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  <description>
  Besides an introduction by the translator, this writing comprises the Introduction and Chapter 1 of
  Volume 2 of Kuyper’s <i>Om de Oude Wereldzee (Around the Ancient Mediterranean Sea)</i>. The entire work is
  Kuyper’s reactions to and thoughts about the Mediterranean Muslim civilization that he traversed.
  Some of the same subjects that captivated his attention a century ago have returned to the limelight
  today:  the role of Turkey, the position of women, Muslim education, and the unrelenting march of
  Islam, often at the expense of Christian communities.  Above all, he seeks an answer to the mystery
  of the dynamics that seem to make Islam unstoppable.<br /><br />
	Dr. Jan H. Boer<br />
	Translator
  </description>
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    <DC.Title>The Mystery of Islam</DC.Title>
    <DC.Creator sub="Author" scheme="short-form">Abraham Kuyper</DC.Creator>
    <DC.Creator sub="Author" scheme="file-as">Kuyper, Abraham (1837-1920)</DC.Creator>
     
    <DC.Publisher>Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library</DC.Publisher>
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    <DC.Subject scheme="ccel">All; </DC.Subject>
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    <DC.Source>J.H. Boer</DC.Source>
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<div1 title="Title Page" prev="toc" next="ii" id="i">
<h1 style="text-align: center" id="i-p0.1">The Mystery of Islam</h1>


<h3 style="text-align: center" id="i-p0.2">By</h3>

<h2 style="text-align: center" id="i-p0.3">Abraham Kuyper</h2>

<h3 style="text-align: center" id="i-p0.4">1907</h3>


<h6 style="text-align: center" id="i-p1">===========</h6>


<h6 style="text-align: center" id="i-p2">With a Preface</h6>

<h6 style="text-align: center" id="i-p3">By Translator-Editor</h6>

<h3 style="text-align: center" id="i-p3.1">Dr. Jan H. Boer</h3>

<h6 style="text-align: center" id="i-p4">2010</h6>

<hr />
<p style="text-align: center" id="i-p5"><br />
Copyright Jan H. Boer  2010<br />
<a href="http://www.socialtheology.com">www.SocialTheology.com</a><br />
<br />
Taken from Om de Oude Wereldzee by Abraham Kuyper<br />
Original title of Introduction: “Voorrede”<br />
Original title of main chapter: “Het Raadsel van den Islam”<br />
Original publisher: Van Holkema &amp; Warendorf, Amsterdam, 1908.
</p>
</div1>

<div1 title="Translator-Editor Preface" prev="i" next="iii" id="ii">
<h1 id="ii-p0.1">Translator-Editor Preface</h1>

<h1 id="ii-p0.2"> </h1>

<h1 id="ii-p0.3">Dr. Jan H. Boer<note n="1" id="ii-p0.4">For Boer see
his website <a href="http://www.socialtheology.com/" id="ii-p0.5">www.SocialTheology.com</a>
</note></h1>

<p id="ii-p1"> </p>

<p id="ii-p2"> It is the year 2010. We are in the middle
of a period in which Islam forms the central focus for much of the world. It is
possible that we stand at the door of an entirely new era of world history in
which Islam will be much more dominant than it has in the immediate past
centuries. Only time will tell.</p>

<p id="ii-p3"> For the West, this is not the first time
Islam has claimed so much attention. There were the Crusades. There was the
Andelusian Muslim civilization from AD 711 AD till 1492, at one time covering
almost the entire Iberian peninsula. This meant the Western heartland was
confronted with the Muslim challenge at its very doorstep for almost eight
centuries, a force they could not afford to ignore and which became an
important stimulant for Western cultural development. But then the challenge
receded into the distance. Kuyper’s book on Muslim civilizations around the
Mediterranean was written during another transition period, namely the time of
the collapse of the Turkish Caliphate or Sultanate in 1923.</p>

<p id="ii-p4">As Kuyper’s Introduction shows, this work became very
popular in its country of origin, The Netherlands. This material is translated
from a copious work of two massive volumes. They were expensive in a time of
limited wealth. Kuyper was delighted that, in spite of general poverty and the
limitations of a small Dutch-language market, the first 5000 copies sold
immediately and within two months two more prints appeared. What especially
enthralled him was that a young lady almost immediately prepared a Braille
version of this entire two-volume set! Clearly this was a subject of major
interest to the Dutch populace. A popular Dutch writer, J. W. Schulte Nordholt,
wrote almost a century later, “We can learn much from this book. Though the
main theme of this work is not altogether clear to me, it contains much
interesting random data. A traveler around the Mediterranean today will still
find much enjoyment from reading these century-old Kuyper books and is sure to
appreciate them.”<note n="2" id="ii-p4.1"><i>Trouw</i>,
July 8, 1994. </note></p>

<p id="ii-p5"> Of course, there may have been additional
reasons for the popularity of this work. Kuyper himself was a Dutch icon. 
Since the 1870s he had been at the centre of a battle for Christian liberation
of the Dutch Calvinist masses from the tyranny of a state-church alliance that
was dominated by modernist liberalism, today described as secularism. The
battle was waged organizationally, spiritually, politically and in print at
every major cultural front in the country. The end product was a host of
Christian organizations, including a new denomination, and a new sense of power
among the people he championed. They took over the government with Kuyper and,
later, succeeding leaders of the movement serving off and on as Prime Ministers
till this day. Until well into 2010, the Dutch Prime Minister, J. P.
Balkenende, described himself as a Kuyperian.<note n="3" id="ii-p5.1">Balkenende stated, “In case any of you should still doubt this: I am
a Kuyperian in heart and soul. That is due to my upbringing, my education and
the path of my career. But I am especially a Kuyperian from conviction.” J.
P. Balkenende, “Speech by Prime Minister
J.-P. Balkenende on the occasion of the unveiling of the statue of Abraham
Kuyper in the town of Maassluis on 5 November, 2008.” Princeton
Theological Seminary, Abraham Kuyper Center for Public Theology, <i>The Kuyper Center Review, </i>Vol. 1, 2010. </note> 
Due to the triple influence of secularism, Barthian theology and stultifying
traditionalism that requires new oxygen for rejuvenation, the resulting social
structures based on religion and worldview are currently lamented by some Dutch
citizens as “<i>verzuiling.”</i> However, the system is lauded in other
quarters, including and especially foreigners, as the most effective guarantee
for the freedom of all religions and worldviews.<note n="4" id="ii-p5.2">H. ten Napel, 
pp. 93, 97-102.. J. Boer, 2009, pp. 82, 416. </note>
</p>

<p id="ii-p6"> While engaged in this whirlpool of
re-organizing society, Kuyper also wrote an entire library that includes
massive tomes of heavy academic and philosophic treatises as well as many
volumes of meditations marked by a wholistic <i>piety</i>—in distinction from <i>pietism</i>,
which is <i>not</i> wholistic!<note n="5" id="ii-p6.1">J. Boer, 1979,
pp. 446-449. </note>--
and innumerable articles in the newspapers he himself established, one of
which, <i>Trouw,</i> still exists as a daily and is now part of an
international publishing conglomerate. This entire body of Kuyperiana was very
popular in his day. In the course of these writings, Kuyper led his people in
the development of a new worldview that was orthodox but hardly “conservative”
as that term is popularly used today, and significantly different from existing
Christian traditions and philosophies, even though borrowing heavily from them.
It can be said that he re-arranged or re-combined existing philosophical and
theological concepts into a dynamic new Christian worldview that features a
heavy emphasis on this world and society without losing sight of the spiritual
and eternal sides of creation.</p>

<p id="ii-p7">I have introduced elements of this new school of thought in
Volumes 1, 5 and 8 of my series <i>Studies in Christian-Muslim Relations </i>as
well as some other publications<i>.<note n="6" id="ii-p7.1">See also the
introduction to Kuyper in my Essay One in this book. For other introductions
to Kuyper see my website &amp;lt; <a href="http://www.socialtheology.com/%20kuyperiana" id="ii-p7.2">www.SocialTheology.com/
kuyperiana</a> &amp;gt;. </note></i> 
It goes by various names, such as Neo-Calvinism, Kuyperianism, Neo-Kuyperian
even, and Reformational. Succeeding generations strove to produce a more or
less full-fledged Christian philosophical system that is matched among modern
orthodox Christians only by Roman Catholics.<note n="7" id="ii-p7.3">To pre-empt
criticism of this statement, I hasten to explain that Kuyper and his allies
made grateful use of existing Western philosophy, but they fused these various
philosophical concepts into a unique combination. </note> 
It is widely sought after by Christians throughout the world today who are
seeking to develop a Christian worldview that can responsibly counter
secularism and Islam. Unfortunately, they are hampered by language problems,
since many of the core publications exist only in Dutch, a language not widely
understood. Fortunately, the movement is spawning an increasing number of
English publications, to which this translation is a small contribution. I
have only recently learned about the exciting and ambitious hopes of the Kuyper
Center at Princeton Theological Seminary to translate all or most Kuyperiana
into English.</p>

<p id="ii-p8">I am offering this English translation of Kuyper’s
discussion on Islam not because he was an expert on the subject nor because I
agree with all his opinions, allegations or predictions. In fact, I don’t. My
reason is that it is interesting for his 21<sup>st</sup>-century heirs to learn
how Kuyper, the pioneer of an emerging international school of philosophy and
social action, interpreted the Islamic movement of a century ago, the same
movement that today is once again at the centre of the world’s attention. How
did this pioneer of wholistic Christianity and assailant of an intolerant
secularism a century ago interpret Islamic wholism and <i>its </i>resistance to
secularism? I leave potential implications for today for you to ponder.</p>

<p id="ii-p9">Kuyper was a reformer or, in more contemporary language, a
social transformer, a <i>radical</i> transformer in the sense that he went to
the root of things he tackled, to their <i>radix.</i> He was not a radical in
the popular modern sense in that he sought to overthrow existing structures and
replace them with others that had no basis in history, as is the tendency of liberal
secularism. He constantly sought to base his claims and efforts on both the
Bible, the deep historical roots of his own country, as well as on various
strands of existing philosophies. But, prophetic as he was, he could hardly be
expected to transform an entire society in one lifetime. He remained a child of
his time and, while tackling important cultural sectors, left others in their
traditional state, often embracing the popular notions of his day that may be
rejected today. He is faulted for that and, sometimes, deeply resented and
criticized, especially by some Christians involved in the feminist movement.
Sometimes he is said to have unwittingly prepared the foundations of South
African apartheid. However, I have listened to a Black South African<note n="8" id="ii-p9.1">I regret not
knowing the brother’s name. My file of the conference is incomplete and he is
one of its unfortunate casualties. </note>
speaking at a Kuyper centennial celebration at Princeton Theological Seminary
in 1998, who stated that he stood before this international forum of scholars
precisely <i>because</i> he was a product of the Kuyperian liberation
movement. In short, no man, woman or even movement can do it all in one
generation. It is sufficient that descendants continue the transformation over
succeeding generations in areas not touched by “Father Abraham.” He <i>did</i>
lay the foundations for expanding the entire Christian horizon, worldview and
range of social action, even if he did not apply it as fully as some demand
today, a century later. Will expecting more of one man or movement be fair or
reasonable? Kuyper had to leave some things for us to do!</p>

<p id="ii-p10">Kuyper leaves us with an intriguing question. Interwoven
throughout the article is the reality of Western imperialism that then as now
rattles the Muslim world as well as myself. Being a politician of note, even
Prime Minister of his country, as well as a pioneering liberation theologian of
orthodox vintage, one would think that Kuyper might have had some sympathy for
the Muslim community’s political plight and indicate at least some misgivings
about Western aggression. One detects none of that in this publication, even
though he was aware of Muslims’ chaving under this yoke.</p>

<p id="ii-p11">My comment, I hasten to say, is not mere cheap hindsight.
The ecumenical movement of the day was acutely aware of the un-Christian
behaviour of the West vis a vis its colonies and did not hide its dismay.<note n="9" id="ii-p11.1">J. Boer, 1979,
pp. 103-105; 1984, p. 114. </note> Similarly,
Kuyper was painfully aware of the parallel problems caused by <i>laissez faire </i>capitalism
in his <i>home</i> country and railed against them in radical terms: “The law
of the animal world, dog eat dog, became the basic law for every social
relationship.”<note n="10" id="ii-p11.2">A. Kuyper,
1950, pp. 22, 35-36, 16. J. Boer, 1979, pp. 16, 47; 1984, pp. 31, 137-138.</note> 
And, yes, he did also recognize similar dynamics in colonialism and had a
certain ambivalence towards it.<note n="11" id="ii-p11.3">J. Boer, 1979,
pp. 47, 466-467, 469, 471-472. </note>
It does not appear that he ever overcame this ambivalence. However, I would
argue that if the <i>main</i> contours of Kuyper’s predilection as a liberation
theologian/politician had been allowed to work themselves out, Kuyper would
have ended up on the side of Johannes Verkuyl, a Kuyperian missionary of a
later generation. He was imprisoned by the Dutch for siding with the
Indonesians in their struggle for independence. It was another point on which
Kuyper and most of his successors did not achieve clarity.<note n="12" id="ii-p11.4">This
ambivalence continued to characterize Kuyper’s political party for decades and
kept it from developing the radical stance to which the Kuyperian perspective
really should drive his heirs. This ambivalence among Kuyperians eventually
drove the American Kuyperian philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff, retired Yale professor,
to near despair. He cried it out about his church, the Christian Reformed
Church in North America (CRC), being so proud of its Kuyperian heritage but
having become so “quiescently—sometimes even oppressively—conservative.” (N. Wolterstorff, 1983, p. ix. J. Boer, 1992, pp. 187-188.) Why did that happen? How could
this happen? I believe it has to do with the constituency climbing the
socio-economic ladder from working class and low middle to middle, high middle
and managerial class. Marx was correct about our worldviews and religions
tending to follow changes in our economic conditions more than following the
authority of our Holy Book, not infrequently <i>regardless</i> of that Holy
Book. We may not consciously turn away from the Book, but our interpretation
gradually and unnoticeably changes to conform to the new situation. The CRC
constituency that spawned the Christian Labour Association in the USA during the 1930s, rejected all overtures made by that body during the 1990s. During
the transition of its constituency from a largely labour community to one of
owners and managers, it also changed from pro-union (Christian) to anti-union,
including Christian, while Well, that’s a whole story in itself—and a lucid
example of Marx’s thesis. </note></p>

<p id="ii-p12"> </p>

<p id="ii-p13">An explanatory note: There are many references throughout
the article to events, persons and place names that are not immediately clear
to most 21<sup>st</sup>-century readers. I considered inserting explanatory
footnotes. Then I realized that almost all of them can be found on the
internet and have only to be “googled.” So, for those who want all those
details, I refer you to the internet. I could not find any information about
some names or events on the internet, neither about their meaning nor their
English spelling. Those I marked with a star (*). For those who are interested
only in the general perspective Kuyper offers, the article will suffice for a
starter as it stands.<note n="13" id="ii-p13.1">I encourage you
to google the original title of this book, <i>Om de Oude Wereldzee, </i>for
further introductions to and discussions about this work. </note>
</p>

<p id="ii-p14">A cautionary note: Be it understood that translating it all
does not translate into agreeing with it all.</p>
</div1>

<div1 title="Introduction" prev="ii" next="iv" id="iii">
<p id="iii-p1">Introduction</p>

<p id="iii-p2"> </p>

<p id="iii-p3">By Abraham Kuyper</p>

<p id="iii-p4"> </p>

<p id="iii-p5"> </p>

<p id="iii-p6">I can only be grateful for the reception this book has
enjoyed. It is encouraging that the first print of 5,000 copies of a work of
this format—[remember: the whole was a voluminous two-tome job--translator]—and
that was available only at a rather steep price, enjoyed two reprints within
two months! Even more so, given the restrictions of the small Dutch-language
market. But I derived the greatest satisfaction from the young lady who had
such love for the blind that she had the patience to promptly produce a Braille
edition of this work! It forms a gigantic tome that can be seen at the Library
for the Blind in The Hague.</p>

