§ 2. Meaning of the terms, Natural and Revealed

By Theology we understand, according to the etymology of the term, the knowledge of doctrine of God and of divine things [1]. Such a knowledge we gain, partly in a natural way, by the use of reason alone, partly in a supernatural way, by special revelation; and hence Theology is divided into Natural and Revealed. [2] In both cases, however, Theology is not a mere outward knowledge, by which the understanding alone is enriched, but is of such a nature as to make man truly wise, and show him the way to be saved; hence Theology, strictly so-called, must be defined: “Eminently practical wisdom, teaching from the revealed Word of God all things which sinful man, who is to be saved, needs to know and to do, in order to attain true faith in Christ and holiness of life.”[3] (HOLL.1.) If however, we leave out of view the influence which Theology exerts upon man, and consider only its subject-matter, Theology may be defined as the doctrine concerning God and all religious truths, the province of which is to instruct men concerning the means by which they may be saved. “Theology, viewed as a system and in a secondary sense, is the doctrine concerning God, which teaches man, from the divine Word, as to the true method of worshiping God in Christ, unto eternal life.”(HOLL.7.)[4]

[1] QUEN. (I, 1); “Theology, if you consider the force and usage of the word is nothing else than λογος περι του θεον, what is said about God and divine things, as πνευματολογια is what is said about spirits, and αστρολογια, what is said about the stars.”

The word is sometimes employed in a wider and sometimes in a narrower sense. The different significations are thus stated by HOLL. (3): “The word Theology is employed in a fourfold sense; (a) most comprehensively, for every doctrine concerning God, whether true or mixed with errors; (b) comprehensively, for true Theology, either in itself considered, or as communicated; either of men on earth or of saints in heaven; either natural or revealed; (c) specially, of revealed Theology, that guides mortal man to eternal life; (d) most specifically, of the doctrine concerning the one and triune God.”

In all these significations, reference is had merely to the Theology of the creature, i.e., to the knowledge which creatures have of God, and not to that which God has of Himself. Theologians distinguish also between these, and call the former theologia εκτυπος (derived Theology), and the latter theologia αρχετυπος (original Theology), by which they mean to say that our knowledge of God, although derived and not original, is, nevertheless, absolutely correct, because derived from God, and only the faithful copy of His own knowledge. HOLL. (3 and 4): “Archtypal Theology is the knowledge which God has of Himself, and which in Him is the model of another Theology, which is communicated to intelligent creatures. Ectypal Theology is the science of God and divine things communicated to intelligent creatures by God, after His own Theology, as a pattern. We thus prove our assertion: (1.) Man was made complete, in the image of God. But the image of God consisted in a knowledge of God conformed to the divine wisdom. Therefore its archetype was the infinite wisdom of God. (2.) Fallen man “is renewed in knowledge after the image of God,” Col. 3:10. Therefore his prototype is the divine self-knowledge. For the knowledge of God and of divine things, which divine revelation communicates to the minds of men, is called by the Apostle knowledge after the image of God, for no other reason than because it is expressed in imitation of the knowledge which God has of Himself and of all divine things.” Considered in its relation to Christ: “Archetypal Theology belongs to Christ essentially, and through His nature, inasmuch as He is eternal God; it belongs to Him, as to His human nature, personally, and through the communicatio idiomatum, by virtue of the personal union.” Concerning Ectypal Theology, QUEN. further adds (I, 5): “We have one Ectypal Theology in Christ, viewed as to His human nature, another in angels, and a third in men. (I, 6.) The Ectypal Theology of mere man is either that of the Way, i.e., of this life, viz., of mortals, or that of the Home,1 This distinction is founded upon 1 Cor 9:24; 2 Cor. 5:6, 8. It is made as early as Thomas Aquinas. i.e., of the other and happy life, viz., of the finally saved. The Theology of the Way, or of mortals, is twofold, viz., that before and that after the Fall. That which describes man before the Fall, in the state of integrity, is called also the paradisaical, from the place in which man was placed.” But, in reference to all these divisions, BAIER remarks (4): “As the usus loquendi does not allow us to call either God, or Christ, or men in heaven, or angels, theologians, it readily appears that the meaning must here be rejected, which obtains elsewhere when we add to the definition, ‘the theology of the way.’”

[2] HOLL. (5): “The Theology of the Way is twofold, natural and revealed (supernatural). The former is that according to which God is known both by innate ideas, and by the inspection of created things. The latter is the knowledge of God and of divine things, which God communicates to man upon earth, either by immediate revelation or inspiration (to prophets and apostles), or by mediate revelation or the divine Word, committed to writing.”

[3] Still more frequently Theology is called a practical habit. As it appeared to the theological writers that the expression science gave too much prominence to the mere acquaintance with the subjects concerned, they therefore sought a definition in which it should be distinctly expressed that by Theology there was meant a divinely-wrought knowledge, such as urged its possessor to put to practice what he learned.

[By dogmaticians follow the mediaeval mystics and some scholastics, in defining Theology as “wisdom” rather than “science,” thus emphasizing the need of spiritual illumination for the apprehension of the truths. Scotus taught that Theology could be a science only to the glorified; to others, it could only be a matter of faith. On this, GRHD. (II, 4): “To believe and know are particularly unlike; for scientific certainty depends upon internal and inherent principles, but that of faith, upon external, viz., upon the authority of the Revealer. Besides, the subject of Theology is Christ, the knowledge of whom cannot be acquired in a scientific way, but from divine revelation. Matt. 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:7. In Theology, the intellect is not the source, but the end. ‘We believe, that we may know; we do not know, in order that we may believe.’ Cf. Is. 7:9.”]

QUEN. (I, 11): “We are here speaking of Theology, not as to what it signifies in a book, but as to what it is, subjectively in the mind.”

GRH. thus defines (II, 13): “Theology, viewed as a discipline and concretely, is a divinely-given discipline, bestowed upon man by the Holy Spirit through the Word, whereby he is not only instructed in the knowledge of divine mysteries, by the illumination of the mind, so that what he understands produces a salutary effect upon the disposition of his heart and the actions of his life, but so that he is also qualified to inform others concerning these divine mysteries and the way of salvation, and to vindicate heavenly truth from the aspersions of its foes; so that men, abounding in true faith and good works, are led to the kingdom of heaven.”

QUEN. (I, 16): “A distinction is made between theoretical habits, which consist wholly in the mere contemplation of the truth, and practical habits, which, indeed, require a knowledge of whatever is to be done, but which do not end in this, nor have it as their aim, but which lead to practice and action. Theology, we refer, not to the theoretical, but to the practical habits.”

HOLL. (8) thus states the reasons for this distinction: “(1) Because the immediate aim of Theology is true faith in Christ, the operation of which is twofold, viz.: internal, which embraces Christ with His benefits, and external, which produces good works, the fruit of righteousness. The ultimate end of Theology is eternal happiness, which consists not only in the intuitive knowledge of God, but also in the enjoyment of God. (2) Because Theology treats of man, not theoretically, as the subject of its description, as certain qualities are ascribed to man in Physiology, but as the subject of its operation, or how he, as a sinner, is to be freed from his misery and transferred into a state of blessedness . . . (3) Because Paul himself defines Theology to be ‘the knowledge of the truth which is after godliness.’ Tit. 1:1”

§ 3. Religion, True and False

THE subject of Theology is accordingly, Religion.[1] Religion is the way and manner in which God is worshiped. That is a false religion in which God is worshiped in a manner that does not accord with His nature and will; that is the true and right religion in which this is done in the manner which He regards as right and which He prescribes,[2] so that hereby man, estranged from God, is brought back again to Him, and secures his salvation. This proper manner is taught in the Holy Scriptures; and thus the true religion, more accurately defined, is that in which God is worshiped in the manner therein prescribed, and therefore the Christian Religion is the true one.[3] The proper manner of worshiping God must, accordingly, first of all, manifest itself in that disposition of soul towards God which is agreeable to Him, and secondly, in love toward our neighbor and the practice of all the virtues enjoined by God.[4] In the widest sense, therefore, Religion embraces all that God commands to be believed and to be done.[5]

[1] HOLL. (32): “Some suppose the term Religion to be derived from religando (Lactantius), others from relegendo (Cicero). According to the former derivation, religion signified the obligation rightly to worship God, or, that which imposes upon man obligations and duties. According to the latter etymology, religion is diligent attention to those things which pertain to the worship of God. The former derivation is more generally received.” — QUEN. “Synonymous are θρησκεια, James 1:26; ευσεβεια, 1 Tim. 4.8; λογικη λατρεια, Rom. 12:1.”

[2] QUEN. (I, 19): “The Christian religion is the method of worshiping God prescribed in the Word, by which man, separated from God by sin, is led back to God, through faith in Jesus Christ (who is both God and man), so that he is reunited with God, and enjoys Him eternally.”

§ 4. Revelation, — not Reason, nor Tradition.

In order to understand what is true and correct Theology, we must inquire for the Source from which we derive our knowledge of it. QUEN. 32: “The source (principium) is that from which anything, in some manner or other, proceeds.” This is the Revelation given by God.[1] By this divine Revelation we understand here, not that which is given in nature, but that given in the Word (supernatural, as distinguished from natural revelation).[2] More accurately, therefore, we say: the source of theological knowledge is the revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures,[3] and this is, moreover, the only source of Theology,[4] and neither reason,[5] nor, at a later date, tradition, or the appeal to the consentaneous doctrine of the ancient church,[6] is to be ranked with it; nor are supplementary revelations now to be expected from any quarter.[7]

[1] CAL. (I, 269); “Revelation is taken either in a formal sense, for the act of the divine communication, or objectively for that which is divinely revealed. The former sense is here intended.”

[2] HOLL. (61): “We speak here not of that general revelation or natural manifestation, by which God makes Himself known both by the innate light of nature and by the effects conspicuous in the kingdom of nature. But we speak of the special and supernatural revelation, which is twofold, immediate and mediate. The Holy Spirit immediately illuminated the prophets and apostles, and suggested to them conceptions of things and of words concerning doctrines of faith and moral precepts. At the present day God reveals Himself to men by means of the Word written by the prophets and apostles.” Revelation is, therefore, defined as: “The external act of God, by which He makes Himself known to the human race by His Word, in order that they may have a saving knowledge of Him.” — QUEN. I,32.

CAL. (I, 268) thus states the proof that this divine revelation exists: “It having been proved, if this should be denied, that God is, and that there must be some method in which God may be worshiped by men, we must teach, that it cannot be but that God has revealed that method, so that He may be worshiped properly; then, that God wishes men to be led to the enjoyment of Himself, and also, that He has revealed unto men the manner in which they are to be thus led; finally, the fact that God has revealed Himself, must be taught from history, which revelation God has seen fit abundantly to accompany with miracles and documents, by which we are rendered absolutely certain that it is truly divine. Rom. 1: 16; 2 Cor. 12: 12. But as one general revelation has been made in Nature, Rom. 1:19 sq., and another special one by verbal communication, it is first to be proved from nature that God is, inasmuch as God has revealed Himself unto all by His works, in the formation of this world; and subsequently it is to be shown that God has revealed Himself to the human race in a more perfect manner by the Word.”

[3] QUEN. (I, 32): “The source of Theology is the written, divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures.” HOLL. (61) more accurately: “Christian Theology is derived from an infallible source of knowledge, viz., divine revelation, which, for the present state of the Church, is mediate, i.e., comprehended in the writings of the prophets and apostles.” As proof, John 20:31; 2 Tim. 3:14,15; Rom. 15:4; 2 Tim. 3:16,17. With regard to the different modes of revelation in ancient times, BR. (62): “Formerly God employed many and various methods in revealing those things which pertain to the salvation of man, Heb. 1:1. Specifically: (1.) By articulate language, uttered in a supernatural way. Thus revelations were made to the patriarchs, Gen. 18:2; 19:1; 22:1; to Moses, Ex. 3:2; Num. 12:6; to the Israelites, Ex. 19:10. (2.) By dreams or visions, presented to the minds of the sleeping, Gen. 28:12; Dan. 2:19. (3.) By ecstatic visions of the waking, Ez. 1:4; Dan. 10:5; Acts 10:10; finally (4.) By the immediate illumination of the intellect, without the intervention of dreams and visions, 2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Pet. 1:21. But now, since God has chosen to present, in certain books, those things which are necessary to be known with reference to revealed things, in order to salvation, and not to communicate any new revelations, the only source of Theology is to be found in those ancient revelations which were made immediately to the prophets and apostles and have been committed to writing.”

Inasmuch, however, as the religion of the Old and New Testaments is to be regarded as substantially the same, QUEN. (I, 32) adds the remark: “As the divine revelation became more full, in the course of time, so also did Theology, which was based upon it; and as the former, just so the latter, gathered up its own additions in the progress of time, God meanwhile imparting new revelations. These additions did not relate to those things which constitute the foundation of faith and salvation, but to other things which render the statement and comprehension of these more complete, or which relate to various circumstances, rites, and ceremonies, and to ecclesiastical order and discipline.”

If, therefore, the Holy Scriptures are thus the Source of Theology, we are authorized to draw the following conclusion: “Whatever the Holy Scriptures teach is infallibly true.” Hence, the early divines speak of a twofold source, viz., the source indefinitely stated, i.e., by a single term; and the source more fully stated, i.e., by an entire proposition. The former is the Holy Scriptures. The latter, from which the doctrines of the Christian faith are deduced, and into which they are again merged, is this proposition: “Whatever God has revealed in His Word, that is infallibly true, and must be reverently believed and embraced.” From the Holy Scriptures, then, as this source, are drawn all doctrinal truths. “The source, whence theological conclusions are drawn, is but one, viz., the Word of God, or, ‘Thus saith the Lord.’ Theological conclusions are nothing else than truths concerning the faith, elicited and deduced from the Word of God.

[4] QUEN. (I, 33): “The sole, proper, adequate, and ordinary source of Theology and of the Christian Religion is the divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures; or, what is the same thing, that the canonical Scriptures alone are the absolute source of Theology, so that out of them alone, are the articles of faith to be deduced and proved.”

Further (I, 36): “Divine revelation is the first and last source of sacred Theology, beyond which theological discussion among Christians dare not proceed. For every doubt concerning religion in the mind of a true Christian is removed by divine revelation, and by this the faith of the believer grows so strong, and is so firmly established, that it frees his mind from all fear and suspicion of deception, and imparts to him a firm assurance.”

[5] QUEN. (I, 38): “Human or natural reason is not the source of Theology and supernatural things.”

[6] CAL. (I, 304): “We contend that, over and above the written Word of God, there is at present no unwritten Word of God concerning any doctrine necessary to the Christian faith and life, not comprehended in the Scriptures, that ever came forth from the apostles, was handed down by tradition, was preserved by the Church, and is to be received with equal reverence.”

QUEN. (I, 44): “The consent of the Primitive Church, or of the Fathers of the first centuries after Christ, is not a source of Christian faith, either primary or secondary, nor does it produce a divine, but merely a human or probable belief.” In reference to this latter clause, HOLL. (71): “The consent of the Fathers is not to be esteemed of little, but of great importance, as a ground of credibility, as a secondary source of theological conclusions (viz., because it furnishes opinions or conceptions that are probably true), and as a demonstrative and invaluable testimony that the early bishops of the Catholic Church understood and expounded passages of the Holy Scriptures in the same sense in which the Evangelical Church of the present day understands them.”

[7] HOLL. (63): “After the completion of the canon of Scripture, no new and immediate divine revelation was given to be a fundamental source of doctrine, 1 Cor. 4:6; Heb. 1:1.” QUEN. (I, 48): “The opposite opinion is that of various fanatics who hold that the knowledge of God, and of all doctrines that are to be believed, is not to be sought from the written Word of God, but that a higher wisdom than that contained in the Holy Scriptures is to be sought from a revelation especially made to each individual, and from innate light, from ecstatic raptures, dreams, angelic communications, from an internal word, from the inspiration of the Father, from knowledge internally communicated by Christ, who is essentially united with them, and from the instruction of the Holy Spirit, speaking and teaching internally.” [Cf. APOLOGY, 215,13; SMALCALD ARTICLES, 332:4; 333:9,10; LARGE CATECHISM, 499:13; FORMULA OF CONCORD, 552:4; 561:46.]

§ 5 Excursus. Concerning the Use of Reason in Theology

By the term Reason, we may understand either, the capacity of intellectual apprehension in general — and this is essential to man, for it is only by means of this capacity, which distinguishes him from irrational animals, that he can comprehend the truths of religion; [1] or, the capacity of acquiring knowledge and appropriating truths. [2] The knowledge, however, which one thus acquires is, even if true, still defective and unsatisfactory, [3] and therefore Reason is by no means the source from which man can draw the knowledge of saving truths, [4] but for these the revelation contained in Holy Scripture remains ever the only source.

The question now arises, How is Reason related to this revelation, and what use can Theology make of Reason?

Inasmuch as Reason also derives its knowledge from God, Reason and Revelation are, of course, not opposed to each other. [5] This hold true, however, only of Reason considered per se, of Reason as it was before the fall of man. This would have remained conscious of the limits of its sphere; would not have sought to measure divine things by the rule of natural knowledge; would have subordinated itself to Revelation, [6] and would have known that there are truths which, although not in antagonism with it, are yet far beyond its reach. [7]

But the case if very different with Reason as it dwells now in fallen man; for we must concede that, by man’s fall, such a change has occurred that Reason now often assumes a position of antagonism to revealed truth. [8] It still, indeed, possesses some knowledge of divine things, but this knowledge is obscured in proportion to the moral depravity of man, and it now, more easily than before, transcends the assigned limits. If now Reason, even before the fall of man, had to keep within modest limits, with respect to the truths of Revelation, much less dare it now, in the fallen condition of man, assume to judge in regard to divine things, or subject the truths of Revelation to its tests; still less dare it reject that which does not seem to agree with its knowledge: its duty rather is to subject itself to Revelation and learn therefrom. If this be done, however, much will again become intelligible that previously appeared contradictory, and Reason will again approach the condition occupied before the Fall. But this will be only an approach to that condition; for just as man, even through regeneration, never again becomes entirely sinless, so the Reason of the regenerate never attains its original power. [9] We may therefore say of Reason, even when enlightened, that it can have no decisive judgment in regard to matters of faith, and possesses in such matters no normative authority, all the more since this was true of Reason before the Fall. [10]

As to the use, then, that is to be made of Reason in Theology, it follows, from what has been said, that Reason stands in the relation merely of a handmaid to the latter. [11] In so far as it is the capacity for intellectual apprehension in general, the use that is to be made of it will consist in this, that man, by its help, intellectually apprehends the truths of Theology, and accepts from it the means of refuting opponents. In so far, however, as it also conveys knowledge, one may also employ it in the demonstration of a divine truth; in such a case, Reason would contribute whatever of natural knowledge it has acquired. And just in the same proportion as Reason has suffered itself to be enlightened by divine Revelation, will it be able to demonstrate the harmony of divine truth with natural knowledge. [12]

[1] Cal. (I, 358): “Human Reason denotes two things. On the one hand, it designates the intellect of man, that faculty of the rational soul that must be exercised in every kind of knowledge, since it is only by the reason or intellect that man can understand.” . . . HOLL. (69): “Without the use of reason we cannot understand or prove theological doctrines, or defend them against the artful objections of opponents. Surely not to brutes, but to men using their sound reason, has God revealed the knowledge of eternal salvation in His Word, and upon them He has imposed the earnest injunction to read, hear, and meditate upon His Word. The intellect is therefore required, as the receiving subject or apprehending instrument. As we can see nothing without eyes, and hear nothing without ears, so we understand nothing without reason.”

§ 6. Of the terms, Holy Scriptures and Inspiration.

God determined that His revelation should be committed to writing, so that it might be preserved pure and uncorrupted throughout all future time; [1] therefore He has deposited it in the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. [2] These are, therefore, defined to be the written Word of God. [3] GRH.: “The Holy Scripture is the Word of God recorded in the Holy Scriptures.” Between these and the Word of God, there is, then, no real distinction, inasmuch as they contain nothing more than this very Word of God, which was also orally proclaimed; [4] and they contain it entire and complete so that, aside from them, no Word of God is anywhere to be found. [5] By being the Word of God, the Holy Scriptures are distinguished from all other books for, in consequence of this, they are, in respect of all their contents, entirely divine; and this by virtue of the fact that they were communicated by inspiration from God to the prophets and apostles. [6] God is therefore their author (causa principalis), and the prophets and apostles only the instruments (causa instrumentalis) which God employed in their production. [7] We are, therefore, to ascribe the origin of the Holy Scriptures to a peculiar agency of God, by means of which He impelled the prophets and apostles to the production of the Holy Scriptures, [8] and communicated to them both the matter and the form of that which was to be written. [9] This agency of God, by means of which the Holy Scriptures were produced, we call Inspiration. [10] BR: “Divine inspiration was that agency by which God supernaturally communicated to the intellect of those who wrote, not only the correct conception of all that was to be written, but also the conception of the words themselves and of everything by which they were to be expressed, and by which He also instigated their will to the act of writing.” Hence it follows, that everything that is contained in the Holy Scriptures is altogether, and in every particular, true and free from all error. [11]

[1] CHMN. (Exam. Conc. Trid. I,20): “We show . . . . why and wherefore the Holy Scriptures were written; because, viz., by tradition purity of doctrine was not preserved; but, under shelter of that term, many strange and false things were mingled with the true.”

GRH.(II, 26): “‘Why did God desire His Word, at first orally promulgated, to be committed to writing?’ The principal causes appear to have been the following: 1. The shortness of human life. 2. The great number of men. 3. The unfaithfulness to be expected from the guardianship of tradition. 4. The weakness of human memory. 5. The stability of heavenly truth, Luke 1:4. 6. The wickedness of man. 7. In the New Testament, the perverseness of heretics, which was to be held in check.”

[2] GRH. (II, 13): “The scriptures have their designation from the formal, external act, viz., that of writing, by which the Word of God, at first orally promulgated, was, by the command of God, recorded. God himself made the grand and majestic beginning of this work when He inscribed His law on Mount Sinai, upon tablets of stone, which, on this account, are called ‘the writing of God.’ Ex. 32:16. To distinguish them from all other writings, they are called the Holy Scriptures, an appellation derived from Rom. 1:2 and 2 Tim. 3:15. The reasons of this designation are drawn, 1. From their original efficient cause, their Great Author, who is God most holy, yea holiness itself, Is. 6:3; Dan. 9:24. 2. From their instrumental cause, viz., holy men, 2 Pet. 1:21. 3. From their matter, for they contain holy and divine mysteries, precepts for holy living, Ps. 105:42. 4. From their design and effects, for the Holy Spirit sanctifies men through the reading and study of the Scriptures, John 17:17. 5. From the additional circumstance that they are widely different from all other writings, both ecclesiastical and profane, inasmuch as they are clothed with the sublime attribute of canonical authority, to which every believing and godly mind pays due deference.”

Terms synonymous with Holy Scripture are (Id. II,16): γραφη or γραφαι, John 7:38 and 42; Acts 8:12; Rom. 4:3; γραφαι αγιαι, Rom. 1:2; ιερα γραμματα, 2 Tim. 3:15; γραφη θευπνευστος, v. 16. Titles of honor which are attributed to the Word of God in Scripture, are the following: דכר יהוה λογια του θεου. Rom. 3:2; ζων ο λογος του θεου, Heb. 4:12; ρηματα τας ζωης αιωνιου, John 6:68. The whole collection is termed ספר התורה Josh. 1:8; ספר יהוה Is. 34:16; מקְרא Neh. 8:8.

[3] GRH. (II, 427): “The Holy Scriptures are the Word of God reduced to writing, according to His will, by the prophets, evangelists, and apostles, perfectly and perspicuously setting forth the doctrine of the nature and will of God, that men may thereby be brought unto eternal life.”

HOLL. (77): “In the definition of the Holy Scriptures, the Word of God signified formally the purpose of God, or the conception of the divine mind, revealed for the salvation of men immediately to the prophets and apostles, and mediately, through their ministrations, to the whole race of man.”

For the sake of the greatest possible accuracy, the following distinctions are made. GRH. (II, 14): “By the term Scripture, we are not to understand so much the external form, or sign, i.e., the particular letters employed, the art of writing and the expressions by which the divine revelation is described, as the matter itself or the thing signified, just that which is marked and represented by the writing, viz., the Word of God itself, which instructs us concerning the nature and will of God. For, as in all writing, performed by an intelligent agent, so also in these prophetic and apostolic writings, two things are to be considered, viz., in the first place, the letters, syllables, and sentences which are written, and which are external symbols signifying and expressing conceptions of the mind; and secondly, those conceptions themselves, which are the thing signified, expressed by these external symbols of letters, syllables, and sentences; wherefore in the term Scriptures we embrace both of these, and the latter especially.” According as the term is taken in one or the other of these significations, the relation of the Church to the Scriptures is differently expressed. GRH. (II, 15): “Whence we add, by way of corollary, that certain things are predicated of Scripture, with reference to its matter, as that it is more ancient than the Church, that it is the very Word of God itself, formerly preached orally by the apostles and prophets; and others in reference to its form, as that it is, in point of time, later than the Church, that at the last day it will perish, while, on the other hand, as to its matter, it can never be destroyed or perish, John 10:35.”

[4] GRH. (II, 15): “That there is no real difference between the Word of God and the Holy Scriptures, viewed in reference to the matter contained in them, is proved, 1. By the subject-matter of Scripture. The prophets and apostles wrote that, and nothing else than that, which, taught by divine inspiration, they had before preached orally, 1 Cor. 15:1; 2 Cor. 1:13; Phil. 3:1; 2 Thess. 2:15; 1 John 1:3. 2. By the identity of the spoken and written Word. Because the recorded predictions of the Old Testament are frequently quoted in the New, with these words: ‘That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets,’ Matt. 1:22, 2:15, 4:14, etc. Therefore, what the prophets said or predicted, is the same as that which they wrote. 3. By the rule of logic: ‘The accident does not alter the essence.’ It is a mere circumstance in regard to the Word of God, whether it be proclaimed orally or committed to writing. It is one and the same Word of God, whether it be presented to us in the form of spoken or of written language; since neither the original efficient cause, nor the matter, nor the internal form, nor the object, is thereby changed, but only the mode of presentation by the use of different organs. 4. By the demonstrative particle employed by the apostles. Paul speaks thus distinctively of the Mosaic writings and the other like books of the Old and New Testament: ‘τουτ εστι το ρημα της πιστεως,’ ‘this is the word of faith,’ Rom. 10:8; Peter, in 1 Pet. 1:25.”

CAL. (I, 528): “The fanatical sects, especially, deny that the Scriptures are, strictly speaking, the Word of God, maintaining that the internal Word of God alone can properly be called the Word of God.” (Schwenckfeld, Rathmann, Weigel.)Ample quotations from Schwenckfeld and Weigel in GRH. xiii:69 sqq.; for Rathmann, see WALCH's Streitigkeiten innerhalb d. Luth. Kirche, iv:577 sqq.

[5] GRH. (II, 16): 1. “This distinction of the Papists between the written and unwritten Word may, in a certain sense, be admitted, viz., if by the term ‘unwritten Word’ be understood the divine revelation proclaimed orally by the patriarchs before the Mosaic books were written, but after the publication of the Scripture Canon, there can be no unwritten Word of God, as distinct form Scripture.”

2. “We must distinguish between the leading truths of divine revelation which are necessary, essential, etc., and their more full explanation. The prophets and apostles committed to writing the principal doctrines of revelation, which are necessary to be known by all, and which we do not deny that they explained orally at greater length.”

[6] QUEN. (I, 56): “The internal form, or that which gives existence to the Scriptures, so that they are indeed the Word of God, that, namely, which constitutes them and distinguishes them from all other writings, is the inspired sense of Scripture, which, in general, is the conception of the divine intellect concerning divine mysteries and our salvation, formed from eternity, and revealed in time and communicated in writing to us; or it is divine inspiration itself, 2 Tim. 3:16, by which, namely, it is constituted a divine, and is distinguished from a human word.”

[7] QUEN. (I, 55): “The efficient or principal cause of Scripture is the triune God, 2 Tim. 3:16 (the Father, Heb. 1:1; the Son, John 1:18, and the Holy Spirit, 2 Sam. 23:2; 1 Pet. 1:11; 2 Pet. 1:21); 1. By an original decree. 2. By subsequent inspiration, or by ordering that holy men of God should write, and by inspiring what was to be written.”

GRH. (II, 26): “The instrumental causes of Holy Scripture were holy men of God, 2 Pet. 1:21, i.e., men peculiarly and immediately elected and called by God for the purpose of committing to writing the divine revelations; such were the prophets of the Old Testament and the evangelists and apostles of the New Testament; whom, therefore, we properly call the amanuenses of God, the hand of Christ, and the scribes or notaries of the Holy Spirit, since they neither spoke nor wrote by their own human will, but, borne along by the Holy Spirit (φερομενοι υπο του πνευματος αγιου), were acted upon, led, driven, inspired, and governed by the Holy Spirit. They wrote not as men, but as men of God, i.e., as servants of God and peculiar organs of the Holy Spirit. When, therefore, a canonical book is called a book of Moses, the psalms of David, an epistle of Paul, etc., this is merely a reference to the agent, not to the principal cause.”

QUEN. (I, 55): “God, therefore, alone, if we wish to speak accurately, is to be called the author of the Sacred Scriptures; the prophets and apostles cannot be called the authors, except by a kind of catachresis.” To the remark that prophets and apostles may be called the amanuenses of God, QUEN. (I:52) adds: “And not as though these divine amanuenses wrote ignorantly and unwillingly, beyond the reach of and contrary to their own will; for they wrote cheerfully, willingly and intelligently. They are said to be φερομενοι, driven, moved, urged on by the Holy Spirit, not as though they were in a state of unconsciousness, as the Enthusiasts pretended to be, and as the heathen feigned that there was a certain ενθουσιασμος in their soothsayers; not, further, by any means, as though the prophets themselves did not understand their own prophecies or the things which they wrote, which was formerly. . . . the error of the Montanists; but, because they wrote nothing of their own accord, but everything at the dictation of the Holy Spirit.” Inasmuch as it holds good of all the sacred writers, that they are inspired, those are also accounted such who were not, in the strictest sense, apostles. HOLL. (80): “By the name apostles we here designate those holy men of God, who, after the birth of Christ, wrote the Scriptures of the New Testament; although they did not all belong to the college of the apostles, chosen by Christ, before His ascension, to teach all nations; but who, after Christ’s ascension, were numbered with the apostles; such were Matthias (whose writings, however, we do not possess) and Paul. But also those apostolic men, nearest to the apostles in office and dignity, are called apostles in a wider sense; such are Mark and Luke, the evangelists, cf. Rom. 16:7.”

[8] HOLL. (83): “Inspiration denotes as well the antecedent divine instigation or peculiar impulse of the will to engage in writing, as the immediate illumination by which the mind of the sacred writer is fully enlightened through the supernatural illumination of divine grace, and the conceptions of the things to be written are themselves suggested immediately by the Holy Spirit.” The co-operation which here takes place on the part of God is described by QUEN. (I, 65) as “a most special and extraordinary concurrence, peculiar to the sacred writers,” and to be carefully distinguished from “the general and common concurrence of God, by virtue of which He is present to all believers sincerely meditating upon, and writing about, sacred things.” HOLL. (83) distinguishes between inspiration and divine governance. “For the latter merely guards against anything being written that is not true, becoming, congruous; whereas the former, through the Holy Spirit dictating, suggests the conception of the things to be written. The divine governance would warrant the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, but not their inspiration.” If the impulse to engage in writing be embraced under the term inspiration, then it follows that all the Holy Scriptures were written by the command of God, because all are inspired. QUEN. (I, 65): “All the canonical books, of both the Old and New Testaments, were written by God, who peculiarly incited and impelled the sacred writers to engage in the work, and, therefore, the Scriptures of the New Testament were recorded according to the command and will of God by the evangelists and apostles.”

The opposite view is that held by the Papists, who foolishly assert that the evangelists and apostles did not write by any divine command, but were incidentally urged by some accidental circumstance originating elsewhere, or by necessity. It is, indeed, granted that we do not possess the proof of an express and outward command of God in the case of each of the sacred writings, but it is at the same time observed that the want of this is not felt where the impulse exists. GRH. (II, 30): “In the holy men of God, the external command and the internal impulse correspond to each other. For what else is that divine impulse than an internal and secret command of precisely the same authority and weight with one that is external and manifest?” The latter is proved (by HOLL. (81), but also in the same manner by all the earlier writers) to have existed in the case of all the books of Scripture: “1. By the general command of Christ, Matt. 28:19. (GRH. (II, 31): Those who were commanded to teach all nations, were also commanded to reduce their teachings to writing; for they could not teach all nations, even of the succeeding age, orally and without writing.) 2. By the impulse of the Holy Spirit, which Peter teaches, 2 Pet. 1:21. 3. By the divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, which Paul inculcated, 2 Tim. 3:16. 4. By the apostolic office, in which these holy men became the ambassadors of God, 2 Cor. 5:20. Ambassadors are restricted by the commands of their sovereign. Peter, as an ambassador of God, did not undertake to preach to the Gentiles without a divine command; therefore still less would he dare to write an epistle unless commanded by God.” That, however, the external instigations alluded to in the antithesis of the Papists are not excluded, GRH. (II, 33) had already stated: “The inducements to engage in writing brought to bear upon the apostles from without, do not annul the internal command, but rather confirm it, since those circumstances were made to influence the apostles by the wonderful arrangement of divine Providence, and to them was subsequently added the interior impulse of the Holy Spirit, urged on by which they applied their hand to the work.”

[9] Hereby an inspiration both of subject-matter and of the words is asserted, from which it follows that there is absolutely nothing in the Holy Scriptures that is not inspired. These assertions are contained in the following two sentences (of HOLL., 83 and 85):

“I. The conceptions of all that is contained in the Holy Scriptures were immediately communicated by the Holy Spirit to the prophets and apostles.

“II. All the words, without exception, contained in the Holy Manuscript, were dictated by the Holy Spirit to the pen of the prophets and apostles.”

These two sentences we illustrate by the following remarks of QUEN. and HOLL. In reference to No. I: 1. “In inspiration, we recognize a divine assistance and direction, which includes the inspiration and dictation of the Holy Spirit; but we deny as insufficient such a bare divine assistance and direction as would simply prevent the sacred writers from departing from the truth in speaking and writing. . . . The Holy Spirit guides others also in writing, i.e., so that we observe here a difference in this respect, that the Holy Spirit so directed the inspired men, that He at the same time suggested and communicated all things to them in so far as they are recorded in Scripture.” — QUEN, I,68.

2. Inspiration embraces all that is contained in Scripture, and therefore also those things which could have been otherwise known to the apostles and prophets, because in this case it was necessary that these things should be said just at the particular time when the design which God had in view required it. HOLL. (84): “The things which were known to the sacred writers may be considered either absolutely and in themselves, or relatively, in so far as they were to be written by the purpose of God. In the former manner they were previously known by the sacred writers, but not in the latter. For, although the sacred amanuenses may have known certain things, which are described by them before the act of writing, yet it was not, in the nature of the case, known to them whether God desired these things to be described, or under what circumstances, in what order, and with what words they should be committed to writing.”

3. In like manner inspiration embraces things that are not of a spiritual nature. HOLL. (83): “There are contained in Scripture historical, chronological, genealogical, astronomical, natural-historical, and political matters, which, although the knowledge of them is not actually necessary to salvation, are nevertheless divinely revealed, because an acquaintance with them assists not a little in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and in illustrating the doctrines and moral precepts. If only the mysteries of the faith, which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, depend upon divine inspiration, and all the rest, which may be known by the light of nature, depend merely upon the divine direction, then not all of Scripture is inspired. But Paul declares that the whole of Scripture is divinely inspired. Therefore not only the mysteries of the faith, but also the remaining truths that may be known by the light of nature, which are contained in Scripture, are divinely suggested and inspired;” therefore,

4. Even apparently unimportant matters are, none the less, to be regarded as also inspired. QUEN. (I, 71): “A matter may be of small moment, considered in itself and with reference to the estimation in which it is held by men, and yet of great importance if we regard the end and wise design which God has in view with regard to it. Many things in Scripture seem to be of small account (2 Tim. 4:13), in regard to which some suppose that our theory of inspiration derogates from the dignity of the Holy Spirit; but they are, nevertheless, of great moment, if we regard the end had in view (Rom. 15:4) and the all-wise design of God, in accordance with which these things were introduced into the Scriptures.” CALIXTUS (in QUEN., I,69) is a prominent advocate of the opposite view, viz.: “Neither is it taught in Scripture, that it is necessary to ascribe all the particulars that are contained in it to a peculiar divine revelation, but that the principal topics, those which the Scripture is mainly and peculiarly designed to teach, viz., those which relate to the redemption and salvation of the human race, are to be ascribed solely to that particular divine revelation; while in writing concerning other things, known in some other way, either by experience or the light of nature, the writers were so directed by the divine assistance and by the Holy Spirit, that they wrote nothing but what was actual, true, becoming, and congruous.” The proof of plenary inspiration is drawn 1. From 2 Tim. 3:16. (QUEN. (I, 71): “The word πασα may be taken distributively, of the single books or parts of Scripture, or collectively for those parts taken as a whole, so that πασα is the same as hole; in either case our opinion remains true, viz., that all Scripture is inspired.”) Whence the following argument of CAL. (I, 555): “If all Scripture be inspired, then there can be nothing in the Holy Scriptures that was not divinely suggested and by inspiration communicated to those who wrote. For, if even a single particle of Scripture were derived from human knowledge and memory, or from human revelation, then it could not be asserted that all Scripture is divinely inspired.” 2. From 2 Pet. 1:21 (although Peter does not allude particularly to writing, but speaking,. . . yet by λαλιαν both speaking and writing are here implied, and both are comprehended under this term cf. Acts 2:31; 3:24; Rom. 3:19; for just as the holy men of God were incited and impelled by the Holy Spirit to speak, so were they also incited and impelled by Him to write). 3. By the promise of Christ, John 14:26. 4. From 1 Cor. 2:10. We add, from CAL. (I, 556), the following additional proofs: “From the originating cause of Scripture, if indeed the sacred writers were merely the pen, the hand, or the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit; from the nature of the direction of the Holy Spirit, which is usually described as such that the Scriptures were written by His direction, wherefore Gregory the Great declared that the whole of the Holy Scriptures were nothing more nor less than a letter from God the Creator to man His creature; from the equal authority of all that is contained in Scripture. For not merely those things which directly refer to the subjects of faith and salvation are the Word of God, but everything that is found in Scripture, Rom. 3:2, and, for the same reason that they are called by this name, they well deserve to be regarded as the immediate Word of God.”

In relation to No. II., HOLL. (87): “The divine inspiration of the words known by common usage, was necessary to the proper expression of the mind of the Holy Spirit. For the prophets and apostles were not at liberty to clothe the divine meaning in such words as they might of their own accord select; but it was their duty to adhere to, and depend upon, the oral dictation of the Holy Spirit, so that they might commit the Holy Scriptures to writing, in the order and connection so graciously and excellently given, and in which they would appear in perfect accordance with the mind of the Holy Spirit.” QUEN. (I, 76) thus accounts for the variety of style: “There is a great diversity among the sacred writers in regard to style and mode of speaking, which appears to arise from the fact that the Holy Spirit accommodated Himself to the ordinary mode of speaking, leaving to each one his own manner; yet we do not thereby deny that the Holy Spirit suggested the particular words to these individuals.”

CAL., however (I, 574), remarks: “The Holy Spirit, Supreme Author of the Holy Scriptures, was not bound to the style of any one, but, as a perfectly free teacher of languages, could use, through any person soever, the character, style, and mode of speech that He chose, and could just as easily propose the divine oracles through Jeremiah in a highly ornate style, as through Isaiah in one of great simplicity. But He regarded not so much the ability of the writers to speak as the character of the subjects concerning which He wished them to speak; and, throughout the whole, He used His own authority (αυτεξουσια) under the guidance of His unlimited wisdom. So that we need not wonder that the same Spirit employed diversities of style. . . . The cause of this diversity of style is the fact that the Holy Spirit gave to each one to speak as He pleased.” Yet CAL. adds also: “Although the style of Scripture is plain and very well suited, not only to the genius of the readers and hearers, but also to the old and customary style of speech of the sacred writers, yet there may be recognized in it a condescension, συγκαταβασις, of the Holy Spirit; because He accommodated Himself sometimes to the ordinary method of speaking, leaving to the writers their own style of speech; but it must not be denied that the Holy Spirit breathed into them the words.” The inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points was included in this theory; conf. GRH.’s argument ex absurdo (II, 272): “It would follow that the Scriptures were not communicated by God through the prophets, so far as the single words are concerned, since without the vowel-points the words cannot possibly exist; therefore not all Scripture is inspired.” From the theory of verbal inspiration there arose also the assertion: “The style of the New Testament is free from every trace of barbarism and from solecisms.” (QUEN., I, 82.) The proof of verbal inspiration was drawn, 1. From 2 Tim. 3:16. (All Scripture is wholly inspired; not only its meaning, or the thing signified, but also the words, as signs of things, were divinely inspired. Therefore, etc., etc. (HOLL., 85.)) 2. From 1 Cor. 2:13; Ex. 34:27,28; Matt. 5:18.

[10] Inspiration is, therefore, a divine agency employed in connection with the recording of the truth, and, in several respects, it differs from Revelation.

If we consider the latter as embracing the whole compass of Christian faith, it owes its very existence to inspiration. CAL. (I, 280): “Divine inspiration may be regarded either as the source and efficient cause of revelation, in which sense it is an act of God as inspiring, or as the form which revelation assumes, or the revealed Word.” But if revelation be taken in its etymological sense, as the communication of that which was before unknown, then it differs from inspiration in the following respects: 1. The latter may contain also that which was before known, merely specifying the particular time and manner in which it is to be consummated, and, 2. The subject-matter of revelation may be communicated to man in various ways, but that of inspiration only by an immediate divine suggestion. QUEN. (I, 68): “Revelation, formally and etymologically viewed, is the manifestation of things unknown and hidden, and can be made in many and various ways, viz., by outward speech, or by dreams and visions. Inspiration is that act of the Holy Spirit by which an actual knowledge of things is supernaturally conveyed to an intelligent creature, or it is an internal suggestion or infusion of conceptions, whether the things conceived were previously known to the writer or not. The former could precede the commitment to writing; the latter was always associated with it and influenced the writing itself.” Add to this the remarks: “With all this I do not deny that divine inspiration itself may be called revelation, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as it is a manifestation of certain circumstances, as also of the order and manner in which certain things are to be written. (We must distinguish between divine revelation when by it the subject-matter itself is made known, and when it refers to the peculiar circumstances and time and manner and order in which the subject-matter is to be reduced to writing.” (I, 72) “And when, also, revelation concurs and coincides with divine inspiration, when, viz., the divine mysteries are revealed by inspiration and inspired by revelation, in the very act of writing. Thus CALOVIUS very properly remarks: ‘That all the particulars contained in the Holy Scriptures are not, indeed, to be regarded as having been received by a peculiar and new revelation, but by the special dictation, inspiration, and suggestion of the Holy Spirit.’”

[11] HOLL. (88): “Divine inspiration, by which the subject-matter and the words to be spoken, as well as those to be written, were immediately suggested to the prophets and apostles by the Holy Spirit, preserved them free from all error, as well in the preaching as in the writing of the divine Word.”

CAL. (I, 551): “No error, even in unimportant matters, no defect of memory, not to say untruth, can have any place in all the Holy Scriptures.”

QUEN. (I, 80): “We are to distinguish between the conversation of the apostles and their preaching and writing; or between infirmities in conduct and errors in doctrine. In doctrine the apostles never could err, after receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit, . . . but in their conduct and outward conversation they were not sinless, but, in consequence of innate original corruption, were still subject to infirmities and failings.” The more accurate development of the doctrine of inspiration begins with GRH. HUT. (Loci Theologici (30)) still thus briefly expresses himself in regard to it: “Although God did not directly write the Scriptures, but used prophets and apostles as His pen and instrument, yet the Scripture is not, on that account, of any the less authority. For it is God, and indeed God alone, who inspired the prophets and apostles, not only as they spoke, but also as they wrote; and He made use of their lips, their tongues, their hands, their pen. Therefore, or in this respect, the Scriptures, as they are, were written by God Himself. For the prophets and apostles were merely instruments.” This contains, however, essentially everything that we have adduced above from the later theologians. It was mainly the controversy with the Roman Catholics that gave occasion for detailed specifications; for these very well knew that they would rob the Protestant Church of all its weapons, without thereby injuring themselves, if they could cast suspicion upon the true inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Such discriminations were also called forth in part by the fanatics, who treated the written Word of God with little respect; partly by the Socinians and Arminians, who adhered to a merely partial inspiration of the Scriptures. In opposition to these, it became of great importance to the Lutheran theologians to defend with all earnestness the doctrine of the inspiration, not only of the matter, but of the very words.

§ 7. The Attributes of the Holy Scriptures.

If the Holy Scriptures are really the Word of God, then it follows that we are bound to yield to them implicit faith and obedience. As they are the only source of truth, they must contain this entirely and so clearly that we can really learn it from them. And they are, finally, as the Word of God, the only means by which we can attain unto faith, and, therefore, must also be able to awaken this faith in us. We ascribe to them, therefore, the attributes of authority, perfection or sufficiency, perspicuity and efficacy. [1]

§ 8. (1.) Authority

BR.: “The authority of the Holy Scriptures is the manifest dignity that inclines the human understanding to assent to their instructions, and the will to yield obedience to their commands.” We believe what the Holy Scriptures declare, simply because they declare it, and it is they that beget faith in us, and they are the only source from which we derive our faith. They are, at the same time, the only inspired book, and by this they are distinguished from all other writings. It is therefore only from them that we can learn what is true in divine things; and they furnish the means by which we can everywhere distinguish between truth and error. The authority of Holy Scripture is, accordingly, divided into: “(a) Causative authority, by which the Scriptures create and confirm in the mind of man assent to the truths to be believed. (b) Normative or canonical authority, by which authentic Scripture is distinguished from other writings and versions, and that which is true from that which is false.” [2] HOLL. (104.)

(a) Causative Authority. This rests upon the fact, that we acknowledge God as the author of the Holy Scriptures, [3] and this we prove by the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. [4] The proofs of inspiration are, it is true, derived in the first instance only from the Holy Scriptures themselves, and already presuppose faith in the Holy Scriptures themselves, on the part of those who admit them as evidence. But, for the Church and her members, there is no need of proof for the inspiration of Scripture, for her very existence depends upon this faith, and this faith precedes all proofs; [5] without this no article of faith could be based upon the Holy Scriptures. [6] Therefore, the proof that the Holy Scriptures are inspired, or, what amounts to the same thing, that they are of divine origin, and consequently possess full authority in matters of faith, is required only for those who are yet without the Church, or who, if within her pale, are not confirmed in the faith. But it lies in the nature of the case, that no proof can be given to those, which they cannot, in an unbelieving frame of mind, evade; for the only absolutely stringent proof lies in the fact, that the Holy Spirit bears witness in the heart of each individual, and thus convinces him of the divinity of the Word of God, by the mighty influence which it exerts upon him; [7] but that this may be the case, it is necessary that the individual do not resist the drawings of the Holy Spirit, and before this takes place the testimony of the Holy Spirit can have no probative power for him. [8] To this experience, therefore, the individual is referred, and through it alone will he attain to absolute certainty in regard to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. All other so-called proofs are rather to be considered as such evidences for the divinity of the Holy Scriptures as can make this probable to the individual, and invite him to give himself up to the influence of the Holy Spirit, in order to acquire for himself the same experience which the Church has gained. [9] Such evidences are of two kinds. The Holy Scriptures themselves testify in regard to this divinity, by their internal excellence and dignity (κριτηρια interna, internal proofs); and the effects which the Holy Scriptures have produced upon others, testify also to the same (κριτηρια externa, external proofs). [10] These evidences the Church holds out to each individual, and seeks by their means to induce him to yield his heart to the influence of the Holy Spirit, who will produce in him the full conviction of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. [11]

(b) Normative or Canonical Authority. HOLL. (125): “The canonical authority of Scripture is its supreme dignity, by which, in virtue of its meaning, as well as of its divinely inspired style, it is the infallible and sufficient rule, by which all that is to be believed and done by man in order to secure eternal salvation, must be examined, all controversies in regard to matters of faith decided, and all other writings adjudged.” [12] Accordingly, we must acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the only rule and guide of our life, by which alone all controversies in regard to divine things must be settled, [13] so that in no case is the addition of any other authority required, by which they may be decided. [14] But if the Holy Scriptures are thus the only judge of controversies, the question arises: How is this decision to be obtained from them? It lies in the nature of the case, that not every one can accomplish this with equal success, for certain previous conditions are required for this purpose, without which the Holy Scriptures cannot be understood and expounded; and besides, necessary ecclesiastical order demands that, at least for the public investigation and announcement of the decisions contained in the Holy Scriptures, there should be a regular calling. Hence, it pre-eminently belongs to the Church publicly to make known, by means of her representatives (the clergy), the decision discovered in the Holy Scriptures, in reference to a contested point, [15] whence, however, it does not yet follow, that every private individual within the pale of the Church does not possess the right of private judgment. [16] If then, in any given case, the adjustment of a controversy be not attained, the fault lies not in the Holy Scriptures, but in the fact that the Holy Scriptures were not properly interpreted, or the proper interpretation was not adopted. [17] But, in every case, when such a controversy is to be decided, resort must be had to the original text of the Holy Scriptures; for, although a good translation may enable us to secure the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is never so accurate, that we dare employ it in doubtful cases, in which often everything depends upon the most accurate investigation of the single words of the original text. [18]

[1] The attributes are variously enumerated by the early divines. CAL. and QUEN. add to those we have mentioned, infallible truth, the power of interpreting itself, normative and judicial authority, which are again by others incorporated in those we have mentioned.

Some theologians also add the following as secondary attributes: (1) “Necessity; or, that it was necessary for the Word of God to be committed to writing, in order to preserve the purity of the heavenly doctrine. (2) Integrity and perpetuity; or, that the Holy Scriptures have been preserved entire, and will be thus perpetually preserved. (3) Purity and uncorrupted state of its sources; or, that the Hebrew text in the Old Testament, and the Greek in the New, have not suffered, in all copies, any corruption, either through malice or carelessness, but have been preserved by Divine Providence, free from all corruption. (4) Authentic dignity; or, that the Hebrew text alone of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, is to be regarded as authentic, nor is any version to be counted worthy of such supreme authority. (5) The liberty of all to read for themselves.” — CAL., I, 450.

[2] BR. (82): “The authority of Scripture, so far as it regards the assent that is to be yielded to its declarations, may be viewed in a two-fold light: first, in a strict sense, in order to cause assent to the things that are to be believed, which right the Scriptures hold because they are the source of knowledge and the formal object of faith and revealed theology; secondly, in order to distinguish by the inspired Scriptures themselves, both the true Scriptures and those other teachings, which relate to matters of faith and practice; and this right they hold, inasmuch as they are canonical, or the rule and guide whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood. . . . For, although the authority of Scripture is one and the same, based upon the veracity of God and the dependence of the Scriptures upon God, through which it is appointed, both in a formal sense to produce faith and in a normal sense to examine and decide between certain Scriptures and other teachings; and as, further, the Scriptures are to be employed somewhat differently for the formal purpose of causing assent to the faith, and for the normal purpose of distinguishing truth from falsehood; thus, also, we must by all means treat distinctly of both these methods in discussing the authority of Scripture.” HOLL. (105): “In the former method, they (the Holy Scriptures) are employed in every language for producing faith in the mind of an unbelieving man, and for confirming it in the mind of a believer; in which respect this authority is called causative or promotive of faith; in the latter method, they are employed only in the original text, to distinguish from the actually inspired Scripture the versions of the Hebrew and Greek originals, the Symbolical Books, and all writings that treat of matters of faith and practice.”

[3] BR. (80): “The authority of Scripture, viewed in itself and absolutely, or with reference to its contents, depends upon God, the sole Author of Scripture, and results from His veracity and great and infinite power.” GRH. (II, 36): “Inasmuch, then, as the Holy Scriptures have God for their author, by whose immediate inspiration the prophets, evangelists, and apostles wrote, therefore they also possess divine authority; because they are inspired, they are in like manner self-commendatory, winning faith by virtue of their own inherent excellence.”

[4] BR. (81): “So far as we are concerned, or that we may be convinced that the Holy Scriptures are worthy to receive faith and obedience, not only these perfections of God must be known, but also the dependence of Scripture upon God, or its inspiration by Him.” Our conviction, however, rests upon the two theses: “(1) Whatsoever Scripture is recorded by divine inspiration, that is certainly and infallibly true. (2) The Holy Scriptures were recorded by divine inspiration.”

§ 9. (2.) Perfection, or Sufficiency.

From the fact that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God, it necessarily follows that all that is contained in them is perfectly true; from the fact that they are the only Word of God given to us, it further follows that, if we are at all to learn the way of life, it must be perfectly taught in the Holy Scriptures, [1] and this is what is meant by their perfection or sufficiency. GRH. (II, 286): “That the Scriptures fully and perfectly instruct us concerning all things necessary to salvation.” [2] And, indeed, so perfectly must everything necessary to salvation be contained in the Holy Scriptures, whether declared in express words or to be learned inferentially, [3] that we never find occasion to make up deficiencies from another source; whence, all doctrines claiming to be derived from oral tradition are to be rejected. GRH. (I, 25): “Laying aside tradition, we are to adhere to Scripture alone.” [4]

[1] HOLL. (173) distinguishes: “the perfection of Scripture (a) in reference to the subject-matter; since no inspired book, received into the permanent canon of the faith, perishes. (b) In reference to the form; that no error has crept into the authentic text by the negligence or perfidy of transcribers. (c) In reference to the end to be attained; for it sufficiently teaches man all doctrines and moral precepts necessary to salvation.” Of the latter, viz., perfection as to the end to be accomplished, we are here speaking. BR. (136): “We only assert that the Scriptures are perfect in reference to the accomplishment of their end, and in this opinion we all agree. Those things are said to be perfect in reference to their end which want nothing that is necessary for the attainment of that end. But the ultimate aim of Scripture is our salvation; the intermediate, faith in Christ.” Of perfection in the second sense, we have already spoken, under the head of inspiration. In reference to perfection, in the first sense, BR. (135) remarks: “We do not so much refer to the number of the books that ever were written by the sacred penmen, of which some referred to by the names of their authors or titles in the remaining books of Scripture are supposed to have perished; but we refer to the perfection of the Scriptures that remain in regard to the accomplishment of their end. Moreover, also, as to those books which some suppose to have perished, it is to be observed that some of them have not really perished, but are still extant, though under different titles. . . . But, if some books written by the sacred penmen did really perish, yet we hold that (1) such were not written by Divine inspiration, but by human prompting; (2) they were also rather historical than doctrinal; at all events, or if it be (3) conceded that inspired books have perished, it must be maintained that the doctrines themselves are found with equal truth and fulness in the remaining books; certainly (4) that no book which once by the intention of the Holy Spirit formed a part of the canon or rule, has perished, to the detriment of the canonical Scriptures, so that they should cease to be the adequate source and rule of faith and practice.”

GRH. remarks, in addition, that the Holy Scriptures are not to be regarded as perfect only since the canon of the Old and New Testament has been closed. (II, 286): “The perfection of the Holy Scriptures is to be estimated not by the number of the books, but from the sufficiency of the doctrine necessary to be known, in order to salvation. That which was written at any particular age of the Church, constituted a perfect canon, since the divine revelation was perfectly developed, so far as that age required it, in those books. Thus, when only the books of Moses were extant, the Scriptures were perfect, i.e., with respect to that age of the Church, in which not many revelations had been made which God wished to be committed to writing.”

[2] QUEN. (I, 102): “The Holy Scriptures contain with perfect fulness and sufficiency all things necessary to be known in order to Christian faith and life, and therefore to the attainment of eternal salvation.”

This GRH. (II, 286, sq.): proves. “(1) From their plain designation and title, Ps. 19:7. (2) From their efficient original cause, viz., God, most wise and most perfect. (3) From the subject-matter. The inspired Holy Scriptures, comprehended in the prophetical and apostolical books, contain the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation, and unfold all the parts of Christianity in such a manner that nothing need be added or subtracted. This is proved by Acts 20:27; 26:22; 2 Tim. 3:16,17; Deut. 4:2; 12:32; Gal. 1:8; Rev. 22:18. (4) From their aim and effects.”

[3] CAL. (I, 610): “We assert, that the Holy Scriptures sufficiently and adequately contain all things necessary to faith and a Christian life, and we think that those other things also in the Scriptures should be clearly and sufficiently considered, which, both according to the words and according to the sense, are comprehended therein, or, as plain interferences, are drawn from those which are clearly written; so that there is no need of any unwritten tradition to supply the defects of Scripture, or to collect and deduce from it those things which are virtually contained in it; because without any tradition they may all be sufficiently obtained from Scripture alone.”

GRH. (II, 286): “We by no means say that the Scriptures are perfect in such a sense that all things which are necessary to be known for faith and practice are contained in the Scriptures, literally and in so many words, but some of them in substance, others literally; or, what is the same thing, that some are contained in them explicitly and others by implication, so that by legitimate and undeniable inference they can be deduced from them.” QUEN. (I, 102) thus guards against the misapprehension of his remark: “We do not say, with the Papists, that the Scriptures are perfect by implication or contain all things necessary to faith, as in a root or germ, or common source, or, as it were, in outline. . . . so that they do not themselves really contain all things, but show whence and where they are to be sought, with a reference to the Church and her traditions, from which the defects of those doctrines which are wanting may be supplied.”

[4] Hereby the papal doctrine of tradition is rejected, which CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 110) thus describes: “They pretend that many things necessary to faith and practice were handed down by the apostles which are not comprehended in Scripture. To this claim they add another, viz., that those things which are handed down and observed in the Roman Church, and cannot be proved by any Scripture testimony, are the very things which were orally transmitted by the Apostles and not comprehended in Scripture.”

Whence HOLL. (178): “Tradition is the instruction orally given by Christ and the Apostles, which is neither substantially nor literally contained in Scripture, but by continuous succession is preserved in the Church.” To which is replied: “We infer from the perfection of Scripture that it needs in no way the aid of tradition in the articles of faith necessary to salvation.” (GRH. II, 307.)

Inasmuch as the word, tradition, was used in such different senses in the Holy Scriptures, and such various significations applied to it, the Dogmaticians take occasion accurately to designate the sense in which they reject tradition, and from this signification carefully to distinguish those which in a certain sense they admit. CHEMN. in Exam. Trid. I, 110 seq., marks eight different significations, viz.:

“(1) Those things which Christ and the Apostles orally delivered, and which were afterwards committed to writing by the Evangelists and Apostles, are often called traditions.

“(2) The books of Holy Scripture have been guarded by the Church during an uninterrupted series of ages and in a connected and sure succession, and they have been faithfully transmitted to posterity and handed down, as if from hand to hand, unto us.

“(3) Irenaeus and Tertullian celebrate apostolical tradition . . . They do not, indeed, propose and prove any other doctrines of faith by tradition than those which are contained in Scripture; but they show, and prove also by tradition, those same doctrines which are contained in Scripture.

“(4) There are traditions concerning the exposition, the true sense or native meaning, of Scripture.

“(5) The fathers sometimes thus designate those doctrines which are not contained in so many words and syllables in Scripture, but are derived from clear Scripture testimony, by sound, certain, indisputable, and evident reasoning.

“(6) The term is applied to the universal consent of the fathers. The phrase is common, ‘by the tradition of the fathers’ (patres ita tradiderunt).

“(7) When the ancients made mention of unwritten tradition they did not understand by them doctrines of faith to be received without, over and above Scripture, even if they could not be proved by any Scripture testimony; but they spoke concerning certain rites and customs, which on account of their antiquity they ascribed to the Apostles.

“(8) Traditions relating both to faith and practice, which cannot be proved by any Scripture testimony, which nevertheless the Council of Trent commands to be received and venerated with the same reverence and pious feeling as the Scriptures themselves.”

HOLL. (178) accordingly divides the traditions of the Church into “ritual, historical, exegetical, evidential, and dogmatical.” Only the latter class is here referred to. HOLL.: “We do not disapprove of all the ritual traditions of the Church, but the theological rule observed by CHEMN. in his Exam. Conc. Trid. must be adhered to, viz., ‘Let the ceremonies in the Church be of an unessential nature, few in number, devout, and useful for edification, order, and decorum; let the observance of them be left free, so as to avoid giving offence,’ and so that they may be instituted, changed, or abrogated with a reference to edification, to times, places, and persons. We admit historical tradition, concerning the canon of Scripture, not as an infallible, but as a probable argument. We receive with gratitude exegetical traditions, if namely the interpretation of the fathers present no discrepancy with the scriptural text, the proper use of the words, the context, and the analogy of faith. We hold in high esteem evidential tradition, and confess with Chemnitz that we differ from those who invent opinions that find no supporting testimony in any age of the Church. We think also that no doctrine that is new and at variance with all antiquity should be received in the Church.” The Symbolical Books treat only of the ecclesiastical or ceremonial traditions. The AUG. CONF. XV, APOLOGY VIII, and FORM. CONC. X, discuss the questions: (1) Whether these are admissible, which they answer affirmatively; and (2) Whether in the Church nothing dare be taught, as nothing is believed, which is not proved by an express declaration of Scripture? which, in the light of Christian liberty, they deny.

Syncretism then gave occasion to further specifications in regard to the idea of tradition. G. CALIXTUS has said: “It should not be doubted, that from the writings of the ancient Church, which are still extant, the common belief of antiquity can be sufficiently ascertained, and that should be regarded as apostolical, which they unanimously teach and declare that they receive as apostolical.” To which CAL. (I, 327) replies: “Although some innovators differ from the Papists in this, that they do not recognize any article of faith that is merely traditional and not contained in the Scriptures, or receive any doctrine as taught by the Apostles, which is not written; yet they side with the Papists in this, that they accept as the Word of God something not written and handed down by the Apostles, and wish some apostolical tradition, I know not what, handed down to us through the writings of the fathers, to be regarded as the undoubted Word of God.” And, page 330, the additional statement: “Although it is not to be doubted that the Apostles taught not only by writings but also viva voce, and that the Word which they preached, no less than what is comprehended in the Scriptures, is to be regarded as the undoubted Word of God, yet we neither can, nor ought to, gratify the Papists by teaching that there is still extant some additional Word of God communicated by the Apostles, and handed down from them to us, which should be received as infallible and indubitable, along with the prophetical and apostolical Holy Scriptures.

§ 10. (3.) Perspicuity.

If the Holy Scriptures contain everything necessary to salvation, and if they alone contain it, they must necessarily exhibit it so clearly and plainly that it is accessible to the comprehension of every one; hence the attribute of Perspicuity is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures. CAL. (I, 467): “Because in those things which are necessary to be known in order to salvation, the Scriptures are abundantly and admirably explicit, both by the intention of God their Author, and by the natural signification of the words, so that they need no external and adventitious light.” [1] But while such perspicuity is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures, it is not meant that every particular that is contained in them is equally clear and plain to all, but only that all that is necessary to be known in order to salvation is clearly and plainly taught in them, [2] and that, if this be not expressed in all cases with equal clearness, it can nevertheless be gathered from a collocation of the passages bearing upon it. [3] It is also not maintained that the Holy Scriptures can be understood without the possession of certain prerequisites. On the other hand, such as the following are required, viz., proper maturity of judgment, the necessary philological attainments, an unprejudiced frame of mind in the investigation of the sacred truth, and a will inclined to embrace this truth in its purity. [4] Where these prerequisites are wanting, there can, as a matter of course, be no thorough understanding of the Holy Scriptures; but in such a case the fault does not lie in the Holy Scriptures. [5] Where these prerequisites exist, a clear and accurate comprehension of the saving truths contained in Scripture may be gained, which nevertheless, even in this case, is merely external and natural until, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, an internal apprehension of them is effected, [6] as well as the power of heartily appropriating, to one’s self the saving truths contained in Scripture. [7] Finally, the perspicuity of the Holy Scriptures is not to be so understood as if the mysteries of the Christian faith were unveiled by it; on the other hand, these remain as they are, mysteries; perspicuity consists only in this, that the Scriptures make known to us the mysteries just as God wishes them to be made known. [8]

From what has here been said, it naturally follows, further, that in all cases in which the interpretation of a passage is doubtful, the decision dare never be found anywhere else than in the Scriptures themselves, whereby the faculty of self-interpretation is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures. [9] And, in this interpretation, it is a fundamental principle, that the doubtful passages are to be explained by those that are clear. [10] Inasmuch now as all doctrines necessary to be known in order to salvation, are clearly taught in Scripture, so that we gain from them the general substance of the Christian plan of salvation; and inasmuch, further, as we can safely presuppose that the Holy Scriptures will not contradict themselves, we need only take care that we do not derive from these doubtful passages a sense that would conflict with the clearly revealed truths; we must therefore interpret according to the analogy of faith. (CAL.: “The analogy of faith is the consistency of the doctrine clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures.”) [11] To the interpretation of all Scripture, whether doubtful or plain, the general rule applies, that each passage contains but one original and proper sense, that, namely, which is derived immediately from the words employed (the literal sense), which is to be ascertained in every case by the use of the means above described. [12]

[1] The fullest description of perspicuity we find in BR. (138): “Perspicuity, or that those things which are necessary to be believed and done by man in seeking to be saved, are taught in Scripture in words and phrases so clear and conformed to the usage of speech, that any man acquainted with the language, possessed of a common judgment, and paying due attention to the words, may learn the true sense of the words, so far as those things are concerned which must be known, and may embrace these fundamental doctrines by the simple grasp of his mind; according as the mind of man is led, by the Scriptures themselves and their supernatural light, or the divine energy conjoined with them, to yield the assent of faith to the word understood and the things signified.”

