “innocence of.” The same senses reappear freely in Ecclus. So in N.T.: Mt. xii. 37; Lk. vii. 29; x. 29; xvi. 15; xviii. 14 (not to count ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία etc., Mt. xi. 19; Lk. vii 35); besides all the passages in St Paul, and also Acts xiii. 39 where St Paul is the speaker.

Leaving then for the present St Paul out of sight, that we may not disturb St James’ argument, we have naturally here the sense “Did not Abraham appear righteous in God’s sight on the ground of works?”

ἀνενέγκας κ.τ.λ.] From a combination of Gen. xxii. 2 (ἐνένεγκον) and 9, ἐπέθηκεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον. There is sometimes doubt when ἐπὶ stands before τὸ θυσιαστήρ. whether it means “to” or “upon”: but here doubtless, as the Hebrew suggests, it is “upon,” as Mt. v. 23; 1 Pet. ii. 24. The meaning is that this act was distinctly a work. The faith in God which Abraham felt was carried out in a piece of conduct which tried it to the utmost.

²²βλέπεις ὅτι ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη,

22. βλέπεις, thou perceivest] It is so obvious, when looked at, that there is no room for doubt.

ἡ πίστις, the faith] Sc. in this case: the faith in antithesis to the works was not separate from them but wrought with them.

συνήργει, worked with] A bold image. The faith not only was followed or accompanied by works — that is expressed in τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ — but itself worked with his works. Not for faith plus works does St James plead, but for faith at work, living, acting in itself, apart from any value in its results; συνήργέω is properly to be a συνήργός: not used in LXX., but twice in Apocr. and in four other places of the N.T.

καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, and by the works] Ἐκ as before, in consequence of, by effects proceeding from.

ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη, the faith was made perfect] So long as the faith was not exercised, it was in a manner imperfect. It gained maturity and completeness by being thoroughly acted out. This is the only place where St James uses this verb (common in N.T., especially Jn, 1 Jn, Heb.), but τέλειος, as we have seen, he has five times, and this nearly answers to ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω in i. 4. It is to be observed that the two clauses are exactly complementary to each other. The works received the co-operation of a living power from the faith: the faith received perfecting and consummation from the works into which it grew.

²³καί ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα Ἐπιστευσεν δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ. καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη.

23. καί ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα, and there was a fulfilment of the Scripture which saith] The usual phrase, as Lk. iv. 21, etc. The Divine word spoken is conceived of as receiving a completion so to speak in acts or events which are done or come to pass in accordance with it. This idea of filling, or giving fullness to, is always contained in the biblical use of fulfilling, though not always in precisely the same sense. ἡ γραφή probably the individual saying of Scripture (ἡ γραφὴ αὕτη in Lk.).

The passage Gen. xv. 6 was the one which most clearly expressed the faith of Abraham and which at the same time connected it with the accounting it on the part of God as righteousness. The words ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ. are equivalent to saying ἐδικαιώθη (he, not the faith). Philo, Leg. All. iii. 81 (p. 132) paraphrases them, Ἀβραάμ γέ τοι ἐπίστευσε τῷ θεῷ, καὶ δίκαιος ἐνομίσθη. The two passages are brought together also in 1 Macc. ii. 52, Ἀβραὰμ οὐχὶ ἐν πειρασμῷ εὑρέθη πιστός, καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην; for the πειρασμός doubtless refers to Gen. xxii. 1, ὁ θεὸς ἐπείραζεν τὸν Ἀβραάμ.

καὶ φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη, and (so) he was called the friend of God] Probably the meaning is that this was another result of the faith which be shewed in the sacrifice of Isaac, the first result being the fulfilling of the words spoken of him with reference to an earlier exhibition of faith. The reference itself is doubtless mainly, if not wholly, to Isa. xli. 8 (Heb. Sym., not LXX. ὃν ἡγάπησα) “who loved me,” not “whom I loved” (see Cheyne); 2 Chr. xx. 7 (Heb. not LXX. τῷ ἡγαπημένῳ σου); but v.l. τῷ φίλῳ apud Field), and ἐκλήθη means not “acquired the human title,” but “was Divinely stamped” with that unique name. At the same time the name, though doubtless originating in Isaiah if not earlier, was widely spread, and St James may have had Greek authority for it. See the authorities in Lightfoot on Clem. Rom. 10 (Clement refers to it 17 also); and Rönsch in Hilg. Z. S. 1873 iv. 583 ff., and Wetst. Philo uses it, even substituting it once for τοῦ παιδός μου in Gen. xviii. 17. Judith viii. 26=22 in lat. vg., “quomodo pater nester Abraham tentatus est, et per multas tribulationes probatus Dei amicus factus est.” Cf. Wisd. vii. 27; Clem. Hom. xviii. 13; Recog. i. 32. So also Lib. Jubil. 19, Ber. R. on Gen. xiii. 8, etc.; and the name is still in use among the Arabs, El Khalil. Weil, cited by Rönsch 585, quotes “When Abraham by Nimrod’s command was to be thrown into the fire, the heaven with its angels and the earth with all the creatures therein cried out with one voice, ‘God of Abraham, Thy friend, who alone on earth adores Thee, is thrown into the fire’ etc.” This various use shews by the way that the occurrence of the phrase in a Christian author is no sufficient proof that he employed the Epistle of St James.

It is very doubtful whether the name is etymological, though a writer against the Jews called Molon, cited by Alex. Polyhistor ap. Euseb. P. E. 9. 19, p. 420, says, ὃν δὴ μεθερμηνεύεσθαι Πατρὸς φίλον; and Rönsch argues that ח being changed into ה, רַחַם represents φίλος, though more properly “one on whom God had mercy.”

²⁴ὁρᾶτε ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον.

24. ὁρᾶτε, ye see] St James now turns from the “empty man” to the brethren whom he was previously addressing. Τοίνυν is spurious. Elsewhere in the N.T. ὁρᾶτε is always imperative, but in the sense “see to it,” “beware,” which will not do here. It is not likely to be used in the sense “take note,” “observe,” so that the indic. is the most natural. The sense must be “ye see by this example of Abraham”: otherwise ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ has no force.

ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται] The same phrase as in v. 21: but here the important explanatory clause is added, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον; shewing that with him it was no question of faith contrasted with works, but of faith without works contrasted with faith with works: the faith as a ground of justification is assumed as a starting point.

²⁵ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ῥαὰβ ἡ πόρνη οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ὑποδεξαμένη τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ ἑτέρᾳ ὁδῷ ἐκβαλοῦσα;

25. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ] This introduces another example, not needing such full exposition. Abraham the father of the Jewish people was the first; now St James cites a heathen, a Canaanitess, as a type of the other branch of Israelites and of Christians, the proselyte Jews, the Gentile Christians; nay the first of all proselytes, for her act took place at the very entrance into the Promised Land. In doing this, St James doubtless was building on a Jewish traditional view. Setting aside Heb. xi. 31, the remarkable introduction of Rahab’s name in Mt. i. 5 (as also Tamar, Ruth, Bathsheba) implies a tradition as to her marriage to Salmon which marks her out in a signal manner. See Wetst. (i. 226) and better Wünsche Erl. der Ev. 3 f. Thus Megilla 14 b, “Eight prophets who were also priests are descended from the harlot Rahab, etc.” (ten prophets and prophetesses according to Midrash, Ruth i.): another Midrash says priests. Midr. Cant. “As long as the Israelites do the will of God, He brings every righteous man whom He sees among the other peoples, and joins him to Israel, as came to pass with Jethro and Rahab.

The precise purpose of adding ἡ πόρνη (added also in Heb.) is not clear. Perhaps her occupation is meant to point to her heathen origin, and as marking the extreme form of a faith which was due to a change or conversion, not part of an orderly and continuous growth, as in Abraham or Samuel.

οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη] The force of this lies in what is implied, that she was justified in virtue of her faith in that she embraced the belief in the one true God, and risked all on the belief. This very faith, he says, was not one barren of works: it shewed its strength by her willingness to risk her life to save the servants of the true God.

ὑποδεξαμένη, hospitably entertained.

τοὺς ἀγγέλους] Called κατασκόπους in Heb., and τοὺς κατασκοπεύσαντας Josh. vi. 25. The more favourable word is perhaps chosen to suggest that in receiving them she was as it were receiving angels.

ἑτέρᾳ ὁδῷ] Probably no more than “different different from the way by which they came.”

ἐκβαλοῦσα, dismissed them] So probably. The word is a stronger one than we should expect to find used, but the same thing happens in other places of the N.T., as Mt. ix. 38, Lk. x. 2, ἐργάτας; Jn x. 4, πρόβατα; Mt. xii. 35, xiii. 52, ἐκ τ. ἀγαθοῦ θησαυροῦ τὰ ἀγαθά, etc.

²⁶ὥσπερὥσπερ] + γὰρ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς πνεύματος νεκρόν ἐστιν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ πίστις χωρὶς ἔργων νεκρά ἐστιν.

26. γὰρ is very doubtful: some authority for δέ: but no conjunction most likely. It is a general summing up, not standing in very near relation to v. 25, but referring alike to the whole passage from v. 14.

χωρὶς πνεύματος, separated from (the) spirit] Not spirit in the higher sense, but simply the breath of life. The body with the breath in it has all the difference from the body out of which the breath has departed that life has from death, although externally the body is nearly the same. So too the same contents of faith, that there is one God, or to go on to all that is contained in ii. 1, the faith of the Lord Jesus Christ the Glory, is a dead thing if it is separated from works, in other words, from active energy. The paradox must be intentional. The opposite is what most would be tempted to say: but it would be only superficially true. True faith is a faith that aims at work and motion; false faith is virtually a corpse. He uses νεκρά here where he had said ἀργή before. The idea is much the same, but νεκρά expresses it by a strong image.