<p id="iii-p7">Originally I was at a loss as to how to explain such
humbling interest in this project. It did not pretend to be scholarly. 
Neither could it be regarded as a great literary work or a captivating travel
journal. Market research later revealed that readers were attracted by the
great amount of highly compact information about a region in which there is
wide-spread interest but little knowledge. To be sure, during the 1890s a
couple of major books on the region were published in French (1891) and German
(1895), but the French one became too voluminous with its nine heavy tomes,
while the German one was simply too broad in compass without showing the
interwoven nature of developments around the Mediterranean. Thus a great need
was felt for a work in compact format that would provide information about the
peoples around that sea.<note n="14" id="iii-p7.1">Given his own
verbosity that resulted in multi-volume tomes, it is almost humorous for Kuyper
to present his as compact! </note> 
Encouraged by the initial popularity of this work, I thus decided to proceed
with a condensed description of some of the less familiar Mediterranean
countries not covered so far. I included Spain and Portugal mainly because of
the residue of Muslim civilization and culture that still marks these
countries.</p>

<p id="iii-p8"> History does not stand still. In several of the countries
I visited, significant changes were underway. I took careful note of these
changes in the awareness that a book that is in progress for two years cannot
possibly be up to date in its first chapters. This applies especially to
Turkey with the revolution that took place there and that totally changed the
issues surrounding the Balkan question. Allow me therefore briefly to draw
your attention to this revolution.</p>

<p id="iii-p9">Although Abdul Hamid remained Sultan, one must regard the
change in government there as nothing less than a wholesale revolution. A
groups known as “The Young Turks” had quietly blanketed the country with a
network of Committees or cells that were obviously copied from the French
Revolution. These Committees constitute the government, not only in
Constantinople but also in the more remote villages. Government officials are
totally dependent on these Committees. Even the Sultan has no choice but to go
by their policies. They depose ministers and other officials at will. Even
the judiciary is subject to their policies. This arrangement had since long
been planned by a central committee in Paris. Actually it was Sultan Abdul
Hamid with his carelessness and reckless expenditures who empowered them to
suddenly carry out their plot without bloodshed.</p>

<p id="iii-p10">They availed themselves of the same instrument that had
upheld the regime of the Sultan, namely the army. The army had been neglected,
not in terms of weaponry or training, but in salaries and promotions. Even
among the troops that the Sultan had sent to Yemen to squelch a rebellion
there, repeated mutiny took place. Government and the corrupt civil service
slurped up all the available funds. Hence, the troops were not paid and
promotions were intentionally delayed to avoid paying higher salaries.
Dissatisfaction was rife and that was the weapon the Young Turks used to draw
army officers to their side. The rank and file soldiers followed suit. The
confusing state of affairs in Macedonia, which was close enough to
Constantinople, allowed them space and time to organize themselves properly and
then, from that vantage point, to dare an attack on Constantinople. They did
so by raising the same slogan that already had been used by Abdul Hamid to
checkmate the Western powers in the region, namely restoration of the Constitution. 
</p>

<p id="iii-p11">The constitutional cry by itself did not raise any Muslim
hackles, for it is in keeping with the Muslim spirit. Hence, even the Sultan
supported the call for the retrieval of the Constitution. Islam is democratic
by nature. It was accepted in Algeria, and long ago in Spanish Cordova a Muslim
republic had been established. The new issue here was only the attempt to
create a Turkish <i>nation</i> in which all inhabitants, regardless of origin
or religion, would be accorded full rights. Christians cheered at the
prospect, for it could spell the end of their centuries-long oppression. The neighbouring
Greeks cheered, because they expected that the new situation would ensure their
influence over the government. Even the Bulgarian army withdrew from the country,
for now they would be able to achieve their national political aims without
bloodshed. The people themselves, including some groups within the palace, were
convinced that finally the heavy pressure of the Western powers upon them would
come to an end. From now on, the Sultan could defend himself against the
demands of the West by pointing to the refusal of Parliament. Thus, when the
West hastened to withdraw their political representatives from Macedonia, the
Turkish people imagined they had already won the game.</p>

<p id="iii-p12">That myth soon dissolved. Bulgaria understood that it was
now possible and, in fact, imperative for her to take immediate action, for
once the Turkish Parliament would have its affairs in order, all chances for
regaining her independence from Turkey would slip through her fingers. Austria
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina with great speed. Crete also made use of the
interim period to finalize her attachment to Greece. Thus, instead of gaining
or profiting from internal developments, even before the Parliament was fully
established, Turkey lost the greater part of her nominal European possessions
and was left only with Macedonia, Albania and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, along
with the area immediately surrounding Constantinople, now known as Istanbul. 
The greatest disappointment was that the West began their interference again,
interference for which Turkey itself now needed to invite them. The hope was
that Turkey would finally become great, free and independent. Instead, it was
greatly reduced so that it is no longer a threat to anyone. A war would have
put a sudden end to the new regime of the Young Turks.</p>

<p id="iii-p13">Thus, though the restoration of the Constitution itself was
a matter of general rejoicing, it immediately evoked bitter disappointment. That
disappointment became more intense as soon as Parliament settled down to its
work. Due to the power the Young Turks wielded throughout Turkey, they quickly succeeded
in cobbling together a Parliament that meekly carried out their designs, but it
did not take long for that Parliament to become the source of division. The
Young Turks were real Occidentalists, oriented to Western culture, that wanted
a constitutional atmosphere that was not rooted in the East, but was wholly to
be based on the radical French model. Even in Austria that is united by the
bond of a common religion, the possibility of different nationalities to live
together under one constitution is visibly evaporating. How much more will
Turkey have problems with its varied nationalities in addition to the division
caused by its three religions? Currently, it is being realized in Hungary that
under such conditions it is impossible for one nationality to place its stamp
on the entire population for any length of time without even greater failure.
Like the Magyars in Hungary, so do the Turks want to have <i>their</i> language
and <i>their </i>religion declared the language and religion of the State. 
Everyone can sense ahead of time where this will lead. It is still an open
question how the current crisis will develop, but we can be sure that this
first crisis will be little more than prelude to a much more serious struggle. 
Those who dream that the Young Turks have solved the Eastern question are not
familiar with Mediterranean cultures. The Turkish people are not a nation and
never will be.<note n="15" id="iii-p13.1">For a relevant
brief modern or current discussion of the “Young Turks” and of their long-range
success compared to that of other Muslim nations, see Gwynne Dyer, “Turkey,
Islam and the ‘Idiotic Autocrats,’” <i>Georgia Straight</i>, September 6-13,
2007. See also my <i>Studies in Christian-Muslim Relations</i>, Volume 9—<i>Companion
CD</i>, 2009, file &amp;lt; Miscellaneous Articles/Other
Countries/Asia/Turkey/2007-09-06 Turkey Islam Democracy &amp;gt;. These “Young
Turks” were more successful than Kuyper predicted. Today, their descendants
are serious contenders for membership in the European Union. The very movement
that initially resisted European colonization, today is applying for absorption
into Europe! Who says history is boring or without humour? There is a
difference, of course. Today it is in terms of so-called equal partnership. 
Today the question is whether a Muslim country that has not experienced the
Western Enlightenment movement fits in an Enlightenment-Christian-Postmodern
alliance.</note> 
</p>
</div1>

<div1 title="The Mystery of Islam" prev="iii" next="iv.i" id="iv">
<h1 id="iv-p0.1">The Mystery of Islam</h1>

<p id="iv-p1">More than in
Asia, when you move over to Africa you will be impressed not only by the power
of Islam but by its mystery. It is in Africa, more than in Asia, that Islam is
spreading rapidly. Mahdi after Mahdi has demonstrated how easily and
powerfully the flames of fanaticism can light up. The mystical orders are
making their influence felt in the spiritual soil from Khartoum to Rabat. <i>Al
Azhar</i>, the university in Cairo, is the most prestigious and most
influential of all Muslim schools. I do not wish to belittle the serious
influence Islam still holds along the long route from Hayderabad in India to
Bosnia on the Adriatic Sea, or along the long line that runs from Orenburg to
Batavia. However, in Asia, Islam merely maintains the position she long ago
achieved during its heyday. In contrast, in North Africa, Islam is visibly on
the march. Even among the Negro people that fill Africa’s interior, Islam
continues to win converts.</p>

<p id="iv-p2">In the first
part of this work I have sufficiently shown that I do not regard Asian Islam a
spent force or an exhausted autumn plant. Saudi Arabia, India and Indonesia
demonstrate the contrary. However, if you want to learn about the conquering
force of Islam, then you must turn to Africa. In this “dark” continent of
almost 30 million square kilometers, an area three times the size of Europe,
there live 170 million people who, with the exception of Ethiopia and South
Africa, increasingly are turning away from Christianity to seek their salvation
in Islam. Sixteen centuries ago, the entire northern coast of the
Mediterranean and its east coast from Port Said to deep into Sudan was won for
the Christian faith, but this has all disappeared. Islam has triumphed along
the entire coast. And it now appears that the Crescent is seriously poised to
conquer the interior as well.</p>

<p id="iv-p3"> As it
suddenly lit up the sky like a meteor in the seventh century and began its
miraculous triumphal march from Mecca, Islam is one of the most difficult
phenomena in world history to explain, especially psychologically. Till this
day it has still not fully revealed its enigmatic nature. Oh, yes,
Christianity also spread very rapidly. Already by its fourth century it had
penetrated deep into the heart of Asia, had conquered the entire north coast of
Africa and southern Europe. It practically covered the entire width and breath
of the once mighty Roman Empire and exercised spiritual authority over this
entire area. But what was this Christian expansion compared to the gigantic
triumph of Islam that within a century after the <i>Hijira, </i>with the
exception of the bulk of Europe, subjected the same expansive territories in
Asia and Africa, not merely to its spiritual influence but simultaneously to
its sword?</p>

<p id="iv-p4">This is
psychologically all the more amazing when you consider that Christianity
conquered a series of weak, primitive religions, while Islam burrowed its way
into country after country where the higher religion of the Cross had blossomed
with such unexpected richness. Islam broke through with a force to which no
one offered resistance, drove out everything in its path and subdued it. It
transformed the reigning spirit of the day by imposing its own. It imposed its
stamp on the conquered peoples so thoroughly and deeply that today, fourteen
centuries later, all these nations live out of the spirit of Islam, adhere to
its traditions and stubbornly resist all other cultures, even the higher, more
developed, ones. Wherever train tracks cut through field and farm and
telegraph lines snake their way through farms and along modern roadways,
everyone, Bedouin as well as sedentary populations, is marked by that ancient
unchanging stamp that Muhammad, that mysterious son of Abdullah and Amina with
his powerful personality, was able to impress on his followers in Mecca in the
seventh century in both their spiritual and cultural makeup.</p>

<p id="iv-p5"> What
actually was this magic wand with which Muhammad won this unprecedented loyalty
and brought about this unique turn in the history of the world? It cannot
possibly be attributed to conscious deceit. A deceiver lives on basis of his
lies and can produce no more than pseudo events that can only control
restricted circles and are short-lived. Undoubtedly Muhammad had ecstatic
visionary instincts, but such instincts are both quickly enflamed and equally
quickly extinguished. Such a person is not likely to possess sustaining
power through the centuries. A spiritual power of the first order must have
dwelt in Muhammad that, regardless of other factors of lower rank, supplied the
essential driving force from which his creativity emerged and that retains its
vitality till this day. <i>That driving force undoubtedly was his inspired and
resilient call for Monotheism.</i></p>

<p id="iv-p6">Mohammad had
a weak moment once in Mecca. Under pressure of a threat to his life, he
recited a verse still found in the Qur’an, Sura 53:19-21—“Have you seen Lata
and ‘Uzza, and another, the third (goddess), Manat? What! For you the male
sex, and for Him, the female?”<note n="16" id="iv-p6.1">I
use the translation of the Qur’an by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, p. 495. </note> 
This was weakness. Uzza and Manat were well-known idols. Since then he has
with relentless severity preached Allah, the god of the ancient Hanifites, as
the only true God and held up this as Allah, the All Compassionate and All
Merciful, as the exclusive object of worship for his adherents.</p>

<p id="iv-p7">Religion in
general stirs us in the deepest of our being; it is more powerful than any
other factor in our personal lives as well as in the history of nations. Among
religions, it is Monotheism that does this most powerfully, because it reduces
all things to their single origin, propels them along a single consistent line
and guides all things towards their destiny or end where it unites them in one
elevated focus. The courage that welled up from all this to break with all
forms of Polytheism and everything associated with it, reached so deeply into
the existing regime, that the glow it emitted consumed nearly all resistance
and called up a totally new life motif or worldview. The courage of such a heroic
spirit evokes enthusiasm, and elevated enthusiasm transports the masses,
propels them along and raises them to heights and powers far above their normal
levels.</p>

<p id="iv-p8">The
spiritual centre of Muhammad was embedded in both his deep conviction of the
evil of Polytheism and in his bold confession of Monotheism. However, his
purely spiritual power would never have guaranteed him his triumph if the
effects of his principle had not opened the way for the ongoing penetration of
his spiritual message. This penetration was due not so much to clever
manipulation as to the expression of his personality in relation to both his
own local and international environments at the time. Muhammad did not develop
his confession next to or outside of daily life. His religion was not a
mystery suitable only for the inner chamber. Rather, he was so deeply and
ideologically convinced of the all-encompassing rule of Allah’s omnipotence,
that he spread his confession of Allah as a net over the full range of human
culture, and demanded its dominance over the personal and family as well as
economic and political life. Religion as a private affair was unthinkable for
him.<note n="17" id="iv-p8.1">
See J. Boer, 2005, pp. 61-76, for a fuller discussion of Muslim wholism.</note>
Monotheism did not only exclude all rival gods but Allah, but just as much
every other commanding or deciding power whether in the human will, in
established cultural customs or in the power of the State. Allah alone rules
and controls everything. The universe is like a gigantic clock designed by
Allah, artfully assembled by Him, wound up by Him, and operating according to
His fixed rules. Allah’s will and law alone apply and decide the direction of
all of life and of all existence. This is not only currently the case, but has
been so in the past and will be so in the farthest reaches of the future.</p>

<p id="iv-p9">That is the
reason Muhammad connected to earlier revelations of Monotheism. He did not
consider his a new religion. Neither was it a religion that syncretistically
was cobbled together by mixing existing religions. Allah had always reigned,
had all the while revealed His will and had from the beginning counted in
history. It is just that mankind was not capable of comprehending the full
mystery of Allah’s rule all at once. Hence Allah revealed Himself gradually,
progressively, step by step. The prophets of all the ages were the vehicles
for these revelations. They numbered in the thousands, but most of them were of
minor significance. Some were mere sparks that flamed up quickly but
extinguished just as quickly. A few among them became leading vehicles in this
development of the service of Allah. Adam was the first in that series. The
series includes Noah and Shem. After them, especially Abraham, Moses and Jesus
Christ. All of these not only struggle zealously for Monotheism and proclaimed
the majesty of Allah, but in their successive appearances they formed an
unbroken chain, a continuous progressive revelation from Allah. Jesus was the
last among them before Muhammad, and the highest. However, even Jesus Christ
was merely one of the many prophets, the latest in order and the highest, but
no higher than Moses and other predecessors in rank and kind. That is why even
in Jesus, divine revelation had not yet come to a close. Did the Gospels
themselves not predict that after Jesus there would be another Comforter? That
final closure to revelation came in the person of Muhammad. He completed what
was begun with Adam, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. Muhammad received the closing
revelation. At the eschaton, that is, the end of all things, at the closure of
world history, there will be more appearances, but these will no longer belong
to history, for that history will also have come to its close. From now until
that ending, that is, during this present dispensation, there will not come any
further, higher or more complete revelation after Muhammad. What began with
Adam or, if you prefer, with Abraham, is one single unified process that found
its finale in Muhammad. That is why all faith comes down to two articles:
first, the confession that Allah controls all things; second, that Muhammad
represents His full and closing revelation.</p>

<p id="iv-p10">But now,
according to Muhammad, that revelation is complete. That is to say, that
revelation, being the final revelation of God’s will, must have priority over
the law and rule over all other things. Here is where the Qur’an came in and
then, next to it, a variety of sources of orthodoxy. There are the <i>Hadith </i>[the
Traditions or record of individual actions and sayings by the Prophet as
reported by his Companions], the <i>Sunnah </i>[the sacred collection of the <i>Hadiths,
</i>the second highest Islamic authority next to the Qur’an] and the <i>Ijima</i>
as the <i>vox populi </i>[the voice of the people] comprising the entire body
of learned Islamic scholars and their output. The last is associated with the <i>Ijtihad,
</i>a controversial method of logical deduction that may lead to
innovation within Islam.<note n="18" id="iv-p10.1">Kuyper knew
the terminology he is using here, but I am not sure he understood the relations
between them accurately. I have not tried to upgrade him here, except that I
have inserted in the text brief explanations of these Arabic terms so important
to Islam.</note>
Nothing could be left to human initiative. Everything had to be arranged
according to higher ordinances. Allah had to govern the life of his true
worshippers in all its breadth and depth. Here you have the origin of the
rigorous Nomism or legalism that has penetrated all of Islam as a yeast. 
Later, a struggle arose about the freedom of the will, but this had to do only
with moral responsibility. Every Muslim was convinced that all laws for human
life derived from Allah, a factor that created that all-encompassing focus for
all of Muslim life, the source of the power of their solidarity. The worship
of Allah and the subjection of everything to Him were not two components of the
faith, but one.</p>