The proof, according to QUEN. (I, 121, 122): “(1) From Deut. 30:11, 12; Rom. 10:8; 2 Pet. 1:19; Ps. 19:8; 119:105; Prov. 6:23. (2) From the character of Scripture: (a) Because it has God for its Author, who can speak perspicuously, and does not wish to speak obscurely. He can speak perspicuously, for He formed speech and the voice. To say that He wished to speak obscurely, would be nothing short of blasphemy. (b) It gives wisdom to babes or the unskilled, Ps. 19:7; 2 Tim. 3:15. (c) It reveals hidden mysteries, Rom. 16:25; 1 Cor. 2:9, 10; Col. 1:26, 27. (d) It was given for the purpose that the will of God might here be learned, and men informed in regard to eternal life, John 20:31; Rom. 15:4. (e) Because its precepts are to be read by all, Deut. 17:19; John 5:39.”

[2] GRH. (I, 26): “It is to be observed that when we call the Scriptures perspicuous, we do not mean that every particular expression, anywhere contained in Scripture, is so constituted that at the first glance it must be plainly and fully understood by every one. On the other hand, we confess that certain things are obscurely expressed in Scripture and difficult to be understood . . . But this we do assert, and endeavor in every way to prove, that the perspicuity of the Scriptures is of such a nature that a certain and consistent opinion can be drawn from them concerning the doctrines whose knowledge is necessary to salvation.” Whence it follows (II, 329) that “the knowledge of those things, which are nowhere plainly and perspicuously revealed in Scripture, is not absolutely necessary to salvation.”

QUEN. (I, 118): “We do not maintain that all Scripture, in every particular, is clear and perspicuous. For we grant that certain things are met with in the sacred books that are obscure and difficult to be understood, 2 Pet. 3:16, not only in respect to the sublimity of their subject-matter, but also as to the utterance of the Holy Spirit, that afford materials for calling into exercise the learning of the doctors during the course of a long life, and the full understanding of which is to be expected only in heaven; but that the doctrines of faith and moral precepts are taught so obscurely everywhere, that they can nowhere be found clearly and explicitly, it is this that we deny. But the articles of faith and the moral precepts are taught in Scripture in their proper places, not in obscure and ambiguous words, but in such as are fitted to them, and free from all ambiguity, so that every diligent reader of Scripture, who reads it devoutly and piously, can understand them.” (BR. (140): “At least in those places where the writer professedly, as they say, treats of a particular precept of faith or morals, or where its seat is; so that there is no article of faith, or no moral precept, which is not taught in Scripture somewhere in literal, clear, and conspicuous language.”)

QUEN. (I, 18) distinguishes between “onomastic, chronological, topographical, allegorical, typical, prophetical (i.e., predictions, but unfulfilled) matters, and those which are historical, dogmatical, or moral. If in the former class, especially in points relating to style and order, there should occur some difficulty or obscurity, this would still not derogate from the perspicuity of Scripture in matters of the latter class. The Scriptures give us elementary truths, containing the supreme and necessary articles of our religion. They give us sublime, mystical, onomastic truths. God chose to teach most clearly in the sacred books the elementary truths, because what is taught by them is necessary to be known by all in order to salvation. Other matters are involved in some difficulty.”

[3] GRH. (II, 329): “Observe that some things in Scripture are clearer than others, and what is obscurely expressed in one passage is more clearly explained in another.”

QUEN. (I, 118): “It is one things that there should at times be some difficulty and obscurity in the statement of the mysteries of the faith and of those things that must be believed in order to salvation; and another, that this obscurity should be nowhere cleared up in the Scriptures themselves, if a comparison be instituted with parallel passages and the analogy of faith as contained in Scripture be called into requisition. Doubtless what is expressed in one place obscurely, appears perfectly clear in another; and what in one passage is hidden under tropes and figures, is elsewhere disclosed in plain and simple language; and thus upon many difficult passages of Scripture, light is thrown by others that are more clear.”

[4] GRH. (II, 329): “Observe that, is asserting perspicuity, we do not exclude the godly study of the Scriptures by reading and meditation, nor the use of the aids necessary to the interpretation of the Scriptures.”

QUEN. (I, 119): “We are to distinguish between men who, on account of their immature age and their want of familiarity with the language in which they read the Scriptures, meet with difficulty through unskillfulness or ignorance, or who are prejudiced by preconceived erroneous opinions, and those with whom this is not the case. . . . For we presuppose a sufficient knowledge of the language, maturity of age, a mind not filled with prejudice and erroneous opinions, and also a legitimate and good translation of the original text.”

BR. (146): “For he who does not attend to the words themselves, but follows his own prejudices and makes the words of Scripture conform to them, can err even in perspicuous passages and in investigating the true sense.” Whence HOLL. (149): “The perspicuity of Scriptures is not absolute, but dependent upon the use of means, inasmuch as, in endeavoring to understand it, the divinely instituted method must be accurately observed. For there is required: (1) Prayer to God the Father of Lights. (2) A knowledge of the idiom in which the Holy Scriptures are expressed, whether it be the original or in a version. (3) The attentive consideration of the expressions, of the scope, of the previous and subsequent context. (4) The laying aside of preconceived opinions and of evil feelings, of ambition, hatred, envy, boldness, etc., etc.”

[5] Wherefore QUEN. (I, 118) distinguishes between “obscurity in the object contemplated and that which lies in the subject contemplating it. The Scriptures, especially in things necessary to salvation, are not obscure in and of themselves, or through a want of native clearness and plainness, but they are lucid and perspicuous. They may be obscure, however, accidentally, on account of the incapacity and blindness of the human mind, and through the malice of heretics and the heterodox who superadd to their natural blindness a voluntary one, and maliciously close the eyes of their mind against the clearest light of Scripture. (2 Cor. 4:3.)” As an instance of this, the controversy in regard to the Lord’s Supper is cited (I, 124): “The words of the Testament are in themselves very perspicuous, but are variously interpreted; because many, neglecting the literal and proper sense, studiously seek a foreign one, and do not follow so much the teaching of Christ as the counsel and dictation of blind reason. A mistake as to the cause is therefore made when the discrepancy in the expositions is ascribed to the obscurity of Scriptures, since its cause is either the perverseness or imbecility of men. The obscurity which lies in the subject must not be transferred to the object . . . If nothing be perspicuously spoken except that which cannot be understood perversely and expounded in a bad sense, then nothing in the wide universe can be perspicuously and plainly uttered.”

[6] GRH. (I, 26): “The clearness of Scripture is twofold; as Luther says, ‘One kind is external, lying in the ministry of the Word, the other in the knowledge of the heart. If you speak of the internal clearness, no man understands a single iota in the Scriptures by the natural powers of his own mind, unless he have the Spirit of God; all have obscure hearts. The Holy Spirit is required for the understanding of the whole of Scripture and of all its parts. If you allude to the external clearness, there is nothing left obscure and ambiguous, but all things brought to light by the Word are perfectly clear.’”

GRH. (I, 52): “Some, who have not yet been enlightened by the Holy Spirit, may have a knowledge of the Scripture doctrines, and acquire an historic faith by the outward ministration of the Word; but an absolutely certain, firm, and saving knowledge they cannot have without the internal illumination of the mind by the Holy Spirit.” There is, therefore, a distinction made between the “grammatical (literal) and external” and the “spiritual, divine and internal sense.” Perspicuity in the first sense consists, BR. (140), “in the proper selection of words, their correspondence with the things signified, and their mutual connection and arrangement, according to the common usage of language” (141): “For not only the regenerated and believers, but also the unregenerate and godless, through this clearness of the words in their natural signification, in which respect they are the same for all readers, can acquire a knowledge of the sense designed by the words. i.e., a merely literal or historical, not a saving or believing knowledge.” Also (144), (from the Jena and Wittenberg Opinion, in answer to Rathmann’s Reply, 1629): . . . “If the Reply means to infer that no unconverted person can understand the proper sense which is contained in the words of Scripture, and expressed by them, i.e., the grammatical and literal sense, unless the Holy Spirit assist with His gracious illumination, then we cannot agree with the Reply, but abide by our own opinion. . . . For the words, and whatever serves to interpret them, viz., the lexicons, dictionaries, and grammars of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, are human inventions, and belong to the gifts of nature and not to the gracious gifts of the Holy Spirit; for He was not appointed, nor was He poured out, that He might treat of grammatical rules and teach us to hunt up Hebrew roots, . . . but that He should teach us the articles of faith through the Scriptures and instruct us in the truth that maketh wise unto salvation. Many a one properly understands the words without possessing that saving knowledge of the mysteries which belongs to faith.”

CAL. (I, 657): “Although the external sense of Scripture may be understood by the unregenerate, yet the saving and internal sense, joined with hearty assent, cannot be attained without the illumination of the Holy Spirit.”

[7] GRH. (II, 338): “A literal acquaintance with the articles of the faith is not sufficient to salvation, but there must also be a spiritual knowledge, for the acquisition of which the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary; and this is to be obtained by humble prayer.”

BR. (150): “In order that man may properly understand the plan of salvation, two things are necessary: first, that by the natural powers of his mind he comprehend those things that necessarily must be known by him in order to his salvation; and secondly, that he embrace these, thus apprehended as true and divinely revealed, and yield to them the full assent of faith. The Scriptures, therefore, which in this matter should be as a bright and shining light, ought to accomplish these two ends: first, to represent to the mind the things that are to be known in language adapted to this end and clear, so that they may be simply and naturally apprehended; and secondly, that when the thing signified is of a more exalted nature and the mind too weak or corrupt to be able to judge correctly by the exercise of its own powers concerning that which is signified by the words, or to elicit or yield the assent that is due, the Scriptures themselves, by their own illuminative power, should enable the mind to accomplish this and bestow the faculty of apprehending and embracing the truth.” The latter alone is referred to when HOLL. remarks (155): “An unregenerate man, opposing the illuminating grace of the Holy Spirit, cannot understand the true sense of the sacred writings. But when an unregenerate man, in a teachable spirit, attentively reads the Holy Scriptures, or hears them expounded by the living teacher, the Holy Spirit illuminates him by the Scriptures, so that he may understand the true sense of the Divine Word and rightly apply it, thus understood, with saving effect.” And although HOLL. claims “for the unregenerate but teachable and prevenient and preparative grace of the Holy Spirit, that they may acquire an external and literal knowledge of the Holy Scriptures,” he does not thereby mean anything more than that such grace is needed in order that they may attain to a self-appropriation of the truth of salvation; for he elsewhere remarks (158): “The words of the Prophets and Apostles may be considered either out of their proper scriptural connection, or in it. In the former case, they are analogous to human words, and can be understood by the unregenerate without the grace of the Holy Spirit; but if they be considered in their proper connection, as they are accommodated to the mysteries of the faith, and are, as receptacles or vehicles of these, really Divine words, no correct conception, conformed to the mind of the Spirit, can be formed concerning them without the preceding prevenient and preparative grace of the Holy Spirit.”

[8] HOLL. (149): “The Scriptures are called clear, not in respect to the subject-matter, but to the words, for even subjects that are not clear may be expressed with clear and perspicuous words.”

QUEN. (I, 117): “We must make a distinction between the clearness of the subjects which are revealed in Scripture and the plainness of the words by which the revealed subjects are expressed. We refer not to the former but to the latter; for we acknowledge that many mysteries are contained in the Scriptures, abstruse and impenetrable by the human intellect, especially in this life; but we deny that they are taught in Scripture in an obscure style and with ambiguous words.” Luther expresses it differently: “The things of God are obscure; . . . the things of Scripture are perspicuous. . . . The doctrines in themselves are obscure; but in so far as they are presented in Scripture they are manifest, if we are willing to be content with that knowledge which God communicates in the Scriptures to the Church.”

[9] QUEN. (I, 137): “From no other source than the Holy Scriptures themselves can a certain and infallible interpretation of Scripture be drawn. For Scripture itself, or rather the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture or through it, is the legitimate and independent (ανυπευθυνος) interpreter of itself.”

And further, QUEN. (I, 144): “We cannot, therefore, acknowledge the harmonious opinions of the ancient teachers of the Church or the decisions of councils as a certain and unquestionable rule and measure of scriptural interpretation, nor the Roman pontiff as the supreme, infallible interpreter of the Holy Scriptures.”

[10] QUEN. (I, 137): “The most obscure passages, which need explanation, can and should be explained by other passages that are more clear, and thus the Scripture itself furnishes an interpretation of the more obscure expressions when a comparison of these is made with those that are more clear; so that Scripture is explained by Scripture.”

[11] GRH. (I, 53): “From those perspicuous passages of Scripture a rule of faith is gathered, which is, so to speak, a summary of the heavenly doctrine extracted from the clearest passages of Scripture. Whatever, therefore, is necessary, is clearly expressed in the Holy Scriptures, says Chrysostom. If certain things in them are very obscure, the knowledge of these is not necessary to all for their salvation; and hence, although we may not always ascertain their true and genuine interpretation, it is sufficient if, in interpreting them, we propose nothing that conflicts with the rule of faith.”

(II, 424): “All interpretation of Scripture should be according to the analogy of faith. This canon is taught in Rom. 12:6, and signifies that the interpretation of Scripture should be instituted and carried on in such a manner as to accord with the usual line of thought which is conveyed in Scripture concerning each article of the heavenly doctrine. For, since all Scripture was given by the immediate suggestion of the Holy Spirit, and is inspired, all things in it are harmonious and perfectly consistent with each other, so that no discrepancy or self-contradiction can occur. The article of faith, which the apostle here means by πιστις, the knowledge of which is necessary for all in order to salvation, are taught in the Scriptures in clear and perspicuous language, of which a brief summary is contained in the Apostles’ Creed, which the fathers often call “the rule of faith.” Nothing is ever to be broached in the interpretation of Scripture that conflicts with this rule of faith; and hence, if we be not exactly able at times to ascertain the precise sense of any passage, as designed by the Holy Spirit, we should nevertheless beware of proposing anything that is contrary to the analogy of faith.”

GRH. (I, 54) thus states all the rules that apply to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures: “(1) Without the light of the Holy Spirit, our mind is blind so far as the understanding and interpreting of Scripture are concerned. (2) In addition to this blindness, natural to us all, some are blinded by peculiar wickedness and an unyielding obstinacy, whose eyes the Holy Spirit either has opened or has wished to open, but they have contumaciously resisted Him; neither of these kinds of blindness, however, makes or proves the Scriptures obscure. (3) Because our mind is blind, we are prayerfully to implore the light of the Holy Spirit. (4) But this illumination of the mind the Holy Spirit does not confer immediately, but by the light of the Word heard and meditated upon. (5) Inasmuch as the doctrines necessary to be known by every one in order to salvation are taught in Scripture in clear and perspicuous language, (6) the remaining passages of Scripture receive light from these. (7) For from the perspicuous passages of Scripture, a rule of faith is deduced to which the exposition of the remainder must be conformed. (8) And if we cannot ascertain the precisely literal sense of all passages, it is sufficient that in their interpretation we do not propose anything contrary to the analogy of faith. (9) Nevertheless, it is also of importance that we rightly and accurately interpret the more obscure passages of Scripture, which can be done if we apply the means adapted to remove the difficulties. (10) That we may discover these means, we must seek the causes of the obscurity. (11) Some Scripture passages are obscure in themselves, when singly considered, others when compared with other passages; if they merely seem to conflict with other passages, this obscurity may be removed by reconciling the passages. (12) Those that are obscure in themselves and singly are so either as to their subject-matter or as to their words. The obscurity in regard to the subjects discussed is removed by those settled axioms, in individual articles of belief, which are to be regarded as the unfailing guide. (13) The obscurity in regard to the words is dispelled by the grammatical analysis of sentences, by the rhetorical exposition of the tropes and figures, by the logical consideration of the order and circumstances, and finally by an acquaintance with physical science; but the greatest assistance in all these cases is afforded by a prudent and diligent collation of Scripture passages, whenever either the same or different words and phrases are employed to express the same or different things.” He illustrates the manner of making deductions from the rule of faith by the example of the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper.

[12] GRH. (I, 67): “There is but one proper and true sense of each passage, which the Holy Spirit thereby intends, and which is drawn from the proper signification of the words, and only from this literal sense available arguments may be derived.” But this literal sense may be either strictly literal, which the Holy Spirit intends when the words are taken in their usual signification, e.g., God is a spirit (John 4:24), or figurative or tropical, which is the intention of the Holy Spirit when words are used figuratively, e.g., God is our shield (Gen. 15:1), (HOLL., 91). But in this case also the remark applies, GRH. (II, 425): “All interpretation of Scripture should be literal, and there should be no departure from the letter in matters of faith, unless the Scriptures themselves indicate the figurativeness and explain it.” (I, 67): “Allegories, tropes, anagogies, are not different senses but different adaptations of the same sense and subject designated by the letter. The same historical narrative may be presented in a variety of ways, and treated either allegorically, or tropically, or analogically, while the true and literal sense of the words in which the history is described remains the same.” The Dogmaticians therefore assume, it is true, such a spiritual sense in certain cases, but strictly speaking this is not understood as a second sense, co-ordinate with the first, but only that the natural signification of the words, which must always be the basis of the interpretation, admits also a special spiritual application, or contains at the same time a symbolical allusion. HOLL. (91): “That is called the mystical sense which is not immediately signified by the inspired words, but which proceeds and is deduced from the subject signified by the inspired words. It is, however, improperly and unauthorizedly called the sense of the biblical expression, since it is not the immediate sense of the inspired words, but inasmuch as God desire, by means of the subject or fact described by those words, to present some other subject or fact to the consideration of men. More properly, therefore, it is called the accommodation of the literal sense, or its mystical application, than the mystical sense of Scripture, e.g., Jonah 2:1. Here the prophet Jonah is said to have been three days and nights in the belly of the whale, and the literal sense it the one plainly designed by God, expressed and immediately implied by the words. When now this whole history or transaction is employed to signify the abode of Christ for three days and nights in the grave, no new sense here arises, but there is merely an accommodation and application of that historical narrative so as by it to express the fact that Christ was to be three days and nights in the grave.” Hence the Dogmaticians declare against the assumption of a double sense in the prophecies of the Old Testament. Such a mystical sense may either be designed by God, or it may be engrafted upon the literal sense. Only in the former case dare it be employed in the interpretation of Scriptures. CAL. (I, 664): “The mystical accommodation may either be ενγγραφος (contained in the written Word) and divine, or αγραφος (superadded to the written Word) and of human invention.” (HOLL.: Either innate or introduced.)

QUEN. (I, 131): “When our theological writers approve of the following scholastic axioms, viz.: ‘Mystical theology can prove nothing, parabolic theology cannot be advanced in argument, solid and effective arguments for proving the doctrines of the faith and refuting errors can be drawn only from the literal sense of Scripture,’ they do not exclude, but at the same time include, mystical applications of the literal sense of this or that biblical passage, made by the Holy Spirit Himself in the Holy Scriptures; yet they exclude allegorical and parabolical interpretations that men have devised and forced upon the Scriptures. For applications of the literal sense of this or that passage or sacred narrative, that are shown to exist and are explained in the Scriptures themselves, can be used in proof, just as other things that are literally expressed in the Scriptures. When, therefore, in any plain Scripture passage there is an accommodation of the literal sense to a spiritual subject, then its validity for proving or disapproving is just as great.” “The mystical sense, as it may be loosely styled, is divided by the Lutheran theologians into the allegorical, typical, and parabolical. It is called the allegorical sense, when a Scriptural historical narrative of things that really occurred is applied to a certain mystery or spiritual doctrine by the intention of the Holy Spirit in an allegorical manner; it is called typical when, under external facts or prophetic visions, things hidden, either present or future, are prefigured, or especially matters relating to the New Testament are shadowed forth; and parabolical, when something is described as having really occurred, and yet applied to designate something else that is spiritual.” (CAL. I, 665.)

§ 11. (4.) Efficacy.

CAL. (I, 478): “That the Holy Scriptures are living and efficacious, and a means of illumination, conversion, and salvation, prepared and vivified by Divine power.”

This subject will be treated of subsequently under the head of the Means of Grace.

§ 12. Of the Canon and the Apocryphal Books.

The written Word of God consists of the Word of God of the Old and the Word of God of the New Testament. [1] In the collection, however, that contains both of these, we find also other writings, which we do not call the Word of God in the same sense. We distinguish these two kinds of writings in the following manner, viz.: we call the first class canonical books, i.e., such as, because they are inspired by God, [2] are the rule and guide of our faith; [3] the others, apocryphal books, i.e., such whose divine origin is either doubtful or has been disproved. [4] Although both kinds are found in the Bible, only those of the first class are admitted as a rule of faith, whence they are called the Canon (catalogue, or number, of the canonical books), while those of the other class may contribute their share to the edification of believers, but are not to be regarded as the Word of God, and from them, therefore, no proof for any doctrine of the faith is to be drawn. [5]

Whether a book is canonical or not, we are then to ascertain by the signs whereby we recognize the Word of God in general as such, as of the divine origin, as inspired. [6] The testimony of the Holy Spirit is more conclusive evidence than anything else of the divine character of the contents of a book; next to this come all the other kinds of evidence which we have enumerated under the head of the Authority of Holy Scripture (§ 8, Note 10) as the external and internal criteria. [7] Among the latter, the testimony of the Church in the earliest ages in regard to the canonical character of a book is of special importance, for it is assuredly a matter of the highest moment if we know that a book was acknowledged as canonical already at a day when its origin could be most accurately ascertained. [8] More particularly do we need the testimony of the earliest ages of the Church in deciding historical questions, as to the name of the author of a book, as to the language in which it was originally composed; [9] for by the testimony of the Holy Spirit we may indeed become assured of the divinity of a book, experiencing its power in our own hearts, but He bears no testimony as to questions of this kind.

As canonical books of the Old Testament we acknowledge: (1) Genesis; (2) Exodus; (3) Leviticus; (4) Numbers; (5) Deuteronomy; (6) Joshua; (7) Judges; (8) Ruth; (9) I and II Samuel; (10) I and II Kings; (11) I and II Chronicles; (12) Ezra and Nehemiah (or second Ezra); (13) Esther; (14) Job; (15) Psalms; (16) Proverbs; (17) Ecclesiastes; (18) Song of Solomon; (19) Isaiah; (20) Jeremiah; (21) Lamentations; (22) Ezekiel; (23) Daniel; (24) twelve minor prophets, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zachariah, Malachi. [10]

As apocryphal: Tobias, Judith, Baruch, I, II, and III Maccabees, III and IV Ezra, Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus or Syracides. As appendices: Epistle of Jeremiah, annexed to Baruch, Appendix to Daniel, Supplement to Esther, Prayer of Manasseh.(GRH.) [11]

In the New Testament we have no apocryphal books in the same sense as in the Old Testament; but still there are single books of the New Testament in regard to whose origin and authors the evidence is not in all cases equally consentaneous. A certain distinction must therefore be made between them and the others that are equally authenticated by every species of evidence; and yet this distinction, resting as it does merely upon the want of entire agreement in the evidence, whilst very important testimony of various kinds is at hand to prove their canonical authority, is not of so much importance as to prevent us from making a canonical use of these books. [12]

The books of the New Testament authenticated by all the testimonies are the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, [13] and John, Acts of the Apostles, Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, his two Epistles to the Corinthians, his Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, two Epistles to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, the Epistle to Titus, the Epistle to Philemon, the first Epistle of Peter, and the first of John.

Those in regard to which doubts are entertained by some are the Epistle to the Hebrews, the second Epistle of Peter, the second and third of John, the Epistle of James, that of Jude, and the Apocalypse of John.

[1] GRH. (II, 50): “The biblical books are distinguished into the books of the Old and New Testaments. The books of the Old Testament are those which were written before the appearance of Christ; the books of the New Testament, those which were written after the appearance of Christ, and addressed to the Church. It is to be observed, that the books of the Old Testament are called such, not because they do not manifestly contain anything of the substance, grace, and felicity of the New Testament promised through Christ to those believing in Him, but because they predict and prefigure that as future and to be fulfilled in due time, which in the New Testament is announced as complete. Rom. 3:21; 16:26.”

HOLL. (129), as to the relation between the Old and New Testaments: “The books of the Old Testament were committed to the Israelitic Church, those of the New Testament to the Christian Church, collected from all nations. Yet the Christian Church receives the canonical books of the Old Testament on account of the most admirable harmony of the prophetic and apostolic writings, on account of their great utility, and especially in obedience to the command of Christ, John 5:39. There is a disparity between the Old and New Testaments as to the degree of perspicuity, but not a diversity as to the object of revelation, as if in the one, things were explicitly taught as necessary to be believed, different from those so taught in the other, since faith is the same in both. Eph. 4:16.”

[2] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I,85): “The Canonical Scriptures derive their eminent authority mainly from the fact that they are divinely inspired, 2 Tim. 3:16; i.e., that they came not by the will of man, but the men of God both spake and wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.”

[3] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I,81): “The Scriptures are called canonical, the canonical books, or the canon of Scripture, because they are a rule according to which the edifice of the faith of the Church is to be so constructed and framed that whatever agrees with this rule is to be regarded as right, sound, and apostolical; and that whatever does not quadrate with it, but varies either by excess or deficiency, is properly to be regarded as suppositious, adulterated, erroneous. This canon or rule is the doctrine divinely communicated from the beginning of the world to the human race through the patriarchs, prophets, Christ, and the apostles. And because this doctrine is by the will of God contained in the Scriptures, they are hence called canonical. A canon is an infallible rule or measure which by no means allows that anything be added to it or taken from it.”

[4] GRH. (II, 53): “The apocryphal books are so called απο του αποκρυπτειν, which signifies concealed, either because their origin was not clearly ascertained by those by whose testimony the authority of the true Scriptures has been handed down to us (Augustine); or, because they are not read publicly in the churches as a source of proof for ecclesiastical doctrines, but merely as a means of moral improvement.” HOLL. (131): “The apocryphal books are those which are found in the volume of Scripture, but do not belong to the canon, and were not written by immediate divine inspiration.” This definition applies only to those which accompany the canonical Scriptures; another class consists of those “which contain fable, errors, and lies, and hence are not to be read in the churches.” GRH. (II, 55): “The former kind are called apocryphal, in the sense of obscure (absconditi), i.e., uncertain and hidden as to their origin; the other class, in the sense that they deserve to be kept obscure (abscondendi) and ought not to be read in the churches.” CAL. (I, 491): “The division of the books of Scripture into canonical and apocryphal is improper and equivocal, since only the former meet the definition of the Holy Scriptures, the latter merely having the name.”

[5] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 93): “Are then these books to be absolutely condemned and rejected? This we by no means demand. Of what use then is this whole discussion? We reply, That the rule of faith or sound doctrine in the Church may be certain. The fathers taught that authoritative proof of ecclesiastical doctrine was to be drawn only from the canonical books. . . . The authority of canonical Scripture alone was judged competent to decide in disputed questions; but the other books, which Cyprian calls ecclesiastical, Jerome apocryphal, they desired indeed to have read in the churches, merely however for the edification of the people, not as proof in matters of doctrine. No dogma is, therefore, to be deduced from these books which has not clear and indubitable support and evidence in the canonical books. No controverted topic can be decided by these books, if there be not other and conclusive evidence in the canonical books. But whatever is said in these books is to be expounded and understood according to the analogy of those truths which are plainly taught in the canonical books.”

CAL. (I, 492): “Two things are necessary to constitute a canonical book; first, inspiration, or the immediate divine impulse, which proves the document in question to be divine truth, or the very Word of God; secondly, the divine sanction (canonicatio divina), by which God constitutes His written Word the perpetual and universal rule of the Church.”

HOLL. (129): “The canonical books are those whose doctrines and single words were committed to writing by the prophets and apostles, by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and were communicated to the Church by God, and received by her as the infallible rule of faith and morals for man who is to be saved.”

[6] HOLL. (126): “We judge of the canonical authority of Scripture with reference to its doctrines, by the same proofs and arguments by which we decide in regard to its divine origin. For the Holy Scriptures are an infallible rule or canon of faith and morals, because they derive their origin immediately from God, and are designed by Him for canonical use. Wherefore, when the abovementioned criteria convince us that the meaning or doctrine of Scripture has proceeded immediately from God, there is no need of an extended demonstration of canonical authority, so far as the doctrine of the canon is concerned.”

[7] HOLL. (126): “The canonical authority of Scripture, considered as to its doctrines, is proved by external and internal criteria, but especially by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit illuminating the minds of men, through the Scriptures attentively read or heard from the mouth of a teacher.”

[8] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 85): “That this whole matter, in itself of such vast importance, might be perfectly secure against all imposture, God selected certain men to write, furnished them with many miracles and divine testimonials, that there might be no doubt that those things which they wrote were divinely inspired. Finally, these writings, divinely inspired, were at the time when they were written, by common consent, with public indorsement, presented, given, and intrusted to the Church, that she should, by all possible care and forethought, preserve them uncorrupted, transmit them thence from hand to hand, and intrust them to posterity. And as the ancient Church, in the time of Moses, Joshua, and the prophets, so also the primitive Church in the time of the apostles, could give certain testimony as to which writings were divinely inspired. For she knew the authors whom God commended to the Church by the peculiar evidence; she knew also what those things were that were written by them, and, from what she learned orally from the apostles, could decide that those things which were written were the very same doctrine which the apostles orally delivered. . . . The Scriptures, therefore, derive canonical authority principally from the Holy Spirit, by whose impulse and inspiration they were written; secondarily, from the writers themselves, to whom God gave clear and peculiar proofs of their truth; finally, from the primitive Church, as a witness, in whose day these writings were published and approved. Now this testimony of the primitive Church concerning the divine inspiration of the Scriptures has been handed down in perpetual succession to posterity, and carefully preserved in certain ancient historical records; so that the Church in subsequent ages is the guardian of the testimony of the primitive Church concerning the Scriptures. There is, therefore, the greatest difference between the testimony (1) of the primitive Church in the times of the apostles, that (2) of the Church in the first centuries, which received the testimony of the primitive Church, and (3) that of the present Church concerning the Scriptures; for if what now is and formerly was the Church, can show the testimony of those who received and knew the testimony of the early Church concerning the true Scriptures, we give our assent to her as to a witness proving her assertions. But she does not possess the power of determining or deciding anything concerning the sacred books of which she cannot adduce clear documentary proof from the testimony of the primitive Church.”

As to the manner in which the primitive Church proceeded in this matter, CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 87) thus expresses himself: “The testimony of the primitive Church, in the times of the apostles, concerning the genuine writings of the apostles, the immediately succeeding generations constantly and faithfully retained and preserved; so that when many others afterwards were brought forward, claiming to have been written by the apostles, they were tested and rejected as supposititious and adulterated, first, for this reason, that it could not be shown and proved by the testimony of the original Church either that they were written by the apostles, or approved by the living apostles, and transmitted and intrusted by them to the Church in the beginning; secondly, because they proposed strange doctrine not accordant with that which the Church received from the apostles, and was at that time still preserving fresh in the memory of all.”

[9] HOLL. (126): “But the canonical authority of Scripture, in reference to the original language, or the authentic Hebrew text of the Old and Greek of the New Testament, is indeed distinctly proved by the testimony of the primitive Church, but not by this alone.” (127): “We add to the testimony of the primitive Church the testimony of Scripture, its continued preservation for the profitable use of men, and the character of its style.”

The intent of this passage and the one quoted in the eighth note is the following: The internal and external criteria may indeed beget in us a human faith, but not a divine; the latter can be produced only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. And this must not necessarily be obtained by the use of the original text: a translation will answer quite as well, since the power of the Holy Spirit lies in the sense and not in the letter of the Word. Wherefore, also, we cannot become divinely assured, in regard to the idiom in which any of the sacred books has been written, by an internal experience. For information on this point we are therefore referred to historical evidence; and the state of the case thus appears to be, that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is necessary to assure us of the divinity of the Scriptures, to which must be added historical proofs to satisfy us as to the language in which a sacred book was written, as to its author, etc. For BR. (112) thus expresses himself: “The internal illuminating power of the Scriptures is associated with the sense in every language, in such a manner, that it does not point out precisely the words of the original text as essentially different from other equivalent words of the same or any other language, text or version.” But the other criteria, which prove the inspiration of the doctrine contained in Scripture, either do not at all relate to the material part, or the words, of Scripture, but only to the formal part, or the doctrine; or, when they do in some degree relate to the words and their connection, and are employed to prove in general that God is the author of the words of Scripture in any idiom, whatever it may be, they still cannot clearly indicate the precise words and letters in which each book of Scripture was originally committed to writing. There remains, therefore, the testimony of the Church, which does not, indeed, confer canonical or normative dignity upon the books of Scripture in any particular language, nor does it by its own authority induce that reception of the divine faith by which the inspiration of that idiom is believed; but notwithstanding this, inasmuch as it historically proves a certain idiom or writing to be the original of the books of Scripture, in which it received them as written by the sacred penman, thus producing a moral certainty in regard to it, it now joined with that which the Scriptures themselves teach, and with which the Holy Spirit intimately connects his own influence, holds a place in the discussion of the faith. As an example, HOLL. (127) adduces the following: “When it is asked, Was the Gospel of Matthew originally written in Greek or Hebrew? this is a question not of Dogmatics, but of history. . . . Of this fact the Primitive Church is a credible witness, for it fought upon earth under the banner of Christ, together with the writers then living in the flesh, and received their autographs from their own hands. . . . Thus we seek from the Jewish Church evidence for the Hebrew original of the Old Testament, and from the primitive Christian Church for the original Greek of the New.”

It is still worthy of remark that it cannot be clearly understood, from the passages quoted from Hollazius and Baier, whether these theologians supposed that, as each individual can attain only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit unto divine faith in the revelation by Christ, so in like manner each individual can be convinced of the divinity of each single book of Scripture by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The contrary might seem to be proved by the fact that the most of the theologians speak of the testimony of the Holy Spirit only when they are discussing the grounds upon which the authority of Scripture rests (so GRH.); for when it is asserted that each individual attains to divine assurance of the authority of Scripture only through the testimony of the Holy Spirit, this is still somewhat different from the assertion that the canonicity of each separate book must be proved in the case of each individual by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. And Chemnitz, further, does not mention, in this connection, this testimony of the Holy Spirit; but, in order to prove the canonicity of the separate books, points only to the testimony of the earliest Church, which could appeal to the indorsement of the Apostles. And, finally, in all the investigations by the Dogmaticians, in regard to the canonicity of a single book, there is never any allusion to the testimony of the Holy Spirit (Luther’s well-known expression of opinion, in regard to the Epistle of James, must not here be taken into the account), but they are all conducted upon the basis of historical evidence. The true state of the case appears most probably to be, that the question whether the proof of the canonicity of a particular book is to be distinguished from the proof of the divine authority of Scripture in general, was never clearly brought home to the consciousness of our theologians; so that the passage quoted in this note, and in Note 6, are designed merely to preclude the error of supposing that the historical testimony of the Church can establish divine faith in the Scriptures in general.

[10] Many theologians divide the books of the Old Testament into legal, historical, dogmatical, and prophetical.

§ 13. What are Articles of Faith?

THE whole subject matter of revelation naturally divides itself into single propositions, which we call articles of faith. “An article of faith is a part of the doctrine, revealed in the written Word of God, concerning God and divine things, proposed to the sinner to be believed in order to his salvation.” HOLL. (43) [1] Taken together, these articles form the sum of what the Christian is to believe, [2] and they are closely connected together, standing in the same relation to the general contents of revelation as the members of a body to the body itself. The articles of faith have their origin solely in the Holy Scriptures; [3] but, inasmuch as their contents embrace some truths which could not be known in any other way, and others of which some knowledge may be gained by the light of nature; and, inasmuch as all the truths contained in them are not of equal importance for our salvation, and do not stand in equally intimate connection with it, the articles of faith may be divided into,

I. The pure articles (which are known only by divine revelation), and the mixed (which are manifest not merely from revelation, but also from the light of nature. BR. (43). [4]

II. The fundamental and non-fundamental.

HOLL. (46): “The fundamental articles are parts of the Christian doctrine so necessary to be known that, when they are not known, the foundation of the faith is not savingly apprehended or retained by man; and when they are denied by him, to that same extent it is overturned.” [5]

(53): “The non-fundamental articles are parts of the Christian doctrine which one may be ignorant of or deny, and yet be saved.” [6] But the fundamental articles are again divided into “primary, without the knowledge of which no one can attain unto eternal salvation, or which must be known in order for any one to hold the foundation of the faith and secure salvation;” [7] and “the secondary, which one may be ignorant of, but dare not deny, much less oppose, without injury to the foundation of the faith.” QUEN. (I, 243). [8]

The whole of the articles of faith the Church has collected in the Symbols. These contain the confession of faith which the Church has put forth at different times, and are therefore divided into the symbols of earlier and later times. [9]

[1] HOLL. (43): “The term, article, is derived from artus, and this from arcto. It properly signifies members of the body closely joined together, as the joints of the fingers closely cohere. Metaphorically, the word article is applied to the parts of the doctrine of faith, which are most intimately joined together.” QUEN. (I, 241): “So that articles of faith are parts of the doctrine of faith, divinely revealed for our salvation, which are most intimately united to each other and to the whole, as the parts or joints of a finger, and into which the whole structure of the Christian religion may be resolved, as a finger into its joints. And their connection is so intimate that, when one is removed, the rest cannot continue sound and whole.” The word is sometimes taken in a wider, and sometimes in a narrower sense. HOLL. (44): “Collectively, it signifies a whole head of doctrine; distributively, any assertion or enunciation which constitutes a part of Christian doctrine. The Christian doctrine is divided into heads or theological loci, and these again into certain theses. The heads of doctrine are called articles of faith, as well as the theses under the separate heads; e. g., the theological locus [general topic] concerning Christ is called an article of faith, and the proposition, ‘Christ, in the flesh, sitteth at the right hand of God,’ is also called an article of faith.” Sometimes, merely the mysteries of the faith are meant by the articles of faith. BR. (42): “It is certain that the term, article of faith, is sometimes used in a stricter sense, as accurately denoting the mysteries of faith necessary to be believed in order to salvation, namely, the pure articles, and of these the fundamental alone.”

[2] QUEN. (I, 241): “The subjects with which the articles of faith are occupied are τα πιστα, the credenda, the things to be believed as such. For a distinction must here be made between the historical and the dogmatical, and between the moral doctrines, which teach what is to be done or avoided, and the doctrines of faith, which treat of what is to be believed or not believed. For although faith, generally viewed, may have respect to all that is contained in the Word of God, whether it be of an historical or moral or dogmatical character; yet it has nevertheless a special reference to the doctrines of faith or to the things to be believed, as such.”

GRH. (VII, 165): “Since those things which are propounded in the Scriptures as matters of faith, are not of one kind, but some pertain to the faith directly and per se, and other in certain respects and remotely, such as historical descriptions of deeds performed by the saints, so not all the matters contained in the Scriptures can be regarded as articles of faith, strictly and accurately speaking, but only those doctrines the knowledge of which is necessary to salvation.”. . . . And, after an appeal to Thomas Aquinas: “If the Jesuits in the Ratisbon Colloquium had observed this principle of the teacher, they never would have blurted forth the assertion: ‘It is an article of faith, that the dog of Tobias wagged his tail.’”

If the Dogmaticians found it necessary, over against the Romanists, to guard against too wide a use of the term, “articles of faith,” they found it equally necessary, at a later day, in opposition to Calixtus, to guard against a too narrow use of the same expression. After the example of Bonaventura, he divided the doctrines into antecedent, constituent, and consequent. In the first class he included everything that man can know by means of his reason, without the aid of revelation; in the second, all in the strict constituting the faith, and standing in special relation to the salvation provided by Christ, and that cannot remain unknown without peril to salvation. In the third class he included all those doctrines which are derived only by inference from the special doctrines of the faith. The term “articles of faith” he applied only to those of the second class. “The constituent articles of faith are those which, in themselves and their substance, so to speak, and as divinely declared, must be known and believed, from the necessity both of means and of the command. . . . The knowledge of the antecedents and consequents is not a matter for every one, but only for the more advanced.”. . . . In opposition to him, therefore, the distinction was made, that everything contained in the Scriptures that refers to the faith is an article of faith. As Calixtus further maintained: “That the Apostles’ Creed sufficiently comprehended all the articles of faith, so that the ignorance of other doctrines might be regarded as by no means harmful to salvation;” and: “That the Apostles’ Creed was a mark for distinguishing not only Christians from the heathen, but also the orthodox or Catholics from heretics; so that whoever received the Apostles’ Creed should be considered members of the Catholic Church and subjects of the kingdom of Christ, and were by no means to be condemned as heretics, whatever errors they might entertain,” — he is answered by the statement (QUEN. I, 30): “The Apostles’ Creed is not an adequate test of the doctrines that must be believed in order to salvation, for many articles especially necessary are omitted, as: Of Original Sin, Redemption, the Personal Union, the Universality of the Grace and Merit of Christ, Justification by Faith, the Imputation of Christ’s Righteousness, etc.”

[3] HOLL. (44): “A true article of faith must be (a) revealed in the written Word of God; (b) have reference to the salvation of man; (c) be intimately connected with the remaining doctrines of the faith; and (d) be not apparent to unaided reason.” QUEN. (I, 242): “For it is possible for doctrines to be perspicuously and plainly propounded in Scripture, while their subjects, peculiar to faith, may not be clearly apprehended, as the mystery of the Trinity, etc., etc., since by the light of nature they would never have been known; whence faith is said to be occupied with such things as are not seen. Heb. 11:1.”

In opposition to the assertion of the Socinians: “Whatever is absolutely necessary to salvation, must necessarily be with simple and entire literalness written in the Scriptures,” we have the statement of CAL. (I, 804): “Although we acknowledge that those things which must be believed in order to salvation ought to be clearly taught and exhibited in the Holy Scriptures, so that they may be drawn thence by all, yet we do not admit that they are there expressed precisely, or literally, so that those things which are deduced by easy, ready, and obvious inference from the Holy Scriptures, are not to be considered as articles of faith and necessary to be believed.”

[4] QUEN. (I, 242): “There are some doctrines in Scripture which are simply pista (matters of faith), and cannot be at all learned from reason, but are infinitely above it; there are also some things to be believed which, although they are revealed in Scripture and necessary to be known, are nevertheless of such a nature that even reason by the use of her own principles could attain some sort of knowledge of them; hence arise the pure and mixed articles. The former are derived from the Word of God alone and are simply matters of faith, as the article concerning the Trinity, etc., etc.; the latter, although they may be known n some degree from the light of nature, are nevertheless purely matters of faith, in so far as they are known by divine revelation; e.g., that God is, etc., is known from evident proofs, and is believed on the authority of the divine revelation. Yet all such things as may be known to some extent by the light of nature, are not matters of faith so far as they are apprehended by the aid of the light of nature, but in as far as they are apprehended by the aid of divine revelation.” In like manner, HOLL. (45): “No article of faith formally considered, so far as it is an article of faith, is mixed; inasmuch as all articles of faith are dependent on divine revelation, and therefore, with respect to their formal object, are not naturally apprehended.”

Of the pure articles of faith HOLL. (45) remarks: “They treat of the mysteries of faith that transcend the comprehension of unaided human reason. Μυεισθαι (mystery) is derived from μυειν, which signifies to have closed eyes, to compress the mouth, and consequently to be silent. From μυειν is formed μυεειν, which signifies to imbue any one with honest doctrine. Μυεισθαι is the same as to be initiated into sacred things. Ο μυστης is a man initiated into sacred things, or who is imbued with such knowledge of sacred things, that he may teach them, and is to be heard with reverential silence. To μυστηριον, in profane authors, signifies every secret matter that dare not be rashly mentioned, but especially the sacred Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres, guarded by the strictest silence. In sacred literature, mysteries are divine and supernatural matters, unknown to unaided reason, not intuitively perceived, but divinely revealed for the sake of our salvation.”

[5] QUEN. (I, 242): “The fundamental articles, or those that cannot be unknown, or at least not denied, consistently with faith and salvation, are those which are intimately connected with the foundation of the faith. A foundation, generally speaking is, as N. Hunnius defines it, ‘that which is the first in any structure, which lies beneath the whole structure, and is not sustained by anything else.’” Thus the foundation of the faith is that upon which the faith, and, indeed, the whole of Christianity, as a house that is to be built and upheld, is based. And, inasmuch as a foundation is sometimes the same as a cause, a fundamental article is such a doctrine as serves to produce and establish faith and eternal salvation, or which explains some cause of faith and salvation. QUEN., according to the method of Hunnius, distinguishes a threefold foundation. “1. Substantial, the object upon which man rests his confidence, from the beneficial effect of which he expects eternal salvation; or, it is the proper object of faith, which is the triune God, to be embraced by faith in Christ, the Mediator. 2. Organic, the Word of God, which is as a seed, out of which Christians are born again; thus it is also called a foundation, inasmuch as it is a means of generating faith, and a source of doctrine which lies underneath faith, and thus is a foundation of faith. 3. Dogmatic, that first part of the heavenly doctrine which is not referable to any other doctrine, but revealed for its own sake, and to which all other doctrines, as if revealed for its sake, are referred, and from which, as a sufficient and immediate cause, faith results. Hence heresy is not any and every error, contrary to the Word of God, but one that undermines or overturns the foundation of the faith.” HOLL. (46): “A foundation of the faith is either real, i.e. substantial, or dogmatic, i.e., doctrinal. The substantial foundation of the faith and salvation is Christ, since He is the meritorious cause of obtaining from God forgiveness of sins and eternal life. In 1 Cor. 3:11, Paul calls Christ the foundation of the building; for the whole Church rest upon Christ. . . . But since the Church is the assembly of all who believe and are to be saved, it may be legitimately concluded that Christ is the foundation of faith and salvation. The dogmatic foundation of the faith is the collection of doctrines divinely revealed, by which Christ, the substantial foundation of the faith, and the sources and means of salvation necessarily connected therewith, are set forth. By the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Paul means, in Eph. 2:20, the doctrine taught by them. Moreover, the apostle teaches that Christ is the cornerstone, indicating that the doctrine of the prophets and apostles is in such a sense the foundation, that it rests upon Christ Jesus, as the ultimate cornerstone and foundation. . . . The substantial and the dogmatic foundation of the faith are not two foundations essentially contradistinguished from each other, nor do they differ as to their subject-matter, but as to our method of conceiving of them, in consequence of their different connotation. For Christ is the foundation, as to the subject-matter; the doctrine concerning Christ is the foundation, as to our knowledge. But the doctrine concerning Christ is the foundation, as to our knowledge. But the doctrine concerning Christ is nothing else than Christ, known by the intellect, and exhibited in a written or preached form, that others may know Him.”

[6] BR. (56): “E.g., concerning the sin and eternal ruin of certain angels, concerning the immortality of the first man before the Fall, concerning Antichrist, concerning the origin of the soul, whether by creation or traduction.” But he adds to this: “At the same time, moreover, we are to be careful in regard to this matter, lest by embracing or professing error we rashly sin against divine revelation and God Himself; especially, lest something be maintained, through the persuasion of others, contrary to conscience, whereby the foundation and the truth of one or more of the fundamental articles of the faith are overturned. For thus, as by a mortal sin, faith and the Holy Spirit may be and are entirely driven away.”

§ 15. Preliminary Statement. The Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God.

The full and saving knowledge of God we obtain, of course, only from revelation. But aside from this there exists a knowledge of God, for we find it even among the heathen. We can therefore distinguish a twofold source from which the knowledge of God may be derived, the one, the volume of Nature, and the other, the volume of the Scriptures; and the knowledge of God is accordingly both natural, and revealed or supernatural. [3]

The natural knowledge is either innate or acquired, i.e., a certain knowledge of God is inborn, and this can be expanded and further confirmed by the contemplation of the works and ways of God in nature and history. [4] The knowledge thus arising, though in itself true, may nevertheless be corrupted and changed into error through the moral depravity existing in man; [5] it is at best very imperfect, making known indeed something concerning God, e.g., His existence and somewhat of His attributes and will, but this never in its entire extent, and never in such manner as to give to man an absolute certainty, so as to furnish a trustworthy guide for his faith and life; [6] much less does it suffice to secure his salvation. [7] The reason of this imperfection lies, however, in the depravity of human nature, which, since its fall, can no longer lift itself up to a perfect knowledge of God. All knowledge thus derived we must therefore regard as the remnant of a knowledge which, but for the Fall, we would have possessed in full measure. [8] It serves, accordingly, rather to awaken in us a longing after true and perfect knowledge (cognitio paedagogica), and in some measure to regulate our moral deportment, even before the knowledge communicated by revelation has reached us (cognitio paedeutica); and it can also be profitably employed along with the revealed knowledge (cognitio didactica). [9] We still need revelation, therefore, in order to acquire full and true knowledge. [10]

[1] GRH. (III, 1): “That this doctrine concerning God is necessary, is proved (1) by the design for which man was created. Just as all things else were created on account of man, so man was brought into being in order rightly to know and worship, to love and honor God his Creator. . . . (2) By the design for which God reveals Himself. God, coming forth from the hidden seat of His majesty, not only in the creation of the world, but also and most of all in the revelation of His Word, out of His boundless goodness unto men reveals Himself, surely with no other aim than that men may rightly know God through this revelation, and may preserve and hand down to their posterity the true doctrine concerning God, free from any intermixture of error and in its integrity.” [MEL. begins his Loci of 1542: “For this end man was created and redeemed, that he might be the image and temple of God, to proclaim God’s praises.”]

[2] GRH. (ibid.): “As the Holy Scriptures are the only source of knowledge in Theology, so God, boundless in goodness, supreme in power, is the only and absolute source of existence, not only with reference to the Holy Scriptures themselves (in which the Word of God or the divine revelation is contained), but also with reference to the divine works concerning which Theology treats. The centre of all Scripture, the nucleus of Theology, the end and aim of our knowledge and desire, all these are one and the same. We pass, therefore, in convenient order, from the article concerning the Scriptures to the article concerning the Nature of God and the Divine Attributes.”

QUEN. (I, 250): “The chief end of man and of all Theology is God, and the knowledge, worship, and enjoyment of God; with the doctrine concerning Him, therefore, we properly begin, when Theology is teated after the manner of a practical discipline.”

HOLL. (187): “As Theology is a practical science, we are first of all to treat of its design. But as the aim of Theology is twofold, in part objective, that is, the infinitely perfect and supremely beneficent God, and partly formal, that is, the beholding and beatific fruition of God; so the objective end of Theology, namely, God, who thoroughly satisfies the desire of man, is first to be considered.”

[3] GRH. (I, 93): “Two things lead to the knowledge of God: the creature and the Scripture (Augustine).”

HOLL. (188): “The knowledge of God is sought both by the light of Nature or Reason, and by the light of Revelation.”

[4] QUEN. (I, 251): “The natural knowledge of God is that by which man, without any special revelation, may know of himself, though very imperfectly, by the light of Nature and from the Book of Nature, that there is some supreme Divinity, that He, by His own wisdom and power, controls this whole universe, and that He has brought all things into being.”

GRH. (I, 93): “Innate knowledge is that common conception concerning God engraven and impressed upon the mind of every man by Nature, and hence from the womb, as though from principles born within us or κοιναις εννοιαις (which are nothing else than certain remains and ερειπια of the divine image, sparks and scintillations of that clear light which shone with full splendor in the mind of man before the fall), which also embrace some knowledge of God; as, that He is one, good, etc.” (III, 42): “These scintillations therefore we refer to that internal Book of Nature, to which also belongs the book συνειδησεος, the internal testimony of conscience, which the scholastics call συντηρησις; for from principles born within us there arises in the heart of every one this practical syllogism: ‘He who leads an impious life shall experience the wrath and punishment of a divine judge.’ The reason of this lies in that which is by nature engraven upon all, i.e., that there is a God, that God is to be worshiped, that God is the avenger of crimes. The conscience of the guilty adds: ‘I have led a wicked life.’”

(Id., III, 42): “Natural knowledge is acquired by the human mind from the external Book of Nature, i.e., from the contemplation of the divine effects and ways, by the exercise of its natural powers.” As such effects of the divine agency, GRH. enumerates (I, 94): “(1) The creation of things visible. (2) The variety, beauty, and order of created things. (3) The supporting, governing, and preserving of created things. (4) The profuse bestowment of the various gifts which minister to the necessities of man and other living beings. (5) The notice and retribution of the avenging eye and hand of God. (5) The working of miracles. (7) The foretelling of future events. (8) The periodical overthrow of kingdoms. (9) The nature of the human mind. (10) The fragments of natural knowledge, and among these the distinction of good and evil. (11) The terrors, gnawings, and stings of conscience. (12) The series of efficient and final causes.”

[Mel. (Loci, 1542) cites as proofs of the Divine existence: 1. The order of Nature, which could not have arisen or be maintained by accident, or have arisen from matter. The perpetuity of species, e.g., that men are born of men, and cattle of cattle, is cited as one illustration. 2. The nature of the human mind. A senseless and irrational thing cannot be the cause of an intelligent nature. 3. Moral distinctions made universally by men. These could not have originated from matter. 4. The universality of the testimony to God’s existence. 5. Terrors of conscience, implying a Supreme Judge. 7. Organization of political society, which could not have arisen accidentally, but points to a divine mind, implanting within man the capacity and laws of order. 7. The series of efficient causes implying a First Cause. If the series were infinite, there would be no order among the causes, and none would necessarily cohere. 8. Final causes prove a designing mind. Everything in Nature is arranged with reference to an end.]

[GRH. (III, 4) recapitulates proofs of philosophers and scholastics: 1. The series of moving objects in this world implies a First Mover. 2. The order of efficient causes implies a First Cause. 3. The different degrees of good imply a Supreme Standard. 4. The direction of all things, even those that are irrational, towards a certain end. 5. The natural inclination of all men to believe that there is a Governor of the Universe, whom they call God. This is illustrated by the fact that, in sudden dangers, when men recognize the impotency of human aid, they instinctively resort to prayer.]

QUEN. (I, 253): “The natural knowledge of God is twofold; partly εμφυτος, or by nature impressed upon the minds of men in their very origin, innate and implanted, by which men recognize God through certain principles born within them, as it were by certain fragments and remains of the divine image, without any research or operation of the mind; partly επικτετος, or acquired, because it is evolved through the inborn principles of nature through a process of reasoning and the accurate contemplation of created things, or gathered from the works of God in creation and those traces of divinity which are scattered throughout the universe. The former is called subjective; the latter, objective. The former all men, even infants, possess; but the latter is not found in all. The former is propagated by generation; the latter by the instruction of others, or also by personal culture and investigation. The former may be called constitutional knowledge, for it belongs to us after the manner of a constitutional tendency, even before the use and exercise of reason; the latter, actual, because it exerts itself and is obtained by reasoning and research.” Compare also the remark of GRH. (III, 46): “Finally, we observe, that when Ostorodus says that men do not obtain whatever knowledge they have of God or of divinity from nature, or from the contemplation of created things, but alone by hearing and from the teaching of others, the word, “hearing,” is ambiguous. For if Ostorodus means that for all knowledge of God there is required a special manifestation of God through the Word, this we totally deny; but, if by the word, hearing, be understood the doctrine and precepts derived from our ancestors, who followed nature alone as a teacher, then we say that this, no less than the principles connate with us, and also the contemplation of created things, belongs to natural knowledge. But, although the arguments are distinct by which we demonstrate as well the innate as the acquired natural knowledge of God; yet, when the Photinians deny both, it is sufficient for us to prove against them that there is some natural knowledge of God, from whatever source derived, whether from natural instinct, or intuition, or the instruction of others, who have followed Nature alone as a teacher.”

CAL., in opposition to the Socinians, thus sums up the propositions in regard to the natural knowledge of God: “(1) That man, destitute of the revealed Word of God, can attain, by the use of sound reason, to some knowledge concerning God, His being and His general will or providence. (II, 61) (2) That not only the faculty or the power of knowing God, but also a certain knowledge of God, belongs to us by nature. (II, 73) (3) Although there does not belong to man a knowledge of God before the use and exercise of reason, so far as concerns a distinct notion or mental conception, yet we think it cannot be denied that there exists in man a certain disposition, or a kind of constitutional tendency, a certain τελειωσις of intellectual power left in man after the Fall, by the use of which man can, to some extent, recognize God without the help of a teacher. (II, 80.) (4) That it is known to man, not only naturally, but also per se, that there is a God.” (II, 86.)

The proof for the existence of an innate knowledge is drawn from Rom. 1:19, and 2:14, 15; also from the following reasons: “(1) From the connate distinction between good and evil that is stamped upon the minds of all; (2) From the dread of a supreme divinity naturally springing up in the hearts of men; (3) From the terrors of an evil conscience and the cheerfulness and security of a good conscience; (4) From the torments of conscience on account of a crime committed. . . . (5) From the unanimous consent of all nations; (6) From the secret inclination of all to some form of religion; (7) From moral precepts drawn from the light of nature.” (QUEN. I, 253.)

The acquired knowledge is proved from Rom. 1:20; Acts 17:27.

[5] QUEN. (I, 253): “That the natural knowledge of God is true, is evident from this, that the apostle expressly calls it αλεθεια, Rom. 1:18 sq., and with the addition, αλεθειαν του θεου, v. 25, as that which springs from the original truth; where, nevertheless, we must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, considered in and through itself, and in so far as it has united with it imperfection, corruption of reason, and a proclivity to various errors. Viewed in the former light it is true, viewed in the latter it is mingled through accident with falsehood.”

[6] CAL. (II, 47): “The imperfection of the natural knowledge of God as to those things which are revealed in nature, and its nullity as to the supernatural mysteries of faith.”

QUEN. (I, 253): “The natural knowledge of God is imperfect mainly in two respects: (1) as regards its object, this being either altogether unknown (and here belongs the Gospel, which is a mystery hidden from the ages), or not fully known (and here belongs the doctrine of the Law, which man knows from natural sources only in part); (2) As regards its subject, either not recognizing God with sufficient constancy, or sometimes doubting concerning Him in consequence of congenital corruption.”

CHMN. (Loci, I, 20): “The natural knowledge of God either amounts to nothing, or is imperfect, or languid. It amounts to nothing, since all philosophy knows nothing whatever of the gratuitous promise of the forgiveness of sins; for the Son of God has revealed this to the Church from the bosom of the Eternal Father, John 1:18; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 1:21; 2:7. It is imperfect, for the heathen know only a small portion of the Law; but of the inner worship of the First Table, reason neither knows not determines anything for certain. Heathen philosophers teach of only external and civil topics, mingling with them many foolish paradoxes, concerning which there is among them no agreement. It is languid, for although the fact that God exists and requires obedience is impressed upon men’s minds, nevertheless, the assent to this is not only feeble, but is often shaken by horrid doubts. An apt illustration is found in the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero, discussing with Antony the immortality of the soul, says: ‘Read diligently Plato’s treatise concerning the immortality of the soul. Nothing will be left for you to desire.’ ‘This I have done frequently,’ Antony replies; ‘but, somehow or other, as long as I read I assent, but whenever I lay aside the volume and begin to reflect concerning the immortality of the soul, all my assent glides away.’”

In regard to the substance of what is known by the light of nature, QUEN. (I, 255): “The controversy here is not whether man, naturally or without revelation, can recognize το τι εστι, what and who is the true God, according to all the peculiarities of the divine nature; and whether he can naturally fully understand His providence and His special will in the government of the Church and in the eternal salvation of men: for all these things are to be sought only through the revealed Word. But the question is whether man can naturally know το υτι, whether God be, and in general recognize what that Divine Being is, who is the cause of all things in nature, who is just, good, holy, is to be worshiped, etc.; and so, whether man without a revelation can have any adequate knowledge concerning the true God or any true conceptions concerning God, although in particular he may apply them improperly, as e.g., to that which is not truly God.”

With the last remark from Quenstedt compare the statement of Gerhard (I, 96): “We must distinguish between the conception of God, derived by the heathen mind from the contemplation of His creatures, and the application of that conception; the former is legitimate, the latter is far from being so. For, although they derive the conception of eternal power and divinity . . . from the Book of Nature, yet they do not rightly apply it to the one Jehovah, . . . but they ascribe the same to irrational animals, serpents, reptiles, etc.; and inasmuch as they of their own accord devise a method of worship, they thereby worship the imagination of their own hearts and not the true God.”

Through the light of nature man attains, therefore, only “a partial knowledge concerning the power, wisdom, goodness and providence of God.” GRH. (III, 60): “Man has been deprived of the knowledge of God, so far as the integrity of natural knowledge is concerned, for the greater part of it has been obliterated from his mind by sin; so far as its purity is concerned, for the knowledge yet remaining is very much obscured; and, in view also of the peculiar wickedness of certain persons.”

[7] QUEN. (I, 261): “The natural knowledge of God is not adequate to secure everlasting life, nor has any mortal ever been redeemed, nor can any one ever be redeemed, by it alone. Acts 4:12; Rom. 10:18; Mark 16:16; Gal. 3:11; Eph. 4:18; Gal. 4:8; Eph. 2:12.”

MEL. (I, 9): “Although, in some way, the human mind comes to the knowledge of the fact that God punishes the guilty, nevertheless concerning reconciliation it knows nothing without the revelation of the divine promise.”

[8] QUEN. (I, 254): “We must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, viewed in its original integrity, and the same in its fragmentary remains; the former is a perfect θεονγνωσια, constituting a part of the mental condition of our first parents, as graciously created; the latter, on the other hand, is a partial and imperfect knowledge of God, still inherent in our corrupt nature since the Fall. It is as it were a little spark of primeval light, a small drop from a vast ocean, or an atom of the ashes of a splendid house in ruins.”

[9] CHMN. (Loci, Part I, 21): “The reasons why God imparted the external knowledge of Himself to the minds of all men are: (1) For the sake of external discipline, which God wished to be exercised by all men, even the unregenerate; (2) that God might be sought after (Acts 17:27-30); (3) that He might render men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20).”

CAL. (II, 40): “The use of the natural knowledge of God is (1) Paedagogical, for seeking after the true God, who has manifested Himself through the Scriptures in the Church; (2) Paedeutical, for directing morals and external discipline both within and without the Church; (3) Didactic, because it contributes to the exposition and illustration of the Scriptures, if it be rightly employed.” (Also II, 51): “The use of this doctrine (i.e., the topic concerning the natural knowledge of God) is that we may understand whether we can by nature know anything of God, or what and how much we can thus know; lest we either deny those things which are naturally manifest, or ascribe too much importance to them: also, that we gratefully recognize this manifestation and cultivate this natural knowledge as the Book of Nature is daily unfolded, and do not suppress it, or abuse it, but duly unite the Book of Nature with the Book of Scripture, and finally be confirmed and stimulated by the teaching and example of those who have applied themselves to the study of truth and virtue as here exhibited and illustrated.”

[10] QUEN. (I, 268): “The supernatural or revealed knowledge of God is that saving knowledge of the triune God and of divine things, drawn from the written word of God, which has flourished from the beginning of the Church and was ordained for human salvation.”

CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 22): “The saving knowledge of God through which we obtain eternal life, is that revealed through the Word, in which God makes known Himself and His will. To this revelation, God has bound His Church, which knows, worships, and glorifies God only as He has revealed Himself in this Word, so that in this way the true and only Church of God may be distinguished from all heathen religions.”

§ 16. (1). The Certainty of the Divine Existence.

Although the divine existence is postulated in the natural human consciousness, which furnishes many proofs of it, [1] yet we become perfectly certain of it only through revelation. [2]

§ 17. (2.) The Essence of God.

Our knowledge of the essence of God (quid sit Deus) is also mainly derived from revelation, for the Holy Scriptures give us in His names, attributes, and works a description of God Himself. [3] And with the knowledge thus derived we must be satisfied, for we know concerning the essence of God nothing more, and nothing more specific, than what the Holy Scriptures teach. We acquire, indeed, from this source no adequate and complete knowledge of the essence of God; for this transcends our powers of comprehension, and for this reason the Scriptures declare the incomprehensibility of the divine essence. (1 Tim. 6:16; 1 John 3:2; Rom. 11:33.) But we may very well be content with the knowledge imparted to us through the Holy Scripture, as we nevertheless learn therefrom as much about God and His essence as is needful for our salvation. [4]

From what has been said, it is manifest in what sense God may be defined. He cannot be literally defined, i.e., we cannot express in words what God is as to His essence, what He is in Himself, because no adequate conception can be formed of Him; but a definition of God, in a wider sense, may nevertheless be given, in so far, namely, as, upon the authority of the Holy Scriptures, a description of God may be presented, according to which we can most clearly distinguish between Him and other essences. [5]

Upon the authority of the description of God given in the Holy Scriptures, we can thus define Him as an Infinite Spiritual Essence.

[6] [1] See above, § 15, Note 4.

[2] GRH. (III, 40): “To some it may seem that this question in the Church is superfluous, since it is known and conceded by all that God exists, and there is no people, however barbarous, that denies that God exists, and that He is to be worshiped (though it may not know how to worship Him), and so the knowledge of God is naturally innate in all. . . . But, nevertheless, we must prove that God exists, (1) for the confutation of those who deny that there is a God; (2) for the confirmation of our faith (. . . in great and severe temptations, says Chemnitz, we are all either Epicureans or Stoics; our mind must therefore be established by the consideration of the arguments which prove that there is a God, and that He exercises a providential care over human affairs); (3) for the perfecting of natural knowledge (. . . since the natural knowledge of God is imperfect and languid, and so must be confirmed, widened, and deepened from the Word divinely revealed.”)

[3] CAL. (II, 110): “That God exists, special scriptural statements testify, especially those which communicate His names, words, and works.”

§ 18. (3.) The Attributes of God.

The doctrine of the attributes of God comprises only the more specific description of the divine nature, as the same is set forth in the Holy Scripture. [1] The attributes are, therefore, not to be considered as something supplementary to the essence of God, which may be laid aside without detriment to the substance of God; [2] but in them we describe the divine essence only according to its special features, because we cannot otherwise conceive of it (they are thus variously characterized on account of the feebleness of our conception). Hence it also follows that the attributes are to be regarded as unchangeable and permanent. [3]

We acquire our knowledge of the divine attributes, in general, only from the Holy Scriptures, as has been already said, and yet these are here taught, either only by way of popular representation, or without any design of aiding us in constructing a systematic doctrinal statement of the divine attributes. To accomplish this, we must have recourse to other expedients. A correct and exhaustive arrangement of the divine attributes we may, however, attain, if, starting out with the proposition that God is the Most Perfect Essence, we endeavor to enumerate all His perfections; inasmuch as the attributes of God are nothing else than the description of the most perfect Essence. These perfections we ascertain in a threefold way:

1. By ascribing to God, in the highest sense, all the perfections which we can discover in His creatures, inasmuch as no perfection can be wanting to God of which we find creatures possessed.

2. By removing from our conception of God all imperfections which we observe in creatures, as nothing in any wise imperfect can be ascribed to Him, and by attributing to Him all the opposite perfections.