Now as regards the relation of this section to St Paul, the examples cited are certainly not enough to imply that St Paul had already written. St Paul mentions Abraham: but who could do otherwise in speaking of faith? St Paul does not mention Rahab; and though the Pauline author of Heb. does, it is not in connexion with justification or with any controversial purpose but simply as one of a series of examples of faith. It is remarkable that Philo, de nobil. 5 (ii. 442), first speaks strongly of Abraham (διὸ καὶ πιστεῦσαι λέγεται τῷ θεῷ πρῶτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος ἀκλινῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἔσχεν ὑπόληψιν, ὡσ ἔστιν ἕν αἴτιον τὸ ἀνωτάτω καὶ προνοεῖ τοῦ τε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ), and then proceeds Ταύτην τὴν εὐγένειαν οὐ μόνον θεοφιλεῖς ἄνδρες ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες ἐζήλωσαν, and then gives as an instance Tamar, who appears in Mt. with Rahab, using language that might be applied at once to Rahab, how she was an inhabitant of Palestine, a woman brought up in a city full of many gods, full of images etc.: and then how out of deep darkness she was able to see a little dawn of light, and how she waxed strong unto piety, little heeding life if she were not to live nobly. Thus both examples might come quite naturally to St James simply from his Jewish education.

But the phrase ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, taken in its juxtaposition to faith, is very hard to explain without reference to St Paul. There is no real evidence for any similar Jewish language. Justification is not part of St James’ original argument: but he brings it in from vv. 21-24 in a way which implies that he is arguing against some actual plea. If he had been intending to argue against St Paul he would have used language which struck at St Paul’s doctrine. But this he avoids. His language is indeed formally inconsistent with St Paul’s, since St Paul altogether declined to speak of any justification by works. But this language of St Paul may easily have been used, even by men opposed to him, in a manner at variance with his true purpose. Such verbal contradictions are sometimes inevitable for the expression of the fulness of the truth: and laying aside the insoluble question whether St James personally would have accepted every word that St Paul used, or St Paul every word that St James used, we are justified in considering both, not merely to have been needful as leaders of the Church in the Apostolic age, but as having contributed two forms of teaching, each of which is permanently necessary for the completeness of truth.

III. ¹Μὴ πολλοὶ διδάσκαλοι γίνεσθε, ἀδελφοί μου, εἰδότες ὅτι μεῖζον κρίμα ληψόμεθα·

III. 1. St James takes up now a fresh point: wrong speech after wrong action.

μὴ πολλοὶ διδάσκαλοι, not many teachers] There is no need to correct to πολυδιδάσκαλοι or otherwise. The phrase is peculiar, but forcible and clear enough as interpreted by the context and by vv. 13 ff. It is assumed that for the good of the community there should be teachers, discharging a special function for the rest (1 Cor. xii. 29, μὴ πάντες διδάσκαλοι; cf. 28, τρίτον διδασκάλους), and then implied that many set up as teachers not from a sense of responsibility but from a vain or censorious spirit. Thus the single notion “many teachers” practically involves the idea that the teaching arose from low personal motives.

The context would allow διδάσκαλοι to be used vaguely, as if ordinary social censoriousness were intended. But it is hardly likely that this word would have been chosen except with reference to actual public teaching. The sense is illustrated by the whole of 1 Cor. xii.-xiv., but especially by xiv. 26; though it is true that we cannot conclude too rapidly from the ways of Corinthian Greeks to the Jews of the Dispersion. Still what follows in the rest of the chapter is strikingly analogous to much that St Paul says in 1 Cor. about σοφία and λόγος, and to the manner in which he connects together the misuse of both. The disputatiousness of Greeks may well have had much in common with the disputatiousness of Jewish Christians, more especially as many of them were of Greek race.

This precise tendency has no distinct echo in the Gospels, except the warning against idle words. Mt. xxiii. 8-10 refers rather to the honour of rabbiship than to the pride of the exercise of the office of teacher,

ἀδελφοί μου] This again introduces a fresh point, softening off at the outset the sharpness of what St James had to say.

εἰδότες] Not “taking note,” “observing,” but “knowing as ye already do.”

μεῖζον κρίμα ληψόμεθα, shall receive greater judgment] The word of Christ on idle words (Mt. xii. 36 f.) pronounced that account should be given ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κρίσεως; “for by thy words . . . thou shalt be condemned (καταδικασθήσῃ).”

κρίμα ληψόμεθα] This phrase occurs in a different context Mk xii. 40 || Lk. xx. 47, with περισσότερον for μεῖζον. There περισσότερον seems to mean that those who combined the pretensions of scribeship with these faults and vices should be condemned yet more than ordinary offenders. Here μεῖζον must have much the same force, but perhaps also a special reference to the just retribution involved in “Judge not that ye be not judged”: that is, it seems to be implied that wrong judging was a characteristic of the much teaching. This seems to follow from γάρ in v. 2, which cannot be otiose. We all stumble and therefore come under judgment: but the judgment is greater if we have been taking on ourselves to judge others.

²πολλὰ γὰρ πταίομεν ἄπαντες. εἴ τις ἐν λόγῳ οὐ πταίει, οὗτος τέλειος ἀνήρ δυνατὸς χαλιναγωγῆσαι καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα.

2. πολλὰ γὰρ πταίομεν ἄπαντες, For in many things we all stumble] Πταίω as before (ii. 10).

πολλὰ] Lies between πολύ and πολλάκις: it is “much” with the idea of plurality and repetition introduced: so Mt. ix. 14 v.1. (νηστεύομεν); Mk iii. 12 (ἐπετίμα); v. 10 (παρεκάλει), 38 (ἀλαλάζοντας), 43 (διεστείλατο), etc.

ἄπαντες] “one and all.”

εἴ τις ἐν λόγῳ οὐ πταίει, If any stumbleth not in speech] Not μή but οὐ, = “succeeds in escaping stumbling,” the two words being taken together. For the phrase cf. Ps. xxxix. 1, τοῦ μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν ἐν γλώσσῃ μου; Ecclus. xix. 16, καὶ τίς οὐχ ἥμαρτεν ἐν τῇ γλώσσῃ αὐτοῦ; (Cf. Philo de nom. mut. 1082 C; de Abr. 352 C.) The image was applied to the tongue by Zeno ap. Diog. Laert. vii. 26 (Wetst.), κρεῖττον εἶναι τ. ποσὶν ὀλισθεῖν ἢ τῇ γλώττῃ: cf. Eustathius in Od. viii. 171.

The previous sentence spoke of moral stumbling of any kind. Here it becomes narrowed to speech: stumbling in speech is peculiarly easy and common: but the misuse of speech in pride and bitterness of teachership is something much worse than ordinary stumbling in speech. Here then St James drops for a while the subject begun in v. 1, to be taken up again in 13-18. The vicious teachership suggested to him the vicious use of the tongue in general, and so he launches out into this wider subject.

τέλειος ἀνήρ, a perfect man] The adjective as before, consecrated by Mt. v. 48. Ἀνήρ cannot have the sense that ἄνθρωπος would have, “one shewing the perfection of humanity”: it is simply “one that is perfect.”

δυνατὸς χαλιναγωγῆσαι καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, able to bridle the whole body also] The force of καὶ is that his stumbling not in speech arises from his bridling his tongue; and that a man who can bridle his tongue can also bridle his whole body. This may be in two senses, that the tongue is so difficult to bridle that it is an easier thing to bridle the whole body, and that in the bridling of the tongue the bridling of the body is virtually accomplished at the same time. The comparison to the horses’ bridle in v. 3 and to the rudder in v. 4 and the whole language of 6 prevent the exclusion of the second sense, while the form of this sentence rather suggests the first. Probably St James meant both senses to be included.

The bridling of the tongue (already named i. 26) is naturally one of the commonest of images in various languages: but it is especially associated with μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐν γλώσσῃ in Ps. xxxix. 1 (Heb. not LXX.).

³εἰ δὲ τῶν ἵππων τοὺς χαλινοὺς εἰς τὰ στόματα βάλλομεν εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα αὐτῶν μετάγομεν·

3. εἰ δὲ] True reading, not ἰδέ (or as T.R. with a few ἰδού) derived from supposed parallelism to ἰδού in v. 4. The δὲ is equivalent to the logical “now”: the verse is really an inference from the force of the word χαλιναγωγῆσαι. St James has used it completely metaphorically of the whole body, when he might have said in general terms “keep in order”: but it occurs to him that the word has a special force for his purpose because it is just through the mouth, the source of speech, that the process of bridling takes place.

τῶν ἵππων] Put first because horses are the direct subjects of comparison with τέλειος ἀνήρ: it thus is equivalent to “in the case of horses” though of course governed not only by τα στόματα but also by τοὺς χαλινοὺς: the mouths are the part of the horses into which we put the bits by which we mean to restrain them. This accounts for the two articles.

εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι (not πρός), to make them obey us] St James doubtless means to express not merely result but purpose. The reason why the phrase is introduced is probably because St James is thinking how far control of the tongue goes towards producing control of the whole body.

μετάγομεν, we turn about] Μετάγω as commonly used means to “transfer” or “transport” in a strong sense, as prisoners to a strange land, or the power of government from one class to another. It is also used of turning men to a better mind (still transference) Plut. ii. 225 F; Epict. Ench. xxxiii. 3. Apparently here simply in the sense of leading not from one place to another but from one direction to another, though it is not satisfactory to have no clear authority for it. Lexicons and commentaries pass the point over.