<p id="iv-p11">We have here
the root of both the pride of the Muslim and the command to holy war. Only
those who bow before Allah and honour His highest Prophet were considered
genuine human beings, Allah’s allies<note n="19" id="iv-p11.1">I am not sure
Islam allows this terminology. It is Kuyper’s. </note>
and Allah’s protected. Because Allah rules everything, only His true
worshippers can rule on earth. They are the only ones to carry out His holy
will and honour Him; all others are opponents and enemies. Consequently and
logically, all individuals and all nations that are not part of the Muslim
community either partially or wholly, are in a state of resistance to Allah,
fail to honour Him and go against His ordinances. Should mankind raise the
sword on behalf of worldly interests but not for the highest of interests,
namely the honour of Allah? Should we shed blood for minor misdeeds but not
when human beings assault the majesty of Allah, especially if people purposely
persist in this evil?</p>

<p id="iv-p12">This
rigorous concept of holy war would not have gone further than did Israel’s
campaign in Canaan, if Muhammad had brought them a <i>national</i> religion as
Moses has done. Such a national idea was totally foreign to Muhammad. His
religion was to be an absolute religion, the religion of the world, the only
religion. The Muslim community was therefore to encompass and rule the entire
world. Allah is not a national god. Neither is He a god whose revelation is
merely temporary or for a time as in the case of his temporary arrangements
with Israel. That was possible at the time of Moses, but no longer, for in
Muhammad the final revelation appeared. That revelation made high demands of
all humanity. Islam crossed all borders and where there were still idols or
where Allah was not acknowledged, people were considered to be in a mode of
rebellion, of scorn, and of provocation of the Almighty. Therefore, the <i>jihad,<note n="20" id="iv-p12.1"> </note> </i>the
holy war against unbelievers, is not an incidental matter in the Qur’an, but an
obligation that flows directly out of the principle of absolute Monotheism, at
least, in its Nomistic form. The Qur’an states it in a harsh and relentless
tone in Sura 9:5—“<i>But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and
slay the Pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie
in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent and establish
regular prayers and pay Zakat, then open the way for them, for Allah is
Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful</i>.” That this harsh commandment was later
re-interpreted and attributed a “softer” meaning by Muslim authorities does not
change anything in principle. The Hanifites later declared that as long as
someone, somewhere, was waging a holy war, the rest of the faithful would be
relieved of this duty, but the principle itself has never been relinquished
and, in fact, cannot be renounced. To disobey Allah is the greatest of all
misdeeds, in fact, the only misdeed. All who call upon Allah have the duty to
break such resistance and to punish that repugnant misdeed.</p>

<p id="iv-p13">Such strict
nomistic/legalistic Monotheism is the natural friend of democracy and freedom. 
A clerical class could easily have usurped power by inserting itself between
the faithful and Allah—thus a power over the people next to or in addition to
Allah, but this could not be tolerated. Even though such a class did arise in
the form of the Khalif and the Ulama, who did in fact serve as intermediaries,
the principle that “all people are like the teeth of a comb” as Muhammad used
to put it, was maintained. There is no central authority that ties the Muslim
community together. Islam depends on the confession of the faithful. That is
the only force that keeps it together. Hence the endless splinter groups
within Islam into sects and cults, almost worse than in Christianity. This
freedom is inherent to Islam. But in the end, no matter how adherents differ
from each other, all those who call upon Allah and follow the Prophet see
themselves as one body, regardless of their country of origin.</p>

<p id="iv-p14">Out of this
situation an all-pervasive power emerges that is far above any hierarchical power. 
It is exactly this sense of freedom that provides every Muslim with a deep
consciousness of obligation and responsibility for the honour of Allah. Not
even the practice of circumcision unites them, for which reason it is sometimes
grossly neglected. Only the confession of Allah and His Prophet unites them. 
Even negligence in worship and failure to adhere to the ordinances of the
Qur’an and the <i>Sunna</i> can be tolerated and forgiven, as long as the
believer boldly and openly resists all opposition to Islam and calls loudly on
Allah and His Prophet. No matter the differences over the Caliphate or issues
of succession or anything else, even, as is done in Zanzibar, supporting a
different Sheriphate from that of Mecca, still every believer in Islam feels
himself one with all his fellow believers, as members of the same holy <i>ummah</i>
or community. Islam finds its unconquerable strength not in some pseudo
organization but in the personal confession of each Muslim. For that reason,
Muhammed neither founded a Caliphate dynasty nor appointed a successor. Upon
his death, the Muslim community itself had to appoint its next leader.</p>

<p id="iv-p15">But there is
a darker side to Islam that also flows out of its nomistic character, namely
its lack of spiritual depth. It knows nothing about regeneration or being born
again; it does not realize the deeper reality of sin and evil; it is short on
soteriology or doctrine of salvation that goes beyond mere formal declaration
of reconciliation. This does not mean that it has renounced all higher moral
principles. To the contrary, if you compare the moral standards in vogue in
the Arabia of Muhammad’s day with his principles, then Islam clearly
represented progress and higher purpose. His declaration concerning marriage
and alcohol pointedly collided with the traditional immoral standards in the
areas of sex and alcohol. But this was no more than a repositioning of the
principial line that indicated the new norm. Muhammad himself was infatuated
with sex.<note n="21" id="iv-p15.1">This is a
strong statement that I am not sure can stand scrutiny. </note>
By breaching his own prohibition of having more than four wives he reduced the
seriousness of this restriction. The provision of concubinage of female slaves
further lowered his ethical and moral standards.</p>

<p id="iv-p16">It is
therefore impossible to develop a higher level of domestic life under Islam: 
It prevents women from reaching their full potential. The loose and easy
divorce introduced by Muhammad may have been an improvement over the customs of
the day, but it, too, served to keep the ethical level of Islam low. As soon
as you compare the moral standards of Christendom with those of Islam, you will
immediately note the profound difference. On the moral side, Islam is a system
of accommodation, a partial elevation of the low level he found on the ground,
but definitely not a return to first [creational] principles. His
self-presentation as the last and final divine ambassador constituted a serious
obstacle, for that forever cut off the possibility of developing a higher
ethical standard in the future. This ethical norm may have been progress over
the existing moral level, but it was still at a low principial level and so it
has remained ever since among Muslims. It has served to weaken the seriousness
of their moral life.<note n="22" id="iv-p16.1">Remember that
Kuyper is comparing the two religions a century ago. Since then, Christendom
has disappeared, secularism has taken over with its very loose moral standards
that have even affected Christians in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Had he
written this comparison today, he undoubtedly would have been more nuanced. 
Comparing and contrasting today’s Christian moral standards with those of Islam
is tricky. Both will win some and loose others.</note> 
</p>

<p id="iv-p17">All of this
can only be explained by the nomism or legalism of Islam and the absence of any
attempt to raise the moral life through regeneration or being born again. The
Christian emphasis on the contrast between the old and the new born-again
person is completely foreign to Islam. This situation has not prevented the
rise of revivals, as for example the Wahabis, that represented a return to more
puritanical attitudes, or the various Mahdi movements with similar goals. But
such movements never elevated themselves morally beyond the standards of the
Qur’an. Whenever moral standards sunk below those of the Qur’an, Muslims
were called upon to return to its standards, but it never came to a process of
ethical development that welled up from the ethical principle itself.<note n="23" id="iv-p17.1">Kuyperian
thought emphasizes creation ordinances, including moral ordinances, that are
out there and can be discovered in rough outline through experience, but for
which fallen man needs the Bible to understand them in their full depth.</note> That did not
and could not happen.</p>

<p id="iv-p18">Christendom
has its three pillars on which it rests: faith, hope and love. Or, if you
prefer: regeneration, faith and sanctification. In contrast, Islam has five
pillars that support the religion: faith in Allah and His Prophet; prayer;
fasting in the month of <i>Ramadan</i>; alms giving; pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Nothing demonstrates the external character that so disfigures Islam more than
this row of pillars when set side by side. Even Muhammad’s expectation for the
afterlife betrays a similar lack of ethical elevation. To be sure, Muslim
scholars have repeatedly sought to allegorize the rough outlines of the
Paradise image Muhammed held up before his followers, but it remains a fact
that most Muslims understand Paradise in a purely sensual sense. Muhammad’s
language was purposefully designed to imprint that sensual image permanently.</p>

<p id="iv-p19">It was only
the mystics, in their ascetic as well as their ecstatic strains, who provided a
more holy glow for this barren ethical scheme. It would be doing Islam an
injustice if we were to regard this mysticism as a totally foreign implant in
the garden of Islam. Mysticism is an indispensable component of all legalistic
religions, but it is not for everyone. The lifestyle of the masses is too
superficial for this approach. Mysticism requires a special aptitude and a
unique orientation of the spirit, so that it always is the monopoly of a small
group. You do not find much of mysticism in the Qur’an, for it addresses the
masses. Neither would it need to be in the Qur’an, for regardless of which
form the religion were to adopt, mysticism develops spontaneously as soon as
its seed is present. Even though it does not win over the masses, it always
commands respect, especially in nomistic or legalistic circles. Thus it can be
said that this spontaneously-erupted mysticism, though always behind the veil
of officialdom, has deepened and intensified the emotional and spiritual life
of the people. Without the mystical movements such as the Dervishes, Sufism
and other forms, Islam would definitely not have retained the spiritual power
that millions and millions of Allah worshippers continue to exude, especially
not after the cessation of holy wars. Without this glow of mysticism,
Pan-Islam would simply be unthinkable.</p>

<p id="iv-p20">It is
possible to debate the question whether the more rigid form of asceticism did
not emerge long after Muhammad. It is generally agreed that the Qur’an excludes
rather than encourages the mystical version of asceticism. Nevertheless, it
cannot be denied that the ecstatic visionary founder of Islam himself found
part of his powers in mysticism. Besides, mysticism is such an integral part
of the Semitic worldview that it is impossible to imagine a Semitic
religion—and Islam is and will always remain that—without this mysterious
background of mysticism.</p>

<p id="iv-p21">But even if
we accept mysticism as an inseparable ingredient of Islam, this will never
serve to elevate its ethical standard. All mysticism is religion-specific and
as such never adopts an imposed ethical character. Even in its ascetic form it
merely aims either to achieve communion with the Divine Being or to insure its
salvation after death. It normally does not have any influence on moral life
in society. Rather, history teaches that all mysticism throughout the ages tends
to end up “in the flesh,” that is to say, become “worldly,” even though it
begins “in the spirit.”</p>

<p id="iv-p22">If Islam had
spread exclusively in regions where idolatry and Polytheism constituted the
traditional religion, as in Arabia itself or in parts of Persia, we would be
able to understand how the higher religion of Islam without great difficulty
would have pushed out these lower religions. The riddle that the rapid rise of
Islam confronts us with is that it almost exclusively spread in fully
Christianized nations and that in these higher cultures this even higher
Christianity disappeared almost without a trace after only a short struggle. I
have already done full justice to the inspiration inherent in Monotheism. I
have expressed full appreciation for the enthusiasm instilled in the emotions
by the command for holy war, while I also have fully accounted for the
enthusiasm generated by the consciousness that the faithful were to dominate
the entire world. To all these factors we must also add that the militant
spirit and the lust for booty, so native to the Arab, were among the less noble
factors that led to the triumph of Islam.</p>

<div2 title="Reasons for Rapid Muslim Subjugation of Christianity" prev="iv" next="iv.ii" id="iv.i">
<h2 id="iv.i-p0.1">Reasons
for Rapid Muslim Subjugation of Christianity</h2>

<p id="iv.i-p1">But none of
this explains the painfully rapid subjugation of the Christian religion in Asia
and Africa. When Islam suddenly raised its head in the seventh century,
Christianity had been the state religion in the eastern regions of the Roman
Empire of Byzantium for well over three centuries. It had penetrated Asia as
far as Arabia, Persia and Indonesia, and the greater part of North Africa,
including Egypt. North Africa had already hosted Christian synods of more
than 500 bishops. Men with the highest talents that are till this day highly
revered in the Church, served in Egypt and Carthage. Origenes, Athanasius,
Cyprianus, Augustine and, before him, Tertullian, had taught there. There may
have been an element of pseudo-Christianity, but the most severe and most cruel
persecutions that took place in these regions caused the holy courage of the
martyrs, both men and women, to shine even brighter. The most splendid
cathedrals had arisen and the most famous schools for the training of the
clergy had been established throughout Byzantine Asia and along the entire
north coast of Africa. The Christian Church was not only tolerated, but she
was the supreme power, while all traces of the earlier Paganism had been
exterminated, mostly by imperial command. The Church existed there in a state
of unprecedented bloom and was fully intending to penetrate Asia and Africa
still deeper, all the way to Ethiopia and Sudan. Furthermore, the Christian
religion did not merely float on the surface as a drop of oil on water, but it
shaped the cultures of peoples in their deepest dimensions. Wherever struggles
arose in the Church, entire <i>nations</i> would get involved.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p2">If you were
to visit these regions today, you would hardly find a trace of this Christian
history in Africa, with the exception of Ethiopia and half a million Coptics in
Egypt. In Asia, you would find here and there a few residual groups of Greeks,
Marionites and Armenians as pitiful remnants of the once magnificent Byzantine
State Church. And then realize that Islam conquered these peoples not after a
struggle of many centuries, but as it were with one fell swoop. This series of
facts confronts us today as an almost inexplicable problem, the solution to
which must be found in two factors, namely, the internal condition of the
church at the time and the style of Islamic propaganda. It is on these that we
will now focus.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p3">Originally, the Christian Church in the East tried to spread
its tentacles by means of quiet evangelism. As long as she retained this mode,
she retained her internal health. However, before long, Christianity began to
penetrate wider circles. It was among them that Greek and Eastern philosophies
in their many varieties re-interpreted the mysteries of the Gospel and
distorted them according to their own philosophies. History teaches us about
the struggles of the Church during the second century to wrestle itself loose
from the embrace of Gnosticism, Doceticism and, later, Manicheism. A spirit
of dissatisfaction arose in the East with respect to their own heritage. This
lead to a tendency to welcome and incorporate every new religion into a new
syncretism. This process meant that such new religions were distorted and then
smothered. True, the silent majority of the masses continued in the faith,
but they did not determine the direction of things. In contrast, the educated
upper crust who propagated their theoretical concoctions in writing and taught
in the academies, increasingly sought their inspiration and power in a
philosophical frame on which they elegantly embroidered the flowers of the
Christian religion—as they saw them. This process caused an increasing distance
from the roots of the faith and led to attempts to seek the essence of
Christianity in various philosophical and dogmatic systems that found their
strength not in spiritual inspiration but in arid, scholastic dialectics. 
Worse, some undermined the structure of Christian truth by replacing its
foundation with that of Pagan philosophy. Since these systems and schools of
thought began to oppose each other, before she realized what was happening, the
Church became enmeshed in bitter arguments and divisions. Most of the debates
focused on the centre of the Christian religion, i.e. on the person of Christ
Himself. They no longer gratefully accepted in faith the incomprehensible
mystery of the incarnation, that is, of God becoming man, but began to dissect
and sift the mysteries of the faith in a rationalistic way. One philosophical
explanation of this mystery was pitted against another, all of them claiming
for themselves the inspired faith of the masses and uttering warnings to their
opponents that they were shortchanging the majesty of Christ. The Church had
no choice but to intervene in these controversies by way of a series of
Conciliar Councils [meetings of the church’s hierarchy] in order to discern the
truth or otherwise of these philosophical and dogmatic schools of thought.
Arians, Nestorians, Monophysites and Monotheletes were successively declared
heretics and pushed beyond the pale of the Church.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p4">The ordinary
people participated in these struggles. Frequently they even resorted to
violence and came to physical blows. The sad outcome of all of this was that
the entire Body of Christ was torn and members confronted each other in hostile
camps. This did not only destroy the unity of the Church but also its
strength, because the zeal of the Christian religion for the mysteries of the
holy faith diminished in favour of dialectic skirmishes. Gradually what was to
be a religion of the heart and which was to bloom in faith, hope and love, became
rigid and arid in a mode of thought in which the heart went cold and froze up. 
While Byzantine scholars engrossed themselves restlessly in dogmas <i>about</i>
Christ, the love <i>for</i> Christ in their hearts dampened, while the mystical
union of the believer with his Christ slowly faded away and dissolved.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p5">And then, as if all this philosophical stupor, dialectical
confusion and Byzantine dampening of the spirit were not enough, there appeared
on the horizon a second force that would undermine genuine Christianity, namely
the Ceasaropapism introduced by Emperor Constantine the Great. Now it was not
a case of the State seeking a deep alliance with the Church of Christ, but,
rather, of the Church being placed under the guardianship of the State. This
new relationship lead to unprecedented external flowering of the Church in two
ways. First, entire tribes were “converted” by force, as later was the case
also with Charlemagne and in the provinces around the Baltic Sea. Paganism was
rejected. Its temples were either demolished or turned into churches, its
altars crushed and its schools closed by imperial order. Secondly, there were
those among the powerbrokers and elite who used to engage in sun worship, but
who, now that the Christian religion was part of the establishment, bowed their
knees before the Cross in order to achieve high prestige in the State. These
two elements spelled numerical increase for the church, but it weakened her
internally, spiritually. None of this added anything to Christ’s glory in a spiritual
way. People draped themselves in Christian garb, but no change occurred in
their hearts. This made the Church appear a soulless entity.<note n="24" id="iv.i-p5.1">For a similar
explanation of how African Christian ethnic groups can fight each other to
death, see J. Boer, “Old Wine in New Skins: An Old African Worldview in a New Church.” In <i>Studies in Christian-Muslim Relations</i>, vol 5, Appendix 7. Also <i>Christian
Courier,</i> June 5, 1998, pp. 10-11. </note></p>