§ 19. The Doctrine is a Mystery.

THE Holy Scriptures declare that God is but one, and yet they also ascribe Divinity to three, viz., Father, Son, and Spirit; and thus we learn from them that there is one God, but that this one God is Father, Son, and Spirit. Here a proposition is stated which is altogether beyond the grasp of reason; the doctrine it contains belongs therefore to those we designate as mysteries. [2] Concerning this mystery the Holy Scriptures alone can give us any information, therefore upon them alone this doctrine is based. [3] But the Holy Scriptures do not unveil for us this mystery; they rather reveal the doctrine as a mystery, and it is therefore to so great an extent a mystery, that we here upon earth can never attain to a perfectly correct conception or comprehension of it, [4] and at best can only approximate this by analogies drawn from the sphere of human knowledge. [5] Therefore the Church desists from any attempt to fathom this mystery, but applies in this case most rigidly her rule of extracting the substance of her faith alone from the Holy Scriptures. She simply assigns to herself the task of most carefully collecting and arranging the subject-matter of what the Scriptures teach in regard to this mystery, and is the more urgently impelled to do this, because the matter in hand is one of no less importance than to learn what conceptions God wishes us to form concerning Himself. [6] Therefore she demands of every one, who wishes to belong to the Church, that he believingly accept this revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures. [7] The Church, when she sets forth this doctrine, is moreover fully justified in the use of such terms as do not occur in the Holy Scriptures; for, inasmuch as the opponents of this doctrine, when it was stated only in the terms employed in the Holy Scriptures, perverted the meaning of these and gave them a different interpretation, the Church was compelled more specifically to explain in what sense these scriptural expressions, taken in their connection, are to be understood; and this, of course, had to be done in terms which were not contained in the Scriptures, for their very purpose was to explain the sense in which the Church understands the statement of the Scriptures. [8] And this explains why it is that the doctrine of the Trinity only gradually assumed the form in which the Church now sets it forth, and how ungrounded is the inference that the doctrine is not fully indorsed by the Holy Scriptures, and that it was not from the first believed by the Church. [9] And, finally, the Church, in using these terms, neither presumes that she has unfolded the mystery, nor does she intend that these expressions are to be taken precisely in the sense in which they are generally used; for, inasmuch as we have here to do with a doctrine that is entirely beyond the reach of reason, the terms that are applicable to other things are inadequate, and the Church therefore still always thus explains the particular sense in which she wishes these expressions to be understood. [10]

The Church arrives at the doctrine of the Trinity by observing that in the Holy Scriptures, on the one hand, the unity of God is taught; and on the other, Divinity is ascribed to three, Father, Son, and Spirit; that, accordingly, a certain distinction is recognized in God, and a plurality in Him is indicated. [11] These predicates concerning God, contained in the Holy Scriptures, of unity, plurality, and diversity, the Church combines in the formula:

The one divine essence subsists in three persons; or (what is the same thing),
In the Deity there are three persons and one essence; or,
God is one in essence, but the same God, one in essence, is threefold in person.

§ 20. Creation a Divine Work.

THE doctrine of the Divine works follows next in order to that of the existence, essence, and attributes of the triune God. The first outward work of God (opus ad extra) is the creation of the world. [1] Concerning this creation the Holy Scriptures teach us:

(1) That it is a work of God, which He accomplished without the cooperation or assistance of any creature, [2] of His own free will, [3] and solely by means of His omnipotent creative Word; [4] a work of the one true God, and, therefore, of the Triune God. [5]

(2) As God is, in the true sense of the word, Creator of the world, this fact excludes every conception of a material existing from eternity out of which God only made, prepared, or fashioned the world; on the contrary, the material itself, of which the world consists, was created by God. This is expressed in the proposition, that the world was created from nothing, which is intended to mean that there was nothing in existence which God made use of in forming the world, but that everything that exists was first called into being by Him. (2 Macc. 7:28; Rom. 4:17; Heb. 11:3; Is. 41:24; Prov. 8:22.)[6]

(3) As a specific beginning of creation is taught in the first chapter of Genesis, this at once excludes the conception of a world existing from eternity. [7]

(4) The world, if we mean by this term its entire construction and arrangement as existing at the end of the six days of creation, came into being, according to the narrative in Genesis, not at once, but gradually (“during a period of six days God made all things which He created and made, observing an admirable order”). The manner of their production (ordo creationis) is described in the first chapter of Genesis, and from this account we can distinguish: (a) The creation of matter; (b) The separation of the different kinds of materials created from nothing; (c) The arrangement of the rude masses and their construction into the form in which they appeared at the end of the days of creation. [8] We can thus also distinguish between immediate and mediate creation; the former being the creation from nothing, and the latter the arrangement of the previously created materials. [9]

(5) The first and highest aim of creation is the glory of God, for God wishes to be recognized and revered as the great God that He is. (Ps. 19:1; Prov. 16:4.) But, among all the creatures that have been called into being, man holds the highest place, and for his sake everything else in the world has been created; therefore, as the intermediate aim of creation, we are to regard the use and benefit of man. (Gen. 1:28.) [10]

(6) If the world is thus entirely the creature of God, it follows, finally, as is indeed expressly stated, Gen. 1:31, that everything in the world was very good, and that, therefore, everything evil that is now in it must be regarded as having entered subsequently. [11]

This is all comprehended in the definition: “Creation is an act of God, who is one and alone, and an undivided work of the three persons of the Godhead, by which the Father, through the co-eternal Son, in the co-eternal Holy Spirit, of his own free will, in six distinct days, formed all things, visible and invisible, not out of some materials co-existing with Himself from eternity, but from nothing, for the glory of His own name and the benefit of man; and all things that God made are very good.” (GRH. IV, 51.) [12]

[1] The distinction between works ad intra and ad extra, which we discussed in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, is not introduced by some of the Dogmaticians until they treat of the present topic.

QUEN. (I, 415) divides divine actions ad extra into: “actions of power, as the creation and preservation of the world;” “actions of mercy, as the redemption, calling, regeneration, conversion, and salvation of the human race;” and “actions of justice, as the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, and the damnation of devils and the wicked.”

Concerning the connection of the doctrine of the creation with that of the Trinity, CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 112): “Thus far, in the article of the Trinity, God has been described as He is in His secret nature, and mention has, indeed, been also made of the works of God, but, especially, of those which divinity works within itself, apart from every creature. But God, who has made darkness His hiding-place, and who dwells in inaccessible light, coming forth from His secret abode, has manifested Himself, also, in works ad extra, . . . and, because the first manifestation ad extra was made in the work of creation, the article concerning the creation immediately follows.”

[2] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 115): “Creation is an action of the one God. This is said, because of those who have proposed a number of sources; It is, likewise, an action of God alone, which neither ought to be, nor can be, ascribed to any creature (Mal. 2:10; Job 31:15; 1 Cor. 8:6; Is. 45:6, 7; Job 9:8.)” This statement, at the same time, excludes the opinion of those “who add to God, in the work of creation, the co-operation of nature, in accordance with what occurs in things already framed and set in order” (CHMN. (I, 116)), as well as the view of those, also, “who have divided the work of creation between God and the angels” (GRH. IV, 7).

CALOV. (III, 897): “In the primeval creation there was no instrumental cause or means, because God created all things by the Word.”

[3] QUEN. (I, 417): “Neither was there any antecedent cause, except the purpose of God alone, communicating Himself, not from the necessity of nature, but from the freedom of His will.”

§ 21. The Doctrine taught by both Reason and Revelation.

GOD is not a workman who, when he has completed his work leaves it to itself and goes his way” [Augustine]; but, having created the world, He sustains it and continually cares for it. [1] Therefore the Holy Scriptures never speak of the creation without at the same time alluding to the superintending care that is exercised over the world; and in this very fact the Christian finds the highest consolation, that he is permitted to regard God as continually present in the world, caring for the greatest just as for the least, and hindered by nothing in the exercise of His care. This consolation we may, indeed, in part derive from the contemplation of the world by the light of Nature, and from observing the course of its affairs; but it is only the certainty which Revelation communicates that establishes us immovably in this confidence. [2]

The Providence of God [3] specially manifests itself: I, in His preserving what has been created in the world; II, in His cooperating with all that occurs; and III, in His leading and directing everything in the world. The doctrine of Providence is accordingly divided into the doctrines of Preservation, Concurrence, and Government [4] (Conservatio, concursus, gubernatio.)

I. “Preservation is the act of Divine Providence whereby God sustains all things created by Him, so that they continue in being with the properties implanted in their nature and the powers receive in creation” (HOLL., 441). The world would fall back again into nothing if God did not continually uphold, not only the various species of creatures and the individuals in them, but also the existing order of arrangement and cooperation which He has assigned the whole; [5] for created things have no power of subsistence in themselves, but have it only so long as God imparts it to them. [6] We distinguish, therefore, between creation and preservation only in our conception; in God we must regard one as implying the other: therefore, preservation is also designated as continued creation. [7]

II. Concurrence. [8] The doctrine of Divine Providence implies far more than merely that God creates and uphold the world. If this were all, then we would have to refer all the changes and transactions that occur in the world entirely to creatures, and God would have no further share in all this than merely to give to His creatures the ability thus to act. But God is to be regarded as, in a far higher sense than this, present in the world. The Holy Scriptures teach us that He is an active participant in all that transpires in the world; that nothing that occurs could take place without Him and His active co-operation; that, therefore, ever single effect, change, or transaction in the world comes to pass only through the influence of God. In this, God is not, indeed, as in creation and preservation, the sole cause of that which happens; for God has given to living creatures a will that is to be employed in actions, and has imparted even to inanimate things a power which we are to regard as the efficient cause of changes. God’s Providence can, therefore, by no means be so regarded, as if He alone were the author of all that is done; for, in that case, this will, which we must assume in the case of living creatures, would not have justice done to it, and the power that belongs to inanimate things would not be called into exercise: yet God is nevertheless the cooperative cause of all that occurs. In all transactions, therefore, that proceed from a creature, the creature itself is just as much a cause as God is; He, on the other hand, is always to be regarded as co-operating: every change, effect, or transaction that occurs is, accordingly, to be referred at the same time to both, to the creature and to God. [9] This is expressed in the doctrine of the concurrence. Concurrence, or the co-operation of God, is the act of Divine Providence whereby God, by a general and immediate influence, proportioned to the need and capacity of every creature, graciously takes part with second causes in their actions and effect. (HOLL. 442.) [10] While it is certain that God is to be regarded as co-operating in everything that occurs, [11] it is no less certain that the manner of His co-operation differs very greatly, varying with the nature of the co-operating causes (the causae secundae) and with the necessities of the case. God co-operates, for instance, in one way when the action is to proceed from inanimate nature, and in a very different way when the second cause, with which He co-operates, is one endowed with freedom. [12] Also, God has one way of cooperating with good deeds and another with those that are evil. [13] The general co-operation of God is, moreover, always to be regarded as immediate, [14] but at the same time also as of such a kind that the effect is not already predetermined (not a previous but a simultaneous concurrence, not predeterminating but mildly disposing), since in that case the effectual participation of the second cause would be excluded and its liberty infringed. [15]

III. “Government is the act of Divine Providence by which God most excellently orders, regulates, and directs the affairs and actions of creatures according to His own wisdom, justice, and goodness, for the glory of His name and the welfare of men.” (CAL., III, 1194.) [16] God actively participates in actions for the express purpose of directing the whole world according to His own purposes. As, therefore, preservation has reference to the existence and continuance of created things, government has reference to the actions that proceed from these creatures. God inclines and leads them according to His will so as to accomplish His designs: and this government of God extends over the whole as well as over each single part, over the great as well as over the small. [17]

Inasmuch as God, however allows men in their freedom to have their own way, as we have already seen under the doctrine of concurrence, this marks distinctly the character of His government; for He governs in such a manner that this liberty is not restricted. Hence, much is done that would not be done if so wide a range were not allowed to human liberty; and, according to the different conduct of men, whom God will not hinder in the exercise of their liberty, God is determined in employing different methods of directing the world for the accomplishment of His designs. This different method is described in the expressions, permission, hinderance, direction, and determination.

(1) Much is done that cannot at all be said to meet the special approbation of God; but God permits it, suffers it to occur, because He does not choose to enforce His own preference by doing violence to or prohibiting human liberty, and therefore seeks to accomplish His aims in some other way (permission). [18]

(2) Thus God often is content with merely hindering the accomplishment of what would be contrary to His purposes (hinderance). [19]

(3) He knows, too, how to sway the freely performed actions of men, after they have been permitted by Him to occur (whether they be good or evil), in such a way that they must be subservient to and in accordance with His own purposes (direction). [20]

(4) As, finally, He is Himself the source from which proceeds all power and ability to act, so He knows also how to attain His own ends by withholding the necessary power, or by holding this within certain limits which it dare not transcend, when men are about to act contrary to His will (determination). [21]

Of Providence in general, as comprehending preservation, concurrence, and government, we have yet to remark:

(1) That it affects everything, but not uniformly; on the other hand, everything is affected by it just in proportion to the relative importance of its position in the world. And, as man occupies the highest place in the world, Providence has special reference to him; most specifically, however, it is exercised with reference to the godly, as God’s chief purpose in regard to man is his salvation. [22]

(2) The providence of God ordinarily employs second causes, and thus accomplishes its designs; but God is by no means restricted to the use of these second causes, for He often exercises His providence without regard to them, and operates thus contrary to what we call the course of nature, and hence arises the difference between ordinary and extraordinary providence. [23]

§ 22. When were they created?

CERTAINTY in regard to the existence of angels we attain only through revelation; for reason can at best make their existence only possible or probable. [1] They are, indeed, not referred to in the history of the creation; nevertheless we know that they are beings created by God, and we have reason to believe that they were not created before, nor after, but within the six days of creation; yet we know nothing further as to the day upon which they were created. [2]

The Holy Scriptures furnish us with more specific information, both in regard to the nature of the angels and their moral condition.

I. THE NATURE OF ANGELS.

The Holy Scriptures represent the angels as, indeed, finite, because created, but intelligent and spiritual, therefore incorporeal beings, which, without needing a body, nevertheless have a personal subsistence. (QUEN. I, 444): “The angels are spiritual substances (Ps. 104:4; Heb. 1:14), i.e., without any bodily form (whether gross or refined), finite, complete, and thus real persons [hypostases]. [3] Angels are, further, intelligent substances, and very capable of becoming well acquainted both with themselves and with other things.” They were originally created by God in order to promote His glory and to serve Him. [4]

§ 24. State of Integrity Defined.

The state of integrity is the original condition of man created after the image of God, in goodness and rectitude.” QUEN. (II, 2.) The first condition of man is thus designated, because in it he was entirely uninjured and incorrupt in all his endowments, powers, and attributes. [3] This condition is more specifically described by the expression, “the image of God in which man was created,” Gen. 1:26, 27; 5:1; for man is distinguished from all other creatures in this, that he was made after the image of God. [4] This expression denotes, in general, a resemblance to God, which has its ground in this, that God took Himself, so to speak, as a pattern and archetype according to which He created man. [5] The passages, Col. 3:10 and Eph. 4:24, teach in what particulars that resemblance to God consists, by which man’s original condition is described. [6] In these, the apostle states that mankind, whom he presupposes to have lost the image of God, must be renewed again in the same; and, inasmuch as he describes the new condition as that in which mankind are renewed by the power of the Holy Ghost, in true righteousness and holiness, we see that he means by the image of God (Gen. 1 and 5) the peculiar spiritual and moral perfection of man’s original condition. [7] QUEN. (II, 9): “The image of God is a natural perfection, consisting in an entire conformity with the wisdom, justice, immortality, and majesty of God, which was divinely concreated in the first man, in order that he might perfectly know, love, and glorify God, his Creator.” [8] Accordingly, man in his original condition possessed:

(1) Wisdom and the power to understand perfectly, according to the measure of his necessities, things divine, human and natural. [9]

(2) Holiness and freedom of the will, according to which man loved God and that which is good, and possessed the power to live, in all respects, in conformity with the will of God. [10]

(3) Purity of the natural affections, and the perfect harmony of all his powers and impulses. [11] HOLL. (470): “The perfections constituting the image of God were an intellect excelling in knowledge, perfect holiness and freedom of the will, absolute purity of the sensuous appetites, and the most harmonious agreement of the affections with the decision of the intellect and guidance of the will, in conformity with the wisdom, holiness, and purity of God, as far as was consistent with the capacity of the first man.”

§ 25. Of Sin in General.

According to 1 John 3:4, sin is every deviation from a law of God (HOLL., 488: “Sin is a deviation from the divine Law”), whether that law be written in our hearts, or be communicated externally by positive precept. [1] It can proceed only from a being endowed with reason and free will. But from this general conception of sin it does not, therefore, necessarily follow, that every such act as may be a deviation from the Law of God must be performed with the consciousness and purpose that such a deviation from the Law of God shall take place. [2] God is in no sense the author of sin; He did not create sin in man, since of all that was created, it is said that it was good (Gen. 1:31): neither did He decree that at any particular time man should become a sinner. He has neither urged man on to that which is sinful (James 1:13), nor did He approve of sin when it entered. Much rather does He hate it at all times (Ps. 5:5; Zach. 8:17; 1 John 2:16.) [3] The origin of sin lies, therefore, only in the will of the creature who, of his own accord, departed from God, and acted in opposition to the divine command. [4] And here Satan made the beginning, and then led man also astray to sin. [5]

The immediate consequence of sin is that the sinner, who broke the commandment which he was bound to obey, incurred guilt which deserves punishment. HOLL. (502): “The consequence of sin is responsibility for guilt and liability to punishment.” [6] The punishment is partly temporal, partly eternal.

[1] BR. (388 sq.): “By the Law is to be understood the eternal and immutable wisdom and decision of God concerning those things which belong or do not belong to a rational creature, as such, united with His will, that they may or may not be done.”

[2] HOLL. (497): “A sinner is a rational creature, endowed with a free will, and subject to the divine Law, who departs from it, by doing what it forbids, and neglecting what it enjoins.” (501): “That which is voluntary (το εκουσιον), does not enter into the definition of sin generically considered. Sin is called voluntary, either subjectively, as far as it inheres in the will, or effectively, according as it proceeds from a deliberate volition. Not every sin is voluntary in the latter mode. Sin is called voluntary, either formally, which is committed by one’s own volition, or virtually, which was voluntary in the root and stock of the human race, from which it has been propagated to posterity, whose will would have been the same as that in Adam, had they lived at the same time with him” [i.e., sin may be voluntary, when not volitionary]

[3] MEL. (Loc. Th., 56): “God is not the cause of sin, nor is sin a thing contrived or ordained by Him, but it is a horrible destruction of the divine work and order.”

CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 146): “The explanation also must be noted, of what is intended when it is said that God is not the cause of sin, viz., that He neither desires or approves of sin, neither does He influence the will to sin. For some understand that He is not the author of sin in such a sense, as in the beginning to create it, or to have it in Himself, or to produce it through Himself, but that men sin nevertheless by the will of God, and that God produces sins not only permissively, but also efficiently, in men and by men; yet He is not, in their view, therefore to be called the author of sin. Therefore is added, as if for the sake of explanation: ‘author and cause of sin.’”

QUEN. (II, 49): “God is in no manner the efficient cause of sin. Neither in part nor in whole, neither directly nor indirectly, neither accidentally nor per se, whether in the form of Adam’s transgression or in that of any other sin, is God or can He be called, the cause or author of sin. God is not the cause of sin, (1) physically and per se, because thus the evil or sin has no cause; (2) not morally, by commanding, persuading, or approving because He does not desire sin, but hates it; nor (3) by way of accident, because nothing can happen to God either by chance or fortuitously. This conflicts with the divine wisdom, prescience, goodness, holiness, and independence, as is proved from Ps. 5:5; 45:7; Is. 65:12; Zach. 8:17; 1 John 1:5; James 1:13, 17.”

How God stands related to sin was shown in the discussion on the doctrine of concurrence.

[4] QUEN. (II, 49): “Whatever want of conformity to Law (ανομια) there ever is in a rational agent must be ascribed to the free will of the creature itself, as being spontaneously deficient in acting. Ps. 5:5; Hos. 13:9; Matt. 23:37. A rational agent, or creature, which possesses reason, and the power of knowing those things which the Law given either commands or forbids, is properly said to be the cause of sin, viz., the will of the devil and of man. But this rational agent ought to be viewed, not in respect of any real influence, but in respect of a deficiency; for sin has rather a deficient than an efficient cause.”Cf. Chap. IV, Note 13.

[5] CONF. AUG. (19): “Concerning the cause of sin, they teach that, although God creates and preserves nature, yet the cause of sin is the will of the wicked, namely, the devil and impious men, which without the assistance of God turns itself away from God.”

CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 148): “The devil is the first author of sin: (1) because by his own free will he himself turned away from God; (2) because he is the cause of sin in the human race in this way, that he deceived and seduced Eve in the state of integrity, so that she departed from God.”

[6] HOLL. (502): “Guilt is a moral foulness or deformity, resulting from an act inconsistent with the Law and unworthy of a rational creature, and inhering in the sinner as a shameful stain. Responsibility for guilt (reatus culpae) is an obligation, by which man, on account of an act inconsistent with the moral Law, is held, as if bound, under sin and its blemish, so that in consequence of this act, the sinner is regarded and pronounced detestable.”

“The divine punishment is a grievous evil by which God, the offended Judge, punishes the guilt before incurred and not yet forgiven, so as to display His justice and majesty, and vindicate from contempt the authority of the Law. Liability to punishment (reatus poenae), is an obligation by which the sinner is held bound, by God, the offended Judge, to endure the punishment of the unforgiven guilt. Guilt differs from punishment. The former precedes, the latter follows. Guilt deserves punishment; punishment is due to guilt, and is, as it were, its wages. Rom. 6:23. Guilt proceeds from the will; the will of the sinner revolts from punishment. The sinner contracts guilt by his acts; he endures punishment by suffering.”

§ 26. Man’s First Transgression, and the State thereby produced. viz., Original Sin.

It was the first of the human family who committed the first sin. These, seduced by Satan under the form of a serpent, of their own free will, transgressed the prohibition of God (Gen. 1:16, 17) to eat of the tree of knowledge. [1] HOLL. (507): “The first sin of men is the transgression of the Law of Paradise, by which our first parents, having been persuaded by the devil, and having abused the freedom of the will, violated the divine prohibition concerning the not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and brought down upon themselves and their posterity, the divine image having been lost, a great guilt, and the liability to temporal and eternal punishment.” [2] In consequence of this transgression, our first parents burdened themselves with a guilt which deserved punishment; therefore also God immediately inflicted upon them (Gen. 2:17) the punishment threatened in the event of transgression. [3] The consequence of their sin then was, that their whole relation to God, and their corporeal, spiritual, and moral state, were changed. The state of righteousness, above described, ceased to exist, and, in its place, was introduced a state of moral depravity, [4] which must therefore be transmitted to all their posterity, since they who are begotten after the common course of nature cannot be introduced into a different state from that of their parents at the time when they beget them; so that the first sin, in its results, affects not only our first parents, but also all their posterity. [5] Since, therefore, they incurred the divine wrath by reason of sin, so also are all mankind, descended from them, in a similar state; and that, too, for two reasons: first, because the state of depravity, which they have derived from their first parents, renders its subjects the objects of God’s wrath; [6] secondly, because all the descendants of Adam are represented and contained in him, as the representative of the human family — therefore, that which was done by Adam can be regarded as the act of all, the consequences of which also must be borne by all, so that Adam’s sin also is imputed to his posterity, i.e., it is regarded as their own sin, because they are all represented in Adam. [7] The state of depravity which followed Adam’s transgression, and which now belongs to our first parents, as well as to all their posterity, is designated by the expression Original Sin. [8] HOLL. (518): “Original Sin is the thorough corruption of human nature, which, by the Fall of our first parents, is deprived of original righteousness, and is prone to every evil.” [9] According to its single parts, it is described, (1) as the lack of the Original Righteousness, which ought to exist in man; (2) as carnal concupiscence, or inclination to evil. [10] In the place of original holiness and purity, there came directly the opposite, a state thoroughly sinful and desirous of that which is evil, which in itself is sin, so that, in consequence of this constant propensity to evil, and not originally an account of actual transgressions proceeding from it, man is an object of the divine displeasure. [11] This depraved state, then, is not only the foundation and fountain of all actual transgressions, but also has, as its consequence, the wrath of God and temporal and eternal punishment. [12]

Concerning this state, finally, it must be asserted, that it is natural to us in that sense in which this is said of original righteousness in the state of integrity. Were this state different, man would not cease to be man, and hence it does not constitute man’s essence, but is connected with the essence, or the nature of man as he is now born, and that too in the most intimate and inseparable manner; and as no man is now born, except in that depraved state, so also this state can never be lost by man, as long as he lives on the earth. Man, when he becomes a partaker of the Holy Ghost, can indeed refuse obedience to his evil propensity; and, when redemption through Christ is apprehended by faith, he is also freed from the consequences of sin, i.e., the wrath of God and punishment; but yet the evil inclination to sin always remains in him. All this is expressed in the adjuncts of original sin, which QUEN. thus enumerates (II, 62): 1. Natural Inherence, Heb. 12:1; Rom. 7:21, which, therefore, is not a substance, but an accident. [13] 2. Natural transmissibility, Gen. 5:3; Job 14:4; Ps. 51:6; John 3:6; Eph. 2:3. [14] 3. Duration (a tenacity or obstinate inherence during life, Rom. 7:17; Heb. 12:1). [15] [1] QUEN. (II, 51): “The first sin in the human race is the voluntary apostasy of our first parents from God their Creator, by which, having been seduced by the devil, they transgressed, of their own accord, both the general divine and internal law impressed upon their mind, and the particular external prohibition concerning the not eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Concerning the existence of this sin, the history contained in Gen. 3, does not permit us to doubt. By Paul it is called the transgression of Adam, Rom. 5:14, because he transgressed the divine precept by eating of the forbidden fruit. The Fall is ascribed to Adam by way of eminence, both because he was the head of the woman, and also because he was the beginning and root of the human race, from whom, as the source, sin descended to posterity. For a like reason it is called a transgression by one, Rom. 5:15, 17, and 18, where by one man the Apostle understands Adam particularly, so, however, as not entirely to exclude Eve.” [HUTT. (312): “It is noteworthy that the Apostle does not say ‘of (ex) one man,’ but ‘by (per) one man,’ thus implying that the principal efficient cause was Satan.”] Hence arise the following definitions: QUEN. (II, 51): (a) “The external first and principal (but remote) cause of this sin is Satan, acting here, not by internal impulse, nor by external violence (for each is repugnant to the integrity of the state in which man was originally created), but by mere external moral suasion. John 8:44; 2 Cor. 11:3; Rev. 12:9. (b) “The instrumental cause is a true and natural serpent, but possessed by the devil, Gen. 3:1, 14 (not a mere serpent, but one possessed by the devil, as is manifest from the conversation and discourse with Eve, and also from the punishment, Gen. 3:15. For the bruising of the serpent’s head by the seed of the woman, which was to follow, has respect, not to a natural, but to the infernal serpent).” (c) “The internal and directly efficient cause is the intellect and will of the first man, not from any internal defect therein, which could not exist in an unfallen state, but by way of accident, in consequence of his wandering and departure from God, through seduction from without. (Man did not fall in consequence of any absence or denial of any special grace, nor from the presence of any internal languor and natural defect, but through the accidental abuse of his liberty, while his will yielded to the external persuasion and seduction of the devil, and interrupted the gracious influence of God.)” (d) The order and mode of the seduction are the following: HOLL. (511): “Eve was first and immediately seduced by the devil (HOLL. (505): Eve sinned first, not because she was more feeble in intellect than Adam, but because she was more yielding in will), while Adam was drawn mediately, and by the persuasion of the woman, into the same sin, and thus the fall of Adam is referred also to the devil, as the first author of sin.” In reference to the passage, 1 Tim. 2:14, QUEN. remarks (II, 53): “These words are not to be understood of the seduction simply, but of the mode and order of the seduction; seduction is either external, through the address of the serpent from without, or internal, through the suggestion of Satan from within. In the former sense Eve only, and not Adam, was seduced.” (e) The particular sinful acts which the transgression involves are: HOLL. (510): “(a) on the part of the intellect, a want of faith (incredulitas), (Eve hesitated between the Word of God, Gen. 2:17, and the word of the devil, Gen. 3:4); (b) on the part of the will, selfishness and pride, Gen. 3:5; (c) on the part of the sensuous appetite, an inordinate desire for the forbidden fruit, Gen. 3:6, from which came forth the external act forbidden by the law of Paradise.” [2] HOLL. (509): “Our first parents, in their Fall, immediately violated the positive law given in Paradise, forbidding to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; mediately and really by their disobedience they broke through the restraints of the entire moral Law. The intention of the positive Law was a trial or test of obedience, which, as due to God, the whole moral Law demands. But he who fears not to transgress one precept of the Law, will not blush to violate the remainder, since they have the same author and the same obligatory force.” [3] HOLL. (512, 513): “The consequences of Adam’s fall are guilt and punishment. Punishment, like an inseparable companion, follows closely upon guilt. God, in His holiness, has threatened death to man, if he transgresses the Law which was given him. Gen. 2:17. By death was meant spiritual, corporeal, and eternal death. Spiritual death, the root of all evil, is the immediate consequence of the first sin. For, as soon as man turned his heart away from the divine Law, he deprived himself of spiritual union with God, who is the life of the soul, and thus, having been deserted by God, he died spiritually. This spiritual death brought with it the loss of the divine image, the entire corruption of the whole human nature, and the loss of free will in spiritual things. The death of the body follows spiritual death, or the death of the soul, including all the diseases and miseries by which man is surrounded from without. Whether also are to be referred the severe and burdensome labor which must be constantly endured by the man, Gen. 3:17, and the painful throes of parturition in the woman, Gen. 3:16. Although our first parents did not suffer the death of the body as soon as they fell, nevertheless from that time they became subject to death, since this is the wages of sin, Rom. 6:23. Eternal death is a perpetual exclusion from the beatific enjoyment of God, united with constant and most excruciating torments, which, by the force of the threatening annexed to the divine Law, Adam and all his posterity must have suffered, unless Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the human race and the Restorer of the lost image of God, had interposed.” [4] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 227): “For this, too, is the misery of Original Sin, that not only the image itself of God was lost, but also the knowledge of God was nearly extinguished.” KG. (80): “The effects of the first-sin, in respect of our first parents, are: the total loss of the divine image, some fragments, indeed, or vestiges remaining; the most profound depravity of the whole nature; exposure to punishment expressed in the penalty annexed to the law of Paradise; the griefs and miseries of this life; and finally death itself.” [5] GRH. (IV, 315): “We must not regard the sin of our first parents and its consequences, as if they had respect only to them, and did not in any way affect us; because afterwards Adam begat a son, in his own image and likeness, Gen. 5:3. As he was, such also did he beget his children, despoiled of the image of God, destitute of original righteousness, subject to sin, to the wrath of God, to death and damnation. Adam lived, and we all lived in him. Adam perished, and we all perished in him. As when parents lose the possession of a feudal benefit, the male children also lose it, because the parents received it not only for themselves, but also for their children; so also our first parents, having been created in the image of God, had received those gifts which were bestowed by the goodness of God, like a deposit, to be faithfully guarded for themselves and their posterity; thus also, by sinning, they lost them, not only for themselves, but for all their posterity.” HOLL. (523): “Our first parents are the proximate cause of this original blemish, from whose impure nature the original stain has flowed into our hearts. Everything follows the seeds of its own nature. No black crow ever produces a white dove, nor ferocious lion a gentle lamb; and no man polluted with inborn sin ever begets a holy child.” [6] BR. (403) says, referring to Rom 5:12: “Therefore we must say that all sinned in one, inasmuch as, he having sinned, it came to pass that all who should be naturally descended from him would necessarily be born with sin, and thus every one on account of his own sin would become, in his very birth, liable to death, see Eph. 2:3; so that, when all men are said to be children of wrath, the cause of this guilt is taken for granted, namely, because all by nature are sinners. For to be a son of wrath is the same as to be liable to divine wrath, and worthy of punishment, on account of the violation of the Law, to be inflicted by God, the vindicator of the Law. Therefore, one could not be by nature a child of wrath, unless he were polluted by sin in his own nature or by the corruption of his nature.” But BR. also adds (414): “It is not necessary, neither, perhaps, is it wise, that we should pryingly inquire how God could so impute the sin of our first parents to their posterity, not yet in existence, that they should for this reason necessarily be born destitute of original righteousness, and sinners. For it is enough that the fact (to oti) is revealed, although the explanation of it (to pwß) be unknown.” GRH. (IV, 316): “Therefore that sin (of Adam) is not in all respects foreign to us, because Adam did not sin as a private man, but as the head of the whole human race; and as human nature was communicated through him, so also natural corruption was similarly propagated” . . . (327): “Because, therefore, all who are born in the natural and common course of generation are under sin, so also all are by nature children of wrath, liable to death and damnation; for it is not possible that God should not be angry at sin.” [7] HOLL. (513): “The first sin of Adam, since he is regarded as the common parent, head, root, and representative of the whole race, is truly and justly imputed by God, for guilt and punishment, to all his posterity.” By the sin that is imputed to us is understood (QUEN., II, 111): “That disobedience by which the first parents of the human race turned themselves away from God,” etc. Therefore, also, it is said (II, 53): “Not only our first parents were the subject of the first sin, but also all their posterity to be propagated by natural generation. For Adam and Eve were substitutes for the whole human race, inasmuch as they ought to be regarded as both the natural (i.e., seminal) and also the moral source of the human race, namely, of the entire progeny in nature and grace. Hence the apostle properly says, Rom. 5:12, ef w, in whom, viz., in the first man, all sinned, or in that, because that, one sinned, all sinned, viz., in Adam, who represented the persons of all his posterity; and v. 19, ‘by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners.’ That is to say, we have been made sinners through the sin of Adam, not by mere interpretation, nor even by limitation, but by the imputation of real guilt, and the propagation of natural depravity, and the participation of an actual crime. And thus the proximate cause why, when the first man sinned, all his posterity sinned, is the existence of the whole human species in the person of our first parent, Rom. 5:12. For our first parents were then considered not only as the first individuals of the human race, but also, as the true root, stock, and source of the whole human race, which in them could both stand and fall. Hence we are said to have been in the loins of our first parents.” Id. (II, 111): “The first sin is considered — I. With regard to Adam himself, who by one transgression involved all his posterity in crime, in guilt, in punishment; in so far, namely, as his will was the interpreter of the wills of all of them who, as the Scriptures say, were in his loins, whose own act the sin interpretatively is, so that they are born with the absence of the perfection that should exist. The will, I say, of Adam, as the source and root of the human race, was considered as ours, not formally, but interpretatively. For the first man had the wills of all his posterity gathered up, as it were, in his own will; whence, for himself and all his posterity, he declared his will and that of his posterity against the Law that had been given. II. With regard to God, as the Judge who, according to His mighty power, justly punishes the crime against the divine majesty also in the posterity, namely, those fallen in Adam, by the want, in so far, of original righteousness, and thus most justly imputes to them the sin of Adam unto condemnation.” QUEN., however, distinguishes between immediate and mediate imputation (II, 114): “The first Adamitic sin is immediately imputed to us so far as we existed already in Adam. But the sin of Adam is mediately imputed to us, viz., as original sin is mediately inherent in us, so far as we are regarded in our own persons and individually. For no one is considered as a sinner by God and to no one is that first act imputed, except to him who descends contaminated with original sin, from the same Adam.” The word to impute, QUEN. explains thus (II, 111): “The word imputation in this place is received not physically, for implanting or inserting, but relatively, for estimating. In the Hebrew language it is explained by bvj, in the Greek by logizesqai, and in the German by zurechnen; as if you would say, in computing, that you set something over to some one, or in counting or calculating, that you assign something.” Imputation is proved from Rom. 5:12, 14, 19. The common explanation of the first passage is: “in whom, viz., Adam, all have sinned.” But QUEN. remarks (II, 58) that “it makes little difference whether you translate ef w, in whom, or on which account. For, if it is retained as causal, it confirms our view. For thus we argue: They who die, die because they have sinned. But all mankind die, even infants and those not yet born. Therefore, they die, because they have sinned.” “But infants and those not yet born, die either on account of some fault (delictum) of their own or of an actual transgression; therefore, on account of the actual transgression of another, scil., of Adam, who tainted them with his own stain. But if the other signification be received, i.e., (in quo) relatively in Adam, as root, fountain, cause, head, it is again proved that Adam’s sin is imputed to all.” In reference to Rom. 5:19, QUEN. remarks (II, 113): “As we are made righteous by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, so were we made unrighteous by the disobedience of Adam.” In order to express himself with entire accuracy, QUEN. remarks, in addition (II, 53), that the phrase, “the fall of Adam,” is taken in different senses. The one sense is, “Specifically a transgression in relation to the forbidden tree,” and therefore it is, “Formally considered, the sin of the individual Adam;” in this case we say, “The Fall becomes ours by imputation only.” The other sense is, “That also which flowed from this transgression, viz., the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature;” and then we must say, “It passes over to posterity, not only by imputation, but also by natural generation.” We remark, in addition, that the doctrine of the imputation of the guilt and punishment of our first parents was fully developed only by the later Theologians, from about the time of CALOVIUS, but an intimation of it appears in the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., I, 9): “That fault or liability, whereby it comes to pass that we all, because of the disobedience of Adam and Eve, are under God’s abhorrence and are by nature children of wrath.” [8] The Scholastics distinguished “original sin originating,” from “original sin originated.” QUEN. (II, 115): “Active, or originating original sin, is that vicious act which our first parents committed, by transgressing the paradisaic Law, which act, indeed, has not passed over to their posterity, nor is it found in them, except by imputation only. However, it gave origin to the deep corruption of man, which is called passive or originated original sin, which is a vicious habit, contracted by Adam through that actual transgression of the divine Law, and propagated to his posterity.” The word is here used in the latter sense. HOLL. (518): “In ecclesiastical phraseology, not biblical, this sin, derived from the fall of Adam is called original, and indeed, not in respect to the origin of the world or of man, but (1) because derived from Adam, the root and beginning of the human race; (2) because it is connected with the origin of the descendants of Adam; (3) because it is the origin and fountain of actual transgressions.” “In the language of Scripture, this connate depravity is called: (1) indwelling sin, Rom. 7:17, because after the Fall it fixed its seat firmly in man, nor departs from him until the habitation of soul and body is dissolved; (2) besetting sin, because it surrounds us on all sides, like a long garment impeding a runner, Heb. 12:1; (3) a law in the members, Rom. 7:23, since, as a law rules and governs an agent, thus original sin directs the members of the body to the perpetration of wicked deeds; (4) an evil lying near, Rom. 7:21, because like a chain it clings to a man who wishes to do good.” [9] More extended definitions. HOLL. (518): “Original Sin is a want of original righteousness, connected with a depraved inclination, corrupting in the most inward parts the whole human nature, derived from the fall of our first parents, and propagated to all men by natural generation, rendering them indisposed to spiritual good, but inclined to evil, and making them the objects of divine wrath, and eternal condemnation.” QUEN. (II, 52): “Original Sin is a want of original righteousness, derived from the sin of Adam and propagated to all men who are begotten in the ordinary mode of generation, including the dreadful corruption and depravity of human nature and all its powers, excluding all from the grace of God and eternal life, and subjecting them to temporal and eternal punishments, unless they be born again of water and the Spirit, or obtain the remission of their sins through Christ.” The proofs of the existence of Original Sin are drawn from Gen. 6:5; 8:21; Job 14:4; Ps. 14:2, 3; 58:3; Isaiah 48:8; John 3:5, 6; Eph. 2:3. Especially from Ps. 51:5; Rom. 5:12-14; Gen. 5:3. CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 230) thus comments on the important passage, Rom. 5:12: “(1) The efficient cause of Original Sin is shown to be the first man. (2) The subject affected by Original Sin is pointed out, i.e., that it not only adhered in Adam, but has passed into the world, i.e., into all men who come into the world. (3) The punishment is described, which is not only the death of the body, but the reign of death and the sentence of condemnation. . . . (4) Lest the guilt should be understood only as for the sin of another, without any personal fault, Paul affirms that the whole world is guilty, both in consequence of the one sin of the first man, and because all have sinned, i.e., have been constituted sinners. (5) He indicates what kind of sin it was, when he says that even they have original sin who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression. (6) He describes the manner in which original sin is propagated — he says, by one man.” [GRH., IV, 322: “The chief arguments of the Pelagians are: 1. Ez. 18:20, ‘The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.’ Answer: The passage treats not of original, but of actual sins, whose penalty the son does not bear, if he desist from the sins of the guilty parent, and be converted. We invert the argument. Infants are punished by disease and death; therefore, they have sin of their own, because of which they are punished, viz., original sin propagated in them by their parents, which is no longer foreign to them, but transmitted to them, by the contagion of propagation. 2. Ps. 106:38, Infants are pronounced innocent. John 4:11; Rom. 9:11. Answer. This is to be understood relatively with respect to actual sins, and not with respect to original sin. 3. Rom. 4:15: ‘Where there is no law, there is no transgression.’ Answer: Infants are both without the Law, i.e., they are ignorant of the Law, Rom. 2:12, and yet are not without Law, i.e., they are not free from the accusation whereby the Law reproves and condemns all lawlessness. 4. ‘If there be Original Sin, sin must be attributed to God forming infants in the womb; therefore, marriage is to be condemned.’ Answer: The fault in a nature must be discriminated from the kindness of God in forming the nature. Both nature and the fault or defect of the nature are propagated: of which, the former is good; the latter, evil. 5. If the sins of godly parents are forgiven in baptism, how then do they propagate sin to their children? Answer: Carnal generation is not according to grace, but according to nature. Augustine: ‘In begetting, he does not give that whence one is regenerated, but whence one is generated.’ ‘That which is born of flesh is flesh.’ Do you ask how an unrighteous man is born of a righteous, when you see that one could not be righteous, unless he were regenerate? A grain of wheat, though freed from chaff, produces grains with chaff. Circumcised Israelites beget uncircumcised children.”] [10] QUEN. (II, 59): “In form, it is an habitual want of original righteousness, Ps. 14:3; 53:3; Rom. 3:10, 11, 12, 23, united with a contrary form, i.e., the most complete corruption of the whole nature, Rom. 7:17, 20, 21; Heb. 12:1.” See Symbolical Books, and especially Ap. Conf., II, 26; Form. Conc., I, 11. In reference to the former (viz., the lack of original righteousness), BR. (404) remarks: “Here belongs that death, or the want of spiritual life, and of all the active powers which are required for the exercise of vital acts in conformity with the divine Law. And this death is ascribed to men, because they are by nature children of wrath, Eph. 2:1, 5; Col. 2:13. For, as original righteousness had inhered in the faculties of the soul of the first men, and had, as it were, animated and prepared them to live a life of godliness, and to elicit and exercise among themselves actions and motions spiritually good; so, this primeval righteousness having been lost, a man is like a dead body which has been deprived, by the separation of the soul from the body, of all power to call forth in itself and to exercise vital acts and motions, because he is destitute of strength for the performance of spiritual actions and motions.” In reference to the latter (viz., concupiscence), BR. (404): “For the same carnal man who, in consequence of the want of spiritual life, is like one dead, in another respect is said to be living and very active, but it is a life alien from the life of God, Eph. 4:18; 2:3. The faculties of the soul are, indeed, essentially vital faculties; and, when they are deprived of original righteousness, although they lack the powers necessary to conduct the life in a manner agreeable to God, nevertheless those powers are not lost or destroyed, as far as there is in them vitality and strength to call forth vital acts and motions. Therefore, they pursue another course of life, manifestly different from the former.” Concupiscence is, therefore, predicated along with the want of original righteousness; and the following position is taken as opposed to the Papists: QUEN. (II, 135): “Original Sin, formally considered, consists not in a mere want of rectitude which should exist, or a want of concreated righteousness, but also in a state of illegality, or an approach, contrary to the divine Law, to a forbidden object; which, in one word, is called a depraved concupiscence.” “Original Sin is, therefore, a depravity negative and positive: negative, without the good which should exist; positive, desirous of the evil which should not exist, i.e., concupiscence itself.” The positive depravity is thus more particularly defined. QUEN. (II, 136): “Original Sin is called a positive depravity, not accurately and according to philosophical abstraction, according to which every positive entity is a good created by God, but according to the latitude used by theologians, and that (1) denominatively, as far as it includes a subjective positive act; (2) formally, as far as, besides the act in which the privation is inherent, and besides the want of that original righteousness which ought to exist, it involves also an inclination, and a wickedness directly opposite to original righteousness.” The particular parts of Original Sin are then more specifically thus described by BR. (406-408): “In respect of the intellect, Original Sin implies a total want of spiritual light, so that it cannot know God aright, nor perfectly prescribe in what way He should be worshiped, nor embrace with a firm assent the things which have been divinely revealed; at the same time, also, there is a proneness of the intellect to form rash and false judgments concerning spiritual things; even also in those things which lie open to the light of nature, there is a certain impotency in the knowledge of God and the government of life. In respect of the will, Original Sin consists in a want of original holiness, or the ability to love God above all things, to perform what the intellect has dictated aright, and to restrain the appetite in a proper manner; also, on the contrary, in that the will is inclined to sinful acts. In respect of the sensuous appetite, there is a want of the obedience that is due to the higher faculties, and a rushing, as if by some impulse, contrary to them, into those things which are agreeable to the senses, although prohibited by the divine Law; the decision of reason either not having been waited for, or having been rejected.” [11] CONF. AUG. II. “They teach that, since the fall of Adam, all men who are begotten in the natural way are born with sin (i.e.) without the fear of God, or faith in God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease, or original fault, is truly sin, condemning and causing now, also eternal death to those who are not born again by Baptism and the Holy Spirit.” See AP. CONF. II, 38, 41. FORM. CONC., Sol. Decl. I, 6. “This evil Dr. Luther was accustomed sometimes to call the sin of our nature or person; by which he meant that, although a man should not think, speak, or do any evil (which, indeed, since the fall of our first parents, is impossible for human nature, in this life), nevertheless, the nature and person of man are sinful (i.e.) that they are wholly and completely infected, poisoned, and corrupted before God, by original sin, in their very inmost parts, and the most profound recesses of the heart; and in consequence of this corruption and fall of our first parents, the nature and person of man are accused and condemned by the Law of God, so that we are by nature the children of wrath, the slaves of death and damnation, unless we be liberated from these evils, and be preserved through the benefits which flow from the merits of Christ.” QUEN. (II, 60): “This concupiscence, denoting the propensity to evil which is implanted in the depraved nature, even as it remains in the regenerate, is truly sin, because the definition of sin suits it. Therefore Paul, Rom. 7, calls it sin fourteen times, not by metonymy, that it is only the punishment of the first sin, and the cause of subsequent actual transgression, as the Papists teach, but properly and formally, because it is truly sin, whence also the Apostle names it the law of sin warring against the law of the mind, an evil, a sinning sin.” [12] BR. (420): “The consequences of Original Sin are various evils: In respect of the soul, a want of freedom of the will in spiritual things, and an infirmity of the will in things natural; actual transgressions, multiplied both in kind and number; a want of grace, and, on the contrary, the anger of God. In respect of the body, diseases and other troubles, with temporal death; finally, also, eternal death or damnation.” It having been urged that Original Sin in itself is not an adequate cause of eternal death, CAL. (XII, 229, sqq.) answers: “That not all infected with Original Sin are condemned, is due not to the fact that original sin is not of itself an adequate or sufficient cause of condemnation, but that by faith some obtain forgiveness, as of actual, so also of Original Sin.” The passage John 3:18 being cited to show that unbelief is the only damning sin, he answers: “Unbelief condemns formally; but sins condemn materially. Unbelief is the cause of our not being freed from the condemnation, from which by faith we can be freed. ** Luther’s marginal gloss on John 15:22 does not teach the contrary. For he says that Original Sin has not been blotted out except by Christ’s acquiring for it expiation through His merit; aye, he adds that original sin even now condemns those who do not believe.” Cf. GERHARD VIII, 26 sqq. Quen. II, 62: “Original Sin is in itself, and of its own nature, deserving of divine wrath and eternal death, although in fact accidentally, viz., through and because of Christ’s merit, apprehended by faith, it does not condemn the regenerate. That is: In itself, it is always a damnable sin, although in the regenerate, it has lost, because of Christ’s merit, the power to damn, Rom. 8:1. Here the Apostle does not say that there is nothing damnable in the regenerate, or those who are in Christ Jesus, but that there is no katakrima, i.e., nothing which would actually bring damnation.” [13] When it is asserted, concerning Original Sin, that it is inherent naturally, two things are hereby intended: (1) QUEN. (II, 62): “That it is not a mere accident, lightly and externally attached, but internally and intimately inhering, and therefore called, Heb. 12:1, the easily besetting sin (euperistatoß); that it is an accident connate (sunemfutoß) and natural; that although it does not arise from the nature as such, yet it is produced together with it, or is connate with it; that it is not any temporary and transient accident, but is fixed and permanent.” In order to keep aloof from such a view (the Pelagian), the Dogmaticians express themselves in forcible language concerning human depravity. Thus CHMN. (Doc. Th., I. 259): “There are not a few who so extenuate Original Sin, that they pretend that it is a corruption of certain accidents only, and that the substance itself of man, and especially of the soul, exists after the Fall, and remains upright, uninjured, and pure: so that this quasi impediment having been removed, the substance itself of man, after the Fall, and before the renewing of the Spirit, by, in, or of itself, has certain spiritual powers or faculties which it employs of itself to begin to complete spiritual actions. . . . The true and constant sentiment of the Church must be opposed to, clearly explained and keenly defended against, these philosophical and Pelagian vagaries, . . . viz., that the nature or substance in man, since the Fall and before regeneration, is by no means upright, pure, or sound; but that the very nature or substance of man, and especially of the human soul, is truly corrupt, vitiated, and depraved, and that not lightly or only superficially, or even in some part only; but that the whole mass (if I may so speak) of the substance, or of the human nature, and especially of the soul, is corrupted and vitiated with the deepest and extreme depravity. . . . This corruption or depravity is nothing abstract, nor an idea outside of the substance or nature of man, but is inherent in our very nature or substance, and like a spiritual poison has infected, pervaded, and diffused itself far and wide throughout all the members of our whole substance or human nature.” The position of Flacius, viz., “That Original Sin is the very substance itself of man or the human soul,” arose from a misapprehension or an overstraining of these views. Therefore the expression, “inherent in our nature,” signifies — (2) QUEN. (II, 62): “That Original Sin is not the very substance of man . . . but that which inheres in it after the manner of an accident; for it is distinguished in the Scriptures, Rom. 7:20, from the essence itself of man, and is called indwelling sin; now, as an inhabitant or guest is not the same as the house, so neither is sin the same as man.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. 1:33): “Although Original Sin has infected and corrupted the whole nature of man, like some spiritual poison and horrible leprosy, so that now, in our corrupt nature, these two, viz., Nature alone and Original Sin alone, cannot be distinctly pointed out to view; yet the corrupt nature or the substance of corrupt man, body and soul, or man himself created by God, in whom original sin dwells (by reason of which the nature, substance, and indeed the whole man is corrupted), and original sin itself, which dwells in the nature or essence of man and corrupts it, are not one and the same. . . . The distinction, therefore, between our nature, as it was created by God and is preserved to this day, in which Original Sin dwells, and Original Sin, which dwells in our nature, must be retained.” And this is the reason why Original Sin is called accidental. FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. I, 57): “Since therefore, this is an unchangeable truth, that whatever is, is either a substance or an accident, namely, either something subsisting by itself, or something elsewhere derived and adhering in a substance, . . . we must assuredly admit . . . that sin is not a substance, but an accident.” To this the FORM. adds (I, 60): “When it is inquired what kind of an accident Original Sin is, that is another question. No philosopher, no papist, no sophist, yea, no human reason, can exhibit a true solution of this question; its explication is to be sought from the Holy Scriptures alone.” The expressions which have been employed by CHMN. are sustained by the following distinction (Sol. Dec. I, 51): “In order to avoid logomachies, terms of an equivocal signification should be carefully and clearly explained. When, e.g., it is said: ‘God creates the nature of man,’ by the term, nature, the very substance, body and soul is meant. But often a property or condition of anything (whether it be taken in good part or bad) is called the nature of that thing; as when it is said, it is the nature of the serpent to strike and to infect with poison (here not the substance, but the badness of the serpent is expressed); in this sense Dr. Luther uses the term nature, when he says that ‘sin and to sin is the nature of corrupt man.’” [14] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. I, 7): “And at the present time, even in this corruption of nature, God does not create sin in us, but, together with the nature which God creates and effects in men, original sin is propagated by natural generation, by seed corrupted by sin, from father and mother.” Here the question naturally presents itself, in what manner this corrupt nature perpetuates itself, and “Whether the soul is propagated by traduction (ex traduce), i.e., whether, as in natural generation, the flesh of the offspring is substantially transmitted from the seed of the parent, the soul of the child is, in like manner, also transmitted from the soul of the parent?” On this subject CHMN. (Loc. Th. I, 236) says: “Luther, in his discussions, concludes that he wishes to affirm nothing publicly concerning that question, but that he privately held the opinion of traduction. It is sufficient for us to know concerning the efficient cause, that our first parents by their Fall merited that, such as they were after the Fall, both in body and mind, such also all their posterity should be procreated. But how the soul contracts that sin we need not know, since the Holy Spirit has not been pleased to disclose this in certain and clear Scripture testimonies.” HUTT. also (328) says: “In consequence of this disagreement among the Dogmaticians, it has come to pass, even in our day, that there are not wanting theologians even of the highest rank who, in regard to this very question, would rather keep silent altogether (epecein) than to assert anything positively either within or beyond the express authority of Scripture.” But he adds, also: “If any of our brethren should ask which opinion we think most accordant with truth, we fearlessly answer that we precisely accord with the opinion of Luther, and hold it to be consonant with Scripture, namely, that the human soul is propagated by traduction; so that, just as everything else produces its like, a lion begetting a lion, a horse begetting a horse, so also man begets man, and not alone the flesh, or the body, but also the soul is propagated essentially from its parents.” (319). . . . QUEN. (II, 62): “As the soul was the first to exhibit sin (prwton deiktikon), so original sin itself, through the medium of the soul, in which it most deeply inheres, is propagated per traducem.” (For a fuller discussion of this subject see § 20, Note 8.) [HUTT. (329) further shows that as soon as the opinion of a new creation of souls is admitted, one of three things follows, viz., either that the soul, as immediately created by God, is free from sin, or that it is polluted by sin, or that it is defiled by union with the body. But if God creates it sinful, or unites it with a body where the inevitable consequence is that it contracts sin, He becomes the author of sin. On the other hand, the entrance of the soul into the world in a state of integrity is contradicted by the express testimony of Scripture concerning natural depravity.] [15] It is more specifically described as follows. QUEN. (II, 62): “In Original Sin there are four things worthy of attention, to each of which a certain limit of duration has been prefixed. (1) An inflammable material (fomes, tinder) habitually inhering, or a root. (2) The sense of this tendency or root. (3) The dominion of it; and, finally, (4) Guilt. The last is removed in regeneration and justification; dominion in sanctification (not at once, but gradually and successively, because sanctification is not complete in this life); the sense of it is removed in death; the material itself, not in the incineration (since not the body, but the soul, is the first and immediate subject of sin), but in the dissolution of the soul and body.” AP. CONF. (II, 35): “Luther always wrote that Baptism removes the guilt of Original Sin, although the material of sin, as they call it, viz., concupiscence, remains. He added, also, concerning its material character, that the Holy Spirit, being given in Baptism, begins to mortify the propensity to sin, and creates new motions in man. Augustine also speaks in the same manner, and says that sin is remitted in Baptism, not that it may not exist, but that it may not be imputed. He openly confesses that it exists, that is, that sin remains, although it is not imputed.” [On the other hand, the Council of Trent maintained that concupiscence, in the regenerate, is not properly sin. CHEMNITZ answers (Ex. Conc. Trid., Pr. Ed., 108): “It is not a good thing, as Paul shows in Rom. 7, in many words. Nor is it an adiaphoron, or indifferent matter, Rom. 7:21. It is certain, therefore, that it is an evil. . . . This original concupiscence is forgiven, weakened and diminished in Baptism: yet not so as to be suddenly removed and altogether extinguished, as no longer to exist; for as long as the regenerate live here there must be a law of sin in their members. But the remaining concupiscence does not hinder them from pleasing God, and being heirs of everlasting life. Nevertheless this is not because this concupiscence in the regenerate has been rendered holy or indifferent by means of Baptism. But it is of God’s grace, that such an evil dwelling in the flesh of the regenerate is, for Christ’s sake, not imputed to them for condemnation.”]

§ 27. Of Actual Sins.

Original Sin is the ground and source of all actual transgressions. By these we are to understand, however, not only sins which manifest themselves in outward acts, but also those which depend upon purely internal acts of man. HUTT. (Loc. c. Th., 346): “Actual transgression is every act, whether external or internal, which conflicts with the Law of God.” [1] They are numerous and diversified, and are divided, according to QUEN. (II, 65), in the following manner: I. “In respect of an internal defective cause in the agents, into voluntary and involuntary. A voluntary sin is an act by which man transgresses the divine Law, by a deliberate volition, contrary to the dictates of conscience. Involuntary sin is an act inconsistent with the Law, committed without sure knowledge or a deliberate purpose of the will.” Involuntary sin is accordingly divided into sins of ignorance and of infirmity. [2] II. “In respect of the person sinning, 1, into our own sins and the sins of others. Our own sins are those which we ourselves contract, either by doing what has been prohibited, or by omitting to do what has been commanded. Those are called the sins of others, which are indeed perpetrated by others, but in which we share or participate; [3] 2, into venial and mortal. Venial sins are those which, as soon as they are committed, and at the very moment when they are perpetrated, have pardon connected with them by an indissoluble bond. Mortal sins are those which produce spiritual death at the very moment when they are committed.” [4] III. “In respect of the material in which (in qua) they are committed, they are divided into internal and external. Internal are those of the heart; external are those of word and deed.” [5] IV. “In respect of the material about which (circa quam) they are committed; into sins against the first table immediately and directly, and those against the second table, i.e., against God, against a neighbor, and against the person of the transgressor himself.” V. “In respect of the sinful act itself: into sins of commission and of omission. Sins of commission are those which consist in positive acts which come into conflict with a negative precept. Sins of omission consist in the refusal or omission of acts which are prescribed by a positive precept.” (BR. 440.) [6] VI. “In respect of the effect: into sins which cry out for punishment, and those which do not. Of the former kind are vicious acts which provoke God to vengeance, although men are silent or only connive at them. The latter are those which God endures through His longsuffering, and either postpones the punishment, or, if they have been committed by the regenerate, forgives.” [7] VII. “In respect of their adjuncts, sins are divided into, 1, more or less grievous (on account of the greater or less fault or wickedness connected with them); [8] 2, into secret and manifest; [9] 3, into dead and living. Dead sins are those which indeed remain in us, but are not known as sins, or certainly not considered as great as they really are. Living sins are those which are known to be such, and rage even after the knowledge of the Law, Rom. 7:8, 9; 4, into remaining and remitted sins. A remaining sin is that which yet oppresses the sinner by its guilt and weight. A remitted sin is that whose guilt has been removed from the sinner, by the grace of God, for the sake of the merit of Christ; 5, into sins connected with hardness of heart and blindness of mind, and those unconnected with these; [10] 6, into pardonable and unpardonable sins. Of the latter class there is only the sin against the Holy Ghost. [11] This sin consists in a malicious denial of, a hostile attack upon, and a horrid blasphemy of divine truth, evidently known and approved by conscience, and an obstinate and finally persevering rejection of all the means of salvation. HOLL. (556), Matt. 12:31, 32; Mark 3:28, 29; Luke 12:10; Heb. 6:4-6; 10:26, 29.” [1] CAL. (V, 311): “Actual sin is a departure from the Law, by which human thoughts and actions proceeding from the flesh transgress the divine Law given by Moses, and thus it exposes the transgressor to temporal and eternal punishment.” HOLL. (537): “Actual sin is a turning away, by a human act either of commission or omission, from the rule of the divine Law, incurring responsibility for guilt and liability to punishment.” QUEN. (II, 63): “The words ‘act’ and ‘actual’ in this place are used not strictly for external acts only, and sins of commission, but with such latitude that they embrace also internal vicious emotions, both primary and secondary, and also sins of omission.” “In the Holy Scriptures, actual sins are called works of the flesh, Gal. 5:19; unfruitful works of darkness, Eph. 5:11; deeds of the old man, Col. 3:9; dead works, Heb. 6:1; 9:14; unlawful deeds, 2 Peter 2:8.” [2] Here these further remarks are to be added: (a) QUEN. (II, 67): “Sin is here called voluntary, not because it is with the will or in the will, for thus also involuntary violations of duty would be voluntary; but it is understood here as opposed to that which is done through ignorance and inconsiderately (aproairetwß).” (b) HOLL. (542): “Voluntary sin is viewed both in respect of conscience, and in respect of the purpose of the will.” Sin against conscience is fourfold. For it is committed either against a correct conscience, when a man, either by action or omission, does not follow, but despises the dictate of conscience when it agrees with the divine Law; or against an erroneous conscience, when a man, either by action or omission, turns away from the dictate of conscience imbued in error; or against a probable conscience, when any one is delinquent contrary to the dictate of the intellect, which urges, for probable reasons, that something should be done or omitted now at this place; or against a doubtful conscience, when any one does or omits that, concerning which he is in doubt whether it should be done or omitted. Voluntary sin, viewed in respect of the purpose of the will, is twofold. The one kind is that which is committed from mere malice and a will altogether free. The other is that which is committed under the power of a will influenced by force or fear, and by surrounding dangers. Matt. 26:70, 72, 74; Mark 14:68, 70, 71; Luke 22:57, 58, 60; John 18:25, 27.” (c) Involuntary sins are [QUEN., II, 70): “1. Sins of ignorance, which overtake the unwilling regenerate, in consequence of the darkness of the mind, which has not been yet entirely removed by the illumination of the Holy Spirit. 2. Sins of infirmity, which overtake the regenerate without any certain purpose of sinning. Such are sinful emotions of the mind, which have suddenly arisen without their will, and whatever unlawful words or deeds are the result of inadvertence or precipitancy, and contrary to the purpose of the will, Gen. 9:21; 16:5; 18:12; Numbers 20:11, 12; Acts 15:39; Rom. 7:15; Gal. 2:12, 13, 14; 6:1.” [3] HOLL. (552): “Our own sin is a vicious act, produced by a real influence of our own: the sin of another imputed to us, is an unlawful act, to the production of which we concur indeed by no real influence, yet by an efficacious intention, so that it can be justly imputed to us. (He concurs, by efficacious intention, in the sin of another, who commands, consults, consents, connives at, does not oppose, or give information, and thus is the moral cause of the sin of another), Eph. 5:7 and 11; 1 Tim. 5:22; 2 John 11; Rev. 18:4.” [4] HOLL. (547): (a) “Venial sin is every involuntary sin in the regenerate, which neither removes the indwelling grace of the Holy Spirit, nor extinguishes faith, but, in the moment in which it is committed, has pardon connected with it by an indissoluble bond. The distinction of sin into mortal and venial does not arise from the desert of sin, for every sin, of itself, and by its own nature, in a court of law is damnable; but (1) From the different conditions of the subject, or the person sinning. For a venial sin exists in the regenerate, a mortal sin in those who either never were regenerated, or, having been overcome by the predominating power of the flesh, fell from a state of grace. (2) From the estimate which God has made in the Gospel; because God, a reconciled and gracious Father, does not impute to the regenerate sins of infirmity and ignorance for guilt and punishment. (3) From the event. A mortal sin precipitates the sinner into a state of wrath, death, and condemnation, so that, if he should die in this state, and without repentance, he would be certainly condemned; but a venial sin, because it has pardon as an inseparable attendant, can consist with the grace of God and saving faith.” (Id. 551): “The causes of forgiveness or non-imputation are: the compassion of God, the satisfaction and intercession of Christ (1 John 2:1, 2; Rom. 8:1), the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, and the daily penitence of the regenerate.” (Id. 547): (b) “A mortal sin is that by which the regenerate, having been overcome by the flesh, and thus not remaining in a regenerate state, transgress the divine Law by a deliberate purpose of the will, contrary to the dictates of conscience, and thereby lose saving faith, reject the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, and cast themselves into a state of wrath, death and condemnation.” [5] HOLL. (552): “Sins of the heart are depraved thoughts and desires which are cherished within the human breast; sins of the lips are wicked words and gestures expressed by the lips; sins of deed are actions which are performed contrary to the divine Law, by an external effort of the members. Matt. 5:21, 22.” [6] HOLL. (552): “Sins of commission are positive acts, by which the negative precepts of God are violated. Sins of omission are the neglect of acts prescribed by the affirmative precepts of God, James 4:16, 17. Note. Although there is oftentimes, in a sin of omission, a certain illicit positive act, either an internal act of the will, as, for example, to will to omit what had been commanded, or an external act, as an operation by which any one is hindered from that which he ought to do; yet such a positive act is not always or necessarily required, but the mere fact that one does not do what is commanded is sin.” [7] HOLL. (553): “Outcrying sins are the following, the Scriptures being witness: 1. The fratricide committed by Cain, Gen. 4:10. 2. The sins of the Sodomites, Gen. 18:20. 3. The oppression of the Israelites in Egypt, Exod. 3:9; of widows and orphans, Exod. 22:22. 4. The denial of wages due to hirelings, James 5:4.” [8] HOLL. (454): “One sin is more grievous than another: 1. In respect to the efficient cause or person sinning. A Christian sins more grievously than a heathen, though he commit the same crime. 2. In respect of the impelling cause. He who commits adultery with his neighbor’s wife, for the sake of gratifying his lust, sins more grievously than he who steals when impelled by hunger. 3. In respect of the object. He is more guilty who slays his father than he who slays an enemy. 4. In respect of the Law. He sins more grievously who violates the first table of the Law, than he who violates the second. 5. In respect to the effect. That sin is regarded as the more grievous which is attended with the greater injury.” [9] HOLL. (554): “A secret sin is that which is either unknown to the person himself who sins, or which is known only to him who sins, and a few others who wish it suppressed. An open sin is that which has become known to many, and, if it be connected with offence to others, is called a scandal. A scandal is an open sin which furnishes an occasion of sinning to those who know it. It is usually divided into given or active scandal, and received or passive. The former is an open sin which is the occasion of sinning to others; the latter is a word or deed of another, not in itself evil, by which others are offended, or take occasion to sin.” [10] HOLL. (555): “Sin, connected with hardness of heart, is the most atrocious of all, by which the mind of man, having been polluted, remains averse to the Word of God and blind; the will, confirmed in wickedness, resists the Holy Spirit; the appetite indulges in beastly pleasures; and therefore the sinner, being with difficulty or not at all corrigible, brings upon himself temporal and eternal punishments. The cause of this hardness is not God, but partly the devil, who multiplies evils, blind the mind, and fills the heart with wickedness, 2 Cor. 4:4; Acts 5:3; Eph. 2:2; partly man, who rejects the ordinary means of salvation, and is continually selling himself to the desire and practice of sin, Matt. 13:15.” In reference to Exod. 7:3, HOLL (492) remarks: “God does not harden men causally or effectively, by sending hardness into their hearts, but judicially, permissively, and by forsaking them. For the act of hardening is a judicial act, by which, on account of antecedent, voluntary, and inevitable wickedness, God justly permits a man habitually wicked to rush into greater crimes, and withdraws His grace from him, and finally delivers him up to the power of Satan, by whom he is afterwards driven on into greater sins, until He finally cuts him off from the right of the heavenly inheritance.” [11] QUEN. (II, 74): “The word, Spirit, is not used here with respect to essence, as the term is common to the three persons of the God-head, but it is used personally, for the third person of the Godhead; yet respect being had, not so much to the person itself of the Holy Spirit, as if this sin were committed immediately against Him, as to His office and blessings, for example, as far as He strives to illuminate men through the doctrines of the Gospel. . . . Therefore, the Holy Spirit must here be viewed in relation to His office, and the sin is said to be against the Holy Spirit, partly in respect of His ministry, and partly in respect of His testimony. Rom. 8:16.” GRH. (V, 85): “The Sin against the Holy Ghost, therefore, is an intentional denial of evangelical truth, which has been acknowledged and approved by conscience, connected with a bold attack upon it, and voluntary blasphemy of it. For we must observe that this kind of sin was proved against the Pharisees by Christ; for, although they were constrained by the force of the truth uttered by Him, and were convicted in their consciences by its illumination, yet they raged against Him by their wicked impiety, to such a degree that they blushed not to ascribe His doctrines and miracles to Satan. The epistle to the Hebrews thus describes those who sin against the Holy Ghost, that they, having been previously illuminated, have also tasted the heavenly gift and been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, have tasted also the good Word of God, and the powers of the world to come, yet afterwards fall away, and thus crucify to themselves afresh the Son of God, and put Him to an open shame; also that, by voluntary apostasy, they trample under foot the Son of God, and esteem His blood, by which they were sanctified, an unholy thing, and do despite unto the spirit of grace.” QUEN. (II, 82): “The form of the Sin against the Holy Ghost consists, (1) In a denial, by a full, free, and unimpeded exercise of the will, of evangelical truth, after the latter has been evidently and sufficiently acknowledged and approved. Heb. 6:4; 10:26, 29. (2) In a hostile attack upon the same. Matt. 12:31, 32. (3) In voluntary and atrocious blasphemy. Heb. 10:26, 29.” To this the remark is added, however (Ib., p. 83): “That these essential requisites of this sin must always be taken conjointly, and never separately, and that then that must be called the sin against the Holy Ghost, concerning which all these can be conjointly verified.” The following additional description flows from the nature of the subject: “Not infants, but adults, commit this sin, who are not destitute of the knowledge of the revealed Word of God, but who have been illuminated and convicted by conscience of the certainty of divine truth, and have fallen from the desire and love of it into bitter hatred against it.” (HOLL., 561.) To which BR. adds (444): “Whether the doctrine had been once approved by the assent of divine faith and a public profession, or only so clearly perceived that the mind, having been convicted, had nothing which it could oppose to it. In the former mode, those apostates sin against the Holy Ghost who deny the truth once acknowledged and believed, and utter reproaches against it, as Paul describes them, Heb. 6:4. The Pharisees and Scribes belong to the latter class, who never, by their confession, approved of the doctrines of Christ. In the meantime, they were so convinced of their truth, from the Scriptures and the miracles of Christ, that they could oppose nothing but reproaches.” As adjuncts of this sin, QUEN. (II, 83) adds: “(1) Final impenitence, Heb. 6:4-6; (2) Absolute irremissibility, Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28, 29; Luke 12:10; (3) Exclusion from the prayers of believers, 1 John 5:16.” HOLL. (564): “It is irremissible, not through any want of divine grace, or inadequacy of the atonement of Christ, or any want of the efficacious influence of the Holy Ghost, but on account of a wicked rejection of all the means of grace, and by reason of final impenitence.” On the other hand, the sin against the Son of man is remissible. Matt. 12:32; Luke 12:10. QUEN. (II, 87): “The sin against the Son of man is either a denial of the truth of the Gospel already acknowledged concerning the Son of God, who became man, resulting from infirmity of the flesh and fear of danger, but not united with a hostile attack and blasphemy, or an attack or blasphemy through ignorance of the truth not acknowledged.”