⁴ἰδοὺ καὶ τὰ πλοῖα, τηλικαῦτα ὄντα καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνέμων σκληρῶν ἐλαυνόμενα, μετάγεται ὑπὸ ἐλαχίστου πηδαλίου ὅπου ἡ ὁρμὴ τοῦ εὐθύνοντος βούληται·

4. The example of the ships and rudders comes in by way of addition, apparently as suggested by the last words of v. 3.

τηλικαῦτα ὄντα καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνέμων σκληρῶν ἐλαυνόμενα, though they are so great, and though they are driven by rough winds] This is the most natural construction according to the form of the sentence. On the other hand it is somewhat singular that the size and the driving by winds, which would not be always rough, are coupled together; and it is possible that καὶ means not “and” but “even,” “the ships, great as they are, even when they are being driven by rough winds, are turned about,” etc.

πηδαλίου, rudder] From the Odyssey onwards.

ὁρμή, impulse] This might be either the impulse in the mind of the steersman or the impulse which his hand communicates to the helm: but the whole phrase would be rather feeble if referred to the mind only: moreover there would be almost a contradiction between the “impulsiveness “and the purpose (βουλή).

τοῦ εὐθύνοντος, the steersman] Εὐθύνω, first to make straight, is then used of any kind of guidance, shepherd of sheep, charioteer of chariot, steersman of ship (Plato etc.); and of the rudder itself (Luc. Dial. Mort. x. 10, εὔθυνε, ὦ πορθμεύ, τὸ πηδάλιον; Eur. Cyc. 15,

ἐν πρύμνῃ δ᾽ ἄκρᾳ
αὐτὸς λαβὼν ηὔθυνον ἀμφῆρες δόρυ).

βούληται, willeth] By a bold figure the deliberation and decision is transferred to the last point at which the steersman’s action passes into that of the rudder by the movement of his hand. Βούλομαι as before implies not mere will but intention: the steersman turns the helm this way or that because he knows which way his course lies. Rudders and steersmen have furnished many images. This combination of the horse’s bridle and the ship’s rudder as illustrative of the government of the tongue is found in Ps.-Plat. Axioch. [? ap. Theoph. Simoc. Ep. 70] and in Plutarch and Philo [see Wetst. and Mayor].

⁵οὔτως καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα μικρὸν μέλος ἐστὶν καὶ μεγάλα αὐχεῖ. ἰδοὺ ἡλίκον πῦρ ἡλίκην ὕλην ἀνάπτει·

5. Apparently a direct comparison with v. 4. What is not easy is μεγάλα αὐχεῖ (so better than μεγάλαυχεῖ).

μεγάλα αὐχεῖ, hath great things whereof to boast] Αὐχέω is properly to stretch the neck and hold up the head in pride, and hence to speak with proud confidence. Μεγάλαυχέω seems always to be used in a disparaging sense, to denote “boastfulness.” The difficulty is that the comparison seems to require not great pretension but great performance to be ascribed to the tongue. Oecumenius has μεγάλα ἐργάζεται by way of paraphrase, and something like this is doubtless what we should expect. It does not help much to say that the pretension comes first, the performance next, viz. in the following verses. The true solution lies probably in the wider use of αὐχέω than of μεγάλαυχέω. Though αὐχέω never loses the sense of boast, it frequently, both in early and late Greek, is used without sense of unreality in the boast, and virtually as equivalent to “having cause to boast.” The only question then is as to the use of μεγάλα, which prima facie has an adverbial force, “greatly.” Now αὐχεῖ used absolutely without reference to any object could refer only to boastfulness, pretence; and μεγάλα as an adverb would only accentuate this force, by the association with μεγάλαυχέω. But in late Greek αὐχέω is not infrequently used with the accusative of things boasted of, where the classical usage would be with dative with or without ἐπί. Thus Aristid. i. 103, μόνοις δ᾽ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει καθαρὰν εὐγένειάν τε καὶ πολιτείαν αὐχῆσαι: just as we use the verb “boast” transitively: “that country boasts many great cities.” So here μ. αὐχεῖ doubtless means “hath great things whereof to boast,” or shortly “great are its boasts” (i.e. the concrete subjects for boasting, αὐχήματα, not the boastings, αὐχήσεις). This sense is supported by the analogy of κατακαυχᾶται in ii. 13, where the glorying of mercy against judgment is no mere vain boasting, but a true position proudly held. It is thus quite doubtful whether there is even an indirect reference to arrogance of tongue. What follows gives examples of the “great things.”

ἰδοὺ ἡλίκον (not ὀλέγον) πῦρ ἡλίκην ὕλην ἀνάπτει, Behold how much wood is kindled by how small a fire] Ἡλίκος expresses magnitude in either direction, quantus or quantillus (Luc. Hermot. 5): the antithesis explains that with πῦρ it means “how little,” with ὕλην “how great.” This is a good example of St James’ pregnant enigmatic style, leaving much to the reader’s intelligence.

ὕλην] Etymologically = silva, and answers fairly to both the English words “wood” and “timber.” It is used either of dead wood or living, and either will make sense here. But it never means a wood, a forest. As applied to living wood it is either woodland as opposed to mountains and cultivated plains, specially the rough bushy skirts of the hills, or brushwood. Thus Plat. Polit. 272 A says, καρπούς τε ἀφθόνους εἶχον ἀπό τε δένδρων καὶ πολλῆς ὕλης ἄκκης. A spark setting fire to the brush might suggest the image, or it may be (as often) simply a great mass of cut timber ready for the carpenter. The word is interesting on account of Plato’s use, answering to materia, materies. [See Additional Note.]

The image was probably taken from the Hebrew Proverbs of Ben Sira (trans]. in Drusius ap. Crit. Sacr. viii. p. 1899) cf. Ecclus. xi. 32. “A burning fire kindles many heaps of corn.” On which the Scholiast has “There is nothing which more devastates the world than an evil tongue: for a tongue of this kind, though it be not very evil, is the ruin of many just and pious men. (Example of Doeg.) Wherefore the wise Hebrews declare that in an evil tongue lurks deadly poison, and that because of it the world suffers chastisement,” etc.

⁶ καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας ἡ γλῶσσα καθίσταται ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, ἡ σπιλοῦσα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα καὶ φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεέννης.

6. A very difficult verse. Οὕτως is spurious before ἡ γλῶσσα καθίσταται, and misleading also. It is impossible Greek to take ἡ σπιλοῦσα as predicate to the sentence ἡ γλῶσσα καθίστ. as though it were τὸ σπιλοῦν. The best punctuation is to take καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ as a separate clause, “the tongue also is a fire,’ introductory to what follows. Then ὁ κ. τ. ἀδ. ἡ γλ. καθίστ. ἐν τ. μέλ. ἡμ.; then ἡ σπιλοῦσα . . .γεέννης, in which last clause references to fire appear again. Hence ἡ γλῶσσα (the 2nd) must be the subject, ὁ κόσμος τ. ἀδ. the predicate; and the reason why ὁ κόσμος τ. ἀδ. is put first is because ἡ γλῶσσα must be put last in order to connect it distinctly with the following participles. Thus the arrangement of words is exactly analogous to that of i. 7, 8.

καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, The tongue also is a fire] Cf. Prov. xvi. 27; Ps. cxx. 4; Ecclus. xxviii. 21–23; also Ps. Sol. xii. 2.

ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας, the unrighteous world] Certainly a difficult phrase. The article must of course have its full force, “a world of iniquity” cannot be right. Some take κόσμος as “ornament”: understanding it to mean that the tongue gives a specious and seductive colour or gloss to what is evil by means of plausible words. But though words might by a rather bold figure be called the adornment of iniquity, the tongue that utters them could not: nor has that sense any special force here. The commonest interpretation is to take it as “world” in the sense of universe, “that world of iniquity.” The article here acquires a possible sense with the other construction, in apposition with πῦρ; but not as the predicate after καθίσταται. The sense itself too is at once exaggerated and vague. It is not the comprehensiveness of the tongue within itself that the context refers to, but its power of acting upon what is without it.

There remains the “evil” sense of κόσμος, found already i. 27, and recurring iv. 4. To repeat very briefly. This sense of something called the κόσμος as not only containing evil elements but itself in some sense evil is chiefly found in Jn and 1 Jn, also 2 Pet.; perhaps not elsewhere (2 Cor. vii. 10 doubtful). It is not derived from the physical universe, but a Jewish image taken from the תֵּבֵלּ of the early chapters of Isaiah (cf. Ps. ix. 8 etc.), rendered οἰκουμένη in LXX., denoting the heathen nations around, the heathen world at once as destructive and as corruptive: hence it is human society in a corrupt and perverted state. As applied to the tongue then, the meaning is that the tongue is to the rest of the body what the corrupt society is to mankind, and especially to the Church as the representative of mankind in its true state. Thus τ. ἀδικίας may be compared to its use in Lk. xvi. 8, τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς ἀδικίας and 9, μαμωνᾶ τ. ἀδ. and xviii. 6, ὁ κριτὴς τ. ἀδ.: the world which gives itself up to unrighteousness, which takes its form from unrighteousness and obeys it: somewhat similar are the genitives in i. 25. Much the same ultimate sense would be obtained by taking κόσμος as the sphere or region, the domain as it were in which unrighteousness obtains a footing. But this is not a natural sense of the word, which is more easily interpreted by the other passages of this Epistle referred to.

καθίσταται, is constituted, shews itself, makes itself, acts the part of] The exact force is shewn by iv. 4. Καθίστασθαι εἰς is to come into a certain state, or καθ. with nominative to become (contrast καθέστηκα to have become, to be). Thus Plut. ii. 2 E, trees if neglected στρεβλὰ φύεται καὶ ἄκαρπα καθίσταται, τυχόντα δὲ ὀρθῆς παιδαγωγίας ἔγκαρπα γίνεται καὶ τελεσφόρα (cf. 6 F).

ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, among our members] Apparently not merely with reference to its action on the other members; but as being that one among the members which has this special power.

ἡ σπιλοῦσα, that stainer of] The article has the effect of giving a substantive force to the participle, as it were, the tongue that stainer of the body. The use of this word agrees with the interpretation just given of κόσμος, when compared with ἄσπιλος . . . ἀπὸ τ. κόσμου in i. 27. The image however is difficult: in what sense can the tongue be said to stain the body? Apparently with reference to the idea that runs through chap. i. that there is a Divine image received by man at creation, a true ideal form derived from likeness to God, and that all moral evil is to be regarded in relation to this as (i. 21) a ῥυπαρία or defilement and a περισσεία or excrescence (unnatural growth). Still why “the body,” for St James certainly regarded the Divine image as (at least in the first instance) inward and spiritual? Probably because he regarded the body as the outward expression of the inward mind; and the, external deformities of passion as true types as well as results of the invisible deformities from which they spring. Moreover the action of the tongue might be regarded as staining the action of the whole body, the total conduct of which the body is the organ. Cf. also Eccles. v. 5.

καὶ φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως, and it setteth on fire the wheel of man’s creation] Here we reach one of the hardest phrases in the Bible. To discuss it fully would take too long. We must be content to deal with the leading points. At the outset Grotius’ suggestion that τροχόν should be read τρόχον, a running or course, must be set aside. The word, chiefly poetic, is never used figuratively; and at all events φλογίζουσα points to some physical image. The suggestion comes from too prosaic a dealing with the imagery of a prophet. Φλ. τ. τροχόη must mean “setting on fire the wheel.”

But then what is τ. γενέσεως, and what wheel is meant? Attention was called eight years ago by Hilgenfeld (ZWT. 1873. 20; cf. Einl. 539 f.) to the certainly curious fact that Simplicius on Arist. de caelo ii. p. 91 B in allegorising Ixion’s wheel says, “and he hath been bound by God τῷ τῆς μοίρας τροχῷ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, ὃν ἀδύνατον μεταλλάξαι κατ᾽ Ὀρφέα (what follows is hopelessly corrupt, but ends with τὰς ἀνθρωπινὰς ψυχάς), clearly referring to an Orphic doctrine. The sense comes out more clearly, but with κύκλος for τροχός, in Procl. Tim. v. 330 A (on Plato’s words τῇ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ, “This is the one salvation of the soul which is held forth by the Creator, delivering it τοῦ κύκλου τ. γενέσεως and from the great error and from the ineffectual life, namely the ascent of the soul to the spiritual region (τὸ νοερὸν εἶδος) and its flight from all things which cleave to us ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως; and lower down (B) . . . ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν πλάνης, ἧς καὶ οἱ παρ᾽ Ὀρφεῖ τῷ Διονύσῳ καὶ τῇ Κόρῃ τελούμενοι τυχεῖν εὔχονται

Κύκλου τ᾽ αὖ λῆξαι καὶ ἀναπνεύσαι       κακότητος.

There is somewhat similar language in Procl. Tim. i. 32 E and Theol. Pl. vi. 3 p. 351; cf. Verg. Aen. vi. 748, Hos omnes ubi mille rotam volvere per annos. For γενέσεως we have ἀνάγκης in the statement of Diog. Laert. viii. 14, Vit. Pyth., “They say that he was the first to declare the soul κύκλον ἀνάγκης ἀμείβουσαν ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις ἐνδεῖσθαι ζώοις. So more vaguely, without reference to any one in particular, Chrys. Mt. lxxv. 728 C, περιφορὰν καὶ γένεσιν λέγοντες. Also Philo de Somn. ii. 6, p. 664 of Pharaoh’s gold chain round Joseph’s neck, ἀγχόνην ἐπιφανῆ, κύκλον καὶ τροχὸν ἀνάγκης ἀτελευτήτου, . . . οὐκ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τὸ ἑξῆς ἐν βίῳ καὶ τὸν εἱρμὸν τῶν τῆς φύσεως πραγμάτων, ὡς ἡ Θάμαρ, οὐ γὰρ κλοιὸς, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρμίσκος αὐτῆς ὁ κόσμος (cf. de mut. nom. 23 p. 598). In the first places cited the reference is certainly to the Orphic or Pythagorean doctrine of a cycle of metempsychosis: Chrys. and Philo are ambiguous. Another passage of Simplicius (Comm. in Epict. Ench. p. 177 C) gives it a distinctly wider sense, “The dissolution of compounds and the change of simples one into another is good for the whole; since the destruction of one is the origin (γένεσις) of another; and this is the cause why τὸν τῆς γενέσεως κύκλον remains imperishable (ἀνέκλειπτον).

But it is most improbable that St James should use a phrase of this origin to convey a doctrine with which he can have had no sympathy. The Orphic doctrine would be entirely alien to him (notwithstanding Hilgenfeld’s references to θρησκός), and the vaguer doctrine hardly less. Γένεσις in this connexion was the word used in late Greek philosophy to express natural necessity; the necessary chain of causation; and it was especially opposed to any religious view of the world.

An equal improbability lies in the mode of use: this setting on fire of the τροχὸν τ. γενέσεως is evidently spoken of as an evil thing; but to a believer in God this interruption of the wheel of earthbound destiny would be no subject for regret. The interpretation thus just inverts the purport of the sentence.

Moreover it is difficult to think that τῆς γενέσεως should recur in two places of the Epistle (here and i. 23) in very peculiar phrases, yet be entirely different in sense: for whatever sense we give to γενέσεως with τὸ πρόσωπον, it cannot possibly be destiny.

Another simpler image occurs in various classical writers, partly again in connexion with Ixion, that of human life as a wheel rolling down hill over all sorts of inequalities: thus Sil. Ital. vi. 120. But here too there is no special force in the setting fire, and τ. γενέσεως remains inexplicable. The same may be said of the vaguer senses “course of life,” “course of nature.”

The true clue is doubtless to be found in τ. γενέσεως which we saw (on i. 23) to refer to the original creation of man. It is not in classical but in biblical language that we should naturally expect to find the explanation. Not the heathen godless genesis but the genesis of revelation, the origin of the world in the will and purpose of God, is denoted by the word for St James. It is the תלדת or מלדת (see Gen. ii. 4; v. 1), whence Genesis has its Greek name. Κτίσις is not used in LXX. (though κτίζω is): see 2 Macc. vii. 23, ὁ τοῦ κόσμου κτίστης, ὁ πλάσας ἀνθρώπου γένεσιν καὶ πάντων ἐξευρών γένεσιν. It thus is equivalent to what in modern language we call Creation. The phrase “the wheel of creation” is limited by the sense of the rest of the sentence to “the wheel of man’s creation,” i.e. the wheel of man’s nature according to its original Divine purpose, just as τι πρόσωπον τ. γενέσεως αὐτοῦ is “the face of his creation,” the face reflecting the Divine image in which he was created.

What then is meant by the wheel? It can hardly be the detached wheel rolling uselessly along, as in the classical image. It must be the chariot wheel of man as he advances on the way of life, fulfilling his appointed course. Probably, I do not say more, but probably there is an allusion to the wheel in the vision of Ezekiel (i. 15, 16b, 19-21). This may sound fanciful till we remember that this vision of Ezekiel, called the Chariot by the later Jews, was in Jewish thought associated with the Creation. According to the imagery of the vision, the wheel might be the body and all its activities, by means of which the spirit moves upon the earth. This is represented as set on fire by the tongue, because its orderly Divinely-appointed motion is made violent and irregular by the passions which the tongue excites: it catches fire, and loses its power to fulfil its proper course. [See Additional Note.]

καὶ φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεέννης, and is set on fire by hell] The fire is not a fire from above but from beneath. This seems to be the true force of the reference to Gehenna, which usually in the N.T. appears simply as the place of punishment for evil (whether we mean by punishment retribution only, or retribution combined with purification), not excepting perhaps Mt. xxiii. 15, υἱὸν γεέννης, as itself so to speak a realm of evil. The fire lighted at the nether fires is a simpler and broader image, answering in some degree to the lower wisdom of v. 15. Wetstein quotes the Targum on Ps. cxx. 2 (where the hot burning coals may be taken as describing either the operation of the tongue or its punishment, or indeed both, i.e. its appropriate punishment) Lingua dolosa . . . cum carbonibus juniperi, qui incensi sunt in gehenna inferne.

⁷ πᾶσα γὰρ φύσις θηρίων τε καὶ πετεινῶν ἑρπετῶν τε καὶ ἐναλίων δαμάζεται καὶ δεδάμασται τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπινῃ·

7. γὰρ, For] The purpose of γὰρ seems to be to introduce an explanation and justification of the strong language just used. From the word “bridle” in v. 2 St James has been led to the idea of a small agency exercising great power, and especially to the image of fire as representing the tongue: and now he proceeds to explain this, pointing first to its unbridledness, and then to its strange inconsistency of action.

πᾶσα γὰρ φύσις, every nature] Φύσις is often used periphrastically with the genitive, so that this might mean simply “all beasts and birds,” etc. And it is also sometimes used for “kind.” Thus Diod. Sic. i. 10, ἡ γῆ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς καινὰς ἤνεγκε τῶν ζώων φύσεις; Plut. ii. 636 E, ζώων δὲ πολλὰς φύσεις τοῦ κόσμου περιέχοντος, οὐδέν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, γένος ἄμοιρόν ἐστι τῆς ἐξ ᾤου γενέσεως. But even in such places the original sense is latent, “many kinds” as dependent on “many natures.” Here, at all events, the strict sense is required by τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπινῃ; for although ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις is occasionally, though very rarely, equivalent to “mankind,” the periphrasis would have a rhetorical unnaturalness here, especially in the resolved form τῇ φ. τῇ ἀνθ. (not τῇ ἀνθ. φ.). The meaning doubtless is that the inherent nature of man, that nature which proceeds from the Divine image, has proved its kingship over the natures of different classes of animals, probably with reference to Gen. i. 28; ix.2. The meaning cannot be that every kind, or the nature of every kind, of animals has been tamed; which would be manifestly untrue: but each of these four great classes is considered as having a special nature. An exact parallel is 1 Cor. xv. 39, ἄλλη δὲ σὰρξ κτηνῶν κ.τ.λ. What is there said of the outward flesh is here implied as to the inward nature.