<p id="iv.i-p6">The story is
not yet finished. After the State had turned the Church into an attachment,
church affairs became affairs of state. The Emperor and his lackeys interfered
in all church affairs. Originally Constantine announced that he would concern
himself only with the externals of the Church, while the internals were left to
the Church itself. This was a healthy principle, but it was soon suppressed 
when ecclesiastical infighting threatened the peace and power of the State. 
The Emperor had no choice but to interfere, take sides and exorcise attempts to
create division. Hence, time and again he applied the weight of the State to
ecclesiastical life. This in turn led each of the opposing parties to give
priority to currying the favour of the imperial Court. It was common knowledge
that the side favoured by the Emperor and supported by the Court was assured of
victory. The great Conciliar Councils continued to protect the terrain and
power of the church. We have good reason to admire the courage and resilience
with which these leaders tried to maintain the independence of the Church. 
However, after the decisions had been made and the delegates returned to their
dioceses, the decisions had to be turned into actions—and this was in the hands
of the Emperor. And so politics joined philosophy and dialectics to undermine
the Church.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p7">The
spiritual condition of the Church deteriorated seriously. It harboured too many
false elements and was constantly pulled farther away from its roots. Finally,
exhausted from all her controversies, it lost its resistance to becoming a mere
tool in the hands of nitpicking scholars, power-hungry princes of the Church
and sly politicians. Warnings against such developments already appeared in
the seven letters to the churches of Asia Minor in the New Testament book of
Revelations, chapters 2-3. There it was predicted that the hour would come
that the candlestick would be taken away from them and false philosophies
devastate the Church. Christ would come like a thief in the night to undo her
and spit her out of His mouth because of her lukewarm state.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p8">It was while
the Christian Church was in the above pitiful condition that Islam arose,
suddenly attacked her, made her shake on her foundations and saw to the demise
of almost all her splendid cathedrals. Of course, God not only allowed this
all to happen, but He willed it. <i> Anyone who believes in the royal reign of
Christ over His Church must recognize the hand of God in this destruction of
the Church by the Muslims as a justified penalty for her unfaithfulness.<note n="25" id="iv.i-p8.1">Italics
by translator. </note> </i>It
was in the West that the Christian religion was to triumph, not in the East. 
The East was exhausted. Only in the West, under the instigation of the
Germanic peoples, would the church bloom. In the East, only little remnants
would remain in order to remind us of the great Church of Christ that once
was. Nothing touches the emotions of faith of the traveler through these lands
of Asia and Africa more than to see how in all these countries the Church not
only suffered fearful devastation but totally disappeared. The slowly
corroding ruins of churches in which once the Halleluiah was raised, are all
that reminds the traveler of the ancient glory of Christendom in these
regions. Apart from the Arabs who came from elsewhere, all the ancestors of
the Muslims who surround the traveler were once baptized Christians. Our martyrs
who astounded the world with their stalwart courage, came from those
generations. It was Christian in a much more intimate way than what you find
in much of today’s European Christendom. And all of this Christianity is
eradicated lock, stock and barrel, so that we are left without a trace. Even
customs and traditions that once marked domestic and social life as well as the
religious and moral life of these nations—not a trace of that can be found
today. At the same time, you will find that under Islam, Pagan influences that
were thought to have been forgotten, returned to the surface, especially among
the Berbers, but of the Christian religion you will find nothing. Even the
holy symbol of the Cross is no more to be seen in even a single monument. 
There is nothing, absolutely nothing that remains to remind you of the ancient
Christian confession of their forefathers. We do recognize that the small
remnants of the Church of Christ in Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor have been
influenced by Islam in their morals, customs and even in their mode of worship,
while among the great populations of Islam you will find no trace, however
faint, of the former Christianity. This hurts immensely. This situation is
spiritually depressing and must lead to somber reflection. You constantly hope
you will come across some reminder somewhere, but you find nothing. No name, no
sign, no sound. The ruins tell you that this was once the land of Christians,
but provide no clue about that past. As a swarm of locusts descends on an
orchard and devours all the leaves and blossoms to leave only bare branches, so
has Islam in those countries totally devoured and dissected the Christian
orchard till nothing was left.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p9">And now, how
did it go with the Muslim mission that caused such a destructive ending for
Christendom? I am not now speaking of the harsh manner with which Muhammad
himself and the Caliphs after him turned against the Arab Pagans and against
the numerous Jews in Medina and surroundings. These idolaters and Jews simply
had the sword put to their throat. They had to adopt Islam or pay the supreme
price. But this is not where the riddle I am talking about is to be found. 
These Jews were also among the lower cultures whose Cabalism had caused them to
wither spiritually and who later sided with Muslims against Christians. The
puzzling question is what enabled Islam to so relentlessly pursue its
unprecedented success without interruption when it confronted the Christian
Church that was so powerful at the time and ranked spiritually and morally so
much higher than Muhammad’s religion. Of course, the violence of the sword
terrified the people, but we make a mistake if we imagine that the horsemen
that turned up in Syria, Persia and Egypt from Arabia simply put to the sword
all who refused to convert to Islam. Instead, they occupied their lands, they
evicted those in power and replaced them. They presented themselves as the
rulers and, since nothing could withstand the power of their sword, they
behaved as lords and masters of the land.</p>

<p id="iv.i-p10">But this is
very different from actually conquering the spirit, even though that is what
eventually happened. With the exception of a few small remnants, all the
descendants of former Christians are today Muslim in heart and soul. This result
was not and could not have been reached by violence and force alone. Rather,
this spiritual transformation took place very gradually. However, in contrast
to Asia and Africa, in the European part of Turkey, including all its former
Balkan vassal states, by far the majority have remained Christian till this
day.</p>

</div2>

<div2 title="Contours of the EarlyMuslim Jihad" prev="iv.i" next="iv.iii" id="iv.ii">
<h2 id="iv.ii-p0.1">Contours
of the EarlyMuslim Jihad</h2>

<p id="iv.ii-p1">Muhammad and
his followers definitely did not place Christians and Pagans on the same
level. They distinguished sharply between those who bowed before idols and
those who stood by the revelations of Moses and Jesus. After all, according to
Islam, Moses and Jesus also honoured Islam. Their revelations are all
recognized as being of divine origin, the difference between them being that
the revelation to Muhammad was higher, came later and went further. Thus
Christians were viewed as knowing Allah at an earlier period and were walking
the right path. They only went wrong when they refused to accept the <i>later</i>
and <i>higher</i> revelation. This and this only was their offence. It is
similar to the way Christians honour the Jews in so far as they follow Moses,
but we fault them only for being blind towards the later and fuller revelation
that came in Christ. So Muslims judge that Christians did indeed obey the
revelation that till that point was the highest, but they willfully closed
their eyes to the even higher light that came with Muhammad. Here they
determined the limits of the <i>Holy Book.</i> Jews had the Holy Book of the
Old Testament; Christians honoured the Holy Book of the Old and New Testament,
but both rejected the even holier Book of the Qur’an. But even though,
according to Muhammad’s judgement, the others were at a lower level, they could
be tolerated as backward or deficient kindred. That is why all Christians were
not only tolerated but were given a degree of freedom of worship, on condition
that they acknowledge the authority of the Muslim ruler, if not in religion, at
least in politics.</p>

<p id="iv.ii-p2">From the
beginning this demand for nations and non-Muslims to acknowledge the
superiority of Islam governed their relationship. Since Allah is omnipotent
over the entire world, His faithful warriors are automatically entitled to
control that entire world. Strictly speaking, only the followers of Islam have
a right to exist or human rights. Allah is the Lord of lords, while the
supreme leader of Islam is His representative on earth. With this high sense
of calling, in 629 AD or thereabouts, thus only five years after the <i>hijira</i>,
before his power was secure in Mecca, Muhammad wrote a letter to all
neighbouring rulers, even to the King of Persia and the Emperor at
Constantinople, in which he called upon all these rulers to convert to Islam
and to subject their lands and peoples to the Prophet of Mecca.<note n="26" id="iv.ii-p2.1">In a fine
modern touch and, I suspect, in imitation of these letters from the Prophet,
Khomeini wrote a similar letter to Gorbachov during their days in power (<i>The
Pen</i>, a discontinued Nigerian Muslim bi-weekly, 27 January, 1989, p. 8).</note> These letters
were marked by his seal that read, “Muhammad the Representative of Allah.” It
may seem strange, but these letters written by the head of a new, unknown, cult
actually made a deep impression. In Arabia, the rulers of Yemen and Bahrain
submitted immediately. The response of the Christian ruler of Ethiopia was
friendly. The Byzantine viceroy of Egypt demonstrated his cowardice by sending
Muhammad two young Coptic girls for his harem. Last but not least, Emperor
Heraclius of Constantinople responded in very courteous terms. Only Khosrau
II, King of Persia, in quick-tempered fashion, tore up the letter in the
presence of the messenger and instructed his general to find Muhammad, attack
him and take him prisoner forthwith. If nothing else, these letters
demonstrated the position of Islam from its early inception. How strong must
his conviction of his own exalted position have been, to dare to make such a
bold demand for total subjection to the most powerful rulers around him, even
the prestigious Emperor of Constantinople, while his own domain was no more
than a small strip of territory.<note n="27" id="iv.ii-p2.2">We read the following about the
Prophet’s letter campaign in the Wikipedia article “Khosrau II:” </note> 
But it is precisely to this strong consciousness of divine calling and of his
God-given supremacy over the entire world that Islam owes its inextinguishable
enthusiasm and the indomitable courage of its horsemen by which he
simultaneously pursued the strongest propaganda and overtook the mightiest of
spirits by surprise. Islam did not negotiate with any earthly power on basis of
equality but demanded that everyone simply capitulate, that is, that everyone
recognize the supremacy of the Commander of Islam and accept all conditions of
peace from him as grace or favour. The “capitulations” in vogue those days
were treaties of subjugation in which the victorious sovereign would grant
certain privileges to his new vassal only as a free privilege. The same
situation obtained when it came to tolerance granted to Jews and Christians in
any country militarily occupied by Muslims. They would find favour in the eyes
of a conqueror only on condition that they recognize his right to rule over
them and, if necessary, to force them to accept Islam, with violence even. The
tolerance awarded Christians was also such a “capitulation.” Under whatever
conditions they capitulated, granting them tolerance was pure grace.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="Christian Dhimmi Status" prev="iv.ii" next="iv.iv" id="iv.iii">
<h2 id="iv.iii-p0.1">Christian Dhimmi Status</h2>

<p id="iv.iii-p1"> Christians
in a land militarily occupied by Muslims have only three choices. The first is
to adopt Islam so as to be absorbed into the faithful. The second is to pay
the special tax known as <i>jizya</i>, which turns them into <i>dhimmi</i> or
second-class citizens. The third is simply to be killed by the sword. Choosing
to pay the tax is in effect to submit and thereby to accept conditions of
tolerance that were painful and humiliating. These treaties or, as they are
sometimes called, “covenants” were all designed to socially oppress and
humiliate. When Omar conquered Jerusalem, he included the following conditions
in the decree of capitulation often referred to as the “Covenant of Umar:”<note n="28" id="iv.iii-p1.1"> </note> (1) Christians
are free to worship in their churches, but Muslims are allowed to attend at any
time, day or night; (2) they will never perform their worship services on the
street; (3) they will not teach the Qur’an to their children; (4) they will not
convert anyone to their religion; (5) they will not hinder anyone from becoming
Muslim; (6) they will always give Muslims the highest seat of honour in their
meetings; (7) they will not dress like Muslims (8) they will never write in
Arabic, the glorious language of Islam; (9) they will not adopt Muslim names;
(10) they will not ride on large saddles; (11) they will never carry weapons;
(12) they will shave their beards; (13) they will never place crosses on their
churches; (14) they will never play their carillons; (15) they will bury their
dead without public display; (16) they will never harbour a slave that belongs
to a Muslim; (17) they will never peek into Muslim houses; (18) they will never
raise a hand against a Muslim. These conditions were to be accepted at the time
of the capitulation for themselves and their descendants. Should they ever fail
to strictly observe any of these conditions, they would in effect concede to
Omar the right to apply any penalty against them that is due to a sovereign
over against rebel subjects.</p>

<p id="iv.iii-p2">In Egypt,
these conditions were made even heavier. Christians were obligated to carry a
wooden cross of considerable weight around the neck, while they also were
forced to wear very dark and almost dishonourable clothes. Every Christian was
made to feel deeply that every Muslim was of higher status, that in public life
only Muslims counted for full and that they were in fact marginalized from
society. <i> It soon became clear that this harsh treatment of a subjugated
people was less inspired by Islam than by a lust for spoils.<note n="29" id="iv.iii-p2.1">Italics
by translator. </note> </i>The <i>Khalif</i>
wanted to see money at every turn. The more the head tax yielded, the happier
he was. When that tax began to shrink because the payers converted to Islam,
this conversion was greeted at the Court in Baghdad with some misgiving. In
Egypt the yield of the tax diminished within a few years from ten to three
million dinars, a painful statistic of Christian apostasy. Amr bin Al-As, the
general who conquered Egypt but who did not send enough money from this rich country
to the <i>Khalif’s</i> Court or for the construction of the large mosque in
Jerusalem, was eventually even recalled and replaced by Abdullah, who was a
more willing tool.</p>

<p id="iv.iii-p3">Even though
Muslims exerted little pressure on Christians to convert, the social humiliation
inflicted on them in the long run proved to be unbearable. Persecution steels
and stimulates; it fires up a holy enthusiasm and revives heroism, but
never-ending social humiliation depletes energy and leads eventually to total
collapse. Imagine being excluded from everything prestigious and honourable,
constantly to be treated like an inferior, to be held back at all fronts, to
see your family move about with oppressive inferiority, your children robbed of
any future improvement, to be walking around in shameful clothes day after day.
And then, on the contrary, to see everyone who accepts Islam crowned with
honour, helped to advance and gain in power. This contrast constitutes
life-long torture that at the end becomes too heavy to bear. And then to
realize that with only <i>one</i> word it is possible to throw off this yoke,
to be free from the head tax, and to open for yourself and for your children
the path to honour and power. And come to think of it, Islam did not demand a
lot. The kiss [of peace] was offered as soon as you call upon Allah and His
Prophet. This is the temptation for which entire Christian families, century
after century, have fallen. To be sure, there has also been courageous
resistance and energetic opposition so that whoever digs deeply into this sad
history of nameless suffering will experience profound admiration for the
toughness and the unyielding spirit with which numerous families preferred this
harsh humiliation to denying Christ. But this fire of holy faith could only glow
where faith had sunk deeply into the heart—and that was exactly where the
masses were lacking. For this reason, the masses gradually moved over to
Islam, family after family. As the number of Christian families in the cities
and villages gradually diminished, it became increasingly difficult for the
remnant to hold out. As apostasy of others became the pattern, your own
apostasy seemed less sinful. And so it was that, with the exception of small
remnants, everywhere in Asia and Africa entire nations were converted to
Islam.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="The Muslim Cultural Expansion (Al-Azhar University)" prev="iv.iii" next="iv.v" id="iv.iv">
<h2 id="iv.iv-p0.1">The Muslim
Cultural Expansion (Al-Azhar University)</h2>