§ 28. The Freedom of the Will.

Since so great a change has taken place in man through the Fall, the question remains to be discussed, What powers to act does he still retain? [1] For, since all these powers are dependent upon knowledge and will, it is natural that, so far as knowledge and will are weakened or lost, these powers to act should also thereby suffer. But the question, as to the powers retained by man, is identical with that as to how far freedom of the will (liberum arbitrium) in regard to his actions pertains to him [2] As, however, various opinions have often been entertained in reference to this liberum arbitrium, it is necessary, first of all, that we definitely determine the proper significance of this term. If we understand by it the will itself, then it cannot be questioned that since the Fall this still belongs to man, for without this he would cease to be man. [3] In like manner it belongs also to the nature of man that neither in his will nor in his acts, neither externally nor internally (by instinct), can he be determined by irresistible necessity. [4] All this is therefore to be predicated of man after the Fall, no less than before it, for all this belongs strictly to the essential nature of man, which suffered no change through the Fall. But, if we understand by liberum arbitrium that power of willing, in virtue of which man can act in everything, in good as well as in evil, entirely without hindrance, just as he pleases (“the liberum arbirium is that power of the will which, following the judgment of reason, enables man most freely to embrace the good and resist the evil” (HUTT., Loc. c. Th., 269)), [5] then it follows, from the change that has occurred in man through the Fall, that this cannot now be predicated of him. If this change consists in the loss of the divine image, it at once follows that man can no longer freely choose between good and evil, but has lost the power to will and to do that which is good. [6] If, then, we would describe more particularly the liberum arbitrium, as it exists in fallen man, we must say, that man, in consequence of the evil disposition that dwells within him since the Fall, is no longer able to will or to do anything really good and acceptable to God, viz., nothing of all that the Holy Scriptures designate and prescribe as such, because all of this can be accomplished only under the special influence of the Spirit of God. He is therefore so completely destitute of the liberum arbitrium in rebus spiritualibus, [7] that he cannot of his own accord even cherish a desire for salvation and a change of his present depraved condition. [8] And in this condition all that remains to him is liberum arbirium in malis (liberty of choice in regard to what is evil), [9] and liberum arbitrium in rebus externis, [10] namely, in all those things which being recognizable by the light of reason, are within the reach of the natural powers, without needing the aid of a truly good disposition. [11] [1] GRH. (V, 87): “Connection with the preceding. We have seen above in what wonderful and miserable ways original sin, like poison, has pervaded all the powers of man, how intimately the corruption arising from it has adhered to human nature, what pestilential fruits that envenomed seed has produced. It remains for us to inquire, what there is yet of strength in man.” CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 179): “This is the question, What human powers are there after the Fall to produce obedience to the Law, when darkness is in the mind, aversion to God in the will, and in the heart rebellion against the Law of God? And, because not only external civil acts are demanded by the Law of God, but a perfect and perpetual obedience of the whole human nature, what, and how much can the will of man accomplish? Therefore the caption of this section would have been more clearly stated, concerning man’s powers, than concerning the freedom of the will.” [2] QUEN. (II, 170): “These powers remaining in man after the Fall are otherwise called the freedom of the will.” GRH. (V, 87), thus explains the term liberum arbitrium, or freedom of the will: “These powers of man are best judged of from the rational soul by which he is distinguished from the brutes, and is constituted a distinct species. Two faculties belong to the rational soul, viz., mind and will: the former performs its office by knowing, discriminating, reflecting, judging; the latter by choosing and rejecting. From the concurrence of both, that is produced which is commonly called the free determination, which is a faculty of the mind and will, so that the determination belongs to the mind and the free belongs to the will.” Therefore HOLL. (573): “The proper and adequate seat of free determination is the will. But the intellect concurs antecedently, and by way of preparation (paraskeuastikwß), in the execution of the free determination.” QUEN. (II, 170): “The term ‘free determination’ is not given in so many words in the Scriptures; yet is found for substance, and in equivalent terms, in Deut. 30:19; Josh. 24:15; 1 Cor. 7:37; Phil. 5:14; Heb. 10:26; 1 Pet. 5:2.” [3] CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 182): “There is great diversity among ecclesiastical writers, some affirming, others denying the freedom of the will. Even the same writer, in different places, seems oftentimes to express opposite sentiments on this subject, sometimes affirming and sometimes denying it. This diversity cannot be more readily settled than by a grammatical explanation of the word. For, if the term, free will, be used in the most common acceptation, it signifies nothing more than, (1) that the man who possesses it is rational, or has mind and choice; (2) that besides natural emotions and actions, concerning which there is no deliberation of mind or choice of will, a man has voluntary emotions, to the exercise of which the judgment of the mind and the inclination of the will concur; (3) and that in virtues and vices, in order that actions may be called either good or bad, an intelligent mind is required and a will which either yields to or resists the judgment.” HUTT. (Loc. c. Th., 267): “Sometimes the term ‘will,’ or ‘choice’ is employed to designate the other faculty of the soul, indeed the very substance of the will itself, whose function is simply that of willing. Thus regarded, scarcely any one will deny free will to man, unless he dare assert that man is totally destitute of this faculty of the soul. The absurdity of this is, indeed, deservedly repudiated by all, inasmuch as no faculty or power of the soul can be ignored without ignoring the whole substance of the soul itself; for this is itself nothing else than what its faculties are, and when one faculty perishes it must itself expire.” GRH. (V, 100): “The question is not whether the essence of the will itself has survived the Fall, for this we emphatically maintain, viz., that man has lost not his will, but the soundness of it.” [4] GRH. (V, 87): “Liberty is assigned to choice in the first place, in respect of its mode of action, because it is such that the will as far as it is such, acts freely, i.e., it is not forced or violently hurried along by an external motion, nor does it act alone by natural instinct, but either embraces, or rejects something of its own accord, or from an inner principle of movement. In this sense, free and voluntary are synonymous; and to say that the will is not free, is the same as if any one would say, that that which is warm is without warmth. That is called freedom from compulsion, according to which it happens that the will cannot be forced to do anything contrary to its inclination. Also freedom from necessity, as far as necessity is employed in the sense of force and violence. Others call it interior liberty, by which the will of man is moved voluntarily, freely, without coercion, by a power implanted and with capacity to choose, and has within itself the principle of its own motion. By others it is called liberty in the subject. This liberty, since it is a natural and essential property, given to the will by God, has not been lost by the Fall. The substance of man has not perished; therefore, neither has the rational soul; therefore neither the will, nor the essential liberty of the will. The will is an essential power of the soul, and the soul is nothing else than the powers or essential faculties themselves. Therefore while the soul remains, its essential powers, intellect and will, also remain. On the other hand, the power of free and uncoerced volition is essential to the will; therefore, as long as the will remains, this power also remains. In this sense and respect we firmly believe, and emphatically declare, that the will of man has remained free even after the Fall.” QUEN. (II, 171) makes a distinction between freedom from violence and constraint, and freedom from inward necessity, and remarks: “Freedom from violence is common to man with the brutes; but man has freedom from necessity in common with God and angels.” The following distinction also deserves a place here: “An intelligent nature, that is at the same time infinite and divine, possesses freedom of the will in the most excellent and perfect manner; finite, or angelic and human nature, in a more imperfect manner.” [5] HUTT. (Loc. c., 268): “Sometimes the term ‘will,’ or ‘choice,’ is understood to signify the capacity of determining freely to choose that which is good and freely to avoid that which is evil.” In this respect, it is very properly denied that free will has remained in man since the Fall. GRH. (V, 98): “Free will in man before the Fall was that faculty of the reason and will by virtue of which he was able either to sin or not to sin.” QUEN. (II, 175): “The form of free choice consists in the indifference of the will, both that which has respect to specification as well as that which has respect to the exercise of the act; that is, it consists in such indifference and freedom that the will is not necessarily determined to one thing, but, all the requisites to action being placed before it in accordance with its own liberty, it can do either this or that, can choose one and reject the other, which is freedom of specification (or specific freedom); can either act or not act, which is freedom of action (or active freedom). This liberty is also called ‘liberty of action from the necessity of immutability,’ which is exercised when one acts without being controlled by violence or coercion, at the prompting of an internal impulse that holds itself immovably to its purpose.” [6] GRH. (V, 98): “If the question be concerning the liberty of rectitude, or the power of deciding either way, of choosing or rejecting either good or evil, we maintain that this has perished. For, after through sin the image of God was lost, at the same time also the power to choose the good was lost (for it was part of the divine image): and, because through sin man was not only despoiled but also miserably corrupted, therefore, in the place of that liberty, there succeeded the unbridled impulse to evil, so that since the Fall, in men corrupt and not yet regenerate (either corrupt by their own will, as our first parents, or born from corrupt parents, as all their posterity), the will is free only towards that which is evil, since such corrupt and not yet regenerate men are able to do nothing but sin.” (ID., V, 100): “Understanding the term ‘liberty’ as describing the free power and faculty of choosing the good and rejecting the evil, that was possessed by Adam, we maintain that Luther was perfectly correct in saying, ‘Free will is a title without the thing itself, or a thing with nothing but a title.’” [7] QUEN. (II, 177): “By spiritual things are understood such emotions and actions as are prescribed by the Law and the Gospel, and can be produced only by the motion and action of the Spirit of God, so that they are the true knowledge of God, according to the measure of written revelation, detestation of sin committed, or sorrow for sins, the fear of God, faith in Christ, the new obedience, the love of God and of our neighbor.” CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 190): “The human will cannot, by its own powers, without the Holy Spirit, either begin interior and spiritual movements, or produce interior obedience of the heart, or persevere unto the end in the course commenced and perfect it. They are called spiritual acts because (Rom. 7:14) ‘the Law is spiritual,’ that is, it is not satisfied by any external civil actions which the unregenerate can perform; but it demands such movements and actions (1) as cannot be performed except by the agency of the Holy Spirit; (2) as unrenewed nature not only cannot perform, but even hinders the Holy Spirit in performing.” The FORM. CONC. thus defines (Sol. Dec., II, 20): “Spiritual or divine things are those which have respect to the salvation of the soul.” Concerning these says QUEN. (II, 178): “We assert that the powers of the unrenewed man, both in intellect and will, whether for the beginning, or continuing, or completing these entirely spiritual acts which have just now been mentioned, are not only bound, impeded, or even weakened or broken, but altogether destroyed, lost, extinct and a nullity. For, in knowing and seeking an object spiritually good, the old powers in man are not renewed, the drowsy are not awakened, the infirm strengthened, nor the bound loosed; but altogether other and new powers and faculties are bestowed and put on.” The proof of this position, as to the intellect, QUEN. (II, 178) derives from Eph. 5:8; 1 Cor. 2:14; 2 Cor. 3:5; Rom. 1:21, 22. as to the will, from Gen. 6:5; Rom. 8:7; Ezek. 11:19; 36:26; Rom. 2:5; 6:17, 20; John 8:34; Eph. 2:1, 2; Col. 2:13; Ps. 14:2, 3; Matt. 7:18. This want of freedom extends so far that QUEN. (II, 178) proceeds: “To this category also we refer the going to church for the sake of receiving information from the preached Word, the reading and hearing of the Word of God with the desire of profit, the being controlled by the desire of information from the Word, all which are the operations of antecedent and receptive grace. Here belongs also the external and historical knowledge of the biblical propositions, which transmit the mysteries of faith, 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 4:18; 5:8.” In the Symbolical Books the principal passages are in the FORM. CONC. II. [8] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. II, 7): “We believe that man is entirely corrupt and dead to that which is good, so that there has not remained, neither can remain, in the nature of man since the Fall, and before regeneration, even a scintillation of spiritual power, by which he can, of himself, prepare himself for the grace of God, or apprehend offered grace, or be capable, in and of himself, of receiving that grace, or of applying or accommodating himself to grace, or by his own powers contributing anything, either in whole or in half, or in the smallest part, to his own conversion, or of acting, operating, or co-operating, as of himself, or of his own accord.” The FORM. CONC. (II, 77) therefore rejects the dogma of the Synergists, “who pretend that in spiritual things man is not absolutely dead to that which is good, but only deeply wounded and half dead. And although the free will is too weak to begin and, by its own powers, convert itself to God and obey with the whole heart the Law of God, yet, if the Holy Spirit make a beginning, call us by the Gospel and offer to us His grace, the forgiveness of sins, and eternal life, then that free will could by its own peculiar powers, meet God, in some way contribute (something, at least, although little and languidly) to its own conversion, aid it, co-operate, prepare itself for grace, and apply it, apprehend it, embrace it, believe the Gospel, and co-operate together with the Holy Spirit to continuing and preserving its own operations.” The following positions taken by Melanchthon, in the Examen Ordinandorum: “Three causes concur in conversion, the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and the Son send that He may enkindle our hearts, and our own will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God;” as also in Article XVIII of the altered Augs. Conf.: “A state of spiritual justification is effected when we are assisted by the Holy Spirit,” and “Human nature cannot produce the interior emotions, true fear, etc., unless the Holy Spirit govern and assist our hearts,” are therefore regarded as synergistic. CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., I, 201) clearly comments upon the first of these proposition: “The human will does not concur in such a manner as to aid spiritual acts by its own powers. . . . But the human will is numbered among the causes of a good act, because it can resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51) and destroy the work of God (Rom. 14:20). The children of God are led by the Holy Spirit, not that they should believe or do good ignorantly and unwillingly, . . . but grace makes them willing from being unwilling, because it works to will, Rom. 7:22.” [9] QUEN. (II, 176): “In the state of corruption, liberty in the will of man is not only that of contradiction or action, but that also of contrariety or specification; not, indeed, that which is employed between spiritual good and evil, for this was lost by the Fall, but that which is employed between this and that spiritual evil in particular.” “By liberty of contradiction, we are to understand that liberty which is employed about one and the same object, within opposing limits, as to will and not to will, to do and not to do; by liberty of contrariety, that liberty which is employed either about diverse objects or about diverse acts of the same object.” HOLL. (570). GRH. (V, 99): “There exists in man, therefore, freedom of will, along with the servitude of sin, for he both sins and is unable to refrain from sinning, while he nevertheless sins freely and delights to sin; although he is not moved except to evil, yet he chooses it freely, i.e., willingly and spontaneously, not unwillingly or under coercion, and is moved to it with all his energy. Add to this, that in the very choice of evils he exercises a certain liberty.” HUTT. (Loc. c., 272): “Even in evil and vicious actions, freedom of the will is very readily conceded, inasmuch as the will, not yet regenerate, most freely, i.e., not by coercion, but spontaneously, wills, chooses, approves, and does that which is evil. Whence it happens that that which is voluntary enters into the definition of sin, so that that cannot properly be called sin which is not voluntary. . . . But it is here asked why this propensity to evil is said to be free, aye, freedom itself, since it is rather a sad and horrid service. But it is very properly replied that both assertions are true in a different respect; for this propensity of our will is properly described as both enslaved and free. Enslaved it is with respect to the lost image of God; for, since by the Fall the faculty of choosing the good and avoiding the evil was taken away, there was afterwards left a will which is so held captive under the tyranny of sin that it is not moved, except to the choosing of evil and avoiding the good. Gen. 8:21; Rom. 8:7. But, though the will be such a slave, yet it nevertheless is very properly called free, if we only have regard to the proper seat of sin, which is in the will of man. But if any one wish to assign to it also another cause, as when the Church sets the bounds of liberty concerning evil actions, that it may assign limits to human curiosity, so that the latter may not seek the cause of sin, without itself, but rather examine and discover it in itself; to this assuredly we will not object.” [10] CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., I, 183): “Augustine calls the works of the present life ‘external things.’ Because in spiritual acts there is no liberty, the will not being free, therefore, in order that freedom may not be entirely taken away from the will even in external things, this doctrine is taught concerning the freedom of the will in external discipline. But discipline is diligence in governing external actions and restraining external members in accordance with the precepts of the Decalogue; although the interior movements either may not be present or may not consent. . . . But in external things, Paul (Rom. 1:20) ascribed even to the unregenerate mind thoughts, knowledge, truth, etc. It is very evident that the mind was not despoiled of all intellect by the Fall, but that there is remaining, even in unregenerate men, some power of mind in perceiving and judging those things which have been subjected to reason and the senses, as in inventing and learning the various arts, in domestic life, politics, ethics, in counsel, prudence, etc. For this faculty makes the difference between rational man and irrational animals.” MEL. (Loci. Th., 68): “Since there remains, in the nature of man, a certain judgment and choice of things which are objects of reason or sense, there remains also a choice of external civil works; wherefore the human will is able, by its own powers, without renovation, to perform in some way the external duties of the Law. This is the freedom of the will which philosophers properly attribute to man. For even Paul, discriminating between carnal and spiritual righteousness, admits that the unregenerate have a certain power of choice, and perform certain external deeds of the Law, such as to abstain from murder, theft, robbery; and this he calls carnal righteousness.” HUTT. (272): “Reason and will in man are so inseparably united that neither can exist without the other, but they mutually presuppose each other; so that any concession of the existence of reason since the Fall necessarily carries with it the concession of the faculty of the will, unless any one should wish to assert that the reason could choose or refuse anything without the will, which would be supremely absurd.” CONF. AUG. XVIII: “Concerning free will, they teach that the human will has some liberty to attain civil righteousness and to choose in regard to things subject to reason. But it has no power without the Holy Spirit, to attain righteousness before God or spiritual righteousness.” The expression ‘Civil Righteousness’ is more fully explained in the AP. of the CONF., XVIII, 70: “We do not strip the human will of liberty. The human will has liberty of choice in works and things which reason by itself comprehends. It can in some measure attain to civil righteousness, or the righteousness of works, it can speak about God, it can offer to God a certain external worship, obey magistrates and parents; in choosing external acts it can withhold its hand from murder, adultery, and theft. Since there remains in the nature of man reason and judgment concerning things subject to sense, there remains also the choice concerning such things and the power of attaining civil righteousness. For it is this that the Scripture calls the righteousness of the flesh, which the carnal nature, i.e., reason, by itself effects without the Holy Spirit. Although the power of concupiscence is so great that men more frequently obey their evil affections than their sound judgment. And the devil, who ‘worketh in the children of disobedience,’ as Paul says (Eph. 2:2), does not cease to incite this imbecile nature to various sins. These are the reasons why civil righteousness also is so rare among men.” For proof, CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., I, 185): “(1) Because Paul affirms that there is a certain carnal righteousness, Rom. 2:14; 10:3; Phil. 3:6. (2) Because Paul says that the Law is the object of free will, even among the unjust, 1 Tim. 1:9, i.e., the Law was given to the unregenerate to restrain the will, the affections of the heart and locomotion in externals.” The later divines point out, as “the objects about which the will of man in the state of corruption is occupied, two hemispheres, one of which is called the lower and the other the higher.” To the latter belong the things purely spiritual or sacred (sacrae internae) of which we have been speaking. To the former are referred HOLL. (577): “All things and actions, physical, ethical, political, domestic, artificial, pedagogic, and divine, as far as they can be known by the light of reason and can be produced by the powers of nature aided by the general concurrence of God.” GRH. (V, 101): “For we confess that some liberty remained as far as acts are concerned which are just, in the sense of moral, political, and domestic justice, which, according to Luther, belong to the lower hemisphere. For example, an unregenerate man can control his external locomotion as he will, he can govern the members of his body by the dictate of right reason; he can, in some degree, attain civil justice, and avoid the more heinous external sins that are in conflict with external discipline. Much more can he also hear with the outward ear, and meditate upon the words of God.” Yet his cannot be admitted without some limitation. HOLL. (583): “The will of regenerate and unregenerate men since the Fall has the power, in regard to different things which are subject ot reason, of choosing or embracing one rather than another, although that power is languid and infirm.” This weakness arises from impediments both external and internal. Among internal impediments are reckoned the following, viz., “blindness of the intellect, which causes error in deliberations, disinclination of the will to pursue the good, and a proclivity to embrace the evil, vehemence of the affections, often so great that like a torrent it carries away with it the will and disturbs the judgment. The external impediments are the cunning of the devil, the blandishments and terrors of the world, the control of God, subverting plans and diminishing or cutting off the ability to act.” HUTT. (269) divides all the actions of men into: “evil, viz., those forbidden by the Moral Law; mediate or indifferent; and good.” Concerning the mediate he says: “These again are threefold, according as they pertain to the condition of our nature, such as to stand, sit, sleep, eat, drink, and such like, most of which are common to man and brutes, having mainly respect to the vegetative, positive, appetitive, and locomotive powers of the soul; or, as they pertain to our civil and domestic conduct, such as to buy, sell, go to law, go to war, to follow a trade, and whatever pertains to civil or domestic life; or, finally, such as pertain to the external government and discipline of the Church, such as to teach and hear the Word of God, to observe certain ceremonies, to give and receive the sacraments, and similar external works, affecting the external senses. We call the actions of this second class mediate or indifferent, because by their nature, or in themselves, they are neither good nor bad; but whatever of good or evil belongs to them, this they derive from other accidental causes.” Concerning good actions he says: “They are twofold, either morally good, such as to live honestly, to give every one his due, not to injure another; or spiritually good, such as to have proper regard for the worship of God, for true religion, and the eternal salvation of souls.” It is only the latter that he denies to the unregenerate. Of the others he says (273): “It is clear that some liberty of the will must be conceded to the unregenerate, not only as to the despotic (despotikwn) kind of actions, when, namely, the movement of the members is controlled by the command of the will, whether the affections inwardly consent or not, but also as to the freely chosen (proairetikon), when the will, in accordance with a good affection, prefers honest actions.” [11] This description of free will applies to man in the state of corruption. The Dogmaticians distinguish, however, a threefold condition, “the state before the Fall, the state of corruption, the state of reparation,” and in each of these conditions free will is a different thing. QUEN. (II, 176): “In the state before the Fall man was free (1) from physical necessity; (2) from compulsory necessity; (3) from the servitude of sin; (4) from misery; (5) from the necessity of immutability; not, however (6) from the necessity of obligation” (“which is the determinative direction of the will for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, according to the rule of a higher law,” HOLL. (571).).” QUEN. (II, 183): “In the state of reparation. The restoration of the integrity lost by the Fall is either that commenced in conversion or that completed in glorification; the former occurs in this life, the latter in the life to come. In the state of incipient restoration there exists in man, when converted, or after his conversion, a freedom in relation to an object supernatural or purely spiritual, not only from physical necessity, but also from the necessity of immutability, because his will is no longer determined to evil, as before his conversion, but it can freely choose good, by the grace of the Holy Spirit assisting and co-operating; it can also choose spiritual evil in consequence of the remains of a carnal disposition still adhering to him. In the state of consummated restoration, or in eternal life, there will succeed a full and perfect freedom of the human will, not only from compulsion and from the servitude of sin, but also from misery, and from the root and sense of sin; and also a liberty from internal necessity or immutability, as well that of contrariety (or, as to what relates to the kind of sin) as that of contradiction (or, as to whether the power to sin shall be exercised or not).” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. II, 67): “There is a great difference between the baptized and the unbaptized. For since, according to the teaching of Paul (Gal. 3:27), all who are baptized put on Christ, and are truly born again, these now have free will, i.e., have again been made free, as Christ testifies (John 8:36). Whence, also, they not only hear the Word of God, but also, though not without much infirmity, can assent to it and believingly embrace it.”

§ 30. Benevolence of God.

The gracious will of God, to deliver fallen men from their ruined condition, is the first thing we have to consider, for it is this that originates the sending of the Son, who accomplishes the redemption, and the sending of the Holy Spirit, who applies it to individual persons. This, His gracious will, God at once announced in His promise (recorded in Gen. 3:15). But God did not then, for the first time, form this purpose of redeeming man; for, as He foresaw from eternity that he would fall, He determined at the same time both to create and to redeem him. [2] This purpose of God, however, will, in time, be accomplished only in the case of those who fulfil the condition upon which redemption is to be applied. Therefore we distinguish this gracious will of God into general and special benevolence. I. The gracious will of God is called the universal or general will (benevolence) when it is considered in itself, as it refers to all men alike miserable, and it is exhibited in preparing the means of redemption for all, and effectually offering the same to them, without for the present considering the manner in which men treat the grace thus offered to them. [3] HOLL. (586): “The universal benevolence of God is that act of divine grace by which God, having witnessed the common misery of fallen men, is moved not only earnestly to desire the salvation of them all, but also to give Christ as Mediator for its accomplishment, and to appoint appropriate and efficacious means with the intention that all men should use them, attain through them true faith in Christ, and possess and enjoy eternal salvation, procured through Him, to the praise of the divine goodness.” This will is also called antecedent, inasmuch as, in the nature of the case, it antedates all question as to the manner in which man may treat the offered grace. [4] It refers to all men alike (universally to all, without a single exception. John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:4; Rom. 11:32; Acts 17:30, 31; Tit. 2:11; 2 Pet. 3:9; Ezek 33:11), [5] depends alone upon God’s compassion for the wretched condition of man, and has in no sense been called forth by any merit or worthiness of man. [6] This will of God, moreover, earnestly and sincerely proposes that all men obtain salvation through Christ, [7] and God offers unto all the necessary means, and is ready to render these available for them. [8] Meanwhile this will of God is still not as absolute and unconditional as is the compassion of God towards man, from which the plan of salvation has proceeded; that is, this will of God aims at saving men through the merits of Christ and the appropriation of the means of redemption as furnished to them. [9] The statements concerning the universal will of God may accordingly be summed up under the following characteristics: It is (1) gratuitous and free (Gal. 3:22; Rom. 11:32; 8:32); (2) impartial (Rom. 3:22); (3) sincere and earnest (Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11): (4) efficacious (Rom. 2:4); (5) not absolute, but ordinate and conditioned (John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:6; Rom. 5:8; 1 John 1:4, 9, 10. [10] The universal will of God is distinguished from — II. The Special Will of God. — Thus this same [11] will of God in reference to the salvation of men is designated, when we view it in connection with the divinely foreseen conduct of men towards the offered grace, as the condition upon which they are to be saved. HOLL. (586): “This special benevolence of God is that which induced Him to bestow eternal salvation upon sinners who embrace the means of salvation offered to them.” Although the will of God is general, inasmuch as God’s disposition is equally gracious toward all men, and inasmuch as for their salvation He has prepared a plan of redemption in the sending of His Son, available equally for all; yet it already follows from the above distinction, according to which the general will of God is not absolute, but ordinate and conditioned, that the accomplishment of this gracious will is conditioned by the conduct of man towards the offered grace. If the aim of the will of God, considered in itself, without regard to this conduct of men, be that all are to be saved by the plan of redemption through Christ, yet its aim, more specifically described, is that only those shall be saved who accept of the salvation offered and persevere therein, and it refers only to these. This will of God, thus more specifically described (the special will of God), is also called consequent, because the divine foreknowledge of the proper conduct on the part of man precedes it; and it is also designated as particular, because it refers not to all men, but only to those to whom God foreknows that they will properly treat the offered grace. [12] (Eph. 1:1; James 2:5; Rev. 2:10; 1 Tim. 1:16; John 17:20.) From this special benevolence of God, which is based upon the universal benevolence of God, and proceeds from it, there comes forth the purpose of God, [13] which is called predestination [14] or election; [15] the purpose, namely, to save through the merits of Christ the definite number of those whose right treatment of the offered grace God had foreseen. HOLL. (604): “Predestination is the eternal decree of God to bestow eternal salvation upon all of whom God foresaw that they would finally believe in Christ.” [16] In virtue of the universal benevolence, salvation is provided for and offered to all, but the purpose of redemption is accomplished not with all, but only in the case of a definite number of men; the reason of this, however, lies in the special benevolence, in virtue of which only those really are to be saved who truly accept by faith the offered salvation, and persevere in this faith. [17] But God, by His foreknowledge, eternally foresees who these will be, and this foreknowledge is the ground upon which the purpose of God, embracing only a definite number of men, is eternal. [18] The decree of God is still further defined as (1), not absolute, but ordinate (determined by a certain order of means) and relative (1 Cor. 1:21), [19] i.e., there is no arbitrariness on the part of God, if He include a number of persons among the elect, and exclude others, for His purpose depends upon the observance of the order to which salvation is bound (“The apostle does not say that God absolutely wills to save all, in whatsoever manner they may conduct themselves, but that God wills that all may be saved, that is, by certain means.” QUEN.), and He has respect, therefore, in forming His purpose, to man’s conduct towards this appointed order of salvation. But this decree is also (2), not conditional, but categorical and simple, i.e., God does not allow it to be still doubtful, in time, whether He will bestow salvation upon this or that man, as though His purpose were only to save this or that man, if or after he may have laid hold upon the merit of Christ; but, by virtue of His foreknowledge, He recognizes in advance those who will lay hold upon the merit of Christ, and only to these does His purpose refer, and thus it is simple and categorical. [20] Hence it follows, therefore, also (3), that the election (taken in its strictest sense), because it rests upon an eternal decree of God, is immutable and irrevocable (so that an elect person cannot become a reprobate, Matt. 25:34; James 2:5; Matt. 24:24; 1 Pet. 1:2, 4; John 10:28; Dan 12:1; Rom. 8:29, 30); for God would not have correctly foreseen if His purpose would have to suffer change (election is immutable, because based upon an ordinate decree and because of the infallibility of the divine foreknowledge). Though the elect may for a while fall into sin and from grace, this cannot continue forever, and they cannot fail of eternal salvation. [21] The attributes or adjuncts of election and of the elect may be thus compendiously stated (QUEN., III, 20): “I. The attributes of election: (a) Eternity (Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9; 2 Thess. 2:13; Matt. 25:34); (b) Particularity (Matt. 20:16); (c) Immutability (2 Tim. 2:19; Matt. 24:24; 1 Pet. 1:4; Rom. 8:29, 30). “II. The attributes of the elect: (a) Paucity (Matt. 20:16: 22:14; (b) Possibility of totally losing, for a while, indwelling grace (Ps. 51:12; 1 Cor. 10:12); (c) The certainty of election [22] (Luke 10:20; Rom. 8:38; 2 Tim. 4:8: Phil. 2:12); (d) Final perseverance in the faith (Matt. 10:22; Rev. 2:10).” In contrast with predestination stands reprobation. [23] As God foreknows those who will preseveringly believe in Christ; and as, in view of this, He forms His purpose to save these, so also, in the same way, His purpose of condemnation embraces the definite number of those who are lost; and therefore reprobation is “that act of the consequent divine will by which God (before the foundation of the world) through His vindicative justice, and for its perpetual glory, adjudged to eternal condemnation all contumacious sinners, of whom He foresaw that they would finally reject the proffered grace of the call and of justification, and would depart this life without faith in Christ.” (HOLL. 643.) All the specifications referring to this topic correspond to those given concerning Predestination. The “internal exciting cause is the vindicative or punitive justice of God (Rom. 2:8); the external exciting cause is the rejection of the merit of Christ, i.e., the foreseen apistia or final incredulity (Mark 16:16; John 3:36).” [24] The form of reprobation, however, consists in “exclusion from the inheritance of eternal salvation, and in adjudication to eternal punishment according to the purpose and foreknowledge of God (Matt. 25:41).” Thus the attributes of reprobation and of the reprobate correspond to those of election and the elect. The attributes of reprobation are: (a) Eternity (Matt. 25:41; Jude 5:4); (b) Immutability (Numb. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Mal. 3:6).” The attributes of the reprobate are: “(a) Plurality (Matt. 7:13); (b) Possibility of being for awhile in the state of the truly regenerate; (c) Perseverance in final unbelief.” OBSERVATION I. — The foregoing representation, as here developed, belongs to the later period. GRH. is the first who, with special reference to earlier scholastic distinctions, presented the doctrine in this form; while the earlier theologians, in their statement of this doctrine, adhered to the definition which in Note 14 we designate as the second. That is as follows: “God determined from eternity to save those who would believe upon Christ.” Thus the FORM. CONC. When, however, the later theologians undertook systematically to present what can be said concerning predestination, the statement of the FORM. CONC. did not seem to them sufficient, because the purpose of God to save all who would believe on Christ could not be so indefinite in His own mind as was expressed by the words, “all those who would believe.” This purpose of God, they supposed, must rather be so positive that the definite number of those who should be saved must be known to Him, as otherwise it might be maintained that God would allow it to remain undecided until in the course of time which persons are to be saved; which would be inconsistent with the assumed eternity of the purpose. From this effort to express themselves accurately originated the definition of predestination in the strictest sense, as also the distinction between proqesiß and proorismoß. But to avoid the error of assuming that, if the number of the elect was fixed from eternity, their reception among that number in time was for that reason no longer conditioned by the conduct of men with reference to the offered grace, but depended upon an absolute and hidden decree of God, the further specification was added, that God, by virtue of His foreknowledge, antedating the purpose itself, from eternity foresaw who those would be who would accept the offered grace. (A specification which, indeed, is not unknown to the FORM. CONC., cf. Sol. Dec. XI, 54, but which was not then introduced into the definition of predestination.) And then there was added by the later theologians the distinction between the general and special will of God, which was meant to show that the will of God to save was, indeed, in itself considered, and without reference to the conduct of men, general and applicable to all; but that, as the actual conferring of salvation was dependent upon the conduct of men with reference to it, as soon as reference was had to this, it then became special, and referred then only to those who conducted themselves properly with reference to the offered salvation. By all these further specifications, however, the doctrine of predestination was only more accurately stated, and not in any wise altered. OBSERVATION II. — The question, whether the foreknowledge of God does not necessarily determine the fate of men, so that human freedom is thereby abolished, is not discussed by any of the theologians in this connection. CHMN. (Loc. c., I, 162) endeavors, in the discussion of the cause of sin, to meet the above objection by remarking that the foreknowledge is no act of the will, and that therefore the future is not determined by it. “The fact, whether past or future, does not depend upon knowledge, but knowledge upon the fact, . . . and it was rightly said by Origen, ‘yet we judge by common consent concerning foreknowledge, not that anything will happen because God knows that it will, but that, because it will happen, God already knows it.’” And so also the later Dogmaticians. QUEN. (I, 539): “That same divine foreknowledge or foresight does not depend upon any divine decree, nor does it of itself impose any necessity upon things foreseen, nor remove their contingency, although in itself it is certain and infallible.” (Compare the specific statements in § 21, Note 4.) The FORM. CONC. appears to regard this question as belonging to the domain of the inexplicable and mysterious, the prying into which constitutes no part of human duty. Sol. Dec. XI, 54, 55. [1] HUTT. (l. c., 768, sq.) introduces the doctrine with the following words: “The apostle in his golden epistle to the Romans, having treated the subject of Divine Predestination very extensively and accurately, at length, as though having passed into a stupor, as he surveys somewhat more deeply the exhaustless abyss of the divine mysteries about this article, breaks forth in the almost unaccustomed exclamation: ‘O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out.’ Rom. 11:33. This exclamation has caused most of the orthodox Fathers to treat the article of Predestination too cautiously and briefly; and even to-day there are some who regard its consideration imprudent and useless, nay, rather troublesome and painful; who affirm that it cannot be presented, in an assembly of hearers, without great danger; and who apply to this the trite proverb, Noli me tangere. While we, indeed, think that the modesty and care of the ancient Fathers deserve praise, we, at the same time, neither can nor ought, in any way, to approve the excessively severe judgment of some later teachers. For if the consideration of this article ought to be regarded imprudent, certainly Christ and the apostles can scarcely be defended from the suspicion of temerity, since they often, and indeed accurately and publicly, presented and explained to their hearers the subject of Predestination. If you except the one article of Justification, there is scarcely any other theological topic which the Holy Spirit has so fully unfolded in the Scriptures of the New Testament, Matt. 28:22, 31; Mark 13;20, 22, 27; Luke 18:7; Job 13:18; 15:16; Rom. 8:30; and almost the entire ninth, tenth and eleventh chapters; 1 Cor. 1:27, 28; Eph. 1:4, 5; Col. 3:42; 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; 2:10; Tit. 1:1; 1 Pet. 1:2; Rev. 17:14. As, therefore, those things which God has wished to be secret are not to be investigated, so those things which He has revealed are not to be denied or concealed; in order that we may not be found unlawfully curious in regard to the former, or culpably ungrateful in regard to the latter. . . . These matters being considered in such a manner that we can be occupied, profitably and with a good conscience, in the explanation of the mystery of eternal predestination, we are thoroughly convinced, nevertheless, that, just as we confine ourselves within the bounds and limits of the Divine Word, we will err neither in excess nor defect. But here we must especially observe the caution, to attend well to the source whence judgment concerning this article can and should be sought and framed. Moreover, the Book of Christian Concord teaches correctly, that outside of and beyond the Word of God no place for weighing this mystery should be left for human reason. . . . Furthermore, neither is Predestination to be sought immediately in God Himself, whom no one has ever seen. But it is the Word of God alone from which the entire treatment of this mystery is to be solely sought; as, in it, nothing has been omitted that at all pertains to the mystery of our salvation and election: nay, rather, according to the testimony of the apostle, the whole counsel of God has been revealed in it to us. Acts 20:27. . . . This Word is nothing else than the Gospel of Christ. As, therefore, we have the will of God revealed in the Word of the Gospel, we declare that this itself must be considered the eternal and immutable decree; and the counsel and purpose of God is the ground both of our eternal election and salvation, because in God there are not contradictory wills.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. XI, 9, sq.): “Still this eternal election or ordination of God to life eternal must be considered not merely in that secret, heavenly, and inscrutable counsel of God, as though the election comprehended or required nothing more, and in thinking upon it nothing more required to be taken into account than the fact that God has foreseen what men and how many will attain salvation, and who and how many will perish eternally, or as though the Lord would make a military review, and would say or determine, ‘This one is to be saved, but that one is to be damned; this one shall persevere steadfast in faith to the end, but that one shall not persevere.’ For, from this opinion, many derive absurd, dangerous, and pernicious thoughts, which produce and strengthen, in the minds of men, either security and impenitence or distress and despair. . . . (13) Wherefore, as we wish to think or speak correctly and with profit concerning the eternal election or predestination and ordination of the sons of God to eternal life, let us accustom ourselves not to endeavor, by our reason, to investigate the mere, secret foreknowledge of God, which no man has explored and learned to know. But let us meditate upon the divine election according to the manner in which the counsel, purpose, and ordination of God are revealed to us, through the Word, in Christ Jesus (who is the true Book of Life). Therefore, let us comprehend at the same time, in thought, the whole doctrine concerning the purpose, counsel, will, and ordination of God (namely, all things which pertain to our redemption, call, justification, and salvation).” [2] GRH. (IV, 146): “After Adam with all his descendants had been ensnared, by the Fall, in the toils of eternal death, and no other remedy could be found for this evil, by the wisdom either of men or angels; God, coming forth from the secret seat of His majesty, revealed the adorable mystery concerning the restoration of the human race, through His Son, Gen. 3:15. From the fact, therefore, that God, in fulfillment of this first promise, sent in the fulness of time His own Son, born of a woman, Gal. 4:4, we infer that God from eternity had made a decree concerning sending His Son into the flesh, that, by His obedience and satisfaction, the wounds might be healed, which the infernal serpent had inflicted upon man, and the blessings lost by the Fall might be restored.” [3] QUEN. (III, 1): “The most kind and merciful, universal will of God the Father towards fallen men embraces within its bounds all men in general who have been placed in misery, and has, according to our method of conception, two acts; of which the first is the pity of God, by which He inwardly and sincerely lamented that the human race, and indeed the whole of it, had been deceived so basely by the fraud of the devil, and, through the Fall, had been cast into instant, and that, too, eternal ruin; and by which He willed to deliver it from evil, and, provided it could be done without any injury to His justice, to recover for the same its lost salvation. The second act is that by which God, moved by this pity and love to man, made a decree concerning the liberation of the human race, through the sending of His Son, and the revelation of the same through the Gospel, to the end that all might believe in Him and thus be saved. For upon the interposition of His Son, offering and promising a most perfect satisfaction, God mercifully ordained from eternity in His Son to restore all, and give them eternal life.” [4] GRH. (IV, 169): “The antecedent will is so named, because it precedes the consideration of the obedience and disobedience of men, and consists simply in that aspect of the divine will in which we regard the beneficent will of God as disposing itself equally towards all.” HOLL. (586): “The antecedent will is that by which God wills the salvation of all fallen and wretched men, and for attaining this has given Christ as a mediator, and has ordained those means by which the salvation acquired through Christ, and the strength for believing, are offered to all men with the sincere intention of conferring such salvation and faith.” [5] HUTT. (Loc. c., 792): “In this antecedent will of love and mercy in God, not even a single individual of the entire human race has been neglected or passed by, even the son of perdition not being excepted, John 17:12. The full force of this assertion is, that God desired the salvation of all mortals,; that he destined His Son as the Redeemer for the whole world equally; that He willed to offer these blessings to all in common, even to those who indeed do not actually hear this Word, who do not actually believe, who are not actually saved; yea, even to those who God foreknew would not hear His Word, would never believe, and also never be saved.” The passages which ordinarily are quoted against the universality of grace, are Rom. 9:18, 19; 9:11-13, 22. In reference to Rom. 9:19, QUEN. (III, 12): “From this passage the Calvinists frame an argument like this: ‘The will of which Paul speaks is absolute. But it is the will to save and to destroy, of which Paul speaks. Therefore, the will to save and to destroy is absolute.’ Reply: The minor premise is false. For, indeed, it is the same will in both cases; yet there is a difference between willing the same absolutely, and with a condition.” In reference to Rom. 9:28, HOLL. (594): “(a) THe apostle speaks not of the general, or universal, but of the special mercy of God, by which He justifies those believing in Christ (v. 30), and therefore he does not treat of the antecedent but of the consequent will of God. (b) The mercy of God is indeed free, but it is not absolute. . . . (c) God hardens whom He wills by sending upon them hardness, not causatively but judicially.” . . . In reference to Rom. 9:11-13 (QUEN. III, 12): “(a) The text does not speak of Esau and Jacob, in their persons, but of their descendants. . . . (b) It does not give this testimony with reference to eternal predestination to salvation, or reprobation to destruction. Therefore, the Calvinists are inconsiderate in assuming that the love for Jacob, and the hatred towards Esau, relate to love of the former for life, eternal and absolute, and the reprobation of the latter to death eternal and absolute; but the apostle treats, Rom. 9:10, 11, of the rejection of the Jews from the outward superiority which they enjoyed in the course of so many ages, and the reception by the Gentiles of those prerogatives which the Jews claimed for themselves alone. If the discussion had been concerning election, from the opinion of the Calvinists this absurdity would follow, viz., that all the descendants of Jacob have been saved, and, on the other hand, all the descendants of Esau have been condemned. Therefore the sense of the passage is: I have not brought or granted as much blessing to the descendants of Esau as I have to the descendants of Jacob, and thus I have preferred the latter to the former; I have loved them less (the word hatred is thus employed, Luke 14:27; Matt. 10:37).” In reference to Rom. 9:22, “From these words it is clear that God has indeed prepared vessels of mercy for glory, but vessels of wrath are not said to have been prepared by God, but to have been tolerated by God with much long suffering. Wherefore, men hardened not by God, but by themselves, and by their own wickedness and voluntary perversity, have become vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, because they despise the counsel of God against themselves, Luke 7:30.” [6] HOLL. (599): “The mercy of God has been called forth by no merits, Gal. 3:22; Rom. 11:32. Pity for the sinner does not move God causally, but only affords an occasion, and presents an object for pity, towards which, while He is able, yet He is under no obligation, to exercise filanqropia. For in man there is no impelling cause whatever.” [7] HOLL. (599): “The benevolence of God towards the fallen human race has not been feigned or counterfeited, but is earnest and sincere; because, in the caring for human salvation, the will of the sign conspires most harmoniously with the will of the divine purpose, the precept and promise with the divine intention. He acts the hypocrite who promises one thing with his mouth and another with his heart; to think this of God is a crime.” HUTT. (Loc. c., 792): “The truth of this statement is evident from clear testimonies of Scripture, 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9; Matt. 23:37; Ez. 18:32. Finally, the same is manifest from the use of the oath in most solemn attestation, Ez. 33:11.” [8] HOLL. (599): “The benevolence of God is not an empty vow, a fruitless wish, an indifferent complacency, by which one does not long to effect or obtain the thing which pleases him and which in itself he loves, and, therefore, is not willing to employ the means leading to that end; but it is an efficacious desire, by which God seriously intends, through sufficient and efficacious means, to effect and obtain the salvation of men, in which He is most ardently delighted, Rom. 2:4. The antithesis of the Calvinists states that God indeed, by His will, manifested in Scripture, or that of the sign (signi), wishes all to be saved; but by His secret will, which they call that of His purpose (beneplaciti), that He wishes to save the elect alone.” (QUEN., III, 7.) CF.

§ 18, Note 13. [9] HOLL. (600): “Although the first compassion of God, by which He pitied the human race that had fallen into sin, and in fact the appointment of a Mediator, and the administration of the means of salvation, are absolute, yet the merciful will of God to confer remission of sins and eternal salvation is not absolute, but relative and limited by justice, because it has respect to the satisfaction of Christ, by which divine justice was satisfied.” QUEN. (III, 5): “It is founded in Christ, and is limited to the ends and means by which He is moved.” In regard to the will of God, in general (HUTT., Loc. c., 782): “The will of God, in this mystery, is not considered according to its own most simple essence; it is distinguished only according to our understanding, and access to it does not lie open to our mind; but by reason of His act, with respect to things created, God goes forth beyond His own essence. According to the former method of consideration the will in God is just as indivisible as it is impossible for the essence of God itself to be divided into parts. But, according to the latter method of consideration, namely, as the will of God goes forth beyond its essence to creatures, it is twofold. For, whatever God wills to take place in created things, He wills either simply or with a determined mode or condition. The former will is commonly called, in the schools, absolute, and is joined with the immutable necessity of the event; according to this He calls those things which are not, as though they were, Rom. 4:17. . . . The latter will if fulfilled in no other way than by the fulfilment of the predetermined mode or precise condition; when this is not fulfilled, it likewise comes to pass that that does not occur which God has notwithstanding especially willed should occur. The former is to be altogether separated from this mystery, and to be relegated to the schools of the Stoics and Calvinists . . . but the latter, namely, the modified or limited will of God, enters into the act of the present mystery.” [10] HOLL. (600): “The benevolence of God is ordinate, because God from His most profound counsel established a fixed taxiß or series of means, to which, in the conferring of blessedness upon sinners, He has regard. These means are the Word of God and the Sacraments, by which God seriously intends to call sinners to the kingdom of grace, and convert, regenerate, justify, and save them. By this ordinate will God wishes not only that all men be saved, but also that all men come to the knowledge of the truth. The will is called conditionate, not as though God wills only the end, and does not will the means, or wills the end under a condition which He Himself from His mere purpose is unwilling should be fulfilled in many; but as God, willing that men should be saved, does not will that they should be saved without regard to the fulfilment of any satisfaction or condition, but should be led to salvation under the condition of determined means.” Hence the proposition concerning the universality of grace is more specifically expressed thus: “God wills, through ordinary means, to confer saving faith upon all men.” (Ib.) [11] GRH. (IV, 169): “Moreover this division (into antecedent and consequent will) distinguishes not the will by itself, which in God is one and undivided, just as the essence also is one; but its twofold relation. In the antecedent will, regard is had to the means of salvation, in so far as, on the part of God, they have been appointed and are offered to all. In the consequent will, regard is had to the same means, but in so far as they are accepted or neglected by men.” HUTT. (l. c., 783): “This distinction was introduced into the Church because of those passages of Scripture which bear witness that the will of God is not always done or fulfilled, e.g., Matt. 23:37; 1 Tim. 2:4.” [12] HOLL. (586): “The consequent will is that by which God, from the fallen human race, elects those to eternal life who He foresees will use the ordinary means, and will persevere to the end of life in faith in Christ.” More specific definitions. HOLL. (587): “The will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent. (1) Not with regard to time, as though the antecedent will preceded the consequent in time; for, as God is free from any limitations of time, He does not have any will which anticipates another in time. (2) Neither with regard to the divine will itself, as though two actually distinct wills in God were affirmed; for the divine will is the essence itself of God, and a connoted object, conceived under the mode of an act of volition. (3) But the will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent, from the order of our reason, distinguishing the diverse acts of volition in God, according to a diverse consideration of the objects, and regarding one act before the other, so that it is only indicated that the antecedent will precedes the consequent in that which is the image of the divine reason: because, according to our mode of conception, God’s willing eternal salvation to men, and His providing the means of grace, are anterior to the will of the same to confer in act eternal salvation upon those who would to the end believe in Christ, or to assign eternal condemnation to the impenitent.” QUEN. (III, 2): “The antecedent will relates to man, in so far as he is wretched, no regard being had to circumstances in the object; but the consequent will is occupied with certain circumstances in reference to man, namely, as he is believing or unbelieving.” [HOLL. (588): “Wherefore the antecedent and consequent wills of God are not opposed to each other in a contrary or contradictory manner, but are subordinated to one another. The latter is materially contained in the former, and passes into it when the condition is assumed. This I prove thus: By His antecedent will, God wills that all men be saved if they believe to the end. But those using aright the ordinary means of salvation, are those who finally believe. Therefore the antecedent will of God is not overthrown, abolished, or removed by the consequent, but rather passes into the same when the condition is fulfilled.”] “The antecedent respects the giving, and the consequent, the receiving of salvation on the part of man. The former is universal; the latter, particular. The former precedes. the latter follows, a purified condition. In the former, salvation is regarded with reference to the means, as on the part of God, these have been established and offered equally to all men. In the latter, the same salvation is regarded with respect to the means, but in so far as these are either accepted or neglected by men. The will of God, pertaining to that which is antecedent (antecedanea), defines what men ought to do, viz., to hear the word of God, through its hearing to receive faith, to apply to themselves the merit of Christ, and by means of this faith to be saved. The consequent will considers what men in fact do or do not, whether they obey the antecedent will or not, i.e., it considers who in fact use the means of salvation established by God and who do not, who hear the Word of God and believe in Christ and who do not.” HUTT. (l. c., 794): “In the antecedent will (prohgoumenh) faith is considered as a part of the order which God, so far as it pertains to Himself, desires should be observed. In the consequent will (epomeuh) the same is considered not only in the manner in which God desires His own order to be observed by men, but, in so far as that order either is in fact observed by believing, or is not observed by not believing. Although, indeed, this occurs in time with regard to men; yet, by reason of His prescience, it was especially present to God, inasmuch as, by the nature of eternity, nothing is future to Him, but all things are from eternity especially present to Him in the most simple now (tw nun). By reason of the ultimate difference, the consequent will always attains its end, either for salvation or condemnation; but the antecedent will, not in like manner.” Concerning the necessity of this distinction, HOLL. (587): “This distinction (between the general and special will) is necessary, on account of the wonderful combination of divine justice and mercy, which are to be reconciled with each other. For there are expressions in the Holy Scriptures that show that the mercy of God is inclined towards all sinners, 1 Tim. 2:6; 2 Pet. 3:9. There are other expressions which indicate the justice of God, and exclude from the inheritance of salvation those who resist the divine order, John 3:18; Mark 16:16. Finally, there are biblical passages in which both the mercy and justice of God are declared, Matt. 23:37. Christ, by His antecedent will, as far as it pertained to Himself, willed that the children of Israel be gathered together; but, by His consequent will, because they were unwilling to be gathered, He willed that their house be left to them desolate, cf. Acts 13:46. This distinction is implied in the parables of Christ, Matt. 22:1; Luke 14:16.” [13] QUEN. (III, 14): “From the admitted universal benevolence of God, in the establishment and presenting of means, whereby He has determined to convert, regenerate, justify, and save men, though His own efficacy, there arises a special benevolence conspicuous in the predestination to eternal life.” . . . [14] The Dogmaticians observe that the word ‘predestination’ has been employed in the Church in various senses: sometimes in a wider sense, according to which it denotes the purpose of God, referring equally to the saving of believers and the condemnation of unbelievers; sometimes in a narrower sense, according to which it refers alone to the former. In the latter sense they understand it to be employed in Biblical usage. Rom 8:30; Eph. 1:5. HOLL. (607): “Some Fathers and teachers have employed the word predestination improperly (aknrwß), inappropriately, and in a wider sense than is lawful, to denote the divine purpose both for saving believing men and condemning unbelievers. But in Biblical usage the term predestination is always taken in a good sense, to denote the divine decree concerning the salvation of fallen men.” But, even then, there is still a threefold distinction to be observed in the definition of predestination; and the more the Dogmaticians appropriate at one time the one, and again the other, so much the more is this distinction to be considered, in order that the thought may not hence arise, that the Dogmaticians stood in opposition to each other in regard to the subject itself. Sometimes they understood by predestination, in the most general manner, the purpose of God to establish a scheme of redemption whereby all might be saved. BR. (711): “The decree refers to the entire work of leading man to salvation.” Thus the notion is defined by the Formula Concordiae (Sol. Dec. XI, 14): “Therefore we embrace in mind, at the same time, the entire doctrine of the design, counsel, will, and ordination of God (viz., all things which pertain to our redemption, call, justification, and salvation, cf. sq.),” and, after it, HUTT. and others. HOLL. (609) gives the following definition: “Predestination, taken in a wider sense, can be defined as the eternal, divine decree, by which God, from His immense mercy, determined to give His Son as Mediator, and, through universal preaching, to offer Him for reception to all men who from eternity He foresaw would fall into sin; also through the Word and Sacraments to confer faith upon all who would not resist; to justify all believers, and besides to renew those using the means of grace; to preserve faith in them until the end of life, and, in a word, to save those believing to the end.” Sometimes those are more particularly described in whose case the decree of redemption is really to be accomplished; they are those concerning whom God knows that they will believe. HOLL. (608): “In the special or stricter sense, it signifies the ordination of believers to salvation, combined with proqesiß and prognwsiß. The proqesiß (the divine, general and undefined decree concerning the communicating of eternal salvation to all sinful men who, to the end, will believe in Christ) is therefore more specifically defined through the prognwsiß (the foreknowledge of certain human persons or individuals, who will retain true faith in Christ to the last breath of life).” In the latter case, however, by predestination (taken in the strictest sense) only that decree is understood which was really based upon the general proqesiß in accordance with the antecedent prognwsiß, in so far as it embraces the specific number of men who are to be saved, which decree is called proorismoß. HOLL. (608): “In the most special and strict sense, by which proorismoß is distinguished from proqesiß and prognwsiß, and denotes the eternal purpose of God, determinate or applied to certain men as individuals, whom God from the common mass of corruption elects to eternal life, because He distinctly foresees that they will believe to the end in Christ.” The meaning of the last two distinctions is this: that, when we come to speak very accurately, the conceptions of the proqesiß and prognwsiß, contained in the latter statement, are merely the antecedent factors of the true and actual purpose (the proorismoß), which factors, therefore, are not to be connected with the conception of predestination itself, when that is defined as an act or decree. Whence these two factors, viz., the proqesiß and prognwsiß are also defined as the normative or directive sources from which election proceeds; the proqesiß being regarded as the primary or mediate normative source, and the prognwsiß as the immediate and proximate source. QUEN. (III, 18): “The proqesiß is the primary directing principle of election; yet not immediate, but mediate, for it concurs with the intervening prognwsiß, or the foreseeing for election of individuals who would to the end believe in Christ.” [15] Concerning the relation between predestination and election. QUEN. (III, 16): “Election is a synonym of predestination, yet predestination and election are not logical synonyms, so as to have the relation of genus and species, as the Calvinists state (contending that the divine predestination as a genus contains, within its bounds, two species, viz., election and reprobation; or, as others say, it contains two decrees, the one of election, the other of reprobation).” HUTT. (773): “But, according to the tenor of Scripture, they are grammatical synonyms, and of the same breadth. And, although they differ somewhat with respect to formal signification, yet materially, and in relation to the subject, they are not distinguished; whence in Eph. 1:4 and 5, both terms, election and predestination, are received in the same sense, nor is there an unlike example given in Scripture.” HOLL. (605): “Predestination and election agree with respect to the subject, because no man has been predestined to eternal salvation who has not been elected to the same, nor has nay one been elected who has not been predestinated.” But “they differ with respect to formal signification. Election, according to is formal notion, relates to the objects which are to be elected; and predestination, to the end and order of means, which lead to the end of election, or eternal life. For the particle pre, in the word predestination, connotes the priority and eternity of the divine ordination; but the particle e, in the word election, connotes the common aggregate of men, from which there is a separation of some men, and therefore the divine election is the separation of some men from the common mass of corruption, and their adoption into the inheritance of eternal salvation. Predestination (1) presupposes prognwsiß, the foreknowledge of certain persons believing to the end, Rom. 8:29; (2) it formally denotes the ordination to eternal life of those men who, according to the divine foreknowledge, receive and continue to employ the means of grace. Acts 13:48. But election (1) presupposes the love of God, Eph. 1:6; (2) it formally denotes the separation, from the common mass of perdition, of those men who He foresees will perseveringly believe in Christ, John 15:19.” “Another expression for predestination is, according to Phil. 4:3; Rev. 3:5, the writing in the Book of Life.” [16] (a) Full Definition. HOLL. (604): “Predestination is an act of the consequent divine will, by which God (moved by gratuitous mercy, because of the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith) separated from the fallen human race, and ordained to the obtaining eternal salvation for the praise of His glorious grace, those men alone and individually who He foresaw would believe in Christ to the end.” QUEN. (III, 19): “Predestination is an act of the divine will, by which, before the foundations of the earth were laid, not according to our works, but out of pure mercy, according to His purpose and design, which He purposed in Himself in consideration of the merit of Christ to be apprehended by faith, God ordained to eternal life for the praise of His glorious grace such men as, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the preaching of the Gospel, would perseveringly and to the end believe in Christ.” QUEN. (III, 14): “The peculiar and chief foundation of this fundamental article is Eph. 1:4-7.” (b) The form of election is then thus described by QUEN. (III, 18): “It consists in the entire taxiß, or order, which God, in ordaining the eternal decree of election, had as His design, and according to which, for the sake of His own mercy, because of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, He elects those believing and persevering in faith to the end of life, or, according to which He fulfils in time the election decreed from eternity.” From the fact that election has its ground in the preceding proqesiß and prognwsiß, which are related as major and minor premises to the conclusion, viz., the proorismoß, the syllogism of Predestination arises: “Every one who will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life. “But Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life. “Therefore, Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life.” (HOLL., 630.) (c) The causes of election are then stated thus: “The efficient cause of election is the will of the Triune God, freely decreeing (Rom. 8:28; Eph. 1:4; John 13:18; 15:16, 19; Acts 13:2; 2 Thess. 2:13); the impulsive or moving internal cause is the purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 9:15, 16; Eph. 1:5; 2:8, 9; Rom. 11:5, 6); the moving external cause is the merit of Christ, regarded with respect to foreseen final application (Eph. 1:4-7).” As the external less principal cause, some state, “Faith in Christ, and this final.” [17] HUTT. (795): “Concerning the question (whether the eternal election of those who are to be saved is to be assigned to the antecedent or the consequent will), a twofold way presents itself, some turning too much to the right, others too far to the left, and both from the path of truth, although in a diverse mode, relation, and end. For those who follow the side of Calvin affirm that the decree of election should be sought in the antecedent will of God alone, but in such a way, as thence to derive both the absolute and the particular will, and indeed also the absolute election of few men. Huber, on the other hand, likewise placed election in the antecedent will alone; and, although contending aright, against the Calvinists, that this will is universal, yet erroneously and falsely constructed thence, against the orthodox, the opinion that election is universal and entirely unlimited. Therefore, just as Calvin removes and eliminates from the decree of election all reference to faith, so Huber does the very act of faith. Each of these errors, deviating from the analogy of faith, violates it in this, that it altogether substitutes election from every consideration of righteousness, imputed through faith on account of Christ. In this way, indeed, it is lawful to infer no election at all, rather than either the absolute election of a few, or the universal election of all. For in all Scripture the name of the elect is never ascribed except to those alone who actually believe and absolutely persevere in faith. In the second place, even the very sound of the terms, election and elect, and their peculiar relation, intimate and prove a distinction or dissimilarity with respect to men. For the elect are so called in distinction from the non-elect; and yet, in fact, Christian piety and faith forbid us making any distinction among men in the antecedent will. Therefore, the orthodox Church, making a separation from each of these errors, places election not in the sole and merely simple antecedent will of God, but rather in the consequent will.” [18] HOLL. (633): “Those elected by God in Christ are wretched sinful men; yet not all promiscuously, but those whom God from eternity distinctly foresaw as those who would believe in Christ to the end.” THerefore (619), “The election to eternal life of men corrupted by sin was made by the most merciful God, in consideration of faith in Christ remaining steadfast to the end of life.” To guard the expression, in consideration of faith (intuitu fidei), from misunderstanding, it was still farther observed by QUEN. (III, 36): “(a) Faith, and that, too, as persevering or final faith, enters into the sphere of eternal election, not as already afforded, but as foreknown. For we are elected to eternal life from faith divinely foreseen, apprehending, to the end, the merit of Christ; (b) Faith enters into election not by reason of any meritorious worth, but with respect to its correlate, or so far as it is the only means of apprehending the merit of Christ; or, in other words, faith is not a meritorious cause of election, but only a prerequisite condition, or a part of the entire order divinely appointed in election;” others express themselves so as to mark faith as the less principal external cause. Concerning the different expressions through which the relation of faith to predestination is stated, BR. (725): “Some of our theologians, indeed, have said that faith in Christ is the instrumental cause of the decree of election; others, that it is its condition; some that it is the condition on the part of the object of election; others that it is a part of the order of predestination. These all practically agree with each other, and with those who call it the impulsive less principal cause. For all acknowledge that faith is not a mere condition which exercises no causality; but, as it is constituted for the act of saving, so is it for the act of decreeing salvation (virtually causing salvation), as that in consideration of which we have been elected, and yet not as a principal cause, of itself able to influence God to elect us. Whence, when faith is otherwise regarded under the figure of a hand or organ, by which, as a cause of salvation, the grace of God electing and the merit of Christ are apprehended, and, in this manner, is usually called an instrument; yet here the relation of faith to the decree of election itself must be shown: where our theologians do not say that it is of the manner of an instrument, which the efficient principal cause, God, in electing, employs to produce the act of election by a real influx. But those who have spoken of an instrumental moral cause cannot understand anything else than an impulsive less principal cause. . . . Therefore, then, this formula of speaking remains, by which faith is called the impulsive cause or reason, yet not the chief or principal; but with the addition, for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, of less principal.” BAIER commends the following from MEISSNER: “It seems more fitting that faith be considered not separately as a peculiar cause of election, distinct from the merit of Christ, but joined with that merit as apprehended, so as to render both united the one impelling cause of election. For neither does faith merit without the application, nor does it itself move God to elect, but both combined in the divine foreknowledge, i.e., the merit apprehended by faith, or faith apprehending the merit.” Concerning the relation of prescience and predestination, HUTT. (Loc. c., 803): “I. The word Prescience is received in this place, not in a general, indefinite, and loose sense, concerning the knowledge of all future things; in which sense the prescience of bad things, as well as of good, belongs to God, and presupposes, at the same time, predestination: but restrictedly and determinatively to a certain matter and subject, namely, to prescience of faith in Christ, which is peculiar to the elect. This determinative distinguishing of prescience always presupposes predestination, according to Rom. 8:29, whom He foreknew, viz., according to the interpretation of Augustine, those who would believe in His Son, He also did predestinate; and He indeed predestinated them to be conformed to the image of His Son. For in this passage the Apostle does not treat of the antecedent will of God, by reason of which He wishes all men to be conformed to the image of His Son, but he treats of those who already, in the very decree of God, are conformed to this image. II. This prescience is not the predestination itself of God, or the decree of election, as Calvin affirms. . . . For the Apostle, in the words just cited, expressly considers prescience and predestination as two distinct things; saying, whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate; otherwise, a most senseless notion, such as this, would appear: ‘Whom He predestinated, He predestinated.’ . . . Therefore, it is decided aright that the word prescience in this passage denotes, according to the Hebrew idiom, not the simple knowledge of God, but that which is joined with approbation and delight, because determined to an object pleasing to God, viz., to Christ apprehended by faith, or, what amounts to the same thing, to faith apprehending the merit of Christ. III. This prescience, which we have said enters into the decree of election, is not regarded as a cause, on account of, or because of, which election takes place, or salvation itself is conferred upon the elect; because it is not an essential part, constituting election itself, but is added to predestination only as an adjunct, and that, too, inseparable. For although prescience, since it is placed in a lower grade, can be sometimes unaccompanied by predestination, as happens in regard to the sins and wicked actions of men, yet, with predestination determined because of a higher grade, it is necessary that the lower should always be included. Hence the Apostle says: ‘The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, “The Lord knoweth them that are His,”’ 2 Tim. 2:19. Moreover, He knew this not only in time, but foreknew it from all eternity. This knowledge or foreknowledge is therefore an eye, as it were, of the eternal election; for he who would destroy this would render our election blind and destroy it.” [19] HOLL. (631): “The decree is relative, because when God predestined certain fallen men to eternal life, and, indeed, some rather than others, He regarded something outside of Himself as an impulsive external cause, viz., the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith.” QUEN. (III, 31): “Predestination to eternal life is not absolute, but is founded upon Christ as Mediator. The antithesis of the Calvinists, who exclude the merit of Christ from the causes of election, and refer to means of accomplishing it furnished in time, and, therefore deny that Christ is the meritorious cause of our election.” The doctrine of Calvin, is accordingly distinguished from that of the Lutheran Church, in that, according to the former, predestination rests upon an absolute decree of God (“by which God absolutely of Himself, without a prerequisite condition or without outward respect to any other cause or intervening reason, wills and does something, according to the manner in which He absolutely willed to create and preserve it.” QUEN.); and hence, likewise, it is not the earnestly intended will of God that all men should be saved unto whom the Gospel is preached, and, accordingly, a distinction is made between the manifest will, or that of the sign, and the secret will, or that of the purpose. [20] HOLL. (631): “God indeed decreed absolutely and unconditionally to save this or that one, because He certainly foresaw his persevering faith in Christ.” If it be asserted of the decree that it is not conditioned, it appears to contradict the former assertion that it is not absolute. HOLL. (632) explains the apparent contradiction by the following: “When the decree of predestination is said to be not absolute, it must not be regarded on that account conditional. For the idea is not, that God from eternity would elect this or that one to salvation, if he would believe in Christ, and depart hence in the true faith, but because he would believe and would persevere. Faith regarded in the will of God, before the act of predestination, is therefore indeed a condition, under which He desires the salvation of all; yet in the decree itself it is not a condition under which the election was made, but a reason by which God was moved to elect. Therefore, the decree should not be denied to be absolute, when considered with respect to that which is conditional; yet not in such a manner as to exclude the consideration of the a priori reason outside of God, as a part in the order of predestination, which is, without doubt, faith in Christ foreseen from eternity, or, what amounts to the same thing, the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith. For the decree must not be confounded with the antecedent will of God, which, we affirm, from the Word of God, does not exclude a condition, but appoints it, Rom. 11:23.” [21] QUEN. (III, 21): “Through mortal sins the elect may altogether lose and banish the Holy Ghost, faith and the grace of God, and thus for a time become subjects of condemnation, yet they cannot be wanting to the end, and perish eternally. Total loss of grace is one thing, final loss of grace is another. That is total, by which any one is entirely deprived of the grace of God; that is final, by which any one, shortly before death, departs from the faith, and dies in unbelief.” [22] HOLL. (642): “A regenerate man in the midst of the course of his life is certain of his election conditionally (Phil. 2:12); but at the end of life, he rejoices in the absolute certainty of his predestination.” [23] HOLL. (644): “The word ‘reprobation’ (apodokimasia) is not found in just so many syllables in Holy Scripture. The word adokimoß is used, 1 Cor. 9:27; 2 Cor. 13:5; Heb. 6:8.” QUEN. (III, 21): “It is otherwise called prografh eiß to krima, Jude 4.” [24] BRCHM.: “When the case of reprobation is considered, there is need of pious caution. We must avoid considering God the cause of reprobation in the same manner as He is the cause of election. For He is the cause of election, but with regard to His effecting it and with regard to the end; both with regard to the decrees and to all the means leading to the end. But the matter is different in reprobation. For, since reprobation is eternal perdition, to which there is no direct way except through sin, and especially unbelief, every one must see that reprobation cannot be ascribed to God as effecting it, inasmuch as it is either damnation itself or sin, the means leading thither. The true cause of reprobation is in man himself, and is undoubtedly the obstinate contempt of the grace offered in the Gospel. . . . God, meanwhile, is not the indifferent witness of reprobation, but, as the just avenger of crimes and of despised grace, is occupied with certain special acts concerning the wicked and unbelieving, who, although they have been for a long time admonished, invited, and punished, yet out of pure malice have continued to despise and resist the Gospel.”