θηρίων τε καὶ πετεινῶν ἑρπετῶν τε καὶ ἐναλίων, of beasts and birds, of creeping things and things in the sea] These classes are exactly and almost verbally taken from Gen. ix. 2, which is a modification of i. 28. Θηρία probably includes both θηρία and κτήνη of i. 28, the fiercest and least tameable of quadrupeds being taken as representatives of the whole class: πετεινά and ἐρπετά are taken as they stand.

In the second pair ἐρπετῶν answers to θηρίων in the first, and doubtless was intended especially to include serpents, with especial reference to the tongue (see v. 8). The allusion may be to the sacred tame serpents which were kept in different temples, for instance in those of Asclepius. Tame fish, sacred and other, were also known to the ancients (see Ael. Nat. An. viii. 4; xii. 30). Ἐνάλια answer to ἰχθύες. A poetic word, used in prose in this general manner in late writers only, as Ps.-Arist. de mundo 5, οὗτος ἐναλίων ζῴων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ ἀερίων φύσεις ἐχώρισεν; Plut. ii. 911 D, τὸ τῶν ἐναλίων γένος contrasted with τὰ χερσαῖα; also 729 E, ἐφείδοντο μάλιστα τῶν ἐναλίων.

δαμάζεται καὶ δεδάμασται τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, is tamed and hath been tamed into subjection to the nature that is human] First comes the general statement that they are tamed: then the thought occurs that there are domestic races which have been tamed long ago; and so the present acquires a more precise sense.

There is a long-established conquest by the human race transmitted by hereditary instinct, and it is being perpetually renewed. Δαμάζω is sometimes applied to the mere crushing of a foe: its proper sense is taming, subduing not for destruction but for orderly use, as with horses and oxen. There is no clear indication that use is contemplated here: but rather the general notion of taming, involving obedience and restraint. There is probably a reminiscence of what has been said above of the bridling of horses.

The taming is part of the lordship of the earth bestowed in Gen. i. 28, and corresponds to the government (ἄρχετε LXX.) over the lower animals which there follows: cf. Ps. viii. 6 ff. This is brought out by the emphatic form τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθ.; lit. “the nature that is human,” i.e. the conquest is connected with the characteristic prerogative of the living soul which God breathed into man. The dative is probably not the simple dative of agency with a passive verb, of which (except with passive participles) there is no clear case in the N.T. All the instances seem to fall under one of two heads, including the idea either of appearing to (as a εὑρεθῶ ὑμῖν 2 Cor. xii. 20; αὐτῷ εὑρεθῆναι 2 Pet. iii. 14; ἐγνώσθη Lk. xxiv. 35; Phil. iv. 5) or of being subjected to (here, and ᾧ τις ἧττηται 2 Pet. ii. 19). Thus the sense is not simply tamed by the human nature, but tamed into subjection to it. See the chorus in the Antigone 332 ff., esp. 342-351.

⁸τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων· ἀκατάστατον κακόν, μεστὴ ἰοῦ θανατηφόρου.

8. τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων, but the tongue can no one, even of men, tame] By a vivid image the tongue is projected, as it were, out of human nature and spoken of as though it had a separate life of itsown, over which no one can gain complete mastery. And though in strictness the tongue is nothing more than the organ by which what is in the heart and mind is expressed, yet experience shews that speech or utterance, as such, has what may well be called a magic power which acts reflexly on the mind within: so that St James’ language does express a true fact, though it does not attempt to explain all the grounds of it. There may be, that is, a kind of conflict between a man and his own tongue, or his own impulse of utterance, in which his true self gets worsted.

The position of ἀνθρώπων is at once secondary and emphatic; it might be “the tongue no one can tame, — no one, that is, of men”; but is rather “no one, even of men,” even of those beings so highly endowed, of whom he has been just speaking.

ἀκατάστατον κακόν, a disorderly evil] This is the true reading, not ἀκατάσχετον, which would be merely a feeble repetition of οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται. St James has used the word already in i. 8, and ἀκατάστασία in iii. 16, where it is coupled with πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα. To his mind it expressed the utmost evil, the disorder which is the entire opposite of God’s perfect purpose and man’s single-minded surrender to God’s purpose. Cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 33.

Not ἀκατάστατον only, but ἀκ. κακόν. It is startling to hear the tongue called “an evil,” rather than its misuse. But (1) the adjective explains how it becomes an evil; and (2) its evil arises from the very fact of its independence, i.e. from its isolation from the integrity of humanity. There is just the same abnormal and morbid independence as in the case of a desire which in like manner can be conceived of as something distinct from the man in whom it arises (i. 14 f.).

μεστή, full of] Not μεστόν: it cannot therefore agree with κακόν, but goes back to ἡ γλῶσσα. The tongue not merely contains deadly venom, it is charged with it: cf. Ps. lviii. 4; cxl. 3. There must be an indirect reference to a poisonous serpent, as in these Psalms; the image probably being derived in the first instance from the flexibility and mobility of the actual tongue.

⁹ἐν αὐτῇ εὐλογοῦμεν τὸν κύριον καὶ πατέρα, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καταρώμεθα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ γεγονότας·

9. ἐν αὐτῇ (bis), therein] The phrase is remarkable. The purely instrumental use of ἐν is Hebraistic, and found only in such writers of the N.T. as admit a certain (not very large) amount of Hebraism. It does not agree with the general colour of St James’ language. Nor does this passage come well under the rather vague “causal” use of ἐν (Jelf 246 f.; Kühner ii. 403 f.). But St James’ purpose is probably to identify ourselves with the tongue. If he had said δι᾽ αὐτῆς, it would have expressed a pure instrumentality: we should have appeared solely as the speakers, the tongue as our organ merely. Now the whole passage implies a kind of independent power over us exerted by the faculty of utterance; so that St James intentionally makes the tongue an actual speaker as well as an organ of speech: in the tongue we bless God, almost in the sense “in the person of the tongue.” The nearest parallel is in Rom. xv. 6, ἐν ἑνὶ στόματι δοξάζητε κ.τ.λ..: cf. also Mt. ix. 34, ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων; and Acts xvii. 31, κρίνειν τ. οἰκουμένην . . . ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾧ ὥρισεν.

εὐλογοῦμεν, we bless] This is the highest function of speech. As man’s relation to God is the supreme fact of his nature which alone puts all others into their right place, so blessing God for His goodness and His benefits is the supreme use of the powers of utterance. Thus (Lk. i. 64) this is the first use which Zacharias makes of the recovered power, ἀνεῴχθη δὲ τὸ στόμα . . . καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐλάλει εὐλογῶν τὸν θεόν. Cf. Ps. li. 15.

τὸν κύριον (not θεόν) καὶ πατέρα, the Lord and Father] The less common phrase is the true reading. The κύριον expresses God’s majesty and His rule over all His creatures, and especially over men who have the privilege of being able to render conscious obedience. Πατέρα expresses both rule and love, and also all the associations connected with the human word, in reference (i. 18) to the first origin of man as not merely owing his existence to God’s fiat but a partaker of the Divine nature as being made in God’s image.

καταρώμεθα, we curse] Καταρῶμαι originally took the accusative of the thing, the dative of the person: “imprecate this or that against a man,” the thing imprecated being sometimes omitted. But in late writers (Plutarch, Lucian) it succumbs to the general tendency to pure transitiveness. The first person καταρώμεθα (as well as εὐλογοῦμεν) is singular, because St James does not seem to be speaking directly of a universal human shortcoming (πολλὰ πταίομν ἅπαντες v. 2).

As far as this verse goes, the meaning might be only that blessing and cursing are both utterances of the tongue: but v. 10 shews that St James meant to say that they come from the very same tongue, and that he is in fact attacking not merely a vice of the tongue but a false kind of religion. He is dealing with a tendency, close akin to that which he combated at the end of chapter i., to a loveless religiosity, the combination of professed devotion to God with indifference and even hatred to men. He implies that the utterance of blessing must be spurious if it does not include men as its objects as well as God: cf. 1 Pet. iii. 9; Rom. xii. 14; 1 Cor. iv. 12; and their source, the use of the word in Lk. vi. 28, where it has a stronger force than appears at first sight.

It is to be observed that τὸν κύριον καὶ πατέρα here repeats the τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρίof i. 27.

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, men] Not simply individual men, but mankind: the curse uttered against the hated or despised individual persons was in effect a wrong done to mankind, and sprang from an evil spirit as towards mankind, a disregard of the second law, the law of love to neighbours. It was the temper of the Pharisees in Jn vii. 49, “This people which knoweth not the law are accursed.”

τοὺς καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ γεγονότας, which are made after the likeness of God] Here the latent doctrine of the Epistle breaks out into plain words. The connexion between the two supreme forms of love which together make up the sum of human duty is not accidental: the love of man is founded on the love of God. The tenderness and mercy shewn to the lower animals form but a small part in that true love of men which attaches itself to the Godlike in them, hidden as the image may often be; so that the cursing of them is a cursing of that which bears the stamp of the Creator’s own nature.