<p id="iv.iv-p1">Nevertheless,
it would be a mistake to imagine that actual missionary propaganda played only
a minor role in these developments. During its initial period of bloom, Islam
developed a high level of intellectual life. It is well known how the Arabs
were the pioneers of scholarship and science in much of Asia, Africa and even
in Europe for four centuries. Islam wanted to rule all of life, not only the
religious but also the social, juridical and political aspects. The more
Muslims wanted to dominate a cultural sector, the stronger the impulse to work
out the consequences of Islam. Every principle of the Qur’an in all its
consequences and applications had to be thought through theologically,
politically and juridically. In this process, various differences of opinion
cropped up that had to be solved by way of debate and dialogue. Schools of
thought arose, one after the other, each offering its own perspective on life. 
Greek philosophy was translated and called in to help, so that it once again
became accessible, even for Europe. This access stimulated interest in
studying. First rate brilliant minds competed with each other for the highest
laurels. So it happened that, while Christian Europe hardly bestirred itself
at the level of scholarship, in the land of Islam a high level of scholarship
prevailed century after century, that even today demands the highest respect
and assured its domination over the minds of the peoples of Asia and Africa. 
The public opinion of the ruling classes, who by their higher development
controlled the spirit of the populace, leaned increasingly on Islam, while
Christians, bereft of their schools, sunk into obscurity and hung on to a tradition
that was no longer understood and thus marginalized.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p2">The Muslim
tradition, as much as it was able, constantly tried to attach schools to
mosques. From the beginning it was bent on spreading knowledge. Our pedagogy
is different from theirs. That of Islam concentrates on memory and on
imprinting strong conviction more than on developing your own thinking. The
influence of these primary schools and, especially, of their <i>madrasah</i> or
higher schools was most profound. Every degree of skepticism was excluded. 
Incised deeply, the mind received the imprint of the Islamic spirit so that,
because of the very strong development of the memory, what was received in
school stayed with them throughout life and controlled thought decisively. 
Muslims therefore were never at a loss when they confronted other opinions. 
They were saturated with what they advocated; their strong memory never
disappointed them when it came to arguing their convictions. Furthermore, that
conviction was simple in content. Over against Christians they always had the
argument ready at hand that the former actually placed a second god next to
Allah and thus by their own confession of Christ did violence to the purity of
Monotheism. They did not reject Jesus. In fact, they honoured Him above
Moses, but they did so in a manner purer and better than Christians, for Islam
freed their picture of Christ from all the dogmatic reconstructions with which
the falsification of the original Gospel had surrounded Him. This actually was
the same type of argument that causes so many people today to forsake their
confession of Christ. This was the thrust of the dominant public propaganda
that pulled public opinion with it in its wake and over against which
Christians were helpless.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p3">But there
was more to it. Especially the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo played an
important pioneering role. This grand institution at its zenith had up to
20,000 registered students and, even though it suffered a period of decline, is
currently once again the spiritual and scholarly centre for Islam. It was
founded in 975 AD by Djawhar al-Katib al-Sikilli in the city of Cairo that
itself had only recently been established by the Fatimids.<note n="30" id="iv.iv-p3.1">Gibb and
Kramers associate Djawhar with founding the Al-Azhar <i>Mosque</i> with which
the university is associated, not the university as such, p. 50.</note> The Fatimid <i>Khalifs,
</i>who rebelled against the <i>Khalifs</i> of Baghdad, were originally
Shi’ites and as such honoured Ali. They followed the rites of the Shafites,
not those of the school of the Hanifites. There was tension between the Baghdad
schools and them. In fact, the <i>Khalifs </i>of Baghdad pronounced them
heretics. This created the need for the Fatimids to establish their own centre
for scholarship. The University of Al-Azhar can trace its beginning to this
need. The Fatimids did all they could to lure the most famous Arab scholars
with high salaries and high prestige. It did not take long for the new school
to achieve a high reputation. Students from all over the Muslim world came to
Cairo to follow the lectures. In the endless disputes between Baghdad and Cairo
that continued for two centuries, Cairo usually had the last word.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p4">The first to
put an end to all this disunity in the bosom of Islam was Salah al-Din, more
commonly known as Saladin, after he conquered Egypt. He began by restoring
recognition of the authority of the <i>Khalifs</i> of Baghdad and joining the
Sunnis. However, not wanting the Egyptian scholars to oppose him, he decided
that the Shafites could stay, but that from that point on, the other recognized
Sunni schools of thought, namely the Hanifites, Malakites and Hanbalites,
should also be represented on the faculty, each enjoying complete freedom to
teach theology and jurisprudence in their own way. This only served to
increase the reputation of Al-Azhar. Now scholars from all the schools came to
curry the favour of the Egyptian ruler. And so it happened that from the time
of Saladin, Al-Azhar became the great centre of Islamic scholarship. Lectures
were offered in literature, theology and jurisprudence; sometimes also in
astronomy, mathematics and science.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p5">The Turkish
capture of Egypt closed the University’s first blossoming chapter. They were
characterized by a different spirit. In addition, their entry into Egypt
coincided with a natural turn of the tide in Arabic scholarship. This
scholarship had as good as reached its goals completely. In spite of much struggle
and in-fighting, the grammatical studies, as well as those in theology and
jurisprudence, had matured, resulting in research having come to a close. This
stage of scholarship was completed. Differences of opinion had disappeared. 
In each area a kind of common mind had been achieved so that from now on there
was no need for any further study, except to defend that which had already been
established or agreed upon. This snapped the resilience of Islamic scholarship
in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century and left her with nothing but a
bare, conservative character that it has retained till this day. But as the
authority of this conservative tradition preserved Islamic scholarship, so does
the Al-Azhar of today [1907] serve as a significant agent for the preservation
of Islam, more even than it did during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries,</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p6">The very
expansive building in which the lectures are presented is very close to the
graves of the <i>Khalifs </i> and borders on one of the first mosques of
Cairo. If the weather is suitable, and that is almost always the case in
Cairo, the lectures are held out in the open in an outside courtyard surrounded
by a porch with pillars. You will find no trace here of stiff scholastic
forms. Every lecturer surrounds himself in this open air space with whoever
wants to listen, while the students contribute to their own education by
fielding questions and comments. If they do not approve of the lecturer’s line
of reasoning, they will interrupt him so that he has to explain himself
further. Each of the four schools has at its head a sheikh or doctor, while
the entire school has a rector as head sheikh. During the days of Muhammad
Ali, this head sheikh would position himself as the <i>Sheikh-ul-Islam</i> to
compete with the <i>Khalif </i>of Constantinople in prestige. This rector is
practically always of the Shafite school, as a continuation of the old Fatimid
tradition. Only once, during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, did a Hanifite by
the name El-Mahdin El-Abassi occupy the position, but in 1887 he was again
succeeded by a Shafite.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p7">The rector,
sheiks and lecturers are all chosen by the entire academic corps. Only the
Hanifite who interrupted the line of Shafites was appointed by Viceroy Ishmael
Pacha. Foreigners are often given preference, because they will draw students
from their own country and thus help Al-Azhar to develop a more international
Islamic character. There is no entrance exam; anyone may follow the lectures. 
I even found little boys there and, what I had expected even less, there were
even a few little girls. These children learned reading, writing and Arabic
grammar and with that they are taught to memorize some of the easier chapters
of the Qur’an. This study, or, rather, memorization, and the ability to write
Qur’anic passages, continues throughout the entire initial period. After that,
they move on to the study of commentaries, logic, rhetoric, dialectic and of
the art of poetry. During the final period, time is devoted to the higher
studies of Islamic theology and jurisprudence. An average student requires
fifteen to sixteen years for this entire course of studies. If someone begins
at age six, he will have completed all these lower and higher studies at
twenty-two. Even then there are no final examinations, nor is there any
official declaration of graduation, but, on basis of all the courses he
followed, the graduate can claim the title “Sheikh.” By far the greatest
number break off their studies after they have completed the lower phase,
usually around age fourteen. Only those who have given evidence of superior
intelligence continue their studies at the higher level.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p8">It should be
noted that most foreigners enroll at a much later age. You find people there
thirty years of age and older. For example, I found a number of adult
Javanese, whom I invited to my hotel and with whom I had an interesting
discussion with the help of our consul as interpreter. They had gone to Mecca
and from there were sent on to Cairo, because of their special religious zeal
and their great intelligence. They had taken on prestigious names like
Muhammad and Omar and appeared rather pleased with themselves.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p9">The
University has a boarding facility that has rooms large enough for up to 40
students to live together, usually from the same area. Each student has a
locker. Once a year, needy students are given a free outfit. They can also
avail themselves of free, simple meals of dry bread and vegetables cooked in
water. There are always water carriers with their leather bags, walking around
for the thirsty. Order is preserved by security guards, burly men with
respect-inducing clubs. I observed a little rascal teasing a nearly-blind
female lecturer. (In Egypt some people are almost completely blinded by an
indigenous eye disease.) This lady had so memorized the Qur’an that she could
continue her teaching of the Qur’an. The only problem she had was to point to
the correct words with her fingers on the printed page. Now this rascal
thought it fun to push the page upward without her noticing it, so that she
pointed to the wrong line that said something else, while the boy laughingly
observed her. But it did not take long for a security man to notice. He gave
him a sharp blow and immediately ended this ignoble scene.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p10">The numerous
needy young men studying at Al-Azhar live off gifts and small earnings. The
old system of “<i>bettelstudent</i>” or beggar student still operates here. 
Quite a few students even work during the day as doorkeeper, load carrier,
peddler or clerk. During the evening they ask other students to inform them
about the day’s lectures.</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p11">Students
have vacation for three months, during which time they return home to raise
money, engage in small business and, wherever possible, spread knowledge about
the Qur’an or lead unbelievers to Islam. Thus it is that Islam, not just
recently but through the centuries, constantly, without letup and bit by bit,
proceeds with its mission work. To be sure, there are more wealthy Muslims who
devote their wealth to send missionaries to isolated regions, but this is not
where the great influence of Islamic mission is to be found. That influence
comes mostly through ordinary students, who during their travels and wanderings
ply their trades but quietly and unobtrusively win unbelievers for Islam,
especially in Pagan areas. The same process is at work in the Dutch Indonesian
Archipelago, where most people are slowly won for Islam by the same method. 
These former students of Al-Azhar remain zealots for their faith throughout
their lives and, totally on their own without any stipend, conduct their
propaganda in a quiet manner.<note n="31" id="iv.iv-p11.1">Most scholars
of the spread of Islam, including Westerners, attribute the spread of Islam
more to traders than to students. </note>
</p>

<p id="iv.iv-p12">In addition,
most <i>khadis</i> and imams graduate from Al-Azhar, as well as the fakirs, a
class of poor and often ascetic mendicants and dervishes, who are generally
hired by wealthy Muslims as governors or nannies to teach the children and to
lead in daily family prayers. By this arrangement the influence of this
University spread throughout the land and far beyond, while the sheikhs serve
governments with advice in all things religious. For example, recently they
published an extensive public declaration condemning the Mahdi in Sudan. 
Thanks to this prestigious religious authority of Al-Azhar, every itinerant
teacher-pupil who engages in mission comes with a letter of recommendation in hand.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="Additional Reasons for Christian Capitulation" prev="iv.iv" next="iv.vi" id="iv.v">
<h2 id="iv.v-p0.1">Additional Reasons for Christian Capitulation</h2>

<p id="iv.v-p1">Nevertheless,
even in this kind of mission, the main point of attraction Islam exudes lies in
the notion that when you join Islam, you will be taken up into the religious
aristocracy of this world. This is the ancient Jewish idea of the chosen
people that, shed by Islam of all its nationalistic baggage, morphed into the
notion of world supremacy. The entire world belongs to Islam and all those
converted to Islam have both the right and the calling to carry out this world
supremacy. Muslims have turned upside-down Jesus’ comment to Pilate, “My
kingdom is not of this world, otherwise my servants would fight.” Their
kingdom is of <i>this </i>world and they may [Translator: “must”?] fight over
it with the sword. This raises their self-image to a whole new and higher
level. By becoming Muslim, you are incorporated into the aristocracy, not
merely of a country, but of the entire world. This gratifies human pride and
especially works magic on the lower classes. As I have explained earlier, this
prominent feeling is by no means the least of the factors that have helped
Muslims triumph over collapsed and internally divided Christian communities.</p>

<p id="iv.v-p2">And then,
not to forget, Christians suppressed by non-Muslim regimes not infrequently
embraced the approaching Muslims as liberators. The Byzantine State Church
persecuted dissenting sects harshly and so these sects owed the regaining of
their freedom to the arrival of the Arabs. As the French Protestants cheered
the Revolution of 1779, because it delivered them from almost three centuries
of oppression by the Roman Catholic Church, so did the suppressed Christian
sects not infrequently welcome the Arabs as liberators and join them in common
cause.<note n="32" id="iv.v-p2.1">Such incidents
are widely attested to in T. W. Arnold’s tome, a book very popular with Muslims
till this day.</note></p>

<p id="iv.v-p3">Finally, medieval Europe experienced a deep sense of divine
judgment, even in its legal system. This was not like the kind of fatalism with
which Muslims accept temporary occupation of their territories by non-Muslims. 
Rather, it meant that in the struggle between Christianity and Islam, the
outcome seemed to prove that Muhammad was right and that his mission would
triumph over that of Jesus. You should keep in mind that changing religion was
nothing unusual in Asia or Egypt. Whenever a new ruler took over, he would
either recommend the idols of his home domain or force them on the subjugated
people. Usually they would meekly follow. People had become accustomed to such
transitions. If you now remember that Islam does not completely reject Christ
but honours Him above all prophets except Muhammad, then you can understand how
an exhausted Eastern Christian community could succumb more easily than would
Western Christians of 1907. After all the quarreling over scholastic dogmatic
questions into which the Christians of that time entrapped themselves, Islam
presented itself as a simple, sensually pleasing and steadfast religion. The
prayers were all prescribed. All behaviour in family and society was guided by
clearly defined laws. In spite of these laws, many questionable types of
behaviour were allowed to pass; there was freedom and latitude so that they
could continue to observe many marginal practices from their own traditions. 
The spider of Islam only gradually spun its web around the fly, but once the
fly was in its web, it would slowly be totally enveloped. That new spirit would
impress itself on his heart so that it would rule his entire life and he slowly
develop into a Muslim, heart and soul, bone and marrow.</p>

<p id="iv.v-p4">Nevertheless,
it remains a mystery how the higher Christian religion in all these countries
could give up so helplessly in such a short time that it was reduced to a mere
residue. But though under the rule of God this almost total disappearance of
the Eastern Church remains a dark spot, there are also a few light beams that
help us somewhat understand and that should temper our judgement over the lack
of faithfulness of those Christians. Their divisions broke their back; <i>the
mass conversions to Christ under the political influence of emperors was more
illusory than real </i>[italics by translator]; the superior power of Islam was
imposing; their social humiliation wore down all resistance; Islam pleased the
instincts of the sensual and lust for power; the superiority of Islam in its
high scholarly developments soon became nearly irresistible. Islam put itself
in line with the Christian tradition and replaced it with a form of religion
that was simple in its conceptions, gave solid norms for life and was
powerfully disseminated in nation after nation through the conviction of its
adherents. Even today (1907) we can observe in Africa and in our own Dutch
Archipelago of Indonesia how Islam, once it has entered a nation, tends to
spread spontaneously and gradually until it has captured the spirit of the
nation as a whole.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="Muslim Tenacity Versus Political Disintegration" prev="iv.v" next="iv.vii" id="iv.vi">
<h2 id="iv.vi-p0.1">Muslim Tenacity Versus Political Disintegration</h2>