§ 31. Statement of the Subject.

THE redemption designed by God from eternity was accomplished in time by His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, [1] and of this we are now to treat. The subject will be discussed under three heads: I. The Person of the Redeemer. II. The Work by which He accomplished Redemption. III. The several States in which He appeared from the time of His incarnation. [1] HOLL. (650): “The Redeemer of the human race is Jesus Christ. The Redeemer is called Jesus, i.e., Saviour, because He was to save His people from their sins, Matt. 1:21.” (655): “He is called Christ, i.e., anointed, because He was anointed by the Holy Ghost as our king, priest, and prophet, John 1:41.” The Dogmaticians prove that Jesus Christ is the true Messiah, in whom all the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the Messiah are exactly fulfilled. HOLL. (675): “Proof. (1) Whoever is God and man is the true Messiah. But Jesus, etc. The major premise is evident from 2 Sam 7:12, 13; Ps. 110:1; Micah 5:1; Jer. 23:5 . . . (2) Whoever was born of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, of the royal branch of David, and of a pure virgin, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Gen. 22:18; 49:10; 2 Sam. 7:12; Is. 5:14. The minor, from Luke 3:23; 1:34. (3) Whatever ruler of Israel, as God, was begotten from eternity, and as man was born in the fulness of time at Bethlehem, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Micah 5:2. The minor, from Matt. 2:6. . . . (4) He is the true Messiah, for whose approach a divinely-appointed herald prepared the way. The major, from Is. 40:3; Mal. 3:1. The minor, from Mark 1:2, 3. . . . (5) Whatever king of Zion entered Jerusalem poor and humble, riding upon an ass, is the true Messiah, Zach. 9:9. . . . (6) Whoever is the Goel, or Redeemer, according to the law of consanguinity, Job 19:25; the prophet like Moses, Deut. 13:15; a universal king, Zach. 9:9; Ps. 72:8; a priest according to the order of Melchizedek, Ps. 110:4; a priest interceding for sinners, Is. 53:12; who is to pass through the extremity of suffering, Ps. 22; Is. 53; who is to die, Dan. 9:26; who is to be buried, Is. 53:9; who is to be free from corruption; to descend to the dead and to rise again, Ps. 16:10; to ascend to heaven, Ps. 68:18; to sit at the right hand of God the Father, Ps. 110:1, is the promised Messiah. All these things the New Testament declare of Jesus of Nazareth.” A. — OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

§ 32. Of the Personal Union. In Christ the Redeemer we recognize a duality of natures and a unity of person, as expressed in the statement: “In Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, are two natures, a divine, that of the Word (ho logoß), and a human nature, so united that Christ is one person.” (CHMN., Loc. Th., I, 75.) We are to treat, therefore, in succession, first, of the two natures in Christ, and secondly, of the person of Christ. I. Of the Two Natures in Christ. — Christ is God and man. This is otherwise thus expressed: He exists in two natures, the divine and the human. [1] The divine nature He has of God the Father, and from eternity; the human nature He assumed in time from the Virgin Mary. [2] Each of these natures is to be regarded as truly genuine and entire, [3] for Christ is true God and true man. [4] As true man He participates in all the natural weaknesses to which human nature is subject since the Fall — He participates therein, however, not in consequence of a natural necessity, but in consequence of His own free will, for the accomplishment of His mediatorial work; for, as He was born of a human being, the Virgin Mary, but not begotten of a human father, His human nature did not inherit any of the consequences of Adam’s sin. [5] This does not prevent us from ascribing to Christ a true, complete human nature, like our own, as this is, indeed, predicated of Adam when not yet fallen, inasmuch as original sin, that we have inherited in consequence of the sin of Adam, has not given man another nature. It does, however, follow from the peculiar circumstances connected with the birth of Christ, and from the peculiar relation which the divine logoß sustains to this human nature, that certain peculiarities must be predicated of the human nature of Christ which distinguish it from that of other men. These are (1) the anupostasia [i.e., want of personality]; (2) the anamarthsia [i.e., sinlessness]; (3) the singularis animae et corporis excellentia [i.e., the peculiar excellence of soul and body.] [6] The first results from the peculiar relation which the divine logoß entered into with the human nature; for this latter is not to be regarded as at any time subsisting by itself and constituting a person by itself, since the logoß did not assume a human person, but only a human nature. Therefore there is negatively predicated of the human nature the anupostasia, inasmuch as the human nature has no personality of its own; and there is positively predicated of it the anupostasia, inasmuch as this human nature has become possessed of another hypostasis, that of the divine nature. The anamarthsia (sinlessness) is expressly taught in many passages of the Scriptures (2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 7:26; Is. 53:9; Dan. 9:24; Luke 1:35; 1 Peter 1:19; 2:22), and follows also from the supernatural birth of Christ. The singular excellence of soul and body is a consequence of His sinlessness. II. Of the Person Of Christ. — The person of the Redeemer is constituted, when the logoß, the Second Person of the Godhead, the Son of God, unites Himself with human nature, and this so firmly and intimately that the two natures now united constitute One Person, which is that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [7] The act itself by which this is accomplished is called unitio personalis. HOLL. (665): “The divine action by which the Son of God assumed human nature, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, into the unity of His own person.” [8] This act is chosen and determined upon by the entire holy Trinity, by whom the substance that constitutes the human nature is prepared, and by whom this is united with the divine nature; but this act is accomplished in the second person of the Godhead, who alone has become man. [9] This Second Person of the Godhead, the logoß, in the act of uniting holds such a relation to the human nature that He, the logoß, imparts the personality, [10] and is in general the efficient agent through which the union is accomplished; for it is He that sustains an active relation to the human nature, which He assumes, whilst the human nature stands in a passive relation to Him. [11] This firm union of the divine and human natures, regarded as a condition, is then called unio personalis seu hypostatica [i.e., personal or hypostatic union]. HOLL. (679): “The personal union is a conjunction of the two natures, divine and human, subsisting in one hypostasis of the Son of God, producing a mutual and an indissoluble communion of both natures.” [12] And the result of this activity of the logoß is, that the hypostasis of the divine nature now has become also the hypostasis of the human nature, i.e., both natures have now one hypostasis, that of the logoß, and together form one person, that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [13] In consequence thereof the union of the two natures is so close and inseparable [14] that the one can no longer be conceived of as without or away from the other, but both are to be regarded as in all respects united, [15] yet in such a way that each of the two natures in this union retains its own essential character and peculiarities as before, and remains unmingled with the other. [16] So the Scriptures teach. But it is impossible to form a correct conception of the way and manner in which these two natures are united in the One Person, because the Scriptures teach us only the union itself, and not the mode in which it is effected. We shall have to content ourselves, therefore, with guarding against false conceptions that might be entertained in regard to this union. [17] Accordingly, we say that the union is “(1) not an essential one, by which two natures coalesce in one essence (against the Eutychians); (2) not a natural one, such as that of the soul and body in man; (3) not an accidental one, such as (a) between two or more different qualities united in one subject (as whiteness and sweetness are united in milk); (b) between a quality and a substance (as we find in a learned man); (c) between two substances that are accidentally united (as between beams that happen to be fastened together); (4) not a merely verbal one, arising either from a sinecure title (as when a man is called a counselor of his sovereign, which title was never bestowed upon him because of counsels he had given) or from the use of figurative language (as when Herod is called a fox); finally, (4) not an habitual or relative one, which may exist, although the parties to this union may be separated and far apart. (There are many varieties of this relative union, such as moral, between friends; domestic, between husband and wife; political, between citizens; ecclesiastical, between members of the Church.)” [18] HOLL. (679). On the other hand, we may predicate of this union, positively, that “(1) It is true and real, because it exists between extremes that really adhere, there being no separation or distance between them; “(2) It is a personal one (but not a union of persons), and interpenetrative (perichoristica);16 “(3) It is a perpetually enduring one.” (See Notes 6, 7, 8.) [1] HFRFFR. (260): “By the natures, the two sources or parts, so to speak, are understood, of which the person of Christ has been constituted, namely, a Divine nature and a human nature.” Of Person it is remarked: “The Person of our Redeemer is here considered, not as asarkoß, or such as it was from eternity before the incarnation, but as ensarkoß, or such as it began to be in the fulness of time, through the taking of our human nature into His own divine person.” (HOLL., 656.) General Definition of Nature and Person. CHMN. (de duab. nat., 10: “Essence, or substance, or nature, is that which of itself is common to many individuals of the same species, and which embraces the entire essential perfection of each of them.” “Person or individual is something peculiar, possessing indeed the entire and perfect substance of the same species, but determined and limited by a characteristic and personal peculiarity, and thus subsists of itself, separated or distinguished from the other individuals of the same species, not in essence, but in number. For a person is an indivisible, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which neither is a part of another, nor is sustained in another, nor has dependence upon another object such as the separated soul has upon the body that is to be raised up. Therefore, the names of the essence or natures are qeothß, anqrwpothß, divinity, humanity, divine nature, human nature, divine essence, human substance. The designations of the person are God, man.” Concerning the difference of signification, in which the term nature or essence is employed with reference to God and to man, cf. chapter, “Of the Holy Trinity,” note 14, p.141. QUEN. (Of the Divine Nature of Christ (III, 75)): “The divine nature otherwise signifies the divine essence, one in number, common 1 6 Perichoristica. See § 33, Note 2. to all three Persons, and entire in each; but, in the article ‘Of the Person of Christ,’ this is not considered absolutely, in so far as it is common to the three persons of the Godhead, but relatively, so far as it subsists in the person of the Son of God, and, as by the manner of its existence, it is limited to the Second Person of the Trinity. Whence it is true that the entire divine essence is united to human nature, but only in one of its persons, viz., the second.” [2] QUEN. (III, 75): “The incarnate Person consists of two natures, divine and human. The divine nature He possesses from eternity, from God the Father, through eternal, true, and properly named generation of substance; whence Christ is also the true, natural, and eternal God, the Son of God. A true and pure human nature He received in time, of the Virgin Mary.” A twofold generation is, therefore, distinguished in Christ: one “an eternal generation, through which He is the Son of God;” and another, “a generation in time through which He is man, or the Son of man. Gal. 4:4.” (Br., 457.) [3] HOLL. (659): “The Council of Chalcedon: ‘We confess that He is true God and true man, the latter consisting of a rational soul and a body, co-essential with the Father according to the Godhead, and co-essential with us according to the manhood, in all things like unto us, sin only excepted.’” SCHRZR. (177): “The antithesis of the Eutychians, who indeed admit two natures prior to the act of union, but affirm that from that time the human nature has been altogether absorbed by the Godhead.” QUEN. (III, 75): “With regard to the human nature we must consider: 1, its truth; 2, its completeness; 3, its omoousia (identity of essence). The first excludes a mere appearance; the second, incompleteness; the third, contrariety of essence (eterousia).” GRH. (III, 373): “In Christ there is a true and perfect divine nature, and hence Christ is also true, natural, and eternal God. We say that in Christ there are not only divine gifts, but also a true and perfect divine nature; nor do we simply say that He is and is called God, but that He is true, natural, and eternal God, in order, by this means, to separate our confession the more distinctly from the blasphemies of the Photinians, and all opponents of the divine nature.” (Id. III, 400): “In Christ there is a true, complete, and perfect human nature, and for this reason Christ is also true, perfect, and natural man. By truth of human nature is meant that the Word took upon Himself not an appearance, or mere outward form of human nature, but in reality became a man. By completeness of human nature is meant that He took, into the unity of His person, all the essential parts of human nature, not only a body, but also a rational soul; since His flesh was flesh pervaded by soul. Nor is it said only that He was, but that He still is, a man: because He never has laid aside, nor ever will lay aside, what He has once assumed.” These expressions are directed against the Monotheletes, “who acknowledged a human mind in Christ, but denied to Christ a human will.” (BRCHM.) [4] HOLL. (656): “1. The true and eternal divine nature is proved by the most complete arguments, derived (a) from the divine names (arg. onomastikoiß); (b) from the attributes peculiar to the true God alone (arg. vidiomatikoiß); (c) from the personal and essential acts of God (arg. energhtikoiß); (d) from the religious worship due God alone (arg. latreutikoiß);” cf. chapter on the Trinity, note 34. “II. That Christ is true man, is shown (a) from human names (John 8:40; 1 Tim. 2:5); (b) from the essential parts of a man (John 2:21; Heb. 2:14; Luke 24:39; John 10:15; Matt. 26:38; Luke 2:52; John 5:21; Matt. 26:39); (c) from the attributes peculiar to a true man (Matt. 4:2; John 19:28; Matt. 25:37; Luke 19:41; John 11:33); (d) from human works (Luke 2:46, 48; Matt. 4:1; 26:55); (e) from the genealogy of Christ as a man (in the ascending line, Luke 3:23; in the descending line, Matt. 1:1).” [5] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 11): . . . “Christ, conceived of the Holy Ghost, took upon Himself a human nature without sin, pure. Therefore the infirmities, which as punishments accompany sin, would not have been in the flesh of Christ by necessity of the condition, but His body could have been kept clear and exempt from these infirmities. Sinful flesh was not necessary to His being true man, as Adam, before the Fall, without the infirmities which are punishments, was true man. But for our sakes, and for our salvation, the incarnate Christ, to commend His love to us, willingly took upon Himself these infirmities, that thus He might bear the punishment transferred from us to Himself, and might free us from it.” HUTT. (l. c., 125): “That He took upon Himself these, not so far as they have reference to any guilt, but only as they have the condition of punishment; neither, indeed, these individually and collectively, but only such as the work of Redemption rendered it necessary for Him to take upon Himself, and which detract nothing from the dignity of His nature.” But a distinction is made between natural and personal infirmities. HOLL. (657): “The natural infirmities common to men are those which, since the Fall, exist in all men, e.g., to hunger, to thirst, to be wearied, to suffer cold and heat, to be grieved, to be angry, to be troubled, to weep. Since they are without guilt, Christ, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture, took them upon Himself, not by constraint, but freely; not for His own sake, but for our sake” (QUEN. (III, 76): “that He might perform the work of a mediator, and become a victim for our sins”), “not forever, but for a time, namely, in the state of humiliation, and not retaining the same in the state of exaltation. . . . Personal infirmities are those which proceed from particular causes, and derive their origin either from an imperfection of formative power in the one begetting, as consumption, gout; or from a particular crime, as intemperance in eating and drinking, such as fever, dropsy, etc.; or from a special divine judgment, as the diseases of the family of Job (2 Sam. 3:29). These are altogether remote from the most holy humanity of Christ, because to have assumed these would not have been of advantage to the human race, and would have detracted from human dignity.” [6] HOLL. (657): “To the human nature of Christ there belong certain individual designations, by which, as by certain distinctive characteristics or prerogatives, He excels other men; such are (a) anupostasia, the being without a peculiar subsistence, since this is replaced by the divine person (upostasiß) of the Son of God, as one far more exalted. If the human nature of Christ had retained its peculiar subsistence, there would have been in Christ two persons, and therefore two mediators, contrary to 1 Tim. 2:5. The reason is, because a person is formally constituted in its being by a subsistence altogether complete, and therefore unity of person is to be determined from unity of subsistence. Therefore, one or the other nature, of those which unite in one person, must be without its own peculiar subsistence; and, since the divine nature, which is really the same as its subsistence, cannot really be without the same, it is evident that the absence of a peculiar subsistence must be ascribed to the human nature.” Still, a distinction must be made between anupostasia and enupostasia. QUEN. (III, 77): “That is anupostaton which does not subsist of itself and according to its peculiar personality; but that is enupostaton which subsists in another, and becomes the partaker of the hypostasis of another. When, therefore, the human nature of Christ is said to be anupostatoß, nothing else is meant than that it does not subsist of itself, and according to itself, in a peculiar personality; moreover, it is called enupostatoß, because it has become a partaker of the hypostasis of another, and subsists in the logoß.” HOLL. (658) considers the following objections: “You say, ‘If the human nature is without a peculiar subsistence, the same will be more imperfect than our nature, which is auqupostatoß, or subsisting of itself.’ Reply: ‘The perfection of an object is to be determined from its essence, and not from its subsistence’” The observation of GRH. (III, 421) is also of importance: “Anupostaton has a twofold meaning. Absolutely, that is said to be anupostaton, which subsists neither in its own upostasiß, nor in that of another, which has neither essence nor subsistence, is neither in itself, nor in another, but is purely negative. In this sense, the human nature of Christ cannot be said to be anupostaton. Relatively, that is said to be anupostaton, which does not subsist in its own, but in the upostasiß of another; which indeed has essence, but not personality and subsistence peculiar to itself. In this sense, the flesh of Christ is said to be anupostatoß, because it is enupostatoß, subsisting in the logoß.” “The statement of some, that the starting-point of the incarnation is the anupostasia of the flesh intervening between that subsistence, on the one hand, by which the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed subsisted as a part of the Virgin, not by its own subsistence and that of the Virgin; and the subsistence, on the other hand, whereby the human nature, formed from the sanctified mass by the operation of the Holy Ghost in the first moment of incarnation, began to subsist with the very subsistence of the logoß, communicated to it, is not to be received in such a sense as though the flesh of Christ was at any time entirely anupostatoß; but, because in our thought, such an anupostasia is regarded prior to its reception into the subsistence of the logoß, not with regard to the order of time, but to that of nature. The flesh and soul were not first united into one person; but the formation of the flesh, by the Holy Ghost, from the separated and sanctified mass, the giving of a soul to this flesh as formed, the taking up of the formed and animated flesh into the subsistence of the logoß, and the conception of the formed, animated, and subsisting flesh in the womb of the virgin, were simultaneous.” (b) anamarthsia. CHEMN. (de duab. nat., 13, 14): “For this reason Gabriel says to Mary, ‘The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, so that what shall be born of thee will be holy.’ Therefore, the working of the Holy Ghost caused the Virgin Mary without male seed to conceive and be with child. And the Holy Ghost so sanctified, and cleansed from every spot of sin, the mass which the Son of God, in the conception, assumed from the flesh and blood of Mary, that that which is born of Mary was holy, Is. 53:9; Dan. 9:24; Luke 1:35; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 7:26; 1 Pet. 1:19; 2:22.” (QUEN. (III, 77): “I say inherent, not imputative, sinlessness; for our sins were really imputed to Him, and He was made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5:21.”) SCHRZR. (189): “Christ never sinned, nor was He even able to sin. We prove the statement that He was not even able to sin, or that He was impeccable, as follows: (a) He who is like men, sin only excepted, cannot be peccable. For, since all men are peccable, Christ would be like them also with regard to sin and peccability, which contradicts the apostle, Heb. 7:26. (b) He who is both holy by His origin, and is exempt from original sin, who can never have a depraved will, and constitutes one person with God Himself, is clearly impeccable. (g) He who is higher than the angels is altogether impeccable. (d) He to whom the Holy Ghost has been given without measure, is also holy and just without measure, and therefore cannot sin.” (c) An eminent excellence of soul and body. QUEN. (III, 78): “A threefold perfection of soul, viz., of intellect, will, and desire.” (HOLL. (658): “The soul of Christ contains excellences of wisdom, Luke 2:47; John 7:46, and of holiness.”) “The perfection of body: (a) THe highest eukrasia, a healthful and uniform temperament of body. (b) aqanasia, or immortality” (HOLL. (ib.) “which belongs to Him, both because of the soundness of an im- peccable nature, Rom. 6:23, and through the indissoluble bond of the personal union. Christ, therefore, is immortal, by reason of an intrinsic principle, and the fact that He died arose from an extrinsic principle, and according to a voluntary arrangement, John 10:17, 18. Yet, in the death which was voluntarily submitted to, the body of Christ remained afqarton, or exempt from corruption, Ps. 16:10; Acts 2:31.”) (g) “The greatest elegance and beauty of form, Ps. 45:2.” (HOLL. (ib.): “The beauty of Christ’s body is inferred from the excellence of the soul inhabiting it, . . . and from the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, by whose efficacious presence the most glorious temple of Christ’s body was formed.” QUEN. (III, 78): “The passage, ‘He was despised and rejected of men,’ Is. 53:3, refers to the deformity arising from the wounds of the passion.”) [7] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 18): “It is not sufficient to know and to believe that in Christ there are, in some way or other, two natures, divine and human, but we must add to this that, in the hypostatic union, they are so closely joined, that there is one and the same subsistence consisting of these two natures, and subsisting in two natures.” HOLL. (668): “The divine and human natures existing in the one united person of the Son of God have one and the same hypostasis, yet have it in a diverse mode. For the divine nature has this primarily, of itself and independently; but the human nature has this secondarily, because of the personal union, and therefore by partaking of it from another (Lat. participative).” [8] BR. (461): “The union of the human nature with the divine consists in this, that the natures are so joined that they become one person.” Expressions of like import are sarkwsiß, ensarkwsiß, sarkogennhsia, incarnation, becoming man, becoming body (incorporatio, enanqrwphsiß and enswmatwsiß), assumption (proslhyiß). QUEN. (III, 80): “The basis of this mystery is found in John 1:14; Gal. 4:4; 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14, 16; Rom. 9:5.” Definition — HOLL. (665): “The incarnation is a divine act, by which the Son of God, in the womb of His mother, the Virgin Mary, took into the unity of His person a human nature, consubstantial with us, but without sin, and destitute of a subsistence of its own, and communicated to the same both His divine person and nature, so that Christ now subsists forever, as the God-man, in two natures, divine and human, most intimately united.” [9] GRH. (III, 413): “The question is asked, ‘How is the work of incarnation ascribed to the Father and Holy Ghost, so that, nevertheless, the Son alone is said to be incarnate?’ We distinguish between (1) the sanctification of the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed, which cleansed it from every stain of sin, and (2) the formation of the body of Christ from the sanctified mass by divine power, which twofold action is common to the entire Trinity, and (3) the assumption of that body into the person of the logos, which is peculiar to the Son of God. Whence the work of incarnation, so far as the act is concerned, is said to be common to the entire Trinity; but, so far as the end of the assumed flesh, which is the person of the logoß, is concerned, it is peculiar to the Son. So far as the effecting or production of the act is concerned, it is said to be a work ad extra and essential, or common to the entire Trinity. So far as its termination or relation is concerned, it is a work ad extra and personal, or peculiar to the Son.17 The act of assumption proceeds from the divine virtue common to the three persons; the end of the assumption is the person peculiar to the Son. The Father sent the Son into the world. The Holy Ghost, coming upon the drops of blood from which the body of Christ was formed, sanctified and cleansed them from all sin, in order that that which would be born of Mary should be holy, and by divine power 1 7 Compare chapter on the Trinity, note 22. so wrought in the blessed Virgin that, contrary to the order of nature, she conceived offspring without male seed. The Son descended from heaven, overshadowed the Virgin, came into flesh, and became flesh by partaking of the same, by manifesting Himself in the same, and by taking it into the unity of His persons.” (In Luke 1:35, “The power of the Highest shall overshadow thee,” is generally understood as referring to the Son.) HOLL. (661): “Overshadowing denotes the mysterious and wonderful filling of the temple of the body, formed by the Holy Ghost. For the Son of God overshadowed the Virgin Mary, while He descended in an inscrutable manner into the womb of the Virgin, and by a peculiar assimilation filled and united to Himself a particle of the Virgin’s blood excited by the Holy Spirit, so that He dwelt in it bodily, as in His own temple.” (Id. 661 and 662): “The conception of the God-man is referred to the Holy Ghost, Luke 1:35: (a) because the entire work of fructifying is ascribed to Him, Gen 1:2; (b) in order that the purity of the particle of blood, from which the flesh of Christ grew, might be the more evident; (c) that thus the cause of the generation of Christ as a man, and of our regeneration, might be the same, viz., the Holy Ghost. The material source, and that the entire source, of the conception and production of Christ, the man, is Mary, the pure Virgin (Is. 7:14), born of the royal pedigree of David, and therefore of the tribe of Judah (Luke 3; Acts 2:30). The material, partial and proximate source is the quickened seed of the Virgin (Heb. 2:14, 16).” Against the above, Vorstius, following the Socinians, asserts: “That the Holy Ghost in forming Christ, the man, supplied the place of male seed, yea, even of man himself, and that nothing was absent from the generation of Christ except the agency and seed of a male.” GERHARD, in reply, asks (III, 417): “Whether, because of the peculiar work of the Holy Ghost in the conception of Christ, it is right to call Him the father of Christ?” and answers: “By no means; for none of those acts which are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, in this work, confers upon Him the right and title of father. The devout old authors confine this action to three points. The first is the immediate energy which gave the Virgin the power of conceiving offspring, contrary to the order of nature, without male seed. The second is the miraculous sanctification, which sanctified, i.e., cleansed from sin, the mass of which the body of the Son of God was formed. The third is the mysterious union, which joined the human and divine natures into one person. The Holy Ghost was not the spermatic, but (a) the formative (dhmiourgikh), (b) the sanctifying (agiastikh), (c) the completing (teleiwtikh) cause of conception . . . But, because of none of these operations can the Holy Ghost be called the father of Christ, because the flesh of Christ was not begotten of the essence of the Holy Ghost, but of the substance of the Virgin Mary. ‘Of the Holy Ghost,’ does not denote the material, but the efficient cause and operation. . . . When we say, ‘Of the Holy Ghost,’ the ‘of’ is potential.” [10] CHEM. (de duab. nat., 23): “The human nature did not assume the divine, nor did man assume God, nor did the divine person assume a human person; but the divine nature of the logoß, or God the logoß, or the person of the Son of God, subsisting from eternity in the divine nature, assumed in the fulness of time a certain mass of human nature, so that in Christ there is an assuming nature, viz., the divine, and an assumed nature, viz., the human. In other cases, human nature is always the nature of a certain individual, whose peculiarity it is to subsist in a certain hypostasis, which is distinguished by a characteristic property from the other hypostases of the same nature. Thus each man has a soul of his own. But in the incarnate Christ, the divine nature subsisted of itself before this union, and indeed from eternity. Yet the mass of the assumed nature did not thus subsist of itself before this union, so that before this union there was a body and soul belonging to a certain and distinct individual, i.e., a peculiar person subsisting in itself, which afterwards the Son of God assumed. But in the very act of conception, the Son of God assumed this mass of human nature into the unity of His person, to subsist and be sustained therein, and, by assuming it, made it His own, so that this body is not that of another individual or another person, but the body is peculiar to the Son of God Himself, and the soul is the peculiar soul of the Son of God Himself.” (Id. Loc. c. Th., I, 76): “Since in the incarnate Christ there are two intelligent, individual natures, and yet only one person, because there is one Christ, we say that these two natures are united, not in such a manner that the human nature of Christ was conceived and formed in the womb of Mary, before the divine nature was united to it. For if, before the union, the humanity of Christ had ever by itself had a subsistence, there would then be in Christ two persons also, just as there are two intelligent individual natures.” The communication of person or subsistence, therefore, proceeds from the logoß. HOLL. (668): “The communication of person is that by which the Son of God truly and actually conferred upon His assumed human nature, destitute of proper personality, His own divine person, for communion and participation, so that the same might reach a terminus, be perfected in subsisting, and be established in a final hypostatic existence.” [11] QUEN. (III, 83): “Of these two extremes (the divine and the human nature), one has the relation of an agent or of one perfecting, and the other the relation of one passive and able to be perfected. The former is the Son of God, or the simple person of the logoß, or, what is the same thing, the divine nature determined by the person of the logoß; the latter is the human nature. . . . The former extreme is the active principle of pericwrhsiß, which acts and perfects; the latter the passive principle of the same pericwrhsiß, which is perfected or receives the perfections.” KG. (126): “Pericwrhsiß (immission, active intermingling) is that by which the divine nature of the logoß, in perfecting, pervades inwardly and all around, so to speak, the human nature, and imparts to all of it its entire self, i.e., in the totality and perfection of its essence, Col. 2:9.” Moreover its effect is, that the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the human nature, and both natures are, in the highest degree, present to each other. [12] GRH. (III, 412): “The state of the union is properly and specifically called union, hypostatic union, and is the most intimate pericwrhsiß, or unmixed and unconfused pervasion in one person of two distinct natures, mutually present in the highest degree to each other, because of which one nature is not outside of the other, neither can it be without impairing the unity of the person. Such a distinction is made between the state and the act of the union, that the act is transient and the state is permanent; that the act is that of a simple person, i.e., of the logoß, who before His incarnation was a simple person, upon a human nature, but the state exists between two natures, divine and human, in a complex person; that the act consists in the assumption of humanity, made in the first moment of incarnation, but the state, in the most intimate and enduring cohesion of natures.” QUEN. (III, 86): “The form of this personal union implies: (a) The participation or communion of one and the same person, 1 Tim. 2:5; (b) the intimate personal and constant mutual presence of the nature, John 1:14; Col. 2:9.” [13] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. VIII, 6): “Although the Son of God is Himself an entire and distinct person of the eternal God-head, and therefore from eternity has been, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, true, essential, and perfect God; yet that He assumed human nature into the unity of His person, not as though there resulted in Christ two persons, or two Christs, but that now Jesus Christ, in one person, is at the same time true eternal God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and true man.” CHMN. (de duab. nat., 25): “To the specific difference of the hypostatic union belongs the fact that these two natures are joined and united, in order to constitute one personality in the incarnate Christ, i.e., the nature inseparably assumed in the union became so peculiar to the person of the Word assuming it, that although there are and remain in Christ two natures, without change and mixture, with the distinction between the natures and essential attributes unimpaired, yet there are not two Christs, but only one Christ.” Hence, since the act of union, Christ is called a complex person. GRH. (III, 427): “The hypostasis is called complex, not because it became composite, by suffering in and of itself an alteration and loss of its simplicity, but because, since the incarnation, it is an hypostasis of two natures, while before it was an hypostasis of the divine nature alone. Before the incarnation the person of the logoß was self-determined and simple, subsisting only in the divine nature; by the incarnation the hypostasis became complex, consisting, at the same time, of the divine and human nature, and thus not only His divine, but also His assumed human nature, belongs to the entireness of the person of Christ now incarnate. Because the hypostasis of the logoß became an hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the hypostasis of the logoß was imparted to the flesh,” and hence there follows the impartation of personality to the human nature. [14] HFRFFR. (263): “These two natures in Christ are united (1) inconvertibly. For He became the Son of God, not by the change of His divine nature into flesh; (2) unconfusedly. For the two natures are one, not by a mingling, through which a third object (tertium quiddam) comes into being, preserving in no respect the entireness of the simple natures; (3) inseparably and uninterruptedly. For the two natures in Christ are so united that they are never separated by any intervals, either of time or place. Therefore this union has not been dissolved in death, and the logoß cannot be shown at any place without the assumed human nature. For the Son of God took upon Himself human nature, not as a garment which He again would lay aside. Neither did the Son of God appear, as angels sometimes have appeared, in human form to men, but He made the assumed flesh His own, and since He has assumed it, never leaves it. For, according to the Council of Chalcedon: ‘We confess one and the same Jesus Christ, the Son and Lord only-begotten, in two natures, without mixture, change, division, or separation (en duo fusein, asugcutwß, atreptwß, adiairetwß, acwristwß).’” [15] GRH. (III, 428): “For neither has a part been united to a part, but the entire logoß to the entire flesh, and the entire flesh to the entire logoß; therefore, because of the identity of person and the pervasion of the natures by each other, the logoß is so present to the flesh, and the flesh is so present to the logoß, that neither the logoß is without the flesh, nor the flesh without the logoß, but wherever the logoß is, there He has the flesh present in the highest degree with Himself, because He has taken this into the unity of His person; and wherever the flesh is, there it has the logos in the highest degree present to itself, because the flesh has been taken into His person. As the logoß is not without the divine nature, to which the person belongs, so also is He not without His flesh, finite indeed in essence, yet personally subsisting in the logoß. For as, by eternal generation from the Father, His own divine nature is peculiar to the logoß, so through the personal union, flesh became peculiar to the same logoß.” FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., VIII, 11. [16] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 7): “We believe that now, in this undivided person of Christ, there are two distinct natures, namely, the divine, which is from eternity, and the human, which in time was taken into the unity of the person of the Son of God. And these two natures in the person of Christ are never either separated, or commingled, or changed the one into the other, but each remains in its nature and substance, or essence, in the person of Christ to all eternity. We believe . . . that as each nature in its nature and essence remains unmingled, and never ceases to exist, so each nature retains its natural essential properties, and to all eternity does not lay them aside.” [17] GRH. (III, 422): “The mode of this union is wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful, transcending the comprehension not only of all men, but even of angels, whence it is called ‘without controversy, a great mystery.’ There are various and diverse modes of union which are to be excluded from the mode of the personal union. For, as devout old writers say that it is better to know and be able to express what God is not, than what He is, so also of the divine and supernatural union of the two natures in Christ, we can truly affirm that it is easier to tell what is not, than what is its mode.” From the Holy Scriptures, GRH. (ib.) justifies the above-mentioned presentation of this doctrine as follows: “The more prominent passages of Scripture which speak of the union of the two natures in Christ are: John 1:14; Col. 2:9; 1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14-16. As these are all parallel, they must be constantly connected in the explanation of the union. John says: ‘The Word was made flesh;’ but, lest any one think that the Word was made flesh in the same sense that the water was made wine, Paul says that God, i.e., the Son of God, ‘was manifest in the flesh,’ and that ‘He took part of flesh and blood’ (kekoinwnhke). But now communion is between at least two distinct things, otherwise it would be interchange and coalescence. God is said by the apostle to have been ‘manifest in the flesh;’ but, lest any one might think that it was such a manifestation as there was in the Old Testament, when either God Himself or angels appeared in outward forms, John says that the ‘logoß became flesh,’ i.e., that He so took flesh into His person as never afterwards to lay it aside. The Son of God is said to have taken on Him the seed of Abraham; but, lest any one might think that it was an assumption such as that was when angels for a time took upon them corporeal forms, it is said that, ‘as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same.’ But now it is evident that children partake of flesh and blood in such a manner that, by birth, flesh and blood, or human nature, is imparted to them by their parents. The apostle described the union by the dwelling of the logoß in assumed flesh; but, lest any one might think that the Son of God dwelt in assumed flesh in the manner in which God dwells, through grace, in the hearts of believers, he adds significantly that all the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the assumed flesh, and that, too, bodily, to denote the dwelling-place, or personally, to express the mode of union.” [18] The negative properties are enumerated very differently by the Dogmaticians. Besides those specified in the text, the most prominent are these: “The union occurred (a) asugcutwß, unconfusedly; (b) atreptwß, inconvertibly; (c) adiairetwß, indivisibly; (d) acwristwß, inseparably; (e) analloiwtwß, uninterchangeably; (f) adialutwß, indissolubly; (g) adiastatwß, uninterruptedly.” Or, “Not by reason of place (topikwß), as formerly in the temple at Jerusalem; not by reason of power (energhtikwß), as in creatures; not by reason of grace (carientwß), as in saints; not by reason of glory (doxastikwß), as in the blessed and the angels.”

§ 33. Continuation.