St James chooses not the κατ᾽ εἰκόνα, but the second phrase καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν, not elsewhere found in the N.T. On these words it is worth while to refer to Delitzsch New Comm. on Genes. E.T. i. pp. 99 f., on the words צֶלֶם εἰκών, and דְּמוּת ὁμοίωσις. In image, he says, the representation of the primitive form or model predominates, in likeness the representation of the pattern or ideal. He accordingly treats the difference as justifying the interpretation common in the Fathers, by which likeness is the gradual process of assimilation to the archetypal image; image belonging to fundamental nature, likeness to progressive character. The distinction is an important one, whether it was intended in Genesis or not; a point very hard to determine. There does not appear, however, to be any trace of it here, where the reference is rather to what God originally made men to be than to what they have grown to be under His fatherly nurture.

Γεγονότας with καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν expresses at once the primitive origin and the present continuance of the state which it introduced: in St James’ eyes mankind are still in the likeness of God for all their sin and evil. Beresh. Rabb. 24 fin. (on Gen. v. i), “According to R. Akiba the words Lev. xix. 18, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,’ are a comprehensive principle of the Law. Thou shouldest not say ‘Because I have been despised, may my neighbour be despised with me; and because I have been cursed, may my neighbour be cursed with me.’ If thou attest so, said R. Tanchuma, know that he whom thou despisest is made after the image of God.” On the image cf. Ecclus. xvii. 3 (and context).

¹⁰ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος ἐξέρχεται εὐλογία καὶ κατάρα. οὐ χρή, ἀδελφοί μου, ταῦτα οὕτως γίνεσθαι.

10. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος, from the same mouth] This merely states clearly and emphatically what was implied in v. 9. It excludes the notion of different tongues blessing and cursing: it is not “from the same source,” but definitely “from the same mouth.”

Cf. Testam. Benj. 6, ἡ ἀγαθὴ διάνοια οὐκ ἔχει δύο γλώσσας εὐλογίας καὶ κατάρας.

οὐ χρή, ἀδελφοί μου, ταῦτα οὕτως γίνεσθαι, It is not fitting, my brethren, that these things should so be] Here St James turns from his statement to direct expostulation, intermitted since v. 1; so that the division of verses is very awkward, though modern editions of the A.V. have partially mended it by putting a full stop in the middle.

Ἀδελφοί μου marks the sudden turn of language, kept up by the repetition in v. 12.

χρή occurs here alone in the N.T., not at all in the LXX. or Apocrypha. Though St James does not use δεῖ, χρή is not a synonym. It is a somewhat vague word, apparently starting from the sense “there is need.” In ethical applications it comes nearer to πρέπει or καθήκει than to δεῖ, meaning rather “fitting,” “congruous to a law or rather standard.” Hence St James probably does not mean “ this conduct of yours is wrong,” but “this doubleness in the use of the tongue is an unnatural monstrous thing.” Then ταῦτα has probably the definite sense, the blessing on the one hand and the cursing on the other: it is a monstrous state to be in that this blessing and this cursing should be constantly arising on this footing of identical origin, from the same tongue, the organ of the same mind. Thus, there is no redundance in the two words ταῦτα οὕτως; and the present γίνεσθαι has also its force, for he is speaking not of casual sins but of a settled and deliberate habit.

¹¹μήτι ἡ πηγὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀπῆς βρύει τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν;

11. μήτι, Can it be that] The τι added to μή strengthens it, suggesting impossibility. Two similar uses of it in the N.T. are Mk iv. 21 and Lk. vi. 39. In other places it is used where the possibility is recognised by the side of the unexpectedness.

ἡ πηγή, the fountain] The force of the article is not obvious: συκῆ has none, and a fountain, as such, has no particular title to be spoken of generically. The true reason probably is that St James is thinking of what the fountain stands for, the heart. The reference to ἡ πηγή in itself proves that the tongue was to him merely the organ of a power within. Doubtless he remembered (Mt. xii. 34) ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ περισσεύματος τῆς καρδίας τὸ στόμα λαλεῖ, the overflow. And so ἡ πηγή = ἡ καρδία (cf. ὁ ὀφθαλμός, τὸ σῶμα).

ὀπῆς, crevice] Ὀπή is properly a chink in a wall for looking through. It then comes to be applied to holes and burrows in the ground, as those of ants and of hibernating animals, or somewhat larger clefts in the rock (Heb. xi. 38, etc.). Here too it is probably the crevice in a face of rock through which a stream bursts forth. The πηγή is not to be confounded with the well. On the springs of Palestine see Stanley Sinai and Palestine pp. 123, 146, and Grove’s App. 500 ff.

βρύει, sends forth] Βρύω is chiefly used of the fresh and vigorous putting forth of herbage by the earth, or of leaves, flowers, or fruits by plants and trees; but also sometimes of the shooting forth of water by a source (cf. Clem. Alex. Paed. i. 6. 45; iii. 7. 39). Usually also it occurs with a dative, but occasionally in late writers, as here, with an accusative.

τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, that which is sweet and that which is bitter] The articles are not easy. If we supply nothing, and understand merely “that which is sweet,” etc., the articles are quite justified, and on the whole this is best, the most general abstract opposites being used here in the first instance, and then ἁλυκόν afterwards substituted. The mere omission of ὕδωρ would create no difficulty: but a generalisation of water “the sweet water,” “the bitter water” does not seem natural here.

St James would be familiar with bitter springs from those of Tiberias (see Reland Palest. 301 ff., 1039 f.; Robinson Bibl. Res. ii. 384).

¹²μὴ δύναται, ἀδελφοί μου, συκῆ ἐλαίας ποιῆσαι ἢ ἄμπελος σῦκα; οὔτε ἁλυκὸν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ.

12. Not only a new image comes in here, but a new point of view, prepared for by part of v. 11. In 9-11 St James has dwelt on the inconsistency of the two kinds of speech as coming forth from the same tongue, as though bitter and sweet came alike from the same spring. But ἡ πηγή has carried us back from the springs to the inner reservoirs, from the mouth to the heart; and so now a comparison between the heart and its utterance, rather than between two utterances, comes into view. The image is formed by examples of our Lord’s words, Lk. vi. 44, “Each tree is known by its own fruit.” Wishing to treat them gently, he keeps within the limits of that single sentence of Christ, as though it were only one kind of fruit tree as against another, all three being good and useful. But doubtless he intended them to apply the associated words, which spoke of “corrupt trees” and of “thorns” and “thistles “(Lk. vi. 43 f. || Mt. vii. 16-20). In so doing he was indirectly implying that the curses uttered by their tongues expressed the contents of their hearts more truly than the blessings, which he assumes to be unreal words. The same comes out more clearly in the next image.

οὔτε ἁλυκὸν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ, neither can salt water yield sweet] So we must read for οὕτως and οὐδεμία πηγὴ ἀλ. καὶ γλυκύ, a vapid repetition of v. 11. Οὔτε is hard and some good MSS. naturally substitute οὐδέ, but by a manifest grammatical correction. In late Greek the original difference of οὔτε and οὐδέ, μήτε and μηδέ, became to a great extent broken down. This may be seen in the N.T. (as Acts xxiii. 8), and still more in later MSS. of the N.T. See Win.-Moult. 614 if. Probably the best way to explain this οὔτε, which Lachmann thought corrupt, and which seems to have no exact parallel, is to treat the previous questions as equivalent to negative assertions: “the fountain does not, the fig tree cannot, nor can,” etc.

ἁλυκόν] Simply “salt” as an adjective: doubtless ὕδωρ, kept to the end, goes with both ἀλ. and γλυκύ. Ποιῆσαι is borrowed from above, being used of natural producing. As applied to ὕδωρ it means to rain, and this is a rare use. Doubtless St James purposely retained the same word as an image in the sense, out of a reservoir of salt water springs forth no fountain of sweet water. Thus he distinctly implies, though he still leaves the rebuke to implication, that not the verbal blessing of God but the cursing of men was a true index to what lay within. It is no longer merely a difference of kinds placed on a level, but one is evil, the other good. Thus this sentence is no mere repetition of v. 11, but goes far beyond it.

¹³Τίς σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἐν ὑμῖν; δειξάτω ἐκ τῆς καλῆς ἀναστροφῆς τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας.

13. Here the long digression on the tongue ends, and St James returns with full recollection of what he has said in the interval, to the interrupted warning of v. 1 against being “many teachers.” The excuse for this ambitious teachership was the possession of wisdom, and so he goes on now to consider the true and the false wisdom. Speech and wisdom, as good things liable to grievous abuse, appear in like manner in 1 Corinthians (i. 5, 17, and thence on through ii.; also iii. 18 f., etc.).

Τίς is by no means equivalent to ὅς. The only passage in the N.T. where this can be, and this at best is doubtful, is Acts xiii. 25. But it shews how the one sense can pass over into the other. St James rather calls upon anyone who makes this claim to come forward, and hear what the true demand upon him is. Cf. Ps. xxxiv. 12, LXX.

σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων, wise and understanding] As Deut. i. 13; iv. 6. Ἐπιστήμων especially expresses personal acquaintance with things, conversance with them: it thus includes experience.

δειξάτω, let him shew] Cf. ii. 18 bis; ἐκ also as there.

καλῆς, good] As directly beheld and contemplated, as distinguished from ἀγαθός good in fruit or result. Thus here it manifestly refers to a goodness which can be seen and recognised. This comes out strongly in the parallel but more limited passage 1 Pet. ii. 12, where conduct which even the heathen must honour and admire is expressed by καλός (also ἀναστροφή): on this application of letting the light shine before men cf. Rom. xii. 17; 2 Cor. viii. 21.