<p id="iv.vi-p1">The tenacity
with which Islam has held its own for almost fourteen centuries and continues
to do so is just as important as the great speed with which it spread. The
period of its scholarly climax is past. Everything open to exploration and
conclusions was explored and concluded. It was the Sunnis, especially the
Hanifites among them, who managed to imprint their system and insights as <i>the</i>
orthodoxy on Islam to its fullest extent. Scholarship turned into defense of
tradition; their schools largely lost their earlier relevance; their art
collapsed-- but the spirit of Islam continued to govern the emotions with
undiminished fervor. Western unbelief penetrated the educated elite in the
cities. Their attending European schools and, no less critical, their visiting
Paris lead in many cases to a change in spirit. The Young Turks and the young
Egyptians even dream of a revolution that will separate state and religion.
They want to leave the religion of the people as is but reshape Government into
the mould of Western constitutionality. These modern concepts are a mere drop
of oil on the water. The ordinary masses of people have not changed and hold
tenaciously on to their tradition. In fact, it would take very little to have
the flame of the old fanaticism suddenly arise again. This happened repeatedly
during the last decades in Egypt, where the European influence was especially
advocated by Mehemet Ali.</p>

<p id="iv.vi-p2">Islam has
definitely weakened. As disunity once broke the back of Christians, so has it
also caused the radiance of Islam to grow pale. Even the Caliphate has split
time and again. And what especially attacked the nerve of Islam’s power is
that the unity of Islam as a ruling world power was broken. Islam was no longer
one single world power; ruler attacked ruler. To be sure, the Turks restored
that powerful unity for a considerable time. With the exception of Persia,
India and Central Asia, they managed to reunite almost all the Muslim people. Even
Eastern Europe was threatened with recapture. But after the battle of Lepanto
in 1571 this unity was once again broken up. Even though the Sultan of Turkey
commands a well disciplined army of more than half a million soldiers, after
Turkey lost marine supremacy, a process that started at Lepanto and was
completed at Navarino, the Sultan could no longer exert his authority beyond
his narrow borders. No power can maintain itself around the Mediterranean Sea
unless it controls that Sea itself. The Carthaginians perished when their navy
was defeated during the Punic Wars with Rome near Mylae and Ecnomus in 263-265
B.C., just as even earlier the Persians were defeated by the Greeks after the
battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. Again as the defeat of Antonius in 31 B.C. at
Actium led to his demise, so did defeat of the Turks at Lepanto and Navarino
lead to their downfall. The land route is simply too long to rule the distant
regions of such an empire. And since the United Kingdom became master of the
Mediterranean Sea after the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, the Sultan does not
have sufficient means to resist the pressure that is constantly exerted on him
and to which he must constantly succumb. Thereto must be added the
consideration that the Muslim is basically a warrior at heart and lacks the
capacity for effective administration. Conqueror by birth, he has been
deprived of the special qualities needed for civil administration. Even though
Islam always reserved its most capable for the higher positions, the Turkish
government depended mostly on the Greeks and Armenians and, in Egypt, on the
Coptics for financial and general administration as well as for the lower ranks
in diplomacy. These distorted relationships caused welfare to reduce, trade to
shrink and the country to be impoverished, so that financial crises presented
themselves repeatedly.</p>

<p id="iv.vi-p3">But none of
these developments could disturb the Muslim community in the depth of its soul.
Throughout the length and breadth of the entire Muslim world the spirit of the
people remained unflinched. Their entire territory everywhere is still fully
Muslim. In spite of its tolerance for national traditions, its patience with
the residue of previous religions, its recognition of native customary law, it
always remained faithful to Allah and His Prophet.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="The Contemporary State of Islam" prev="iv.vi" next="iv.viii" id="iv.vii">
<h2 id="iv.vii-p0.1">The Contemporary State of Islam</h2>

<p id="iv.vii-p1">The
population of Islamic regions has not greatly increased. Many wars have taken their
toll. Infant mortality was high. A variety of epidemics reaped tens of
thousands of souls. At one time, Sudan had a population of over eight million,
but because of the Mahdi war and a terrible measles epidemic, now (1907) has no
more than two million. Nevertheless, Wagner estimates the total Muslim world
population in the year 1900 to be no less than 245 million. That amounts to
15.4 percent of the total world population. This mass of people just sits
there as an unmovable block as Islam steadily spreads further in India, in
Indonesia and, especially, in Africa. Others present us with different
statistics. Exact figures are not really available. The lowest numbers
available give us 145 million for mainland Asia, 50 million for Africa, almost
12 million for Europe and almost 30 million for Indonesia and a few other
islands.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p2">Among all the
Muslim nations, Persia has adopted the most independent position but also the
most isolated one, by which it weakened the power of Islam rather than
strengthened it. Of its over nine million inhabitants, only two million belong
to the Sunni sect, while the remainder follow the Shi’ites. From the beginning,
Persia chose a hereditary monarchical government over against the democratic
ideals of the Arabs. Therefore, they rejected the elected Caliphs Abubakar,
Uthman and Omar and stood behind Ali, who should have succeeded Muhammad
according to hereditary rights. In fact, they pushed their support for Ali so
far that they attributed a divine incarnation to him, a notion that he himself
declined but that nevertheless took increasing root among them. By this break
with orthodox Islam, the high sense of nationalism that still characterizes
Persia maintained itself, while the Arian spirit, that never allowed itself to
be fully erased, sought to survive through philosophical contemplation and
pantheistic speculation. This was the reason for the rise of new sects, among
which some even replaced Muhammad with Ali. Not the least among these new
sects were the Sufis and, in the nineteenth century, the Baha’i faith, which
gained adherents in all circles. Voltaire’s spirit was also welcome in Persia,
as seen among the Baha’i. It led to increasing estrangement between the
official state religion and the spirit of the people. In some isolated areas
one still finds some Guebres or fire worshippers and in one remote corner a
remnant of the ancient Christian church, but the dominant atmosphere is
provided by philosophy and poetry. So little support for Islam can be expected
from Persia, that it is constantly at loggerheads with Turkey and tends to draw
more of its inspiration from Western Europe. In this sense, Islam never
conquered the Persian spirit so that the official Shi’a rule, even more today
than previously, exists more in name than in actuality.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p3">Five million
Muslims live in Aghanistan. In the cities, they speak mostly Farsi (Persian)
and are Shi’ites. But in the rural areas they hold on to their Afghani language
and consider themselves Sunnis, with the exception of the Shi’ite Khazars. 
However, this country is too much of a buffer state between British and Russian
interests to have any significance for Muslim power. Spiritual life hardly
exists there, while it is unable to follow an independent political agenda.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p4">Then we have at a still much lower level the country of
Balutchistan with less than a million inhabitants. They claim to be Sunni, but
they are so wild and uncivilized that they have as an expression, “Anyone who
has not murdered a neighbour and seduced his wife is not a real Baluchi.” It
hardly needs saying that this country carries no weight in the scale of Muslim
power.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p5">Persia
separates these lands too far from Turkey, while an alliance with India is too
difficult to motivate both Afghanistan and Balutchistan to do anything for
Islam beyond serving as an isolated and superfluous reserve. That especially
in Afghanistan the spirit of Islam still motivates a few individuals
powerfully, is demonstrated by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, whose attempts at
reformation at the University of Al-Azhar were even amenable to the movement of
Arabi Pasha. But such were totally isolated phenomena that had little
following among the people.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p6">The
situation is totally different when you cross the Himalayas into India, where
the Muslims are not less than 63 million in number and thus make the United
Kingdom, India’s colonial ruler, the largest Muslim power. Muslims first
entered India from Ghazni, an Afghani province, some three centuries after the <i>Hijira</i>,
i.e., around the year 1,000 A.D. They remained in the northwest without making
much progress initially. It was not till the middle of the seventeenth century
that Aurangzeb, one of the great Moghul kings, who did not hesitate to use
violence, exerted powerful propaganda and thus initiated the spread of Islam
over a wide area. The Hindu caste system favoured conversions. The oppressed
and despised untouchables were powerfully attracted to the position of equality
that Islam offered. This process is still going on. The greatest
concentration of Muslims is found in Punjabi. They also have a powerful
presence in a part of Bengal, that was split in two to please Muslims. The
rest live mainly in the coastal cities, where they maintain contact with Arab
marine traffic from across the water.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p7">The vast
majority of Indian Muslims are Sunnis of the Hanifite school. There is also
movement of sects from Persia, while the Hindus who convert to Islam continue
to cling to many features of their former religion. Still, on the whole,
Indian Islam is of an orthodox character. The Sultan of Turkey is acknowledged
as the legitimate head of Islam. The atmosphere is increasingly open to
mystical influences of the spiritual orders. Even in the area of scholarship
new life is beginning to stir among them. They surpass the Hindus in courage,
resilience and pride, while in the moral sphere they have shown themselves to
be carriers of a higher culture. Because of their growing numbers and
increasing influence, the British government increasingly favours them. All
indications are that Muslims in British India will assert themselves more than
they have in the past.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p8">At first
glance, the Islam of Indonesia appears to be of far greater significance in so
far as it has been adopted by almost the entire community, especially on the
main island of Java. The number of Muslims in Indonesia is about half of those
in India. On the island of Sumatra it is sharply delineated, but this is not
the case to the same degree on Java. Here much of the traditional religion
with its many traditions and local customs lives on in the shadow of the
crescent. The character of the Javanese is much less fanatic.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p9">During
recent years even here a more decisive tone has penetrated from Al-Azhar
University. Sometimes the pilgrimage to Mecca produces fanaticism. Arab
immigrants goad them into action. In these so-called dependencies, Muslim
propaganda goes on relentlessly but mostly under the radar. The Netherlands
government must thus keep a watchful eye on the situation, for the strength of
the more than 30 million Muslims who find their home in this Archipelago can be
ignored only at the expense of Dutch power.<note n="33" id="iv.vii-p9.1">I find it
striking that Kuyper seems to accept the colonial status without any qualms,
while my published critique of colonialism is the product of the Kuyperian
worldview (See J. Boer, 1979, throughout).</note>
Pan-Islam has its secret agents everywhere, while Constantinople is also
interested in every aspect of this island nation.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p10">The number
of Muslims under Russian control in southern Russia, the Caucasus and in
Central Asia is smaller but by no means insignificant. Statistical data put the
number of the combined adherents of Islam under the authority of the Czar at
well over seventeen million—eight million in Europe and the Caucasus, and a
good nine million in Central Asia. Quite a few have left the Caucasus for
Turkey, but the unique way in which Russia treats its Muslims soon put a stop
to this exodus. The government does not touch their religion. It grants them
every freedom to conduct their social life according to their own tradition. 
It operates a strong regime to maintain peace and order. It establishes schools
for Muslims and has even given them their own Sheikh-ul-Islam who, as their own
spiritual leader, keeps them from developing close relations with
Constantinople. The extreme manner in which the authority of the Czar was
originally established has cultivated resignation with respect to their
subjugation. While Russia continued in a state of war with its Jewish
population, it managed to establish complete supremacy over its Muslims,
especially after the destruction of the Tscherkessen people, so that there is
little to be concerned about from that side. Also the balance of the Slavic
colonization in Central Asia is changing so that the preponderance of Muslims
in those regions is gradually reducing.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p11">In China,
the number of Muslims is estimated at over twenty-three million. Some
authorities even estimate thirty-three million. They already started
penetrating here in the eighth century. It is said that <i>Khalif</i> Abu
Giefer sent 4000 Arabs to China to help the ruling dynasty against a rebellious
population.<note n="34" id="iv.vii-p11.1">Translator’s note: I could not find
anything about Khalif Abu Giefar to confirm this history. However, I did find
the following quote about the incident: “An Lu-shan, a favorite of Emperor
Hsuan Tsung, rebelled against the T'ang Dynasty. Of mixed Sogdian and Turkish
descent, the enormously fat An Lu-shan, a skilled military commander and
governor of three provinces, led an uprising in 755 after Hsuan Tsung abdicated
in favor of Su Tsung. When An Lu-shan captured and occupied Ch'ang-an, Su
Tsung, apparently influenced by the Muslim success at the Battle of Talas,
wrote to A-p'u ch'a-fo - rather a good rendition of the Arabic name of the
second Abbasid caliph Abu Ja'far al-Mansur - asking him to send troops to help
him recapture Ch'ang-an. The caliph responded by sending 4,000 men - who did
help Su Tsung retake the capital, but who also settled in China, took Chinese
wives and, in effect, established the first Muslim community in China” 
(Chinahistoryforum.com). </note> 
For this reason, the emperors have had special regard for Muslims and even
entrusted them with high posts and honours. The community increased by
marrying Chinese women and by buying up children, which they then would bring
up as Muslims.<note n="35" id="iv.vii-p11.2">These and
similar or parallel practices are still common among Muslims in various
countries even today in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. (J. Boer,  vol. 7,
2008, pp. 61-62, 155, 161-162.)</note> 
But it was exactly this privileged position of theirs, combined with their
excessive pride of character and sense of moral superiority, that tempted them
often to armed resistance. In the province of Yunnan and neighbouring areas
where they were greatest in number, a civil war broke out between them and the
indigenous Chinese in 1855 over a mine dispute that was squashed by imperial
troops with unprecedented cruelty. This was not altogether undeserved, for
Maheen, the leader of the rebels, boasted that he personally had killed no less
than a million Chinese! In 1877, a new rebellion broke out under Yakub Bey. 
This was repeated in Chinese Turkestan, while simultaneously numerous Muslims
joined the Boxers. However, the Chinese government managed every time to retain
control over their territories. Even though Muslims constitute little more than
five percent of the population and have adopted much of the dominant religion
and customs in order to find acceptance, they nevertheless represent a power
that must be taken into account in China. We will likely hear more about them
in the future.<note n="36" id="iv.vii-p11.3">Kuyper’s
prediction came true. A century later, during the very months this article is
being translated (July-September, 2009), the struggle has again revived and is
indeed again in the news. </note>
</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p12">Outside of
Russia and the Turkish Empire, the number of Muslims in Europe is negligible.
In Bosnia and Herzogovenia that are currently Austrian protectorates, as in
Bulgaria, Muslims are little more than half million strong. In addition, a
hundred thousand live in Romania, Greece, Servia and Montenegro. But even if
you add European Turkey to all this, this would give all of Europe, apart from
Russia, no more than three million. In European Turkey, the figure hardly
surpasses two million. But Turkey as a whole remains an Islamic superpower for
two reasons. First, it is the seat of the Sultan. Second, it is the only
independent power of considerable significance because of its extensive
territory, the size of its population and the availability of a significant
army. We may as well disregard the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan over
Egypt, but even then, taking everything together, including Tripoli, Turkey
still has a Muslim population of two million in Europe, controls well over
fourteen million in Asia and one and a quarter million in Africa. Put together,
a total of eighteen million along with a military force that, together with a
reserve, amounts to about one million. Of course, this is a low number
compared to the total figure of 245 million Muslims over the entire world, but
Turkey is and remains the historic continuation of the original Muslim world
power. The Islamic world as a whole wants the Sultan to continue to serve as
sovereign, but within Turkey the original power of the <i>Khalifate</i> has
been transferred to the Turkish Government, for it alone knew how to maintain
it all. This is the reason that almost all Muslims look upon Turkey as the
actual world centre for Islam. In almost every mosque prayers are offered for
the Sultan of Turkey. Even in Egypt the national party backs Turkey.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p13">However, new
pockets of resistance are constantly emerging from Arabia, usually from the
Wahabis, that receive their strength from the traditional Arab resentment of
the Mongols. But now that the railway line from Damascus to Medina is near
completion, the chances of the Sultan to retain control over this area by the
rapid transportation of troops are greatly increased. The difficulties always
arise from independent tribes in Arabia that even now still form a power of
over three million, but the main thing is that the Sultan will not allow Mecca
to slip out of his hands and that the Upper Sherif remains faithful to him. 
For this reason, the Turkish government strongly encourages the construction of
railways. It is very aware that nothing is more effective for the maintenance of
her supremacy over such a wide area. Whoever has access to well-trained troops
and an extensive railway system can easily retain control over such a wide
area, especially when the people are deeply divided and lack all national
cohesion, even if other conditions are unfavourable.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p14">It remains
to be seen whether the railway system will not cause an internal weakening of
Islam by encouraging the penetration of a foreign higher culture. At this
point, it can only be said that in Egypt, where the influence of Western
culture has penetrated the farthest, already since the time of Mehemet Ali, and
even more after the establishment of British rule, one detects few traces of a
radical change in the hearts of the people. In Algeria and Tunisia the
experience is the same. Morocco with its population of eight to nine million
people is totally independent in spirit. The Sultan there, who boasts of being
a descendant of Muhammad’s family, is an independent <i>Khalif</i> and has no
relations with Turkey as a political power or with the Sultan of Turkey. 
Nevertheless, this country remains Muslim through and through. The contempt
for death that the tribes from the interior exhibited against the French troops
around Casablanca demonstrated clearly that here also the spirit of Islam is
still capable of generating a fanatic defiance. The Islamic fire is far from
extinguished.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p15">Islam along
the coast of Africa and in its interior is, with the exception of Tripoli,
almost totally under European control. This is important on two counts. First,
because at the moment Islam exerts its strongest propaganda in Africa and,
second, the African continent is beginning to count more and more in world
affairs. Of its population of 170 million, almost 60 million have already
converted to Islam, among them the 24 million of the northern coastal states,
including Egypt, while the rest live in the interior and along the east coast. 
All the attempts since the sixteenth century to convert the Sub-Saharan Black
peoples to Christianity have failed, while Muslims, who penetrated deep into
the interior, succeeded to win one ethnic group after another without meeting
strong resistance anywhere.<note n="37" id="iv.vii-p15.1">Kuyper clearly
was not familiar with the situation in the region that the British turned into Northern Nigeria. Here Traditionalist ethnic groups throughout the nineteenth century
resisted this Muslim encroachment. Their resistance lost its force only under
British colonialists who, under the “Pax Britannica,” in many ways favoured
Islam at the expense of Traditionalists, one of the ways being the imposition
of Muslim emirs on Traditionalist-Christian tribes. What Muslims could not achieve
on their own during the nineteenth century was given to them on a silver
platter by the British during the twentieth. (J. H. Boer, 1979, pp. 71-74,
101, 141-143, 211-213, 500-506; 1984, pp. 60-63; 2004, vol. 3, pp. 86-88,
203-204, 214, 286-287; 2005, pp. 101-102; 2008, pp. 194, 286-287, Appendices
8-10--p. 422. </note> 
The Sahara and Sudan have as good as been won over; the propaganda among the
Bantu peoples from central Africa, the Zulus and other Black populations has
already been started with great energy. If it is not possible to stem this
tide by putting up a dam,<note n="38" id="iv.vii-p15.2">The idea of a
“mission wall” was, perhaps unbeknown to Kuyper, already close to a century
old. Allow me to cite a paragraph from my 1979 dissertation. “Already in the
1820s men began to dream about an ‘Apostle Street,’ a route that was yet to be
determined, along which would enter the King of Glory. A station was to be
established every 100 miles along the route for the spread of the Gospel. This
idea was adapted later by the German missionary Krapf, who devised a complete
plan for an east-west chain of stations. He envisioned a total distance of some
2700 miles that would be divided into sections of 300 miles, each with its own
station manned by four missionaries. The entire cost would be between L4,000
to L5,000 annually. The project was to be called the ‘Equatorial Mission
Chain’ and it was to be completed within a dozen years” (p. 101). </note>
then it can be foreseen that the day is coming that, with the exception of
Ethiopia, Madagascar and the British colonies in South Africa, this entire
continent will fall into the lap of Islam.<note n="39" id="iv.vii-p15.3">That was, in
fact, a consuming fear of the Western missionary movement of the day to the
point of it being a missionary crisis that was felt throughout the ecumenical
church. The milestone Edinburgh Missionary Conference of 1910 spoke of “the
most critical missionary problem in Africa” (J. H. Boer, 1979, pp. 101-102). 
Here Kuyper had his finger on the missionary pulse of his day. It is perhaps
unfair to have expected these missionaries and Kuyper to have foreseen the
tremendous explosion of the African church, especially since independence. 
Today, in Nigeria, the most populous African nation, Muslims find themselves
confronted with a Christian community equal in number, some 65 million of
each! There are entire African countries that consider themselves
“Christian.” </note> 
We should not lose sight of the fact that all these newly-won lands border on
each other, so that, if the above scenario is realized, eventually this entire
contiguous land mass from the Mediterranean to Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) with its
population close to 100 million, will belong to Islam. In Asia, Muslim groups
exist in isolated pockets among other large world religions. In Africa, to the
contrary, one huge mass of intermingled peoples will hold the banner of Islam
high. No matter how divided they may be among European colonies, they will
find their unity in Islam. Blacks once converted, regardless of their current
status, become brothers to the adherents of the religion to which they
convert. The enthusiasm displayed in the Sudanese Mahdi uprisings indicates
that Africa is susceptible to strong religious upheavals.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p16">There is no
need to make special mention about the small group of Muslims in Siam
(Thailand), Indochina and a few Portuguese and Spanish possessions. Their
total number probably does not exceed three million. What is important to
realize about the power of Islam is that of the 245 million Muslims more than
180 million are under European control; only 65 million are independent. Great
Britain leads the pack with 72 million. China is next with its 33 million,
after which follow The Netherlands with 30 million, France with 22 million and
Russia with 17 million. The statistics for the other European countries are
negligible: Germany, two and a half million; Italy, one and a half; the rest,
from half a million down to a few thousand. The largest groups of Muslims are
under European sovereignty—Great Britain, The Netherlands and France—and number
a total of 135 million and thus constitute more than half of the entire world
Muslim population.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p17">Leaving
aside its government, I doubt that the people of my own country, The
Netherlands, are conscious of this fact. They do not give much thought to
Islam. Certainly, the Dutch missionary movement is not sufficiently aware of
the kind of battle with which it needs to approach Islam. From the scholarship
point of view, we can hold our heads high. We have several missionaries of
international repute, such as Veth, Dozy, De Goeje, Snouck Hurgronje and
Houtsma, but our people do not pay attention and fail to sense the significance
of the problem with which Islam confronts little The Netherlands. Hence the
Dutch missionary thrust in Indonesia lacks the necessary persistence and the
specific kind of approach that is necessary for all missions to Islam.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p18">From the
above data about the distribution of Muslim power in Asia and Africa, it is
clear that Islam does not constitute a serious political challenge. Islam,
more than any other worldview, demands unity of spiritual and political power,
but only one quarter of the total Muslim community in the world live under
Muslim sovereignty. Turkey is supposed to represent the unified power of
Islam, but the Sultan has only a little over 18 million subjects that probably
cannot all be considered Muslims. That is such a tiny fraction of the whole
that the unity of spiritual and political power really does not exist
anywhere. When only a quarter of all Muslims live under Muslim sovereignty and
even that one quarter is so bitterly divided that the power of the Sultan
extends to little over one third of that one quarter, Islam is not only doomed
as a political power but is also undermined in its foundations. <i>Islam
requires that Muslims rule other nations. That, in fact, is their privilege
and calling. But they themselves may not be subjected to foreign rule. Where
the latter does happen, Muslims will patiently accept the situation
temporarily, but deep in its soul Islam will eventually come to resist it and
constantly look forward to the glorious day that it will regain its freedom and
restore its own sovereignty.<note n="40" id="iv.vii-p18.1">Italics by
translator. Translator’s note: Wanting to rule over other nations is, of
course, not unique to Muslims. It is called imperialism, a disease that has
long afflicted the West as well. Much of the religious, political and cultural
revival of Islam at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is in reaction to
Western imperialism over them. Kuyper foresaw this scenario already in his own
day. </note></i>
Islam depends for such a turn of events on supernatural help, because it fully
realizes its military weakness. Even Turkey, in the absence of a navy, is in
no position to buttress its claims with any authority. Everywhere, Muslims
have had the painful experience that their fierce heroism and fanatic devotion
are no match for modern European weaponry.</p>