The hypostasis of the divine nature having thus, through the personal union, become at the same time that of the human nature, and thus no longer only a divine but a divine and human nature being now predicated of the person of the Redeemer, a real communion of both natures is thereby asserted, in consequence of which the two natures sustain no merely outward relation to each other; for, as the hypostasis of the divine nature is not essentially different from this nature itself, and this hypostasis has imparted itself to the human nature, it therefore follows that there exists between the divine and human nature a true and real impartation and communion. [1] The first effect of the personal union is, therefore, the “communion (also communication) of natures.” QUEN. (III, 87): “The communion of natures is that most intimate participation (koinwnia) and combination (sunduasiß) of the divine nature of the logoß and of the assumed human nature, by which the logoß, through a most intimate and profound perichoresis, so permeates, perfect, inhabits, and appropriates to Himself the human nature that is personally united to Him, that from both, mutually inter-communicating, there arises the one incommunicable subject, viz., one person.” As, however, in the act of union, the divine nature is regarded as the active one, and the divine logoß as that which assumed the human nature, so the intercommunion of the two natures must be so understood as that, between the two natures, the active movement proceeds from the divine nature, and it is this that permeates the human. [2] It is, indeed, just as difficult for us to form an adequate conception of this as in the case of the personal union, and we must be satisfied with analogies, which furnish us with at least an approximate conception of it. Such we may find, e.g., in the union of soul and body; in the relation in which the three persons of the Godhead stand towards each other; or in the relation between iron and fire in red-hot iron. Just as the soul and body do not stand outwardly related to each other, as a man to the clothing that he has put on, or as an angel to the body in which he appears, but as the union between soul and body is a real, intimate and perfect one, so is also the union and communion of the two natures. As body and soul are inseparably united, and constitute the one man, so are also the human and divine natures most inseparably united. As the soul acts upon the body and is united with it, without there being any mingling of the two, the soul remaining soul and the body remaining body, so are we also to regard the communion of the two natures in such a light, that each abides in its integrity. As, finally, the soul is never without the body, so also the logoß is to be regarded as always in the flesh and never without it. [3] If, now, there really exists such a communion of natures, it follows — I. That the personal designations derived from the two natures must be mutually predicable of each other; that we must therefore just as well be able to say, “The man (Christ Jesus) is God,” as “God is man,” which expressions, of course, do not signify that God, having become man, has ceased to be God, but rather, that the same Christ, who is God, is at the same time man (HOLL. (686): “The Son of God, personally, is the same as the Son of man: and the Son of man, personally, is the same as the Son of God”); whence the predicate “man” belongs just as much to the subject God as the predicate “God” belongs to the subject man. [4] For, if we refuse to say this, we would betray the fact that we conceive, not of two natures in Christ, but rather of two persons, each remaining as it originally was, which would be Nestorianism. From the communion of natures are, therefore, deduced the personal designations, i.e., statements in which the concrete of one nature (as united) is predicated of the concrete of the other nature; i.e., the two essences really (alehqwß) different, the divine and the human, are in the concrete reciprocally predicated of one another, really and truly, yet in a manner very singular and unusual, in order to express the personal union. [5] To guard against a misunderstanding of these personal designations, it may be more particularly stated that they are (1) not merely verbal, i.e., they are not to be understood as if only the name, but not the nature thereby designated, were predicated of the subject, as Nestorius does, when he says of the son of Mary, He was the Son of God, ascribing to the subject a title, as it were, but altogether refusing to acknowledge that He who was the son of Mary was also really the Son of God; (2) not identical (when the same thing is predicated of itself); i.e., the predicates that are ascribed to the subject dare not be so explained as if they applied to it only in so far as the predicate precisely corresponds to the nature from which the designation of the subject is derived. The proposition, “The Son of God is the son of Mary,” dare not, therefore, be interpreted, “The man who is united with the Son of God is the son of Mary;” (3) not metaphorical, figurative, or tropical; as when, in the predicate that is applied to a subject, not the essential nature itself of the subject is ascribed to it, but only particular qualities of this predicate are appropriated to the subject, so that it might be said, in a figurative sense, God is man, as we understand the expression when it is applied to a picture: “This is a man,” “a woman;” or, when it is said of Herod, “He is a fox;” (4) not essential and univocal; as if the subject, in its essential nature, were that which the predicate ascribes to it (the expression, “God is man,” would then mean, The nature of God is this, that it is the nature of man). The personal designations are rather — (1) Real; i.e., that which is ascribed to the subject really and truly belongs to it. (2) Unusual and singular; for, as there is no other example of the personal union, so there are no other examples of the personal designations. But from the communion of natures it follows also — II. That there is a participation of the natures in the person as well as of the natures with each other. [6] This is set forth in the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. BR. (467): “The communicatio idiomatum is that by which it comes to pass that those things which, when the two natures are compared together, belong to one of them per se and formally, are to be truly predicated, also, of the other nature (either as regards concretes, or for that which is peculiar to it.)” [7] According to this doctrine, therefore, it is neither possible to ascribe a quality to one of the two natures, which is not a quality of the whole person, nor is it possible to predicate an act or operation of one of the two natures, in which the other nature does not participate (not, however, in such a way as if along with the qualities or the acts proceeding from them, their underlying essence were transferred to the other nature). [8] There exists, therefore, a communicatio idiomatum between the natures and the person, and between the natures reciprocally. [9] The communicatio idiomatum is, therefore, of several genera, of which we enumerate three (for so many are distinctly mentioned in the Scriptures), [10] the idiomatic, majestatic, and apotelesmatic. I. THE IDIOMATIC GENUS. If the two natures are really united in one person, then every idioma (peculiarity) that originally belongs to one of the two natures must be predicated of the entire person; the idiomata (peculiarities) of the divine nature, as well as those of the human nature, must belong to the person of the Redeemer. If, therefore, to be born or to suffer is an idioma of the human nature, then we must just as well be able to say, “Christ, the God-man, was born, suffered,” as it is said of Him, “by Him were all things created,” although creation is an idioma of the divine nature. [11] For, if we will not say this, but maintain that an idioma of the human nature can be predicated only of the concrete of the human nature, and an idioma of the divine nature only of the concrete of the divine nature, so that we would say: “The man, Jesus Christ, was born,” “by Christ, who is God, all things were created;” then the personal union would be set aside, and it would appear that two persons and not two natures are recognized. [12] But it is just in this that the personal union shows itself to be real, that all the idiomata which belong to the one or the other nature are equally idiomata of the person. As, further, in virtue of the communion of natures, and of the personal designations resulting therefrom, it is all the same whether we designate Christ by both of His natures or only by one of them, an idioma of one of the two natures can be just as readily predicated of the concrete of the one as of the other; we can, therefore, just as well say, “God is dead,” as, “the man, Jesus Christ, is Almighty.” [13] While, however, the idiomata of the two natures are attributed to the concrete of both natures (to Christ, the God-man) or to the concrete of one of the two natures (God — the man, Christ Jesus), it by no means follows from this that therefore the idiomata of the one nature becomes those of the other; for the two natures are not in substance changed by the personal union, but each of them retains the idiomata essential and natural to itself. Therefore it is only to the person that, without further distinctions, the idiomata of the one or of the other nature can be ascribed; but this can in no wise happen between the natures themselves, in such a sense as though each of them did not retain the idiomata essential to itself. [14] To avoid such a misunderstanding in statements of this kind, it is usual to designate particularly from which nature the idiomata predicated of the person are derived. [15] General Definition. — HOLL. (693): “The first genus of communicatio idiomatum is this, when such things as are peculiar to the divine or to the human nature are truly and really ascribed to the entire person of Christ, designated by either nature or by both natures.” [16] This genus the later Dogmaticians divide into three species, according as the different idiomata are predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, or of the concrete of both natures. These species are “(a) idiopoihsiß (appropriation), or oikeiwsiß (indwelling), when human idiomata are ascribed to the concrete of the divine nature. Acts 3:15; 20:28; 1 Cor. 2:8; Gal. 2:20. (b) koinwnia twn qeiwn (participation of the divine), when the divine idiomata are predicated of the person of the incarnate Word, designated from His human nature. John 6:62; 8:58; 1 Cor. 15:47, (c) antidosiß or sunamfoterismoß, alteration, or reciprocation, in which as well the divine as the human idiomata are predicated concerning the concrete of the person, or concerning Christ, designated from both natures. Heb. 13:8; Rom. 9:5; 2 Cor. 13:4; 1 Pet. 3:18.” (HOLL. 694) II. THE MAJESTATIC GENUS. As the divine logoß has assumed human nature, so that by the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has become also that of the human nature, a further and natural consequence of this is, that thereby the human nature has become partaker of the attributes of the divine nature, and therefore of its entire glory and majesty: [17] for, by the personal union, not only the person, but, since person and nature cannot be separated, the divine nature also has entered into communion with the human nature; and the participation in the divine attributes by the human nature occurs at the very moment in which the logoß unites itself with the human nature. [18] But there is no reciprocal effect produced; for, while the human nature can become partaker of the idiomata of the divine, and thus acquire an addition to the idiomata essential to itself, the contrary cannot be maintained, because the divine nature in its essence is unchangeable and can suffer no increase. [19] The attributes, finally, which, by virtue of the personal union and of the communion of natures, are communicated to the human nature, are truly divine, and are therefore to be distinguished from the special human excellences possessed by the human nature which the logos assumed, over and above those of other human natures. [20] Definition. — (HOLL. 699): “The second genus of communicatio idiomatum is that by which the Son of God truly and really communicates the idiomata of His own divine nature to the assumed human nature, in consequence of the personal union, for common possession, use and designation.” [21] III. THE APOSTELESMATIC GENUS. The whole design of the incarnation of Christ is none other than that the logoß, united with the human nature, may accomplish the work of redemption. From the communion of the two natures, resulting from the personal union, it follows that none of the influences proceeding from Christ can be attributed to one only of the two natures. [22] The influence may, in deed, proceed from one of the two natures, and each of the two natures exerts the influence peculiar to itself, but in such a way that, while such an influence is being exerted on the part of one of the natures, the other is not idle, but at the same time active; that, therefore, while the human nature suffers, the divine, which indeed cannot also suffer, yet in so far participates in the suffering of the human nature that it wills this suffering, permits it, stands by the human nature in its suffering, and strengthens and supports it for enduring the imposed burden; [23] further, that the human nature is to be regarded as active, not alone by means of the attributes essentially its own, but that to these are added, by virtue of the second genus of the communicatio idiomatum, the divine attributes imparted to it, with which it operates. [24] For the divine nature could not of itself, alone, have offered a ransom for the redemption of the world; to do this it had to be united with the human nature, which, consisting of soul and body, could be offered up for the salvation of men. Again, the human nature could not have accomplished many of the deeds performed (miracles, etc.), had not its attributes been increased by the addition of the divine. [25] Definition — GRH. III, 555): “The third genus of the communicatio idiomatum is that by which, in official acts, each nature performs what is peculiar to itself, with the participation of the other. 1 Cor. 15:3; Gal. 1:4; Eph. 5:2.” [26] If we now contemplate the entire doctrine of the Person of Christ, its supreme importance at once becomes manifest. Only because in Christ the divine and human natures were joined together in one person, could He accomplish the work of redemption. [27] In order clearly to exhibit this truth, it has been necessary for us to develop the present doctrine at such length. [28] [1] QUEN. (III, 87): “IF the hypostasis of the logoß has been truly and really imparted to the assumed flesh, undoubtedly there is a true and real participation between the divine and the human nature, since the hypostasis of the logoß and the divine nature of the logoß do not really differ. But as the former is true, so also must be the latter.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 14): “But we must not regard this hypostatic union as though the two natures, divine and human, are united in the manner in which two pieces of wood are glued together, so as really, or actually and truly, to have no participation whatever with each other. For this is the error and heresy of Nestorius and Paul of Samosata, who thought and taught heretically that the two natures are altogether separate or apart from one another, and are incapable of any participation whatever. By this false dogma, the natures are separated, and two Christs are invented, one of whom is Christ, but the other God, the logoß, dwelling in Christ.” QUEN. (III, 143): “THe antithesis of the Calvinists, some of whom teach that it is only the person of the logoß, and not, at the same time, His divine nature that has been united to human nature, unless by way of consequence and accompaniment, because of its identity with personality, which alone was at first united. Thus they invent a double union, mediate and immediate; that the natures are united, not immediately, but through the medium of the person of the logoß.” [2] HOLL. (680): “The communion of natures in the person of Christ is the mutual participation of the divine and human nature of Christ, through which the divine nature of the logoß, having become participant of the human nature, pervades, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates this to itself; but the human, having become participant of the divine nature, is pervaded, perfected, and inhabited by it.” BR. (463): “From the personal union proceeds the participation of natures, through which it comes to pass that the human nature belongs to the Son of God, and the divine nature to the Son of man. For marking this, the word pericwrhsiß, which, according to its original meaning, denotes penetration, or the existence of one thing in another, began to be employed, so that the divine nature might indeed be said actively to penetrate, and the human nature passively to be penetrated. Yet this must be understood in such a manner as to remove all imperfection. For the divine nature does not penetrate the human so as to occupy successively one part of it after another, and to diffuse itself extensively through it; but, because it is spiritual and indivisible as a whole, it energizes and perfects at the same time every part of the human nature and the entire nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part of it. Here belongs the passage, Col. 2:9. HOLL. (681): “Pericwrhsiß is not indeed a biblical term; nevertheless it is an ecclesiastical term, and began especially to be employed when Nestorius denied the communion of natures. But they did not understand pericwrhsiß as local and quantitative, as an urn is said to contain (cwrein) water, but as illocal and metaphorically used.” [3] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 18, 19): “Learned antiquity has indeed declared this personal union and communion of natures by the similitude of the soul and body, and likewise, in another manner, by that of glowing iron. For the soul and body (and so also fire and iron) have a participation with each other, not merely nominally or verbally, but truly and really; yet in such a manner that no mingling or equalizing of the natures is introduced, as when honey-water is made of honey and water, for such drink is no longer either pure water or pure honey, but a drink composed of both. Far otherwise is it in the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, for the union and participation of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ is far more exalted, and is altogether inexpressible.” HOLL. (681): “The fathers have seen fit to describe the personal pericwrhsiß (a) from the essential pericwrhsiß of the persons of the Holy Trinity; (b) from the natural pericwrhsiß of body and soul; (c) from the accidental pericwrhsiß of fire and iron. For, as one person of the Trinity is in another, as the soul pervades the body, as fire penetrates all the pores of iron, so the divinity of Christ is in the humanity, which it completely fills and pervades. From this it is easy to infer that pericwrhsiß denotes (1) that the personal union is an inner one and most complete. A union is outward and incomplete when an angel assumes a body, a pilot stands by a ship, a garment hangs on a man. The teachers of the Church, to separate from it the idea of such an outward union, were in the habit of calling the union a personal union, and the communion proceeding from it pericwrhsiß. For, as the soul does not outwardly stand by the body, nor merely direct its movement, but enters, moves into, and fashions it, by imparting to the body its own essence, life, and faculties; so the logoß enters the flesh, and inwardly communicates to it its own divine nature. (2) That the communion of natures is mutual, yet in such a manner that the divine nature, as actual being (enteleceia), i.e., as a most absolute act, permeates and perfects and assumed human nature, and the assumed flesh is permeated and perfected. (3) That the personal union and communion of natures in Christ is inseparable (acwriston). The rational soul so enters the body that it could in no way have been separated from it, if, by the divine judgment, the violence of death had not followed from the Fall accidentally intervening. It is true that the natural union of soul and body was dissolved during the three days of Christ’s death; but the divine nature of the logos was not separated from the assumed humanity, but was, in the highest degree, present to it. (4) That the natural union and communion is without mingling, mixture, or change (asugcuton, amikton, kai atrepton). As the persons of the Trinity permeate each other without mixture; as the soul fashions the body without any disturbance, mingling, or change of either; so the logoß pervades His own flesh in such manner that in essentials there is in no respect a giving way by either, and neither is mingled or mixed with the other. (5) That the natures of Christ have been united continuously (adiastatouß), or are mutually present to each other. The persons of the Trinity enter each other so mutually that neither is outside of nor beyond the other. In like manner the rational soul is in the body so as never to be outside of or beyond it; the logoß also is in the flesh, so as never to be beyond, and never to be outside of it.” [4] GRH. (III, 453): “The source and foundation of the personal designations consist solely and alone in the personal union and participation of natures, from which they alone and immediately proceed, from which alone, also, they are to be judged and explained. For God is man, and man is God, because the human and divine natures in Christ are personally united, and because an inner pericwrhsiß exists between these two natures personally united, so that the divine nature of the logoß does not subsist outside of the assumed human nature, and the assumed human nature does not subsist outside of the divine. God is and is called man, because the hypostasis of the logoß is the hypostasis not only of His divine, but also of His human nature.” Scriptural examples: Jer. 23:5, 6; 33:17; Matt. 22:42-45; Luke 20:44; Ps. 110:1; 2 Sam. 7:19; Is. 9:6; Matt. 1:21-23; 16:13, 16; Luke 1:35; 2:11; 1 Cor. 15:47. [5] a. The expression “concrete” was employed when a personal designation was sought for Christ, as one who is of two natures. If the personal designation was derived from one of His two natures, the same was called the concrete of that nature; and, therefore, since Christ is of two natures, the concrete of the divine nature, when the designation was derived from the divine nature; the concrete of the human nature, when the designation was derived from the human nature. To the former class belong the designations, “God,” “Son of God,” etc.; to the latter, “man,” “Son of man,” “Son of Mary.” HOLL. (685): “The concrete of a nature is a term whereby the nature is expressed with a connotation of the hypostasis.” BR. (465): “By the concrete, a term is understood which, in the direct sense, denotes a suppositum, but in an indirect sense a nature. Thus God denotes a suppositum, having a divine nature; man denotes a suppositum, having a human nature. Still, a distinction must be made between the concrete of the nature, and the concrete of the person; the latter expression is employed where the personal designation has not been derived so much from one of the two natures, as where it rather serves to designate, through an expression elsewhere derived, the particular person in whom the two natures are united as one person.” BR. (466): “The concrete of a person is such a term or name, as formally signifies the person consisting of both natures, e.g., Christ, Messiah, Immanuel; which names, in the nominative case, denote the suppositum, and, in an oblique case, neither nature alone, but rather both.” In the present case, only the concrete of the nature comes into use; for the question is only in reference to the cases in which the communion of natures shall also express itself in their personal designations. To personal designations, in the proper sense, such designations do not belong, in which a concrete of the nature is predicated of a concrete of the person, as occurs in the sentences: Christ is God, is man, is God-man. GRH. (III, 453): “For this designations accurately and formally express, not so much the unity of person, as the duality of natures in Christ; for Christ is and is called man, because in Him there is a human nature; and He is and is called God, because in Him there is a divine nature; and He is and is called the God-man, because in Him there is not only a human, but also a divine nature.” It is furthermore self-evident that these designations can be employed only upon the presupposition of the personal union, and that they are not universally applicable. Hence, HOLL. (685): “If the divine and human natures, or man and God, be regarded outside of the personal union, they are disparate, neither can the one be affirmed of the other. For as I cannot say: a lion is a horse, so also I cannot say: God is man. But if a union exists between God and man, and that too a real union, such as exists in Christ, between the divine and human natures, they can be correctly predicated of each other in the concrete. The reason is, because, through the union, the two natures constitute one person, and every concrete of the nature denotes the person itself. Since, therefore, Christ the man is the same person who is God, or this person who is God is that very person who is man, it is also said correctly: man is God, and God is man.” b. To the abstracts of nature (“an abstract is that by which a nature is considered, yet not with respect to its union, but in itself, and withdrawn from its union or the concrete, nevertheless not actually, but only in the mind.” HFRFFR. (283)) the like does not apply, as to the concretes of nature; therefore it cannot be said that deity is humanity, and humanity is deity. QUEN. (III, 88): “The reason is, because the union was not made to one nature, but to one complex person, with the difference of natures unimpaired, and therefore, one nature in the abstract is not predicated of the other, but the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature.” [6] GRH. (III, 466): “Whatever in the assumption of human nature comes under the union, that also comes under the participation. But now the properties come under the union, because no nature is destitute of its own properties, since a nature without properties is also without existence, and the two natures are united in Christ, not as alone, or stripped of their properties, but entire, without incompleteness, having suffered no loss of peculiarities. Therefore, the properties also come under the participation.” HOLL. (691): “No union can be perfect and permeant (perichoristic) without a participation of properties, as the examples of animated body show. We readily grant that a parastatic (adjacent) union of two pieces of wood may occur without a participation of properties, because that grade of union is low and imperfect. But, according to the definition of Scripture, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is most absolute, perfect and permeant (perichoristic); therefore it cannot be without a participation of properties.” In like manner, proof can be produced from the communion of natures, which, just as the union, has the participation of properties (commun. idiom.) as a necessary consequence. [7] HOLL. (690): “The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, resulting from the personal union in Christ, the God-man, who is denominated from either or both natures.” Explanation of the individual notations of the Communicatio and Idioma. — (a) GRH. (III, 465): “Communicatio (communication) is the distribution of one thing which is common to many, to the many which have it in common.” QUEN. (III, 91): “Not that the properties become common, idiwmata koina, but that through and because of the personal union they become communicable (koinwnhta).” (b) idiwma, proprium, property. QUEN. (III, 92): “By idiwmata are understood the properties and differences of natures, by which, as by certain marks and characteristics, the two natures (in unity of person) are mutually distinguished and known apart. The term idiwmata is received either in a narrow sense, for the natural properties themselves, or in a wide sense, so that it comprehends the operations also, through which these properties properly so called exert themselves; in this place, properties or idiomata are received in a wider sense, so that, in addition to the properties strictly so called, they embrace within their compass actions and results, energhmata kai apotelesmata, because properties exert themselves through operations and results.” GRH. (III, 466): “Observe, that the notion of the divine properties is one thing and that of the human properties another. The properties of the divine nature belong to the very essence of the logoß, and are not really distinguished from it. The properties of the human nature do not constitute but proceed from the essence.” In regard to the authority for this doctrine, HOLL. (690): “The expression, communicatio idiomatum, is not found in the Holy Scriptures word for word, yet the matter itself has the firmest scriptural foundation. For as often as Scripture attributes to the flesh of Christ actions and works of divine omnipotence, so often, by consequence, is omnipotence ascribed, as an immediate act, to Him, from whom the divine operation (energeia) proceeds, as a mediate act. But, although the communicatio idiomatum was first so named by the Scholastics, yet orthodox antiquity employed equivalent forms of speech in the controversies with Nestorius and Eutyches.” The first complete elaboration of this doctrine among the Dogmaticians is given by Chemnitz, in his book, De Duabus Naturis in Christo, 1580. [8] Therefore the more specific caution with regard to the communicatio, according to which it is said that it is not a “communicatio kata meqexin, or according to the essence, by which one passes into the essence and within the definition of the other; but a commuinicatio kata sunduasin (not essential or accidental, but) personal, i.e., a participation of the two natures, whereby one of those united is so connected with the other that, the essence remaining distinct, the one, without any mingling, truly receives and partakes of the peculiar nature, power, and efficacy of the other, through and because of the communion that has occurred.” (QUEN., III, 102.) So, also, still more extended definitions have been given, just as of the personal union. GRH. (III, 466): “As the union is not essential, nor merely verbal, neither through mingling, or change, or mixture, or adjacence, neither is it personal or sacramental; so also the communicatio is not such.” [9] GRH. (III, 465): “The communicatio idiomatum is of a nature to a person, or of a nature to a nature.” HFRFFR. (286): “The communicatio idiomatum is a true and real participation of divine and human properties, by which, because of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, not only the idomata of both natures of the person (who is at the same time God and man), but also the properties of each one of the natures, are ascribed to the other, i.e., the human nature to the logoß, and the divine nature to the assumed man. And because of the same communion, each nature works with a communication of the other, yet with their natures and properties preserved unimpaired.” QUEN. (III, 155): “The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) state that the communicatio idiomatum is indeed real with respect to the person, designated by Deity or humanity, but that with respect to natures it is only verbal, i.e., that it is a communicatio of words and terms and not of properties. (2) They say that those are only verbal designations when human things are declared of God, or divine things of man.” [10] QUEN. (III, 92): “Definite and distinct degrees of the communicatio idiomatum are given; but, inasmuch as the question of the number of degrees or genera of the communicatio idiomatum does not pertain to faith and its nature, but to the method of teaching, some define two, others three, and others four genera of properties. Yet the number three pleases most of our theologians, inasmuch as in the holy volume this is discussed according to a threefold method of expression. I say that Holy Scripture distinctly presents three genera, although it does not enumerate them.” A few Dogmaticians assume four genera of communicatio idiomatum, since they distinguish the declarations in which the properties of the human nature are ascribed to the Son of God, from the declarations in which the properties of one of the two natures are affirmed in reference to the entire person of Christ; and, therefore, the proposition, “Christ suffered,” they assign to a different genus from the proposition, “God suffered.” Still, the most of the Dogmaticians express themselves against this classification. But the order also in which the three genera are given, is not the same in all the Dogmaticians. QUEN. (ib.): “Some follow the order of doctrine; others the order of nature. The former (Form. Conc., Chmn., Aegid. Hunn.) place the communication of the official actions, since this is more easily explained and less controverted, before the communication of majesty, which is especially controverted and must be explained more fully. The latter follow the order of nature, and place the communication of majesty before the communication of the official actions, because the former by nature precedes the latter.” [11] GRH. (III, 472): “The foundation of this communicatio idiomatum is unity of person. For, inasmuch as, since the incarnation, the one person of Christ subsists in two and of two natures, each of which has been clothed, as it were, with its own properties, the properties of both natures, the divine as well as the human, are affirmed of the one complex (sunqetw) person of Christ.” FORM CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 36): “Since there are in Christ two distinct natures, which in their essences and properties are neither changed nor mixed, and yet the two natures are but one person, those properties which belong only to one nature are not ascribed to it, apart from the other nature, as if separated, but to the entire person (which at the same time is God and man), whether He be called God or man.” [12] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): “Nestorius taught such a participation as to ascribe divine properties to Christ only as God, and human properties to Christ only as man; such as that man, not God, was born of Mary, was crucified, etc. Likewise, that God, not man, healed the sick and brought to life the dead. But thus, Christ as God would be one person, and Christ as man would be another, and there would be two persons and two Christs.” [13] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): “In order to show this most complete unity of the person, those things which are properties, whether of the divine, or human, or both natures, are ascribed to the one hypostasis, or are designated by the concrete derived from the divine, or from the human, or from both natures.” (Id., 68): “Because the union of natures occurred in the hypostasis of the Word, so that there is now one and the same person of both natures subsisting at the same time in both natures, when the concrete terms derived from the divine nature, as God the logoß, the Son of God, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, although the designation is derived from the divine nature, yet they signify not only the divine nature, but a person now subsisting in two natures, divine and human. And when the concrete terms derived from the human nature, as man and Son of man, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, they designate not a merely human nature, or a human nature alone, but an hypostasis, subsisting both in the divine and human nature, or which consists, at the same time, of both a divine and a human nature, and to which both natures belong. Hence it occurs that all the properties are correctly ascribed to concrete terms, denoting the person of Christ, whether named from both or only from one of the two natures.” [14] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 67): “But it” (i.e., true faith) “does not, with Eutyches and the Monotheletes, confound that communication between the natures with a change and mixture both of natures and properties, so that humanity is said to be divinity, or the essential property of one nature becomes the substantial property of the other nature, considered in the abstract, whether, on the one hand, beyond the union or in itself, or, on the other, by itself in the union. But a property belonging to one nature is imparted or ascribed to the person in the concrete.” Hence HOLL. (696): “(1) The subject is not the abstract, but the concrete, of the nature or person.” (It cannot, therefore, be said that Deity was crucified.) “(2) The predicate” (namely, that which is affirmed of the subject, i.e., of the incarnate (complex) person) “does not mark a divine or human substance itself, but a property of one of the two natures.” GRH. (III, 485): “In this genus, are the abstract expressions to be employed, ‘Deity suffered, Divinity died?’” He adds, “that they have indeed been employed by some with the limitation, ‘Divinity suffered in the flesh;’” but is of the opinion “that it would be better to abstain from this mode of expression;” and he proves this “(1) From the silence of Scripture. (2) From the nature of Deity. Deity is incapable of suffering, or of change, and interchange; therefore, suffering cannot be ascribed to it. Deity pertains to the entire Trinity; . . . but if, therefore, Deity in itself were said to have suffered, the entire Trinity would have suffered, and the error of the Sabellians and Patripassians would be reproduced in the Church. . . . (3) From the condition of the union. Through the union, the distinction of natures has not been removed, but the hypostasis of the logoß became the hypostasis of the flesh, so as to constitute one complex person; therefore, something can be predicated of the entire person, according to the human nature, and yet it by no means follows that the same should be ascribed to the divine nature. As works and sufferings belong to the person, and not to the nature, I am correct in saying, ‘God suffered in the flesh;’ but I cannot say, ‘the divinity of the logoß suffered in the flesh.’” [15] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 37): “BUt in this class of expressions it does not follow that those things which are ascribed to the whole person are, at the same time, properties of both natures, but it is to be distinctly declared according to which nature anything is ascribed to the entire person.” CHMN. (de duab. nat., 69): “Yet, lest the natures may be thought to be mingled, from the example of Scripture there is generally added a declaration to which nature a property belongs that is ascribed to the person, or, according to which nature of the person it is ascribed. For the properties of one nature do not hinder the presence also of the other nature with its properties. Nor do they hinder the properties of one nature from being ascribed to the person subsisting in both natures. Nor is it necessary that what, in this genus, is predicated of the person should be applicable to both natures. But it is sufficient that it pertain to the person according to one or the other nature, whether the divine or the human. QUEN. (III, 94): “Particles used for this purpose are en, ex, dia, kata, 1 Pet. 2:24; 3:18; 4:1; Rom. 1:3; 9:5; Acts 20:28.” By this additional more specific statement, it is furthermore shown how the predicate, applied to the subject, properly belongs only to one of the two natures, although, by virtue of the union of persons, it belongs also to both natures. (HOLL. (696): “The mode of expression is true and peculiar by which divine or human properties are declared to belong to the entire theanthropic person (for the properties of humanity, because of the personal union, are truly and properly predicated of the Son of God, and vice versa), yet in such a way that, by means of discretive particles, they are claimed for the nature to which they formally belong, while they are appropriated by the other nature to which they belong, not formally, but because of the personal union.”) The mode of expression is illustrated by the following examples. (HOLL. (697): “The Son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, Rom. 1:3. The subject of this idiomatic proposition is the Son of God, by which the entire person of Christ, designated from the divine nature, is denoted. The predicate is, that He was born of the seed of David, which is a human property. This is predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, to which it does not by itself belong, but through something else, because of the unity of the theanthropic person; whence, by the restrictive particle, kata, ‘according to the flesh,’ the human property of the human nature is asserted, to which a birth in time formally applies; yet the divine nature is not excluded or separated from the participation in the nativity, inasmuch as the being born of the seed of David belongs to it by way of appropriation.”) The proposition, “God suffered,” is thus explained: “The Son of God suffered according to His human nature subsisting in the divine personality. As, therefore, when a wound is inflicted upon the flesh of Peter, not alone the flesh of Peter is said to have been wounded, but Peter, or the person of Peter, has been truly wounded, although his soul cannot be wounded; so, when the Son of God suffers, according to the flesh, the flesh or his human nature does not suffer alone, but the Son of God, or the person of the Son of God, truly suffers, although the divine nature is impassible.” (Id., 698): “The sentence, ‘God has suffered,’ is not then to be explained away with Zwingli into ‘The man, Jesus Christ, who at the same time is God, has suffered,’ in which case the mode of expression would be no real and peculiar one.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 39): “Zwingli names it an allaeosis when anything is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ, which, nevertheless, is a property of the human nature, and the reverse; For example, where it is said in Scripture, Luke 24:28, ‘Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?’ there Zwingli triflingly declares that the term Christ, in this passage, refers to His human nature. Beware! beware! I say of that allaeosis; . . . for if I permit myself to be persuaded to believe that the human nature alone suffered for me, Christ will not be to me a Saviour of great worth, but He Himself stands in need of a Saviour.” . . . QUEN. (III, 155): “They” (the Calvinists) “explain the designations of the first genus of communicatio idiomatum either with Zwingli by allaeosis, by which they state that the name of the person, or of one of the two natures, is put in the place of the subject only for the other nature which is expressed in the predicate; or with Piscator by synecdoche, of a part for the whole, i.e., that while the entire is put in the place of the subject, yet that it is in such a manner that the passion is restricted and limited to only a part of it, i.e., to the flesh alone. For example, they explain the proposition, ‘God suffered,’ in this way: ‘Man alone, although united to God, suffered.’” [16] As appellations of this first genus the following were quoted, and their origin traced back to the old Church Fathers: antidosiß, alternation, tropoß antidosewß (Damascenus), enallagh kai koinwnia onomatwn, exchange and participation of names (Theodoret), idiopoiia kai idiopoihsiß appropriation (Cyril), alloiwsiß (but used in a different sense from that of Zwingli), oikeiwsiß, sunamfoterismoß. Examples from Holy Scripture: Heb. 13:8; 1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 7:55; Ps. 24:7, 8; Acts 3:15; John 8:58. [17] GRH. (III, 499): “That which is communicated, the holy matter of communication, is the divine majesty, glory, and power, and on this account gifts truly infinite and divine.” QUEN. (III, 102): “The foundation of this communication is the communication of the hypostasis, and of the divine nature of the logoß. For, inasmuch as the human nature was taken into the union, and through the union became a partaker of the person and divine nature of the logoß, it became truly and really a partaker of the divine properties; for these really do not differ from the divine essence.” CHMN. (de duab. nat., 97): “If the dwelling of God in the saints by grace confers, in addition to and beyond natural endowments, many free divine gifts, and works many wonders in them, what impiety is it to be willing to acknowledge in the mass of human nature, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, only physical endowments, and to be willing to believe of that nothing which surpasses and exceeds the natural conditions of human nature considered by or in itself, outside of the hypostatic union?” QUEN. (III, 158) concerning the nature of the mode: “We deny that this communication is merely verbal and nominal, as the Reformed contend” (p. 160, “who altogether deny this second genus of communicatio idiomatum. The propositions: ‘The flesh of Christ quickens, the Son of man is omnipotent,’ the Zwinglians explain by allaeosis thus: ‘The Son of God who assumed flesh, quickens,’ etc.”); “but we maintain that it is true, peculiar, and real. Yet we do not say that there is any transfusion of divine properties into the human nature of Christ (whereby the reproach of Eutychianism is repelled), or that there is any change of the human nature into the divine, or that there is an equalization or abolition of natures, but that there is a personal communication.” [18] QUEN. (III, 101): “For the communication of majesty occurred in that very moment in which the personal union occurred. For, from the very beginning of incarnation, the divine nature, with its entire fulness, united and communicated itself to the assumed flesh.” With reference to the subsequent doctrine of the states of Christ, QUEN. however still adds: “We must here distinguish between the communication, with reference to possession, and the communication, with reference to use. So far as possession and the first act are concerned, the divine properties were communicated to the human nature at one and the same time with the very moment or the very act of the union, and new ones have not been superadded. And although the second act, and the full use of the imparted majesty, were withheld during the state of humiliation, yet rays of omnipotence, omniscience, etc., frequently appeared, as often as seemed good to divine wisdom. But the full exercise of this majesty began not until His exaltation to the right hand of God.” [19] QUEN. (III, 159): “Reciprocation, which has a place in the first genus, does not occur in this genus; for there cannot be a humiliation, emptying or lessening of the divine nature (tapeinwsiß, kenwsiß, elattwsiß), as there is an advancement or exaltation (beltiwsiß or uperuywsiß) of human nature. The divine nature is unchangeable, and, therefore, cannot be perfected or diminished, exalted or depressed. The object of the reciprocation is a nature in want of and liable to a change, and such the divine nature is not. The promotion belongs to the nature that is assumed, not to the one that assumes it.” THe ground on which only the properties of the divine nature are communicated to the human and not the reverse, arises from the mode of the act of union. BR. (472): “It amounts to this, that, as on the part of the nature, although the divine is personally united to the human, and the human to the divine, yet this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature inwardly penetrates and perfects the human, but the human does not in turn penetrate and perfect the divine, but is penetrated and perfected by it; so in the communicatio idiomatum, this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature, penetrating the human, also makes the same, abstractly considered, in its own way, partaker of its divine perfections; but not so in turn the human nature, which neither permeates nor perfects the divine nature, and does not and cannot in a like manner render this, abstractly considered, the partaker of its own properties.” [20] GRH. (III, 499): “We do not deny that, in addition to the essential properties of human nature, certain gifts pertaining to this condition inhere subjectively in Christ as a man, which although they surpass, by a great distance, the most excellent gifts of all men and angels, yet are and remain finite; but we add, that, in addition to these gifts which pertain to the condition and are finite, gifts truly infinite and immeasurable have been imparted to Christ the man, through the personal union, and His exaltation to the right hand of the Father.” HOLL. (702): “Through and because of the personal union, there have been given to Christ, according to His human nature, gifts that are truly divine, uncreated, infinite, and immeasurable.” And, although it may be said in general “all the divine attributes have been imparted to the flesh of Christ, still a distinction should be made between attributes anenerghta and energhtika.” As is well known, the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum forms a main point of difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. But of most significance is the difference concerning this second genus of properties, since the doctrine set forth under this head is decisive in regard to the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper; for here the discussion has special reference to the attribute of omnipresence. We give, therefore, in this place, first, a summary of the difference between the two churches, and then a more specific statement of the doctrine of omnipresence. COTTA (in GRH., Loci, IV, Diss., I, 50), in the first place, groups together the points in reference to the doctrine of the person of Christ, on which both sides generally agree. “They agree (1) that in Christ there is only one person, but two natures, namely, a divine and a human; (2) that these two natures have been joined in the closest and most intimate union, which is generally called personal; (3) that by this union, a more intimate one than which cannot be conceived, the natures are neither mingled, as has been condemned in the Eutychians, nor the person divided, as has been condemned in the Nestorians; but (4) that this union must be regarded as without change, mixture, division, and interruption (atreptwß, asungcutwß, adiairetwß, acwristwß); and therefore (5) that by this union neither the difference of natures nor the peculiar conditions of either have been removed: for the human nature of Christ is always human, nor has it ever, by its own natural act, ceased to be finite, extended, circumscribed, passible; but the divine nature is and always remains infinite, immeasurable, impassible; (6) that nevertheless by the power of the personal union the properties of both natures have become common to the person of Christ, so that the person of Christ, the God-man, possesses divine properties, uses them, and is named by them; that in addition to this (7) by means of the hypostatic union there have been imparted to the human nature of Christ the very highest gifts of acquired condition (habitualia), for example, the greatest power, the highest wisdom, although finite; but that (8) to the mediatorial acts of Christ each nature contributed its own part, and that the divine nature conferred upon the acts of the human nature infinite power to redeem and save the human race. In a word (9) that the intimate union of God and man in Christ is so wonderful and sublime that it surpasses, in the highest degree, the comprehension of our mind.” But “they” (the Reformed) “differ from us when the question is stated concerning the impartation abstractly considered, or of a nature to a nature; because they deny that, by the hypostatic union, the properties of the divine nature have been truly and really imparted to the human nature of Christ, and that, too, for common possession, use, and designation, so that the human nature of our Saviour is truly Omnipresent, Omnipotent, and Omniscient.” The controversy between the Lutherans and Reformed had mainly reference, therefore, to the possession and use of the divine attributes which were ascribed to the human nature of Christ; among these the following were made especially prominent, viz., omnipotence, omniscience (which He used, however, in the state of humiliation, not always and everywhere, but freely, when and where it pleased Him), omnipresence, vivific power, and the worship of religious adoration, which also were ascribed to the humanity of Christ (so that the flesh of Christ should be worshiped and adored with the same adoration as that due to the divine nature of the logoß). Among these attributes, however, none was more zealously controverted than that of omnipresence, because this was the chief point in dispute between the Lutherans and Reformed with regard to ta presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper. The chief objection against the real presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, Carlstadt, and after him Zwingli, had derived from the statement that Christ is sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, and therefore cannot be at the same time upon earth, in the elements of bread and wine. In opposition to this, Luther appealed to the personal union; from this, and the consequent communion of natures, he inferred the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, and proved thereby the possibility of a real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. Thus the doctrine of the omnipresence, or, as the Reformed expressed it, the ubiquity of the flesh in Christ, became very important, and the Lutheran theologians are very accurate in its presentation. QUEN. thus states the question here at issue (III, 185): “Whether Christ, according to the humanity united with His divine and infinite person, and exalted at the Right Hand of the divine majesty, in this glorious state of exaltation is present to all creatures in the universe with a true, real, substantial, and efficacious omnipresence?” From this question the others, viz., whether omnipresence is to be ascribed to Christ, according to His divine nature, and whether it is to be at all ascribed to the person of Christ, are carefully distinguished. The first follows, as a matter of course; and also in regard to the other question, both parties were agreed in this, namely, that “omnipresence is properly ascribed to the entire person, in the concrete, or in the divine person of Christ, in which human nature subsists, wherever it is; or, what is the same thing, that Christ is everywhere, by reason of His person.” And, from the question stated above, they further distinguished the one with reference to the personal or intimate presence, which is mutual between the logoß and the flesh (by which the logoß has the assumed nature most intimately present with itself, without regard to place, so that the logoß never and nowhere is without or beyond His flesh, or this without or beyond Him, but, where you place the logoß, there you also place the flesh, lest there be introduced a Nestorian disruption of the person subsisting of both natures). The controversy had rather to do with the outward presence, viz., that relating to creatures, and the most of the Dogmaticians understood by this omnipresence, “the most near and powerful dominion of Christ in His human nature.” Accordingly, the thesis of the Dogmaticians concerning the question is the following: “The majesty of the omnipresence of the logoß was communicated to the human nature of Christ in the first moment of the personal union, in consequence of which, along with the divine nature, it is now omnipresent, in the state of exaltation, in a true, real, substantial, and efficacious presence. And so there is given to Christ, according to His human nature, a most near and powerful dominion, by which Christ as man, exalted at the Right Hand of God, preserves and governs all things in heaven and earth by the full use of His divine majesty.” QUEN. (III, 185). “And, finally, it was protested that this omnipresence was not physical, diffusive, expansive, gross, local, corporeal, and divisible (as the Calvinists pretend that we hold), and it was described as majestatic, divine, spiritual, indivisible, which did not imply any locality, or inclusion, or expansion, or diffusion.” (Id. III, 186.) And it was not thereby asserted that the body of Christ had lost its natural properties in such a manner that He had now ceased to be at any particular place. (HOLL. (712): “We must distinguish between a natural and personal act of the flesh of Christ. The flesh of Christ, by an act of nature, when Christ dwelt upon earth, was in a certain place, in the womb of His mother, upon the cross, etc., circumscribedly, or by way of occupying it; and now also in the state of glory, in accordance with the manner of glorified bodies, it is in a certain celestial somewhere, not circumscribedly, however, but definitively. But to this natural act that personal act is not opposed, by which it is illocally in the logoß, from which presence all local ideas or conceptions are to be abstracted.”) To the proofs for the second genus of idiomata, the Dogmaticians add also, for the omnipresence especially, that derived from the sitting at the right hand of God. (HOLL. (714): “Christ rules with omnipresence according to the same nature according to which He sits at the right hand of God. But, according to His human nature, etc. Therefore, to sit at the Right Hand of God is explained by ruling. Just as, therefore, the Right Hand of God is everywhere and rules, for by this is designated in Holy Scripture the immense and infinite power and might of God, nowhere excluded, nowhere inoperative; thus, to sit at the Right Hand of God is, in virtue of the exaltation, to rule everywhere with divine power, truly immeasurable, and this cannot be conceived of without omnipresence, for surely the divine dominion is not over the absent, but over the present.”) The opposite statement of the Reformed was this: “Just as the body of Christ, while He moved upon earth, was not present in heaven, so now that same body, after the ascension, is not present on earth; and, exalted above the heavens, we believe it is held there.” Their main arguments against the omnipresence were these: “Because thereby the reality of the body of Christ, of His death and ascension to heaven would be disproved, inasmuch as a true human nature cannot be extended infinitely; because He who is omnipresent cannot die; because He who is, by virtue of His omnipresence, already in heaven, cannot still ascend thither.” To these objections HOLL. (718) answers: “1. The doctrine concerning the reality of the flesh of Christ is not overthrown by the ascription of omnipresence to it, for it is not omnipresent by a physical and extensive, but by a hyperphysical, divine, and illocal presence, which belongs to it not formally and per se, but by way of participation, and by virtue of the personal union. 2. The doctrine concerning the death of Christ is not overturned by it, for the natural union of body and soul was indeed dissolved by death, but without disturbing the permanent hypostatic union of the divine and human natures. 3. The doctrine of the ascension of Christ is not disproved by it, for before the ascension the flesh of Christ was present in heaven by an uninterrupted presence as a personal act, but He ascended visibly to heaven in a glorified body according to the divine economy (kat oikonomian), so that He might fill all things with the omnipresence of His dominion. For Christ, by virtue of His divine omnipotence, can make Himself present in various ways.” Notwithstanding these precise statements concerning the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, there still was no uniform and, in all its features, settled doctrinal statement concerning it prevalent among the Lutheran Dogmaticians. The reason of this lies in the fact, that until the time of the FORM. CONC. the only aim had in view, in the development of this doctrine, was the practical one of showing through it the possibility of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. So far as this was necessary, all the Lutheran Dogmaticians are agreed. But this is no longer the case to such an extent, when, without reference to the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, they had to do merely with the dogmatic development of the doctrine of omnipresence. As, however, the Dogmaticians were led by the right tact, to attribute no great importance to a difference which led to no practical result, they had no controversy about it, and the different views stood unassailed alongside of each other. There was still room enough for different views. The question, e.g., could arise: 1. Whether the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ was to be conceived of as only one by virtue of which Christ, according to His human nature, could be omnipresent when and where He wished; or, as one by virtue of which, in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, He was always, without exception, actually omnipresent from the state of exaltation onward, and only refrained from exercising this omnipresence, during the state of humiliation, in consequence of the mediatorial work He had undertaken? 2. How the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ should be defined; whether only as one by virtue of which the human nature participates in the dominion which is exercised by the divine nature; or as one by virtue of which it is present to all creatures in such a manner as Christ is present to them by virtue of His divine nature? In regard to these questions, the views of the Dogmaticians, already before the FORM. CONC., were not alike, and the FORM. itself is so variable in its utterances on this subject that a satisfactory answer to the questions above stated cannot be elicited from it. Hence it happens that later Dogmaticians of different views believed themselves authorized to appeal to the FORM. CONC. in vindication of their several opinions. After the completion of the FORM. CONC., therefore, the Dogmaticians were divided in opinion, about as follows, viz.: the majority mentioning the omnipresence only as “a most powerful and present dominion over creatures,” either not entering at all upon the questions of the absolute presence, or rejecting that doctrine entirely. This omnipresence was then called also modified omnipresence. Thus QUEN., BR., the latter of whom appeals to the FORM. CONC. (475): “(They (the authors of the Form. Conc.) manifestly describe that omnipresence not as absolute, as a mere close proximity to all creatures and without any efficacious influence, but as modified, or joined with an efficacious influence, and according to the needs of the universal dominion which Christ exercises according to both His natures.”) At the same time they assert that, from the time of the exaltation onward, Christ is to be regarded as constantly omnipresent according to His human nature, i.e., as always exercising the “most powerful dominion.” Others, on the other hand, as the majority of the Swabian theologians, but beside these also, HOLL., asserted, that no only the “most powerful dominion” belonged to the human nature of Christ from the time of the exaltation onward, but also the true presence, and the latter, indeed, from the time of the conception. A short-lived controversy arose at the time when the theologians of Helmstadt and Brunswick refused to accept the FORM. CONC., mainly because, as they asserted, a doctrine of the omnipresence was taught in it with which they could not coincide. They admitted, indeed, that Christ, according to His human nature, can be present where He will; but they maintained that He actually willed to be present only there where it has been expressly promised concerning Him, namely, in the Holy Supper and in the Church. Besides, they characterized this presence not as an effect of omnipresence, but of omnipotence. The omnipresence maintained by them they designated the relative omnipresence. This view (which Calixtus, also, at a later date, adopted) was opposed by both classes of Dogmaticians, mainly because they wished to have the possibility of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper deduced from His omnipresence, and this from the communicatio idiomatum, without agreeing among themselves as to the mode of stating it. This point, therefore, has remained unsettled. Another question that arose was, concerning the time in which Christ, according to His human nature, assumed the exercise of the divine majesty. Cf., on that subject, the topic of the “States of Christ.” [21] Scriptural Proofs — Majesty is imparted to the human nature: Matt. 11:27; Luke 1:33; John 3:13; 6:62; Phil. 2:6; Heb. 2: 7. The sitting of Christ, the man, at the right hand of Majesty, Matt. 26:64; Mark 14:62; Luke 22:69; Rom. 8:34; Eph. 1:20; Heb. 7:26; 8:1. Omnipotence, Matt. 28:18; Phil. 3:21. Omniscience, Col. 1:19; 2:3, 9. Omnipresence, Matt. 18:20; 28;20; Eph. 1:23; 4:10. Power to quicken, John 6:51; 1 Cor. 15:21, 45. Power to judge, Matt. 16:27; John 5:27; Acts 17:31. [22] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 46): “With respect to the functions of Christ’s office, the person does not act and operate in, or with one, or through one nature alone, but rather in, with, according to and through both natures; or, as the Council of Chalcedon declares, one nature effects and works, with impartation of the other, that which is peculiar to each. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, Redeemer, King, etc., not merely according to one nature, whether the divine or the human, but according to both natures.” GRH. (III, 555): “The Son of God took upon Himself human nature, for the purpose of performing in, with, and through it, the work of redemption, and the functions of the mediatorial office, 1 John 3:8, etc. Hence in the works of His office, He acts not only as God, nor only as man, but as God-man; and, what is the same, the two natures in Christ, in the works of the office, do not act separately, but conjointly. From unity of person follows unity in official act.” HOLL. (726): “The remote basis of this impartation is unity of person, and the intimate communion of the divine nature in Christ. The proximate basis is the communicatio idiomatum of the first and second genus.” [23] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): “When one nature in Christ does that which is peculiar to it, or, when Christ does anything, according to the property of one nature, in that action or suffering the other nature is not unemployed, so as to do either nothing or something else; but, what is a peculiarity of the one nature is effected and performed in Christ with impartation of the other nature, that difference being observed which is peculiar to each. Therefore, when Christ, according to His human nature, suffers and dies, this also occurs with impartation to the other nature, not so that the divine nature in Him also suffers and dies, for this is peculiar to the human nature, but because the divine nature of Christ is personally present with the nature suffering, and wills the suffering of its human nature, does not avert it, but permits its humanity to suffer and die, strengthens and sustains it so that it can bear the immense weight of the sin of the world and of the entire wrath of God, and renders these sufferings precious to God and saving to the world.” [24] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 85): “Because the offices and blessings of Christ as Saviour are such that, in many or most of them, the human nature in Christ cannot co-operate with its natural or essential properties or operations alone, numberless attributes uperfusika kai parafusika [supernatural and extraordinary] were delivered and imparted to the human nature from its hypostatic union with divinity.” HOLL. (726): “The mode of impartation and mutual confluence consists in this, that the divine nature of the logoß not only performs divine works, but also truly and really appropriates to itself the actions of the assumed flesh; but the human nature, in the office of the Mediator, acts, not only according to its natural strength, but also according to the divine power which it has communicated to it from the personal union.” QUEN. (III, 106): “I say that by means of His person, He appropriates to Himself actions and sufferings of humanity, for it must not be said the divine nature sheds blood, suffers, dies, just as it is said that the human nature quickens, works miracles, governs all things, but God sheds His blood, suffers, dies.” [25] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 86): “The testimonies of Scripture clearly show that the union of the two natures in Christ occurred in order that the work of redemption, atonement, and salvation might be accomplished in, with, and through both natures of Christ. For if redemption, atonement, etc., could have been accomplished by the divine nature alone, or by the human nature alone, the logoß would have in vain descended from Heaven for us men, and for our salvation, and become incarnate man.” GRH. (III, 556): “The human nature indeed could have suffered, died, shed its blood. But the sufferings and bloody death of Christ would have been without a saving result, if the divine nature had not added a price of infinite value to those sufferings and that death, which the Saviour endured for us.” Accordingly, the work of redemption, as well as every individual action of Christ, is considered as one in which both natures in Christ participate. The technical term for this is apotelesma (“a common work, resulting form a communicative and intimate confluence of natures, where the operations of both natures concur to produce this, or the work is divinely-human, because both natures here act unitedly.” QUEN. (III, 105)). Yet as each individual action proceeds, first of all, from one of the two natures, namely, from that one to whose original properties it belongs, the technical term for this is energhma (‘a result peculiar to one nature’). Thus, the shedding of Christ’s blood is an operation of the human nature, for only the human nature has shed blood; the infinite merit which belongs to this blood is an operation of the divine nature. But the atonement for our sins, which has been wrought by means of the shed blood only in view of the fact that both natures have contributed their part thereto, the human nature by shedding it, and the divine nature by giving to the blood its infinite merit, is the work (apotelesma) of both natures. HOLL. (728) further describes the apotelesmata of Christ, as of a twofold order. “The divine nature of the logoß cannot effect some things except by a union with flesh (for example, suffering as a satisfaction, a life-giving death); other things, from His free good pleasure or purpose, He does not will to effect without flesh (for example, miracles).” [26] BR. (478): “The third genus of communicatio idiomatum consists in this, that actions pertaining to the office of Christ do not belong to a nature singly and alone; but they are common to both, inasmuch as each contributes to them that which is its own, and thus each acts with the communication of the other.” QUEN. (III, 209): “The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) deny that the communication of the apotelesmata or of official actions can be referred to the communicatio idiomatum. . . . (2) who teach that both natures act their parts by themselves alone, each without participation of the other, and thus that the human nature of Christ is the works of the office only performs human works from its own natural properties, but must altogether be excluded from divine actions. . . . (3) who affirm that the flesh of Christ contributed to the miracles only as a mere and passive (aergon) instrument.” [27] CHMN. (de duab. nat.): “This union of the kingship and priesthood of Messiah was made for the work of redemption, for the sake of us and our salvation. But as redemption had to be made by means of suffering and death, there was need of a human nature. And it pleased God that, for our comfort, in the offices of the kingship, priesthood, and lordship of Christ, our assumed nature should also be employed, and thus the acts (apotelesmata) of Christ’s offices should be accomplished in, with, and through both.” [28] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 81): “For let not exactness be regarded as idle, just as also accurate care in speaking. But let the question, What is the true use of this doctrine? be always in sight. For thus we will be the more inclined to cultivate care in speaking properly, and will be the more easily able to avoid falling into logomachies and quibbles.” . . . B. — OF THE OFFICE OF CHRIST.

§  34. The Threefold Office of Christ.18

The doctrine of the Person of Christ is followed by that of the Work that He performed; for to accomplish this was the 1 8 GRH. was the first to treat of this entire doctrine under a separate head; before his day it was discussed in connection with other doctrines, usually under the head of Justification; and the form, too, in which the doctrine is now set forth, appears for the first time complete (though in brief outlines) in GRH. MEL. is the first to use the expression, Kingdom of Christ; he does this, however, in the doctrine of the resurrection. STRIGEL then annexed the Priesthood of Christ, which afterwards was developed into the sacerdotal and prophetic offices. We cannot ignore the fact, that this topic has failed to receive anything like as thorough a discussion and development as many others. very design of His incarnation. This Work is the redemption of the human race. CONF. AUG., III: “They teach, that the Word, i.e., the Son of God, assumed human nature . . . that He might reconcile the Father to us and become a sacrifice, not only for original sin, but also for all the actual sins of men.” To accomplish this work of redemption was the work assigned to Christ upon earth, and the undertaking that He assumed. We designate it as His mediatorial work, and understand by it all that Christ did to effect a redemption, and all that He is still doing to make it available to men. “The mediatorial office is the function, belonging to the whole person of the God-man, originating theanthropic actions, by which function Christ, in, with, and through both natures, [1] perfectly executed, and is even now accomplishing, by way of acquisition and application, all things that are necessary for our salvation.” QUEN. (III, 212) [2] This work Christ undertook in its whole extent, i.e. (1) While upon earth, He Himself announces to men the divine purpose of redemption, and provides that after His departure it shall be further announced to men. (2) He Himself accomplishes the redemption, by paying the ransom through which our reconciliation with God is effected. (3) After His departure He preserves, increases, guides, and protects the Church of the Redeemed thus established. As these three functions correspond to those of the Old Testament prophets, priests, and kings, the mediatorial office of Christ is accordingly divided into the Prophetic, Sacerdotal, and Regal offices. [3] [1] The Dogmaticians say here, expressly, that Christ is Mediator according to both natures, as would indeed naturally and properly follow from the topic just discussed. Erroneous opinions upon this subject, that arose even in the bosom of the Evangelical Church itself, furnished the occasion of giving prominence to it, and so we see the FORM. CONC. already denouncing existing errors upon this subject (Epit., Art. III, 2 sq.: Concerning the righteousness of faith before God): “For one side (Osiander) thought that Christ is our righteousness only according to the divine nature. . . . In opposition to this opinion, some others (Stancar, the Papists) asserted that Christ is our righteousness before God only according to the human nature. To refute both errors, we believe . . . that Christ is truly our righteousness, but yet neither according to His divine nature alone, nor according to His human nature alone, but the whole Christ, according to both natures.” . . . QUEN. (III, 212): “For both natures concur for the mediatorial office, not by being mingled, but distinctly and with the properties of both remaining unimpaired, and yet not separately, but each with impartation of the other.” [2] GRH. (III, 576): “The office of Christ consists in the work of mediation between God and man, which is the end of incarnation, 1 Tim. 2:5.” HOLL. (729): “If the mediatorial office of Christ be taken in a narrower sense, it seems to coincide with His sacerdotal office, 1 Tim. 2:5, 6. Yet this does not prevent us from receiving it in a wider sense, so as to embrace His office as prophet and king. For Moses, the prophet, is likewise called mediator and it escapes the observation of no one that kings not unfrequently bear the part of mediators.”

[3] GRH. (III, 576): “The office of Christ is ordinarily stated as threefold, that of a prophet, a priest, and a king; yet this can be reduced to two members” (thus Hutter), “so that the office of Christ is stated as twofold, that of a priest and of a king. For the priest’s office is not only to sacrifice, pray, intercede, and bless, but also to teach, which is a work that they refer to His office as a prophet.” QUEN. (III, 212): “Yet, by most, the tripartite distinction is retained.” “THe appropriateness of this distribution is proved according to GRH. (ib.): (1) From the co-ordination of Scripture passages. It is correct to ascribe just as many parts to the office of Christ, as there are classes to which those designations can be referred which are ascribed to Christ with respect to His office, and passages of Scripture which speak of the office of Christ. But now there are three classes to which the designations which are ascribed to Christ, with respect to office, can be referred. Therefore, etc. (2) From the enumeration of the benefits coming from Christ. Christ atones before God for the guilt of our sins . . . which is a work peculiar to a priest. Christ publishes to us God’s counsel concerning our redemption and salvation, which is the work of a prophet. Christ efficaciously applies to us the benefit of redemption and salvation, and rules us by the sceptre of His Word and Holy Ghost, which is the work of a king.” . . .

§ 35. The Prophetic Office.

By the Prophetic Office we understand the work of Christ, in so far as He proclaims to men the divine purpose of redemption, and urges them to accept the offered salvation. [1] This work Christ performed as long as He was upon the earth; He thereby acted as a prophet, for it was the business of prophets to teach and to declare the will of God; [2] and, in consequence of the greater dignity and power that belonged to Him as the God-man, He performed this work in a much more perfect and effective manner than all the prophets that preceded Him. [3] But this did not cease with His departure from the earth; on the other hand, by the establishment of the sacred office of the ministry, Christ made provision that this work should still be performed, and that, too, with the same efficiency as before, inasmuch as He imparted to the Word and the Sacraments, the dispensation of which constitutes the work of the ministry, the same indwelling power and efficiency that belong to Himself by virtue of His divine nature; and thus, in them and through them, He is still effectively working since His departure. [4] His prophetic office is, therefore, to be regarded as one still perpetuated, and we are to distinguish only between its immediate and mediate exercise. [5] “The prophetic office is the function of Christ the God-man, by which, according to the purpose of the most holy Trinity, He fully revealed to us the divine will concerning the redemption and salvation of men, with the earnest intention that all the world should come to the knowledge of the heavenly truth.” (QUEN., III, 212) [6] From this prophetic office Christ is called a Prophet, Deut. 18:18; Matt. 21:11; John 6:14; Luke 7:16; 24:19; an Evangelist, Is. 41:27; a Master, Is. 50:4; 55:4; 63:1; Rabbi or Teacher, Matt. 23:8, 10; Bishop of Souls, 1 Pet. 2:25; Shepherd, Ezek. 34:23; 37:24; John 10:11; Heb. 13:20. [1] GRH. (III, 578): “The function of teaching is that by which Christ instructs His Church in those things necessary to be known and to be believed for salvation.” QUEN. (III, 217): “The will of God, to reveal which Christ from eternity was chosen, and in time was sent forth as the great Prophet, embraces primarily and principally the doctrine of the Gospel, but secondarily the Law, just as also the revealed Word of God itself is divided into Law and Gospel. Specifically considered, this office consists: (a) in the full explanation of the doctrine of the Gospel, before enveloped by the shadows and types of the Law, or in the proclamation of the gratuitous promise of the remission of sins, of righteousness and life eternal, by and on account of Christ; . . . (b) in the declaration and true interpretation of the Law.” Concerning the relation of Christ to the Law, HOLL. (760): “The old Moral Law Christ neither annulled, nor abated, nor perfected, since it is most perfect (Ps. 19:7), yet He delivered the same from the corruptions of the Pharisees, and fully interpreted it (Matt. 5:21, seq.). Therefore, Christ is not a new legislator, but the interpreter and maintainer of the old Law.” [2] HOLL. (756): “THe office of the prophets of the Old Testament was to teach the Word of God, to hand down the true worship of God, to make known secret and predict future things. As Christ also did these things, He discharged the functions of the office of prophet.” Yet no stress is placed upon the latter, viz., prophecy concerning the future. Therefore, QUEN. (III, 218): “The office of prophet does not consist simply and exclusively in the revelation of future things, but generally in the announcement of the divine will.” [3] HOLL. (756): “Christ is the greatest prophet (Luke 7:16; Deut. 18:18; Acts 3:22; John 1:45; 6:14; Heb. 3:5, 6); a universal prophet (John 1:9; Matt. 28:19); the most enlightened prophet (Ps. 45:7; John 3:34; Col. 2:3; John 1:18); the prophet having the most seals of authority (John 6:27; Matt. 3:17; 17:5; John 12:28); the most powerful and exemplary (Luke 24:19).” GRH. (III, 578): “THe efficacy of the doctrine is that divine power by which Christ, through the Holy Ghost, effectually moves the hearts of men to embrace the doctrine of faith (Ps. 68:35; John 6:45).” [4] HOLL. (759): “According to His divine nature, He has united the highest power, efficacy, and influence with the Word and Sacraments. Whence the Lord co-worked everywhere with the preaching of the apostles.” [5] QUEN. (III, 218): “He revealed this divine will immediately, when He himself, in His own person, for three years and a half during the time of His ministry, taught and instructed and trained His disciples to be the teachers of the Church Universal. Mediately, when He employed the vicarious labor of the apostles and their successors, through whom He perpetuated, still perpetuates, and will perpetuate to the end of the world, the office of teaching. John 20:21; Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:15; Eph. 4:11.” GRH. (III, 578): “To this office of Christ, therefore, belong the publication, in the Gospel, of the divine counsel concerning the redemption of the human race, the appointment and preservation of the office of the ministry, the appointment of the Sacraments, the giving of the Holy Ghost, and, through Him, the effectual change, illumination, regeneration, renewal, sanctification, etc., of human hearts.” [6] QUEN. (III, 219): “The end designed by Christ, the greatest prophet, is, in itself, the bringing of all men to the knowledge of heavenly truth. 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9. For all things are so arranged that the blind may be led into the way, and those who walk in darkness may be enlightened. Acts 26:18. For, although it happens with regard to some that they are thereby blinded and hardened, yet this happens not by the fault of this prophet, and His work, but through their own wickedness they bring this evil upon themselves. John 3:19; 12:39, 40.”

§ 36. The Sacerdotal Office.

The second office of Christ is to accomplish the redemption itself and reconciliation with God. [1] Christ thereby performed the work of a priest, for it was the office of priests to propitiate God by the sacrifices they offered, and therewith to remove the guilt which men had brought upon themselves. Christ, however, did not, like the priests of the Old Testament, bring something not His own as a sacrifice, but Himself, whence He is both priest and sacrifice in one person. [2] This part of His work is called the Sacerdotal Office. “The sacerdotal office consists in this, that Christ holds a middle ground between God and men, who are at variance with each other, so that He offers sacrifice and prayers that He may reconcile man with God.” [3] (BR., 491.) Accordingly it is subdivided into two parts, corresponding to the two functions that belong to priests, i.e., the offering of sacrifice and intercessory prayer. [4] The work is, therefore, in part already accomplished, and in part is still being executed by Christ. The first part of it is called satisfaction, by which expression, at the same time, the reason is implied why reconciliation with God was possible only through a sacrifice; because thereby satisfaction was to be rendered to God, who had been offended by our sins, and therefore demanded punishment. [5] The other part is called intercession. I. SATISFACTION. — If the wrath of God, which rests upon men on account of their sins, together with all its consequences, is just and holy, then it is not compatible with God’s justice and holiness that He should forgive men their sins absolutely and without punishment, and lay aside all wrath together with its consequences; not compatible with His justice, for this demands that He hold a relation to sinners different from that He holds towards the godly, and that He decree punishment for the former; not with His holiness, for in virtue of this He hates the evil; finally, it is not compatible with His truth, for He has already declared that He will punish those who transgress His holy Law. [6] If God, therefore, under the impulse of His love to men, is still to assume once more a gracious relation to them, something must first occur that can enable Him to do this without derogating from His justice and holiness; [7] the guilt that men have brought upon themselves by their sins must be removed, a ransom must be paid, an equivalent must be rendered for the offence that has been committed against God, or, what amounts to the same thing, satisfaction must be rendered. [8] Now, as it is impossible for us men to render this, we must extol it as a special act of divine mercy [9] that God has made it possible through Christ, and that He for this end determined upon the incarnation of Christ, so that He might render this satisfaction in our stead. [10] In Him, namely, who is God and man, by virtue of this union of the two natures in one person, everything that He accomplishes in His human nature has infinite value; while every effort put forth by a mere man has only restricted and temporary value. Although, therefore, a mere man cannot accomplish anything of sufficient extent and value to remove the infinite guilt that rests upon the human race, and atone for past transgressions, yet Christ can do this, because everything that He does and suffers as man is not simply the doing and suffering of a mere man, but to what He does there is added the value and significance of a divine and therefore infinite work, [11] in virtue of the union of the divine and the human nature, and their consequent communion; so that, therefore, there can proceed from Him an act of infinite value which He can set over against the infinite guilt of man, and therewith remove this guilt. In Christ, the God-man, there is therefore entire ability to perform such a work, and in Him there is also the will to do it. But a twofold work, however, is to be accomplished. The first thing to be effected is, that God cease to regard men as those who have not complied with the demands of the holy Law. This is done, when He who is to render the satisfaction so fulfils the entire Law in the place of men that He has done that which man had failed to do. Then it must be brought about that guilt no longer rests upon men for which they deserve punishment, and this is accomplished when He who is rendering satisfaction for men takes the punishment upon Himself. Both of these things Christ has done; [12] the first by His active obedience (which consisted in the most perfect fulfilment of the Law), for thereby He, who in His own person was not subject to the Law, fulfilled the Law in the place of man; [13] the second by His passive obedience (which consisted in the all-sufficient payment of the penalties that were awaiting us), for thereby He suffered what men should have suffered, and so He took upon Himself their punishment, and atoned for their sins in their stead. [14] Through this manifestation of obedience to the divine decree in both these respects, Christ rendered, in the place of man, [15] a satisfaction fully sufficient [16] and available for all the sins of all men, which is designated as the former part of the sacerdotal office by which Christ, by divine decree, through a most complete obedience, active and passive, rendered satisfaction to divine justice, [17] infringed by the sins of men, to the praise of divine justice and mercy, and for the procurement of our justification and salvation.” HOLL. (735). [18] But since Christ rendered satisfaction, as above stated, He thereby secured for us forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation, which we designate as His merit that is imputed to us. QUEN. (III, 225): “Merit flows from satisfaction rendered. Christ rendered satisfaction for our sins, and for the penalties due to them, and thus He merited for us the grace of God, forgiveness of sins, and eternal life.” [19] II. INTERCESSION. — For, after Christ had thus offered Himself as a sacrifice for men, the second part of His priestly office consists in His actively interceding with the Father, when He had been exalted to His right hand, upon the ground of His merit, so that men thus redeemed may have the benefit of all that He has secured for them by His sufferings and death, of everything, in fact, that can promote their bodily, and especially their spiritual welfare. “Intercession is the latter part of the sacerdotal office, by which Christ, the God-man, in virtue of His boundless merit intercedes truly and properly, and without any detriment to His majesty; intercedes for all men, but especially for His elect, that He may obtain for them whatsoever things He knows to be salutary for them, for the body, and especially for the soul (but chiefly those things which are useful and necessary for securing eternal life), 1 John 2:1; Rom. 8:34; Heb. 7:25; 9:24.” (HOLL., 749.) [20] “This intercession has reference, therefore, it is true, to all men, as all men while upon earth may become partakers of salvation; but, inasmuch as Christ can give very differently and more freely to those who have by faith already become partakers of His merit than to those who still reject it, this is distinguished as to its comprehension into general intercession, in which Christ prays to the Father for all men, that the saving merit of His death may be applied to them (Rom. 8:34; Is. 53:12; Luke 23:34); and special intercession, in which He prays for the regenerate, that they may be preserved and grow in faith and holiness, John 17:9.” (HOLL., 749.)[21] As to its nature, it is described as true, real, and peculiar, i.e., as such, that Christ is not content merely in silence to await the effect of His satisfaction, but that He actively, effectively, really avails Himself of His merit with the Father in such manner as becomes Him in His divine dignity. [22] Finally, as to its duration, it never ceases. [23] The effect accomplished by the priestly office, in its whole compass, is the redemption of men. [24] If they appropriate it in faith, their sins are no longer reckoned, nor is temporal or eternal punishment imposed, nor does the wrath of God any longer rest upon them; for, in the true and proper sense of the term, they are redeemed from all this by the ransom that Christ has paid for them. “The redemption of the human race is the spiritual, judicial, and most costly deliverance of all men, bound in the chains of sin, from guilt, from the wrath of God, and temporal and eternal punishment, accomplished by Christ, the God-man, through His active and passive obedience, which God, the most righteous judge, kindly accepted as a most perfect ransom (lutron), so that the human race, introduced into spiritual liberty, may live forever with God.” HOLL. (752). [25] [1] KG. (I, 150): “The end of the office of priest is to reconcile men with God, Heb. 4:16; 9:26, 28; 1 John 2:2.” More specifically, QUEN. (III, 222): “(1) The perfect reconciliation of man, the sinner, with God, or the restoration of the former friendship between the separated parties, God and men the sinners, Rom. 5:10; Col. 1:20, 21; 2 Cor. 5:18, 19; Heb. 7:27. (2) Deliverance from the captivity of the devil, Luke 1:74; Heb. 2:14, 15; 1 John 3:8. (3) From sin, as well in relation to its guilt, Col. 1:14; Eph. 1:7, as its slavery, 1 Pet. 1:18; Gal. 1:4, and its inherency, Rom. 8:23.” [2] HOLL.: “The material of the sacrifice is Christ Himself, Eph. 5:2.” BR. (493): “While, in other sacrifices, victims are offered different from the priests, Christ sacrificed Himself, when He voluntarily subjected Himself to suffering and death, and thus offered Himself to God as victim, for expiating not His own sins, but those of the entire human race.” [3] HOLL. (731): “Christ’s office as a priest is that according to which Christ, the only mediator and priest of the New Testament, by His most exact fulfillment of the Law and the sacrifice of His body, satisfied, on our behalf, the injured divine justice, and offers to God the most effectual prayers for our salvation.” QUEN. (III, 220): “From this priestly office Christ is called a priest, Ps. 110:4 (Heb. 5:10; 6:20; 7:26; 9:11; 10:21); a great high priest, Heb. 4:14; a high priest, Heb. 4:15; 9:11; 3:1.” The priesthood of Christ is adumbrated in the priesthood of Aaron and Melchisedek. The latter is related to the former, as the shadow to the very substance. APOL. CONF. (XII, 37): “As in the Old Testament, the shadow is seen, so, in the New Testament, the thing signified must be sought for, and not another type, as though sufficient for sacrifice.” HOLL. (732): “As the shadow yields in eminence to the body, so does Aaron to Christ.” QUEN. (III, 221): “Hebrews 7 diligently unfolds the type set forth in Melchisedek, and applies it to Christ. . . . This very comparison of Christ with Melchisedek is presented in the germ by Moses, Gen. 14:17, is formally declared by David, Ps. 110:4, and is specifically explained by Paul.” [4] QUEN. (III, 225): “THe priestly office of Christ is composed of two parts, satisfaction and intercession; because, in the first place, He made the most perfect satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, and earned salvation. In the second place, He anxiously interceded and still intercedes and mediates, on behalf of all, for the application of the acquired salvation. That the Messiah would perform these functions of a priest, Is. 53:12 clearly predicted.” [5] HOLL. (735): “Satisfaction is not a Scriptural but an ecclesiastical term, yet its synonyms exist in the holly volume, namely, ilasmoß, propitiation for the sins of the whole world (1 John 2:2; 4.10), (ilasthrion, Rom. 3:24, 25), katallagh, Rom. 5:10; 2 Cor. 5:18, apolitrwsiß, Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14, paying the ransom (ton lutron), Matt. 20:28. For this redemption denotes the payment of a sufficient price for the captive; and the reconciliation of God with men is described in Scripture in such a manner, that it is evident that it was made not without a ransom, which divine justice demanded of the Mediator.” [6] HUTT. (Loc. Com., 418): “This threatening (Gen. 2:17) ought necessarily to have been fulfilled after the Fall of our first parents, because the truth and justice of God are immutable, and God cannot lie. But if God had remitted anything from this, His truth, as the Photinians say, i.e., from this Law, and, without any satisfaction, had embraced the human race in His mercy, then God would have lied, when He said: ‘Thou shalt surely die.’ This truth and justice of God, therefore, remaining unmoved, the human race must either perish eternally, or could be redeemed from this penalty only by the intervention of the most complete satisfaction. But this could be provided by no mortal. Therefore it was necessary to be provided by Christ, the Son of God, as Saviour.” [7] Therefore the proposition (HUTT., Loc. Com., 406): “The mercy of God is not absolute, but in Christ, and founded only in Christ and in His merit and satisfaction. . . . God is not only supremely merciful but also supremely just. But this justice of God required, of the whole human race, such penalties as those with which God Himself in Paradise threatened our first parents, if they should transgress the Law that had been given them. . . . Therefore, there could not be a place for God’s mercy until satisfaction should be rendered the divine justice. . . . Hence, the position remains, established, firm and immovable, that this mercy of God could have had no place, except with respect to, or in consideration of, the satisfaction of Christ.” The love of God to men is therefore denoted accurately as ordinate, and not as absolute. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 415): “God indeed loved already from all eternity the whole human race, yet not absolutely and unconditionally, but ordinately; namely, in His beloved Son. This ordinate love includes and relates to the Son likewise not absolutely, or only in such a respect as that God willed that He should be the teacher of the human race; but also ordinately, so far as He took upon Himself the guilt of our sins, and made satisfaction on behalf of the whole human race to the divine wrath or justice. Therefore, this ordinate affection or love of God necessarily presupposes His wrath, so that this love in God could not have a place, unless, likewise from all eternity, satisfaction had been made to this divine wrath or justice through the Son, who from eternity, offered Himself as a mediator between God and men.” [8] QUEN. (III, 227): “The object to which satisfaction has been afforded is the Triune God alone.” (HOLL. (736): “Observe, that, in a certain respect, Christ made satisfaction to Himself. For, as far as Christ made satisfaction as a mediator, He is regarded as the God-man; but, in so far as He likewise demanded satisfaction, He must be regarded as the author and maintainer of the Law, who by His essence is just.”) QUEN. (III, 227 sq.): “For the entire Holy Trinity, offended at sins, was angry with men, and, on account of the immutability of its justice (Rom. 1:18), the holiness of its nature, and the truth of its threatenings, could not with impunity forgive sins, and, without satisfaction, receive men into favor. But this Triune God has not the relation of a mere creditor, as the Socinians state, but of a most just judge, requiring, according to the rigor of His infinite justice, an infinite price of satisfaction. For redemption itself, made for the declaration of righteousness (Rom. 3:25), proves the necessity of requiring a penalty, either from the guilty one himself, i.e., man, or from his surety, namely, Christ. If God, without a satisfaction, could have forgiven man’s offence, without impairing His infinite justice, there would not have been need of such an expense as that of His only Son.” . . . The chief passages in the Symbolical Books are the following: AP. CONF. (III, 58): “THe Law condemns all men; but Christ, because without sin He submitted to the punishment of sin, and became a victim for us, removed from the Law the right of accusing and condemning those who believe in Him, since He is the propitiation for them for the sake of which we are now accounted righteous.” Ibid. (XXI (IX), 19): “The second requirement, in a propitiator, is that his merits be presented in order to give satisfaction for others, to bestow upon others a divine imputation, that, through these, they may be regarded precisely as righteous as though by their own merits. As, if a friend should pay the debt of a friend, the debtor would be freed by another’s merit just as though by his own. The merits of Christ are so presented to us that, when we believe in Him, we are accounted just as righteous, by our confidence in the merits of Christ, as though we had merits of our own.” FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 57): “Since this obedience of Christ is that not of one nature only, but of the entire person, most perfect is the satisfaction and expiation, on behalf of the human race, according to which satisfaction was made to the eternal and immutable divine justice revealed in the Law. This obedience is that righteousness of ours that avails before God.” . . . Moreover, it was especially the Socinians against whom the Dogmaticians had to defend the doctrine above stated; and it was under the influence of the controversy with them that the doctrine assumed the form just presented. HUTT., who already in his Loc. TH. opposes the Socinian doctrine at great length, states it as follows: “That man is justified before God, not because of the merit or satisfaction of Christ, because neither the justice of God required this, nor did Christ by His death afford it, but because alone of the forgiveness of sins, which God, not on account of any merit of His Son, but from His most free will, grants those who believe in the Word of Christ, and pursue a life of innocence.” In refutation of this doctrine, HUTT. makes a distinction between three controversies. (402): “The first is, concerning the mercy of God, which, the Photinians contend, (1) is not natural or essential, but accidental to God; (2) that in respect to men, as sinners, it is altogether absolute, and is not based upon any satisfaction whatever, whether of Christ or of ourselves. The second is, concerning the justice of God, as avenging or punishing the sins of men, of which the Photinians imagine that there neither is, nor ever has been, any such in God; just as though in the Scriptures God were nowhere read of as ever being or having been angry with sinners. The third is, concerning the satisfaction and merit of Christ our Saviour; for they absolutely deny both, contending very blasphemously, (1) that there was no necessity whatever for a satisfaction; . . . (2) that the suffering of Christ neither was nor could have been a satisfaction or merit for our sins; . . . (3) that the final cause of Christ’s suffering was nothing else than that He might be able to show us the way of life, and that, by means of His doctrine, we might embrace salvation; . . . (4) that the remission of sins comes to us without the shedding of Christ’s blood, solely by free, unconditional, and absolute will of God’s mercy, according to which He is willing to forgive us our sins, and truly forgives them if we truly repent.” [9] HOLL. 736): “The wisdom and mercy of God especially shines forth from the wonderful satisfaction of the Mediator, a most precious ransom having been most wisely found, and most mercifully determined and accepted.” [10] HUTT. (Loc. Com., 408): “Wherefore, in order that the mercy of God might harmonize with His justice, it was necessary that a combination of divine justice and mercy should intervene; by reason of which, both His justice would press its right, and mercy, at the same time, would have a place. We are permitted to hold such a combination, and that, too, by far the most perfect, in one and the same work of our salvation, with respect to one and the same subject, namely, Christ our Saviour. For, when about to reconcile the world, and that, too, not without an unparalleled feeling of mercy, He saw that satisfaction must first be made to justice. Therefore, He turned upon Himself the penalties due our sins, He was made sin for us, He truly bore our griefs, and thus became obedient to God the Father, even to the death of the cross, satisfied divine justice to the exactest point, and thus reconciled the world, not only to God the Father, but also to Himself.”

But the price of redemption must be paid God, and to Him the satisfaction must be rendered. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 430): "Neither the devil, nor sin, nor death, nor hell, but God Himself, was the ruler holding the human race in captivity, as He delivered it to the infernal prison by this sentence, ‘Thou shalt surely die.' The devil bore only the part of a lictor; sin was like chains; death and hell, like a prison. Therefore, the price of the redemption was to be paid not to the devil,[Referring to the doctrine found in many of the early writers of the Church, (especially Origen, Gregory of Nyssa), and in Lombardus and other Scholastics, which represented the price of redemption as paid the devil. Men, they taught, because of sin, had been handed over to Satan's power. Christ offered Himself as man's substitute, and was gladly accepted by Satan, who overlooked Christ's omnipotence, and was thus not only defrauded of his prey, but even himself was destroyed, when the Son of God, brought within his realm, completely overthrew and ruined it. It was the work of Anselm to antagonize this perversion of Heb. 2:14, 15, and to define the doctrine that has since prevailed.] not to sin, not to death or hell, but to God, who had it in His power once again to declare the human race free, and to redeem it for grace; provided only a satisfaction to the exactest point be rendered His justice.”

[11] QUEN. (III, 228): “It was the infinite God that was offended by sin; and because sin is an offense, wrong, and crime against the infinite God, and, so to speak, is Deicide, it has an infinite evil, not indeed formally, . . . but objectively, and deserves infinite punishments, and, therefore, required an infinite price of satisfaction, which Christ alone could have afforded.” GRH. (III, 579): “The guilt attending the sins of the entire human race was infinite, inasmuch as it was directed against the infinite justice of God. An infinite good had been injured, and, therefore, an infinite price was demanded. But the works and sufferings of Christ’s human nature are finite, and belong to a determined time, i.e., are terminated by the period of His humiliation. In order, therefore, that the price of redemption might be proportionate to our debt and infinite guilt, it was necessary that the action or mediation not only of a finite, viz., a human, but also of an infinite, i.e., a divine nature, should concur, and that the suffering and death of Christ should acquire power of infinite price elsewhere, viz., from the most effectual working of the divine nature, and thus that an infinite good might be able to be presented against an infinite evil.” Cf. the doctrine of the third genus of communicatio idiomatum. Christ, as the God-man, could afford such a satisfaction. QUEN. (III, 227): “The source from which” (Christ made satisfaction) “comprises both natures, the divine, as the original and formal source, and the human, as the organic source, acting from divine power communicated through the hypostatic union.” Cf. FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., III, 56.

NOTE. — The passages cited prove that the Dogmaticians attached so much importance to the union of the divine and human natures for the special reason that, if the divine nature had not participated with the human in suffering, in the manner indicated in § 33, Note 23, this suffering would not have had an infinite value, and in this they follow the theory of Anselm. But this theory still further magnifies the importance of the union of the two natures in Christ by another consideration, stating that “if this service of infinite value had not been rendered by one who was at the same time man, it would have been of no avail for us men;” and without this addition the theory is confessedly incomplete. Although our Dogmaticians do not expressly mention this point, we may still assume that they silently included it. This assumption is justified by the self-consistency of the Anselmic theory, which they on this subject adopted.

§ 37. The Regal Office.

To Him, who announced to the world God’s gracious purpose of redemption, and who Himself accomplishes the redemption, the dominion over the world is committed; and, in exercising this dominion, He performs a regal function. This regal dignity belongs to Christ, as God, from eternity; but from the moment of His incarnation His humanity also participated in it. [1] Yet, as long as He tarried here upon earth, He did not exercise this regal dominion in its full extent; but rather, as long as He was in the state of humiliation, refrained, for the most part, from its use and exercise, and not until the time of His exaltation did He enter upon the complete exercise of this, His regal dominion. [2] Inasmuch as Christ is thus King and Lord of the world, His dominion extends over everything that is in the world and belongs to it; and there appertains to Him not only the preservation and government of the world in general, but also the preservation and government of the Church in particular. At the same time, this His dominion extends not only over the present, but equally also over the future world. This kingdom of Christ is, in itself, only one, and embraces the whole world, the present and the future, with all that it contains. Yet this one kingdom can also be distinguished as a threefold one, in the same sense in which we distinguish at present the world and the Church, and in which we distinguish the citizens of this and of the future life, of heaven and of earth. Accordingly, the world and the Church, in this life, are regarded as each a special kingdom, over which Christ rules; and those who are in the life to come constitute the third kingdom. This threefold kingdom is designated as the kingdom of power, of grace, and of glory. The first is called the Kingdom of Power, because it is the kingdom in which Christ exercises His divine power by governing and upholding the world; the second is called the Kingdom of Grace, because in this Christ operates through His saving grace; the third is called the Kingdom of Glory, because He therein unfolds, in all its perfection, His divine glory before the eyes of all who are there assembled. [3]

§ 38.

As the works of redemption, for whose accomplishment the λογος became man, could be brought about only through suffering and death, it is altogether natural that we should see Christ, through all His earthly life, even until the completion of His work of redemption, going about in the form of a servant, subject to all the weaknesses and infirmities of human nature. Not until after His resurrection did He lay aside the form of a servant and appear in divine glory. Accordingly, from the time of the incarnation of Christ, we have to predicate of Him a two-fold condition, that of the form of a servant and that of glory. Inasmuch, however, as in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, resulting from the unio personalis, the human nature participated in all the attributes and glory of the divine nature; and, inasmuch as, in accordance with this, a condition of divine glory would naturally have been looked for from the moment of the incarnation; we cannot comprehend the antecedent condition in the form of a servant without assuming that Christ voluntarily refrained from a glory that belonged to Him. And this indeed is the teaching of the Scriptures in Phil. 2:5-9. Accordingly we designate the former condition the State of Humiliation, a condition of self-renunciation; the other, the State of Exaltation. This self-renunciation, however, that is followed by His being in the condition of a servant, does not lie in the act of incarnation; for, although it is a gracious condescension of the λογος, that He assumed human nature, yet that cannot be the fact here referred to, as the condition of self-renunciation is designated as temporary, while the incarnation is permanent. [1] Neither the self-renunciation nor the exaltation, indeed, can be predicated of the λογος, or of the divine nature; for this, remaining ever the same, is not susceptible of self-renunciation or of exaltation. It is only, therefore, of the human nature that the one or the other can be predicated, [2] and it is only to this that the self-renunciation and the exaltation here described refer. But, when self-renunciation is predicated of it, this is not to be so understood, as if in this condition of self-renunciation the human nature were entirely stripped of the divine glory and confined entirely to itself, and as if the divine glory, as such, were not associated with the human nature until in the condition of exaltation; for this is disproved already by the fact that Christ, even in the State of Humiliation, performed deeds that imply the possession of divine glory. [3] Finally, the self-renunciation is not to be so understood as if the human nature, in consequence of its inalienable possession of divine glory, really exercised the dominion thence accruing to it, but concealed this exercise from the eyes of men, which would have been no real self-renunciation at all: [4] but it must be assumed that the human nature, although, in itself considered, having full right to the divine glory, and being in possession of all the dominion resulting therefrom, here upon earth voluntarily renounced the use and exercise of the same out of regard for the work of redemption that was to be accomplished, [5] and instead thereof led a life of lowliness; that, therefore, the human nature of Christ, which in virtue of the Communicatio Idiomatum was entitled to all the majesty belonging to God, renounced the same, and instead thereof assumed poverty, lowliness, and all the natural (though sinless) weaknesses, infirmities, limitations, and wants of human nature. [6] The self-renunciation consists, therefore, in the real, though at times interrupted abnegation, by the human nature of Christ, of the glory due unto it, and the exaltation, in the assumption by this human nature, of the full use of this divine glory after the completion of the work of redemption. [7] The first state commences with the incarnation and continues until the last moment of His remaining in the tomb. The other begins with the re-animation and continues in eternity, but develops itself in several states. [8]

(BR. (482): “The State of Humiliation consists in this, that Christ for a time renounced (truly and really, yet freely) the plenary exercise of the divine majesty, which His human nature had acquired in the personal union, and, as a lowly man, endured what was far beneath the divine majesty (that He might suffer and die for the life of the world)”).

“The State of Exaltation is the state of Christ, the God-man, in which He, according to His human nature, having laid aside the infirmities of the flesh, received and assumed the plenary exercise of the divine majesty.”[9]

I. THE STATE OF HUMILIATION. — The following are the principal aspects in which the humiliation of Christ reveals itself: HOLL. (759, sq.) [10] “1. Conception, Luke 1:31. A supernatural act, by which the flesh of Christ, produced from the mass of the blood of the Virgin Mary, received in her womb its original being, consubstantial with our own, through the supervention of the Holy Spirit.” [11]

2. Nativity; which besides was accompanied with many humiliating circumstances. “Luke 2:7. The nativity of Christ is the going forth of God, as an infant, from the maternal womb into the light of day.” [12]

3. Circumcision; by which Christ, at the same time, made Himself subject to the Law. “Luke 2:21. The circumcision is the bloody cutting off of the foreskin of the infant Jesus on the eighth day.” [13]

4. Education; according to which Christ also subjected Himself to the laws of domestic life. “The education was His becoming accustomed, in boyhood, to the mode of life customary in Israel, and to a manual occupation.” [14]

5. The visible intercourse of Christ in the world; by which He exposed Himself to all kinds of ill treatment from those who surrounded Him, and to all the discomforts of a lowly life. “The intercourse of Christ was His most holy association, in the days of His flesh, with all kinds of men, even the most contemptible, an association full of troubles, inconveniences, and dangers.” [15]

6. The great suffering; the bodily and mental anguish which Christ endured in the last days of His earthly life. “The great suffering of Christ is the extreme anguish which our Redeemer suffered toward the end of His life, two days before His death, partly in His soul, partly in His body, by enduring to the end the most extreme and bitter sorrows.” [16]

§ 39. Preliminary Remarks.

BEFORE passing on to the consideration of the subject next in order, we preface the remark, that a number of dogmatic topics, belonging in this connection, were not further developed until by the later Dogmaticians, and were by them for the first time assigned a special place in the system; these are the topics of Vocation, Illumination, Conversion and Regeneration, Mystical Union and Renovation, which all the earlier Dogmaticians mention only occasionally, and usually in the section concerning Free Will, but have not more fully elaborated. Not until the time of CAL. did the Dogmaticians begin to arrange these topics together; by so doing they seek to collect, under one general topic, all that is to be said concerning what God, or more accurately, the Holy Ghost, does, in order to induce fallen man to accept of salvation through Christ, and what takes place in order to bring about the designed change in man. From the time of QUEN. this was all embraced under the head, The Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption. [1] It cannot be denied that thereby an advance was made in the systematic development of Dogmatics; and, as the earlier Dogmaticians did so little towards giving definite shape to the conceptions here in question, we find ourselves limited to the later Dogmaticians for our statements in illustration of this subject. Yet the introduction of an independent development of these conceptions led to an arrangement of the entire doctrine which we cannot call a happy one. After the above mentioned topics, to which that of justification is attached, have been treated under the head of “The Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption,” they discuss faith and good works (HOLL. adding, besides, that of penitence), but only after the doctrines concerning the Divine Word and the Sacraments; and they distinguish these [faith and good works] as the means of salvation on the part of man, from the Word and the Sacraments as the means of salvation on the part of God. [2] According to this arrangement, we meet with especially this difficulty, that the full discussion of the doctrine of faith is delayed so long. If we were not, indeed, justified in departing from this arrangement for this reason alone (since our task is simply historical fidelity, and we have no other interest to serve), yet from another quarter a reason arises that does justify us in so departing. For, according to the arrangement introduced by the later Dogmaticians, the articles concerning Justification and Faith, which had been so closely connected together at the time of the Reformation, and by the earlier Dogmaticians, are too widely separated; as, upon the whole, the topics formerly placed in the foreground here find (though it be only in the arrangement) a less favorable place. And, as we regard ourselves called upon to pay equal attention to the earlier and to the later Dogmaticians, we think we are compelled to deviate from the arrangement employed by the later Dogmaticians, if for no other reason, simply to do equal justice to both classes. For this reason, therefore, and not with the view of originating a more excellent dogmatic arrangement (for that is not our mission), we adopt the plan of treating first of Faith and Justification (both of which may be comprehended under the topic of, “The Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption,” since both are effected only through the power of the Holy Spirit), and after that, of Vocation, Illumination, Conversion and Regeneration, Mystical Union and Renovation; so that we may be regarded as treating first of the topics with which the earliest Dogmaticians commenced their discussion of this general subject, and then proceeding to treat of the topics more fully elaborated by the later Dogmaticians.

[1] QUEN. (III, 461) defends the arrangement thus: “The Triune God is very desirous of our salvation, and all the three persons of the Godhead are actively engaged in securing our eternal salvation. God the Father appointed everlasting happiness and the peace of heaven for us, of His own most gracious will and in His eternal counsel; Christ, the Son of man and of God, purchased for us the appointed salvation by His blood-bought redemption, and the Holy Spirit offers and applies the purchased salvation and spiritual blessings through the Word and Sacraments. As we have hitherto considered the grace of the Father’s commiseration and love, and the grace of the fraternal redemption, it remains for us to treat of the applying grace of the Spirit, which is completed in several distinct acts.” (HOLL. (791): “The applying grace of the Holy Spirit is the source of those divine acts by which the Holy Spirit, through the Word of God and the Sacraments, dispenses, offers to us, bestows and seals the spiritual and eternal favors designed for man by the great mercy of God the Father, and procured by the fraternal redemption of Jesus Christ.”)

[2] This arrangement is employed by nearly all the later Dogmaticians, some of them slightly changing the order of the topics. BR. alone considers faith and works separately from the means of salvation. His plan is this: after the Offices of Christ, he introduces Faith in Christ, Regeneration and Conversion, Justification, Renovation, and Good Works. HOLL. subjoins to the articles concerning calling, illuminating, converting, regenerating, justifying, indwelling and renewing grace, the following, viz., preserving grace (HOLL. (963): “Preservation is that act of grace by which the Holy Spirit, dwelling in justified and renewed men, defends them by supernatural strength against the temptations of the devil, the world, and the flesh, which solicit to sin and apostasy from God, and sustains and increases their faith and holiness, that they may not fall from grace, but persevere in it and be eternally saved;”) and glorifying grace (HOLL. (790): “Glorification is the act of grace by which God transfers those who are justified, and who remain faithful until death, from the kingdom of grace to the kingdom of glory, that they may obtain eternal happiness and praise God eternally.”)

The earlier Dogmaticians treat only of Justification, Faith, Good Works, Repentance, and Confession, without attempting a systematic arrangement, and in the free form of unconnected topics, as has been done by Melanchthon.

§ 40. The Agent, the Means, the Result.

As it was Christ who accomplished the work of redemption, so it is the Holy Spirit who offers us the means whereby we can appropriate that redemption to ourselves. The means is Faith, the effect of faith is Justification.

§ 41. I. Faith.

After reconciliation with God has been brought about through Christ, inasmuch as, in man’s stead, He fulfilled the Law and made satisfaction for the sins of the world, thence-forward this new salvation is preached unto men, and through it the forgiveness of sin is offered to them (Luke 24:47; Acts 2:38; 5:31; 10:43; 13:38; 26:18). To become a partaker of it, there is now no need of any meritorious work on the part of man, for Christ has done everything that was necessary to secure it; but this alone is necessary, that man receive the salvation that is offered him, and that he appropriate to himself the promise that is given; and this is done alone by faith. [1] Man cannot, however, attain this faith unless, after the redemption purchased by Christ has been preached and offered to him, he recognize the existence of this salvation, and the truth of this promise, as well as the comfort it contains for him, and can have the confidence that this salvation is designed, not for this or that one alone, but also for himself; for a joyful message can benefit a man only when he has no doubt of its truth, but can convince himself that he, too, is meant by it. [2]

Faith, considered with reference to its individual elements, consists accordingly of —

1. “Knowledge, and that explicit, of things to be believed, especially concerning Christ and His merit, concerning the grace of God, or the remission of sins, and concerning the salvation to be obtained thereby from God.” BR. (503). [3]

2. “Assent, i.e., an approving judgment of the intellect, by which we believe that those things which the Scriptures say concerning Christ and His merit and atonement for our sins, and concerning the grace of God and the promises of the free forgiveness of our sins for Christ’s sake, are certainly and indubitably true, and by which we absolutely acquiesce in them.” [4] QUEN. (IV, 283).

§ 42. (2) Justification.

The effect of faith is justification; [1] by which is to be understood that act of God by which He removes the sentence of condemnation, to which man is exposed in consequence of his sins, releases him from his guilt, and ascribes to him the merit of Christ. BR. (574): “Justification denotes that act by which the sinner, who is responsible for guilt and liable to punishment (reus culpae et poenae), but who believes in Christ, is pronounced just by God the judge.” [2] This act occurs at the instant in which the merit of Christ is appropriated by faith, [3] and can properly be designated a forensic or judicial act, since God in it, as if in a civil court, pronounces a judgment upon man, which assigns to him an entirely different position, and entirely different rights. [4] By justification we are, therefore, by no means to understand a moral condition existing in man, or a moral change which he has experienced, but only a judgment pronounced upon man, by which his relation to God is reversed, [5] and indeed in such a manner, that a man can now consider himself one whose sins are blotted out, who is no longer responsible for them before God, who, on the other hand, appears before God as accepted and righteous, in whom God finds nothing more to punish, with whom He has no longer any occasion to be displeased. Through this act of justification emanating from God we receive,

1. REMISSION OF SINS (Rom. 4:7; Ps. 32:1, 2; Rom. 3:25; Luke 11:4; 2 Cor. 5:19).

2. THE IMPUTATION OF THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF CHRIST[6] (Rom. 5:9; 2 Cor. 5:21; Gal. 3:6; Phil. 3:9; Rom. 4:5); for God, from the moment in which faith is exercised, regards all that Christ has accomplished, as if it had been done by man, and attributes the merit of Christ to him, as if it were his own. [7] From this can be seen what we are to designate as the ground of our justification, and what is the means by which it is attained. The ground lies alone in the merit of Christ, for by this our sins are blotted out, and God is enabled to receive us again into favor. [8] The means, however, through which we attain justification is faith. [9] In no wise, therefore, is any merit or worthiness on our part demanded as the condition for the impartation of justification, as if upon that our justification should depend. It is not denied, indeed, that a moral change takes place in man, with the entrance of faith, and therefore also with that of justification; yet this is to be regarded as only an attendant to justification and contemporaneous with it, but in no wise as the condition upon which we attain justification; [10] and this the less, as it is only the grace of God which displays itself in justification, that furnishes the ground and possibility of such a change. [11] The moral worthiness of man cannot be made account of in the inquiry concerning the reasons of his being received into the favor of God, [12] and it is highly important to assert this firmly, as we would deprive ourselves of the firm footing on which our justification rests, if we regarded it as in any degree dependent upon anything done by us. [13] Justification is, accordingly, to be regarded throughout as a free gift of grace on the part of God, which is offered to us gratuitously and without requiring any addition to it on our part, and which can be received and accepted only by faith, as it is expressed in the declaration that we are justified, gratuitously, by faith alone, [14] and for Christ’s sake. [15]

§ 43. Concomitants and Consequences of Justifying Faith.

Having discussed faith as the means by which we partake of salvation, and justification as the effect of faith, there remain to be described the internal conditions and the moral change which occur in man at the same time with and after justification. But these, however, are also operations of the Holy Ghost. Agreeably to the order in which the Holy Spirit produces them [1] we enumerate: 1. The Call; 2. Illumination; 3. Regeneration and Conversion; 4. Mystical Union; 5. Renovation.

§ 44. (1.) Vocation.

“The Call is the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit manifests by means of the Word of God His will in regard to the salvation of sinners to those persons who are out of the Church, and offers them benefits from Christ the Redeemer, that they may be led to the Church, converted, and obtain eternal salvation.” HOLL. (803). [2] The grace of God through which He desires to effect man’s salvation, begins with the Call, for God must present salvation to man, since uncalled, man would not even desire it. It is distinguished as indirect and direct, or, what is here equivalent, as general and special. [3] By the former is understood the call which reaches man through conscience and the natural knowledge of God, and thus awakens only in general an undefined longing for salvation, which is yet unknown to him; by the latter, the call which comes through the preaching of the Gospel, and directly invites to entrance into the kingdom of God, to conversion, and to the reception of salvation in Christ. It is only the latter which is here discussed. It is not merely an external call, but is invariably accompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, of such a kind that the person so called cannot fail to perceive the drawing of the Holy Spirit, and that his conscience testifies that he has great reason to follow this call; it is, therefore, at once as seriously intended as it is always efficacious. [4] As, in the preaching of the Gospel, the only possibility is afforded, by which man can obtain salvation through Jesus Christ (the instrumental cause is the external preaching of the Word. Rom. 10:17; 2 Thess. 2:14), [5] God makes use of this as the means through which He sends the call to men; and, according as He calls them through men whom He appoints and urges to do this, [6] or immediately, and without their instrumentality, the call is designated as mediate or immediate, and consequently as ordinary or extraordinary. [7] Only in extraordinary cases, however, does God call otherwise than through human instrumentality. The reason of God’s calling is to be found altogether and only in His pity for the wretchedness in which men lie so long as they do not partake of the salvation of Christ. [8] Therefore, as all men are in the same condemnation, this call is addressed to all without distinction, and is therefore universal; and this (a) on account of the purpose of God, who earnestly wishes that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9; (b) on account of the command of Christ, Matt. 11:28; (c) on account of the message itself, for all men in the whole world have been called, Mark 16:20; Rom. 10:18. The universality of the call consists, however, not in that God has called all individuals in the different ages of the world; but in that He provides that the preaching through which the call is to be extended to men, could, in general, in some way reach all nations, and thus also all individuals. [9]

The call is, therefore, extended equally to all men, inasmuch as saving grace is offered to all men through the same means. But an inequality occurs in regard to the order, the manner, and the time of the call: to some it comes earlier than to others; for some it continues longer than for others; some receive the preaching of the Gospel immediately from heralds sent by God, while others receive it at third hand. [10]

The proof that the call has reached all nations and all individuals it is not indeed easy for us to produce, but from history and revelation we know the following: First, that there were three times in which God caused the news of salvation to be solemnly proclaimed in such a manner that thereby, upon each occasion, opportunity was given to all then living to hear it; whereby, at the same time, it became possible for them to hand down these glad tidings to all their posterity. These periods were, the days of Adam, of Noah, and of the Apostles. [11]

If then, in the course of time, some people be found who are entirely ignorant of the preaching of the Gospel, this does not militate against the universality of the call, but arises from this, that these people did not faithfully preserve the truth preached to them or did not lay it to heart, in consequence of which their posterity have to suffer. It is through their guilt that the call which God designed to be universal became particular. [12]

Moreover, we know that God did not limit His solemn call to the three occasions we have cited, but that He also adopted all kinds of expedients whereby the call afterwards could reach nations and individuals. [13] Why God, however, caused the call to be more directly addressed to some nations than to others is indeed unknown to us; for the purposes and ways of God are confessedly unfathomable. But this cannot confuse us in regard to the doctrine that God’s purpose in the call was universal; for this purpose is most clearly declared in Scripture. [14]

[1] HOLL. (795): “The acts of applying grace, according to the order in which they cohere, and follow one another, are the call, illumination, conversion, regeneration, justification, mystical union with the Triune God, renovation, preservation of faith and holiness, glorification.” Thus they are enumerated by nearly all the later Dogmaticians. Justification, which we have already discussed, we now omit. HOLL. (ib.) thus vindicates this arrangement: “This order, and, as it were, concatenated series of acts of applying grace, we learn from Acts 20:17, where Christ says to Paul, ‘I send thee to the Gentiles;’ behold the grace of the call! ‘That thou mayest open their eyes;’ behold the illumination! ‘To turn them from darkness to light;’ behold the act of conversion! ‘And from the power of Satan unto God;’ behold regeneration itself, through which we become the sons of God! ‘That they may receive forgiveness of sins;’ behold justification! ‘And have inheritance among them which are sanctified through faith in me;’ behold union with Christ by faith, sanctification, the preservation of holiness, and glorification!” In the Symb. Books the same order is indicated (as also now and then by the Dogmaticians of the period next following their preparation), but only in passing, viz., in the SMALL CATECH., Art. 3, and FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., II, 50. The “three ways of the Mystics” are rejected, according to which “he who is called to the Church can expeditiously reach the sacred mount of perfection and deification by three ways: the purifying, the illuminating, and the uniting.” The reason for this rejection: “because neither are these arranged in proper order, nor do the men who pursue them certainly reach the goal fixed by the Mystics.”

[2] QUEN.’s extended definition (III, 466): “Calling is the act of the applying grace of the Holy Spirit, by which He manifests towards the whole race of fallen man the most gracious will of God through the external preaching of the Word, in itself always sufficient and effective, and offers to all men the benefits obtained through the merit of the Redeemer, with the serious intention that all may be saved by Christ, and be presented with eternal life.”

[3] In the former manner KG. and QUEN. distinguish; in the latter, HOLL. QUEN. (III, 461): “Taken widely, it includes likewise the indirect call, which arises from the consideration of the universe, its government, and the divine beneficence towards creatures, Rom. 1:19, 20; 2:14, 15; Acts 17:27; likewise by the general and obscure rumor concerning a certain assembly in which it is said the true God is known and worshiped, 1 Kings 10:1; 2 Kings 5:2, 3; 1 Thess. 1:8. The methods of vocation just enumerated are rather invitations and incitements to inquire about the true worship of God and the assembly in which it flourishes, than the call properly so called; the reason is, they have not for their proximate and immediate end the eternal salvation of man or the knowledge of Christ, the Redeemer, and the mysteries necessary for the attainment of eternal salvation, but only the leading of man to the gate of the true Church.”

The term is strictly taken, as it signifies the direct call by which God calls men to faith and repentance, by means of the Word read or preached, and offers to them the grace of conversion by which they may be converted and partake of salvation.

HOLL. (803): “A general and pedagogical call to the Church is that by which God more obscurely and from afar invites sinners who are out of the Church to inquire in regard to the true worship of God and the assembly in which it flourishes, and leads them to the gate of the Church. The general call occurs: (a) Objectively, by the manifestation of the government and the divine beneficence towards creatures; (b) Efficaciously, by the efficacious divine influence and impulse, by which, both from theoretic and practical innate notions, and from proofs of the divine benignity, practical conclusions are produced in the minds of unbelievers to inquire, although in an unequal degree, concerning the true worship of God; (c) Cumulatively, through the rumor concerning the Church spread over the world.”

[4] QUEN. (III, 463): “The form of the call consists in a serious (Matt. 23:37) and by the divine intention always sufficient (Rom. 8:30) and always efficacious (Rom. 1:16) manifestation of the will of God and offer of the blessings procured by Christ.” (Id. 464): “No call of God, whether of itself and its intrinsic quality or of the intention of God, is inefficacious, so that it cannot and should not produce a salutary effect; but every call is efficacious (for the preached Word of God has a divine and sufficient power and efficacy to effect regeneration, conversion, etc., by the ordination and appointment of God Himself), although it may be prevented from attaining its effect by men presenting an obstacle, and thus becomes inefficacious by the fault of the wicked and perverse will of men.” The distinction made by the Calvinists between an external and an internal call is therefore rejected. QUEN. (III, 466): “The Calvinists make a distinction between an external and internal call, and exhibit both: (a) In reference to their origin: because the former is made through the ministry of the Word offered to all or some externally, the other by the Holy Spirit illuminating and guiding within the hearts of the elect. (b) In reference to their subjects: because the former is common to the elect and the reprobate, the other peculiar to the elect, so that the reprobate never partake of it. (c) In reference to the efficacy: because the latter, alone being efficacious and irresistible, not only enlightens the mind, but also bends the will, and never, when it once takes possession of the mind, can be abolished or extinguished; but the former without this would be useless and ineffectual to salvation. We admit the distinction, but not so as to oppose the external to the internal call, nor to separate one from the other, as the external call is the medium and instrument of the internal, and by this God works efficaciously in the hearts of men. If the external did not exactly correspond to the internal call, if a person might be called externally and not internally, it would be vain, fallacious, illusory.”

[5] In regard to the call which comes to men by the preaching of the Gospel and by that of the Law, HOLL. (807): “God calls poor sinners directly and savingly to the Church by the Gospel (2 Thess. 2:14), to which also Baptism pertains (John 3:5). Nevertheless the divine Law contributes something to the call of sinners, but only indirectly, negatively, and accidentally.”

AP. CONF. (V, 51): “God terrifies by the Law, that there may be place for consolation and vivification, because hearts secure and not perceiving the wrath of God despise consolation.”

[6] QUEN. (III, 463): “The ministerial cause is either the ordinary minister of the Word, Matt. 22:3, or whenever any other person out of the usual order, with whatever intention, shall have announced the Word, 2 Kings 5:7.”

[7] QUEN. (III, 462): “The mediate call is that by which God in the Old Testament called some by the ministry of angels, or men, and now, since the institution of the Gospel ministry, calls by men alone. We use the term immediate, not with reference to the medium or Word, without which no salutary call can take place, but in reference to men, because God Himself presented the Word without human assistance. Thus Gen. 12:1; Acts 9:3-4.”

“Ordinary vocation is that which is accomplished by the divinely appointed means, that is, by the external and visible ministry of the Word. Extraordinary is when any one is called to the light of the Gospel, not by the ordinary ministry, but by miracles, trances and other extraordinary means. Thus the Magi, Matt. 2:1; the robber, Luke 23:42. The extraordinary call is special and very rare: formerly, indeed, under the Old Testament and in the commencement of the New, it occurred; but now, since the Gospel has been universally preached and the Church planted by the apostles, it has clearly ceased. Further, a distinction is made between the solemn call, which occurs through the preached Word, and the less solemn, which occurs through the read Word or that which may be read.”

[8] QUEN. (III, 463): “The impelling and moving internal cause is nothing but the mercy and goodness of God founded in the merit of Christ, 2 Tim. 1:9; the external is the utter misery of man.” HOLL. (806): “Human wretchedness is not the cause of God’s gracious call, but it gave occasion to His commiseration.”

[9] HOLL. (809): “When we say that the call to God’s kingdom is universal, we do not assert that the doctrine of the Gospel was actually announced to each and every man openly and immediately by ministers specially sent; but that God most merciful has so clearly made known the doctrine of the Gospel concerning obtaining salvation by faith in Christ, that all men, without exception, can arrive at the knowledge of it, so that God has not by a divine decree denied to any nation or any person the benefit of the doctrine or the way by which he may attain to its knowledge.”

[10] HOLL. (816): “Ordinary calling is equal in substance, or so far as it is essentially considered (because we are called by grace equally salutary; because the same powers of believing are offered to all; because we are called by the same means, by the same Gospel, by the same baptism of equal efficacy, if you regard the divine purpose); but it is unequal in regard to order, mode, degree, time, and interval. As to the order, the Gospel was first to be preached to the Jews and afterwards to the Gentiles, Acts 13:46. As to the mode and degree, some have received more, others less light. Some nations are called by the Word solemnly preached, others by the Word written and read, others by the diffused rumors of the Church, of which some are nearer and clearer and others more remote and obscure. In regard to time and interval, some nations are called earlier, others later. To some the light of the Gospel shone for a longer time, to others it became obscure after a few years. Inasmuch as we cannot, in this present mortal state, entirely fathom this accidental inequality, let us acquiesce in God’s dispensation of the means of salvation; let us acknowledge and admire, but not anxiously explore, the abyss of the divine judgments inscrutable to human minds. Rom. 11:33.”

§ 45. (2.) Illumination.HOLLAZIUS alone discussed Illumination at length under a separate head; and the reason of this no doubt was, that the questions here treated of acquired a special importance just at that time, partly in opposition to Mysticism, and partly to Pietism, which was then making its appearance. Earlier Dogmaticians either have not separate locus for illumination, or they treat of it very briefly, as CALOVIUS, who places it among the features of the call.

As, to the natural man, everything spiritual is foolishness, and he cannot perceive it, but, on the other hand, many prejudices and doubts prevent him from rightly understanding that which is spiritual, the call would be fruitless, if the Holy Spirit did not so operate that the Gospel should appear in its true light and significance to man. [1]

On this account the further operation of the Holy Spirit aims at the removal of this folly of the natural man, at displacing his doubts and prejudices, and furnishing him correct knowledge and comprehension of the substance and meaning of the Gospel. The aim, therefore, here is not only an external knowledge of the plan of salvation, but an internal knowledge; [2] the opening of man’s mind for the due appreciation of the Gospel, the removal of all hindrances, which might conceal from him God’s gracious plan of salvation, and that it may become internally clear to him how miserable is his sinful condition, as shown in the Scriptures, and what a remedy and comfort have been afforded for it in the grace which is in Christ Jesus. [3]

The Holy Spirit having brought about such a result, everything is done on the part of God, and it remains for the will of man to determine whether this salvation is to be received. [4] This is the effect which the Holy Spirit designs to produce by illumination. “Illumination is the act of applying grace, by which the Holy Spirit, through the ministry of the Word, teaches a man who is a sinner and called to the Church, and continues to instruct him in an ever-increasing measure, with the earnest purpose to remove the darkness of ignorance and error, and imbue him with the knowledge of the Word of God, by instilling from the Law the conviction of sin, and from the Gospel the apprehension of divine mercy, founded upon the merit of Christ.” [5] HOLL. (819). Illumination is, accordingly, more immediately an operation of the Holy Spirit upon the intellect of man; He addresses Himself however in this act at least mediately to the will, in as far as this illumination is designed, by the conviction of the misery of sin which it produces, and by presenting the grace of God, to conduct to conversion and the sanctification of the will. [6] It takes place in every man who lays to heart the call of the Holy Spirit, and opens his ear and heart, but not without this, as the Holy Spirit never works by constraint and never when man resists; [7] and He never comes to men except through the divine Word, [8] of which its ministers are the vehicle, [9] and which those who desire to be illuminated must permit to work in them in prayer and religious meditation. [10]

As the Word of God is divided into Law and Gospel, so can illumination, as it is effected by the one or the other, be distinguished as legal or evangelical; and, according to the diverse missions intrusted to the Law and the Gospel respectively, the former will reveal to man only his sins and the wrath of God consequent upon them, and the other grace in Christ; [11] and the effect will be different in these respects, that the one will cause only terror and the other comfort in view of the proffered salvation. Hence, it is only the influence proceeding from the Gospel that is really efficient in securing salvation, while that proceeding from the Law is rather preparatory to the former. [12]

Like all other knowledge, that produced by the Holy Spirit is not instantaneous, but gradual, as may be seen from this, that the knowledge here spoken of consists of various particulars, which follow one another in natural order. [13] And as, in the order of nature, external precedes internal knowledge, so here the Holy Spirit produces an external, which is preparatory to the internal knowledge, and then produces the internal; so that there may be further a distinction between a literal and pedagogic illumination, and one that is spiritual and entirely saving. [14] But as man attains the one as well as the other kind of knowledge only upon proper conduct on his part in reference to the grace ministered to him, the operation of the Holy Spirit, if the will of man do not proceed further, may also be restricted to the first; or, the operations of the Spirit may be restricted to the intellect, and not extend to the will of man as they should, [15] in which case the object of the Holy Spirit is not entirely accomplished in man, and the illumination is not perfect; [16] yet it still cannot be denied, that this first state of illumination is effected by the Holy Spirit. [17]

[1] HOLL. (850): “In an unilluminated man there is not merely a negative ignorance, but also an ignorance of depraved inclination, which is error contrary to true knowledge, because the natural man not only does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, but they are foolishness unto him, 1 Cor. 2:14. Therefore, not only mere ignorance, but likewise carnal-mindedness (Rom. 8:6) and the wisdom of this world (1 Cor. 1:20), are opposed to a saving knowledge. The world has its wisdom, but it is immersed in the darkness of arrogance, so as to array itself against the wisdom of God, 2 Cor. 10:5.”

[2] HOLL. (819): “An objective illumination is not intended here, presenting externally the light of the divine Word, but an effective one, in which the Holy Spirit enkindles the light of knowledge, and subjective illumination, in which the blind sinner permits himself to be enlightened by the operation of the Holy Spirit. (Id. 851.) When we represent illumination as the impartation of knowledge, we do not mean merely external, which is produced by the tongue or pen of the minister of the Church, but likewise internal, by which the Holy Spirit, by His own special and gracious concurrence, enkindles the light of supernatural wisdom, through the divine Word preached or read, in the hearts of hearers or readers who do not maliciously oppose it.”

[3] HOLL. (850): “Blindness of the intellect, filled with the darkness of ignorance and error (Eph. 4:18), is the starting-point of illumination. The light of saving knowledge is its goal. By the Law is the knowledge of sin, Rom. 3:20. The knowledge of the glorious grace of God, unveiled in the face of Jesus Christ, proceeds from the Gospel, 2 Cor. 4:6. Assent attends this knowledge, by which man enlightened regards as sure and beyond doubt all that is revealed in the Word of God, particularly the Gospel message concerning the remission of sins and the eternal salvation to be secured through Christ; which undoubting assent is called ελεγχος, conviction of the intellect, Heb. 11:1.”

[4] HOLL. (820): “The first and principal design of illumination is to prepare man for conversion. For thus the natural darkness, the ignorance of the mysteries, and the errors opposed to them, are expelled by grace from the mind of man, and he is imbued with a knowledge of God and of sacred things, and illuminated, as if by a light, so that he is prepared to receive justifying grace. This illuminating grace, therefore, precedes the completion of conversion.”

[5] HOLL. (850): “Divine illumination consists formally in the instruction of the Holy Spirit by means of the read or preached Word, not merely external, but likewise internal, and penetrating efficaciously the inmost recesses of the human heart, so that the darkness of ignorance and error is expelled, and the light of supernatural knowledge is infused into it.” Id. (819): “Enlightening grace is called teaching grace, because the Holy Spirit, in enlightening, teaches all things necessary to salvation, John 14:26; likewise anointing grace, from 1 John 2:20, 27; opening of the eyes of the mind, Acts 26:18, for, as a blind person obtains the power of seeing by the opening of his eyes, so the sinner, filled with the darkness of ignorance, receives, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the power of knowing the true God.”

[6] HOLL. (828): “First, the intellect of the sinner led to the Church is immediately enlightened (2 Cor. 4:6; Eph. 1:18); subsequently and mediately, the will also, Tit. 2:11, 12. The saving grace of God which, like the beneficent sun, has appeared to all men, teaches the intellect of the sinner, and sheds upon it the light of knowledge, so that this light is diffused upon the will to enable it to flee from wickedness and choose holiness of life. Therefore the apostle desires for the Colossians illumination, that they may be sanctified, Col. 1:9, 10.” The difference between illumination and regeneration is this (832): “The former has respect more to the intellect, regeneration more to the will; the former consists formally in knowledge concerning sacred things from the divine Word, the latter consists formally in the gift of faith. The effect of the former is a knowledge of the divine mysteries; the effect of the latter is confidence in the merits of Christ. The former precedes, the latter follows.” The difference between illumination and sanctification is (ib.): “All Christians agree that sanctification, taken in a broader sense, embraces all the acts of applying grace; taken in a narrower sense, it differs from illumination (1) in regard to the particular subject, because by illumination the intellect, proximately and formally, and by sanctification the will, is made perfect; (2) in regard to the extent, because more men are illuminated than sanctified; (3) in regard to their peculiar effect and design, because the effect of illumination is γνωσις, or the supernatural knowledge of God and divine things, Eph. 1:18; 2 Cor. 4:6, but the effect of sanctification is holiness and righteousness, Eph. 4:24.”

[7] Id. (827): “The most gracious God seriously designs to illuminate all men, but only they are actually illuminated who, called and led to the Church, receive the grace of the Holy Spirit, and listen attentively to the divine Word, read it, and meditate upon it. The grace of the Holy Spirit is not irresistible, for the sinner, if obstinately perverse, may hinder the supernatural illumination of the Holy Spirit by opposing a veil or malicious obstacle, 2 Cor. 4:3, 4. But the sinner not obstinately opposing is efficaciously enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, Ps. 119:130.”

[8] Id. (820): “The Holy Spirit does not immediately, but by means of the divine Word, enlighten us, 2 Pet. 1:18, 19.” (Qualified, however, with great care (825), “the power of illumination which pertains to the divine Word is not accurately confined to the acts of hearing, reading, or meditation; but the Word of God heard, read, or conveyed to the mind, and retained by it, always retains its illuminating power.”) (821): “God hath not promised in His Word that any man by ecstasy shall be illuminated, his faith be confirmed, and a foretaste of eternal life be imparted; in opposition to the Platonics, the Quakers, the Mystics.” Definition of ecstasy (trance): “It is a rare and extraordinary operation either of God, or of a corrupt imagination, or of the devil, alienating the mind of a man from his bodily senses, so that, the use of the latter ceasing, he becomes more ready and quick to receive the objects of imagination. It differs from rapture, because ecstasy simply denotes a departure of the mind from the senses, but rapture adds violence.”

[9] Id. (826): “The Holy Spirit truly and really enlightens the souls of men in darkness in regard to sacred things by means of ministers of the Word, performing in the right way the public office of teaching, Eph. 3:8, 9; 2 Cor. 4:6; Acts 26:18; John 5:35; Matt. 5:14.”

[10] Id. (844): “To obtain spiritual illumination, three auxiliaries are necessary: prayer (Luke 11:13; Eph. 1:17, 18), meditation (John 5:39), trials (Ps. 119:71). The following positions are in addition, opposed to the erroneous views of the Mystics and Quietists:

“I. The illumination and regeneration of the sinner do not take place by the purgation or abstraction of the soul from created objects, and the turning of it in upon itself.” The following explanations are added:

“(a) We do not disallow all abstractions of the mind from foreign objects and secular cares in the actual use of the Word and in godly meditations and prayers. We oppose that abstraction or annihilation by which the mind is presumed to be withdrawn from all creatures and from the divine gifts, and loses itself in God.

“(b) We do not condemn all resignation, since our divines inculcate a temperate and godly resignation (Gelassenheit). We reject that resignation which involves the destruction of all the affections, desires, and thoughts.

“(c) We must distinguish from the descent into the heart or soul for the purpose of bringing to remembrance sin, or the state of misery, and searching for repentance and faith, that introspection whose object is to apprehend the inner light immediately revealing . . . . The present controversy has respect to the introversion of the mind upon itself, to wait for, and observe, and apprehend the internal light, immediately making revelations.”

II. (847): “So far from expecting in silence a supernatural divine light, the external Word of God, which is a most clear light, is on the contrary to be earnestly preached, carefully heard, frequently read, attentively pondered, and, in addition, devout prayers, mingled with sacred hymns, are to be raised to heaven, that the light of saving knowledge may arise in our hearts, and continually increase.” We add also the following remarks:

(848): “(a) When the Mystics distinguish between silence of words, thoughts, and desires, we approve of the first silence, i.e., of words in a certain respect; for meditation on the divine Word is aided by silence in our houses: but we disapprove of the silence of desires and thoughts.

“(b) The expectation of divine assistance, united with silence, is proper for true Christians, but not the silent expectation of directly revealing light.

“(c) The doctrine of an internal Sabbath of the soul, so far as it denotes (α) cessation from works of the flesh, (β) rest of the soul in God, (γ) meditation on the divine mercies, (δ) the desire and expectation of the eternal Sabbath, is retained and inculcated in our churches. But an internal Sabbath is rejected, so far as it denotes, not only a silence of words, but of all the thoughts and senses.”

[11] Id. (824): “Illumination, in respect to the illuminating means, is either legal or evangelical. The former is that which manifests to us sin, the wrath of God, and the temporal and eternal punishments of sin (Rom. 7:7). The latter reveals to us the grace of God, founded on the merit of Christ, righteousness accepted by God, and eternal life (2 Cor. 4:4).”

“The Gospel illuminates the hearts of men, that they may know the glory of Christ, raised indeed upon the cross, but also conveyed to heaven and sitting at the Right Hand of God the Father. The Gospel, therefore, declares and manifests the mercy, the wisdom, and the justice of God the Father, in the open face of Christ, who is His express image.”

[12] Id. (825): “The divine Law, like lightning, has a terrible, slaying and condemning light. But the Gospel, like the beneficent sun, diffuses an exhilarating and vivifying light, 2 Cor. 3:6-9. The Law possesses salutary powers of the pedagogical illumination, Gal. 3:24 (the divine Law shows us and exposes both the native leprosy of the soul and the diseases contracted voluntarily, and thus affords us the occasion of seeking Christ, the physician of souls and the author of righteousness and salvation). But from the Gospel a perfectly saving illumination arises to those who properly use the evangelical doctrine according to the divine purpose (which makes know the knowledge of salvation by remission of sins, and reveals the tender mercy of our God, whereby the Dayspring from on high hath visited us, Luke 1:77, 78).”

§ 46. Regeneration and Conversion.

These are the terms descriptive of the state of one who has really entered into the new kingdom of grace. Both are used in the Holy Scriptures, sometimes in a wider, at others in a narrower sense, and often interchangeably. In the former case they describe the entire state of acceptance of the pardoned sinner, with all the moral powers which are now at his command, and embrace, therefore, in them justification and sanctification; in the latter case, in which indeed they do not directly exclude one another, but yet are also not exactly identical, they describe simply the internal change which has taken place in the entire condition of man, without including the power to lead a holy life. The two conceptions may be distinguished thus, that by regeneration is understood only the actual presence of the new spiritual life, as it is effected in man by the operation of the Holy Spirit; by conversion, the conditions also which must be performed on the part of man in order that he may attain such a spiritual life. [1] As thus the two expressions diverge in a certain sense, they may also be considered separately.

§ 47. (4.) The Mystical Union.

The Holy Scriptures assert that God dwells in the believer, and express by this a peculiar union of God with him, which Dogmatics distinguish as a mystical union. This takes place at the instant in which man is justified and regenerated, and is inseparably united with justification and regeneration, so that, as we associate with justification the forgiveness of sins, and with regeneration the power to believe, so in the mystical union we describe the direct operation of both these acts of divine grace, which consists in this, that God makes His abode in a peculiar manner in the justified or regenerate. [1] By this mystical union more is expressed than a mere agreement of the will of man with the will of God, or a mere union of both in love, or a mere influence and communication of spiritual gifts on the part of the Holy Ghost. [2] The passages, John 14:23; 1 Cor. 6:15, 17; Eph. 5:30; 2 Pet. 1:4; Gal. 3:27; 2:19, 20, prove, moreover, that this union is not merely figurative, but literal and actual, so that it cannot be described otherwise than as the union of the substance of God with the substance of man, in consequence of which God pours out the fulness of His gracious gifts upon the regenerate. [3] It is therefore carefully to be distinguished from that indwelling which is mentioned in Acts 17:28; for, although in this passage a substantial union of God with man is expressed, it must be of a different character from the other, as the one is common to all creatures, the other belongs to believers. Therefore the one, as a special union, is distinguished from the other as a general union. [4] This union is characterized further as a “mystical union (because it is a great mystery (Eph. 5:32), the specific mode of which is unsearchable), also as spiritual (since it is brought about not in a carnal or corporeal, but in a spiritual and supernatural manner, by the Holy Spirit graciously dwelling in the regenerate).” HOLL. (934). As we are unable to give a more specific representation of the nature and manner of this union, we limit ourselves to the removal of erroneous views of it. It would be wrong to suppose that in this union the two substances, the divine and the human, are united in such a manner that the two substances become one, or that the one is absorbed in the other; or, as if out of the two persons, God and man, one person were constituted, as in the case of the two natures in Christ. The mystical union is therefore not a substantial [5] and not a personal union. [6]

[1] In regard to the order in which the mystical union follows upon the preceding regeneration and justification, QUEN. (III, 621): “Regeneration, justification, union, and renovation are simultaneous, and, being more closely united than the ingredients of an atom (quovis puncto mathematico arctiores), so cohere that they cannot be separated or rent asunder. Yet, according to our mode of conceiving of them, justification and regeneration are prior in order to the mystical union. For when in regeneration, a man receives faith, and by faith is justified, then only does he begin to be mystically united to God. But renovation is subsequent to union, for from good works, which are the effects of renovation, the existence of both justification and the mystical union is inferred, a posteriori; therefore they follow each other in this order, according to our conception. Regeneration precedes, that faith may be attained. Justification follows, which is of faith. The mystical union then occurs, which is succeeded by renovation and sanctification.”

According to another mode of considering this, it may be said that union precedes justification inasmuch as faith precedes justification; and in faith, as the organ by which the union is effected, its beginning is already presupposed. Therefore HOLL. (933), after consenting to this view, adds: “Although the mystical union, by which God dwells in the soul as in a temple, may, according to our mode of conception, follow justification in the order of nature, it is however to be acknowledged that the formal union of faith, by which Christ is apprehended, put on, and united with us, as the mediator and the author of grace and pardon, logically precedes justification. For faith is imputed for righteousness, so far as this receives the merit of Christ, and so unites it with ourselves as to make it ours.”

The union may be conceived as an act, inasmuch as it takes place instantaneously, and is then more particularly to be defined as a uniting (unitio) “or the act of union, which is transient and momentary, and takes place at the same time with regeneration and justification;” or, “as a state, which is properly and specifically called union (unio), and remains unbroken as long as the justified person avoids voluntary sins.”

[2] QUEN. (III, 623): “The mystical union does not consist merely in the harmony and tempering of the affections, as when the soul of Jonathan is said to be united to David, 1 Sam. 18:1, but in a true, real, literal, and most intimate union; for Christ, John 17:21, uses the phrase, ‘to be in some one,’ which implies the real presence of the thing which is said to be in, not figuratively, as a lover in the beloved. The mystical union does not consist alone in the gracious operation of the Holy Spirit in believers. For when Christ says, John 14:23, ‘I and my Father,’ etc., and 5:15, ‘the Holy Spirit,’ etc., these are not names of operations but persons. And it is entirely wanton to convert such emphatic words, expressing a reality (υπαρκτικα), by which this mystical union is described, into mere energetic expressions (ενεργητικα); for example, to come, to be sent into hearts, to dwell, to remain, to live in any one. For these are personal properties, and not attributes of operations.”

[3] HOLL. (932) defines: “The mystical union is the spiritual conjunction of the triune God with justified man, by which He dwells in him as in a consecrated temple by His special presence, and that, too, substantial, and operates in the same by His gracious influence.” QUEN. (III, 622): “The mystical union is the real and most intimate conjunction of the substance of the Holy Trinity and the God-man Christ with the substance of believers, effected by God Himself through the Gospel, the Sacraments, and faith, by which, through a special approximation of His essence, and by a gracious operation, He is in them, just as also believers are in Him; that, by a mutual and reciprocal immanence they may partake of His vivifying power and all His mercies, become assured of the grace of God and eternal salvation, and preserve unity in the faith and love with the other members of His mystical body.” While QUEN. thus, already in his definition of the mystical union, incorporates with it union with Christ, the God-man, CAL. (X, 526) distinguishes between the spiritual union of the regenerate with the triune God and the conjunction with Christ, the God-man; and he thus defines the latter: “The mystical union of Christ with the believer is a true and real and most intimate conjunction of the divine and human nature of the theanthropic Christ with a regenerated man, which is effected by the virtue of the merit of Christ through the Word and Sacraments; so that Christ constitutes a spiritual unit with the regenerated person, and operates in and through him, and those things which the believer does or suffers He appropriates to Himself, so that the man does not live, as to his spiritual and divine life, of himself, but by the faith of the Son of God, until he is taken to heaven.” And he specifies, as the accompaniments and consequences of the mystical union of believers with Christ (p. 568), “A spiritual anointing; the designation of Christians [the anointed] taken from this; the mystical espousal with Christ. The mystical anointing is that by which the regenerate, having been consecrated to the Holy Spirit by virtue of Christ’s anointing, have been furnished with His gifts as spiritual prophets, priests, and kings. (P. 572): The espousal of Christ with believers is that by which He eternally marries Himself to believers through faith, so that they become one spirit, and by His power communicates to them, as to His spiritual bride, intimate and enduring love, all His blessings and all His glory, so as finally to lead them to His home, and dwell with them in His celestial and eternal kingdom.” The FORM. CONC. hints at the mystical union when (Sol. Dec., III, 65) it designates as false the assertion that “not God Himself, but only the gifts of God, dwell in believers.” The extremes or limits of the mystical union are then thus defined: “The essence of the subjects to be united are, on the one part, the divine substance of the whole Trinity, 2 Pet. 1:4, and the substance of the human nature of Christ, John 15:1, 2, 4; 1 Cor. 6:15-17; Eph. 5:30; Gal. 2:19, 20; on the other part, the substance of believers, as to body and soul, 1 Cor. 6:15, 19; Eph. 5:30.” The form of this union consists “in a true, real, intrinsic, and most close conjunction of the substance of the believer with the substance of the Holy Trinity and the flesh of Christ.” QUEN. (III, 619) proves the Mystical Union “(1) from the promise of Christ, John 14:23, 26; 15:26. But formally to come to any one, denotes accession and approximation to him, and thus the advent of the sacred Trinity to believers, and the presence not only of His gifts, but likewise of His essence itself. (2) From the indwelling in believers, Eph. 3:17; Rom. 8:9; 2 Cor. 6:16. (3) From the unity of believers with God, John 17:21. The gradation which Christ uses in this place indicates that the spiritual union, whereby He (v. 23) is in believers, is more intimate than that by which the believers (v. 21) are one with God through the communion of the Spirit; and likewise in the mode and form it differs from that which is described in v. 22, where believers are said to be one with each other on account of the unity of faith, love, and hope, for there is superadded a full statement of the consummation (which He explains in the words: ‘I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one.’). (4) From the partaking of the divine nature, 2 Pet. 1:4.”

This Mystical Union is further described in the Holy Scriptures by the expressions: the espousal of believers with Christ, Hos. 2:19; the mystical marriage of Christ and the Church, Eph. 5:32; the union of the members and of the Head, Eph. 1:22, 23; the insertion of the spiritual branches in the spiritual vine, Christ, John 15:4-7; the abiding of the whole Trinity with regenerate man, John 14:23.

[4] CAL. (X, 511): “Although we do not admit an essential union after the manner of a graft that coalesces in one numerical essence with the trunk of the tree, yet we think that here there takes place not only that common union of men with the substance of God of which we are told in Acts 17:28, nor only a union of human substance and accident, or operations, and of the divine movements; but we assert that the substance of the believer is united with the substance of the entire Holy Trinity through a conjunction of substance to substance, without extension or contraction of the divine or human essence, by a change of manner only, which according to God’s gracious will is different in this life from what it will be in eternal life.”

HOLL. (933): “The general union is that whereby all believers and unbelievers live and move and have their being in God. As fishes in water and birds in the air, so all men live and move and are in God, because He gives to all life and breath and all things.” QUEN. (III, 614): “The general union of all men with the substance of God the Creator is indicated in Acts 17:28, where the preposition ‘in’ expresses the general presence of god with men. Hugo Grotius explains the particle εν by a Hebraism, so that in Him would be by Him, by His favor. But there is no necessity of departing from its ordinary acceptation. For neither is the origin only expressed, that we are of Him, but in addition the divine περιχωρησις, that in Him we live and move and are.”

The special union is partly “a gracious one, in the Church Militant, whereby God dwells in the regenerate by His substantial presence, and operates in them by His special concurrence, John 14:23; 17:11, 21;” and partly a “glorious one, in the triumphant assembly of the elect, whereby God fills and delights the elect with the plentitude of His grace. 1 Cor. 15:28.” HOLL. (933). As, therefore, in the general union there is likewise assumed a connection of the divine substance with man, and not merely a gracious operation, the special union is distinguished from it in this way, that in it a new approximation of the divine essence and one different from the omnipresence is assumed, “which is so limited to the believer that the divine substance cannot be said to be present in this way to the wicked and other creatures; and thus the manner of the presence in this union is expressed by a new approximation of the substance.” In reply to the objection: “Whatever as to its substance is already present, while it is present, is necessarily present and cannot be absent, and, therefore, it cannot be said that it comes, draws nigh, or approximates by its substance anew. But, as the Holy Trinity as to is substance or the divine essence by the common and general presence, is already present to all creatures, and thus also to believers; therefore He cannot approach them by a new and special presence,” QUEN. answers (III, 629): “(1) The substance of the Holy Spirit willed to unite itself in a peculiar manner of presence with the dove, and thus to manifest itself to the Baptist, so that where the dove might be, there it could correctly and truly be said that the substance of the Holy Spirit was present in that peculiar kind of presence. (2) That the divine essence, as essence, could admit of such an approximation without the danger of its losing immensity, the peculiar mode of its presence in Christ proves, in whom the divine nature is so united to the finite human nature, that in this way it neither is nor wishes to be anywhere else; which presence is determined, certainly not by a new mode of operating, cut by the intimate immanence of one near substance in another. And although this presence is very peculiar, yet it cannot be denied, because it may be deduced from the hypostatical union, that such an approximation is not entirely repugnant to the divine essence.” And the position is constantly maintained, that, as the union in general is not a mere gracious operation of the Holy Spirit, so the special union does not differ from the general merely by a new and special mode of operating, but by a new approximation of the essence, and that distinct from the common mode of presence.

[5] QUEN. (III, 624): “This union does not consist in transubstantiation, or the conversion of our substance into the substance of God and of Christ, or vice versa, as the rod of Moses was converted into a serpent. Nor in consubstantiation, so that of two united essences there is formed one substance.” HOLL. (939): “(a) God dwells in us as in temples, by the favor of the mystical union, 1 Cor. 3:16; but the habitation is not changed into the inhabitant nor the inhabitant into the habitation; (b) By the mystical union we put on Christ, Gal. 3:27; but the garment is not essentially one with the person who wears it. (c) The divine nature is very distinct from the human, although God comes to us and makes His abode with us, John 14:23, for He can depart from man to whom He has come. The mystical union is, therefore, indeed, called a union of substances, but, strictly taken, not a formal substantial union (such as is that of a graft which coalesces with the trunk into the essence of the tree numerically one), but it is an accidental union. If, then, it be called a substantial union, as by many, it is not “from the mode of union, but from the result attained, because a human substance is united to a divine.”

[6] QUEN. (III, 624): “The mystical union does not consist in a personal union or a coalition of extremes united into one hypostasis or person, such as in the union of the divine and human nature in Christ; so that the believer, united to Christ, could say, I am Christ.” HOLL. (939): “Paul teaches that Christ and believers being mystically united remain distinct persons, Gal. 2:20.” QUEN. (III, 624) adds: “The mystical union differs from the sacramental union and communion. The antithesis here is that of: (1) The Weigelians and Schwenkfeldian, who maintain that the mystical union with God, as to its mode, is essential and corporeal. (2) That of some Scholastics, Papists, Socinians, and Arminians, who deny that God remains in believers by a special mode of substantial presence.” HOLL. (941).

§ 48. (5.) Of Renovation.

It is not enough that man learns to know his sins and hate them, nor that in regeneration he becomes able to grasp the merit of Christ by faith. God desires also that man should exercise this turning away from sin and this return to Him in a moral life, that he cease to be the old and become a new man, leading day by day a more holy life before God. And God Himself works in this direction by His divine grace, seeking to draw off man more and more from sin, and to encourage and strengthen him for that which is good. This operation, however, wrought by God in man, is called renovation, so far as through it a change is wrought in man, in consequence of which he may be called a new man; [1] also sanctification, so far as now his life begins to become holy. [2] HOLL. (946): “Renovation is an act of grace, whereby the Holy Spirit, expelling the faults of a justified man, endows him with inherent sanctity. [3] The change that takes place in man consists further in this, that by the influence of divine grace the sin still cleaving to man disappears, more and more, and gives place to an increasing facility for doing what is good. [4] As, however, the sinfulness yet remaining in man yields only through a constantly repeated struggle against sin, this renovation is not a sudden, but a gradual one, susceptible of constant growth; [5] and as sin never entirely leaves man, it is never perfect, [6] although we are always to strive after perfection. Finally, it is a work of God in man, yet of such a nature that there is a free co-operation on the part of man, who now in conversion has received new spiritual powers.” [7]

[1] Renovation, too, is taken in a wider and narrower sense. BR. (593): “Renovation in general denotes any action by which old things, or things which are injured or weakened or corrupted by age, or in any other way, are restored. So, in the spiritual renovation of man, taken more widely, the old man, as to his entire condition, that is, the deficiency of every kind of spiritual power, the guilt and dominion of sin, is destroyed; and the new man as to his entire extent, that is, his spiritual strength, freedom from guilt, and the habitual gift, by which the dominion of sin is subdued, is said to be produced, 2 Cor. 5:17, sqq. (where men who are in Christ are said to be new creatures). To this is referred the reconciliation with God and justification by Christ, v. 19, 21.” (In which wider sense renovation is taken in the FORM. CONC., Sol. Dec., II, 70, in the AP. CONF., III, 40.) In the Holy Scriptures the word is taken in this wider sense in Heb. 6:6. BR. (594): “Renovation, strictly speaking, signifies a certain real and intrinsic change in the regenerated or converted man. This is taken transitively (as the action of God producing in us holy impulses and actions; as He is said to give a new heart and a new spirit, Ez. 36:26, to renew the spirit within us, Ps. 51:11); and intransitively (so far as men furnished with divinely imparted strength are said to renew themselves, making for themselves a new heart and a new spirit, Ez. 18:31, to lay aside the old man and put on the new, Eph. 4:22, 24”). To this HOLL. remarks (950): “There is really no difference between transitive and intransitive renovation; because (a) it denotes the same change, by which from the old man the new comes forth, from a sinner a saint, which is called transitive, on account of its connoted dependence on God as the agent who produces it in another; but on the part of the subject, regarded as a form of an immanent act, it is called intransitive; (b) both are accomplished by the same power, viz., not human but divine, which the Holy Spirit possesses originally and independently, the regenerate dependently and on account of the mystical union with God.”

QUEN. (III, 632) thus discriminates renovation from regeneration and justification: “Renovation differs (a) As to the efficient cause. Regeneration and justification are actions of God alone; renovation is indeed an action of God, but not of God alone, for the regenerate man also concurs, not in his own strength, but through divinely granted power. (b) As to the subject. Man altogether dead in sins is the subject of regeneration. The sinner, indeed, is the subject of justification, Rom. 4:5, 17, yet one recognizing his sins and believing in Christ; but the subject of renovation is man already justified. (c) As to the object. Regeneration is occupied with the production of faith; justification with imputable righteousness; renovation with inherent righteousness. (d) As to the form. Regeneration consists in the bestowment of spiritual life, and a transfer from a state of wrath to a state off grace; justification in the remission of sins and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness; but renovation in a reformation of the mind, will, and affections, and so of the whole man, or in a restoration of the divine image, commenced in this life and to be completed in the next. (e) As to the properties. Both regeneration and justification are instantaneous; renovation is progressive, from day to day.” GRH. (VII, 294): “Regeneration, properly so called, like carnal generation, does not admit of degrees. But renovation does, because the interior man is renewed from day to day.” “(f) As to the order. Regeneration precedes justification, and justification precedes renovation. Renovation is related to justification as an effect to a cause, and follows it, not in the order of time, but of nature. Therefore Paul does not use these words indiscriminately. Tit. 3:5.”

[2] It is likewise taken either in a wider sense, so that it embraces in its limits calling, illumination, conversion, regeneration, justification, and renovation, as Eph. 5:26; Heb. 10:10; or in a narrower sense, so that it coincides with renovation, strictly speaking, as in Rom. 6:19, 22; 1 Thess. 4:3, 4, 7. BR. (594): “The conferring and obtaining of internal (or inherent) holiness is here meant; for although, in another respect, there is indeed in the act of justification the imputation of another’s holiness, namely, Christ’s (to which the passages 1 Cor. 1:30; Heb. 10:14, may be referred), yet men themselves here are perfecting holiness in the fear of the Lord, 2 Cor. 7:1.” “In accordance with this the predicate of sanctity can be ascribed to the new man, but he is holy, not of himself, but of grace, Ps. 86:2; 1 Cor. 6:11; not so much in himself as in Christ, Phil. 1:1; 1 Cor. 1:2; not by completed, but by commenced and continued holiness, Phil. 3:12.” HOLL. (956).

[3] HOLL. (947): “Renovation is an act of applying grace by which the Holy Spirit abolishes the inherent remains of sin in the justified man that it may not reign, and produces in him internal and external affections conformed to the divine will, and thus spiritually good, that, being endowed with the renewed image of God, he may live piously, soberly, and justly, to the glory of God the most holy.”

BR. (607), (representing renovation more as a state): “Renovation is a combination of spiritual acts which the regenerate man, God assisting graciously by His Word and Sacraments, puts forth by means of the spiritual strength afforded him as to his intellect, will, and sensual appetite, in order to destroy the remains of sin, and to acquire greater sanctity, in the way of salvation, to the glory of God.”

[4] QUEN. (III, 634): “The old man is the starting-point (terminus a quo), the new man the goal (terminus ad quem), Eph. 4:22; Col. 3:10.” HOLL. (553): “The remains of sin are the starting-point of renovation, i.e., those remaining in justified men, after illumination, conversion, and regeneration, and which are to be abolished, by daily renovation, that they may be diminished and suppressed, although they cannot in this life be entirely eradicated; to wit, some defect of the spiritual powers on the part of the intellect in regard to knowledge, on the part of the will to the pursuit of spiritual good, on the part of the sensual appetite to obey the higher faculties, together with a proclivity of these faculties of the soul to evil. The point to which renovation tends is those greater powers which, after illumination, conversion, and regeneration, are conferred upon the justified by the Holy Spirit, viz., a more clear and comprehensive understanding or knowledge of spiritual things, inherent righteousness and holiness in the will, a prompt obedience of the sensual appetite, rendered to the superior faculties; these things being unitedly conferred, the divine image is restored.”

“The form of renovation consists in the expulsion of mental errors and the illumination of the mind, Col. 3:10; Rom. 12:2; in the rectification of the will and the renewing of righteousness and true holiness, Eph. 4:24; in the restraining of the appetites inclined to evil; in the purity and chastity of the affections; in the employment of the members of the body in works of righteousness, Rom. 12:1; in the subduing of the dominion of sin, Rom. 6:13, 19.”

[5] HOLL. (955): “As the body of sin in process of time is more and more weakened by the regenerate man, so the regenerate man is transformed more and more into the image of God from glory to glory by the Holy Spirit (2 Cor. 3:18; 4:16). The body of sin, Rom. 6:6, is called figuratively the old man, as it is a compound of many sins, as of parts and members. As formerly criminals were affixed to the cross, and their limbs bruised, mortified, buried, and corrupted, so successively the old man is crucified when the desires of his flesh are restrained and as if bound; he is bruised, 1 Cor. 9:27, so far as the flesh is kept under, the external pleasures of this world being removed; being bruised, he is mortified, Rom. 8:13, so far as the strength to emerge is taken from sin; mortified, he is buried, Rom. 6:4, inasmuch as the memory and the thought of illicit things are removed; buried, he corrupts, so that the entire body of sin is abolished, here inchoatively and continuously, in the life to come completely, Rom. 6:6.” Renovation is therefore to be considered a continually progressive action both on God’s and on man’s part. QUEN. (III, 636): “The Holy Spirit renews man, while by means of the organs of grace, the Word and Sacraments, He enkindles in him various pious inclinations; indeed, renovation is nothing but those continuous acts by which actual sanctity is effected in man, carried on, continued, and preserved.” Therefore, also, renovation is distinguished (HOLL., 956) as “commenced, continued, and completed.”

[6] QUEN. (III, 636): “Renovation in this life is partial and imperfect, admitting degrees, and therefore it never attains the highest acme of perfection. For sin remains in the regenerate, affects their self-control, the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and therefore our renovation progresses from day to day, and is to be continued through life, 2 Cor. 4:16. The want of perfection in renovation does not arise from the impotency of God, who renews, but form the incapacity of man, who is the recipient of the divine action.” It can therefore have augmentations and diminutions. QUEN. (III, 636): “Renovation is increased by godly acts and frequent efforts. These being intermitted or diminished, a diminution follows, so there is at one time an increase, at another a decrease. The Holy Scriptures expressly affirm that the renovation of the regenerate in this life ought continually to increase and grow, Eph. 4:16.”

The question whether the new man, if sin still cleaves to him, can be considered spiritual, HOLL. (957) decides thus: “When a renewed man is called spiritual, the reason of the denomination is derived from that which is preponderant, to wit, from the prevailing spirit; but when the same is called carnal, the reason is derived from that which is subordinate, to wit, from the flesh, subdued indeed, but rebelling and resisting, with which man justified, placed in the way of life, is continually carrying on war.”

[7] QUEN. (III, 633): “The first efficient cause is the entire Trinity (1 Thess. 5:23; John 15:4, 5); terminatively;[For the ground of this distinction, see § 19, Note 22, last paragraph. As applicable to this article, HOLL. (344) has very clearly presented it thus: “Sanctification is, indeed, a divine action ad extra, and therefore is undivided, or, in other words, is common to all three persons of the Godhead, and accordingly is ascribed also to God the Father, John 17:17, and God the Son, Heb. 9:14. But in the Holy Scriptures and the Apostles’ Creed the Holy Spirit is characterized by an outward mark of discrimination, as it were, so that he is said to sanctify us terminatively, Rom. 14:16.” — TR.] appropriatively, the Holy Spirit (Rom. 15:16; Tit. 3:5; Rom. 1:4; Gal. 5:22).” HOLL. (949): “The regenerate and justified man concurs in the work of his sanctification as a secondary cause, subordinate and moved by God, so that he renews himself daily by the powers which he has received from above. The Holy Spirit produces in man, without human concurrence, the power to produce good works and the first act of sanctification; but man concurs in the second act of sanctification, or in the exercise and continuance of it, when once introduced by the Holy Spirit . . . . The regenerate man co-operates with God in the work of sanctification, not by an equal action, but in subordination and dependence on the Holy Spirit, because he works, not with native but with granted powers. This is inferred from the words of the apostle, Phil. 2:12, 13.”

SUPPLEMENTARY.Most of the Dogmaticians discuss the doctrine of good works immediately after that of faith. (GRH. (VIII, 1): “The article of good works conveniently follows the doctrine of justification by faith. For, although we are justified by faith without works, and thence good works are to be removed from the forum of justification, yet that true and living faith by which we are justified is not without works, since the blessings of justification and sanctification, regeneration and renovation, are united in a constant and indissoluble bond.” We here follow, however, the arrangement of BR., because the connection of faith and justification would be too much broken by the introduction between them of the doctrine of good works.

§ 49. Of Good Works.

Renovation makes itself known by good works. [1] By these we understand such acts as are performed by the regenerate in accordance with the divine will, [2] whether they be outward visible acts or inward acts, impulses, and movements in man. [3] They are called good works, not as though they were good and perfect in themselves, [4] for such cannot be performed by sinful men, [5] but because they are the outgrowth of a good disposition, well pleasing to God, and because they proceed from the faith of one who is reconciled to God. [6] They cannot be produced, therefore, until man has been regenerated, because not until then does such a disposition, wrought by the Holy Ghost and well pleasing to God, dwell in man, and not until then has he become able to do what is good; [7] wherefore, even those acts of the unregenerate which externally correspond with the divine Law cannot at all be called good works. [8] Such good works, however, must be wrought by the regenerate; not, indeed, as though they had thereby to justify themselves before God, or to merit their salvation (for unless they were already justified, they could not perform good works), but because they thereby show their obedience toward God, whose will it is that He be honored by a holy life and good deeds, and at the same time, through them, demonstrate the actual existence of such a believing disposition. Where this exists it inwardly impels to the performance of good works with the same necessity with which the good tree produces good fruits. [9] This necessity is, therefore, no compulsion imposed from without upon man, nor does it destroy his Christian liberty; rather, this exhibits itself by the very fact that man now, with the inward pleasure, and under promptings of his own, can accomplish what the Law of God demands of him. [10] And for this he has a right, too, to expect reward from God; but this is a gracious reward, and the prospect of such reward is not the leading motive for the performance of such good works. [11]

[1] BR. (607): “To the doctrine concerning renovation belongs that of good works, which partly are related to renovation as an end and effect, and partly have respect to its formal reason.”

[2] HOLL. (1190): “Good works are free acts of justified persons, performed through the renewing grace of the Holy Spirit, according to the prescription of the divine Law, true faith in Christ preceding, to the honor of God and the edification of men.”

[3] AP. CONF. (III, 15): “We profess, therefore, that there is a necessity for the Law to begin in us and to increase more and more. And we embrace both together, viz., spiritual emotions and external good works.” HOLL. (1190): “By works here are understood not only external visible actions (which proceed from the hand or tongue), but internal affections of the heart and movements of the will, and thus the entire obedience and inherent righteousness of the regenerate. A distinction is, therefore, to be made between internal and external good works. The former are seen by the eyes of God alone, and comprise the inner thoughts of the mind, the movements of the will, and the pure affections of the heart (such as love, the fear of God, confidence towards God, patience, humility). The latter are seen not only by God, but likewise by man, and manifest themselves by outward demeanor, words, and actions. It has seemed good to holy men of God to use the appellation of works rather than habits or affections, as all the praise of true virtue consists in action, and as external works are more known than internal qualities and affections; finally, as the works of the regenerate alone are deserving of the praise of good works.” QUEN. (IV, 306): “A good work is that which God commands, and which is done with the disposition, manner, and purpose for which it has been commanded.” HOLL. (1198) adds also: “A good intention is to be accounted among good internal works.”

[4] HOLL. (1190): “The works of regenerate and justified men are called good, not absolutely, as if they were perfectly good, but in their kind, because (a) they derive their origin from the good Spirit of God, Ps. 143:10; (b) they proceed from a good heart, Matt. 12:35; (c) they are in some degree conformed to the good will of God, expressed in the Law, Rom. 12:2; And (d) they design a good end, the glory of God.” QUEN. (IV, 306): “The works of the regenerate, in themselves considered, are not perfectly good, but are rendered sordid and polluted by the stain of sin; but in Christ they are perfectly good, and in such a sense that what is not done in them is pardoned through and on account of Christ, and what is wanting to their perfection is compensated for by the imputation of the most perfect obedience of Christ.”

§ 51. The Efficacy of the Word of God.

As the Holy Spirit, through whom alone men are converted, operates only by the Word, this Word must possess the power of producing in man all those effects which are described in the preceding article, On the State of Grace. And this power is of such a character that it is always attended with success when no opposition is made to it on the part of man. [5] Hence the Word is endowed with efficacy, i.e., “it has an active, supernatural, and truly divine force or power of producing supernatural effects; in other words, of converting, regenerating, and renewing the minds of men.” Hence the Word of God does not confine itself merely to teaching man externally the way of salvation and showing him the means whereby to attain it. [6] Its power is not to be compared to the convincing force which even an eloquent human discourse possesses; hence its power is not a natural one, such as dwells in every human word, but it is supernatural. [7] This power is inherent in the Word because the Holy Ghost attends it; from the moment that a Word of God is uttered, the Holy Ghost is inseparably and continually connected with it, [8] so that the power and efficacy of the Word is fully identical with that of the Spirit. [9] This is a truly divine efficacy; [10] and, just as we cannot conceive of the Holy Ghost as separate from this efficacy, so neither can we conceive of the Word of God as independent of it. [11] We are not, then, in any way to represent to ourselves the relation of the Word and the Spirit as though the Word were merely the lifeless instrument which the Holy Ghost employed, [12] or as though the Spirit, when He wished to operate through the Word, must always first unite Himself with it, as if He were ordinarily separated from it. [13]

[1] QUEN. (IV, 1): “We have heretofore treated of the grounds of our salvation; we must now consider the means by which we attain to it. The means, properly so called, on the part of God, are the Word and Sacraments, the saving antidotes to our spiritual disease.”

The Word and Sacraments are also designated as means of salvation under the general idea of the Word — as the Sacraments are designated as the Visible Word.

CONF. AUG. (V, 2). FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., XI, 76): “The Father will draw none to Himself without means, but He employs His Word and Sacraments as the ordinary means and instruments.” ART. SMALCALD. (VIII, 3): “We must firmly maintain that God bestows His Spirit and grace on none unless through the Word and by the external Word previously declared, that we may fortify ourselves against the Enthusiasts, who boast they have the Spirit before the Word and without it, and therefore judge, bend, and distort the Scriptures, or oral Word, as they please, as Münzer did, and many others at present do, who wish to discriminate very acutely between the Spirit and the letter.” HOLL. (991): “The means of salvation are divinely ordained, by which God graciously offers the salvation acquired by Christ, the Mediator, to all men who have fallen into sin, and bestows and preserves true faith in them, and at last introduces all who embrace the merit of Christ and persevere in it into the kingdom of glory.”

[2] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., II, 56): “We should not and cannot always judge of the presence, operations, and gifts of the Holy Spirit from our feelings (the manner and time, viz., when they are experienced in the heart); but, inasmuch as these are often cloaked under much infirmity, we should be convinced from the promise that the Word of God preached and heard is assuredly the ministry and instrument of the Spirit, by which He truly and efficaciously operates in our hearts.”

[3] From what was said in the remarks preliminary to the articles on Faith and Justification, it follows that we cannot entirely adhere to the systematic division of the Dogmaticians in this Part IV. They do not treat, namely, of Faith and Works until under this head, and they call Faith also a means of salvation, according to which, therefore, they embrace more than do we under the phrase, means of salvation. This they can do, because they distinguish between “the means of salvation on the part of God, δοτικα, or those offering salvation (the Word and Sacraments), and the means of salvation on our part, ληπτικον, or that apprehending the offered salvation (faith in the merit of Christ).” In this section the Dogmaticians also treat the subject of the last things (death, resurrection of the dead, etc.), inasmuch as they designate these as means “in a general sense, or executive and isagogical, that is, means divinely instituted, without the previous occurrence of which God does not accomplish the sentence of glorification, and by the final intervention of which men persevering in the faith are introduced into heaven.”

As we have assigned to the article of faith another place, it also appears better to separate that of the last things from this section, so as to confine ourselves, in it, to the proper and limited conception of the means of grace.

[4] The Word, which, in the article Of the Holy Scriptures, was described as the source of knowledge, is here viewed as a means of grace.

HOLL. (992): “The Word of God is here considered not as the source of knowledge, but as the means of practice or action, by whose intervention the sinner is led by God to eternal salvation.”

The Dogmaticians remark, in advance, that by the Word they do not understand the bare external letters of the written Word. QUEN. (I, 169): “We must distinguish between the Word of God as it is materially expressed and exhibited in the written characters, points, letters, and syllables adhering to paper or parchment . . . or also in the sound and the external words formed in the air . . . and formally considered, as the divine conception and sense which we find expressed in these written letters and syllables and in the words of the preached Gospel. In the former sense it is called the Word of God only figuratively (σημαντικως); in the latter, however, κυριως, properly and strictly, it is the Word of God, the wisdom of God, the mind of God, the counsel of God. We ascribe not to the former, but to the latter, divine power and efficacy.”

CAT. MAJ., DECAL. (101): “Such is its virtue and power that where it is recalled to mind, or heard and considered with serious attention and interest, it never passes away without fruit, but always engages, retains, and excites the hearer with some new intelligence, delight, and devotion, and purifies his feelings and thoughts. For the words are not putrid or dead, destitute of sap and vigor, but truly living and efficacious.”

The Symbolical Books do not express themselves distinctly on the efficacy of the Word of God. The more fully stated views of the following Dogmaticians, according to which this efficacy or power is supernatural, if not precisely in the language of the Symbolical Books, are still in accordance with the opinions maintained in them.

[5] QUEN. (I, 170): “The innate power and tendency of God’s Word is always to convince men of its truth, unless its operation is hindered and prevented by voluntary self-assertion and contumacy superadded to a natural repugnance.” Hence the Word is to be regarded as producing an effect wherever it is used; but at the same time it depends on the conduct of men whether it has the special effect designed by its author. “The second act is considered either as the ενεργεια and operation or as the effect itself. If it be regarded as the energy and operation, then it always accompanies the Word of God preached, read, or heard, i.e., it always exerts itself when legitimately used, since the Word of God is never inoperative, but always operative. But, if it be considered as the effect itself, this does not always follow, in consequence of the impediment interposed by the subject or on account of the hardness of the hearts upon which it operates. Although, therefore, the effect of the preached Word is sometimes hindered, yet the efficacy or intrinsic virtue itself cannot be taken away or separated from it. And thus accidentally it may be inefficacious, not from a deficiency of power, but by the exercise of perverseness, which hinders its operation so that its effect is not attained.” . . . Hence the power of the Word is not irresistible, but resistible (171). This efficacy, as belonging to the Word of God, generally, is predicated both of the Law and the Gospel, yet with a distinction.

QUEN. (I, 170): “When we attribute to the Word a divine power and efficacy to produce spiritual effects, we wish not to be understood as speaking of the Gospel only, but also of the Law. For, although the Law does not produce these gracious results directly and per se, i.e., kindle faith in Christ and effect conversion, since this is rather to be ascribed to the Gospel, still the letter is not on this account dead, but is efficacious after its kind: for it killeth, 2 Cor. 3:6; it worketh wrath, Rom. 4:15, etc.

[6] HOLL. (992): “The efficacy of the divine Word is not only objective or significative, like the statue of Mercury, for instance, which points out the path, but does not give power or strength to the traveler to walk in it, but it is effective, because it not only shows the way of salvation, but saves souls.”

[7] QUEN. (I, 170): “The Word works not only by moral suasion, by proposing a lovely object to us, but also by a true, real, divine, and ineffable influence of its gracious power, so that it effectually and truly converts, illuminates, etc., the Holy Spirit operating in, with, and through it; for in this consists the difference between the divine and the human word.”

BR. (123): “(The Holy Scriptures have an active, supernatural force or power) which is to be sought neither in the elegance of their style, nor in the sublimity of their thoughts, nor in the power of their arguments; but it is far superior to every created and finite agency.”

It is a supernatural power in distinction from that which human eloquence possesses. But in another aspect it is also called natural, inasmuch as the Word of God cannot be conceived of without such an efficacy. QUEN. (I, 172): “We say that there is a natural efficacy in the Word of God, because it naturally belongs to it, and its essence and nature are such that it could not be the true Word of God unless it contained within itself that divine power and virtue to convert men, etc., etc.” BR. (124), however, observes: “To avoid ambiguity and disputes, we avoid the use of this term.”

[8] HOLL. (993): “A divine power is communicated to the Word by the Holy Spirit joined with it indissolubly.” Hence, there is a native or intrinsic power and efficacy belonging to the Word, deeply inherent in it. The Dogmaticians draw proofs of this, (1) From the qualities which the divine Word ascribes to itself, John 6:63; Rom. 1:16; Heb. 4:12, 13; 1 Thess. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:23; James 1:21. (2) From the similar supernatural and divine operations which are ascribed to the Word of God and the Holy Spirit, ex. gr., calling, 2 Tim. 2:14; illumination, 2 Pet. 1:19; conversion, Jer. 23:29; regeneration, 1 Pet. 1:23; justification, 2 Cor. 3:9; sanctification, John 17:17. (3) HOLL. (ib.): “The Word of God, as such, cannot be conceived of without the divine virtue, or the Holy Spirit, who is inseparable from His Word. For if the Holy Spirit could be separated from the Word of God, it would not be the Word of God or of the Spirit, but a word of man. Nor is there any other Word of God, which is in God, or with which men of God have been inspired, than that which is given in the Scriptures or is preached or treasured up in the human mind. But, as it cannot be denied that that is the divine will, counsel, mind, and the wisdom of God, so it cannot be destitute of the divine virtue or efficacy.”

[9] QUEN. (I, 183): “We are to assume here not only a certain conjunction or union of distinct actions, or even a unity of aims or effects, but also a unity of energy and operation. For the Holy Spirit does not by Himself do something, and the Word of God by itself something else, in the conversion of men; but they produce the one effect by one and the same action. For such is the peculiar nature of the principal and subordinate causes, intrinsically united together, that they produce an effect by one and the same action. Thus the soul and the eye see by a single action, and not by distinct actions.”

[10] BR. (1124): “Truly that same infinite virtue which is essentially per se and independently in God, and by which He enlightens and converts men, is communicated to the Word, and, although it is communicated to the Word, yet it must be considered as divine.” . . . But it by no means follows from this that there is a commingling of God and the Word in regard to this divine power; hence BR. (128) says: “They frequently and diligently impress it upon us that the same virtue belongs to God and the Scriptures, but not in the same way; for that of God is essential, fundamental, original, and independent, while that of the Scriptures is dependent and participative or derived.” . . . Hence it is said of the Word that it exhibits its power and efficacy οργανικως, or instrumentally . . . . QUEN. (I, 172): “The divine Word is not the principal agent in the work of conversion, regeneration, and salvation, but it is only a suitable means or organ which God ordinarily uses in producing spiritual effects, not indeed by necessity or indigence, as if He so bound His efficacy in the conversion of men to His Word that He could not convert men without any means, or by any other means or organ than His Word if He wished, but of His own free will, because thus it pleased Him. 1 Cor. 1:21.”

[11] QUEN. (I, 170): “Whether the Word be read or not, whether it be heard and believed or not, yet the efficacy of its spiritual effects is always intrinsically inherent in it by the divine arrangement and communication, nor does this divine efficacy only come to it when it is used. For the Word of God, as such, cannot even be conceived of apart from the divine virtue and gracious working of the Holy Spirit, because this is inseparable from the Word of God.”

HOLL. (993) uses the following figures: “It possesses and retains its internal power and efficacy even when not used, just as the illuminating power of the sun continues, although, when the shadow of the moon intervenes, no person may see it; and just as an internal efficacy belongs to the seed, although it may not be sown in the field.”

In order to avoid misapprehension, it is expressly observed that the Word does not operate physically (by the contact of an agent, as opium, poison, fire, etc.), but morally (by enlightening the mind, moving the will, etc.); and a distinction is made between the efficacy of the Word considered in the first act and in the second act, or between efficacy and efficiency. When it is said that the Word operates extra usum, when not used, it is only meant that the power is constantly inherent in the Word, just as the power to give light always exists in the sun; so that, when the Word is to produce a certain effect, the power must not first come to it, but that the Word exercises its legitimate influence only where it is properly used.”

QUEN. (I, 171): “The first act is the operating power δυναμις ενεργητικη; the second act is the real operation. The Word does not exhibit its efficacy in the second act unless in the legitimate use of it.”

QUEN. (ib.) (from his Theses against Rathman): “The distinction we make is not unreasonable, between the power, or the first act, and the divine operation, or second act, of the outwardly read or preached Word. Per se, and in itself, it always is a power, or has in itself a power, to move all readers and hearers, hypocrites as well as believers and converted persons, which is not a physical power, physically included in the letter, like that of medicine, but a divine power, which is always communicated to the read or preached Word by the Holy Spirit. But this power, although it is always present in the preached Word, yet is not always operative on all.” HOLL. (994) illustrates this by the following example: “The hand of a sleeping man does nothing, yet neither is the power of action bestowed on it in vain, nor is the hand thus inoperative, dead.”

The Lutheran theologians, in general, had reason to illustrate very particularly the doctrine of the operation of the Word of God, in order to oppose the Enthusiasts and Mystics, who held that the Holy Spirit operated rather irrespectively of the Word than through it; and to oppose also the Calvinists, who, led by their doctrine of predestination, would not grant that the Word possessed this power per se, but only in such cases where God chose. Hence the position that the Word also possessed a power extra usum was specially defended against Rathman (1628), who denied it, and who appears to have maintained only an objective efficacy of the Word of God. (QUEN. (I, 174) gives the following opinions of Rathman: “Rathman compares the Word of God to a statue of Mercury, to a picture, to a sign, and even to a channel; namely, to instruments altogether passive and inoperative. He asserts, moreover, that the divine efficacy is external to the Word of God, separable from it at any moment, and merely auxiliary (παραστατικον); that the Holy Spirit with His virtue joins Himself to the Word only in the mind or heart of man, and only then when it is legitimately and savingly used.”) But an efficacy extra usum must necessarily be maintained, if the Word of God is not to be put on a precise level with every human word.

HOLL. (992) thus sums up the doctrine: “The Word of God is the most efficacious means of salvation, for its power and efficacy are not only objective, but also effective; not consisting in moral suasion, but in supernatural operation; not external and coming to it when used by men, but intrinsic in the Word; not accidental, but necessary, by a divinely ordained necessity, and therefore not separable, but perpetual, inherent in the Word itself extra usum, as the first act. This efficacy is truly divine, producing the same effect as the Holy Spirit, who is perpetually united with the Word, which (effect) the Spirit influences together with the Word, by the divine power which belongs to the Holy Spirit originally and independently, but to the divine Word communicatively and dependently, on account of its mysterious, intimate, and individual union with the Spirit.”

§ 52. The Law and the Gospel.

The Word of God is divided, according to the different results it produces in men, whose salvation it is to effect, into Law and Gospel. [1]

I. THE LAW, in which God, by command and prohibition, has made known His will to men, and to the fulfilment of which He has obligated them, [2] is, according to its widest extent, partly general and applicable to all times, and partly given for a certain period and under certain circumstances. The former is called the moral Law, inasmuch as it contains the precepts of God relating to our moral conduct, which remain unchanged at all times, and concern all rational creatures. [3] The latter is called the ceremonial and forensic Law, inasmuch as it contains the ceremonial and civil precepts which were given to the Jews during the period of the Jewish theocracy. [4] We have here to consider only the former, as the other has already been abrogated by God. [5] The contents of this were written on the heart of man at the creation (hence it is also called the Law of Nature), and men, as long as they remained in their original state, had in it a perfect rule for their moral conduct; [6] but after the Fall, when their knowledge was obscured and they heard the voice of God in their hearts but imperfectly, it was necessary for God to adopt another method of making known His will to them, and that was most completely done at the delivery of the Law of Sinai. [7]

The Law there given contains the most perfect rule for our moral conduct, [8] and applies to us no less than to the Israelites. [9] It binds us to the most perfect obedience, and threatens temporal and eternal punishment in case of disobedience; [10] but also promises eternal life to him who perfectly observes it.

As, however, no one since the Fall is able perfectly to keep the Law, we cannot say that the Law avails for our salvation, [11] but it rather serves, first of all, to lead to the knowledge of sin, and render man receptive for the salvation that is in Christ. [12] The former the Law effects by teaching us the difference which exists between its requirements and our deeds; the latter, by alarming us the more we come short of the requirements of the Law, and by constraining and impelling us to long earnestly for a refuge from the wrath of God with which He has threatened every violator of the Law. Thus the Law drives us to Christ, who promises us such a refuge. It is also predicated of it that it contains a call to repentance, and hence we include within the Law everything which contributes to repentance. [13] Besides this, the Law serves to maintain external propriety and morality in the unregenerate: bit it is serviceable to the regenerate, because it contains the perfect rule of moral life, both internal and external. According to these different designs for which the Law was given, the use of it is divided into political, elenchtical, pedagogical, and didactic. [14]

II. THE GOSPEL. As the Law contains the declaration of the divine will, promising a reward to him who keeps it, and threatening punishment to him who violates it, so the Gospel, in distinction from the Law, contains the doctrine of the gracious pardon of sins, which we receive as a gratuity for Christ’s sake through faith. [15] Thus, in the preaching of the Gospel, the means are pointed out to men by which they may escape the condemnation which the Law suspends over them. And when men are brought to a knowledge of sin through the Law, the Gospel enters, holds forth the grace of God, the merit of Christ, and all the benefits therewith associated; [16] and aims at producing faith in them, by which they appropriate to themselves the salvation in Christ.

Different, then, as are the Law and the Gospel in their signification, [17] yet there is no contradiction between them. As they were both alike given by God, so they are both always and equally binding; they both alike have a work to accomplish in all men; they have in view the same final result, namely, the salvation of men, [18] to the attainment of which end each contributes its part. As, by the preaching of the Law, knowledge of sin and repentance are produced, so, by the preaching off the Gospel, faith is effected. The efficacy of the one follows that of the other; but the efficacy of the one does not hence entirely cease where the efficacy of the other begins, for the Law still continues to be a rule for the regenerate, to which he conforms his moral conduct, and it thus works in him a penitence which is renewed daily, inasmuch as it still continually convinces him of his sins. [19]

[1] The division of the Word of God, according to its historical publication in the world, into the Old and New Testaments, belongs to the section which treats of the Scriptures. The division specified above, i.e., Law and Gospel, must be treated under this article; for the design here is to derive from the Word, and to illustrate, the different operations which must be experienced before man is fully brought to a personal knowledge of salvation in Christ. The division is justified by John 1:17 and 2 Cor. 3:6. The Law was given by Moses, e.g., “The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life.” The Law and the Gospel are not then here identical with the Old and the New Testament; for the Old, as well as the New Testament, contains “a preaching of repentance, and a preaching of the remission of sins.”

FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., v. 23): “These two kinds of doctrine, viz., repentance and faith, were held in the Church of God from the beginning of the world, yet with a proper distinction. For the posterity of the patriarchs, as well as the patriarchs themselves, not only carefully remembered that man in the beginning was created by God just and holy, and by the guile of the serpent disobeyed the command of God, and thus became a sinner; . . . but they also encouraged and consoled themselves by the most precious announcement concerning the Seed of the woman,  . . . and concerning the Son of David who was to restore the kingdom to Israel and to become the light of the Gentiles.”

[2] HOLL. (996): “The divine Law is the command of God, in which this supreme Lord and Legislator prescribes that which is to be done by men, and prohibits that which is to be avoided, binding them to render a perfect obedience, or, in the deficiency of this, visiting them with punishment.”

The term Law is also used in the sense “(1) of everything that is taught by God, Ps. 1:2; (2) of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, John 15:25; 1 Cor. 14:21; (3) of the Mosaic Pentateuch, Luke 24:44.”

HOLL. (ib.): “But here the words Law and Gospel are taken, as far as they are adequately contradistinguished.”

[3] HOLL. (997): “The divine Law is either universal and perpetual, or particular and temporary. The universal and perpetual Law is the immutable rule of all moral actions, by which God binds all men to do that which is honest and right, and to avoid that which is dishonest and unjust. It is called also the moral Law. The particular and temporary Law is that which God gave to the Israelites alone, binding them to the obedience of it; it is either ceremonial or judicial, and ceased with the cessation of the Hebrew polity.”

[4] HOLL. (1026): I. “The Ceremonial Law is the command of God, by which the supreme Lord and Legislator bound the people of the Old Testament, and through Moses prescribed to them a certain form of external worship, that He might remind men of their sins, show from afar to the contrite a Redeemer, and apply and seal covenant grace by two sacraments and various sacrifices. The external worship, prescribed to the people of God in the Old Testament, consisted in certain rites to be observed about sacred persons, things, places, and times.”

“The chief end of the Ceremonial Law is the signification and adumbration of the benefits of Christ, as well as their application by sacraments and sacrifices. The subordinate end is the admonition of sin, the observance of proper order in ecclesiastical assemblies and rites, and the separation of the Jewish Church from all association with the Gentiles.” (Id., 1027)

II. “The Forensic or Judicial Law is the command of God, by which He bound the Israelites in the times of the Old Testament, and through Moses prescribed to them a form of political government so that external discipline might be preserved in civil society, and the Jewish polity, in which Christ was to be born, might be distinguished from the polity of other nations. The forensic Law uttered precepts concerning all those things which pertained to the administration of the Israelitic republic, and came under the cognizance of the forum or court of the Jews.” (Id., 1030.)

“The design of the Forensic Law is (1) The preservation of external discipline in civil society. (2) The separation of the Jewish polity from that of other nations. (Id., 1031.)

[5] QUEN. (IV, 1): “That the Jewish Law is abrogated is evident from the fact that, since the destruction of the Jewish polity and temple, there is no place for sacrifice or the execution of the forensic Law.”

[6] BR. (398): “It is otherwise called the Law of Nature, because it is employed about those things which are naturally and per se either honorable or base; whether they be such as agree or disagree with rational nature. It is also called the Moral Law, in so far as it relates to morals, or to the mode of life which is becoming or unbecoming to a rational creature.”

HOLL. (997): “The Natural Law is the command of God impressed naturally on the minds of all, by which they are informed and bound to do those things which per se are right and honorable, and to avoid those things which per se are wicked and base.”

QUEN. (IV, 3): “It is the light and dictate of right reason divinely given to man, enabling him intellectually to discriminate between the common notions of what is just and unjust, honorable and base, that he may understand what is to be done and what is to be avoided.”

§ 53. Of the Sacraments in General.

SAVING grace is imparted to man not only through the Word, but also through the Sacraments; [1] and, as in the case of the Word, so also in the case of the Sacraments, an external and visible element, which in the sacred rite is offered to man, becomes the vehicle of the Holy Ghost. [2] A Sacrament is, therefore, a holy rite, appointed by God, through which, by means of an external and visible sign, saving grace is imparted to man, or, if he already possess it, is assured to him. [3] The Evangelical Church enumerates only two such rites, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper; for only through these two rites, in accordance with the direction of Christ, is such saving grace imparted, and, among all the sacred ordinances prescribed in the Scriptures, it is only in these two that these two distinguishing characteristics of a sacrament are combined, viz., (1) a special divine purpose, in accordance with which, in the sacred rite, and external element is to be thus employed; and (2) the promise given in the divine Word that by the application of this element evangelical saving grace shall be imparted. [4] By these marks these two sacred rites are distinguished from all other religious services, and hence, for the purpose of thus distinguishing them, are called Sacraments. [5] In the element thus consecrated by the Word, we have presented to us then no longer merely that which is obvious to the senses, but we have, at the same time, to assume something invisible and more exalted as present and operating through the elements; so that, therefore, the Sacrament consists of both something visible and something invisible. [6] From what has been said, it follows, further, that just as a religious service can be called a Sacrament only when both the above-mentioned marks are combined in it, so also it is not a Sacrament, and does not operate as such, unless it be administered exactly in the mode prescribed by its Founder and for the purpose designed by Him. [7]

Hence (1) the words of the institution must be uttered during the administration of the ordinance, according to the direction of the Founder, for, before that, the element is only an external, simple, and inoperative object; (2) it must be administered and received in the manner prescribed by the Founder; [8] and (3) it must be administered only to those who already belong to the Church, or to those who desire to be received into it through the Sacrament. Finally, order requires that, except in extraordinary cases, it be administered only by regular ministers of the Church. [9] When all these things are observed in this sacred act, according to the instruction of its Founder, then it is a Sacrament; nor is the moral character or the internal intention of the administrator, [10] or the faith of the recipient, [11] necessary to constitute the act a Sacrament. Still, the good or evil effect of the Sacrament depends on the faith or unbelief of the recipient, just as in the case of the good or evil effect of the divine Word. [12] The immediate design of the Sacrament is to impart saving grace to man, or to establish those in it who already possess it. [13] At the same time, however, the Sacraments, as they are administered only within the Church, serve as a mode of recognizing those who partake of them as members of the Church; they serve, likewise, to remind the recipients of the blessings of salvation that are imaged forth in them, to stimulate those who have come together with this same purpose to new mutual love, and excite them to cultivate that internal spiritual life which is symbolically indicated in the Sacraments. [14]

[1] BR. (639): “Since, besides the Word of God, the Sacraments also are means of regeneration, conversion, and renovation, and therefore of conferring, sealing, and increasing faith, we must also treat more particularly of these.”

[2] QUEN. (IV, 73): “God has added to the Word of the Gospel as another communicative (δοτικον) means of salvation, the Sacraments, which constitute the visible Word.” Strictly speaking, there is but one means of salvation, which is distinguished as the audible and visible Word; through both one and the same grace is imparted to man, at one time through the mere Word, at another through the external and visible element.

CHMN. (Ex. Trid., II, 35): “For God in those things which pertain to our salvation, is pleased to treat with us through certain means; He Himself has ordained this use of them, and instituted the Word of Gospel promise, which sometimes is proposed to us absolutely by itself or nakedly, and sometimes clothed or made visible by certain rites or Sacraments appointed by Him.” The two means of salvation are thus distinguished only by the manner in which they operate on men. AP. CONF. (VII, 5): “As the Word enters the ear that it may reach the heart, so the external rite strikes the eye that it may move the heart.” The effect of both is the same. AP. CONF., 1. c.: “The effect of the Word and of the rite is the same, as Augustine has forcibly expressed it, viz., a Sacrament is a visible word, because the rite is presented to the eyes, and is, as it were, a picture of the Word, signifying the same thing as the Word. Wherefore, the effect of both is the same.” Comp. below, Note 13.

[3] AP. CONF. (VII, 3): “(The Sacraments are) rites commanded by Christ, and to which is added the promise of grace.” AP. CONF. (XII, 18): “A Sacrament is a ceremony or work in which God holds out to us that which the promise annexed to the rite offers.”

BR. (650): “A Sacrament in general may be defined as an action divinely appointed through the grace of God, for Christ’s sake, employing an external element cognizable by the senses, through which, accompanied by the words of the institution, there is conferred upon or sealed unto men the grace of the Gospel for the remission of sins unto eternal life.”

§ 54. Of Baptism.

Of the two Sacraments, Baptism precedes the Lord’s Supper. [1] We are to treat of the nature of Baptism, the form in which it is to be administered, and the design of its institution.

1. Baptism is an act enjoined by the Lord, and accompanied with a promise, Matt. 28:19. Hence we have in Baptism not merely water, and not common water, but also the Word of God. But there is superadded to this a higher efficacy than exists in mere natural water, [2] and it is this which, by means of the water, effects saving grace. [3]

2. But if we expect such a result from Baptism, it must be administered precisely according to the instructions of the Lord. The consecration must be according to His will, and the act itself administered to the baptized person agreeably to the prescribed mode. [4] If all this be done, then the Baptism is to be regarded as valid, whether the officiating minister be a believer or not, or whether the person baptized believe in the Sacrament or not. [5]

3. The immediate design of Baptism is, finally, to work saving grace in man. [6] But also the Word of God has the like effect, Baptism is intended to produce this result only in such cases in which it is applied at an earlier period than the Word; this is the case with infants who are not yet susceptible to the preaching of the Gospel. [7] But in adults who, with their already developed reason, can understand the preaching of the Gospel, the Word has precedence, and produces its results before the Sacrament. But, in such instances, Baptism serves to seal and establish the gracious result already accomplished by the Word. [8] Hence in the case of adults, who are yet to be baptized, faith must be demanded as the condition on which the ordinance effects this blessed end. [9] This cannot be expected of infants; but it does not follow that they are for that reason to be deprived of Baptism, for they need grace as well as adults, and are invited to it by God. It is, therefore, God’s will that they be baptized, and Baptism serves also to create in them this faith. [10] The efficacy of Baptism is not limited to the moment of its administration, but it continues to confer strength upon its subject. Nor is this efficacy lost if, in its administration, the intended result, because of some hindrance on man’s part, be not immediately produced; for still, if the ordinance were properly administered, a covenant has been entered into with God, and thereby there is forever established a disposition on God’s part to produce the gracious effect to its full extent, when the individual no longer strives against it. [11] At the same time, in repentance man still has the means to appropriate to himself the blessed efficacy of Baptism, of which he has hitherto by his own neglect been deprived; for repentance is nothing else than a continuation or renewal of that which was symbolically indicated in Baptism, namely, crucifying the old man within us, so that in repentance we can recover that which was neglected on man’s part in Baptism. [12] On this ground, also, the repetition of Baptism is as unnecessary as it is inadmissible. [13]

Finally, Baptism is necessary, because it is commanded by God; but, as God can save us through other means also, we hope that the children of Christian parents who, without their own fault, are prevented from being baptized, will not be lost. [14]

As Baptism, at the same time, distinguishes us from the great mass of those who do not belong to the Church, and imposes on us the obligation to be faithful to our baptismal covenant, the following may be considered as secondary designs of Baptism: (1) The distinction between Christians and Gentiles, and the union of the former with the Church, 1 Cor. 12:12. (2) The obligation to true faith and a godly life, 1 Pet. 3:21. [15]

[1] GRH. (IX, 67): “The Sacrament of Baptism must be considered first, as it precedes the Lord’s Supper in (1) the time of its institution, for it was divinely established in the very commencement of the New Testament dispensation; (2) in administration, for John and the disciples of Christ baptized before the Lord’s Supper was instituted; (3) in order, for Baptism is the first portal to grace, the Sacrament of initiation; the Lord’s Supper is the Sacrament of confirmation. By Baptism we are regenerated; by the Lord’s Supper we are fed and nourished to eternal life. As therefore in nature, so also in grace, we must be born before we are fed; we must be begotten before we can grow. By Baptism we are received into the covenant of God; by the Lord’s Supper we are preserved in it. By Baptism faith and the other gifts of the Spirit are excited in us; by the Lord’s Supper they are increased and confirmed. Baptism was prefigured by circumcision; the Lord’s Supper, by the paschal lamb. No one can have access to the Lord’s Supper unless he has been baptized; as in the Old Testament none but the circumcised were permitted to eat the paschal lamb.”

The Dogmaticians have extensively discussed the question, What relation did John’s Baptism sustain to that of Christ? CHMN. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 66): “The same difference that exists between the Word concerning Christ to come, Christ coming, and Christ offered [to men in the preaching of the Gospel], exists also between circumcision, the Baptism of John, and the Baptism of Christ. But although as to the mode of the publication of the doctrine concerning Christ there may be some difference, yet as to its substance it has been the same and has had the same effects on believers in every age. As it is then with the Word, so also is it with circumcision, the Baptism of John, and of the apostles. Nor are these to be too nicely discriminated. For if these subtleties be allowed, in this way we can also establish the difference between the Baptism performed by the apostles before the passion and resurrection of Christ, and that which they administered afterwards.” The question, Whether it was necessary for those who were baptized by John to receive afterwards the Baptism of Christ? CHMN. leaves undetermined. All the Dogmaticians agree in not referring the words “fire and spirit,” in Matt. 3:11 to actual Baptism, because Christ, Acts 1:5 long after Baptism was administered, refers their fulfilment to the later period; but they understand them as relating to the effusion of the Holy Ghost on Pentecost and the gifts of the Sprit connected with it.

[2] CAT. MAJ. (IV, 14): “If you be asked, What is Baptism? answer, that it is not mere water, but such as is comprehended and included in the Word and command of God, and sanctified by them, so that it is nothing else than a water of God, or a divine water; not that it is in itself of more value than other water, but that God’s Word and commandment are added to it.” (See ART. SMALCALD, V, 2, 3.) The earlier Dogmaticians were satisfied with this simple expression, and hence designate, as the substance of the Sacrament, the external element of water and the Word of the institution and promise. (CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., III, 161): “The distinction is to be retained, viz., that the substance of Baptism consists in the act and in the words, ‘I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.’”) But the later writers (see Of the Sacraments in General, note 6, p. 544 sq.) speak of a double matter in Baptism: the earthly object, which is natural, pure water, everywhere at hand; and the heavenly object, by which they designate that which they suppose is super-added by the words of the consecration. This most of them consider to be the whole Trinity, others the Holy Spirit, and others the blood of Christ. These different views arise from the fact that some of them regard the heavenly object as indicated in the baptismal formula, others in John 3:5, and others again in 1 John 5:6. But there is as little contradiction in these different views of the heavenly object as there is in the passages just cited. (QUEN. (IV, 110): “The opinions of the orthodox of the heavenly object are indeed diverse, but not contradictory, only subordinate and may easy be harmonized.”) The sense in which the heavenly object is by some regarded as the whole Trinity, by others as the Holy Spirit, and by others as the blood of Christ, is thus explained by GRH. (concerning the presence of the Trinity) (IX, 133 sq): “As the name of God is nothing else than God Himself, and the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is, according to the institution of Christ, joined with the water of Baptism, it hence follows that the whole Trinity is present by His grace in Baptism, and by the water of Baptism is efficacious to the salvation of men; . . . therefore the other substantial part of Baptism is the name of the whole adorable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; that is, the infinite majesty, the ineffable sanctity, the unspeakable goodness, the admirable virtue and grace of the whole Trinity, which, with all its virtue and the benefits of grace, are efficacious by water united to and sanctified by the Word.” (Concerning the presence of the Holy Spirit): “As the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity, and as Baptism is administered not only in the name of the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Sprit acts efficaciously in, with and by the water of Baptism, works faith, regeneration, and renovation in those who do not strive against God, and seals the covenant of grace in the hearts of the baptized. (The Holy Spirit is named alone, because regeneration is attributed to Him as His peculiar work. He makes the water of Baptism a salutary means of regeneration, not as though the other persons were excluded, for the works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided, yet with the order and distinction of persons preserved.) As the Holy Spirit was supernaturally and peculiarly united with the dove in which He descended on Christ at His Baptism, so even at the present day is He supernaturally and peculiarly united with the water of Baptism.” (Concerning the presence of the blood of Christ): “As the Son of God in the fulness of time assumed true human nature, and personally and inseparably united it to Himself, it follows that Christ is present in Baptism, not only according to His divine nature, but also in His human nature, and hence that the blood of Christ is by no means to be excluded from Baptism.” But GRH. (IX, 137) adds: “Although Christ the God-man is present in Baptism, and by His blood, through the medium of faith, washes us from our sins, yet the most distinguished theologians maintain that the blood of Christ cannot very well be called the other material part of Baptism.” The most of the Dogmaticians agree in saying, “the heavenly object of Baptism is analogically called the whole sacred Trinity, but peculiarly and terminatively the Holy Spirit. (HOLL., 1085.)” CALOV. (IX, 166) attempts to combine the three expressions: “The heavenly object, considered as a whole, is the most holy Trinity, namely, the Father, the Son of God . . . (to whose entireness, not the divine nature alone, but also the human nature contributes, as that to which alone also the blood belongs, and of which He became a partaker for our sake), and also the Holy Spirit; and this [i.e., the most holy Trinity] in one expression is called the Word and the name of God, i.e., God Himself, threefold and one, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, according to the well-known rule handed down from Augustine: ‘The Word is joined to the element and it becomes a Sacrament.’ This Word of the institution is found in Matt. 28:19.” The fluctuation of the Dogmaticians in these definitions is also manifest in this, that some suppose the expression, “the heavenly object is the whole Trinity,” signifies nothing more than the other earlier one, viz., “the second essential part [of Baptism] is the Word,” since in the Word God is included; while the others (HUTT., for instance) expressly maintain that the Word is not a substantial part, but only the active (ποιητικον) principle of Baptism, which, from this point of view, appears the more correct. It is from this diversity of views that the difference in the expression of the earlier and later Dogmaticians, as noticed in the previous section, note 6, proceeds. The opposition of BR. to this mode of expression we have mentioned in the preceding section. In relation to Baptism, he says (683): “When it is acknowledged (1) that the words of the institution, besides the water, belong to the substance of Baptism; and (2) from the force of these words it is further acknowledged that the Holy Sprit and the whole Trinity are the author of this Sacrament as a means of grace; and when (3) it is acknowledged that the Holy Spirit and the triune God, wherever and whenever Baptism is rightly administered, is present in the same way, by virtue of His measureless essence; and (4) is present by His grace in such a manner that, being present, He not only seriously offers spiritual benefits through this Sacrament, and (5) enters into the covenant of grace, with the person baptized, never to be broken on His part, and seals it through Baptism; but also (6) in the person baptized who does not resist the divine grace accomplishes, in this act itself, the work of regeneration and renovation through this Sacrament in such a manner that, (7) not by a separate and peculiar action, but jointly with the water of Baptism, and through it by one undivided action, He enkindles and confirms faith; and that (8) on account of the merit of the God-man, Christ, truly present as to both natures, and on account of His blood shed for our sins (for, (9) since faith is conferred by baptism, by this also the blood of Christ is sprinkled, as far as His merit is applied by faith), when, I say, these things are acknowledged and maintained, we may well, as far as the rest is concerned, with the more ancient theologians, be silent about the name, heavenly object, and its almost inexplicable nature, and rather confess a cautious ignorance than profess false knowledge.” The assumption of a heavenly object involves that of a “sacramental union, which is the union of true water with the Holy Trinity, and therefore not only with the Father, but also with the incarnate Son and with the Holy Sprit. For, neither is the water given or received without the most Holy Trinity, or without the Holy Spirit;, nor the latter or the former without the water; because these two are most closely united in the sacramental act, nor can one be a Sacrament without the other. And this union is not relative only, or figurative, or typical, such as it was in the Sacraments of the Old Testament, but it tenders the celestial object, and is really and truly present; whence water, in its sacramental form, is not to be regarded as mere water, but the laver of regeneration in the Word, and as united with the most Holy Trinity in an ineffable manner, John 3:5; Eph. 5:26; Titus 3:5; 1 Pet. 3:21; 1 John 1:7.” QUEN. (IV, 112).

[3] BR. (693): “Baptism may be defined as a sacred action, instituted by Christ, by which men are washed with water, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and are thus regenerated and renewed, that they may secure eternal life.”

ART. SMALCALD (V, 1): “Baptism is nothing else than the Word of God with washing in water, according to His institution and command; or, as Paul says, Eph. 5:26, the washing of water by the Word.”

HOLL. (1080): “Baptism is a sacred and solemn action divinely instituted, by which sinful men, living and actually born,[This is in opposition to the baptism infantum nondum in lucem editorum. See GERHARD, IX, 209: “Those not yet born, cannot be born again.”] without distinction of sex and age, are washed in water in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that by this washing of water divine grace, promised in the Gospel, may be applied, conferred upon, and sealed to them.”

[4] GRH. (IX, 137): “The form of Baptism consists in the action, that is, in the mersion of the person baptized into water, or, what is just as well, in the affusion of water, and in the recitation of the words of the institution: ‘I baptize thee in the name of the Father,’ etc.; so that there are, in general, three substantial parts of Baptism to be maintained, which cannot be separated or changed, viz., water, the Word, and the action, which latter embraces mersion of the person into water, or the aspersion of water, and the recitation of the words of the institution . . . . We do not ascribe to the external recitation of the Word any magical or secret power, when we assert that there would be no Baptism unless it be done in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but by this we teach and assert that it is incumbent on the true disciples of Christ to adhere with godly simplicity to His Word, and observe His institution with inviolable accuracy.”

The signification of the words of the institution employed in the administration of Baptism is thus explained by GRH. (IX, 132): “When the Officiating minister says: ‘I baptize thee,’ etc., the words are to be taken in this sense: (1) That Baptism is not a ceremony devised by man, but an ordinance of the true God, and a holy Sacrament divinely instituted . . . . (2) That he does not administer this Sacrament of his own private will, but in the place of God, the dispenser of whose mysteries and whose minister he is . . . . (3) That on this water of Baptism the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the one true God, is invoked, that in this action, commanded by Him, He may be present, according to His promise, and receive the baptized person into favor . . . . (4) That the water of Baptism is no longer simply and merely water, but water through which the whole blessed Trinity desires to be efficacious to the salvation of the subject baptized, and therefore through which the Trinity, in this very action of the baptizing minister, operates efficaciously according to His promise, ‘I baptize thee,’ etc., i.e., I testify that by this Sacrament thou art received into the covenant of grace, that the Father accepts thee as his child, that the Son washes thee from thy sins bin His blood and clothes thee with the garment of righteousness, that the Holy Spirit regenerates and renews thee to eternal life, so that in this way thou mayest become a child of God the Father forever . . . . (5) That the person baptized, being thus received by His Sacrament into the covenant of grace, is obligated to know the one true God through His Word, to supplicate, worship, and serve Him alone.” . . .

To the act, as above described, there is added a series of ceremonies and usages more or less important, all of which are, however, not essential to Baptism, but are intended only to render the act more solemn. GRH. (IX, 308, sq.) specifies these as usual in our Church: “The admonition concerning original sin [since John admonished those coming to his baptism, of the fruitlessness of their lives, Matt. 3:10], the giving of the name [as in circumcision, Luke 1:59], the minor exorcism, the sign of the cross [“to testify that the infant’s reception into grace occurs only by the merit of Christ crucified”], prayers [after our Lord’s example, Matt. 19:14; Mark 10:14], recitation of the Gospel, the imposition of hands, recitation of the Lord’s Prayer, the use of sponsors.” Here belongs also the renunciation of Satan (“by which those who are to be baptized solemnly and in express words renounce Satan and all his pomp”). Concerning exorcism, GERHARD (ib. (310) says: “It is a testimony: 1. Of the spiritual captivity of infants in the kingdom of Satan, because of sin. 2. Of the fact that the Messiah has come, and of the redemption wrought by His work; that the strong man armed is overcome, and the spoils are distributed through Word and Sacraments. 3. Of the divine efficacy belonging to baptism, whereby infants are transferred from the power of darkness into the kingdom of God’s Son. 4. Of the chief end of the ministerial office, consisting not only in the application of the benefits of Christ to believers, but also in unceasing warfare against Satan. 5. It is a public confession of the Church against the errors of Pelagians, Anabaptists, Zwinglians. It is approved by the testimonies of the primitive Church. But our exorcism differs from that of the Papists: 1. Ours rests on human authority, and is an adiaphoron, and of free observance; that of the Papists pretends to rest on apostolic authority. 2. Ours is emblematic, signifying original sin and deliverance therefrom by Christ; to that of the Papists efficacious operation is ascribed.” CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., III, 161): “Those who omit or reject exorcism with the opinion of and for the same reason as the Anabaptists and Sacramentarians, because they think that infants either have no sins, and therefore are not by nature the children of wrath, or under the power of Satan; or that they, although born in sin, yet on account of their birth according to the flesh from believing parents, even before Baptism and without Baptism, are not out of the kingdom of heaven or under the power of darkness, indeed deserve to be rebuked and blamed . . . . But if this doctrine of original sin, of the power and kingdom of Satan and the efficacy of Baptism, be granted by an open confession, the substance, integrity, and efficacy of Baptism are not dependent on that prescribed rite of the words of exorcism; but the Church has the liberty of propounding and explaining that doctrine in other words more agreeable to the Scriptures.” The formula in the ancient Church was this: “I adjure thee, thou unclean spirit, that thou come out of this servant of Jesus Christ, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.” BR. (6092), however, observes: “The words have, it is true, the form of a command, but they are to be taken in the sense of a prayer to God, with confidence, and with innate animosity hence begotten against the enemy to be expelled.”

[5] CAT. MAJ. (IV, 53): “If the Word is connected with the water, Baptism must be regarded as proper and valid, even if faith be not connected with it. For my faith does not constitute Baptism, but it receives and apprehends it. Baptism is not vitiated or corrupted by men abusing it or not properly receiving it; for it is not bound to our faith, but to the Word of God.”

The same is true with regard to the state of mind of the person who administers it, and Baptism even by a heretic is not invalid. HOLL. (1084): “If Baptism be administered by a heretic, who retains the substantials of the ordinance, we must not doubt its efficacy. But if it may be administered in a flourishing church, where an orthodox minister can be procured, it is a great sin to ask it of a heretic. But in a church under oppression, in a case of urgent necessity, it may be asked for and received without blame from a heretic who uses the customary formula of Baptism; but then a protest must be added that the infant is not to be bound by this Baptism to embrace false doctrine.” Baptism by others than ministers, in case of necessity (Noth-taufe), is also valid. HOLL. (1081) says: “Ordinarily, ministers of the Church, legitimately called and ordained, orthodox, and of a blameless life, administer Baptism. Extraordinarily, however, and in case of necessity, any godly Christian, skilled in sacred rites, whether male or female, can administer the ordinance.”

[6] CAT. MAJ. (IV, 24): . . . ”Hence, conceive of the whole thing as simply as possible, namely, that the power, work, fruit and end of Baptism is to save men . . . . But to be saved, we know, is nothing else than to be delivered from the tyranny of sin, death, and the devil, to be transferred into the kingdom of Christ, and to dwell with Him forever.” GRH. (IX, 148, 157): “As Baptism is not simply water, but water comprehended in, sanctified by, and united to the Word of God, it is not therefore used to wash away the impurity of the body, but it is a divine and salutary means and organ by which the whole sacred Trinity efficaciously operates for the salvation of man. Although the effects of Baptism are various and multiform, yet, following the apostle, Tit. 3:5, we reduce them all to these two heads: that Baptism is the washing of regeneration (John 3:5), which embraces the gift of faith (Tit. 3:5), the remission of sins (Luke 3:3; Acts 2:38; 22:16; Rom. 6:3), reception into the covenant of grace (1 Peter 3:21), adoption as the sons of God (Gal. 3:26), the putting on of Christ (Gal. 3:27), deliverance from the power of Satan and the possession of eternal life (Col. 1:13, 14; Mark 16:16); and renewal (Tit. 3:5), that is, the Holy Spirit is given to him, who begins to renew the intellect, the will, and all the powers of the soul, so that the lost image of God may begin to be restored in him, that the inner man may be renewed (2 Cor. 4:16) that the old man may be put off, and the new one put on (Col. 3:10), that the Spirit may oppose the flesh and rule over it, so that sin may not obtain dominion in the body.”

HOLL., more generally (1095): “The primary design of Baptism is the offering application, conferring, and sealing of evangelical grace.” HFRFFR. (497): “The fruit or effect of Baptism is regeneration and the remission of sins (John 3:5; Tit. 3:5; Mark 1:4; Luke 3:3; Acts 2:38; 22:16; Eph. 5:26), salvation and participation in all the benefits of Christ, into whom we are ingrafted by Baptism (Tit. 3:5; 1 Pet. 3:21; Rom. 6:3; Gal. 3:27; 1 Cor. 12:13), a good conscience toward God, or the assurance of faith as to the forgiveness of sins (1 Pet. 3:21; 2 Cor. 1:21), newness of life (Rom. 6:3; Col. 2:11).”

In opposition to the assertion of the Papal Church, that “sin is destroyed by Baptism, so that it no longer exists,” the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins by Baptism is thus more particularly defined: “The guilt and dominion of sin is taken away by Baptism, but not the root or incentive (fomes) of sin.” (HOLL., 1096) AP. CONF. (I, 35): “(Luther) always thus wrote, that Baptism removes the guilt of original sin, although the material of sin, as they call it, may remain, i.e., concupiscence. He also affirmed of this material, that the Holy Spirit, given by Baptism, begins to mortify concupiscence and creates new emotions in man. Augustine speaks to the same effect when he says: ‘Sin is forgiven in Baptism, not that it does not exist, but that it is not imputed.’”

[7] GRH. (IX, 236): “There is no other ordinary means of regeneration than the Word and the Sacrament of Baptism. By the Word infants cannot be influenced, but only adults, who have come to years of discretion. It remains, therefore, that they are regenerated, cleansed from the contagion of original sin, and made partakers of eternal life, through Baptism.”

[8] BR. (690): “But here, as regards the immediate design [of Baptism] a diversity exists in respect to the different subjects. For faith is at first conferred upon and sealed to all infants alike by Baptism, and by this faith the merit of Christ is applied to them. But adults, who receive faith from hearing the Word before their Baptism, are only sealed and confirmed in their faith by it. (Examples, Acts 2:41; 8:12, 36-38; 16:14, 15, 31, 33; 18:8.) And not only now, when Baptism is received, but afterwards, and throughout their whole life, it efficaciously contributes to the confirmation of their faith and further renewal.”

GRH. (IX, 169): “To infants Baptism is, primarily, the ordinary means of regeneration and purification from sin; . . . secondarily, it is the seal of righteousness and the confirmation of faith. To adult believers it serves principally as a seal and testimony of the grace of God, sonship and eternal life; but in a less principal sense it increases renovation and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Infants by Baptism receive the first fruits of the Spirit and of faith; adults, who through the Word have received the first fruits of faith and of the Holy Spirit, procure an increase of these gifts by Baptism.”

HFRFFR. (5000): “But what? Suppose one is regenerated by the Word. Has he need of Baptism also? And can Baptism be said to be to him the laver of regeneration? Answer: Both. For believers, too, ought to be baptized, unless they be excluded by a case of necessity. And when they are baptized, Baptism is truly to them the laver of regeneration, because it augments regeneration, wrought by the Word, by a wonderful addition; because, also, the sacramental act seals the regeneration of faith to absolute certainty.”

[9] “Although Baptism, where it is rightly performed, is a Sacrament and offers saving grace, without any respect to the faith of the recipient, yet it is also true that, in the case of adults, a beneficial result follows only where Baptism is received by faith. The question: Is a hypocrite, therefore, also regenerated, if he receives Baptism? is thus answered by HFRFFR. (499): “In such a case we must distinguish between the substance of Baptism and its fruits. For a hypocrite, if he be baptized, receives indeed true Baptism, as to its substance, which consists in the legitimate administration of the Sacrament according to the words of the institution and in the promise of divine grace. But as long as he perseveres in his hypocrisy and infidelity, he is destitute of its salutary fruits and effects, which only believers experience. Therefore, God really offers His grace and forgiveness of sins to him who is baptized, and desires on His part to preserve that covenant perpetually firm and entire without any change, so that the grace promised in the covenant may always be accessible to him who is baptized, and that he may enjoy it as soon as he repents; but as long as he remains a hypocrite and impenitent, he is destitute of it.” QUEN. (IV, 117): “Even to all hypocrites Baptism offers spiritual gifts, as regeneration and whatever is comprehended under it, the gift of faith, remission of sins, etc.,  . . . but some adults, by actual impenitence, hypocrisy, and obstinacy, defraud themselves of the saving efficacy of Baptism; and hence, although these gifts be offered to them, they are not actually conferred: yet, in the meantime, it is and remains in itself a salutary organ and means of regeneration, since the deprival of the first act does not follow from the deprival of the second act through some fault of the subject.” CAT. MAJ. (IV, 33): “Faith alone makes the person worthy to receive profitably this salutary and divine water. For, as this is offered and promised to us in the words together with the water, it cannot be received otherwise than by cordially believing it. Without faith, Baptism profits nothing; although it cannot be denied that in itself it is a heavenly and inestimable treasure.”

From this follows the antithesis against the Romanists, who maintain: “That Baptism confers grace ex opere operato, i.e., by virtue of the sacramental action itself, so that faith is excluded by the efficiency of sacramental grace.”

[10] BR. (696): “That infants are to be baptized, is plain from the testimony of John 3:5, and Mark 10:14, taken together, thus: 1. Whom Christ desires to come to Him for salvation, but who cannot attain to eternal life in the ordinary way except through the medium of Baptism, upon these Baptism should be conferred, as the ordinary means, and to them it should not be denied. But, Christ desires infants to be saved (Mark 10:14), who cannot attain to eternal life in the ordinary way unless through the medium of Baptism (by virtue of the general assertion, John 3:5). Therefore, etc. 2. Whom Christ desires to be brought to Himself, that they may enjoy His spiritual blessings, they are to be brought to Him by Baptism as the ordinary means. But Christ desires infants to be brought to Him, that they may enjoy a spiritual blessing (Mark 10:14). Therefore, etc. 3. The command, Matt. 28:19, to baptize all nations, is properly extended to infants also, who constitute a portion of the nations. 4. The examples which show that whole families were baptized, e.g., Acts 15:14, 33; 18:8; 1 Cor. 1:16, are properly believed to embrace infants, who doubtless constituted a part of the families. 5. Add also the analogy of circumcision, which was administered to infants; and, 6. That, as the promise of the covenant of grace, Acts 2:39, belongs to infants, so also does the seal of the covenant, which is Baptism. Finally, 7. As the whole Church is cleansed by the washing of water through the Word (Eph. 5:26), this properly refers to infants also, for they too, although unclean by nature, are nevertheless to be engrafted into the Church.”

§ 55. (2.) The Lord’s Supper.

As in Baptism, so in the Holy Supper, we distinguish essential nature, form, and design.

1. ITS ESSENTIAL NATURE. — This is expressed in the words of the institution, to which alone we are referred; [1] and these declare, if we interpret and understand them agreeably to the language (and we dare not adopt any other mode, [2]), that we are to partake therein not only of bread and wine, but at the same time also of the body and blood of Christ. [3] According to this, bread and wine are only the external visible elements through which the body and blood of Christ are communicated, and the Holy Supper is the sacred act in which this takes place. “The Sacrament of the Altar is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, in and under bread and wine, instituted and commanded by the Word of Christ to be eaten and drank by us Christians.” CAT. MAJ. (V, 8). [4] But, in order most distinctly to state the meaning of such a participation of the body and blood of Christ, we add:

(a) That, as by bread and wind real and true bread an real wine are understood, so also, by the body and blood of Christ, the real and true body and the real and true blood of Jesus Christ, as He possesses both since His glorification, must be understood; [5] and, as the bread and wine, so also this body and this blood of Christ are really and truly present. [6]

(b) That in the same sense, and in the same manner, in which we partake of bread and wine, so also we partake of the body and blood of Christ; so that therefore in both cases the participation is not to be understood in a metaphorical, but in a literal sense. As there is therefore an oral and real participation of bread and wine, so there is also of the body and blood of Christ; [7] but yet so that, in the mode of the participation, the same differences which naturally exist between bread and wine and body and blood are here also to be observed, according to which, therefore, our mouth receives the purely material elements of bread and wine in a different way from that in which it receives the glorified body and glorified blood of Christ. [8]

Inasmuch as, according to this, we cannot partake of bread and wine in the Holy Supper without at the same time partaking of the body and blood of Christ, and inasmuch as we can partake of the body and blood of Christ only through the medium of the participation of the bread and wine, we perceive from this, that in the Holy Supper a peculiar union of the body and blood of Christ takes place with the bread and wine. [9] But we are not able to describe this union, according to its essential nature, for it is unique in its character and incomprehensible; hence we must limit ourselves to removing false representations of it. It would be a false representation of it if we believed in a change of one substance into the other, as the Romish Church does in the dogma of transubstantiation, which is altogether a false doctrine, for the Holy Scriptures declare both that the bread and wine, and that the body and blood, are present in the Holy Supper; or, if we believed in the combination of both substances into one; or, if we thought that this union were one extending beyond the Lord’s Supper and continually existing; or, if we maintained that the body and blood were somehow locally included in the bread and wine; or, finally, if we held that this union is of the same nature as that between the divine and the human nature of Christ. [10]

2. THE FORM. — In the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ are communicated to us only when the mode prescribed by the Lord in this solemnity is perfectly observed. there must be, therefore: (a) The consecration. (b) The consecrated elements must be really distributed and partaken of; for only in these cases do bread and wine cease to be common and ordinary elements, and at the same time the body and blood of Christ are comprehended in and by them. [11] Where all this is done, there also the Holy Supper is a real Sacrament, and neither the faith of the communicant [12] nor the state of mind of the officiating minister [13] is a condition of the real presence of the body and blood of Christ.

§ 56. Of the Church [1] in a Wider and a Narrower Sense.

IN view of the efficiency which God has communicated to the means of grace appointed by Him, it may naturally be expected (Is. 55:10; 59:21) that through their instrumentality there should arise a community of such as really embrace the saving grace offered to them. These recognize as their Lord and their Head, Christ, who, by giving Himself up to death, has not only made a congregation of the redeemed possible, but preserves the same, presides over it as Head and King, and procures for it everything that is necessary and serviceable for its existence and prosperity. [2] This congregation is most intimately united to Him, and its members are also most intimately joined together by the bond of a common faith, a common hope, and reciprocal love; [3] so that all who have become so united and believing constitute a single, great communion, which we call the Church. [4] To the Church belong all those who have the same faith and the same hope, however widely they may be separated one from another by space and time. The Church embraces, therefore, not only those now living, but, as well, those who have died in the faith; and between these there is only this difference, that the latter have already reached the goal, the former are still striving after it (Church militant, triumphant). [5] There is, therefore, only one such communion, because there is only one Head to whom all are subject, and only one faith through which they can be saved. This communion we then call holy, because in it the Holy Ghost is operating, to sanctify it; catholic, because, however widely the members of the Church are scattered, yet at all times and in all places the same faith is confessed; apostolic, because its faith, resting upon that proclaimed by the apostles, has never, in the course of time, been changed.

[6] Only those who belong to this communion are certain of their salvation, for the only way of salvation lies in the faith which is the faith of this communion (extra ecclesiam nulla salus). [7] To this communion, moreover, the promise is given that it shall endure for all times, [8] and it can never utterly fall into error, because in the Word of God it possesses the eternal truth. [9]

If moreover, the members of this communion are joined together by the like hope and the like faith, it is just as natural as it is desired by God, that those who dwell together in the same place and at the same time, should combine in a close, visible community; so that thus the one, universal Church should take the form of several particular churches (ecclesia universalis — particularis), [10] and its actual existence be also externally recognized by such combination. It then becomes the duty of each such congregation to draw others also into the same saving fellowship with Christ, and for this end to employ the means of grace by which individuals can be gained. The particular [or individual] Church will then have to count all such as belonging to it, who unite themselves to it, though it be only by an outward profession: for, first, as it cannot, like God, look into the heart, it has no means whereby to determine whether any individual has indeed inwardly followed the call addressed to him; secondly, it can still always hope, in regard to those who at first have only outwardly accepted the call, that, through the power of the divine Word and Sacraments, they will still in time give inward heed to it. Concerning the particular church we cannot, however, assert so unconditionally, that it is a congregation of believers, i.e., of such as have accepted the saving grace offered to them; to it, therefore, the definition of the Church thus far given, viz., the communion of believers, does not apply, for in the midst of it there may be those who have not yet accepted the offered grace. While we count only those as belonging to the Church, as the communion of believers, whose treatment of the offered grace is what it should be, we must count as belonging to the particular Church all those also who stand in outward relation to and in connection with it. And thus we see ourselves driven to admit a twofold conception of the Church, viz., the Church in the narrow sense, composed of only true believers, and the Church in the wider sense, by which we understand the congregation of those who have joined themselves together in the same confession in the use of the Sacraments (ecclesia stricte et late dicta). [11] We do not thereby assume two churches, antagonistic and standing alongside of each other; rather, the relation between them is this, that the Church in the narrower sense exists in the midst of the Church in the wider sense — not so that the latter is numerically equal to the former, but that it contains, or at least may contain, members within itself whom we dare not count as belonging to the Church in the narrower sense. [12] Thus, every one will readily understand that individuals are to be counted as belonging to the Church in this wider sense, not, however, who of them belong to the Church in the narrower sense; and hence the distinction between the visible and invisible Church corresponds to that between the Church widely and narrowly considered. [13] It becomes of the greatest importance, then, if these distinctions be made, not to transfer without qualification the promises and predicates that are given to the Church in the narrower sense to the Church in the wider sense, [14] which course might easily give occasion to false fear or to false hopes, and to selfdeception. [15] Concerning the latter it cannot be said, in the same sense, but only by synecdoche, [16] that it is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic, or that it cannot fail or err; [17] rather, from the fact that the call reaches many who do not receive it in their hearts, it already is manifest, that individuals in it often fail and err, and it is quite as possible that the evil may preponderate in the Church as the good should do so.

The Church (in the wider sense) is further called a true or a false one, not in consequence of there being a greater or smaller number of believers or unbelievers in it, but just in proportion as the doctrines of the Gospel are preached in it purely or impurely, and as the means by which we attain salvation are more or less purely and fully administered in it. [18] The pure preaching of the divine Word and the proper administration of the Sacraments are, therefore, the marks by which we may recognize the Church as a true one. [19]

[1] GRH. (XI, 7): “The word Church [ecclesia] (from εκκαλειν) generically signifies an assembly or congregation, whence it is applied to political and secular assemblies. In order, therefore, that the holy assembly of the Church may be distinguished from secular assemblies, it is called the Church of God, η εκκλησια του θεου, Neh. 13:1; Acts 20:28; 1 Cor. 1:2; 10:32; 11:16, 22; 15:9; 2 Cor. 1:1; Gal. 1:13; 1 Thess. 2:14; 2 Thess. 1:4; 1 Tim. 3:5, 15. Likewise εκκλησια εν θεω, 1 Thess. 1:1, του κυριου, Deut. 23:1; Micah 2:5. But, inasmuch as even heretics boast of a church, for the sake of difference and honor the true Church is called η εκκλησια των αγιων, Ps. 89:15; 149:1; 1 Cor. 14:33, to which is opposed η εκκλησια πονερηυομενων, Ps. 26:5; Rev. 2:9. Finally, inasmuch as the Church of both the Old and the New Testaments is said to be the Church of God and of the Lord, in order to express the difference, the New Testament Church is said to be the Church of Christ. Matt. 16:18; Rom. 16:16; Col. 1:24.”

[2] HOLL. (1292): “The Head of the Church is Christ, the God-man (Col. 1:18; Eph. 1:22, 23; 4:16), not only because of His superior eminence and perfection above the members, but also especially because of the moral and physical or real influence, which, according to both natures, He affords the members of His mystical body. The influence which Christ exerts over the members of the Church is twofold: (1) moral, which consists in this, that Christ, by virtue of His merit, has acquired all spiritual blessings, Eph. 1:3; (2) physical, or real, so called in distinction from that which is moral; this Christ affords the members of His Church efficiently, through actions terminating in themselves, by enkindling, increasing and strengthening faith, love, and other Christian virtues; by comforting anxious minds, by sustaining the wavering, by bringing back the wandering, by governing each and every one in the course of life.”

The Church is, accordingly, the kingdom in which Christ exercises His dominion; hence many Dogmaticians append the doctrine concerning the Church to that concerning Christ as the Sovereign in His empire.

In connection with the foregoing proposition, the following antitheses to the Roman Catholic doctrine are presented:

HOLL. (1293): (a) “Neither from necessity, nor from Christ’s free will and appointment, are we to recognize, in addition to Christ, any other head of the Church, that in Christ’s stead visibly governs the Church Universal.”

(b) (1295): “Christ never appointed the Apostle Peter the general head of His Church, neither did He grant to him primacy of power and jurisdiction over the Catholic Church.”

(c) (1297): “The Pope of Rome is neither the successor of Peter in the episcopate nor the head or monarch of the Catholic Church.”

The Protestant Dogmaticians, in expounding the passage, Matt. 16:18, understand the “rock” to mean the confession which Peter had made, v. 17. HOLL. (1295): “The meaning is, ‘Thou art Peter, a man made of rock, standing upon thy confession just as upon a rock, or most firm petra, and upon this rock will I build my Church, so that it may be made a rock, immovable and impregnable, as long as it shall stand upon this confession of doctrine, as upon an immovable rock.’ v. 19. Christ gave the keys to Peter, not as a prince, but as a minister and steward. Now, indeed, not only Peter, but also the rest of the apostles were appointed stewards by Christ, 1 Cor. 4:1. Therefore the keys here promised Peter were likewise given to the rest of the apostles.”

[3] HOLL. (1300): “The inner and essential form of the Church consists in the spiritual union of true believers and saints, who, as members of the Church, are bound together with Christ the Head, through true and living faith (John 1:12; Gal. 3:27; 1 Cor. 6:17), which is followed by a communion of mutual love (John 13:35).”

[4] BR. (742): “Those men whom God, in accordance with His eternal decree, has granted His faith and grace, taken collectively are called the Church.”

“Men who are true believers and saints constitute the material of the Church.” Hence the Church is defined as “the congregation of saints who truly believe in the Gospel of Christ, and have the Holy Ghost.” (AP. CONF., IV, 28.) It is better defined, “the congregation of saints,” than “the congregation of the elect,” as some define it; “because the title, ’saints and believers,’ is broader than ‘elect.’ Wherefore since the Catholic Church embraces within its limits, not only the elect, properly and accurately so called, but also saints and believers who afterwards fall away, it is preferable to define the Church as the congregation of saints and true believers, than of the elect, although if the term ‘of the elect’ be employed in a correct sense, viz., according to the ecclesiastical and general usage, it ought to offend no one.” (GRH., XI, 13.)

The scriptural proof that the Church is the congregation of saints, according to QUEN. (IV, 489): “In Scripture passages (1) the Church is called the mystical body of Christ, Rom. 12:5; 1 Cor. 10:17; 12:27; Eph. 1:23; Col. 1:18; (2) the Church is the mother of true believers, Gal. 4:26, of the sons of God, John 1:12; 3:6, who are led by the Spirit of God, Rom. 8:14, and are the heirs of Christ, Rom. 8:17; (3) the Church is Christ’s fold, John 10:1, 27, 28; (4) prophets and apostles frequently ascribe such praises to the Church as cannot be referred to the entire assembly of the called, which embraces good and evil, wheat and tares, Matt. 13:24, good and bad fish, sheep and goats, Matt. 3:12; 13:47, 49; John 10:1.” (IV, 490): “Therefore, that must be termed a Church, properly and accurately so called, to which these praises and attributes primarily and immediately belong. For, in the Old and New Testaments, it is frequently called the Bride of Christ, John 3:29; 2 Cor. 11:2; Rev. 21:9; Cant. 4:7, a chaste virgin, 2 Cor. 11:2, one flesh with Christ, Eph. 5:30 (none of these accord with the wicked), the house of the living God, 1 Tim. 3:15, a spiritual house, 1 Pet. 2:5; Tit. 2:14, sq. To this none belong except those who are living stones built upon the chief cornerstone, Jesus Christ, Eph. 2:20, 21; 1 Pet. 2:5.”

[5] BR. (742): “Believers, considered with respect to the present life, are called the Church Militant; but with respect to the other life, or the life to come, the Church Triumphant.”

GRH. (XI, 10): “That is called the Church Militant, which in this life is still fighting, under the banner of Christ, against Satan, the world, and the flesh. (Here observe that this description pertains only to the Church of the elect, and if indeed it ought to be applied to the assembly of the called, it must be added that the Church Militant has been called and established for the purpose of fighting bravely against these contending powers, an object common to all those called into the Church.)”

“That is called the Church Triumphant, which, being transferred to heavenly rest, and relieved from the labor of fighting and the danger of being overcome, triumphs in heaven against all contending powers.”

“The Church is called militant from its spiritual war, or battle against the devil, Eph. 6:10, 11; 1 Pet. 5:8, 9, the world, 1 John 5:4, and the flesh, Rom. 7:14; Gal. 5:17.”