ἀναστροφῆς, behaviour] Ἀναστροφή is “manner of life.” Perhaps “behaviour” is the most exact rendering. Ἀναστρέφεσθαι (=versari) is first used of externals, to have your employment in a place, be going to and fro in it. Then in later Greek as Polybius it is used ethically: the verb, not the substantive, occurs once or twice in this sense in LXX., but the substantive in Apocr. In the N.T. in the Epistles generally (not Evv., Act., Apoc.), and doubtless widely used at that time. Chiefly, and perhaps wholly, it means in the N.T. acts performed towards others, social conduct, whether as towards fellow Christians or towards the world at large.

τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, his works] This is no tautology: his works are not simply his acts, but the utterance and outcome of his wisdom and understanding. It is assumed that the use of wisdom and understanding is practical (so i. 5 in connexion with i. 4); so that τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ are equivalent to “the works of the wise man.” Just as works in chap. ii. were the manifestation of faith, so they are here of wisdom. The works are to be shewn forth in contrast to the words to which vv. 1-12 refer.

ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας, in meekness of wisdom] Here comes in the controlling spirit, the mention of which indicates what it was that vitiated the supposed wisdom. It was pride and bitterness, exaltation of self and not contempt only but hatred of others. Both of these characteristics are negatived together by “meekness,” including at once humility towards self, and gentleness and forbearance towards others (contrast with v. 14). The word itself stands twice in the Gospels as spoken by Christ, Mt. v. 5, “Blessed are the meek”; xi. 29, “for I am meek”; and in Zech. ix. 9, quoted by Mt. xxi. 5, it is a characteristic of King Messiah as He comes to Jerusalem. It occurs a few times in LXX. (chiefly for עָנָו), and is the word applied to Moses (Numb. xii. 3). In i. 21 St James had dwelt on meekness as a condition of receptivity in hearing: here conversely he speaks of it as a condition of the true shewing forth to others for their instruction.

At first sight ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας is a paradox. The arrogant disputer is ready to praise meekness as a fitting virtue for the weak and foolish; but thinks it out of place for himself St James lays down on the other hand that it is a fruit and mark of wisdom. He who is wise in a true sense of the word, he means, cannot but be meek. By meekness of behaviour wisdom will be displayed rather than disguised. St James leaves untouched the question whether the possession of wisdom is a sufficient ground for assuming the responsibilities of teaching. He implies that the καλὴ ἀναστροφή must come first, and then much at least of the ostentatious teaching will disappear.

¹⁴εἰ δὲ ζῆλον πικρὸν ἔχετε καὶ ἐριθίαν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν, μὴ κατακαυχᾶσθε καὶ ψεύδεσθε κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας.

14. ζῆλον, jealousy] A word that oscillates between a good and an evil sense, both occurring in the N.T. Arist. (Rhet. ii. 11. 1) distinguishes it from φθόνος, as emulation from envy; he says, καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων, etc.; and classical writers generally incline to an at least not distinctly evil sense, which they express rather by φθόνος or ζηλοτυπία. But in the Acts ζῆλος is distinctly evil, and so in at least St Paul and St James. St James, however, though in v. 16 he uses ζῆλος absolutely as St Paul does, here precludes mistake by adding πικρὸν.

ἐριθίαν, ambition, rivalry] Combined with ζῆλος likewise in Gal. v. 20. A curious word with an obscure history: see Fritzsche Rom. 143-8, the best account, but very imperfect. Ἔριθος (derivation doubtful) in Homer’s time is a hired labourer, apparently an agricultural labourer (Etym. Mag. κυρίως δὲ ὁ τὴν γῆν ἐργαζόμενος ἐργάτης ἐπὶ μισθῷ): and a gloss of Hesychius (ἐριθεύει, εἰκῆ, ἐργάζη μάτην) seems to shew that labour or work was the main idea. The same is always the force of the somewhat commoner compound συνέριθος. The fundamental passage is Odyss. vi. 32, where Athene tells Nausicaa that she will accompany her καί τοι ἐγὼ συνέριθος ἅμ᾽ ἕψομαι, when she goes with the housemaidens to wash the linen. This one passage apparently gave rise to many others, one in Aristoph. Pax 785 and many in late poets; also Plat. Rep. vii. 533 D; Leg. x. 889 D of the arts cooperative, coancillary with, philosophy, whence also Orig. Ep. ad Greg. i. Afterwards, probably from wrong etymology, it was used of women servants spinning wool. But in Arist. Polit. v. 2, 3 we find ἐριθεία, -εύομαι in a quite different sense. Speaking of changes of political constitution, some he says take place from arrogance, some from fear; some from preeminence, some from contempt and so on: and then some δι᾽ ἐριθείαν. The term is explained by the next chapter: “Constitutions change without sedition also διὰ τὰς ἐριθείας, as at Heraea, ἐξ αἱρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρωτάς, ὅτι ἡποῦντο τοὺς ἐριθευομένους” i.e. apparently they changed the mode of appointment to offices from election to lot, because they chose τοὺς ἐριθευομένους: this may mean either candidates who bribed, or who courted and gained a following in other ways. Suidas says, ἐριθία· ἡ διὰ λόγων φιλονεικία, λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ μισθαρνία. More definitely speaking of δεκάζεσθαι (bribery) he says, ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἐριθεύεσθαι τῷ δεκάζεσθαί ἐστιν, καὶ ἡ ἐριθεία εἴρηται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ μισθοῦ δόσεως (cf. Etym. Mag. 254). This points to the gaining of followers and adherents by gifts. It might, however, be by arts as well as gifts: see Ezek. xxiii. 5, 12, καὶ ἡριθεύσατο (Sym.). But apparently the word came to be used not merely of the manner of winning followers, but of the seeking of followers itself. Thus Hesych., ἡπριθευμένων πεφιλοτιμημένων, ἡριθεύετο ἐφιλόνεικει: hence to be ambitious, indulge in ambitious rivalry. The Scholl on Soph. Ajax 833, ὁ δὲ Σοφοκλῆς ἐριθεῦσαι μέν τι ὡς πρεσβυτέρῳ (sc. Aeschylus) μὴ βουληθείς, οὐ μὴν παραλιπεῖν αὐτὸ δοκιμάζων ψιλῶς φησι κ.τ.λ.; Polyb. x. 25. 9, οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ὀρεγόμενοι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξεριθεύονται τοὺς νέους, καὶ παρασκευάζουσιν εὔνους συναγωνιστὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον. It is likewise implicitly coupled with φιλοτιμία in Philo Leg. ad Caium 10 (ii. 555), ἡγεμονία δ᾽ ἀφιλόνεικος καὶ ἀνερίθευτος ὀρθὴ μόνη. (The passages in Eust. Opusc. ap. Stephan. suit either “ambition “or “ faction.” Cf. C.I.G. 2671. 46, ἀνερίθευτοι)

What sense the earlier Greek Fathers attached to it in St Paul does not appear. Chrys. on Rom. ii. 8 seems to identify it with φιλονεικίας τινὸς καὶ ῥαθυμίας as if he had ἔρις in mind: in the four other places we learn nothing, nor do we from Theodore: Didymus on 2 Cor. has ἔριδάς τε καὶ ἐριθείας. Theodoret on Rom. is strange and obscure. The Latin evidence is as follows:

Rom. ii. 8, contentione d g vg pp

2 Cor. xii. 20, dissensions d g r vg Ambst

Gal. v. 20, provocationes simultates Cyp² (em. Nemesianus) simultates Ambst inritationes d g Iren rixae Luc Hier vg

Phil. i. 17, aemulatione Tert dissensione d contentione g Ambst vg contumaciam r Aug³ invidia(m) et contentione(m) Aug²

Phil. ii. 3, contentionem d g vg Aug Amb al aemulationem Hil irritationem Ambst

Jam. iii. 14, contentionem (es) f s vg Aug

Jam. iii. 16, contentio f s vg Aug

Most of these renderings suggest the erroneous association with ἔρις (also “contention” syr vg): but aemulatio (Tert Hil) may have another force. Some of the N.T. places are ambiguous: but wherever the context has a defining force, it is in favour of the sense found in Polyb. etc. The difficult Rom. ii. 8 must be taken with Phil. i. 17, which seems to point to the Judaizing leaders, who intrigued against St Paul. In 2 Cor. xii. 20 it is separated from ἔρις by ζῆλος and θυμοί and precedes καταλαλιαί, so also in Gal., though followed by διχοστασίαι. In Phil. ii. 3 it is coupled with κενοδοξία and contrasted with ταρεινοφροσύνη: so here with ζῆλος. Thus all points to the personal ambition of rival leaderships. There is no real evidence for “party spirit,” “faction,” etc., i.e. for the vice of the followers of a party: ἐριθία really means the vice of a leader of a party created for his own pride: it is partly ambition, partly rivalry.

ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν, in your heart] Here what answers to the πηγή is at last distinctly expressed.

μὴ κατακαυχᾶσθε, boast not] The imperative is not the most obvious mood: we should rather have expected some statement of the natural consequences of having bitter jealousy in the heart, viz. “how can ye do other than boast, etc.?” Μὴ with a question cannot mean “Do ye not?” so that the imperative is unquestionable. The meaning seems to be this, “Do not set up for teachers, for then your teaching will be a boasting, etc.” It is thus in antithesis to δειξάτω in v. 13. He asks “Who is wise etc.?” The possession of wisdom was made a claim to teachership. He deals with it first positively. There is a right way to show forth wisdom. But, he goes on, if when searching your hearts you find bitter jealousy and ambition there, do not speak and teach, for in shewing forth what you regard as your wisdom you will be boasting etc.