<p id="iv.vii-p19">Pan-Islam
was born out of this awareness of Muslim political and military powerlessness,
combined with their unimpaired faith and relentless heroism. Every now and
then some independent Mahdi would attempt to hasten that day of victory, but,
while these morning stars would emerge with sudden speed, they would invariably
with equal speed sink back into oblivion. The consciousness that this Mahdi
route was not the way to restore the prestige of Islam grew deeper and deeper.
Islam became powerless through its scattered constellation; only the revival of
spiritual unity could promise better days.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="Pan-Islam, Spiritual Orders and Revivalism" prev="iv.vii" next="iv.ix" id="iv.viii">
<h2 id="iv.viii-p0.1">Pan-Islam, Spiritual Orders and Revivalism</h2>

<p id="iv.viii-p1">That
spiritual unity was still a potent factor. The Shi’ites counted few adherents,
while other smaller sects were of no significance, but the large majority still
stood firm in the orthodoxy of the Sunni faith. Even the struggle between the
four major schools was basically decided in favour of the Hanifites almost
everywhere. This spiritual unity was a reality. It only needed to be re-energized
with new life to revive the <i>consciousness</i> of unity.</p>

<p id="iv.viii-p2">This task
was taken on by the spiritual orders. As their adherents gradually increased
in number, they impressed the masses with their superior morality. Islam
provided them with fixed forms for living and for communal worship, forms that
were observed almost everywhere. However, these forms were too external, did
not touch the heart, and could not inspire them enough. It was the spiritual
orders that were to cultivate this spirituality of the heart. They spread
their tentacles in short time throughout the Muslim community.</p>

<p id="iv.viii-p3">Initially,
the Turkish Government did not favour this movement. She saw danger lurking in
the attempt to replace the unity provided by the Turkish regime with another higher
type of unity. The Muftis and Ulama also were jealous of a movement that
threatened to supercede the external worship service by a deeper spiritual
disposition, whose source was to be found not in the mosque but in the
monastery. This opposition had its parallel in the Christian Church where the
established clergy resisted free mystical fellowships. However, over time the
opposition petered out. The Sultan correctly observed that, provided his
spiritual Caliphate was left untouched, eventually the fruit of this movement
would fall into his lap. The plan of the reforming party to appoint the Sherif
of Mecca pope of Islam would undermine the Sultan’s authority, but this new
movement of spiritual orders worked in his favour. Hence, he eventually gave it
his blessing.</p>

<p id="iv.viii-p4"> Attempts
to equate this Pan-Islam movement with the Pan-Slavic and Pan-German movements
are definitely misguided. These latter movements derive their strength from a
racial base and are associated with nationalism. Pan-Islam, on the other hand,
is based exclusively on the religious motif. Every time Muslims play the
racist card, as happened between the Turks and Arabs, Islam loses terrain, for
such issues are not core to Islam.<note n="41" id="iv.viii-p4.1">Translator’s
note: There are plenty more examples of Muslim racism. In Mauritania, the relations between Berbers and Blacks are bedeviled by racism. When I talk to North
African and Asian Muslims about Nigerian Muslims, they invariably shrug their
shoulders with indifference for their Black Nigerian counterparts. In Nigeria itself racism is rife between the northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani and their
neighbours. As in Christianity, the standard is one thing; the practice,
another.</note> 
Outside of Persia and Egypt, Islam has no nationalist impulses and even in
Arabia, where such movements constantly arise, it is always based on the primacy
of the spiritual. Arab Islam, more than any other, is regarded by Arabs as
their own. They especially long for Islam in its original purity and they are
deeply troubled by the fact that a Mongul tribe has taken over the Caliphate. 
But even though nationalism plays a role here, the spiritual factor provides
even here the <i>leitmotif</i>. In Arabia the Crescent comes first and only
after the Arab banner. <i>Pan-Islam found its origin in the painful manner
in which the great powers of Christian Europe imposed their superior power upon
the Muslim states and tribes.<note n="42" id="iv.viii-p4.2">Italics by
translator. Translator’s note: A century later, the same dynamic is
still/again at work. Would that the West would recognize the effects of its own
secular, religious and imperialistic provocation of Islam through the centuries
as an important factor in the current tension between Islam and the West. And
then, of course, factor this into their response to the challenge they are
facing. It does not appear that Kuyper took this second step. He merely
observed the first. </note></i> 
An awareness arose that all of Islam was endangered, that its disunity, its
dampened and petrified faith, condemned Islam to powerlessness.</p>

<p id="iv.viii-p5">It was high
time for Islam to pursue three things if it were to maintain any position of
power at all. First, the band of unity of all who raise the Crescent high had
to be restored. Secondly, Islam had to be purified of all the foreign
accretions that had crept in. Thirdly, the withered faith must be re-animated
with a fresh enthusiasm. That this three-fold urgency was indeed the badly
needed response to the situation on the ground was demonstrated by the surprising
speed with which Pan-Islam took hold. Already it had its interpreters and
supporters throughout the Muslim world, from Hyderabad in Pakistan to Tangier
and Fes in Morocco. It was as if Muslims had been waiting for just such a
movement and as if the sun of Pan-Islam had only to rise over the horizon for
them to embrace it with enthusiasm. It had more the dynamics of a sudden fire
than of the organization of an artificial movement. Yet, it did not lack all
organization, even though some scholars attributed disproportionate weight to
it. Abu Al-Huda, a sheikh of the Rafai order,* leads the movement from
Constantinople, while the Great Sherif of Mecca, a member of this powerful
order, has the consummate skills to utilize the pilgrimage to the Ka’aba as propaganda
for this communal movement. It has even succeeded to unite different orders
under a degree of administrative unity through the person of Sheikh El-Troeg.*
Under the powerful leadership of this administrator, throngs of missionaries
penetrated Asia and Africa to declare an Islamic revival. Sheikh Jafer, head
of the Tripoli-based Madaniya order, has a powerful influence as court chaplain
to the Sultan, and leads the movement in North Africa. This artificial
dispersion of Pan-Islam is by no means insignificant, but it would be far too
weak to reach its goal if the general consciousness of a European threat were
not found in all Muslim countries. It is only out of necessity that Islam
tolerates foreign domination, especially now that even the land of the Sultan
is losing province after province and the Sultan himself has to submit
constantly in his own country to the demands of Western powers. In the
meantime, resentment builds up and people ask themselves whether Islam with its
more than fifteen percent of the population of the world, should not be able to
muster the power to put an end to this foreign oppression. Politically
speaking, the goal of Pan-Islam is undoubtedly the return of all Muslims under
the rule of the Sultan, but this goal is only the last step on a long journey.</p>

<p id="iv.viii-p6">For the
moment, the main agenda is two-fold. First, Islam must purify itself from the
accretions it has absorbed from the earlier religions of the people it has
absorbed. Secondly, it must raise the general awareness that all who live under
the Crescent must wake up and work towards unification in preparation for a new
gigantic struggle. Often the movement expresses itself in minor explosions of
fanaticism, but these are suppressed too quickly to make a lasting impression.
It is realized that this phase of the action must first be completed with
limitless patience and spiritual tenacity, if the end goal is ever to be
reached. That is why there is a heavy emphasis on sending out agents, on the
distribution of literature and the continuation of the ongoing triumphal march
among Africa’s Blacks.</p>

<p id="iv.viii-p7"> Undoubtedly,
this never-ceasing propaganda has already considerably strengthened the
position of Islam. The foreign rulers in India and Pakistan, in Indonesia and
Africa are forced increasingly to take the sensitivities of Islam into
consideration. Sirdar Kitchener was even forced to strongly forbid all
Christian mission activities in Egyptian Sudan.<note n="43" id="iv.viii-p7.1">Translator’s
note: The same prohibition was put into effect by the British in the
Muslim-dominated areas of Northern Nigeria. J. Boer, 1979, p. 69; 2004, p. 19;
2007, pp. 58-59, 61. </note> In India and
Pakistan the British Viceroy tried to make more and more contact with Muslims. 
The French Government in Tunis approached Islam very differently from what it
did earlier in Algeria. In Egypt the British tried to avoid anything that
might annoy Muslims.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="Muslim Reactions towards the West and Missions" prev="iv.viii" next="iv.x" id="iv.ix">
<h2 id="iv.ix-p0.1">Muslim Reactions towards the West and Missions</h2>

<p id="iv.ix-p1">At the
beginning of this document I described the high speed with which Islam had not
only established its military superiority in Asia and Africa, but also
succeeded in capturing the hearts of the people into the net of Islam. This
still portrays the power over the spirit that emanates from Islam. And if we
remember that Pan-Islam succeeded in inspiring its 245 million adherents with
this ancient religious zealotry, then it is impossible to predict what power
can emanate from it in the future. It is not as if the military superiority of
Western powers would not be able to crush all forms of resistance, but this
would only be due to technical power. Military superiority does not break
spiritual resistance, but, rather, tends to strengthen it. Neither must we put
much hope in the widespread expectation that our higher culture will eventually
tame the spirit of Islam. Muslim populations are very adept at profiting from
the fruits of our higher civilization that we introduce or from the
improvements in administration and judiciary that lead to the elevated welfare
of the nations, but this is all external to the heart. Furthermore, these
developments only serve to tempt a small group to fall away, become indifferent
to the faith and replace it with atheism. But this does not touch the masses. 
They continue in their unchanging traditional life and remain Muslim in their
hearts. And even among the elite the motto, “For Muhammad and against Christ,”
retains its attraction.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p2">In another
chapter in this series of mine I told the story of a highly placed and fully
modernized woman who declared she would thoroughly enjoy beheading all
Christian missionaries. I now add the story of a highly regarded man who could
hardly pass a British sentry without feeling a deep desire welling up to wring
his neck with his own hands. With our railways, our irrigation systems, our
advanced administration and our industrial enterprises we can improve the
economic situation of Muslim countries, but we do not win over the people with
such improvements. Muslims everywhere to a man will bless the day they see us
leave and they are searching for ways to make this happen.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p3"> There
is only <i>one</i> means to win over the people, namely if we could get the
masses motivated to trade in their religion for Christianity, but for this
there is not a chance. Since long, Christian missions have concentrated their
efforts on toughest of all countries, namely those of the Sultan. First, the
French. After them, the Italians and the Greeks. Still later, British and
American missions competed with each other for the crown of victory with
unusual resilience and warm zeal for the faith, but the only fruit they could
show for their efforts consists exclusively of encouraging the Christian
remnants still found in scattered places in Turkey. Without these extensive
missionary efforts, these remnants would most likely have been wholly absorbed
into Islam. Now, however, they do not only still exist, thanks to their
expansive school systems, but they have been upgraded to a new level of
Christian life. But everywhere the number of converts from Islam were few and,
when placed in the context of the entire nation, hardly worthy of mention. 
They did lure Muslim youth to their schools and the Muslim sick to their hospitals. 
They also contributed to the development of the community, but they could not
win the hearts of the people anywhere.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p4">Similarly,
in Dutch Indonesia, where Islam has a much more superficial character, all
missions testify to the extreme difficulty of changing the hearts of the
people. I leave aside the question whether missions understood the people
adequately or whether they had the requisite skills. Dutch missionaries treated
the indigenous Indonesian Christian missionary, Kyai Sadrach, who preached a
unique kind of Javanese Christianity, with great impatience. While admitting
that missions have made serious mistakes, the result of their work in Muslim
countries is so disappointing and painfully sad, that only self-deceit can
still harbour hope that there is a chance for the conversion of Muslims on a
large scale.<note n="44" id="iv.ix-p4.1">Translator’s
note: Nigeria always seems different from most other nations. Kuyper would
have been surprised at the great number of Muslim converts to Christ in Nigeria during the last half of the twentieth century. I personally know many of them. The
churches there have every reason for optimism in this regard. Some Christian
leaders, including the late Haruna Dandaura, who was highly respected by Muslim
leaders, claim that the number of Northern converts runs into the millions (J.
Boer, 2008, pp. 179-182).</note> 
Rather, we must acknowledge that the Pan-Islamic revival has further
considerably reduced the chances of Christian victory among Muslims. 
Certainly, during the last half century in Dutch Indonesia, Islam has gained
many more converts from the Traditionalist tribes on Java and a few other
islands than have Christians.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p5">This is the
experience of missions everywhere. For the Muslim to convert to Christianity
is from their point of view to descend to a lower level. Islam came <i>after</i>
Christ. Islam has a later and higher revelation. Who wants to go back from
the latest and highest to an earlier and lower? A convert from Islam is a
traitor in the eyes of Muslims. As far as Muslims are concerned, such a person
has died morally and the entire Muslim neighbourhood works together towards his
reversion under the weight of contempt and of social deprivation.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p6"> Added
to the above is the problem that we tend to bring Christianity to the East in
an almost exclusively Western format, while the Easterner, not feeling
comfortable with that format, is much more attracted to the Eastern format of
Islam. Islam with its Eastern format is better oriented to his needs and
speaks to him, while Christianity with its Western format feels repugnant. The
end result is that Christian missions usually plow on rocks and gain very few
people, while Islam continues its victorious march in both Indonesia and
Africa. Islam hardly loses any people, except in Persia, where it is weakened
by internal instability. But as a world power, Islam continues to grow
steadily. Even during the centuries of its cultural heyday, the number of
Muslims was smaller than it is now. Sometimes Islam exerts such an
irresistible charm or temptation to baptized Christians, that we repeatedly
hear of Christians who have denied the Cross and converted to Islam.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p7"> Islam
flatters the tendency in the human heart to pride and sensuousness. It is
clear, simple and easily understood in its major lines and fixed forms. It not
only shapes your religious life, but also governs the totality of the rest of
your life. It is capable of adapting itself to a wide range of circumstances. 
It allows a high degree of freedom of movement.<note n="45" id="iv.ix-p7.1">This claim may
surprise readers of the 21st century who are accustomed to hearing or reading
the media about rigid Muslim arguments regarding a strict sharia, strict
fashions, strict everything. Kuyper observed Islam during a more relaxed
period, when it was more its normal self. It is in the current crisis that
everything grey has been turned into black and white and everything fluid into
rigid forms. </note> During its
first cycle, Islam proved amenable to high scholarly development and had at its
disposal a very rich body of literature. To the eye of the fanatic it holds up
a sparkling ideal of might and greatness that can still inflame the deepest
passions. So I have no more expectation from Christian subjugation of Islam
than I do from the technical and economic aspects of the West. Even now the
wheels are in motion to develop a higher culture in India that will match the
highest cultural developments of Christian Europe.</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p8">I am fully
aware that it is emotionally very hard for us Christians to acknowledge this
development. Even if Islam endlessly echoes the call to Allah, the
All-Merciful and the All-Compassionate, in its mosques and from its minarets,
this call does not emerge from a deep consciousness of sin or from a thirst for
reconciliation. Allah is and remains for Muslims a mighty Sovereign who
regards His faithful servants with grace and favour. But Islam does not know
of a Father in heaven who comes to His children with the invitation to be
reconciled to Him. In Islam, the Almighty exercises mercy, but there is no
Holy One who overcomes our internal separation through reconciliation.
Therefore the ideal of a Holy Loving God <i>must</i> be totally lacking, even
in Allah Himself.<note n="46" id="iv.ix-p8.1">To make such
absolute claims about another religion is very dangerous. My extensive reading
of and research in Nigerian Muslim literature has made me very cautious not to
make absolutist claims or denials about the Muslim experience of Allah on basis
of logical conclusions from Muslim doctrine. The following paragraphs are
similarly weakened by absolutist claims. Whenever Muslims draw logical
conclusions from some Christian doctrine, I never recognize myself in their
conclusion, for it is usually based on a distorted or partial version of a
doctrine taken out of context. Do Christians understand Islam more than the
other way around? Are they not liable to similar errors? At the very least,
we should usually avoid words like “all,” “every,” “never,” “always” and
“totally” when talking about other religions, especially in critical

comments. </note> 
</p>

<p id="iv.ix-p9">Thus, we
must accept the fact that this mighty group of Muslims that stretches all the
way across Asia and Africa, blocks the way of Christianity and of our higher
culture. Islam itself represents a culture that is much higher than the Paganism
it replaced and that did indeed develop a higher culture from the seventh to
thirteenth centuries. However, today it has consolidated its achievements at
an intermediary level that resists every attempt to climb to higher ideals.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="Muslim Morality" prev="iv.ix" next="iv.xi" id="iv.x">
<h2 id="iv.x-p0.1">Muslim Morality</h2>

<p id="iv.x-p1">Islam is a
religion for men; women look in from the outside. In contrast to France, where
church attendance consists almost exclusively of women, in Islam, women hardly
play any role in their worship services. Islam totally lacks female input to
social life and culture. Isabelle Bird-Bishop had the opportunity to penetrate
deeply into the life of Muslim women. She witnessed the indescribable in the
presence of young harem girls. She could only comment that it would be
impossible for anything more demonic, dirty and demeaning to be called up in
the polluted imagination of a sick man than was displayed before the eyes of
women and young girls or said in their presence. Another lady, Mrs. Stanley
Pool-Lane, testifies that during the course of succeeding generations, life in
harems gradually sank so low that it would be impossible to sink to a lower
level of brutality and animalism.<note n="47" id="iv.x-p1.1">Today, in the
21<sup>st</sup> century, Muslims contemptuously dismiss primitive Western
displays of nudity, scant clothing, every form of bestial sex, with
prostitution presented as a respectable occupation. Sometimes they identify
such sub-human practices with Christianity, a link Christians would strongly
reject. Faithful Muslims similarly reject such links and regard such practices
as un-Islamic. It is not acceptable to compare the best of one religion with
the worst practices of adherents of another. </note> 
</p>

<p id="iv.x-p2">Undoubtedly,
this almost exclusively male character gives Islam its strength. It enables
Islam to retain its position in higher circles. But the total lack of female
influence means Islam is bereft of that tenderness and warmth that women
contribute so generously to the Christian religion. The Muslim, according to
ancient Bedouin tradition, is hospitable and protective of strangers. He is
famous for his charitable treatment of the poor. However, Tenney, in his
recent book <i>Contrasts of Social Progress</i>, comments that everything done
in Constantinople for the poor and needy, through voluntary gifts and
foundations, is not even close to one tenth of the philanthropy practiced in
London. The Muslim is honest in his commerce and traffic and shines here
compared to Greeks and Armenians, not to speak of Asian Jews, but this honesty
is rooted more in his pride than in his moral standard. Provided extremes are
avoided, Muslim ethics makes light of moderate levels of evil. That is
expressed in so many words in Surah 4, where we are told that Allah does not
demand too much from us, for He knows that we are weak. If we keep ourselves from
committing the offences that are explicitly forbidden, He will overlook your
wrongs and ensure your entry into Paradise. These sentiments appear to be
borrowed from the Old Testament, but they are distorted by nomism with its
rough attack on the ethical ideal. A culture based on such a low ethical
foundation cannot possibly develop beyond a mediocre level. Islam has risen a
few rungs up the ethical ladder, but then remained at that level and could make
no further progress. And even though this mediocre culture is often disguised
in European dress to appeal to the higher classes, in their hearts and in their
worldview the spirituality inherent to Islam maintains its control. All
progressive development is cut off. Occasionally, puritan movements arise that
protest against this legalistic deviation from the Qur’an, but even these
revivals never aim higher than a return to the ethical standards of the
Qur’an.</p>
</div2>

<div2 title="A Prognosis" prev="iv.x" next="v" id="iv.xi">
<h2 id="iv.xi-p0.1">A Prognosis</h2>

<p id="iv.xi-p1">The fact is
that Islam’s <i>political</i> power has been undermined by European superiority.
There are no signs of change in this regard. However, Islam fully maintains its
<i>spiritual</i> power and resists all attempts at change at this front. To
the contrary, it gained consciously in its dynamic energy and, thanks to the
movement of Pan-Islam, even enjoys gradual expansion. Due to its method of
peaceful penetration, Islam is left undisturbed to itself, precisely because it
is realized that internally it is unconquerable. A declaration of holy war or <i>jihad</i>
could cause a simultaneous bloodbath in different places, but it would not be
able to return world sovereignty to Islam. <i>But even if Islam for the time
being has no chance for world dominion, it will never let go of this ideal. 
The earthly character of this ideal has put its stamp on all its adherents<note n="48" id="iv.xi-p1.1">Italics by
translator. </note></i> that
can never rise above its contradiction with our culture that is marked by a
heavenly ideal. This core contradiction also blocks any attempt at fusing the
two into a higher unity. Islam will either remain as it is or it will cease to
exist. That it has been able to maintain itself with such tenacity for over
thirteen centuries in spite of unfavourable times, is a testimony to its inner
dynamic that still moves it. The Crescent is far from its demise. As long as
it retains its successful rule over the hearts of its mass of 245 million
people, it will be a bad mistake for anyone to dismiss Islam as a negligible
factor. As in the past, Islam retains its strong position of power, especially
in Africa, but even Europe cannot afford to ignore it. Do not forget the
following remarkable contrast. <i>The millions of Christians who came under
the rule of the Sultan during the seventh and eighth centuries, have almost all
converted to Islam. To the contrary, Muslims who currently are ruled by Christian
powers have fully persevered in their faith.<note n="49" id="iv.xi-p1.2">Italics by
translator. </note> 
</i></p>

<p id="iv.xi-p2">(December 24, 1907)</p>
</div2>
</div1>

<div1 title="Bibliography" prev="iv.xi" next="toc" id="v">
<h1 id="v-p0.1">BIBLIOGRAPHY<note n="50" id="v-p0.2">The footnotes
and this bibliography are Boer’s, not Kuyper’s. </note></h1>

<p style="line-height:150%" id="v-p1"> </p>

<p style="line-height:150%" id="v-p2">Ali, Abdullah Y. <i>The Meaning of
the Holy Qur’an. </i>New Delhi: Millat Book Centre, 2003.</p>

<p id="v-p3">Arnold, T. W. <i>The Preaching of Islam: A History of the
Propagation of the Muslim Faith. </i></p>

<p style="text-indent:.5in" id="v-p4">London: Constable, 1913.</p>

<p id="v-p5"> </p>

<p id="v-p6">Balkenende, J. P. “Speech
by Prime Minister J.-P. Balkenende on the Occasion of the Unveiling</p>

<p id="v-p7">of the Statue of Abraham
Kuyper in the Town of Maassluis on 5 November, 2008.” Princeton
Theological Seminary, Abraham Kuyper Center for Public Theology, <i>The Kuyper Center Review, </i>Vol. 1, 2010.</p>

<p style="text-indent:.5in" id="v-p8"> </p>

<p id="v-p9">Boer, Jan H. <i>Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a
Colonial Context: A Case Study of </i></p>

<p id="v-p10"><i>the Sudan United Mission. </i>Amsterdam Studies in
Theology, volume 1. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979.</p>

<p id="v-p11"> </p>

<p id="v-p12">-------. <i>Missions: Heralds of Capitalism or Christ. </i>Ibadan: Daystar Press, 1984.</p>

<p id="v-p13"> </p>

<p id="v-p14">-------. <i>Caught in the Middle: Christians in
Transnational Corporations.</i> Jos, Nigeria:</p>

<p style="text-indent:.5in" id="v-p15">Institute of Church and Society,
1992.</p>

<p id="v-p16" />

<p id="v-p17">-------. <i>Studies in Christian-Muslim Relations.</i>
Vols. 1-8. Belleville, Ontario: Essence</p>

<p style="text-indent:.5in" id="v-p18">Publishing, 2003-2009. Jos, Nigeria: More Books. See <a href="http://www.lulu.com/" id="v-p18.1">www.lulu.com</a> for e-book
format.</p>

<p id="v-p19"> </p>

<p id="v-p20">-------. Website &amp;lt; <a href="http://www.socialtheology.com/" id="v-p20.1">www.SocialTheology.com</a> &amp;gt;</p>

<p id="v-p21"> </p>

<p id="v-p22">Gibb, H. and Kramers. J, <i>Shorter Encyclopaedia of
Islam. </i>Leiden: Brill, 1961.</p>

<p id="v-p23"> </p>

<p id="v-p24">Kuyper, Abraham. <i>Christianity and the Class Struggle. </i>Trans.
Dirk Jellema. Grand</p>

<p id="v-p25">Rapids: Piet Hein Publishers, 1950. A newer translation
edited by James W. Skillen. <i>The Problem of Poverty.</i> Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1991.</p>

<p id="v-p26"> </p>

<p id="v-p27">-------. <i>You Can Do Greater Things than Christ</i>.
Trans.and ed., Jan H. Boer. Jos, Nigeria:</p>

<p id="v-p28">Institute of Church and Society, 1993. Also available on
CD-Rom from J. Boer at &amp;lt; <a href="mailto:boerjf@hotmail.com" id="v-p28.1">boerjf@hotmail.com</a>
&amp;gt;.</p>

<p id="v-p29"> </p>

<p id="v-p30">Schulte Nordholt, J. W. “Abraham Kuyper schreef zeker zo
aardig over de Oude Wereldzee.”</p>

<p style="text-indent:.5in" id="v-p31"><i>Trouw</i>, July 8, 1994.</p>

<p id="v-p32"> </p>

<p id="v-p33">Ten Napel, Hans-Martien. “Multicultural Democracy.” <i>REC
Focus, </i>July, 2006, pp. 89-103.</p>

<p style="text-indent:.5in" id="v-p34">Also in Boer, Jan H., 2009, p . 82,
Appendix 76 (on <i>Companion CD</i>).</p>

<p id="v-p35">Wolterstorff, Nicholas. <i>Until Justice and Peace Embrace:
The Kuyper Lectures for 1981 </i></p>

<p id="v-p36"><i>delivered at the Free University of Amsterdam. </i>Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983.</p>

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