κατακαυχᾶσθε] As in ii. 13 (cf. 1. 9; iv. 16), but here followed by an additional κατά. This one word exactly expresses the true spirit and purpose of the ambitious teachership. It was boasting against other men, partly against the multitude, still more against rival teachers. But St James unexpectedly puts in another object. The boasting directed against other men would in effect be a boasting against the truth itself which was supposed to be spoken. Nay it would be more, it would turn to falsehood uttered against the truth.

καὶ ψεύδεσθε κατὰ, and lie not against] If necessary the κατά might be repeated in sense from κατακαυχᾶσθε (Kühner ii. 1073 f.): but a better sense is given by the words as they stand: the adverse boast turns to simple falsehood, and the truth suffers from both.

τῆς ἀληθείας, the truth] For somewhat similar contexts of ἡ ἀληθεία see Rom. i. 18; ii. 8 (also ἐξ ἐριθίας), 20; 1 Jn i. 6, 8. The implied doctrine is a paradox, but amply attested by experience. The mere possession of truth is no security for true utterance of it: all utterance is so coloured by the moral and spiritual state of the speaker that truth issues as falsehood from his lips in proportion as he is himself not in a right state: the correct language which be utters may carry a message of falsehood and evil in virtue of the bitterness and self-seeking which accompanies his speaking. At bottom such speakers do not cherish the truth except as a possession of their own, or a missile of their own.

¹⁵οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἄνωφεν κατερχοµένη, ἀλλὰ ἐπίγειος, ψυχικὴ, δαιµονιώδης

15. οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία, This wisdom is not] These words are enough to confirm the interpretation of v. 14 just given. No evil wisdom has been directly spoken of. But it is implied in κατακαυχᾶσθε etc.: the speech there spoken of is the speech which claims to be the speech of wisdom: now therefore St James will say what the wisdom is. Wisdom as such is what he specially prized (i. 5; iii. 17), which made him all the more hostile to its counterfeit.

ἄνωφεν κατερχοµένη, a wisdom that cometh down from above] ἔστιν . . . κατερχοµένη is not equivalent to οὐ κατέρχεται. The participle is qualitative, i.e. in effect an adjective: “is not one that cometh down,” “is not of a kind that cometh down”: it is not such a wisdom as God gives (i. 5). Cf. Philo Leg. All. iii. 58 (i. 120), τούτοις (tried ascetes) συμβίβηκε μὴ τοῖς γηΐνοις ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἐπουρανίαις ἐπιστήμαις τρέφεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ ἐπίγειος, but is earthly] Opposed to ἐπουράνιος. It belongs to the earthly sphere. However it may discourse about heavenly things, it derives its aims and its measures from a mere transfer of things earthly to a higher sphere: it has none of the large vision which belongs to the spirit. Compare τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες of Phil. iii. 19, likewise said, I believe, of Judaizers, and Col. iii. 2, which manifestly refers to them, and has the same context (ii. 23) λόγον μ͒ν ἔχοντα σοφίας. Speaking to Greeks St Paul analogously refers to ἡ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου (1 Cor. i. 20; iii. 19), τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου (ii. 6). All these three words gain their proper sense only when understood in antithesis to characteristics of the true wisdom. The spurious wisdom, in relation to its source and sphere, is earthly not from heaven.

ψυχικὴ, of the mind] A remarkable word, not known in this sense before the N.T. It occurs in four passages: 1 Cor. ii. 14, ψ. ἄνθρωπος contrasted with ὁ πνευματικός; 1 COr. xv. 44 (bis), 46, σῶμα ψ. contrasted with σῶμα πνευματικόν; Jude 19, ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες. These all contain express opposition to πνευματικός, and the same is doubtless implied here. It is not likely that St James and St Jude borrowed it, in such different connexions, from St Paul; and St Paul’s own manner of using it in both places does not suggest that he was giving it a new sense. Most probably all three writers took it from the Greek religious language of Palestine. In earlier usage the word means simply of or belonging to the ψυχή; and this is fundamentally the biblical sense, the only peculiar colouring coming from the way in which the ψυχή was regarded as not identical with the πνεῦμα but inferior to it. On this head there is very little Jewish evidence (Delitzsch seems to know of none: Hor. Hebr. on 1 Cor. ii. 14 in Z. S. f. Luth. Th. 1897 p. 209). But Joseph. Ant. i. 1. 2 describing the Creation says that God καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνῆκεν αὐτῷ (man) καὶ ψυχήν; and in 4 Macc. i. 32 (perhaps from a Platonic basis) it is said that of desires some are ψυχικαί, some σωμαρικαί; and reason (ὁ λογισμός) appears to rule over both; which implies the inferiority of the ψυχή to reason. Cf. Iren. v. 6. 1; Orig. on Ezek. Schol. (iii. 727 Migne). What is implied then is that this wisdom does not rise above the lower parts of the mind. The rendering “sensual” is so far wrong that it suggests sensuality in the common sense: the Latin animalis is in like manner correct as taken from anima, but suggests “bestial,” which is not the true sense, which is simply “of the mind” in contrast to “of the spirit.”

δαιμονιώδης, demon-like] The word requires care. -ώδης properly denotes (1) fullness, (2) similarity. The word itself, a rare word, in all the known examples means “demon-like,” except in two very late writers, where (like δαιμόνιος) it means “supernaturally sent.” The interpretation “inspired by demons” is not unnaturally suggested by κάτωθεν ἐρχομένη and v. 6 φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεάννης; cf. 1 Tim. iv. 1, διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων. But that sense is stronger than really suits the context; and the more correct sense “demon-like” or rather “such as demons have” makes the triad more natural and complete. The origin and sphere of the spurious wisdom is the earth not heaven; its seat in man is his soul, not his spirit; the beings with whom he shares it are the demons, not the angels: thus the wisdom shared by demons answers to the faith shared by demons of ii. 19.

¹⁶ὅπου γὰρ ζῆλος καὶ ἐριθία, ἐκεῖ ἀκαταστασία καὶ πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα.

16. ὅπου γάρ, For where] A necessary justification of what has just been said : St James has just used strong language respecting the professed wisdom of these teachers, and the reasonableness of his language did not lie on the surface, but had to be explained. Ὅπου and ἐκεῖ express presence. Though wisdom is God’s gift, it is also an energy of the human mind and heart, and therefore takes its colour from the condition of the human heart and mind. If jealousy and rivalry are present there, these other things inconsistent with a truly Divine wisdom must be present there likewise.

ἀκαταστασία, disorder] A Stoic word. Cf. ἀκαταστατος i. 8; iii. 8. In Lk. xxi. 9 (cf. 2 Cor. vi. 5) it is coupled with πολέμους, as outward commotions and disorders. In 1 Cor. xiv. 33 it is contrasted with εἰρήνη with reference to orderliness in assemblies of the Church. In 2 Cor. xii. 20 (μή πως ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθίαι, καταλαλιαί, ψιθυρισμοί, φυσιώσεις, ἀκαταστασίαι) it follows ψιθυρισμοί, φυσιώσεις. The meaning here seems to be that the presence of jealousy and rivalry implies a disorderly state of mind leading to disorder of spiritual vision; so that everything is seen in a distorted and disarranged light, the true mark of wisdom being to discern the inward order of things.

καὶ πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, and every worthless matter] Πρᾶγμα is a vague word, properly an act, a thing performed, but often used only as “a matter.” Cf. Herm. Vis. i. 1. 8, ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀνδρὶ δικαίῳ πονηρὸν πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἐὰν ἀναβῇ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν ἡ πονηρὰ ἐπιθυμία;

Φαῦλος expresses not so much moral evil as worthlessness; it is applied to what is poor, paltry, worthless (four times in N.T. of acts and mostly contrasted with τὰ ἀγαθά: Jn iii. 20, contrasted with τ. ἀλήθειαν; v. 29; Rom. ix. 11; 2 Cor. v. 10. Tit. ii. 8 is different). Here apparently we have another antithesis to true wisdom: wisdom discerns not only the order of things, but their relative worth and dignity: and the presence of what is low and worthless in the heart and mind incapacitates it for this discernment. Both ἀκαταστασία and φαῦλον exactly agree with ἐπίγειος etc., implying not so much positive evil as the limitations and paltrinesses that belong to a low order of things.

¹⁷ἡ δὲ ἄνωθεν σοφία πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνή ἐστιν, ἔπειτα εἰρηνική, ἐπιεικής, εὐπειθής, μεστὴ ἐλέους καὶ καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀδιάκριτος, ἀνυπόκριτος·

17. ἡ δὲ ἄνωθεν σοφία, But the wisdom that is from above] That there is such a wisdom is not only implied in v. 15, but stated in i. 5.

πρῶτον μὲν, ἔπειτα] Apparently express first the purely inward personal character, second the social character of the true wisdom, the conduct which it inspires towards others.

ἀγνή, pure] The word answers very nearly to “pure,” καθαρός being rather “clean.” It is an ancient word of Greek religion, denoting freedom from any kind of defilement, whether of sensuality or of things supposed to be of a defiling nature. Cf. Plut. Qu. Rom. i. (ii. 263 E), Διὰ τί τὴν γαμουμένην ἅπτεσθαι πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος κελεύουσιν; . . . ἢ ὅτι τὸ πῦρ καθαίρει καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἁγνίζει, δεῖ δὲ καθαρὰν καὶ ἁγνὴν διαμένειν τὴν γαμηθεῖσαν; It thus expresses religious purity, combining καθαρός and ἄγιος. But in due time it acquired an ethical sense. Theoph. (Bernays 68) and Clem. Alex. 652 quote an inscription from the temple at Epidaurus,

ἀγμὸν χρὴ ναοῖο θυώδεος ἐντὸς ἰόντα ἔμμεναι· ἁγνείη δ᾽ ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὅσια.