Fourth and last particular to be spoken to, which was, To answer some objections which may seem to contradict and bring in question the goodness of God; and they are many, and have (some of them especially) great difficulty in them, and therefore it will require great consideration and care, to give a clear and satisfactory answer to them, which, undoubtedly, they are capable of; the goodness of God being one of the most certain and unquestionable truths in the world. I shall mention those which are most considerable and obvious, and do almost of themselves spring up in every man’s mind; and they are these four: the first of them more general, the other three more particular.

First, If God be so exceeding good, whence comes it to pass, that there is so much evil in the world of several kinds; evil of imperfection, evil of affliction or suffering, and (which is the greatest of all others, and indeed the cause of them) evil of sin?

Secondly, The doctrine of absolute reprobation; by which is meant, the decreeing of the greatest part of mankind to eternal misery and torment, without any consideration or respect to their sin or fault: this seems notoriously to contradict, not only the notion of infinite goodness, but any competent measure and degree of goodness.

Thirdly, The eternal misery and punishment of men for temporal faults seems hard to be reconciled with that excess of goodness which we suppose to be in God.

Fourthly, The instances of God’s great severity to mankind upon occasion in those great calamities which, by the providence of God, have, in several ages, either befallen mankind in general, or particular nations; and here I shall confine myself to Scripture instances, as being the most certain and remarkable, or at least equal to any that are to be met with in history; as, the early and universal degeneracy of mankind, by the sin and transgression of our first parents; the destruction of the world by a general deluge; the sudden and terrible destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them, by fire and brimstone from heaven; the cruel extirpation of the Canaanites, by the express command of God; and lastly, the great calamities which befel the Jewish nation, and the final ruin and perdition of them at the destruction of Jerusalem.

These are the objections against the goodness of God, which I shall severally consider, and, with all the brevity and clearness I can, endeavour to return a particular answer to them.

The first objection, which I told you is more general, is this: if God be so exceeding good, whence then comes it to pass, that there is so much evil in the world of several kinds? It is evident, beyond denial, that evil abounds in the world: “The whole world lies in evil,” says St. John, ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται, “lies in wickedness,” (so our translation renders it) is involved in sin; but, by the article and opposition, St. John seems to intend the devil: “We know (says he) that we are of God, and the whole world, ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται, is subject to the evil one,” and under his power and dominion. Which way soever we render it, it signifies that evil of one kind or other reigns in the world. Now, can evil come from a good God? “Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing? Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet water and bitter? This cannot be,” as St. James speaks in another case. But all evils that are in the world, must either be directly procured by the Divine Providence, or permitted to happen; and, next to the causing and procuring of evil, it seems to be contrary to the goodness of God to permit that there should be any such thing, when it is in his power to help and hinder it.

Answer.—To give an account of this: it was an ancient doctrine of some of the most ancient nations, that there were two first causes or principles of all things, the one of good things, the other of bad; which, among the Persians, were called Oromasdes and Arimanius; among the Egyptians, Osiris and Typhon; among the Chaldeans, good or bad planets; among the Greeks, Ζεὺς and Ἅδης: Plutarch expressly says, that the good principle was called God, and the bad, Dæmon, or the devil; in conformity to which ancient traditions, the Manichees (a sad sect of Christians) set up two principles; the one infinitely good, which they supposed to be the original cause of all good that is in the world; the other infinitely evil, to which they ascribed all the evils that are in the world.

But, besides that the notion of an infinite evil is a contradiction, it would be to no purpose to suppose two opposite principles of equal power and force. That the very notion of an infinite evil is a contradiction will be very clear, if we consider, that what is infinitely evil must be infinitely imperfect, and, consequently, infinitely weak; and, for that reason, though never so mischievous and malicious, yet, being infinitely weak, and ignorant, and foolish, would neither be in a capacity to contrive mischief, nor to execute it. But admit that a being infinitely mischievous were infinitely cunning, and infinitely powerful, yet it could do no evil; because the opposite principle of infinite goodness being also in finitely wise and powerful, they would tie up one another’s hands: so that, upon this supposition, the notion of a Deity would signify just nothing, and by virtue of the eternal opposition and equality of these two principles, they would keep one another at a perpetual bay, and, being an equal match for one another, instead of being two deities, they would be two idols, able to do neither good nor evil.

But to return a more distinct and satisfactory answer to this objection: There are three sorts of evil in the world; the evil of imperfection, the evil of affliction and suffering, and the evil of sin.

And, first, for the evil of imperfection, I mean natural imperfections, these are not simply and absolutely, but only comparatively evil: now comparative evil is but a less degree of goodness; and it is not at all inconsistent with the goodness of God that some creatures should be less good than others; that is, imperfect in comparison of them; nay, it is very agreeable, both to the goodness and wisdom of God, that there should be this variety in the creatures, and that they should be of several degrees of perfection, being made for several uses and purposes, and to be subservient to one another, provided they all contribute to the harmony and beauty of the whole.

Some imperfection is necessarily involved in the very nature and condition of a creature; as, that it derives its being from another, and necessarily depends upon it, and is beholden to it, and is likewise of necessity finite and limited in its nature and perfections; and as for those creatures which are less perfect than others, this also, that there should be degrees of perfection, is necessary, upon supposition, that the wisdom of God thinks fit to display itself in variety of creatures of several kinds and ranks; for though, comparing the creatures with one another, the angelical nature is best and most perfect, yet it is absolutely best that there should be other creatures besides angels. There are many parts of the creation which are rashly and inconsiderately by us concluded to be evil and imperfect, as some noxious and hurtful creatures, which yet, in other respects, and to some purposes, may be very useful, and against the harm and mischief whereof we are sufficiently armed, by such means of defence, and such antidotes, as reason and experience are able to find and furnish us withal; and those parts of the world which we think of little or no use, as rocks and deserts, and that vast wilderness of the sea, if we consider things well, are of great use to several very considerable purposes; or, if we can discern no other use of them, they serve at least to help our dulness, and to make us more attentively to consider and to admire the perfection and usefulness of the rest; at the worst they may serve for foils to set off the wise order and contrivance of other things, and (as one expresseth it very well) they may be like a blackmoor’s head in a picture, which gives the greater beauty to the whole piece.

Secondly, For the evils of affliction and suffering; and these either befal brute creatures, or men endowed with reason and consideration.

1st, For those which befal the brute creatures; those sufferings which nature inflicts upon them are very few; the greatest they meet withal are from men, or upon their account, for whose sake they were chiefly made, and to whose reasonable use and gentle dominion they are consigned.

It is necessary, from the very nature of these creatures, that they should be passive, and liable to pain; and yet it doth in no wise contradict either the wisdom or goodness of God to make such creatures, because all these pains are, for the most part, fully recompensed by the pleasure these creatures find in life; and that they have such a pleasure and happiness in life is evident, in that all creatures, notwithstanding the miseries they endure, are still fond of life, and unwilling to part with it: no creature but man (who only hath perverted his nature) ever seeks the destruction of itself; and, since all brute creatures are so loath to go out of being, we may probably conclude, that if they could deliberate whether they should be or not, they would choose to come into being, even upon these hard conditions.

But, however that be, this we are sure of, that they suffer chiefly from us, and upon our account; we, who are their natural lords, having depraved ourselves first, are become cruel and tyrannical to them; nay, the Scripture tells us, that they suffer for our sakes, and “the whole creation groaneth, and is in bondage” for the sin of man. And this is not unreasonable, that, being made principally for man, they should suffer upon his account, as a part of his goods and estate, not as a punishment to them (which, under the notion of punishment, they are not capable of), but as a punishment to him who is the lord and owner of them, they being, by this means, become more weak and frail, and less useful and serviceable to him for whom they were made; so that the sufferings of the creatures below us are, in a great measure, to be charged upon us, under whose dominion God hath put them.

2dly, As for the afflictions and sufferings which befal men, these are not natural, and of God’s making, but the result and fruit of our own doings, the effects and consequences of the ill use of our own liberty, and free choice; and God does not willingly send them upon us, but we wilfully pull them down upon ourselves; for “he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men,” as the prophet tells us, (Lam. iii. 33.) Or, as it is in the Wisdom of Solomon, (chap. i. 12, 13.) “God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living; but men pull destruction upon themselves, with the works of their own hands.” All the evils that are in the world, are either the effects of our own sin, as poverty, and disgrace, pains, diseases, and death, which are sometimes more immediately inflicted upon men by a visible providence and hand of God, but are usually brought upon us by ourselves, in the natural course and order of things; or they are the effects of other men’s sins, brought upon us by the ambition and covetousness, by the malice and cruelty, of others: and these evils, though they are procured and caused by others, yet they are deserved by ourselves; and though they are immediately from the hand of men, yet we ought to look farther, and consider them as directed and disposed by the providence of God; as David did when Shimei cursed him; “God (saith he) hath bid him curse David,” though it immediately proceeded from Shimei’s insolence and ill-nature.

Now, upon the supposition of sin, the evils of affliction and suffering are good, because they are of great use to us, and serve to very goods ends and purposes.

IV. The consideration of God’s goodness, is a powerful motive and argument to several duties.

1. To the love of God. And this is the most proper and natural effect and operation of the goodness of God upon our minds. Several of the Divine attributes are very awful, but goodness is amiable; and, without this, nothing else is so. Power and wisdom may command dread and admiration; but nothing but goodness can challenge our love and affection. Goodness is amiable for itself, though no benefit and advantage should from thence redound to us: but when we find the comfortable effects of it, when “the riches of God’s goodness, and long-suffering, and forbearance” are laid out upon us, when we live upon that goodness, and are indebted to it for all that we have and hope for; this is a much greater endearment to us of that excellency and perfection, which was amiable for itself. We cannot but love him who is good, and does us good; whose goodness extends to all his creatures, but is exercised in so peculiar a manner towards the sons of men, that it is called love; and if God vouchsafe to love us, well may this be “the first and great commandment, Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.”

2. The consideration of God’s goodness is likewise an argument for us to fear him; not as a slave does his master, but as a child does his father, who the more he loves him, the more afraid he is to offend him. “There is forgiveness with thee, (saith the Psalmist) that thou rnayest be feared:” because God is ready to forgive, we should be afraid to offend. “Men shall fear the Lord, and his goodness,” saith the prophet. (Hosea iii. 5.) And, in deed, nothing is more to be dreaded than despised goodness, and abused patience, which turns into fury and vengeance: “Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and long-suffering, and forbearance, (says the apostle) and treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God?”

3. The consideration of God’s goodness, is a powerful motive to obedience to his laws, and (as the apostle expresseth it) “to walk worthy of the Lord unto all well-pleasing, being fruitful in every good work.” This argument Samuel useth to the people of Israel, to persuade them to obedience; (1 Sam. xii. 24.) “Only fear the Lord, and serve him in truth with all your heart; for consider how great things he hath done for you.”

And, indeed, the laws which God hath given us, are none of the least instances of his goodness to us, since they all tend to our good, and are proper causes and means of our happiness: so that, in challenging our obedience to his laws, as acknowledgments of our obligation to him for his benefits, he lays a new obligation, and confers a greater benefit upon us. All that his laws require of us, is to do that which is best for ourselves, and does most directly conduce to our own welfare and happiness. Considering our infinite obligations to God, he might have challenged our obedience to the severest and harshest laws he could have imposed upon us: so that as the servants said to Naaman, “Had the prophet bid thee to do some great thing, wouldst thou not have done it? how much more when he hath only said, Wash, and be clean?” If God had required of us things very grievous and burthensome, in love and gratitude to him, we ought to have yielded a ready and cheerful obedience to such commands; how much more when he hath only said, Do this, and be happy. In testimony of your love to me, do these things which are the great est kindness and benefit to yourselves.

4. The goodness of God should lead men to repentance. One of the greatest aggravations of our sins is, that we offend against so much goodness, and make so bad a requital for it; “Do ye thus requite the Lord, O foolish people and unwise!” The proper tendency of God’s goodness and patience to sinners, is to bring them to a sense of their miscarriage, and to a resolution of a better course. When we reflect upon the blessings and favours of God, and his continual goodness to us, can we choose but be ashamed of our terrible ingratitude and disobedience? Nothing is more apt to make an ingenuous nature to relent, than the sense of undeserved kindness; that God should be so good to us, who are evil and unthankful to him; that though we be enemies to him, yet, when we hunger, he feeds us; when we thirst, he gives us to drink; heaping, as it were, coals of fire on our heads, on purpose to melt us into repentance, and to over come our evil by his goodness.

5. The consideration of God’s goodness is a firm ground of trust and confidence. What may we not hope and assuredly expect from immense and boundless goodness? If we have right apprehensions of the goodness of God, we cannot possibly distrust him, or doubt of the performance of those gracious promises which he hath made to us; the same goodness which inclined him to make such promises, will effectually engage him to make them good. If God be so good as he hath declared himself, why should we think that he will not help us in our need, and relieve us in our distress, and comfort us in our afflictions and sorrows? If we may with confidence rely upon any thing to confer good upon us, and to preserve and deliver us from evil, we may trust infinite goodness.

6. The goodness of God is likewise an argument to us to patience and contentedness with every condition. If the hand of God be severe and heavy upon us in any affliction, we may be assured that it is not without great cause that so much goodness is so highly offended and displeased with us; that he designs our good in all the evils he sends us, and does not chasten us for his pleasure, but for our profit; that we are the cause of our own sufferings, and our sins separate between God and us, and withhold good things from us; that in the final issue and result of things, “all things shall work together for good” to us; and therefore we ought not to be discontented at any thing which will certainly end in our happiness.

7. Let us imitate the goodness of God. The highest perfection of the best and most perfect Being is worthy to be our pattern: this Scripture frequently proposeth to us; (Matt. v. 48.) “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.” How is that? In being good, and kind, and merciful, as God is: “But I say unto you, (says our Lord) love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that you may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil, and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just, and on the unjust:” and then it follows, “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.” The same pat tern St. Paul proposeth to us; (Ephes. iv. 32.; and chap. v. 1.) “Be ye kind one to another, tender hearted; forgiving one another, even as God, for Christ’s sake, hath forgiven you. Be ye therefore followers of God as dear children, and walk in love.” We cannot in any thing resemble God more than in goodness, and kindness, and mercy, and in a readiness to forgive those who have been injurious to us, and to be reconciled to them.

Let us then often contemplate this perfection of God, and represent it to our minds, that, by the frequent contemplation of it, we may be transformed into the image of the Divine goodness. Is God so good to his creatures? with how much greater reason should we be so to our fellow-creatures? Is God good to us? Let us imitate his universal goodness, by endeavouring the good of mankind; and, as much as in us lies, of the whole creation of God. What God is to us, and what we would have him still be to us, that let us be to others. We are in finitely beholden to this perfection of God for all that we are, and for all that we enjoy, and for all that we expect; and therefore we have all the reason in the world to admire and imitate it. Let this pattern of the Divine goodness be continually before us, that we may be still fashioning ourselves in the temper of our minds, and in the actions of our lives, to a likeness and conformity to it.

It becomes man, above all other creatures, to be merciful, who hath had such ample and happy experience of God’s mercy to him, and cloth still continually stand in need of mercy from God. God hath been very merciful to us. Had it not been for the tender mercies of God to us, we had all of us, long since, been miserable. Now as we have received mercy from God, we should shew it to others. The apostle useth this as an argument why we should relieve those that are in misery and want, because we have had such experience of the mercy and love of God to us; (1 John iii. 16, 17.) “Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us. But whoso hath this world’s good, and seeth his brother have need, &c. how dwelleth the love of God in him?” That man hath no sense of the mercy of God abiding upon his heart, that is not merciful to his brother. And it is an argument why we should forgive one another; (Eph. iv. 32.) “Be ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ’s sake hath forgiven you.” (Chap. v. 1.) “Be ye, therefore, followers of God, as dear children.” (Col. iii. 12, 13.) “Put on therefore (as the elect of God, holy and beloved) bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering; forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel against any: even as Christ forgave you, so also do ye.”

And we continually stand in need of mercy both from God and man. We are liable one to another; and in the change of human affairs, we may be all subject to one another by turns, and stand in need of one another’s pity and compassion; and we must expect, that “with what measure we mete to others, with the same it shall be measured to us again.” To restrain the cruelties, and check the insolences of men, God has so ordered, in his providence, that very often, in this world, men’s cruelties return upon their own heads, and their violent dealings upon their own pates.” Bajazet meets with a Tamerlane.

But if men were not thus liable to one another, we all stand in need of mercy from God. If we be merciful to others in suffering, and forgiving them that have injured us, God will be so to us, he will pardon our sins to us: (Prov. xvi. 6.) “By mercy and truth iniquity is purged.” (2 Sam. xxii. 26.) “With the merciful thou wilt shew thyself merciful.” (Prov. xiv. 21.) “He that hath mercy on the poor, happy is he.” (Prov. xxi. 21.) “He that followeth after righteousness and mercy findeth life.” (Matt. vi. 14.) “If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you.” But, on the other hand, if we be malicious and revengeful, and implacable to those that have offended us, and in exorable to those who desire to be received to favour, and cruel to those who lie at our mercy, hard hearted to them that are in necessity; what can we expect but that the mercy of God will leave us, that he will “forget to be gracious, and shut up in anger his tender mercy.” (Matt. vi. 15.) “If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.” That is a dreadful pas sage: (St. James ii. 13.) “He shall have judgment without mercy, that hath shewed no mercy.” How angry is the lord with the servant who was so inexorable to his fellow-servant, after he had forgiven him so great a debt, as you find in the parable; (Matt. xviii. 24.) he owed him ten thousand talents, and, upon his submission and entreaty to have patience with him, he was moved with compassion, and loosed him, and forgave him all: but no sooner had this favour been done to him by his lord, but, going forth, he meets his fellow-servant, who owed a small, inconsiderable debt, a hundred pence; he lays hands on him and takes him by the throat, and roundly demands payment of him: he falls down at his feet, and useth the same form of supplication that he had used to his lord; but he rejects his request, and puts him in prison. Now what saith the lord to him: (ver. 32-34.) “O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me: shouldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-servant, even as I had pity on thee? And his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, until he should pay all that was due unto him.” Now what application doth our Saviour make of this? (Ver. 35.) “So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye, from your hearts, forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.”

God’s readiness to forgive us should be a powerful motive and argument to us to forgive others. The greatest injuries that we can suffer from men, if we compare them to the sins that we commit against God, they bear no proportion to them, neither in weight nor number; they are but as a hundred pence to ten thousand talents. If we would be like God, we should forgive the greatest injuries; he pardoneth our sins, though they be exceeding great; many injuries, though offences be renewed, and provocations multiplied; for so God doth to us: “He pardoneth iniquity, transgression, and sin.” (Exod. xxxiv. 7.) (Isa. lv. 7.) “He will have mercy, he will abundantly pardon.” We would not have God only to forgive us seven times, but seventy times seven, as often as we offend him; so should we forgive our brother.

And we should not be backward to this work; God is “ready to forgive us.” (Nehem. ix. 17.) And we should do it heartily, not only in word, when we retain malice in our hearts; and while we say we forgive, carry on a secret design in our hearts of revenging ourselves when we have opportunity, but we should, “from our hearts, forgive every one;” for so God doth to us, who, when he forgives us, “casts our iniquities behind his back, and throws them into the bottom of the sea, and blots out our transgression, so as to remember our iniquity no more.”

If we do not thus, every time we put up the petition to God, “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us,” we do not pray for mercy, but for judgment; we invoke his wrath, and do not put up a prayer, but a dreadful imprecation against ourselves; we pronounce the sentence of our own condemnation, and importune God not to forgive us.

Use 4. If the mercy of God be so great, this may comfort us against despair. Sinners are apt to be dejected, when they consider their unworthiness, the nature and number of their sins, and the many heavy aggravations of them; they are apt to say with Cain, that “their sin is greater than can be forgiven.” But do not look only upon thy sins, but upon the mercies of God. Thou canst not be too sensible of the evil of sin, and of the desert of it; but whilst we aggravate our sins, we must not lessen the mercies of God. When we consider the multitude of our sins, we must consider also the multitude of God’s tender mercies: we have been great sinners, and God is of great mercy; we have multiplied our provocations, and he multiplies to pardon.

Do but thou put thyself in a capacity of mercy, by repenting of thy sins, and forsaking of them, and thou hast no reason to doubt but the mercy of God will receive thee: “If we confess our sins, he is merciful and faithful to forgive them.” If we had offended man, as we have done God, we might despair of pardon; but it is God, and not man, that we have to deal with; and “his ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts: but as the heavens are high above the earth, so are his ways above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts.”

We cannot be more injurious to God than by hard thoughts of him, as if fury were in him, and, when we have provoked him, he were not to be appeased and reconciled to us. We disparage the goodness and truth of God, when we distrust those gracious declarations which he has made of his mercy and goodness; if we do not think that he doth heartily pity and compassionate sinners, and really desire their happiness. Doth not he condescend so low as to represent himself afflicted for the miseries of men, and to rejoice in the conversion of a sinner? And shall not we believe that he is in good earnest? Doth Christ weep over impenitent sinners, because “they will not know the things of their peace?” and canst thou think he will not pardon thee upon thy repentance? Is he grieved that men will undo themselves, and will not be saved? and canst thou think that he is unwilling to forgive? We cannot honour and glorify God more, than by entertaining great thoughts of his mercy. As we are said to glorify God by our repentance, because thereby we acknowledge God’s holiness and justice, so we glorify him by believing his mercy, because we conceive a right opinion of his goodness and truth; we set to our seal, that God is merciful and true: (Psal. cxlvii. 11.) it is said, that “God takes pleasure in them that hope in his mercy.” As he delights in mercy, so in our acknowledgments of it; that sinners should conceive great hopes of it, and believe him to be what he is. Provided thou dost submit to the terms of God’s mercy, thou hast no reason to despair of it: and he that thinks that his sins are more or greater than the mercy of God can pardon, must think that there may be more evil in the creature than there is goodness in God.

Use 5. By way of caution against the presumptuous sinner. If there be any that trespass upon the goodness of God, and presume to encourage themselves in sin, upon the hopes of his mercy; let such know that God is just, as well as merciful. A God of all mercy is an idol, such a God as men set up in their own imaginations, but not the true God whom the Scriptures describe: to such persons the Scripture describes him after another manner: (Nahum i. 2.) “God is jealous; the Lord revengeth, and is furious; the Lord will take vengeance on his adversaries, and reserveth wrath for his enemies.” If any man abuse the mercy of God, to “the strengthening of himself in his own wickedness, and bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk in the imagination of mine heart, and add drunkenness to thirst; the Lord will not spare him, but the anger of the Lord and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book shall lie upon him, and the Lord will blot out his name from under heaven.” (Deut. xxix. 19, 20.)

Though it be the nature of God to be merciful, yet the exercise of his mercy is regulated by his wisdom; he will not be merciful to those that despise his mercy, to those that abuse it, to those that are resolved to go on in their sins to tempt his mercy, and make bold to say, “Let us sin that grace may abound.” God designs his mercy for those that are prepared to receive it; (Isa. lv. 7.) “Let the wicked forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and turn unto the Lord, and he will have mercy, and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon.” The mercy of God is an enemy to sin, as well as his justice; and it is no where offered to countenance sin, but to convert the sinner; and is not intended to encourage our impenitency, but our repentance. God hath no where said that he will be merciful to those who, upon the score of his mercy, are bold with him, and presume to offend him; but “the mercy of the Lord is upon them that fear him, and keep his covenant, and remember his commandments to do them.” There is forgiveness with him, “that he may be feared,” but not that he may be despised and affronted. This is to contradict the very end of God’s mercy, which is, to “lead us to repentance,” to engage us to leave our sins, not to encourage us to continue in them.

Take heed, then, of abusing the mercy of God: we cannot provoke the justice of God more, than by presuming upon his mercy. This is the time of God’s mercy; use this opportunity: if thon neglectest it, a day of justice and vengeance is coming; (Rom. ii. 4, 5.) “Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leads to repentance? and treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judgment of God?” Now is the manifestation of God’s mercy; but there is a time a coming, when the righteous judgment of God will be revealed against those who abuse his mercy, “not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth to repentance.” To think that the goodness of God was intended for any other end than to take us off from sin, is a gross and affected ignorance that will ruin us; and they who draw any conclusion from the mercy of God, which may harden them in their sins, they are such as the prophet speaks of; (Isa. xxvii. 11.) “A people of no understanding, therefore he that made them will not save them; and he that formed them will shew them no favour.” Mercy itself will rejoice in the ruin of those that abuse it, and it will aggravate their condemnation. There is no person towards whom God will be more severely just, than towards such. The justice of God, exasperated and set on by his injured and abused mercy, like a razor set in oil, will have the keener edge, and be the sharper for its smoothness. Those that have made the mercy of God their enemy, must expect the worst his justice can do unto them.

One thing, indeed, our Saviour says, which (had they not been prepossessed with another opinion) does sufficiently intimate, that there might be a considerable space of time betwixt the destruction of Jerusalem and the day of judgment; and this we find only in St. Luke, (chap. xxi. 24.) where, speaking of the miseries and calamities that should come upon the Jews, he says, “They shall fall by the edge of the sword, and be carried into captivity into all nations; and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the gentiles, until the time of the gentiles be fulfilled.” So that here were a great many events fore told, betwixt the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world, the accomplishment whereof might take up a great deal of time, as appears by the event of things; Jerusalem being at this day still “trodden down by the gentiles,” and the Jews still continuing “dispersed over the world:” but the disciples, it seems, did not much mind this, being carried away with a prejudicate conceit, that the end of the world would happen before the end of that age; in which they were much confirmed by what our Saviour, after his resurrection, said of St. John, upon occasion of Peter’s question concerning him, (John xxi. 21, 22.) “Lord, what shall this man do? Jesus saith unto him, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?” Upon which words of our Saviour concerning him, St. John himself adds, (ver. 23.) “Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, That that disciple should not die;” that is, that he should live till the coming of our Lord, and then be taken up with him into heaven: from all which, they probably (as they thought) concluded, that the day of judgment would happen before the end of that age, whilst St. John was alive: but St. John, who writ last of the evangelists (as Eusebius tells us), and lived until after the destruction of Jerusalem, as he acquaints us with this mistake, which was current among the Christians, so he takes care to rectify it, telling us, that “Jesus said not, He should not die; but, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?” He tells us, that our Saviour did not affirm that “He should not die;” but, to repress St. Peter’s curiosity, he says, “If it were my pleasure that he should not die at all, but live till I come to judgment, what is that to thee?” And St. Peter, likewise (or whoever was the author of this Second Epistle, or, at least, of this third chapter, which seems to be a new epistle by itself), takes notice of this mistake, about the nearness of the day of judgment, as that which gave occasion to these scoffers to deride the expectation of a future judgment among the Christians, because they had been already deceived about the time of it; and this the scoffers twitted them with in that question, “Where is the promise of his coming?” Therefore, the learned Grotius conjectures very probably, that this last epistle (contained in the third chapter) was written after the destruction of Jerusalem, which was the time fixed for Christ’s coming to judgment; and, therefore, there could be no ground for this scoff until after that time. St. Peter, indeed, did not live so long; and therefore Grotius thinks, that this epistle was writ by Simeon, or Simon, who was successor of St. James in the bishopric of Jerusalem, and lived to the time of Trajan.

I have been the longer in giving an account of this, that we might understand where the ground and force of this scoff lay; namely, in this, that because the Christians had generally been very confident, that the coming of Christ to judgment would be presently after the destruction of Jerusalem, and were now found to be deceived in that, therefore there was no regard to be had at all to their expectation of a future judgment; because they might be deceived in that as well as in the other.

But herein they argued very falsely: because our Saviour had positively and peremptorily foretold his corning to judgment, but had never fixed and deter mined the time of it: nay, so far was he from that, that he had plainly told his disciples, that the precise time of the day of judgment God had reserved as a secret to himself, which he had not imparted to any, no, not to the angels in heaven, nor to the Son himself; (Mark xiii. 32, 33.) “But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father; take ye heed, watch and pray; for ye know not when, the time is.” So that if they presumed to make any conjectures about the time when the day of judgment would be, they did it without any warrant from our Lord: it was great presumption in them to determine the time of it, when our Saviour had so expressly told them, that the Father had reserved this as a secret, which he had never communicated to any; and, therefore, if they were mistaken about it, it was no wonder. But their mistake in this, was no prejudice to the truth of our Saviour’s clear prediction of a future judgment, without any determination of the time of it, for that might be at some thousands of years distance, and yet be certain for all that; and the delay of it, was no sign of the uncertainty of our Saviour’s prediction concerning it, but only of God’s great patience and long-suffering to sinners, in expectation of their repentance; “God is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness, but is long-suffering to us-ward.” And this brings me to the

Third and last particular in the text; namely, The true reason of God’s patience and long-suffering to mankind: “He is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.” And for this, St. Peter cites St. Paul: (ver. 15, of this chapter.) “And account that the long-suffering of the Lord is salvation;” that is, that the great end and design of God’s goodness and long-suffering to sinners, is, that they may repent and be saved: “Account that the long-suffering of our Lord is salvation, even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you.” Now these words are not expressly found in St. Paul’s writings: but the sense and effect of them is, (viz. in Rom. ii. 4.) “Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?” God hath a very gracious and merciful design in his patience to sinners: he is good, that he may make us so, and that his “goodness may lead us to repentance:” he defers punishment on purpose, that he may give men time to bethink themselves, and to return to a better mind; “He winks at the sins of men, that they may repent,” says the son of Sirach. The patience of God aims at the cure and recovery of those who are not desperately and resolutely wicked.

This is the primary end and intention of God’s patience to sinners; and if he fail of this end, through our hardness and impenitency, he hath other ends, which he will infallibly attain: he will hereby glorify the riches of his mercy, and vindicate the righteousness of his justice; the damned in hell shall acknowledge, that the patience of God was great mercy and goodness to them, though they abused it; for God does not lose the glory of his patience, though we lose the benefit of it, and he will make it subservient to his justice, one way or other. Those great offenders whom he spares, after there are no hopes of their amendment, he, many times, makes use of, as instruments for the punishing of others, “as rods of his wrath, for the discipline of the world;” and he often reserves those who are incorrigibly bad, for a more remarkable ruin: but, however, they are reserved to the judgment of the great day; and if, after God hath exercised much patience towards sinners in this world, he inflicts punishment on them in the next, it must be acknowledged to be most just: for what can he do less, than to condemn those who would not be saved, and to make them miserable who so obstinately refused to be happy?

Before I come to apply this discourse concerning the patience and long-suffering of God to sinners, I must remove an objection or two:

I. The severity of God to some sinners in this life, and to all impenitent sinners in the next, seems to contradict what hath been said concerning God’s patience and long-suffering.

As for the severity of God towards impenitent sinners in the next life, this doth not at all contradict the patience of God; because the very nature of patience, and forbearance, and long-suffering, does suppose a determinate time, and that they will not last always: this life is the day of God’s patience, and in the next world his justice and severity will take place. And, therefore, the punishment of sinners in another world, after God hath tried them in this, and expected their repentance, is no ways contrary to his patience and goodness, and very agreeable to his wisdom and justice; for it is no part of goodness to see itself perpetually abused; it is not patience, but stupidity and insensibleness, to endure to be always trampled upon, and to bear to have his holy and just laws for ever despised and contemned.

And as for his severity to some sinners in this life—as to Lot’s wife; to the Israelite that gathered sticks on the sabbath-day; to Nadab and Abihu; to Uzzah; to Ananias and Sapphira; and to Herod Agrippa—in all which instances God seems to have made quick work, and to have executed judgment speedily. To these I answer, that this severity of God to some few, doth rather magnify his patience to the rest of mankind; he may be severe to some few for example and warning to many, that they may learn to make better use of his patience, and not to trespass so boldly upon it; and, perhaps, he hath exercised much patience already towards those to whom at last he is so severe, as is plain in the case of Herod, and it may well be supposed in most of the other instances; or else the sin, so suddenly and severely punished, was very heinous and presumptuous, of a contagious and spreading nature, and of dangerous example. Lot’s wife sinned most presumptuously against an express and an easy command, and whilst God was taking care of her deliverance in a very extraordinary manner. That of Nadab and Abihu, and of the man that gathered sticks on the sabbath-day, were presently after the giving of the law, in which case great severity is necessary; and that of Ananias and Sapphira, at the first publishing of the gospel, that the majesty of the Divine Spirit, and the authority of the first publishers of it, might not be contemned: that of Uzzah was upon the return of the ark of God from among the Philistines, that the people might not lose their reverence for it after it had been taken captive. So that these necessary severities to a few, in comparison of those many that are warned by them, are rather arguments of God’s patience than objections against it.

II. It is objected, That if God do not desire the ruin of sinners, but their repentance, whence comes it to pass that all are not brought to repentance? for who hath resisted his will? To this I answer:

1. That there is no doubt but God is able to do this: he can, if he pleaseth, conquer and reclaim the most obstinate spirits; he is able out of “stones to raise up children unto Abraham:” and sometimes he exerts his omnipotence herein, as in the conversion of St. Paul, in a kind of violent and irresistible manner: but he hath no where declared that he will do this to all, and we see plainly, in experience, that he does not do it.

2. God may very well be said, “not to be willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance,” when he does, on his part, what is sufficient to that end; and upon this ground the Scripture every where represents God as desiring the repentance of sinners, and their obedience to his laws: (Deut. v. 29.) “O that there were such a heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might be well with them!” So Jer. xiii. 27. “O Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be?” (Isa. v. 3, 4.) We find God there solemnly appealing to the people of Israel, whether there had been any thing wanting on his part that was fit to be done: “And now, O inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard: what could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done to it? wherefore when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?” God may justly look for the fruits of repentance and obedience from those to whom he affords a sufficiency of means to that end. And if so, then,

3. The true reason why men do not repent, but perish, is because they are obstinate, and will not repent; and this account the Scripture every where gives of the impenitency of men, and the ruin consequent upon it: (Psal. lxxxi. 13.) “O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! But my people would not hearken to my voice, and Israel would none of me.” (Ezek. xxxiii. 11.) “Why will ye die, O house of Israel?” (Prov. i. 2931.) “That they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord. They would none of my counsel; they despised all my reproof. Therefore they shall eat of the fruit of their own ways, and be filled with their own devices.” The ruin of sinners doth not proceed from the counsel of God, but from their own choice. And so likewise our Saviour every where chargeth the ruin and destruction of the Jews upon their own wilful obstinacy.

The inferences from this discourse concerning the patience and long-suffering of God towards man kind, shall be these three:

I. To stir us up to a thankful acknowledgment of the great patience of God towards us, notwithstanding our manifold and heinous provocations. We may every one of us take to ourselves those words: (Lam. iii. 22.) “It is of the Lord’s mercy that we are not consumed, because his compassions fail not.” They are “renewed every morning.” When ever we sin, (and “we provoke God every day”) it is of his “patience that we are not destroyed:” and when we sin again, this is a new and greater instance of God’s patience. The mercies of God’s patience are no more to be numbered than our sins: we may say with David, “How great is the sum of them?” The goodness of God in sparing us is, in some respect, greater than his goodness in creating us; because he had no provocation not to make us, but we provoke him daily to destroy us.

II. Let us propound the patience of God, for a pattern to ourselves. Plutarch says, “That God sets forth himself in the midst of the world for our imitation, and propounds to us the example of his patience, to teach us not to revenge injuries hastily upon one another.”

III. Let us comply with the design of God’s patience and long-suffering towards us, which is “to bring us to repentance.” Men are very apt to abuse it to a quite contrary purpose, to the encouraging themselves in their evil ways. So Solomon observes: (Eccl. viii. 11.) “Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.” But this is very false reasoning; for the patience of God is an enemy to sin, as well as his justice; and the design of it is not to countenance sin, but to convert the sinner: (Rom. ii. 4.) “Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?” Patience in God should produce repentance in us; and we should look upon it as an opportunity given us by God to repent and be saved: (2 Pet. iii. 15.) “Account that the long-suffering of God is salvation.” They that do not improve the patience of God to their own salvation, mistake the true meaning and intent of it. But many are so far from making this use of it, that they presume upon it, and sin with more courage and confidence because of it; but that we may be sensible of the danger of this, I will offer these two or three considerations:

1. That nothing is more provoking to God than the abuse of his patience. God’s patience waits for our repentance; and all long attendance, even of inferiors upon their superiors, hath something in it that is grievous: how much more grievous and provoking must it be to the great God, after he hath laid out upon us all the riches of his goodness and long-suffering, to have that despised! after his patience hath waited a long time upon us, not only to be thrust away with contempt, but to have that which should be an argument to us to leave our sins, abused into an encouragement to continue in them! God takes an account of all the days of his patience and forbearance: (Luke xiii. 7.) “Behold, these three years I come seeking fruit on this fig-tree and find none: cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?”

2. Consider that the patience of God will have an end. Though God suffers long, he will not suffer always; we may provoke God so long, until he can forbear no longer without injury and dishonour to his wisdom, and justice, and holiness; and God will not suffer one attribute to wrong the rest: his wisdom will determine the length of his patience; and when his patience is to no purpose, when there is no hopes of our amendment, his wisdom will then put a period to it; then the patience of his mercy will determine. “How often would I have gathered you, and you would not? therefore your house is left unto you desolate.” And the patience of God’s judgments will then determine. “Why should they be smitten any more? they will revolt more and more.” Yea, patience itself, after a long and fruitless expectation, will expire. A sinner may continue so long impenitent, till the patience of God, as I may say, grows impenitent, and then our ruin will make haste, and destruction “will come upon us in a moment.” If men will not come to repentance, “the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night,” as it follows in the next verse after the text; the judgment of God will suddenly surprise those who will not be gained by his patience.

3. Consider that nothing will more hasten and aggravate our ruin than the abuse of God’s patience. All this time of God’s patience his wrath is coming towards us; and the more we presume upon it, the sooner it will overtake us: (Luke xii. 45, 46.) the wicked servant, who said his “lord delayed his coming,” and fell to rioting and drunkenness; our Saviour tells us, that “the lord of that servant will come in a day when he looks not for him.”

And it will aggravate our ruin; the longer punishment is a coming, the heavier it will be: those things which are long in preparation are terrible in execution; the weight of God’s wrath will make amends for the slowness of it; and the delay of judgment will be fully recompensed in the dreadfulness of it when it conies. Let all those consider this who go on in their sin, and are deaf to the voice of God’s patience, which calls upon them every moment of their lives. There is a day of vengeance a coming upon those who trifle away this day of God’s patience: nothing will sooner and more in flame the wrath and displeasure of God against us than his abused patience, and the despised riches of his goodness. As oil, though it be soft and smooth, yet, when it is once inflamed, burns most fiercely; so the patience of God, when it is abused, turns into fury; and his mildest attributes into the greatest severities.

And if the patience of God do not bring us to repentance, it will but prepare us for a more intolerable ruin: after God hath kept a long indignation in his breast, it will, at length, break forth with the greater violence. The patience of God increaseth his judgments by an incredible kind of proportion; (Levit. xxvi. 18.) “And if you will still (says God to the people of Israel) walk contrary to me, and if ye will not be reformed by all these things, I will punish you yet seven times more.” And, (verse 28.) “I will bring seven times more plagues upon you, according to your sins.” At first God’s justice accuseth sinners; but, after a long time of patience, his mercy comes in against us, and, instead of staying his hand, adds weight to his blows; (Rom. ix. 22.) “What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endureth with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction?” They upon whom the patience of God hath no good effect, are “vessels of wrath, prepared and fitted for destruction.” If ever God display his wrath, and make his anger known, he will do it in the most severe manner upon those who have despised and abused his patience; for these, in a more peculiar manner, “do treasure up for themselves wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.”

To conclude: Let us all take a review of our lives, and consider how long the patience of God hath waited upon us, and borne with us; with some twenty, forty, perhaps sixty years, and longer. Do we not remember how God spared us in such a danger, when we gave ourselves for lost? and how he recovered us in such a sickness, when the physician gave us up forgone? and what use have we made of this patience and long-suffering of God to wards us? It is the worst temper in the world not to be melted by kindness, not to be obliged by benefits, not to be tamed by gentle usage. He that is not wrought upon, neither by the patience of his mercy, nor by the patience of his judgments, his case is desperate, and past remedy. “Consider this, all ye that forget God,” lest his patience turn into fury; for “God is not slack, as some men count slackness; but long-suffering to sinners, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.”

3dly, Another gross and atheistical inference, which men are apt to make from the delay of punishment; is, that there is no such difference of good and evil as is pretended; because they do not see the good and bad actions of men differenced in their rewards; because Divine justice doth not presently manifest itself; and every transgression and disobedience doth not immediately receive a just recompence of reward, therefore they cannot believe that the difference between good and evil is so great and evident.

For answer to this: not to insist upon the difference which the providence of God sometimes makes between them in this life, I appeal to the consciences of men, whether they do not secretly and inwardly acknowledge a clear difference between good and evil. Are not the worst of men apt to conceive better hopes of success, when they are about a just and honest undertaking, than when they are engaged in a wicked design? Do not bad men feel a secret shame and horror, when no eye sees them, and the wickedness they are about to commit doth not fall under the cognizance and censure of any human court or tribunal? Have they not many checks and rebukes in their own spirits, much disturbance and confusion of mind, when they are enterprising a wicked thing? And does not this plainly argue, that they are guilty to themselves, that they are about something which they ought not to do?

It is very true, that most men are more sensible of the evil of an action, when they feel the ill effects and consequences of it, and suffer the punishment that is due to it: but yet the sense of good and evil is so deeply impressed upon human nature, that I think no man, remaining a man, can quite deface and blot out the difference of good and evil. So that if men will but attend to the natural dictates and suggestions of their own minds, they cannot possibly infer, from the delay of punishment, that there is no difference of good and evil.

But because those who are thus are but few, in comparison, there being not many in the world arrived to that degree of blindness, and height of impiety, as to disbelieve a God and a providence; and I think none have attained to that perfect conquest of conscience, as to have lost all sense of good and evil; therefore I shall rather insist,

II. Upon those kind of reasonings which are more ordinary and common among bad men, and whereby they cheat themselves into everlasting perdition; and they are such as these:

1. Because sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore sin is not so great an evil.

2. Therefore God is not so highly offended and provoked by it. Or,

3. God is not so severe in his own nature, as he is commonly represented.

4. Therefore the punishment of sin is not so certain. Or, however,

5. It is at a distance, and may be prevented time enough, by a future repentance in our old age, or at the hour of death. By some such false reasonings as these, which men think may probably be collected from the patience and long-suffering of God, they harden and encourage themselves in an evil course.

1. Because the punishment of sin is deferred, therefore they conclude it is not so great an evil; they do not feel the ill effects of it at present; all things go well and prosperously with them, no less than with those who are so strict and conscientious; and therefore they hope there is no such great evil in sin, as melancholy people are apt to fancy to themselves. For answer to this,

(1.) Consider seriously what sin is, and then thou wilt see reason enough to call it a great evil. To sin. against God, is to contemn the greatest authority in the world, to contradict the greatest holiness and purity, to abuse the greatest goodness, and to provoke almighty justice to take vengeance upon thee, and to make thee as miserable as thou art capable of being. To sin against God, is to be disobedient to thy sovereign, and unthankful to thy best benefactor, and to act contrary to the greatest obligations, against thy best reason and truest interest; to disoblige thy kindest friend, and to gratify thy worst and bitterest enemy: it is to disorder thyself, to create perpetual disquiet to thy own mind, and to do the greatest mischief possible to thyself; to deprive thyself of the greatest happiness, and to draw down upon thyself extreme and eternal misery. And what do we call a great evil if this be not, which contains in it all the kinds and all the aggravations of evil that can be, and hath all the circumstances of ugliness and deformity in it that can be imagined?

(2.) Whatever sin be in itself, yet from hence we can in no wise conclude that it is not a great evil, because the punishment of it is deferred for a while: from hence, indeed, it follows, that God is very good in deferring the punishment which is due to thee for thy sins, but by no means that sin is not very evil. The reprieve of a traitor does, indeed, argue the goodness and clemency of the prince, but doth not at all abate of the heinousness of the crime for which he is sentenced. The great evil of sin is evident, because the holy and just God hath for bidden it, and declared his hatred and detestation of it, and threatened it with most severe and direful punishment; but that God respites the punishment which is due to sin, and does not immediately take vengeance upon sinners, but affords them a space, and means, and opportunity of repentance, this doth not at all lessen the evil of sin, but is rather an aggravation of it, that we should offend and provoke that God who is so patient and long-suffering towards us, so very loath to bring those evils upon us, which we are so rash and forward to pull down upon ourselves.

2. If God doth not immediately punish sin upon the commission of it, and instantly let fly at the sinner, this they would construe to be a sign that he is not so highly offended and provoked by it; if he were, he would manifest his displeasure against it, by the sudden and violent effusions of his wrath. For answer to this, I desire these two things may be considered:

(1.) That God himself, in his word, every where plainly declares to us his great displeasure against sin: (Psal. v. 4, 5.) “Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand in thy sight; thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.” “Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness.” The words are a μείωσις, and less is spoken than is meant and intended; viz. that God is so far from taking pleasure in the sins of men, that he is highly displeased at them, and bears an implacable hatred against them.

God’s patience would save sinners, but they ruin themselves by their abuse of it: let the blame then lie where it is due, and let God have the glory of his goodness, though men refuse the benefit and advantage of it.

VI. And lastly; But because this objection pincheth hardest in one point, viz. that God certainly foresees that a great many will abuse his long-suffering, to the increasing of their guilt, and the aggravating of their condemnation; and how is long-suffering any mercy and goodness to those, who he certainly foreknows will in the event be so much the more miserable, for having had so much patience extended to them? Therefore, for a full answer, I desire these six things may be considered:

1. That God designs this life for the trial of our obedience, that, according as we behave ourselves, he may reward or punish us in another world.

2. That there could be no trial of obedience, nor any capacity of rewards and punishments, but upon the supposition of freedom and liberty; that is, that we do not do what we do upon force and necessity, but upon free choice.

3. That God, by virtue of the infinite perfection of his knowledge, does clearly and certainly fore see all future events, even those which are most contingent, such as are the arbitrary actions of free and voluntary agents. This I know hath been denied, but without reason; since it is not only contrary to the common apprehensions of mankind, from the very light of nature, that God should not foreknow future events, but to clear and express Scripture; and that in such instances, for the sake of which they deny God’s fore-knowledge, in general, of the future actions of free and voluntary agents; I mean, that the Scripture expressly declares God’s determinate fore-knowledge of the most wicked actions; as the crucifying of Christ, who is said, “according to the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God,” to have been “by wicked hands crucified and slain.”

4. That the bare fore-knowledge of things future hath no more influence upon them to make them to be, than the sight and knowledge of things present hath upon them to make them to be present. I may see or know that the sun is risen, without being the cause of its rising; and no more is bare knowledge of future events the cause that they are when they are. And if any man ask, how God can certainly foreknow things which depend upon free and arbitrary causes, unless he do some way decree and determine them? I answer, that this is not a fair and reasonable demand to ask of men, who have but finite understandings, to make out and declare all the ways that infinite knowledge hath of knowing and of foreseeing the actions of free creatures, without prejudice to their liberty and freedom of acting. However, it is, of the two, much more credible to reason, that infinite knowledge should certainly foreknow things, which our understandings cannot imagine how they should be foreknown, than that God should any ways be the author of sin, by determining and decreeing the wicked actions of men. The first only argues the imperfection of our under standing; but the other lays the greatest blemish and imperfection that can be upon the Divine nature.

So that this difficult controversy about the fore knowledge of God is brought to this point, whether a man had better believe that infinite knowledge may be able to foreknow things in a way which our finite understanding cannot comprehend; or to ascribe something to God, from whence it would unavoidably follow, that he is the author of sin. The first is only a modest and just acknowledgment of our own ignorance, the last is the utmost and greatest absurdity that a man can be brought to; and to say that we cannot believe the fore-knowledge of God, unless we can make out the particular manner of it, is more unreasonable, than if an ignorant man should deny a difficult proposition in Euclid, or Archimedes, to be demonstrated, because he knows not how to demonstrate it.

5. And consequently, fore-knowledge and liberty may very well consist; and, notwithstanding God’s fore-knowledge of what men will do, they may be as free as if he did not foreknow it. And,

Lastly, That God doth not deal with men according to his fore-knowledge of the good or bad use of their liberty, but according to the nature and reason of things; and therefore, if he be long-suffering toward sinners, and do not cut them off upon the first provocation, but give them a space and opportunity of repentance, and use all proper means and arguments to bring them to repentance, and be ready to afford his grace to excite good resolutions in them, and to second and assist them, and they refuse and resist all this; their wilful obstinacy and impenitency is as culpable, and God’s goodness and patience as much to be acknowledged, as if God did not foresee the abuse of it; because his foresight and knowledge of what they would do laid no necessity upon them to do what they did.

If a prince had the privilege of fore-knowledge, as God hath, and did certainly foresee that a great many of his subjects would certainly incur the penalty of his laws, and that others would abuse his goodness and clemency to them; yet, if he would govern them like free and reasonable creatures, he ought to make the same wise laws to restrain their exorbitancy, and to use the same clemency in all cases that did fairly admit of it, as if he did not at all foresee what they would do, nor how they would abuse his clemency; for it is nevertheless fit to make wise and reasonable laws, and to govern with equity and clemency, though it were certainly fore seen that they that are governed would act very foolishly and unreasonably in the use of their liberty. It is great goodness in God to give men the means and opportunity of being saved, though they abuse his goodness to their farther ruin; and he may be heartily grieved for that folly and obstinacy in men, which he certainly foresees will end in their ruin; and may, with great seriousness and sincerity, wish they would do otherwise, and were as “wise to do good,” as they are “wilful to do evil.” And thus he is represented in Scripture, as regretting the mischief which men wilfully bring upon themselves: “O that they were wise! O that they would understand, and consider their latter end!”

And this is sufficient to vindicate the goodness of God in his patience and long-suffering to sinners, and to make them wholly guilty of all that befals them for their wilful contempt and abuse of it.

I shall draw some inferences from this whole discourse upon this argument.

I. This shews the unreasonableness and perverse disingenuity of men, who take occasion to harden and encourage themselves in sin from the long-suffering of God, which, above all things in the world, should melt and soften them. Thou hast sinned, and art liable to the justice of God; sentence is gone forth, but God respites the execution of it, and hath granted thee a reprieve, and time and opportunity to sue out thy pardon. Now what use ought we in reason to make of this patience of God to wards us? We ought certainly “to break off our sins by” a speedy “repentance, lest iniquity be our ruin;” immediately to sue out our pardon, and “to make our peace with God, while we are yet in the way,” and to resolve never any more willingly to offend that God, who is so gracious and merciful, so long-suffering and full of compassion. But what use do men commonly make of it? They take occasion to confirm and strengthen themselves in their wickedness, and to reason themselves into vain and groundless hopes of impunity. Now what a folly is this, because punishment doth not come, therefore to hasten it, and to draw it down upon ourselves? Because it hath not yet overtaken us, therefore to go forth and meet it? Because there is yet a possibility of escaping it, therefore to take a certain course to make it unavoidable? Because there is yet hope concerning us, therefore to make our case desperate and past remedy? See how unreason ably men bring ruin upon themselves; so that well might the Psalmist ask that question, “Have all the workers of iniquity no knowledge?”

But their folly and unreasonableness is not so great, but their perverseness and disingenuity is greater. To sin because God is long-suffering, is “to be evil because he is good,” and to provoke him, because he spares us: it is to strive with God, and to contend with his goodness, as if we were resolved to try the utmost length of his patience; and because God is loath to punish, therefore to urge and importune him to that which is so contrary to his inclination.

II. This may serve to convince men of the great evil and danger of thus abusing the long-suffering of God. It is a provocation of the highest nature, because it is to trample upon his dearest attributes, those which he most delights and glories in, his goodness and mercy; for the long-suffering of God is his goodness to the guilty, and his mercy to those who deserve to be miserable.

Nothing makes our ruin more certain, more speedy, and more intolerable, than the abuse of God’s goodness and patience. After God had borne long with that rebellious people, the children of Israel, and, notwithstanding all their murmurings, all their infidelity and impenitency, had spared them ten times, at last he sets his seal to their ruin: (Heb. iii. 8, 9.) “Harden not your hearts, as in the provocation in the day of temptation in the wilderness: when your fathers proved me, and saw my works forty years.” This was a high provocation indeed, to harden their hearts under the patience and long-suffering of God, after forty years trial and experience of it: (ver. 10.) “Wherefore I was grieved with that generation, and said, They are a people that do err in their hearts, for they have not known my ways.” And what was the issue of all this? Upon this God takes up a fixed resolution to bear no longer with them, but to cut them off from the blessings he had promised to bestow upon them; “He sware in his wrath that they should not enter into his rest.—To whom sware he, that they should not enter into his rest, but to them that believed not?” Or as the word may be rendered, “to them that were disobedient?” that is, to them who went on in their rebellion against him, after he had suffered their manners forty years.

And as the abuse of God’s patience renders our destruction more certain, so more speedy and more intolerable. We think, that because God suffers long he will suffer always; and because punishment is delayed, therefore it will never come; but it will come the sooner for this: so our Lord tells us, (Luke xii.) when the servant said, his lord delayed his corning; “the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he looks not for him, and at an hour when he is not aware, and shall cut him in sunder, and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites.” None so like to be surprised by the judgment of God, as those who trespass so boldly upon his patience.

III. To persuade us to make a right use of the patience and long-suffering of God, and to comply with the merciful end and design of God therein.

1. It is the design of God’s long-suffering to give us a space of repentance. Were it not that God had this design and reasonable expectation from us, he would not reprieve a sinner for one moment, but would execute his judgments upon him so soon as ever he had offended. This our Saviour declares to us by the parable of the fig-tree, (Luke xiii. 6.) Were it not that God expects from us the fruit of repentance, he would cut us down, and not suffer us to cumber the ground: after he had “waited three years, seeking fruit and finding none, he spares it one year more, to see if it would bear fruit.”

2. The long-suffering of God is a great encouragement to repentance. We see by his patience that he is not ready to take advantage against us; that he spares us when we offend, is a very good sign that he will forgive us if we repent. Thus natural light would reason; and so the King of Nineveh, a heathen, reasons, “Who can tell if God will turn and repent?” But we are fully assured of this by the gracious declarations of the gospel, and the way of pardon and forgiveness, which is therein established through faith in the blood of Jesus Christ, who was made a “propitiation for the sins of the whole world.”

Therefore the long-suffering of God should be a powerful argument to us, “to break off our sins by repentance:” for this is the end of God’s patience; “He is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance. He hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked should turn from his way and live.” God every where expresseth a vehement desire and earnest expectation of our repentance and conversion. (Jer. iv. 14.) “O Jerusalem! wash thy heart from wickedness, that thou mayest be saved.” And, (chap. xiii. 27.) “Woe unto thee, Jerusalem! wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be?” He who is so patient as to the punishment of our sins, is almost impatient of our repentance for them; “Wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be?” And can we stand out against his earnest desire of our happiness, whom we have so often and so long provoked to make us miserable? Let us then return into ourselves, and think seriously what our case and condition is; how we have lived, and how long the patience of God hath suffered our manners, and waited for our repentance, and how inevitable and intolerable the misery of those must be who live and die in the contempt and abuse of it; let us heartily repent of our wicked lives, and say, “What have we done?” How careless have we been of our own happiness, and what pains have we taken to undo ourselves!

Let us speedily set about this work, because we do not know how long the patience of God may last, and the opportunities of our salvation be continued to us. This day of God’s grace and patience will have an end; therefore, as the prophet exhorts, (Isa. lv. 6.) “Seek the Lord while he may be found, and call upon him while he is near.” Now God graciously invites sinners to come to him, and is ready to receive them; nay, if they do but move towards him, he is ready to go forth and meet them half way; but the time will come, when he will bid them depart from him; when they shall cry, “Lord, Lord, open unto us,” and the door of mercy shall be shut against the them.

All the while thou delayest this necessary work, thou venturest thy immortal soul, and puttest thy eternal salvation upon a desperate hazard; and should God snatch thee suddenly away in an impenitent state, what would become of thee? Thou art yet in the way, and God is yet reconcileable, but death is not far off, and perhaps much nearer to thee than thou art aware; at the best thy life is uncertain, and death will infallibly put a period to this day of God’s grace and patience.

Repentance is a work so necessary, that methinks no man should lose so much time as to deliberate, whether he should set about it or not; De necessariis nulla est deliberatio; “No man deliberates about what he must do, or be undone if he do it not.” It is a work of so great consequence and concernment, and the delay of it so infinitely dangerous, that one would think no wise man could entertain a thought of deferring it. What greater folly and stupidity can there be, than for men to venture their immortal souls, and to run an apparent hazard in matters of everlasting consequence.

This day of God’s patience is the great opportunity of our salvation; and if we let it slip, it is never to be recovered: if we misimprove this time of our life, we shall not be permitted to live it over again to improve it better. Our state of trial ends with this life; after that God will prove us no more; then we shall wish, “O that I had known, in that my day, the things which belonged to my peace! but now they are hid from mine eyes: therefore to day, whilst it is called to-day, harden not your hearts, make no tarrying to turn to the Lord, and put not off from day to day; for suddenly shall the wrath of the Lord break forth, and in thy security thou shalt be destroyed. Exercise repentance in the time of health, and defer not till death to be justified.”

But that which I design to speak to is the proposition itself, that power belongs to God; that is, that the excellency of power, power in its highest degree and perfection, all power belongs to God; that is, that omnipotence is a property or perfection of the Divine nature.

In the handling of this I shall shew,

First, What we are to understand by the omnipotence of God.

Secondly, That this perfection belongs to God.

First, What we are to understand by the omnipotence of God. And this I shall consider,

I. As to the principle. And,

II. As to the exercise of it.

I. As to the principle; it is an ability to do all things, the doing of which speaks power and perfection; that is, whatever is not repugnant either to the nature of things, or of God; whatever does not imply a contradiction in the thing, or an imperfection in the doer; an ability to do all things which are consistent with itself, and with the Divine nature and perfection; by which we must mean an executive power, the effect whereof is without himself; for what he is said to do within himself, the acts of his understanding and will, as we conceive his will to be distinct from his power, are not to be referred to his omnipotence. To have a right conception of omnipotence, we must imagine the most perfect active principle that we can, and it is still something more perfect than that, or any thing we can imagine. To help our conception,

1. Let us imagine a principle from which all other power is derived, and upon which it depends, and to which it is perfectly subject and subordinate.

2. A perfect active principle, which can do, not only what any finite being or creature can do, but what all beings joined together can do; nay, more and greater things than they all can do.

3. A perfect active principle, to which nothing can make any considerable, much less effectual resistance, which can check and countermand at pleasure, and carry down before it, and annihilate all other powers that we can imagine besides this; because we cannot imagine any other power, that is not derived from this, and does not depend upon it.

4. A perfect active principle, which can do all things in a most perfect manner, and can do all things at once, and in an instant, and that with ease. We can but do one thing at once; and the greater and more considerable it is, the more time it will ask us to do it, and we find it the harder and more difficult to be done: but God, to whose knowledge all things are present at once, and together, and the acts of whose will are as quick and perfect as of his understanding, hath a power answerable to the perfection of both; and therefore it is as easy to him to do all things, as one thing; at once, as successively, and in time. For this is the privilege of an infinite Spirit, that it does not only act without hands and material engines or instruments, as every spirit doth, but without motion from one place to another; because he is every where, and fills all places; he acts per modum voluntatis, as if his actings were nothing else but a willing that such a thing be done; and, ipso facto, every thing is so, as he wills it should be, and when he wills it should be; as if things did start up into being, or vanish out of being, as if they did break forth into being, and sculk again into nothing, and undergo such and such changes, ad nutum voluntatis, “at the beck of his will.” And this is the most perfect way of acting that can be imagined, which the Scripture seems to express to us, when it represents God as making things by his word, up holding all things by the word of his power; as if he did but speak the word, and say, Let such a thing be, and it was so; as if there were nothing more required to the doing of any thing, but an express act of the Divine will, which is all we can understand by God’s speaking, by his word, and voice, and saying, Let things be; but the least that it can signify, is the quick and speedy manner of working, whereby God is able to do things in an instant, as soon as a word can be spoken.

And as he can do all things at once, and in an instant, so with ease, without any pain or laborious endeavour; for what is it that can object any difficulty to him? At the first creation of things, there was nothing to resist him; and since the creation, here is nothing but what was made by him, and consequently all, whose power is derived from him, and depends upon him, and is subject to him, and being finite and limited, is infinitely unequal to the infinite power of God; so that we may imagine the Divine power would pass through all the resistance hat all created power can make, and all the difficulties it can object to it, with more ease than a bullet passeth through the thin air, or a man would pass through a net of cobweb.

5. The most perfect active principle we can imagine, the utmost bounds and limits of whose perfection we cannot imagine, that is, when we have imagined it to be as perfect, and to act in as perfect a manner as we can imagine, yet we have not reached the perfection of it; but after all this, that it can do many things more than we can imagine, and in a manner much more perfect than we can imagine. This is the omnipotence of God as to the principle, which hath no bounds and limits. And,

II. As to the exercise of it, it is only limited by the Divine will and wisdom. The Divine will determines it to its exercise, the Divine wisdom directs and regulates the exercise of it; that is, God exerciseth his power willingly, and not by necessity, and in such manner, for the producing such effects, and in order to such ends and purposes, as seem best to his wisdom. Hence he is said to act all things according to his good pleasure, and according to the counsel of his will; that is, freely and wisely.

As to the extent of this power, I said it was an ability to do all things that are consistent with itself, and with the nature and perfection of God.

First, That are consistent with itself; that is, with a power to do all things. It is a contradiction to imagine that omnipotence can do that, which, if it could be done, would render all power insignificant. Upon this account, the Divine power is not said to extend to the working of any thing which implies a contradiction, and the terms whereof speak a repugnancy to one another, and mutually destroy one another, and the doing whereof is contrary to the nature of the thing which is supposed to be done; that is, is nonsense, and cannot be imagined to be. For example, that a thing should be, and not be, at the same time. For a power to make a thing to be, so as it should not be while it is, signifies nothing, because such a being as is not, is nothing; and to make such a being, would be to do nothing, and consequently such a power would signify nothing. So likewise we cannot say, that the Divine power can cause that the same thing should be made and not be made; that that which hath been, should not have been; for the power which makes a thing, so as that it was not made, and causeth a thing to have been, so as that it hath not been, does nothing; and consequently is no power. Nor can we say, that the Divine power can effect that any thing should be made by itself; that is, be the cause of its own being; for that would be to cause that a thing should be before it is; that is, be when it is not, which signifies nothing. We cannot say, that the Divine power can effect, that twice two should not make four; for that would be to cause that things should not be what they are, if they be at all; which is to cause that things should be, and not be at all, when they are, which amounts to nothing.

We cannot say, the Divine power can make a sound to be seen, and colour to be heard; for that would be to make colour and sound all one; that is, things that differ, to be the same while they differ, which is to make colour and sound not to be colour and sound while they are so; which is to do nothing, and consequently argues no power.

We cannot say, that the Divine power can make that which is intrinsically and essentially good to be evil; and on the contrary: or that which is necessarily true to be false; and on the contrary. For to make that which is intrinsically and essentially to be evil, is to make that which is always good to be sometimes evil; that is, to be evil whilst it is good; that is, to make good and evil all one; which is to bring two things together, which so soon as they do exist, destroy one another, which is to no purpose, because it is to do just nothing; and there is the same reason of true and false.

We cannot say, that the power of God can cause that the same thing should be hot and cold, dead and alive, at the same time, because these destroy one another; and if they were both, neither of them would be, and so the effect we attribute to this power would be nothing.

We cannot say, that the Divine power can effect that the same impression should give a thing two contrary motions, upward and downward, at the same time; that the same body should be in two contrary postures, in motion and at rest, and in several places, which are the contradictions of transubstantiation; for the same body to be at the same time in two several places, is to be limited and circumscribed by each of these; that is, so to be in each of them, as not to be in the other, or in any other; so that if it be in this place, it is not in that, nor in any other besides this; if it be in that place, it is not in this, nor any other besides that; but if it be in two, it is both in this and in that, and therefore in neither of them, nor any where else; so that a power to make a body to be in two places at once, is a power to make it to be no where; that is, not to be at all, which is no power; and there is the same reason of the same bodies being in contrary motion, or in motion and at rest, or in two contrary postures at the same time.

So that by all these instances, it appears, that a power to do any thing which implies a contradiction, and is repugnant to the nature of things, signifies nothing; and the supposed effect of it is only to bring terms together, which, if they could be brought together, so soon as they meet, will mutually take away and destroy one another, which would be vain, and to no purpose.

I have the more explicitly laid open these contradictions, with relation to the gross doctrine of transubstantiation, in which all or most of the contradictions which I have mentioned, are involved. I know they stiffly deny that these contradictions follow from that doctrine, and use pitiful shifts to avoid them; but being not able to satisfy themselves that way, if the worst should come to the worst, they can grant these contradictions, but then they fly to the power of God, which can do things which we call contradictions; or else they say, there are as many contradictions in the doctrine of the trinity, which all Christians believe. And thus they reproach Christianity to defend popery; and if they cannot persuade men to be papists, do what they can to make them atheists, or at least to hinder them from being Christians; but there is not so much malice in this objection, but there is as little strength. Is it any contradiction, that the same thing should be three and one in several respects? which is all that the Scripture teacheth concerning the Trinity: but if men will undertake to explain this more particularly than God thought fit to do, and do it in such a manner, as that they cannot free themselves from contradiction, let them look to it; the Christian religion is not at all concerned in this farther than to censure such men’s boldness and curiosity.

But against this exemption of things that imply a contradiction from the compass and extent of the Divine power, there are two objections which are more considerable, and deserve to be taken notice of.

I. We grant God’s fore-knowledge of future events, which seem to us to be impossible to be foreknown. Now, why may we not as well grant that God can do things which seem to us impossible to be done by any other power, as foreknow things which it is impossible for any understanding to know? For why should we pretend to know the utmost of what infinite power can do, any more than the utmost of what infinite understanding can know?

Answer.—I know no reason but that the argument should be granted, if there were an equal necessity of granting the possibility of those things which seem to us impossible to be done, that there is of granting the possibility of foreknowing future contingencies, though they seem to us impossible to be known. We must grant the possibility of foreknowing future contingencies, because the Scripture, which we believe to be a Divine revelation, expressly tells us, that God doth foreknow them, and gives us instances of it in several prophecies and predictions. Now, if any man can shew me as express texts, which say, that God can make a body to be in two places at once, I would believe it, though I do not see how it is possible; because it is reasonable I should believe that infinite power can do many things, the possibility of which my finite understanding cannot reach. Now, whereas the papists say, the Scripture hath said, that from which this necessarily follows, viz. “This is my body;” this is not enough, unless they could either prove that it is necessary to understand all texts of Scripture in a rigorous and strict propriety of the letter, without admitting of any trope or figure in the words, which they do not pretend; or else shew a clear reason why this should be understood so, more than a thousand others; which they have not done, and I think never can do.

But if it be farther argued; if we grant in one case, that those things which seem to be contradictions to us, may be possible, why not in all cases; unless we had some certain way of distinguishing between seeming contradictions and real ones? And if we grant all contradictions possible, then there is no reason to exempt these from the extent of the Divine power; but we may safely say, that the Divine power can make a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time. To this I answer,

1. I do not grant that any thing which seems to me to be a contradiction, ought to be granted by me to be possible, unless I have higher assurance and greater reason to believe it to be possible, than I have to believe it to be a contradiction: for example, suppose it were clearly revealed in Scripture, that two bodies may be in the same place, and at the same time (which is not, nor any thing like it); then, having a revelation for this, and no revelation that it is not a contradiction, I have higher assurance, and greater reason to believe it possible, than that it is a contradiction; and consequently, I have reason to believe it is no contradiction, and that from thence it would not follow, that the same thing may be, and not be, at the same time: but though in case of Divine revelation, I may believe that to be no contradiction, which seems to me to be a contradiction; yet I am not, without great necessity and clear evidence, to offer violence to reason, and affront the faculty of understanding which God hath endowed me withal, by entertaining any thing which seems to me to be a contradiction; which the papists do in the business of transubstantiation, without any evidence of revelation, and consequently without necessity.

2. But if this were revealed in Scripture, that the same thing may be, and not be, at the same time, I could have no reason to believe that, because I could have no assurance, if that were true, that the Scriptures were a Divine revelation, or that it were to be believed if it were; for if it were true, that the same thing may be and not be, then a Divine revelation may be no Divine revelation; and when I am bound to believe a thing, I may be bound at the same time not to believe it; and so all things would fall into uncertainty, and the foundation of all assurance, and of all duty and obedience, both of faith and practice, would be taken away.

The second objection is from the power of creation, which is generally acknowledged to be a making of something out of nothing. Now, say the objectors, this seems as palpable a contradiction as any thing else.

Answer.—To us, indeed, who converse with material things, and never saw any thing made but out of pre-existent matter, it is very hard to conceive how any thing should be created, that is, produced out of nothing: but every thing that is strange is not a contradiction. It is strange to us, and hard to conceive, that there should be such a thing as a spirit, who never saw, nor can see any thing but matter; and yet we grant there are spirits. It is hard to us to conceive how any thing should be made but out of matter; and yet spirit, if it were made of any thing pre-existent, cannot be made of matter: but if we will attend to those common dictates of reason, which every man, whether he will or no, must assent to, we may easily understand creation to be possible, and free from contradiction. For the clearing of this, I will proceed by these steps:

1. The true notion of creation is, the bringing of something into being, which before had no being at all; for the phrase of making something out of no thing, or out of no pre-existent matter, does mislead our understandings into odd conceits, as if nothing could be the material cause of something, or as if nothing could be what is material.

2. Every one must grant, that something is; for we see that things are, however they came to be.

3. Every one must grant, that something is of itself, whether matter, or that being which we call God.

4. Every one must grant, that that which was of itself, was always; for nothing can begin of itself.

5. It is much more easy to conceive how a thing, that once was not, might sometimes be brought into being by another, than how a thing should be always of itself; for that which once was not, is supposed to have something before it, by which it might be made, though not out of which it was made; but that which was always, neither had, nor could have any thing, by which or out of which it could be made. And why cannot a thing come into being, when there was nothing before it out of which it was made, as well as a thing be always, when there could not be any thing before it out of which it should be?

Secondly, I exempt those things from the extent of omnipotence, which imply imperfection, which are contrary to the nature and perfection of God, both natural and moral imperfections; for these also destroy power, because they are not arguments of power, but of impotence. Natural imperfections; as, to die, to be sick, to be in want, to eat, to sleep, to forget, &c. Moral imperfections, those which contradict the holiness of God, as sin and vice, or to compel any to sin; which contradict his goodness, as to be cruel; which contradict his truth, as to lie, to deceive, to break his promise, to deny himself. (Tit. i. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 13; Jam. i. 12.) He is said to be ἀπείραστος κακῶν, contrary to the constancy and immutability of his nature, as to change his decree, to repent; contrary to justice and equity, as for ever to spare and to pardon obstinate sinners, eternally to punish innocent and good men; for these are moral imperfections, and contradict the holiness, and truth, and goodness, and justice, and immutability of the Divine nature; and that distinction between God’s absolute and ordinate power, that is, that God hath an absolute power of doing some things, which yet, upon supposition of his decree, or promise, or goodness, or justice, he cannot do, is vain and frivolous, unless men mean by it only this, that some things which argue an imperfection, do not imply a contradiction, which is most true; but both these are absolutely and equally impossible to God. I proceed to the

Second thing I proposed, that this perfection be longs to God: and this I shall shew,

I. From the dictates of natural light.

II. From Scripture or Divine revelation.

I. From the dictates of natural light. This was one of the most usual titles which the heathens gave to their supreme Deity, Optimus Maximus; next to his goodness they placed his greatness, which does chiefly appear in his power; and they did not only attribute a great power to him, but an omnipotence. Nihil est quod Deus efficere, non potest, (saith Tully de Div.) Now their natural reason did convince them, that this perfection did belong to God by these three arguments:

1. From those two great instances and expressions of his power, creation and providence; for the heathens did generally acknowledge the making of the world, and the preservation and government of it, to be the effects of power, determined by goodness, and regulated by wisdom. Hence they gave those titles to God of Opifex Rerum, and Rector Mundi. I say generally; I except Aristotle, who supposed the world not to have been made, but to have been from eternity; and Epicurus with his followers, who ascribed the regular and orderly frame of nature to a happy casualty and fortunate concourse of atoms: but, generally, the wiser did look upon the vast frame of nature, this stately fabric of the world, and the upholding and preserving of it, as an argument of a Divine and invisible power. And so the apostle tells us, (Rom. i. 20.) that by the light of nature “the invisible things of God were clearly seen by the things that were made, even his eternal power and Godhead.”

2. Because all other perfections, without this, would be insignificant and ineffectual, or else could not be at all. Without this, goodness would be an empty piece of good meaning, and not able to give any demonstration of itself; knowledge would be an idle speculation; and wisdom to contrive things, without power to effect them, would be an useless thing. There would be no such thing as justice, if the Divine nature were without a power to reward and punish; no such thing as faithfulness, if he had not a power to perform what he promises; no providence, for it would be in vain for him that hath no power, to take upon him to govern and to intermeddle in the affairs of the world.

3. Without this there could be no religion. Take away the power of God, and there can be no foundation of faith and trust, no reason for fear; all arguments from hope and fear would be taken away; we could not expect any good, nor fear any harm, from an impotent being that could do nothing. The sanction of God’s laws would be taken away. To give authority to laws, there must not only be a right to command, but power to back those commands; the grand security and last resort of all government and authority is power. (James iv. 12.) “There is one lawgiver, who is able to save, and to destroy.” None can be a lawgiver, but he that hath this power, to reward and punish, to make men happy or miserable, “to save, or to destroy.” Men would not pray to God, nor make any address to him, if they did not believe he was able to supply their wants, and relieve them in their straits; Nec in hunc furorem omnes mortales consensissent alloquendi surda numina et inefficaces deos.—Seneca. There would be no encouragement for men to serve God, if they did not believe that he was able to reward them, and bring them to happiness, and to defend them against all the enemies of their welfare, so that it should not be in the power of the most malicious spirits to hinder them of their happiness.

II. From Scripture, or Divine revelation. In producing texts to this purpose, I will proceed by these steps:

1. His infiniteness, or the immensity of his being. Grant me but these two things, that there is something in the world besides God, some other matter, as the heavens, the air, the earth, and all those things which we see; and grant me that two bodies cannot be in the same places at once; and then it will evidently follow, that wherever these are, God is shut out; and consequently God should not be infinite, nor in all places; and so much as there is of another matter in the world besides God, so many breaches there would be in the Divine nature, so many hiatuses.

2. The knowledge and wisdom of God. It can not be imagined how mere matter can understand, how it can distinctly comprehend such variety of objects, and at one view take in past, present, and to come. Tully, speaking of spirits, saith, Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; “Their original cannot be found upon earth; for (saith he) there is no material or bodily thing,” Quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia; quæ sola divina sunt, “Which hath the power of memory, of understanding, of thought; which can retain things past, foresee things future, and comprehend things present; all which powers are purely Divine.”

3. Freedom and liberty. For the laws of matter are necessary, nor can we imagine any αὐτεξούσιον, any arbitrary principle in it. This puzzled the Epicureans, as we see in Lucretius; “For if (says he) all things move by certain and necessary laws, and there be a connexion of the parts of matter unto each other, so that if you move this, that must necessarily be moved, whence (saith he) is liberty?” Unde est hæc inquam fatis avulsa voluntas; “Whence is this principle of will, whose motions are not under any law of necessity?”

4. Goodness. This follows from the former; for he is not good who does not know what he does, nor does it freely; so that take away understanding and liberty, and you take away goodness: now take away from God infiniteness, and knowledge, and liberty, and goodness, and you divest him of his glory; you take away his most essential perfections. So that these great absurdities following from the supposing of God to be mere matter or body, we are to conceive of him as another kind of substance; that is, a spirit. So that I wonder that the author of the Leviathan, who doth more than once expressly affirm, that there can be nothing in the world but what is material and corporeal, did not see that the necessary consequence of this position is to banish God out of the world. I would not be uncharitable, but I doubt he did see it, and was content with the consequence, and willing the world should entertain it: for it is so evident, that, by supposing the Divine essence to consist of matter, the immensity of the Divine nature is taken away; and it is also so utterly unimaginable how mere matter should understand, and be endowed with liberty, and consequently with goodness, that I cannot but vehemently suspect the man who denies God to be a spirit, either to have a gross and faulty understanding, or a very ill will against God, and an evil design to root out of the minds of men the belief of a God. I come in the

III. Third place, to consider the objections.

1st Obj.—Why then is God represented to us so often in Scripture by the parts and members of men’s bodies? Answ. I shall only say, at present, that all these descriptions and representations of God are plainly made to comply with our weakness, by way of condescension and accommodation to our capacities.

2d Obj.—How is it said, that “man was made after the image of God,” if God be a spirit, of which there can be no likeness nor resemblance? Answ. Man is not said to be made after the image of God, in respect of the outward shape and features of his body, but in respect of the qualities of his mind, as holiness and righteousness; or of his faculties, as understanding and will; or, which the text seems most to favour, in respect of his dominion and sovereignty over the creatures; for, in the two former respects, the angels are made after the image of God. Now, this seems to be spoken peculiarly of men, (Gen. i. 24.) “Let us make man in our own image, after our own likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the fowls of the air,” &c.

IV. I come now to draw some inferences or corollaries from hence, and they shall be partly speculative, partly practical.

First, Speculative inferences.

1. That God is invisible. The proper object of sight is colour, and that ariseth from the various dispositions of the parts of matter which cause several reflections of light. Now, a spirit hath no parts nor matter, and therefore is invisible. (1 Tim. i. 17.) “Unto the eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God.” (Heb. xi. 27.) “He endured, as seeing him who is invisible;” as seeing him by an eye of faith, who is invisible by an eye of sense. (1 Tim. vi. 16.) “Whom no man hath seen, nor can see.”

When Moses, and the elders of Israel, are said to have seen God, and Jacob to have seen him face to face, (Exod. ii. 6. Gen. xxxii. 30.) it is meant of an angel covered with Divine glory and majesty; as we shall see if we compare these with other texts. When Moses is said to have “spoken to him face to face,” that is, familiarly; and so Micaiah (1 Kings xxii. 19.) is said to have “seen God upon his throne, and all Israel scattered up and down;” this was in a vision. And it is promised, that in heaven we shall see God; that is, have a more perfect knowledge of him, and full enjoyment; as, to see good days, is to enjoy them. Those texts, where it is said, “No man can see God and live,” (Exod. xxxiii. 20. and John i. 18.) “No man hath seen God at any time,” do not intimate that God is visible, though we cannot see him; but seeing is metaphorically used for knowing, and the meaning is, that in this life we are not capable of a perfect knowledge of God. A clear discovery of God to our understanding would let in joys into our souls, and create desires in us, too great for frail mortality to bear.

2. That he is the living God: spirit and life are often put together in Scripture.

3. That God is immortal. This the Scripture at tributes to him, (1 Tim. i. 17.) “To the King immortal, invisible.” (1 Tim. vi. 16.) “Who only hath immortality.” This also flows from God’s spirituality; a spiritual nature hath no principles of corruption in it, nothing that is liable to perish, or decay, or die. Now this doth so eminently agree to God, either because he is purely spiritual and immaterial, as possibly no creature is; or else because he is not only immortal in his own nature, but is not liable to be reduced to nothing by any other, because he hath an original and independent immortality; and therefore the apostle doth attribute it to him in such a singular and peculiar manner, “who only hath immortality.”

Secondly, Practical inferences.

1. We are not to conceive of God as having a body, or any corporeal shape or members. This was the gross conceit of the Anthropomorphites of old, and of some Socinians of late, which they ground upon the gross and literal interpretation of many figurative speeches in Scripture concerning God, as where it speaks of his face, and hand, and arm, &c. But we are very unthankful to God, who condescends to represent himself to us according to our capacities, if we abuse this condescension to the blemish and reproach of the Divine nature. If God be pleased to stoop to our weakness, we must not therefore level him to our infirmities.

2. If God be a spirit, we are not to worship God by any image or sensible representation. Because God is a spirit, we are not to liken him to any thing that is corporeal; we are not to represent him by “the likeness of any thing that is in heaven above,” that is, of any birds; “or in the earth beneath,” that is, of any beast; “or in the waters under the earth,” that is, of any fish; as it is in the second commandment. For, as the prophet tells us, there is nothing that we can liken God to; (Isa. xl. 18.) “To whom will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare to him?” We debase his spiritual and incorruptible nature, when we compare him to corruptible creatures. (Rom. i. 22, 23.) Speaking of the heathen idolatry, “Who, professing themselves wise, became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and to four-footed beasts, and creeping things.” They became fools; this is the folly of idolatry, to liken a spirit, which hath no bodily shape, to things that are corporeal and corruptible. So that, however some are pleased to mince the matter, I cannot see how the church of Rome, which worships God by or towards some image or sensible representation, can be excused from idolatry; and the church of England doth not, without very just cause, challenge the Romish church with it, and make it a ground of separation from her.

3. If God be a spirit, then we should “worship him in spirit and in truth.” This is the inference of the text; and, therefore, I shall speak a little more largely of it; only I must explain what is meant by worshipping “in spirit and in truth,” and shew you the force of this consequence, how it follows, that because God is a spirit, therefore he must be worshipped “in spirit and in truth.”

1. For the explication of it. This word spirit is sometimes applied to the doctrine of the gospel, and so it is opposed to letter, by which name the doctrine of Moses is called, (2 Cor. iii. 6.) “Who hath made us able ministers of the new testament, not of the letter, but of the spirit;” not of the law, which was written in tables of stone, but which Christ by his Spirit writes in the hearts of believers. Sometimes to the worship of the gospel; and so it is opposed to the flesh: (Gal. iii. 3.) “Having begun in the spirit, are ye now made perfect by the flesh?” that is, by the works of the ceremonial law, which is therefore called flesh, because the principal ceremony of it, circumcision, was made in the flesh, and because their sacrifices, a chief part of their worship, were of the flesh of beasts; and because the greatest part of their ordinances, as washing, and the like, related to the body. Hence it is the apostle calls the worship of the Jews, “the law of a carnal commandment,” (Heb. vii. 16. and Heb. ix 10,) Carnal ordinances, speaking of the service of the law, “which (saith he) stood in meats, and drinks, and divers washings, and carnal ordinances.” Now, in opposition to this carnal and ceremonial worship, we are to worship God “in the spirit.” The worship of the Jews was most a bodily service; but we are to give God a reasonable service, to serve him with the spirit of our minds, as the apostle speaks; in stead of offering the flesh of bulls and goats, we are to consecrate ourselves to the service of God: “this is a holy and acceptable sacrifice,” or reasonable service.

“And in truth.” Either in opposition to the false worship of the Samaritans (as “in spirit” is opposed to the worship of the Jews), as our Saviour tells the woman, that “they worshipped they knew not what;” or (which I rather think) in opposition to the shadows of the law; and so it is opposed, (John i. 17.) “The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.”

Not that the external service of God is here excluded, not that we are to shew no outward reverence to him; but that, as, under the law, the service of God was chiefly external and corporeal, so now it should chiefly be inward and spiritual; the worship of God, under the gospel, should chiefly be spiritual and substantial, not a carnal, and bodily, and ceremonious devotion.

2dly, For the force of the consequence, it doth not lie in this, that just such as God is, such must our worship of him be; for this would exclude all bodily and outward worship; our worship of God must therefore be invisible, eternal, &c. for so is he; and besides, the will of God seems rather to be the rule of his worship than his nature: but the force of it is this; God is of a spiritual nature, and this is to be supposed to be his will, that our worship should be as agreeable to the object of it, as the nature of the creature, who is to give it, will bear. Now, saith Christ to the woman, the Jews and the Samaritans limit their worship to a certain place, and it consists chiefly in certain carnal rites and ordinances; but, saith he, though God have permitted this for a time, because of the carnality and hardness of their hearts, yet the time is coming, when a more spiritual, and solid, and substantial worship of God is to be introduced, which will be free from all particular places and rites; not tied to the temple, or to such external ceremonies, but consisting in the devotion of our spirits, even the inward frame and temper of our hearts; all outward circum stances (excepting those of the two sacraments which are positive) being left by the gospel to as great a liberty, as natural necessity and decency will permit.

We must worship God, and therefore it is naturally necessary that we should do it somewhere, in some place; now seeing somebody must determine this, it is most convenient that authority should determine it according to the conveniency of cohabitation. We must not be rude, nor do any thing that is naturally indecent in the worship of God: this authority should restrain; but farther than this, I doubt not but the gospel hath left us free; and to this end, that the less we are tied to external observances, the more intent we should be upon the spiritual and substantial parts of religion, the conforming of ourselves to the mind and will of God, endeavouring to be like unto God, and to have our souls and spirits engaged in those duties we perform to him. So that our Saviour’s argument is this; “God is a spirit;” that is, the most excellent nature and being, and therefore must be served with the best. We consist of body and soul, it is true, and we must serve him with our whole man, but principally with our souls, which are the most excellent part of ourselves; the service of our mind and spirit is the best we can perform, and therefore most agree able to God, who is a spirit, and the best and most perfect being.

So that the inference is this, that if God be a spirit, we must “worship him in spirit and in truth;” our religion must be real, and inward, and sincere, and substantial: we must not think to put off God with external observances, and with bodily reverence and attendance; this we must give him, but we must principally regard that our service of him be reasonable, that is, directed by our understandings, and accompanied with our affections. Our religion must consist principally in a sincere love and affection to God, which expresseth itself in a real conformity of our lives and actions to his will; and when we make our solemn approaches to him, in the duties of his worship and service, we must perform all acts of outward worship to God with a pure and sincere mind; whatever we do in the service of God, we must “do it heartily as to the Lord.” God is a pure spirit, present to our spirits, intimate to our souls, and conscious to the most secret and retired motions of our hearts: now because we serve the Searcher of hearts, we must serve him with our hearts.

Indeed, if we did worship God only to be seen of men, a pompous and external worship would be very suitable to such an end; but religion is not intended to please men, but God; and therefore it must be spiritual, and inward, and real.

I. From the natural notions and dictates of our minds.

II. From Scripture and Divine revelation.

III. From the inconvenience of the contrary.

I. From the natural notions and dictates of our minds. We find that the heathen, by the light of nature, did attribute this perfection to God, Tully tells us, De Nat. Deor. that Pythagoras thought, Deum esse animam per naturam rerum omnem intentum et comeantem; “That God is, as it were, a soul passing through and inspiring all nature.” And in l. 2. de Leg. that this was Thales’s opinion which he commends, Homines existimare oportere deos omnia cernere, deorum omnia esse plena; “That men ought to believe, that the gods see all things, that all things are full of them.” So Sen. Epist. 95. Ubique et omnibus præsto est; “He is every where present and at hand:” and, de Benef. l. 4. Quocunque te ftexeris ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi, nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet; “Which way soever thou turnest thyself, thou shalt find him meeting thee; nothing is without him, he fills his own work.” Not much differing from the expression of the Psalmist here.

II. From Scripture and Divine revelation. I shall instance in some remarkable places: (1 Kings viii. 27.) “Behold, the heaven, and heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee.” (Job xi. 7-9.) “Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?” (Isa. lxvi. 1.) “Thus saith the Lord, Behold, heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool: where is the house that ye build unto me? and where is the place of my rest?” (Jer. xxiii. 23, 24.) “Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him, saith the Lord? Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord?” (Amos ix. 2, 3.) “Though they dig into hell, thence shall mine hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down: and though they hide themselves in the top of Carmel, I will search and take them out thence; and though they be hid from my sight in the bottom of the sea, thence will I command the serpent and he shall bite them.” (Acts xvii.27, 28.) “Though he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.”

III. From the inconveniences of the contrary. And this is the most proper way of proving any of God’s perfections; for, as I have told you formerly, there being nothing before God, nor any cause of his being, his perfections cannot be proved by way of demonstration, but of conviction, by shewing the absurdity of the contrary. The first and most easy notion that we have of God is, that he is a being which hath all perfection, and is free from all imperfections. Now if I prove that the immensity of God’s essence is a perfection, or, which is the same, that the contrary is an imperfection, I do sufficiently prove the thing intended.

Now to suppose the Divine essence to be limited or confined, and his presence to be any where excluded, doth contradict both this necessary perfection of God, his universal providence; and the necessary duty of creatures, to worship and trust in him; and the voluntary manifestation and appearance of God in the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

1. It contradicts the universal providence of God. The universal providence of God supposeth many perfections; viz. infinite knowledge and infinite power, his omniscience and omnipotence, neither of which can be imagined without omnipresence. We find that all finite beings have a finite knowledge and a finite power; and it cannot be conceived how infinite understanding and power can be founded any where else than in an infinite essence. To have an infinite knowledge of all things, even those things which are most secret and hidden, to be able to do all things, to steer and govern the actions of all creatures, and to have a perfect care of them, seems, to all the reason of mankind, to require immediate presence.

2. It contradicts the necessary duty of the creature, which is to worship God, to depend upon him for every thing, and in every thing to acknowledge him. Now all worship of God is rendered vain, or at least uncertain, if God be not present to us to hear our prayers, to take notice of our wants, and receive our acknowledgments: it will much abate our confidence in God, and our fear to offend him, if we be uncertain whether he be present to us or not, whether he sees our actions or not.

3. It contradicts a voluntary manifestation and appearance of God in the incarnation of Christ. He that supposeth God not to be every where present by his essence, must, in all reason, confine his presence to heaven, and suppose him to be present elsewhere only by his virtue and power: but if this were so, how could the Divinity be essentially united to the human nature of Christ which was hereupon earth? how “is God with us?” How does “he pitch his tabernacle amongst men,” if his essential presence be confined to heaven?

Secondly, Endeavour to prove that it doth be long to God, and ought to be attributed to the Divine nature.

Thirdly, Draw some corollaries from the whole.

First, For the explication of it. Eternity is a duration without bounds or limits: now there are two limits of duration, beginning and ending; that which hath always been, is without beginning; that which always shall be, is without ending. Now we may conceive of a thing always to have been, and the continuance of its being now to cease, though there be no such thing in the world: and there are some things which have had a beginning of their being, but shall have no end, shall always continue, as the angels and spirits of men. The first of these the schoolmen call eternity a parteante; that is, “duration without beginning;” the latter, eternity a parte post, “a duration without ending.” But eternity, absolutely taken, comprehends both these, and signifies an infinite duration, which had no beginning, nor shall have any end: so that when we say God is eternal, we mean that he always was, and shall be for ever; that he had no beginning of life, nor shall have any end of days; but that he is “from everlasting to everlasting,” as it is here in the text.

It is true, indeed, that as to God’s eternity a parte ante, as to his having always been, the Scripture doth not give us any solicitous account of it; it only tells us, in general, that God was before the world was, and that he created it: it doth not descend to gratify our curiosity, in giving us any account of what God did before he made the world, or how he entertained himself from all eternity: it doth not give us any distinct account of his infinite duration; for that had been impossible for our finite under standings to comprehend; if we should have ascended upward millions of ages, yet we should never have ascended to the top, never have arrived at the beginning of infinity; therefore the Scripture, which was wrote to instruct us in what was necessary, and not to satisfy our curiosity, tells us this, that God was from everlasting, before the world was made, and that he laid the foundations of it.

So that, by the eternity of God, you are to understand the perpetual continuance of his being, with out beginning or ending.

I shall not trouble you with the inconsistent and unintelligible notions of the schoolmen; that it is duratio tota simul, in which we are not to conceive any succession, but to imagine it an instant. We may as well conceive the immensity of God to be a point, as his eternity to be an instant: and as, according to our manner of conceiving, we must necessarily suppose the immensity of God to be an infinite expansion of his essence, a presence of it to all places, and imaginable space; so must we suppose the eternity of God to be a perpetual continuance, co-existent to all imaginable succession of ages. Now, how that can be together, which must necessarily be imagined to be co-existent to successions—let them that can, conceive.

Secondly, For the proof of this, I shall attempt it two ways.

I. From the dictates of natural light and reason.

II. From Scripture and Divine revelation.

I. From the dictates of natural reason. This at tribute of God is of all others least disputed among the philosophers: indeed, all agree that God is a perfect and happy being; but wherein that happiness and perfection consists, they differ exceedingly; but all agree, that God is eternal, and are agreed what eternity is; viz. a boundless duration: and however they did attribute a beginning to their heroes and demons, whence come the genealogies of their gods, yet the Supreme God they looked upon as without beginning: and it is a good evidence, that this perfection doth clearly belong to God, that Epicurus, who had the lowest and meanest conceptions of God, and robbed him of as many perfections as his imperfect reason would let him, yet is forced to attribute this to him: Tully (de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.) saith to the Epicureans, Ubi igitur vestrum beatum et æternum quibus duobus verbis significatis Deum? “Where then is your happy and eternal being, by which two epithets you express God?” And Lucretius, who hath undertaken to represent to the world the doctrine of Epicurus, gives this account of the Divine nature:

“It is absolutely necessary to the nature of the gods, to pass an eternity in profound peace and quiet.”

The poets, who had the wildest notions of God, yet they constantly give them the title of ἀθάνατοι; the heathen never mention the name of God, with out this attribute; Dii immortales! “Immortal gods!” was their ordinary exclamation; and they swear constantly by this attribute, Deos testor immortales; and to mention no more, Tully saith expressly, Nos Deum nisi sempiternum intelligere qui possumus? “How can we conceive of God, but as an eternal Being.”

Canst thou do this? These interrogations have the force of a vehement negation; as if he had said, No thou canst not; God is unsearchable, he is incomprehensible.

The two questions in the text seem to be only two several expressions of the same thing. The first question is undoubtedly general, concerning the nature and perfections of God in general; “Canst thou by searching find out God?” Canst thou by the most diligent search and inquiry come to a perfect knowledge and understanding of him?

The second question may seem to be a particular instance to the general truth implied in the first question; he seems to instance in his power, as if he had said, God is unsearchable, and then had instanced in a particular perfection, the power of God, “Canst thou by searching find out God?” Thou canst not comprehend the Divine nature and perfections in general; “Canst thou find out the Al mighty unto perfection?” Consider particularly his power, and see if thou canst know r the utmost of that. But I rather think that the latter question is altogether the same in sense with the former; and that the attribute of Almighty, which is here given to God, is used by way of description, and not in tended by way of instance. “Canst thou find out the Almighty,” that is, God, “unto perfection?” Which way soever we take the words, it is not much material, we may ground this observation upon them:

That God is incomprehensible.

This term or attribute is a relative term, and speaks a relation between an object and a faculty, between God and a created understanding; so that the meaning of it is plainly this, that no created understanding can comprehend God; that is, have a perfect and exact knowledge of him, such a knowledge as is adequate to the perfection of the object. Or thus, the nature and perfections of God are above the understanding of any of his creatures; it is only his own infinite understanding that can frame a perfect idea of his own perfection. God knows himself, his own understanding comprehends his own perfections. But he is incomprehensible to his creatures.

Indeed, there is nothing more obvious than God; for “he is not far from every one of us; in him we live, and move, and have our being;” there needs no great search to find out that there is a God: “An eternal power and Deity are clearly seen in the things which are made,” as the apostle tells us; but the manner of the being, and properties, and perfections of this God, these cannot be comprehended by a finite understanding. I shall prove the doctrine, and then apply it.

First, For the proof of it: I will attempt it these three ways:

I. By way of instance, or induction of particulars.

II. By way of conviction.

III. By giving the clear reason of it.

I. By way of instance. And I shall give you instances both on the part of the object, and of the subject, or the persons who are capable of knowing God in any degree.

1. On the part of the object. The nature of God, the excellency and perfection of God, the works and ways of God, are above our thoughts and apprehensions. The nature of God, it is vast and infinite: (Job xxxvi. 26.) “God is great, and we know him not.” (Job xxxvii. 23.) “Touching the Almighty we cannot find him out.” (Psal. 3.) “His greatness is unsearchable.”

The excellencies and perfections of God; his immensity, (2 Chron. ii. 6.) “The heaven of heavens cannot contain him:” the eternity of his duration, “from everlasting to everlasting he is God:” we cannot imagine any limits of his presence, nor bounds of his duration. The infiniteness of his knowledge: (Psal. cxlvii. 5.) “His understanding is infinite.” When we think of the wisdom and knowledge of God, our best way is to fall into admiration: (Rom. xi. 35.) “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!”

Where the Scripture speaks of those perfections of God, which the creatures do in some measure and degree partake of, as his goodness, and power, and wisdom, and holiness, and immortality, it attributes them in such a peculiar and Divine manner to God, as doth exclude and shut out the creature from any claim, or share, or title to them: (Matt. xix. 16, 17.) “Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is God.” (1 Tim. vi. 15, 16.) “Who is the blessed and only Potentate, who only hath immortality.” (1 Tim. i. 17.) “The only wise God.” (Rev. xv. 4.) “For thou only art holy.” In so inconceivable a manner cloth God possess these perfections which he communicates, and we can only understand them as he communicates them, and not as he possesses them; so that when we consider any of these Divine perfections, we must not frame notions of them contrary to what they are in the creature, nor must we limit them by what they are in the creature, but say, the goodness and the wisdom of God are all this which is in the creature, and much more, which I am not able to comprehend; the transcendent degree, and the singularity of these Divine perfections, which are communicable, is beyond what we are able to conceive.

The works of God; they are likewise unsearchable; the works of creation and of redemption. (Job v. 9.) “Which doeth great things, and unsearchable; marvellous things, past finding out.” And then he instanceth in the works of God, (Job xxvi. 14.) “Lo, these are part of his ways: but ho w little a portion is heard of him! and the thunder of his voice, who can understand?” So that he tells us expressly, we cannot find out the works of God; we do but know part of them. The question which he puts, (Job xxxvii. 16.) “Dost thou know the wondrous works of him that is perfect in knowledge?” can only be answered by the words of the Psalmist: (Psal. civ. 24.) “O Lord, how wonderful are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all.” The work of redemption: in this there shines forth such wisdom, mercy, and love, as our understandings cannot reach. This work is called “the wisdom of God in a mystery; hidden wisdom,” σοφία ἀποκεκρυμμενη, (1 Cor. ii. 7.) The mercy, and grace, and love of it is called, “the riches of God’s mercy, the exceeding riches of his grace,” (Eph. ii. 4. 7.) Now riches is, when you cannot tell the utmost of them, pauperes est numerare. (Eph. iii. 18, 19.) “That ye may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge.” When we have the largest apprehensions of this love, so that we think we comprehend it and know it, it “passeth knowledge;” yea, the effects of God’s power and love, which he manifests in believers, are unspeakable; for “he is able to do for us exceeding abundantly, above what we can ask or think, according to the power which worketh in us,” (Eph. iii. 20.) The peace which guards their souls “passeth all understanding,” (Phil. iv. 7.) Those “joys which fill their hearts are not to be expressed.” (1 Pet. i. 8.) We read of “joy unspeakable and full of glory.” The happiness which they hope for is inconceivable; it is that which “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man, which God hath laid up for us.”

The ways of God’s providence, they are not to be traced: (Psal. lxxvii. 19.) “Thy way is in the sea, and thy paths in the great waters, and thy footsteps are not known.” (Eccles. iii. 11.) “No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.” We are but of yesterday, and know nothing. When we look upon God’s providence, we take a part from the whole, and consider it by itself, without relation to the whole series of his dispensation; we cannot see the whole of God’s providence at one view, and never see from the beginning of the works of God to the end; therefore our knowledge of them must needs be very imperfect, and full of mistakes, and false judgments of things; we cannot, by our petty and short-sighted designs, judge of the works of God, and the designs of providence; for “our ways are not as his ways, nor our thoughts as his thoughts; but as the heavens are high above the earth, so are his ways above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts,” (Isa. lv. 8, 9.) The ways of God’s mercy: (Psal. ciii.) “As the heavens are high above the earth, so great is God’s mercy.” (Psal; cxxxix. 17, 18.) “How precious are thy thoughts unto me! how great is the sum of them! If I should count them, they are more in number than the sand.” And the ways of God’s judgments, the severity and greatness of his judgment is not known. (Psal. xc.) “Who knoweth the power of thine anger? and who may stand before thee when thou art angry?” And the reasons of his judgments are unsearchable: (Psal. xxxvi. 6.) “Thy judgments are a great deep.” (Rom. xi. 33.) “How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!” These are the instances on the part of the object.

2. On the part of the subject, or the persons capable of knowing God in any measure. The perfect knowledge of God is above a finite creature’s understanding. Wicked men are ignorant of God, and full of false apprehensions of him. The Scripture gives this description of them: they are those that “know not God.” (2 Thess. i.) Wicked men are so far from knowing God to perfection, that they have hardly any true knowledge of him; for as the man himself is, so will God seem to be to him; the idea and notions which men have of God, is but the picture of their own complexion. To a true knowledge there is required likeness; a man’s mind must be like the thing he would understand; therefore the apostle tells us, “the natural or animal man doth not receive the things of God,” he is not capable of them, because his mind is unsuitable to them; he is πλήρης τοῦ Σώματος, “full of body,” and he cannot relish spiritual things; even those natural notions which wicked men have of God, are strangely tinctured and obscured by the temper of the man; they are lux sepulta in opaca materia, “light buried and hid in matter and darkness,” in the blackness of a foul and impure heart; so that there is no question of them, whether they comprehend God or not.

But good men cannot find out God, they have some false apprehensions of him; all their apprehensions are dark, have much of obscurity in them; they know God to salvation, but not to perfection. In this life we do but know God in part; that is, in comparison of the knowledge which our natures are capable of.

But I will instance yet higher: the angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect, though they have true apprehensions of God, yet they do not arrive to perfect knowledge of him, they cannot pervestigare ultima, “know the utmost of God;” the cherubims themselves are continually looking at the mercy-seat. To which the apostle alludes, (1 Pet. i. 12.) when he tells us the mystery of God’s mercy in the gospel, is a thing “which the angels desired to pry into.” In heaven, “that which is in part shall be done away;” that is, our knowledge shall be as perfect as our natures are capable; but it shall be finite. When we shall “see God face to face;” that is, have an immediate vision of him, “and see him as he is;” that is, not having our understandings tinctured by any lust or passion that may darken our minds, or misrepresent the object; for the apostle tells us, “we shall see him, because we shall be like him;” yet then we shall have short and inadequate apprehensions of him, we shall still retain our limited natures and finite understandings.

II. By way of conviction. Dost thou know perfectly the nature of a finite spirit, the perfection and the power of an angel, how, being immaterial, they can act upon the matter, and move that which can make no resistance to a spirit? Dost thou know how they can move themselves to a great distance in a moment, and dart themselves from one part of the world to another? Dost thou know how man is “formed in the lowest parts of the earth,” as the Psalmist expresseth it, and the curious frame of our bodies is wrought from such rude principles in so dark a shop? Canst thou give an account how the soul is united to the body, by what bands or holds a spirit is so closely and intimately conjoined to matter? Dost thou know how thyself understandest any thing, and canst retain the distinct ideas and notions of so many objects without confusion? Dost thou know the least parts of matter how they are knit together; and by what cement they cleave so fast to one another, that they can hardly be separated?

Now if the creatures be so unsearchable, and the knowledge of these be too hard for thee, is not the Creator of them much more incomprehensible, who possesseth all these perfections which he communicates, and many which cannot be communicated to a creature? If in natural and sensible things, maxima pars eorum quæ scimus, est minima pars eorum quæ nescimus; how much more is it true of God, that “our ignorance is more than our knowledge,” when the whole earth and all the creatures bear no proportion to him? (Isa. xl. 15, 17.) “Behold, all the nations of the earth are as the drop of the bucket, and as the small dust of the balance; all nations before him are nothing, and are accounted to him less than nothing.”

III. By shewing you the clear reason of it, which is this the disproportion between the faculty and the object, the finiteness of our understandings, and the infiniteness of the Divine nature and perfections. “God is greater than our hearts;” and therefore as he knows more than we do, as the apostle reasons, (1 John iii. 20.) so he is more than can be known by us; he is too vast an object for our understanding to entertain, for our minds to receive. Thou mayest as well mete out the heaven with a span, and measure the waters in the hollow of thy hand, and comprehend the dust of the earth in a little urn, and weigh the mountains in scales, and the hills in a little balance, as think to circumscribe God in the narrow limits of thy thoughts, or to bring that which is infinite within the compass of that which is finite.

And there is not only the vastness and greatness of the object, but the glory and resplendency of it does so dazzle our sight, that we cannot perfectly see it: (1 Tim. vi. 16.) “He dwelleth in light, which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see.” As God is too big, so he is too bright an object for our understandings; the presence of his glory overpowers our minds, and bears down our faculties, and conquers our understandings.

I come now to apply this doctrine of the incomprehensibleness of the Divine nature. If the nature, and perfections, and ways, and works of God be incomprehensible, and past finding out;

I. It calls for our admiration, and veneration, and reverence. These are the best apprehensions of him that is incomprehensible; a silent veneration of his excellencies, is the best acknowledgment of them. We must admire what we cannot apprehend or express, (Zech. ix. 17.) “How great is his goodness, and how great is his beauty!” The best way to celebrate the praises of God, is that which Nehemiah useth, (Nehem. ix. 5.) “And blessed be thy glorious name, which is exalted above all blessing and praise.” Whenever we speak or think of God, we necessarily detract from his perfections; but even this necessity is glorious to him, and this speaks his perfection, that the highest finite under standing must have imperfect thoughts of him.

We should make up in reverence and veneration what we fall short of in knowledge. Reverence is an acknowledgment of distance; by our reverence of the Divine Majesty, we should best awe our hearts, in a sense of the distance which is between his in finite nature and perfection, and our finite apprehensions. Worldly greatness will cause wonder, the thoughts of earthly majesty will compose us to reverence; how much more should those excellencies which are beyond what we can imagine? (Isa. vi.) You have there God represented sitting upon his throne, and the seraphims about him, which are described to us as having “each six wings, and with twain they cover their faces.” Creatures of the brightest understanding, and the most exalted purity and holiness, cover their faces in the presence of God’s glory; they choose rather to venerate God, than look upon him.

II. This calls for humility and modesty. The consideration of God’s unsearchable perfections should make “the haughtiness of man to stoop, and bring down his proud looks, and God alone should be exalted.” The thought of God’s excellency should abase us, and make us “vile in our own eyes;” it should make all those petty excellencies that we pride ourselves in, to vanish and disappear. “Those treasures of wisdom and knowledge” which are in God, should “hide pride from man:” it should hide those little parts and gifts which we are so apt to glory in, as the sun hides the stars. When we consider God, we should be so far from admiring ourselves, that we should, with a humble thankfulness, wonder that God should regard such inconsiderable nothings as we are. (Psal. viii. 1, 3, 4.) “O Lord our God, how excellent is thy name in all the earth, who hast set thy glory above the heavens! When I consider the heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man, that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him?” He that considers the glory of God, and the greatness of his works, will think so meanly of himself, that he will be astonished that God should mind him or visit him. This is a noble strain of humility in David, by which he acknowledged that the great est king of the earth, how considerable soever he may be in respect of men, is yet but a pitiful thing to God.

When we speak to God, we should do it with great humility. (Eccles. v. 2, 3.) “Let thy words be few, for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth.” We should say to God, (Job xxxvii. 19.) “Teach us what we shall say unto thee, for we cannot order our speech by reason of darkness.” And when we think or speak of him, we should do it with great modesty; we should not rashly pronounce or deter mine any thing concerning God. Simonides being asked what God was, desired one day’s time to consider; then he desired two, and then four. The more we think of God, the less peremptory shall we be in defining him. He that considers that God is incomprehensible, will not pretend to know all the ways of infinite knowledge, and the utmost of infinite power, and all the reasons of God’s ways and providences. He that rightly values his own short understanding, and the unlimited perfections of God, will not be apt to say, this God cannot do, this he cannot know, such ways are not agreeable to his wisdom. He that knows God and himself, will be modest in these cases; he will ἐπέχειν, abstain from all peremptory pronouncing in these matters; he considers that one man many times differs so much from another in knowledge, and skill of working, that he can do those things which another believes impossible: but we have pitiful thoughts of God, if we think the difference between one man and another, is any thing to the vast distance that is between the Divine understanding and our ignorance, the Divine power and our weakness, the wisdom of God and the folly of men.

III. The incomprehensibleness of God’s perfections calls for the highest degree of our affection. How should we fear this great and glorious God! (Psal. xc. 11.) “Who knoweth the power of thine anger? even according to thy fear, so is thy wrath.” Fear is the most infinite of all our passions, and fills us with the most endless jealousy and suspicions: God’s wrath is greater than our fear; “according to thy fear, so is thy wrath.”

How should we love him, when we are astonished with admiration of God’s goodness, and say, “How great is thy goodness, and how great is thy beauty! Behold, what manner of love the Father hath be stowed upon us!” How great should our love be to him! what manner of love should we return to him!

Hither we may refer those texts which attribute the same to the second Person in the Trinity, as the eternal wisdom and word of God, whereby all things were made, (John i. 3.) “All things were made by him, and without him was nothing made that was made.” (Ver. 10.) “And the world was made by him.” (1 Cor. viii. 6.) “And one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him.” (Eph. iii. 9.) “God, who created all things by Jesus Christ.” (Col. i. 16, 17.) “By him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him; and he is before all things, and by him all things consist.” (Heb. i. 2.) “By whom also he made the worlds.” And, (ver. 3.) “Upholding all things by the word of his power.

Thirdly, and lastly, To apply this doctrine.

Use. First, If God be the first cause of all things, who did at first produce all creatures, and does since preserve them, and govern them, and disposeth of all their concernments, and orders all things that befal them: from hence let us learn, .

1. With humility and thankfulness to own, and acknowledge, and admire, and bless God, as the author and original of our being, as the spring and fountain of all the blessings and good things that we enjoy. If we do but consider what these words signify, that God is the first cause of all things, we shall see great reason to own and acknowledge, to adore and praise him, and that with the greatest humility, because we have not given him any thing, but have received all from him; he is the cause of all things, who did freely, and of his own good will and pleasure, communicate being to us without any constraint or necessity, but what his own goodness laid upon him. (Rev. iv. 11.) “Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created.” We could not before we were deserve any thing from him, or move him by any argument, or importune him by entreaties to make us; but he freely gave us being, and ever since we depend upon him, and have been preserved by him, and cannot subsist one moment without the continued influence of the power and goodness which first called us out of nothing. He is the author of all the good, and the fountain of all those blessings, which for the present we enjoy, and for the future hope for.

When he made us at first, he designed us for happiness; and when we, by our sin and wilful miscarriage, fell short of the happiness which he designed us for, he sent his Son into the world for our recovery, and gave his life for the ransom of our souls. He hath not only admitted us into a new covenant, wherein he hath promised pardon and eternal life to us; but he hath also purchased these blessings for us by the most endearing price, the blood of his own Son, and hath saved us in such a manner as may justly astonish us. Upon these considerations we should awaken ourselves to the praise of God, and, with the holy Psalmist, call up our spirits, and summon all the powers and faculties of our souls, to assist us in this work. (Psal. ciii. 1-4, &c.) “Bless the Lord, O my soul, and all that is within me, bless his holy name; bless the Lord, O my soul, and for get not all his benefits; who forgiveth all thy iniquities, who healeth all thy diseases, who redeemeth thy life from destruction, who crowneth thee with loving-kindness and tender mercies;” it is he that “satisfies our soul with good things,” that hath promised eternal life and happiness to us, and must confer and bestow this upon us; “therefore our souls, and all that is within us, should bless his holy name.”

2. If God be the first cause, that is, orders all things that befal us, and by his providence disposeth of all our concernments, this should teach us with patience and quietness to submit to all events, to all evils and afflictions that come upon us, as being disposed by his wise providence, and coming from him: we are apt to attribute all things to the next and immediate agent, and to look no higher than second causes, not considering that all the motions of natural causes are directly subordinate to the first cause; and all the actions of free creatures are under the government of God’s wise providence, so that nothing happens to us besides the designs and intention of God.

And methinks this is one particular excellency of the style of the Scripture above all other books, that the constant phrase of the sacred dialect is to attribute all events (excepting sins only) to God; so that every one that reads it, cannot but take notice that it is wrote with a more attentive consideration of God than any other book, as appears by those frequent and express acknowledgments of God as the cause of all events; so that what in other writers would be said to be done by this or that person, is ascribed to God. Therefore it is so often said, that the Lord did this and that, stirred up such an enemy, brought such a judgment. And we shall find that holy men, in Scripture, make excel lent use of this consideration, to argue themselves into patience and contentedness in every condition. So Eli: (1 Sam. iii. 18.) “It is the Lord, let him do what seemeth him good.” So Job, he did not so consider the Sabeans and Chaldeans, who had carried away his oxen and his camels, and slain his servants; nor the wind which had thrown down his house, and killed his sons and his daughters; but he looks up to God, the great governor and disposer of all these events; “The Lord giveth, and the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord.” So David, (Psal. xxxix. 9.) “I was dumb, and spake not a word; because thou, Lord, didst it.” So our blessed Saviour, when he was ready to suffer, he did not consider the malice of the Jews, which was the cause of his death, but looks to a higher hand; “The cup which my Father gives me to drink, shall not I drink it?”

He that looks upon all things as coming from second causes, and does not eye the first cause, the good and wise Governor, will be apt to take offence at every cross and unwelcome accident. Men are apt to be angry, when one flings water upon them as they pass in the streets; but no man is offended if he is wet by rain from heaven. When we look upon evils as coming only from men, we are apt to be impatient, and know not how to bear them; but we should look upon all things as under the government and disposal of the first cause, and the circumstances of every condition as allotted to us by the wise providence of God; this consideration, that it is the hand of God, and that he hath done it, would still all the murmurings of our spirits. As when a seditious multitude is in an uproar, the presence of a grave and venerable person will hush the noise, and quell the tumult; so, if we would but represent God as present to all actions, and governing and disposing all events, this would still and appease our spirits, when they are ready to riot and mutiny against any of his dispensations.

Use the second. If God be the last end of all, let us make him our last end, and refer all our actions to his glory. This is that which is due to him, as he is the first cause, and therefore he does most reasonably require it of us.

And herein, likewise, the Scripture doth excel all other books; that is, doth more frequently and expressly mind us of this end, and calls upon us to propose it to ourselves as our ultimate aim and design. We should love him as our chief end; (Matt. xxii. 37.) “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.” Thus to love God, is that which in the language of the schools is loving God as our chief end. So, likewise, the apostle requires that we should refer all the actions of our lives to this end: (1 Cor. x. 31.) “Whether ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God;” that we should “glorify him in our souls, and in our bodies, which are his.” He is the author of all the powers that we have, and therefore we should use them for him; we do all by him, and therefore we should do all to him.

And that we may the better understand ourselves as to this duty, I shall endeavour to give satisfaction to a question or two, which may arise about it.

First, Whether an actual intention of God’s glory be necessary to make every action that we do good and acceptable to God?

Answer.—1. It is necessary that the glory of God, either formally or virtually, should be the ultimate end and scope of our lives, and all our actions; otherwise, they will be defective in that which in moral actions is most considerable, and that is, the end. If a man should keep all the commandments of the gospel, this excepted, of making God’s glory his supreme end, only with a design to gain reputation, or some other advantage in the world, this very thing would vitiate all, and render him unacceptable to God.

2. It is very requisite and convenient, as a good sign, that we should very frequently actually think upon, and intend, this end; for if it be very much out of our thoughts, we have some reason to be jealous of ourselves, that we do not intend it at all.

3. It is so far from being necessary, that we should in every action have this intention of God’s glory, that it is not morally possible that we should, no more than it is possible, that a man that goes a journey of a thousand miles, should every step he takes have actual thoughts of his journey send; nor is it more necessary; for consideration of the end, is only so far necessary, as it is necessary to guide and quicken us in the use of means; as it is not necessary for a man to think of his journey’s end, farther than to direct and excite him to go thither. And this appears farther by the contrary; it is not necessary to make a sinful action, that a man should formally, much less actually, intend God’s dishonour; it is enough to constitute a man a wicked man, if he willingly transgress God’s law, the doing whereof does, by consequence, reflect a dishonour upon him; so, on the other hand, it is sufficient to make an action good and acceptable, if it be conformable to God’s law, and such as by consequence redounds to God’s glory.

Second question. Whether the glory of God may or ought to be considered as an end separate and distinct from our own happiness?

But let us see how they manage it to their purpose. The apostles and their successors (saith Bellarmine) by this power of remitting and retaining sins, are constituted judges of the case of penitents; but they cannot judge without hearing the cause; and this infers particular confession of sins to the priest, from whence he concludes it necessary to the forgiveness of sins.

But do not the ministers of the gospel exercise this power of remitting sins in baptism? And yet particular confession of all sins to the priest is not required, no not in the church of Rome, in the baptism of adult persons. And therefore, according to them, particular confession of sin to the priest is not necessary to his exercising the power of remitting sins, and consequently the necessity of confession cannot be concluded from this text.

And to shew how they are puzzled in this mat ter, Vasquez, by a strange device, concludes the necessity of confession from the power of retaining sins; for (says he) if the priest have a power of retaining sins, that is, of denying pardon and absolution to the penitent, then he may impose confession as a condition of forgiveness, and not absolve the penitent upon other terms. But supposing the priest to have this unreasonable power, this makes confession no otherwise necessary by Divine institution, than going to Jerusalem or China is, in order to the forgiveness of our sins, or submitting to any other foolish condition that the priest thinks fit to require: for according to this way of reasoning, this power of retaining sins, makes every foolish thing that the priest shall impose upon the penitent, to be necessary by Divine command and institution.

But the truth is, this power of remitting and retaining sins, is exercised by the ministers of the gospel, in the administration of the sacraments, and the preaching of the gospel, which is called the word of reconciliation, the ministry whereof is committed to them. And thus the ancient fathers understood it; and as a great divine told them in the council of Trent, it was, perhaps, never expounded by any one father concerning the business of confession.

The second text they allege to this purpose is, (1 John i. 9.) “If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins.” Here, indeed, is confession; but general, not particular, as appears by the opposition, “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us: but if we confess our sins;” that is, if we acknowledge ourselves to have been sinners. And then there is not a word of confessing to the priest; the confession here meant is plainly to God, because it follows, “he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins;” that is, God, who is necessarily understood in the former part of the sentence, as if it had run thus, “If we confess our sins to God, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins.”

The third text is, (Jam. v. 16.) “Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another.” And here again there is only mention of confession, but not a word of the priest; and for another reason, if I had been to advise them, they should not have pressed this text for their service in this cause, because it does them as much hurt as good; for it is certain, the duty of confession here enjoined is reciprocal and mutual, “Confess your sins one to another:” so that if, by virtue of this text, the people are bound to confess their sins to the priest, the priest is hereby as much obliged to confess his sins to the people; which, I dare say, is more than they have a mind to prove from this text. The plain meaning whereof is this—that as Christians should be ready to perform all mutual offices of charity, so to assist and comfort one another by their counsel and prayers. And therefore the apostle adviseth Christians when they are sick, if at the same time they be under any spiritual trouble, by reason of the guilt of any sin lying upon their consciences, to lay open their case to one another, that so they may have the help of one another’s advice and prayers; “Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed,” both of your bodily and spiritual distemper. Not that the priest or minister is here excluded; St. James had spoken of that particular before, that when “any was sick,” he should “send for the elders of the church,” that he might, in the first place, have the benefit of their counsel and prayers; and then, because private Christians may also be useful to one another in this kind, he adds, that they should also lay open their condition and troubles “to one another,” that so they might have the help of one another’s advice and prayers; and very probably all the confession here meant of private Christians “to one another,” is of the offences and injuries they may have been guilty of one towards another; that they should be reconciled upon this occasion, and, as a testimony of their charity, should “pray one for another;” whereas they are bound “to send for the elders of the church,” and they are “to pray over them,” as an act, not only of charity, but of superiority, and by virtue of their office in the church, a more especial blessing being to be expected from their prayers. These three texts are the main arguments from Scripture, which they, of the church of Rome, bring to prove their auricular or secret confession to be of Divine institution; and woful proofs they are; which shews what miserable shifts they are reduced to, who resolve to maintain a bad cause.

I proceed, in the second place, to discover the falsehood of their other pretences, that this kind of confession hath always been practised in the catholic church: and not only so, but believed absolutely necessary to the remission of men’s sins, and their eternal salvation.

The truth of the whole matter is this; public confession and penance for open and scandalous crimes was in use, and with great strictness observed, in the first ages of Christianity; and there was then no general law, or custom, that exacted secret confession of sins to the priest, as a necessary part of repentance, and condition of forgiveness: afterward public penance was by degrees disused; which plainly shews, that, in the opinion of the church, this discipline, how useful soever, was not of absolute necessity to restore men to the favour of God.

In place of this came in private confession to the priest, particularly appointed to this office, and called the penitentiary; but, upon occasion of a scandal that happened, this also was abrogated by Nectarius, bishop of Constantinople; which shews that neither was this necessary. And this act of Nectarius was justified by his successor St. Chrysostom, who does, over and over, most expressly teach, that confession of our sins to men is not necessary to the forgiveness of them, but that it is sufficient to confess them to God alone; so that St. Chrysostom does plainly stand condemned by the decrees of the council of Trent.

1. In order to the obtaining of the prayers of good men for us: (James v. 16.) “Confess your sins one to another;” he said before, “the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up.” This, in all probability, is meant of the miraculous power of prayer, which St. Chrysostom reckons among the miraculous gifts of the Spirit, bestowed upon Christians in the first ages of the church: and this is very much countenanced and confirmed by what presently follows after this command, of confessing our sins one to another, and praying one for another, and given as the reason of it; for “the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much.” The original is δέησις ἐνεργουμέην, “the inspired prayer;” which, in the verse before, is called “the prayer of faith,” meaning that miraculous faith, in the power whereof Christians did obtain of God whatever they were inspired to ask of him; according to our Saviour’s promise in the gospel, concerning the efficacy of the prayers of Christians, which we find mentioned among the other miraculous powers which were to be conferred upon them by the coming of the Holy Ghost.

2. Confession of our sins to men is likewise reasonable, in order to the ease and satisfaction of our minds, and our being directed in our duty for the future. In this case, common reason and prudence, without any precept of Scripture, will direct men to have recourse to this remedy; viz. to discover and lay open our disease to some skilful spiritual physician; to some faithful friend, or prudent guide, in order to spiritual advice and direction, for the peace and satisfaction of our minds. And then,

3. In case our sins have been public and scandalous, both reason and the practice of the Christian church do require, that, when men have publicly offended, they should give public satisfaction and open testimony of their repentance.

But as for private and auricular confession of our sins to a priest in all cases, and as of absolute necessity to our obtaining pardon and forgiveness from God, as the church of Rome teacheth, this is neither necessary by Divine precept, nor by any constitution and practice of the ancient Christian church, as I have shewn in my former discourse.

Not to mention the bad consequence of this practice, and the impious and dangerous use which hath been made of this seal of confession, for the concealing and carrying on of the most wicked and barbarous designs, and the debauching of the penitents, by drawing them into the commission of the same and greater sins than those which they confessed, which the more devout persons of that church have frequently complained of:—I proceed now to shew briefly in the

III. Third place, the grounds and reasons of the necessity of confessing our sins to God; and I shall but just mention them.

1. From the precept and command of God; for which I have already produced clear proof of Scripture.

2. From the nature of the thing, because without this there can be no repentance towards God. He that will not so much as own the faults which he hath been guilty of, can never repent of them. If we will not confess our sins to God, we are never like to be sorry for them.—Thus much for the first thing in the text, the confession of our sins. I proceed now, to the

First, I shall shew that the practice of some vices is evidently mischievous and prejudicial to us, as to this world; as, all those vices which fall under the cognizance of human laws, and are punished by them, murder, theft, perjury, sedition, rebellion, and the like; these cannot be denied to be of pernicious consequence to men, and therefore the great patrons of vice seldom plead for these; the inconvenience of them is so palpable, that some feel it, and all may see it every day.

But besides these, there are many other sorts of sin which human laws either take no notice of, or do not so severely punish, which yet, in their natural consequences, are very pernicious to our present interest; either they are a disturbance to our minds, or dangerous to our health, or ruinous to our estate, or hurtful to our reputation, or it may be at once prejudicial to us in all, or most of these respects; and these are the greatest temporal inconveniences that men are liable to.

All irregular passions, as wrath, malice, envy, impatience, and revenge, are not only a disturbance to ourselves, but they naturally draw upon us hatred and contempt from others. Any one of these passions is enough to render a man uneasy to himself, and to make his conversation disgustful and troublesome to all that are about him; for all men naturally hate all those who are of an envious, or malicious, or revengeful temper, and are apt to rise up and stand upon their guard against them. Anger and impatience are great deformities of the mind, and make a man look as ugly as if he had a wry and distorted countenance; and these passions are apt to breed in others a secret contempt of us, and to bring our prudence into question, because they are signs of a weak and impotent mind, that either hath lost, or never had, the government of itself.

There are other vices which are plainly pernicious to oar health, and do naturally bring pains and diseases upon men; such are intemperance and lust: and though some may pretend to govern themselves in the practice of these with so much moderation and discretion, as to prevent the notorious bad consequences of them, yet there are very few or none that do so: this is seldom more than a speculation, and men that allow themselves in any lewd or in temperate course, will find it very hard to govern themselves in it; for after men have forfeited their innocence, and broke in upon their natural modesty, they are apt by degrees to grow profligate and desperate. If a man gives way but little to his own vicious inclinations, they will soon get head of him, and no man knows how far they will hurry him at last.

Besides that, the vices I am speaking of, intemperance and lust, have other great inconvenience! attending them, they expose men more frequently than most other vices, to occasions of quarrel, in which men often lose their own lives, or take away other men’s, by which they fall under the danger of the law, and the stroke of public justice; or, if they escape that (as too often they do) they cannot fly from their own consciences, which do commonly fill them with the horror and torment of such an action all their days; so pernicious are the usual consequences of these vices, of which we see sad instances every day.

Nor are these vices less hurtful to men’s estates, for they are extremely expensive and wasteful, and usually make men careless of all their business and concernments, liable to be cheated by those whom they are forced to trust with their affairs, because they will not mind them themselves, and be abused by crafty men, who watch the opportunities of their folly and weakness, to draw them into foolish bargains. It is an old observation, that more men perish by intemperance than by the sword; and I believe it is as true, that more estates are dissipated and wasted by these two riotous vices, than by all other accidents whatsoever.

And there is scarce any notorious vice, by which men do not greatly suffer in their reputation and good name, even when the times are worst and most degenerate: any wicked course, whether of debauchery or injustice, is a blemish to a man’s credit, not only in the esteem of the sober and virtuous, but even of those who are loose and extravagant; for men are sooner brought to practise what is bad, than to approve of it, and do generally think all sin and wickedness to be a stain upon them, whatever in a swaggering humour they may say to the contrary. A clear evidence of this is, that men do so studiously endeavour to conceal their vices, and are so careful that as few as may be should be conscious to them, and are so confounded if they be discovered, and so out of all patience when they are upbraided with them; a plain acknowledgment that these things are shameful in themselves, and, whatever face men may put upon things, that they do inwardly, and at the bottom of their hearts, believe that these practices are deservedly of bad reputation, and do, in the general opinion of mankind, leave a blot upon them.

Secondly, There are other sins, which, though they are not usually attended with consequences so palpably mischievous, yet are plainly unprofitable, and bring no manner of advantage to men.

Of this sort is all kind of profaneness, and customary swearing in common conversation; there is neither profit nor pleasure in them. What doth the profane man get by his contempt of religion? He is neither more respected, nor better trusted, for this quality; but, on the contrary, it is many times really to his prejudice, and brings a great odium upon him, not only from those who sincerely love religion, but from others also; though they are conscious to themselves that they do not love religion as they ought, yet they have a veneration for it, and cannot endure that any one should speak slightly of it.

And it is as hard to imagine where the pleasure of profaneness lies. Men cannot but at first have a great reluctancy in their minds against it, and must offer considerable violence to themselves, to bring themselves to it; and when it is grown more familiar, and their consciences are become more seared and insensible, yet, whenever they are alone and serious, or when any affliction or calamity is upon them, they are full of fears and anguish, their guilt stares them in the face, and their consciences are raging and furious.

And as all kind of profaneness is unprofitable, so more especially customary swearing in ordinary conversation, upon every occasion of passion, or any other trivial cause; nay, it may be without cause, out of mere habit and custom. Now what can possibly be imagined to be the profit or pleasure of this vice? Sensual pleasure in it there can be none, because it is not founded in the temper of the body; a man may be naturally prone to anger or lust; but no man, I think, is born with a swearing constitution.

And there is as little profit as pleasure in it; for the common and trivial use of oaths makes them perfectly insignificant to their end, and is so far from giving credit to a man’s word, that it rather weakens the reputation of it.

Thirdly, Those vices which pretend to be of advantage to us, when all accompts are cast up, and all circumstances duly considered, will be found to be quite otherwise. Some vices pretend to bring in profit, others to yield pleasure; but upon a thorough examination of the matter, these pretences will vanish and come to nothing.

The vices which pretend to be most profitable are covetousness and oppression, fraud and falsehood, and perfidiousness: but if we look well into them, we shall find, that either they do not bring the advantages they pretend to bring, or that the inconveniences which attend them are as great, or greater than the advantages they bring; or else that the practice of the opposite virtues would be of much greater advantage to us.

1. Some of these vices do not bring the advantages they pretend to do. Covetousness may in crease a man’s estate, but it adds nothing to his happiness and contentment: for though his estate grow never so much, his want is still as great as it was before, and his care and trouble continually greater; so that so long as he continues covetous, the more rich, the less happy.

And then, for fraud and falsehood; they are not of that real and lasting advantage, that cunning but short-sighted men are apt to imagine. Nothing is truer than that of Solomon; “The lying tongue is but for a moment.” A man can practise the arts of falsehood and deceit but for a little while, before they will be discovered; and when they are discovered, they are so far from being any advantage to him, that they turn to his prejudice, and the cunning man begins to be in a bad case, and he that was wont to overreach others, is at last caught himself.

2. Several of these vices are attended with inconveniences as great or greater than the advantages they bring. If a man increase his estate by injustice and oppression, yet he loseth his reputation. Besides that, all fraudulent and unjust courses are apt to entangle a man in a great many inconveniences, and to expose him to troublesome suits, for the keeping of what he hath unjustly gotten; it is very often seen, that what is gotten by injustice is spent in law; and though it may be those whom he hath wronged never recover their right, yet first or last the unjust man is put to more trouble and vexation about it than the thing is worth. This Solomon observes: (Prov. xv. 6.) “In the revenue of the wicked there is trouble.”

The perfidious man, by betraying a friend or a trust, may, perhaps, make some present advantage: but then, by such villany, he makes himself odious to all mankind, and by this means, at one time or other, prevents himself of greater advantages which he might have had another way; and, perhaps, at last, is miserably crushed by those whom he betrayed, who, in the change and revolution of human affairs, may, some time or other, have the opportunity of being revenged. Or else,

3. The practice of the opposite virtues would be of far greater advantage to us.

Truth and fidelity are in common experience found to be a better and surer way of thriving, and more like to last and hold out, than fraud and false hood; and as honesty is a surer way of raising an estate, so it brings along with it greater security of the quiet enjoyment of it. There is never any real occasion, and seldom any colour and pretence, of bringing such a man into trouble; for which reason Solomon says, “Better is the little which the righteous man hath, than great possessions without right:” because, though it be but little, yet it will wear like steel, and he is like to enjoy it quietly, and may increase it; whereas the unjust man is continually in danger of losing what he hath gotten.

And if this be the case, it is very plain, that those vices which pretend to bring the greatest advantage, are really unprofitable; and to these kind of vices the text seems to point more particularly; “If any say, I have sinned, and perverted that which is right, and it profited me not,” &c.

But, perhaps, though there be no profit in any sinful course, yet there may be some pleasure. That comes next to be examined; and I doubt not to make it evident, that there is no such pleasure in sin, as can make it a reasonable temptation to any man to venture upon it. The vices which pretend to bring the greatest pleasure, are lewdness, and intemperance, and revenge.

The two first of these are the highest pretenders to pleasure: but God knows, and the sinner himself knows, how thin and transitory this pleasure is, how much trouble attends it, and how many sighs and groans follow it; and whatever pleasure they may minister to the sense, they bring a great deal of anguish and perplexity to the mind; so that the trouble which they cause does more than countervail the pleasure which they bring; and they do not only disturb the mind, but they disease the body. How many are there, who, for the gratifying of an inordinate lust, and for the incomprehensible pleasure of a drunken fit, have endured the violent burnings of a fever, or else have consumed the remainder of their days in languishing sickness and pain?

And the reason of all this is plain, because all the pleasures of sin are violent, and forced, and unnatural, and therefore not like to continue; they are founded in some disease and distemper of our minds, and therefore always end in pain and smart.

And as for revenge, it is indeed a very eager and impatient desire: but so far sorely from being a pleasure, that the very thoughts of it are extremely troublesome, and raise as great storms in the mind of a man, as any passion whatsoever; and I never heard of the pleasure of being in a storm; it is pleasant indeed to be out of it, when others are in it. And when revenge hath satisfied itself, and laid its enemy bleeding at its foot, the man that executed it commonly repents himself the next moment, and would give all the world to undo what he hath done; so that if there be any pleasure in revenge, it is so flitting, and of so short a continuance, that we know not where to fix it; for there is nothing but tumult and rage before the execution of it, and after it nothing but remorse and horror; so that if it be a pleasure, it is but of one moment’s continuance, and lasts no longer than the act is a-doing; and what man in his wits would purchase so short a pleasure at so dear a price? This is most certainly true, and if it were well considered, sufficient to convince any reasonable man of the unreasonableness of this passion.

Cain is a fearful instance of this kind, who, after he had drawn his brother into the field and slain him there, how was he tormented with the guilt of what he had done, and forced to cry out, “My punishment is greater than I can bear;” or (as some translations render the words) “mine iniquity is greater than that it can be forgiven!” (Gen. iv. 13.) “From thy face (says he to God, in the anguish of his soul) shall I be hid, and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond in the earth; and it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me shall slay me,” (ver. 14.) “Every one that findeth me;” how fearful did his guilt make him! when probably there was then but one man in the world besides himself. And I may say of this sort of men as St. Jude does of those in his time, (Jude 11.) “Woe unto them! for they have gone in the way of Cain;” they are guilty of his crime, and his doom shall be theirs.

And here I cannot but take notice of a great evil that grows daily upon us, and therefore deserves with the greatest severity to be discountenanced and punished: I mean that of duels, than which what can be more unchristian? And what can be more unreasonable, than for men, upon deliberation, and after the heat of passion is over, to resolve to sheath their swords in one another’s bowels, only for a hasty word? And, which is yet more unreasonable, that because two men are angry, and have quarrelled with one another, and will fight it out, that therefore two more, who have no quarrel, no kind of displeasure against one another, must fight too, and kill one another if they can, for no reason, and upon no provocation. These false rules of honour will not pass in another world, in the highest and greatest court of honour, from whence there is no appeal.

I shall conclude this whole argument with that excellent saying of Cato, reported in A. Gellius: Cogitate cum animis vestris, &c. “Consider (says he) with yourselves, if ye be at any trouble and pain to do a good action, the trouble will be soon over; but the pleasure and comfort of what ye have done well, abides with you all your days; but if, to gratify yourselves, you do any thing that is wicked, the pleasure will quickly vanish; but the guilt of it will stick by you for ever.”

And is it not then much better to prevent all this trouble, by denying ourselves these sinful pleasures, which will follow us with guilt whilst we live, and fill us with horror and despair when we come to die?

I shall now make some reflections upon what has been delivered, and so conclude.

First, What has been said upon this argument ought particularly to move those who have so great a consideration of this present life, and the temporal happiness of it, that the practice of all virtues is a friend to their temporal, as well as eternal welfare, and all vice is an enemy to both.

Secondly, This likewise takes off all manner of excuse from sin and vice. It pretends not to serve the soul, and to profit our future happiness in another world; and if it be an enemy also to our present welfare in this world, what is there to be said for it?

Thirdly, (which I desire to insist a little longer upon) all the arguments which I have used to convince men of the folly of a wicked course, are so many strong and unanswerable reasons for repentance; for when a man is convinced that he hath done foolishly, and to his own prejudice, that he hath sinned, and that it profited him not, what can he do less, than to be heartily sorry for it, and ashamed of it, and resolved to do better for the future? Nothing surely is more reasonable than repentance; and yet how hard is it to bring men to it? Either men will mistake the nature of it, and not do it effectually; or they will delay it, and not do it in time.

I. Men mistake the nature of repentance; and there are two great mistakes about it.

1. Of those who make the great force and virtue of it to consist, not so much in the resolution of the penitent, as in the absolution of the priest. And this the church of Rome, in their doctrine concerning repentance, does. For their sacrament of penance (as they call it) they make to consist of two parts: the matter of it, which consists in these three acts of the penitent, confession, contrition, and satisfaction; and the form of it, which is the absolution of the priest, in which they make the main virtue and force of repentance to consist; In qua præcipue ipsius vis sita est, are the very words of the council of Trent.

And here is a wide difference betwixt us; for though the comfort of the penitent may, in some case, consist in the absolution of the priest, yet the virtue and efficacy of repentance does not at all consist in it, but wholly in the contrition and sincere resolution of the penitent, as the Scripture every where declares: and to think otherwise is of dangerous consequence; because it encourageth men to hope for the benefit of repentance, that is, the pardon and forgiveness of their sins, without having truly repented. And, indeed, the council of Trent have so framed their doctrines in this point, that any one may see, that they did not matter how much they abated on the part of the penitent, provided the power of the priest be but advanced, and kept up in its full height.

2. The other mistake is of those who make repentance to consist in the bare resolution of amendment, though it never has its effect; that is, though the sinner either do not what he resolved, or do it only for a fit, and during his present trouble and conviction.

There is one case indeed, and but one, wherein a resolution not brought to effect is available, and that is, when nothing hinders the performance and execution of it, but only want of time and opportunity for it, when the repentance is sincere, and the resolution real, but the man is cut off between the actual reformation which he intended, and which God, who sees things certainly in their causes, knows would have followed, if the man had lived to give demonstration of it. But this is nothing to those who have the opportunity to make good their resolution, and do not; for, because the resolution which would have been performed, had there been time and opportunity, is reckoned for a true repentance, and accepted of God, as if it had been done; therefore the resolution which was not brought to effect when there was time and opportunity for it, hath not the nature of true repentance, nor will it be accepted of God.

I will add but one thing more upon this head, because I doubt it is not always sufficiently considered; and that is this, that a sincere resolution of a better course, does imply a resolution of the means, as well as of the end: he that is truly resolved against any sin, is likewise resolved against the occasions and temptations that would lead and draw him to it; otherwise he hath taken up a rash and foolish resolution, which he is not like to keep, because he did not resolve upon that which was necessary to the keeping of it. So he that resolves upon any part of his duty, must likewise resolve upon the means which are necessary to the discharge and performance of it; he that is resolved to be just in his dealing, and to pay his debts, must be diligent in his calling, and mind his business; because without this he cannot do the other; for nothing can be more vain and fond, than for a man to pretend that he is resolved upon doing his duty, when he neglects any thing that is necessary to put him into a capacity, and to further him in the discharge of it. This is as if a man should resolve to be well, and yet never take physic, or be careless in observing the rules which are prescribed in order to his health. So, for a man to resolve against drunkenness, and yet to run himself upon the temptations which naturally lead to it, by frequenting the company of lewd and intemperate persons, this is as if a man should resolve against the plague, and run into the pest-house. Whatever can reasonably move a man to be resolved upon any end, will, if his resolution be wise and honest, determine him as strongly to use the means which are proper and necessary to that end.

These are the common mistakes about this mat ter, which men are the more willing to run into, because they are loath to be brought to a true repentance, the nature whereof is not difficult to be understood (for nothing in the world is plainer), only men are always slow to understand what they have no mind to put in practice. But,

II. Besides these mistakes about repentance, there is another great miscarriage in this matter, and that is, the delay of repentance; men are loath to set about it, and therefore they put it upon the last hazard, and resolve then to huddle it up as well as they can; but this certainly is great folly, to be still making more work for repentance, because it is to create so much needless trouble and vexation to ourselves: it is to go on still in playing a foolish part, in hopes to retrieve all by an after game; this is extremely dangerous, because we may certainly sin, but it is not certain we shall repent; our repentance may be prevented, and we may be cut off in our sins; but if we should have space for it, repentance may, in process of time, grow a hundred times more difficult than it is at present.

But if it were much more certain and more easy than it is, if it were nothing but a hearty sorrow and shame for our sins, and an asking God forgiveness for them, without being put to the trouble of reforming our wicked lives, yet this were great folly, to do those things which will certainly grieve us after we have done them, and put us to shame, and to ask forgiveness for them. It was well said of old Cato, Næ tu stultus es homuncio, qui malis veniam precari, quam non peccare; “Thou art a foolish man indeed, who choosest rather to ask forgiveness than not to offend.”

At the best, repentance implies a fault; it is an after-wisdom, which supposeth a man first to have played the fool; it is but the best end of a bad business; a hard shift, and a desperate hazard, which a man that had acted prudently would never have been put to; it is a plaster after we have dangerously wounded ourselves: but certainly it had been much wiser to have prevented the danger of the wound, and the pain of curing it. A wise man would not make himself sick if he could; or if he were already so, would not make himself sicker, though he had the most effectual and infallible remedy in the world in his power: but this is not the case of a sinner, for repentance as well as faith is the gift of God.

Above all, let me caution you not to put off this great and necessary work to the most unseasonable time of all other, the time of sickness and death, upon a fond presumption, that you can be reconciled to God when you please, and exercise such a repentance as will make your peace with him at any time.

I am heartily afraid that a very great part of mankind do miscarry upon this confidence, and are swallowed up in the gulf of eternal perdition with this plank in their arms. The common custom is (and I fear it is too common), when the physician has given over his patient, then, and not till then, to send for the minister; not so much to inquire into the man’s condition, and to give him suitable advice, as to minister comfort, and to speak peace to him at a venture.

But let me tell you, that herein you put an extreme difficult task upon us, in expecting that we should pour wine and oil into the wound before it be searched, and speak smooth and comfortable things to a man that is but just brought to a sense of the long course of a lewd and wicked life impenitently continued in. Alas! what comfort can we give to men in such a case? We are loath to drive them to despair, and yet we must not destroy them by presumption; pity and good-nature do strongly tempt us to make the best of their case, and to give them all the little hopes which with any kind of reason we can, and God knows it is but very little that we can give to such persons, upon good ground; for it all depends upon the degree and sincerity of their repentance, which God only knows, and we can but guess at. We can easily tell them what they ought to have done, and what they should do if they were to live longer, and what is the best that they can do in those straits into which they have brought themselves; viz. to exercise as deep a sorrow and repentance for their sins as is possible, and “to cry mightily to God” for mercy, in and through the merit of our blessed Saviour. But how far this will be available in these circumstances we cannot tell; because we do not know whether, if the man had lived longer, this repentance and these resolutions, which he now declares of a better course, would have been good.

And after all is done that can be done in so short a time, and in such circumstances of confusion and disorder as commonly attend dying persons, I doubt the result of all will be this: that there is much more ground of fear than hope concerning them; nay, perhaps, while we are pressing the dying sinner to repentance, and he is bungling about it, he expires, in great doubt and perplexity of mind, what will become of him! or, if his eyes be closed with more comfortable hopes of his condition, the next time he opens them again he may find his fearful mistake, like the rich man in the parable, who, when he was in hell, “lifted up his eyes, being in torment!”

3. That even those sins and vices which make the fairest pretence to be of advantage to us, when all accounts are cast up, and all circumstances duly weighed and considered, will be found to be but pretenders, and in no degree able to perform and make good what they so largely promise before hand, when they tempt us to the commission of them. There are some vices which pretend to bring in great profit, and tempt worldly-minded men, whose minds are disposed to catch at that bait; such are the sins of covetousness and oppression, of fraud, and falsehood, and perfidiousness. And there are others which pretend to bring pleasure along with them, which is almost an irresistible temptation to voluptuous and sensual men; such are the sins of revenge, and intemperance, and lust. But, upon a particular examination of each of these, it will evidently appear, that there is no such profit or pleasure in any of these vices as can be a reason able temptation to any man to fall in love with them, and to engage in the commission and practice of them. But I shall not now enlarge upon any of these, having lately discoursed upon them from another text. I shall therefore proceed to the

II. Second inconvenience which I mentioned of a sinful and vicious course; viz. that the reflection upon our sins afterwards, is cause of great shame and confusion to us. “What fruit had you then in those things, whereof ye are now ashamed?” And this is a very proper argument for this season;

Preached in Lent.

So that when we look into our lives, and examine the actions of them, when we consider what we have done, and what our doings have deserved, we should, in a due sense of the great and manifold miscarriages of our lives, and from a deep sorrow, and shame, and detestation of ourselves for them; I say, we should, with that true penitent described in Job, take words to ourselves, and say, “Surely it is meet to be said unto God, I will not offend any more; that which I know not, teach thou me; and if I have done iniquity, I will do no more.” And thus I have done with the second inconvenience of a sinful and vicious course of life; viz. that the reflection upon it afterwards causeth shame; “What fruit had you then in those things, whereof ye are now ashamed?”

And yet it cannot be dissembled, that the nature of men is so degenerate as to stand in need of this argument; and that men are so far engaged in an evil course, that they are not to be reclaimed from it by any other consideration but of the endless and unspeakable misery of impenitent sinners in another world. And therefore God, knowing how necessary this is, doth frequently make use of it; and our blessed Saviour, than whom none was ever more mild and gentle, doth often set this consideration before men, to take them off from sin, and to bring them to do better. And this, St. Paul tells us, (Rom. i. 18.) is one principal thing which renders the gospel so powerful an instrument for the reforming and saving of mankind, because “therein the wrath of God is revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.”

So that, how harsh and unpleasant soever this argument may be, the great stupidity and folly of some men, and their inveterate obstinacy in an evil course, makes it necessary for us to press it home, that those who will not be moved, and made sensible of the danger and inconvenience of sin by gentler arguments, may be roused and awakened by the terrors of eternal misery.

That the last issue and consequence of a wicked life will be very miserable, the general apprehension of mankind concerning the fate of bad men in another world, and the secret misgivings of men’s consciences, give men too much ground to fear. Besides that, the justice of Divine providence, which is not many times in this world so clear and manifest, does seem to require that there should be a time of recompence, when the virtue and patience of good men should be rewarded, and the insolence and obstinacy of bad men should be punished. This cannot but appear very reasonable to any man that considers the nature of God, and is persuaded that he governs the world, and hath given laws to mankind, by the observance whereof they may be happy, and by the neglect and contempt whereof they must be miserable.

But, that there might remain no doubts upon the minds of men concerning these matters, God hath been pleased to reveal this from heaven, by a person sent by him on purpose to declare it to the world; and to the truth of these doctrines concerning a future state, and a day of judgment, and recompences, God hath given testimony by unquestionable miracles wrought for the confirmation of them, and particularly by “the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, whereby he hath given an assurance unto all men, that he is the person ordained by God to judge the world in righteousness, and to render to every man according to his deeds; to them who, by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but to them who obey not the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil.”

So that, how quietly soever wicked men may pass through this world, or out of it (which they seldom do), misery will certainly overtake their sins at last; unspeakable and intolerable misery, arising from the anguish of a guilty conscience, from a lively apprehension of their sad loss, and from a quick sense of the sharp pain which they labour under; and all this aggravated and set off with the consideration of past pleasure, and the despair of future ease. Each of these is misery enough, and all of them together do constitute and make up that dismal and forlorn state which the Scripture calls hell and damnation.

I shall, therefore, briefly represent (for it is by no means desirable to dwell long upon so melancholy and frightful an argument),

First, The principal ingredients which constitute this miserable state. And,

Secondly, The aggravations of it.

First, The principal ingredients which constitute this miserable state; and they are these three which I have mentioned:

I. The anguish of a guilty mind.

II. The lively apprehensions of the invaluable happiness which they have lost.

III. A quick sense of the intolerable pains which they lie under.

I. The anguish of a guilty conscience. And this is natural; for there is a worm that abides in a guilty conscience, and is continually gnawing it. This is that our Saviour calls “the worm that dies not.” And though God should inflict no positive punishment upon sinners, yet this is a revenge which every man’s mind would take upon him; for things are so ordered by God in the original frame and constitution of our minds, that, on the one hand, peace and pleasure, contentment and satisfaction, do naturally arise in our minds from the conscience of well-doing, and spring up in the soul of every good man: and, on the other hand, no man knowingly does an evil action, but his guilty conscience galls him for it, and the remembrance of it is full of bitterness to him.

And this the sinner feels in this world; he disguiseth and dissembleth his trouble as much as he can, and shifts off these uneasy thoughts by all the diversions he can devise, and by this means palliates his disease, and renders his condition in some sort tolerable unto himself; but when he is alone, or cast upon the bed of sickness, and his thoughts are let loose upon him, and he hath nothing to give them a diversion, how does his guilt ferment and work! And the fever, which lurked before, does now shew itself, and is ready to burn him up; so that nothing can appear more dismal and ghastly, than such a man does to himself.

And much more, when sinners come into the other world, and are entered into the regions of darkness, and the melancholy shades where evil spirits are continually wandering up and down, where they can meet with nothing either of employment or pleasure, to give the least diversion to their pensive minds; where they shall find nothing to do, but to reflect upon and bemoan themselves; where all the wicked actions that ever they committed shall come fresh into their minds, and stare their consciences in the face. It is not to be imagined what sad scenes will then be present to their imaginations, and what sharp reflections their own guilty minds will make upon them, and what swarms of furies will possess them.

So soon as ever they are entered upon that state, they will then find themselves forsaken of all those comforts which they once placed so much happiness in; and they will have nothing to converse with but their own uneasy selves, and those that are as miserable as themselves, and therefore incapable of administering any comfort to one another. They will then have nothing to think on but what will trouble them; and every new thought will be a new in crease of their trouble. Their guilt will make them restless, and the more restless they are, the more will their minds be enraged; and there will be no end of their vexation, because the cause and ground of it is perpetual. For there is no possible way to get rid of guilt but by repentance; and there is no encouragement, no argument, to repentance, where there is no hope of pardon. So that if God should hold his hand and leave sinners to themselves, and to the lashes of their own conscience, a more severe and terrible torment can hardly be imagined, than that which a guilty mind would execute upon itself.

II. Another ingredient into the miseries of sinners in another world, is the lively apprehension of the invaluable happiness which they have lost by their own obstinacy and foolish choice. In the next world wicked men shall be for ever separated from God, who is the fountain of happiness, and from all the comforts of his presence and favour. This, our Saviour tells us, is the first part of that dreadful sentence that shall be passed upon the wicked at the great day, “Depart from me;” which words, though they do not signify any positive infliction and torment, yet they import the greatest loss that can be imagined. And it is not so easy to determine which is the greatest of evils, loss or pain. Indeed, to a creature that is only endowed with sense, there can be no misery but that of pain and suffering: but to those who have reason and understanding, and are capable of knowing the value of things, and of reflecting upon themselves in the want of them, the greatest loss may be as grievous and hard to be borne as the greatest pain.

It is true, that sinners are now so immersed in the gross and sensual delights of this world, that they have no apprehension of the joys of heaven, and the pleasures of God’s presence, and of the happiness that is to be enjoyed in communion with him, and therefore they are not now capable of estimating the greatness of this loss. But this insensibleness of wicked men continues no longer than this present state, which affords them variety of objects of pleasure and of business to divert them and entertain them: but when they come into the other world, they shall then have nothing else to think upon, but the sad condition into which they have brought themselves, nothing to do but to pore and meditate upon their own misfortune, when they shall lift up their eyes, and, with the rich man in the parable, in the midst of their torments, look up to those who are in Abraham’s bosom; and their misery will be mightily increased by the contemplation of that happiness which others enjoy, and themselves have so foolishly forfeited and fallen short of; insomuch, that it would be happy for them if that God, from whose presence they are banished, that heaven from which they have excluded themselves, and that everlasting glory which they have despised and neglected, might be for ever hid from their eyes, and never come into their minds.

III. This is not all, but besides the sad apprehension of their loss, they shall endure the sharpest pains. These God hath threatened sinners withal, and they are in Scripture represented to us, by the most grievous and intolerable pains that in this world we are acquainted withal; as, by the pain of burning. Hence the wicked are said to be “cast into the lake which burns with fire and brimstone, and into the fire which is not quenched;” which, whether it be literally to be understood or not, is certainly intended to signify the most severe kind of torment; but what that is, and in what manner it shall be inflicted, none know but they that feel it, and lie under it. The Scripture tells so much in general of it, as is enough to warn men to avoid it; that it is the effect of a mighty displeasure, and of anger armed with omnipotence, and consequently must needs be very terrible, more dreadful than we can now conceive, and probably greater than can be described by any of those pains and sufferings which now we are acquainted withal; for “who knows the power of God’s anger,” and the utmost of what almighty justice can do to sinners? Who can comprehend the vast significancy of those expressions, “Fear him who, after he hath killed, can destroy both body and soul in hell?” And again, “It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God!” One would think this were misery enough, and needed no farther aggravation; and yet it hath two terrible ones, from the consideration of past pleasures which sinners have enjoyed in this world, and from an utter despair of future ease and remedy.

1. From the consideration of the past pleasures which sinners have enjoyed in this life. This will make their sufferings much more sharp and sensible; for, as nothing commends pleasure more, and give happiness a quicker taste and relish, than precedent sufferings and pain, there is not perhaps a greater pleasure in the world, than the strange and sudden ease which a man finds after a sharp fit of the stone or cholic, or after a man is taken off the rack, and nature which was in an agony before is all at once set at perfect ease: so, on the other hand, nothing exasperates suffering more, and sets a keener edge upon misery, than to step into afflictions and pain immediately out of a state of great ease and pleasure. This we find in the parable was the great aggravation of the rich man’s torment, that he had first received good things, and was afterwards tormented. We may do well to consider this, that those pleasures of sin which have now so much of temptation in them, will in the next world be one of the chief aggravations of our torment.

2. The greatest aggravation of this misery will be, that it is attended with the despair of any future ease; and when misery and despair meet together, they make a man completely miserable. The duration of this misery is expressed to us in Scripture, by such words as are used to signify the longest and most interminable duration. “Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire,” (Matt. xxv. 41.) “Where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched,” (Mark ix. 44.) And (2 Thess. i. 7.) it is there said, that “those who know not God, and obey not the gospel of his Son, shall be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.” And (Rev. xx. 10.) that “the wicked shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.” And what can be imagined beyond this? This is the perfection of misery, to lie under the greatest torment, and yet be in despair of ever finding the least ease.

And thus I have done with the first thing I propounded to speak to from this text; viz. The manifest inconveniencies of a sinful and vicious course of life; that it brings no present benefit or advantage to us; that the reflection upon it causeth shame; and that it is fearful and miserable in the last issue and consequence of it. “What fruit had you,” &c.

I should now have proceeded to the second part of the text, which represents to us the manifold advantages of a holy and virtuous course of life: (ver. 22.) “But now being made free from sin and become the servants of righteousness, ye have your fruit unto holiness;” there is the present advantage of it: “and the end everlasting life;” there is the future reward of it. But this is a large argument, which will require a discourse by itself, and therefore I shall not now enter upon it; but shall only make some reflections upon what hath been said, concerning the miserable issue and consequence of a wicked life impenitently persisted in.

And surely, if we firmly believe and seriously consider these things, we have no reason to be fond of any vice; we can take no great comfort or contentment in a sinful course. If we could, for the seeming advantage and short pleasure of some sins, dispense with the temporal mischiefs and inconveniencies of them, which yet I cannot see how any prudent and considerate man could do: if we could conquer shame, and bear the infamy and reproach which attends most sins, and could digest the upbraidings of our own consciences, so often as we call them to remembrance, and reflect seriously upon them; though for the gratifying an importunate inclination, and an impetuous appetite, all the inconveniencies of them might be born withal; yet methinks the very thought of the end and issue of a wicked life, that “the end of these things is death,” that “indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish,” far greater than we can now describe, or imagine, “shall be to every soul of man that doeth evil,” should overrule us. Though the violence of an irregular lust and desire are able to bear down all other arguments, yet methinks the eternal interest of our precious and immortal souls should still lie near our hearts, and affect us very sensibly. Methinks the consideration of another world, and of all eternity, and of that dismal fate which at tends impenitent sinners after this life, and the dreadful hazard of being miserable for ever, should be more than enough to dishearten any man from a wicked life, and to bring him to a better mind and course.

And if the plain representations of these things do not prevail with men to this purpose, it is a sign that either they do not believe these things, or else that they do not consider them; one of these two must be the reason why any man, notwithstanding these terrible threatenings of God’s word, does venture to continue in an evil course.

It is vehemently to be suspected, that men do not really believe these things, that they are not fully persuaded that there is another state after this life, in which the righteous God “will render to every man according to his deeds:” and, therefore, so much wickedness as we see in the lives of men, so much infidelity may reasonably be suspected to lie lurking in their hearts. They may indeed seemingly profess to believe these things; but he that would know what a man inwardly and firmly believes should attend rather to his actions than to his verbal professions: for if any man lives so, as no man that believes the principles of the Christian religion in reason can live, there is too much reason to question whether that man doth believe his religion; he may say he does, but there is a far greater evidence in the case than words; the actions of the man are by far the most credible declarations of the inward sense and persuasion of his mind.

Did men firmly and heartily believe that there is a God that governs the world, and regards the actions of men, and that “he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness,” and that all mankind shall appear before him in that day, and every action that they have done in their whole lives shall be brought upon the stage, and pass a strict examination and censure, and that those who have made conscience of their duty to God and men, and have “lived soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world,” shall be unspeakably and eternally happy in the next; but those who have lived lewd and licentious lives, and persisted in an impenitent course, shall be extremely and everlastingly miserable, without pity, and without comfort, and without remedy, and with out hope of ever being otherwise; I say, if men were fully and firmly persuaded of these things, it is not credible, it is hardly possible that they should live such profane and impious, such careless and dissolute lives, as we daily see a great part of man kind do.

That man that can be awed from his duty, or tempted to sin, by any of the pleasures or terrors of this world, that for the present enjoyment of his lusts can be contented to venture his soul, what greater evidence than this can there be, that this man does not believe the threatenings of the gospel, and how “fearful a thing it is to fall into the hands of the living God?” That man that can be willing to undergo a hard service for several years, that he may be in a way to get an estate, and be rich in this world, and yet will not be persuaded to restrain himself of his liberty, or to deny his pleasure, or to check his appetite or lust, for the greatest reward that God can promise, or the severest punishment that he can threaten; can any man reasonably think, that this man is persuaded of any such happiness or misery after this life, as is plainly revealed in the gospel, that “verily there is a reward for the righteous, and verily there is a God that judgeth the earth?” For what can he that believes not one syllable of the Bible do worse than this comes to?

A strong and vigorous faith, even in temporal cases, is a powerful principle of action, especially if it be backed and enforced with arguments of fear. He that believes the reality of a thing, and that it is good for him, and that it may be attained, and that if he doth attain it, it will make him very happy, and that without it he shall be extremely miserable; such a belief and persuasion will put a man upon difficult things, and make him to put forth a vigorous endeavour, and to use a mighty industry for the obtaining of that, concerning which he is thus persuaded.

And the faith of the gospel ought to be so much the more powerful, by how much the objects of hope and fear, which it presents to us, are greater and more considerable. Did men fully believe the happiness of heaven, and the torments of hell, and were they as verily persuaded of the truth of them, as if they were before their eyes, how insignificant would all the terrors and temptations of sense be to draw them into sin, and seduce them from their duty?

But, although it seems very strange, and almost incredible, that men should believe these things, and yet live wicked and impious lives; yet, because I have no mind, and God knows there is no need, to increase the number of infidels in this age, I shall choose rather to impute a great deal of the wickedness that is in the world to the inconsiderateness of men, than to their unbelief. I will grant that they do in some sort believe these things, or at least that they do not disbelieve them; and then the great cause of men’s ruin must be, that they do not attend to the consequence of this belief, and how men ought to live that are thus persuaded. Men stifle their reason, and suffer themselves to be hurried away by sense, into the embraces of sensual objects and things present, but do not consider what the end of these things will be, and what is like to become of them hereafter; for it is not to be imagined, but that that man who shall calmly consider with himself what sin is, the shortness of its pleasure, and the eternity of its punishment, should seriously resolve upon a better course of life.

And why do we not consider these things, which are of so infinite concernment to us? What have we our reason for, but to reflect upon ourselves, and to mind what we do, and wisely to compare things together, and, upon the whole matter, to judge what makes most for our true and lasting interest? To consider our whole selves, our souls as well as our bodies, and our whole duration, not only in this world, but in the other, not only with regard to time, but to eternity? To look before us to the last issue and event of our actions, and to the farthest consequence of them, and to reckon upon what will be hereafter, as well as what is present; and if we suspect, or hope, or fear, especially if we have good reason to believe, a future state after death, in which we shall be happy or miserable to all eternity, according as we manage and behave ourselves in this world, to resolve to make it our greatest design and concernment while we are in this world, so to live and demean ourselves, that we may be of the number of those that shall be accounted worthy to escape that misery, and to obtain that happiness, which will last and continue for ever?

And if men would but apply their minds seriously to the consideration of these things, they could not act so imprudently as they do; they would not live so by chance, and without design, taking the pleasure that comes next, and avoiding the present evils which press upon them, without any regard to those that are future, and at a distance, though they be infinitely greater and more considerable: if men could have the patience to debate and argue these matters with themselves, they could not live so preposterously as they do, preferring their bodies before their souls, and the world before God, and the things which are temporal before the things that are eternal.

Did men verily and in good earnest believe but half of that to be true which hath now been declared to you, concerning the miserable state of impenitent sinners in another world; (and I am very sure, that the one half of that which is true concerning that state hath not been told you;) I say, did we in any measure believe what hath been so imperfectly represented, “What manner of persons should we all be, in all holy conversation and godliness, waiting for and hastening unto (that is, making haste to make the best preparation we could for) the coming of the day of God!”

I will conclude all with our Saviour’s exhortation to his disciples, and to all others; “Watch ye therefore and pray always, that ye may be accounted worthy to escape all these things, and to stand before the Son of man: to whom, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, be all honour and glory, world without end. Amen.”

Men are not usually so sensible of the misery of this kind of servitude, because they are governed by sense more than reason; but, according to a true judgment and estimation of things, a vicious course of life is the saddest slavery of all others. And therefore the gospel represents it as a design every way worthy of the Son of God, to come down from Leaven, and to debase himself so far as to assume our nature, and to submit to the death of the cross, on purpose to rescue us from this slavery, and to assert us into “the liberty of the sons of God.” And this is the great design of the doctrine of the gospel, to free men from the bondage of their lusts, and to bring them to the service of God, “whose service is perfect freedom.” And therefore our Saviour tells us, (John viii. 31, 32.) that “if we continue in his word,” i. e. if we obey his doctrine, and frame our lives according to it, it will make us free; “Ye shall know (says he) the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” And if we observe it, the Scripture delights very much to set forth to us the benefits and advantages of the Christian religion by the metaphor of liberty and redemption from captivity and slavery. Hence our Saviour is so often called the Redeemer and Deliverer, and is said to have “obtained eternal redemption for us.” And the publishing of the gospel is compared to the proclaiming of the year of jubilee among the Jews, when all persons that would were set at liberty. (Isa. lxi. 1, 2.) “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,” saith the prophet, speaking in the person of the Messiah, “because he hath anointed me to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.” And it is probable that upon this account, likewise, the Christian doctrine or law is by St. James called “the royal law of liberty.”

This is the great design of Christianity, to set men free from the slavery of their lusts; and to this end the apostle tells us, (Tit. ii. 14.) that “Christ gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works.” And herein the great mercy and compassion of God towards mankind appeared, in that he sent his Son to rescue us from that servitude which we had long groaned under, “that, being made free from sin, we might become the servants of God,” and “the servants of righteousness.”

And this he hath done, not only by the price of his blood, but by the power and purity of his doctrine, and the holy example of his life, and by all those considerations which represent to us the misery of our sinful state, and the infinite danger of continuing in it; and, on the other hand, by setting before us the advantages of a religious and holy life; and what a blessed change we make, when we quit the service of sin, and become the servants of God. It will not only be a mighty present benefit to us, but will make us happy to all eternity; and these are the two considerations which, at first, I propounded to speak to at this time:

First, The present benefit of a holy and virtuous life, which the apostle here calls fruit; “But now being free from sin, and become the servants of God, ye have your fruit unto holiness.”

Secondly, The future reward and recompence of it; “and the end everlasting life.”

First, Let us consider the present benefit and advantage of a holy and virtuous life, which the apostle here calls fruit. If all things be truly considered, there is no advantage comes to any man by a wicked and vicious course of life. A wicked life is no present advantage; the reflection upon it afterwards is shameful and troublesome, and the end of it miserable: but, on the contrary, the advantages of a holy and good life are many and great even in this world, and upon temporal accounts, abstracting from the consideration of a future reward in the world to come.

I shall instance in five or six eminent advantages which it usually brings to men in this world.

I. It brings great peace and contentment of mind.

II. It is a very fit and proper means to promote our outward temporal interest.

III. It tends to the lengthening our days, and hath frequently the blessing of long life attending upon it.

IV. It gives a man great peace and comfort when he comes to die.

V. After death it transmits a good name and reputation to posterity.

VI. It derives a blessing upon our posterity after us. And these are certainly the greatest blessings that a wise man can aim at, and design to himself in this world. Every one of these taken severally is very considerable; but all of them together complete a man’s temporal felicity, and raise it to as high a pitch as is to be expected in this world.

I. A religious and virtuous course of life is the best way to peace and contentment of mind, and does commonly bring it. And to a wise man, that knows how to value the ease and satisfaction of his own mind, there cannot be a greater temptation to religion and virtue, than to consider that it is the best and only way to give rest to his mind. And this is present fruit, and ready payment; because it immediately follows, or rather accompanies, the discharge of our duty. “The fruit of righteousness is peace,” saith the prophet; and the apostle to the Hebrews speaks of “the peaceable fruit of righteousness,” meaning that inward peace which a righteous man hath in his own mind.

A man needs not to take pains, or to use many arguments, to satisfy and content his own mind, after he hath done a good action, and to convince himself that he hath no cause to be troubled for it, for peace and pleasure do naturally spring from it: nay, not only so, but there is an unexpressible kind of pleasure and delight that flows from the testimony of a good conscience. Let but a man take care to satisfy himself in the doing of his duty, and whatever troubles and storms may be raised from without, all will be clear and calm within: for nothing but guilt can trouble a man’s mind, and fright his conscience, and make him uneasy to himself; that indeed will wound his spirit, and sting his very soul, and make him full of fearful and tormenting thoughts. This Cain found after he had committed that crying sin of murdering his brother. (Gen. iv. 6.) “The Lord said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance fallen?” His guilt made him full of wrath, and discontent filled his mind with vexation, and his countenance with shame and confusion. When a man’s conscience is awakened to a sense of his guilt it is angry and froward, and harder to be stilled than a peevish child; but the practice of holiness and virtue does produce just the contrary effects; it fills a man’s mind with pleasure, and makes his countenance cheerful.

And this certainly, if it be well considered, is no small and contemptible advantage. The peace and tranquillity of our minds is the great thing which all the philosophy and wisdom of the world did al ways design to bring men to, as the very utmost happiness that a wise man is capable of in this life: and it is that which no considerate man would part with for all that this world can give him. The greatest fortune in this world ought to be no temptation to any man in his wits, to submit to perpetual sickness and pain for the gaining of it; and yet there is no disease in the world, that for the sharpness of it is comparable to the sting of a guilty mind y and no pleasure equal to that of innocence and a good conscience. And this naturally springs up in, the mind of a good man, where it is not hindered either by a melancholy temper, or by false principles in religion, which fill a man with groundless fears and jealousies of the love and favour of God towards him; and excepting these two cases, this is the ordinary fruit of a holy and good course, which is not interrupted by frequent falling into sin, and great omissions and violations of our duty: for in this case the interruptions of our peace and comfort will naturally be answerable to the inequality of our obedience.

II. Besides the present and inestimable fruit of holiness, the quiet and satisfaction of our own minds; it is likewise a proper means to promote our interest and happiness in this world. For as every vice is naturally attended with some temporal inconvenience of pain or loss; so there is no grace or virtue, but does apparently conduce to a man’s temporal felicity. There are some virtues which tend to the health of his body, and the prolonging of his life, as temperance and chastity; others tend to riches and plenty, as diligence and industry in our callings; others to the secure and peaceable enjoyment of what we have, as truth and fidelity, justice and honesty in all our dealings and intercourse with men. There are other virtues that are apt to oblige man kind to us, and to gain their friendship and good will, their aid and assistance, as kindness, and meekness, and charity, and a generous disposition to do good to all, as far as we have power and opportunity. In a word, there is no real interest of this world but may ordinarily be as effectually promoted and pursued to as great advantage by a man that exercises himself in the practice of all virtue and goodness, and usually to far greater advantage, than by one that is intemperate and debauched, deceitful and dishonest, apt to disoblige and provoke, sour and ill-natured to all mankind: for there is none of these vices but is to a man’s real hinderance and disadvantage, in regard of one kind of happiness or another, which men aim at and propose to themselves in this world.

III. A religious and virtuous course of life doth naturally tend to the prolonging of our days, and hath very frequently the blessing of health and long life attending upon it. The practice of a great many virtues is a great preservative of life and health, as, the due government of our appetites and passions, by temperance, and chastity, and meekness, which prevent the chief causes from within of bodily diseases and distempers; the due government of our tongues and conversation in respect of others, by justice and kindness, and abstaining from wrath and provocation, which are a great security against the dangers of outward violence, according to that of St. Peter, (1 Epist. iii. 10.) “He that will love life and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil, and his lips that they speak no guile; let him eschew evil, and do good; let him seek peace, and ensue it.”

And beside the natural tendency of things, there is a special blessing of God which attends good men, and makes “their days long in the land which the Lord their God hath given them.”

IV. There is nothing gives a man so much comfort when he comes to die, as the reflection upon a holy and good life: and then surely, above all other times, comfort is most valuable, because our frail and infirm nature doth then stand most in need of it. Then usually men’s hearts are faint, and their spirits low, and every thing is apt to deject and trouble them; so that we had need to provide ourselves of some excellent cordial against that time; and there is no comfort like to that of a clear conscience, and of an innocent and useful life. This will revive and raise a man’s spirits under all the infirmities of his body, because it gives a man good hopes concerning his eternal state, and the hopes of that are apt to fill a man with “joy unspeakable and full of glory.”

The difference between good and bad men is never so remarkable in this world, as when they are upon their death-bed. This the Scripture observes to us. (Psal. xxxvii. 37.) “Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright, for the end of that man is peace.”

With what triumph and exultation doth the blessed apostle St. Paul, upon the review of his life, discourse concerning his death and dissolution? (2 Tim. iv. 6-8.) “I am now ready (says he) to be offered up, and the time of my departure is at hand: I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, will give me at that day.” What would not any of us do to be thus affected when we come to leave the world, and to be able to bear the thoughts of death and eternity with so quiet and well satisfied a mind! Why, let us but endeavour to live holy lives, and to be useful and serviceable to God in our generation, as this holy apostle was, and we shall have the same ground of joy and triumph which he had. For this is the proper and genuine effect of virtue and goodness; “The work of righteousness is peace, and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance for ever.” All the good actions that we do in this life are so many seeds of comfort sown in our own consciences, which will spring up one time or other, but especially in the approaches of death, when we come to take a serious review of our lives; for then men’s consciences use to deal plainly and impartially with them, and to tell them the truth; and if at that time more especially “our hearts condemn us not, then may we have comfort and confidence towards God.”

V. A holy and virtuous life doth transmit a good name and reputation to posterity. And this Solomon hath determined to be a much greater happiness, than for a man to leave a great estate behind him: “A good name (says he) is rather to be chosen than great riches.” Pious and virtuous men do commonly gain to themselves a good esteem and reputation in this world, while they are in it; but the virtues of good men are not always so bright and shining as to meet with that respect and acknowledgment which is due to them in this world. Many times they are much clouded by the infirmities and passions which attend them, and are shadowed by some affected singularities and morosities, which those which have lived more retired from the world are more liable to. Besides that, the envy of others, who are not so good as they, lies heavy upon them, and does depress them. For bad men are very apt to misinterpret the best actions of the good, and put false colours upon them, and when they have nothing else to object against them, to charge them with hypocrisy and insincerity; an objection as hard to be answered, as it is to be made good, unless we could see into the hearts of men.

But when good men are dead and gone, and the bright and shining example of their virtues is at a convenient distance, and does not gall and upbraid others, then envy ceaseth, and every man is then content to give a -good man his due praise, and his friends and posterity may then quietly enjoy the comfort of his reputation, which is some sort of blessing to him that is gone. This difference Solomon observes to us between good and bad men; “The memory of the just is blessed,” or well spoke of; “but the name of the wicked shall rot.”

VI. And lastly, religion and virtue do derive a blessing upon our posterity after us. “O that there were such a heart in them (saith Moses, concerning the people of Israel), that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might be well with them and their children for ever!” And to this purpose there are many promises in Scripture of God’s blessing the posterity of the righteous, and his shewing mercy “to thousands of the children of them that love him, and keep his commandments.”

And this is a great motive to obedience, and toucheth upon that natural affection which men bear to their children; so that if we have any regard to them, or concernment for their happiness, we ought to be very careful of our duty, and afraid to offend God: because, according as we demean ourselves towards him, we entail a lasting blessing or a great curse upon our children; by so many and so strong bonds hath God tied our duty upon us, that if we either desire our own happiness, or the happiness of those that are dearest to us, and part of ourselves, we must “fear God, and keep his commandments.”

And thus I have briefly represented to you some of the chief benefits and advantages which a holy and virtuous life does commonly bring to men in this world, which is the first encouragement mentioned in the text; “Ye have your fruit unto holiness.”

Before I proceed to the second, I shall only just lake notice, by way of application of what has been said on this argument,

1. That it is a great encouragement to well-doing, to consider that ordinarily piety and goodness are no hinderance to a man’s temporal felicity, but very frequently great promoters of it; so that, excepting only the case of persecution for religion, I think I may safely challenge any man to shew me how the practice of any part or duty of religion, how the exercise of any grace or virtue, is to the prejudice of a man’s temporal interest, or does debar him of any true pleasure, or hinder him of any real advantage, which a prudent and considerate man would think fit to choose. And as for persecution and sufferings for religion, God can reward us for them, if he please, in this world; and we have all the assurance that we can desire, that he will do it abundantly in the next.

2. The hope of long life, and especially of a quiet and comfortable death, should be a great encouragement to a holy and virtuous life. He that lives well, takes the best course to live long, and lays in for a happy old age, free from the diseases and infirmities which are naturally procured by a vicious youth, and likewise free from the guilt and galling remembrance of a wicked life. And there is no condition which we can fall into in this world, that does so clearly discover the difference between a good and bad man, as a death-bed: for then the good man begins most sensibly to enjoy the comforts of well doing, and the sinner to taste the bitter fruits of sin. What a wide difference is then to be seen between the hopes and fears of these two sorts of persons! and surely, next to the actual possession of blessedness, the good hopes and comfortable prospect of it are the greatest happiness; and next to actual sense of pain, the fear of suffering is the greatest torment.

Though there were nothing beyond this life to be expected, yet if men were sure to be possessed with these delightful or troublesome passions when they come to die, no man that wisely considers things would, for all the pleasures of sin, forfeit the comfort of a righteous soul leaving this world full of the hope of immortality; and endure the vexation and anguish of a guilty conscience, and that infinite terror and amazement which so frequently possesseth the soul of a dying sinner.

3. If there be any spark of a generous mind in us, it should animate us to do well, that we may be well spoken of when we are gone off the stage, and may transmit a grateful memory of our lives to those that shall be after us. I proceed now to the

Second thing I proposed, as the great advantage indeed; viz. The glorious reward of a holy and virtuous life in another world, which is here called “everlasting life”—“and the end everlasting life;” by which the apostle intends to express to us, both the happiness of our future state, and the way and means whereby we are prepared and made meet to be made partakers of it; and that is by the constant and sincere endeavours of a holy and good life. For it is they only that “have their fruit unto holiness,” whose end shall be “everlasting life.” I shall speak briefly to these two, and so conclude my discourse upon this text.

I. The happiness of our future state, which is here expressed by the name of “everlasting life,” in very few words, but such as are of wonderful weight and significancy: for they import the excellency of this state, and the eternity of it. And who is sufficient to speak to either of these arguments? both of them are too big to enter now into the heart of man, too vast and boundless to be comprehended by human understanding, and too unwieldy to be managed by the tongue of men and angels, answer able to the unspeakable greatness and glory of them. And if I were able to declare them unto you, as they deserved, you would not be able to hear me. And therefore I shall choose to say but little upon an argument of which I can never say enough, and shall very briefly consider those two things which are comprehended in that short description which the text gives us of our future happiness, by the name of “everlasting life;” viz. The excellency of this state, and the eternity of it.

1. The excellency of it, which is here represented to us under the notion of life, the most desirable of all other things, because it is the foundation of all other enjoyments whatsoever. Barely to be in being, and to be sensible that we are so, is but a dry notion of life. The true notion of life is to be well and to be happy, vivere est bene valere. They who are in the most miserable condition that can be imagined are in being, and sensible also that they are miserable. But this kind of life is so far from coming under the true notion of life, that the Scripture calls it “the second death.” (Rev. xxi. 8.) It is there said, that “the wicked shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.” And, (chap. xx. 6.) “Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection; on such the second death shall have no power.” So that a state of mere misery and torment is not life but death; nay, the Scripture will not allow the life of a wicked man in this world to be true life, but speaks of him as dead: (Ephes. ii. 1.) speaking of the sinners among the gentiles, “You (saith the apostle) hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins.” And, which is more yet, the Scripture calls a life of sinful pleasures (which men esteem the only happiness of this world), the Scripture, I say, calls this a death. (1 Tim. v. 6.) “She that liveth in pleasure, is dead whilst she liveth.” A lewd and unprofitable life, which serves to no good end and purpose, is a death rather than a life. Nay, that decaying and dying life which we now live in this world, and which is allayed by the mixture of so many infirmities and pains, of so much trouble and sorrow, I say, that even this sort of life, for all that we are so fondly in love with it, does hardly deserve the name of life. But the life of the world to come, of which we now speak, this is life indeed; to do those things which we were made for, to serve the true ends of our being, and to enjoy the comfort and reward of so doing, this is the true notion of life; and whatever is less than this, is death, or a degree of it, and approach towards it. And therefore very well may heaven and happiness be described by the notion of life, because truly to live and to be happy are words that signify the same thing.

But what kind of life this is, I can no more describe to you in the particularities of it, than Colum bus could have described the particular manners and customs of the people of America, before he or any other person in these parts of the world had seen it or been there. But this I can say of it in general, and that from the infallible testimony of the great Creator and glorious inhabitants of that blessed place, that it is a state of pure pleasure and unmingled joys, of pleasures more manly, more spiritual, and more refined, than any of the delights of sense, consisting in the enlargement of our minds and knowledge to a greater degree, and in the perfect exercise of love and friendship, in the conversation of the best and wisest company, free from self-interest, and all those unsociable passions of envy and jealousy, of malice and ill-will, which spoil the comfort of all conversation in this world; and, in a word, free from all other passion or design but an ardent and almost equal desire to contribute all, that by all means possible they can, to the mutual happiness of one another: for charity reigns in heaven, and is the brightest grace and virtue in the firmament of glory, far outshining all other; as St. Paul, who had himself been taken up into the third heaven, does expressly declare to us.

Farther yet, this blessed state consists more particularly in these two things: in having our bodies raised and refined to a far greater purity and perfection than ever they had in this world; and in the consequent happiness of the whole man, soul and body, so strictly and firmly united as never to be parted again, and so equally matched as to be no trouble or impediment to one another.

(1.) In having our bodies raised and refined to a greater purity and perfection than ever they had in this world. Our bodies, as they are now, are unequally tempered, and in a perpetual flux and change, continually tending to corruption, because made up of such contrary principles and qualities as by their perpetual conflict are always at work, conspiring the ruin and dissolution of them: but when they are raised again, they shall be so tempered and so refined, as to be free from all those destructive qualities which do now threaten their change and dissolution: and though they shall still consist of matter, yet they shall be purified to that degree, as to partake of the immortality of our souls, to which they shall be united, and to be of equal duration with them. So the Scripture tells us, (1 Cor. xv. 52, 53.) “That our dead bodies shall be raised incorruptible: for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.”

Our bodies, when they are laid in the grave, are vile carcasses, but they shall be raised again beautiful and glorious, and as different from what they were before, as the heavenly mansions, in which they are to reside for ever, are from that dark cell of the grave out of which they are raised; and shall then be endowed with such a life, and strength, and vigour, as to be able, without any change or decay, to abide and continue for ever in the same state.

Our bodies in this world are gross flesh and blood, liable to be affected with natural and sensual pleasures, and to be afflicted with natural pains and diseases; to be pressed with the natural necessities of hunger and thirst, and obnoxious to all those changes and accidents to which all natural things are subject: but “they shall be raised spiritual bodies,” pure and refined from all the dregs of matter; they shall not hunger, nor thirst, nor be diseased, or in pain any more.

“These houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust,” are continually decaying; and, therefore, stand in need of continual reparation by food and physic: but “our house, which is from heaven” (as the apostle calls it) shall be of such lasting and durable materials, as not only time, but even eternity itself, shall make no impression upon it, or cause the least decay in it. “They (says our blessed Saviour) who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, cannot die any more: but shall be like the angels, and are the children of God;” i. e. shall in some degree partake of the felicity and immortality of God himself, “who is always the same, and whose years fail not.” Nay, the apostle expressly tells us, that our bodies after the resurrection shall be spiritual bodies, so that we shall then be as it were all spirit, and our bodies shall be so raised and refined, that they shall be no clog or impediment to the operation of our souls. And it must needs be a great comfort to us whilst we are in this world, to live in the hopes of so happy and glorious a change; when we consider how our bodies do now oppress our spirits, and what a melancholy and dead weight they are upon them, how grievous an incumbrance, and trouble, and temptation they are, for the most part, to us in this mortal state.

(2.) The blessedness of this state consists, likewise, in the consequent happiness of the whole man, soul and body, so strictly and firmly united as never to be parted again, and so equally matched as to be no trouble and impediment to one another.

In this world the soul and body are for the most part very unequally yoked, so that the soul is not only darkened by the gross fumes and clouds which rise from the body, but loaded and oppressed by the dull weight of it, which it very heavily lugs on and draws after it; and the soul, likewise, and the vicious inclinations, and the irregular passions of it, have many times an ill influence upon the body and the humours of it. But in the next world they shall both be purified, the one from sin, and the other from frailty and corruption, and both be admitted to the blessed sight and enjoyment of the ever-blessed God.

But the consideration of this (as I said before) is too big for our narrow apprehensions in this mortal state, and an argument not fit to be treated of by such children as the wisest of men are in this world; and whenever we attempt to speak of it, we do but lisp like children, and understand like children, and reason like children about it; “That which is imperfect must be done away,” and our souls must be raised to a greater perfection, and our understandings filled with a stronger and steadier light, before we can be fit to engage in so profound a contemplation. We must first have been in heaven, and possessed of that felicity and glory which is there to be enjoyed, before we can either speak or think of it in any measure as it deserves. In the meantime, whenever we set about it, we shall find our faculties oppressed and dazzled with the weight and splendour of so great and glorious an argument; like St. Paul, who, when he “was caught up into paradise,” saw and heard those things which, when he came down again into this world, he was not able to express, and which it was not possible for the tongue of man to utter.

So that in discoursing of the state of the blessed, we must content ourselves with what the Scripture hath revealed in general concerning it; that it is a state of perfect freedom from all those infirmities and imperfections, those evils and miseries, those sins and temptations which we are liable to in this world. So St. John describes the glory and felicity of that state, as they were in visions represented to him: (Rev. xxi. 2-4.) “And I, John, saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a great voice out of heaven, saying, Behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away:” that is, all those evils which we saw or suffered in this world, shall for ever vanish and disappear; and, which is the great privilege and felicity of all, that there shall no sin be there: (ver. 27.) “There shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth; and, consequently, there shall be no misery and curse there.” So we read, (chap. xxii. 3, 4.) “And there shall be no more curse; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and his servants shall serve him, and they shall see his face.” In which last words our employment and our happiness are expressed; but what in particular our employment shall be, and wherein it shall consist, is impossible now to describe; it is sufficient to know in the general, that our employment shall be our unspeakable pleasure, and every way suitable to the glory and happiness of that state, and as much above the noblest and most delightful employments of this world, as the perfection of embodies, and the powers of our souls, shall then be above what they are now in this world.

For there is no doubt but that he who made us, and endued our souls with a desire of immortality, and so large a capacity of happiness, does understand very well by what way and means to make us happy, and hath in readiness proper exercises and employments for that state, and every way more fitted to make us happy, than any condition or employment in this world is suitable to a temporal happiness; employments that are suitable to “the spirits of just men made perfect,” united to bodies purified and refined almost to the condition of spirits; employments which we shall be so far from being weary of, that they shall minister to us a new and fresh delight to all eternity; and this, perhaps, not so much from the variety, as from the perpetual and growing pleasure of them.

It is sufficient for us to know this in the general, and to trust the infinite power, and wisdom, and goodness of God, for the particular manner and circum stances of our happiness: not doubting but that he, who is the eternal and inexhaustible spring and fountain of all happiness, can and will derive and convey such a share of it to every one of us as he thinks fit, and in such ways as he, who best under stands it, is best able to find out.

In a word, the happiness of the next life shall be such as is worthy of the great King of the world to bestow upon his faithful servants, and such as is in finitely beyond the just reward of their best services; it is to see God, i. e. to contemplate and love the best and most perfect of beings, and “to be for ever with the Lord, in whose presence is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand there are pleasures for evermore,”

J will say no more upon this argument, lest I should say less, and because whoever ventures to wade far into it will soon find himself out of his depth, and in danger to be swallowed up and lost in that great abyss, which is not to be fathomed by the shallow faculties of mortal men.

I shall therefore only mention the

2. Second thing I proposed to speak to; viz. the eternity of this happiness: “and the end everlasting life:” by which the apostle intends to express the utmost perfection, but not the final period, of the happiness of good men in another world. For to a perfect state of happiness these two conditions are requisite; that it be immutable, and that it be interminable, that it can neither admit of a change nor of an end. And this is all that I shall say of it, it being impossible to say any thing that is more intelligible and plain, concerning that which is infinite, than that it is so. I should now have proceeded to the

II. Second thing I proposed; viz. By what way and means we may be prepared, and made meet to be made partakers of this happiness; and that is (as I have told yon all along) by the constant and sincere endeavour of a holy and good life; for the text supposeth that they only who are “made free from sin, and become the servants of God,” and who “have their fruit unto holiness,” are they whose end shall be everlasting life. But this is an argument which I have had so frequent occasion to speak to, that I shall not now meddle with it. All that I shall do more at present, shall be to make an inference or two from what hath been said upon this argument.

I. The consideration of the happy state of good men in another world, cannot but be a great comfort and support to good men under all the evils and sufferings of this present life. Hope is a great cordial to the minds of men, especially when the thing hoped for does so vastly outweigh the present grievance and trouble. The Holy Scriptures, which reveal to us the happiness of our future state, do likewise assure us that there is no comparison between the afflictions and sufferings of good men in this world, and the reward of them in the other. “I reckon, (saith St. Paul, Rom. viii. 18.) that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us.”

Particularly the consideration of that glorious change which shall be made in our bodies at the resurrection, ought to be a great comfort to us under all the pains and diseases which they are now liable to, and even against death itself. One of the greatest burthens of human nature, is the frailty and infirmity of our bodies, the necessities which they are frequently pressed withal, the diseases and pains to which they are liable, and the fear of death, by reason whereof a great part of mankind are subject to bondage; against all which this is an everlasting spring of consolation to us, that the time is coming when we shall have other sort of bodies, freed from that burthen of corruption which we now groan under, and from all those miseries and inconveniencies which flesh and blood are now subject to. For the time will come, when “these vile bodies,” which we now wear, “shall be changed, and fashioned like to the glorious body of the Son of God;” and when they shall be raised at the last day, they shall not be raised such as we laid them down, vile and corruptible, but immortal and incorruptible: for the same power which hath raised them up to life, shall likewise change them, and put a glory upon them like to that of the glorified body of our Lord; and when this glorious change is made, “when this corruptible hath put on incorruption, and this mortal hath put on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory;” and when this last enemy is perfectly subdued, we shall be set above all the frailties and dangers, all the temptations and sufferings of this mortal state; there will be then no fleshly lusts and brutish passions to war against the soul; no law in our members to rise up in rebellion against the law of our minds; no diseases to torment us, no danger of death to terrify us; all the motions and passions of our outward man shall then be perfectly subject to the reason of our minds, and our bodies shall partake of the immortality of our souls. How should this consideration bear us up under all the evils of life and the fears of death, that the resurrection will be a perfect cure of all our infirmities and diseases, and an effectual remedy of all the evils that we now labour under; and that it is but a very little while that we shall be troubled with these frail, and mortal, and vile bodies, which shall shortly be laid in the dust, and when they are raised again, shall become spiritual, incorruptible, and glorious.

And if our bodies shall undergo so happy a change, what happiness may we imagine shall then be conferred upon our souls, that so much better and nobler part of ourselves! as the apostle reasons in another case, “Doth God take care of oxen?” Hath he this consideration of our bodies, which are but the brutish part of the man? what regard will he then have to his own image, that spark of divinity which is for ever to reside in these bodies? If, upon the account of our souls, and for their sakes, our bodies shall become incorruptible, spiritual, and glorious, then certainly our souls shall be endued with far more excellent and Divine qualities: if our bodies shall, in some degree, partake of the perfection of our souls in their spiritual and immortal nature, to what a pitch of perfection shall our souls be raised and advanced! even to an equality with angels, and to some kind of participation of the Divine nature and perfection, so far as a creature is capable of them.

II. The comparison which is here in the text, and which I have largely explained, between the manifest inconveniences of a sinful and vicious course, and the manifold advantages of a holy and virtuous life, is a plain direction to us which of these two to choose. So that I may make the same appeal that Moses does, after that he had at large declared the blessings promised to the obedience of God’s laws, and the curse denounced against the violation and transgression of them: (Deut. xxx. 19.) “I call heaven and earth to record against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life,” that you may be happy in life and death, and after death to all eternity. I know every one is ready to choose happiness, and to say with Balaam, “Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my latter end be like his:” but if we do in good earnest desire the end, we must take the way that leads to it; we must “become the servants of God,” and “have our fruit unto holiness,” if ever we expect that “the end shall be everlasting life.”

V. I shall offer some considerations to convince men both of the necessity and fitness of this resolution, and of keeping steadfastly to it. “Surely it is meet to be said unto God, I will not offend any more.”

VI. I shall add some brief directions concerning the managing and maintaining of this holy and necessary resolution.

I. What resolution in general is. It is a fixed determination of the will about any thing, either to do it, or not to do it, as upon due deliberation we have judged and concluded it to be necessary or convenient to be done, or not to be done by us: and this supposeth three things.

1. Resolution supposeth a precedent deliberation of the mind about the thing to be resolved upon. For no prudent man does determine or resolve upon any thing till he hath considered the thing, and weighed it well with himself, and hath fully debated the necessity and expedience of it; what advantage he shall have by the doing of it, and what danger and inconvenience will certainly, or very probably, redound to him by the neglect and omission of it. For peremptorily to determine and resolve upon any thing before a man hath done this, is not properly resolution, but precipitancy and rashness.

2. Resolution supposeth some judgment passed upon the thing, after a man hath thus deliberated about it: that he is satisfied in his mind one way or other concerning it, that his understanding is convinced either that it is necessary and convenient for him to do it, or that it is not; and this is sometimes called resolution, but is not that resolution which immediately determines a man to action. This judgment of the necessity and fitness of the thing, is not the resolution of the will, but of the understanding: for it does not signify that a man hath fully deter mined to do the thing, but that he hath determined with himself that it is reasonable to be done, and that he is no longer in doubt and suspense whether it be best for him to do it or not, but is in his mind resolved and satisfied one way or other. And these are two very different things; to be resolved in one’s judgment, that is, to be convinced that a thing is fit and necessary to be done, and to be resolved to set upon the doing of it; for many men are thus convinced of the fitness and necessity of the thing, who yet have not the heart, cannot bring themselves to a firm and fixed resolution to set upon the doing of it. So that an act of the judgment must go before the resolution of the will: for as he is rash that resolves to do a thing before he hath deliberated about it; so he is blind and wilful that resolves to do a thing before his judgment be satisfied, whether it be best for him to do it or not.

3. If the matter be of considerable moment and consequence, resolution supposeth some motion of the affections; which is a kind of bias upon the will, a certain propension and inclination that a man feels in himself, either urging him to do a thing, or withdrawing him from it. Deliberation and judgment, they direct a man what to do, or leave undone; the affections excite and quicken a man to take some resolution in the matter; that is, to do suitably to the judgment his mind hath passed upon the thing. For instance; a great sinner reflects upon his life, and considers what he hath done, what the course is that he lives in, and what the issue and consequence of it will probably or certainly be, whether it will make him happy or miserable in the conclusion; and debating the matter calmly and soberly with himself, he is satisfied and convinced of the evil and danger of a wicked life, and consequently that it is best for him to resolve upon a better course; that is, to repent. Now these thoughts must needs awaken in him fearful apprehensions of the wrath of Almighty God, which is due to him for his sins, and hangs over him, and which he is every moment in danger of, if he goes on in his evil course. These thoughts are apt, likewise, to fill him with shame and confusion, at the remembrance of his horrible ingratitude to God his maker, his best friend and greatest benefactor, and of his desperate folly in provoking omnipotent justice against himself; whereupon he is heartily grieved and troubled for what he hath done; and these affections of fear, and shame, and sorrow, being once up, they come with great violence upon the will, and urge the man to a speedy resolution of changing his course, and leaving the way he is in, which he is fully convinced is so evil and dangerous; and of betaking himself to another course, which he is fully satisfied will be much more for his safety and advantage.

So that resolution, in general, is a fixed determination of the will; that is, such a determination as is not only for the present free from all wavering and doubting, but such as cannot prudently be altered, so long as reason remains. For the man who, upon full deliberation and conviction of his mind, resolves upon any thing, cannot without the imputation of fickleness and inconstancy quit that resolution, so long as he hath the same reason which he had when he took it up, and is still satisfied that the reason is good. For instance; the man who hath taken up a resolution to be sober, because of the ugliness and unreasonableness of drunkenness, and the temporal inconveniencies, and eternal damnation, which that sin exposeth a man to; if these reasons be true and good, can never prudently alter the resolution which he hath taken, and return to that sin again.

II. Let us consider what is the special object or matter of this resolution, wherein the formal nature of repentance does consist, what it is that a man when he repents resolves upon; and that I told you is to leave his sin, and to return to God and his duty; and this is the resolution which the penitent here described in the text takes up, “I will not offend any more. That which I see not, teach thou me; and if I have done iniquity, I will do no more.” He resolves against all known sin, “I will not offend any more;” and if through ignorance he had sinned, and done contrary to his duty, he desires to be better instructed, that he may not offend again in the like kind. “That which I see not, teach thou me; and if I have done iniquity, I will do no more.”

So that the true penitent resolves upon these two things:

1. To forsake his sin. And,

2. To return to God and his duty.

1. To forsake his sin: and this implies the quit ting of his sinful course whatever it had been; and that not only by abstaining from the outward act and practice of every sin, but by endeavouring to crucify and subdue the inward affection and inclination to it.

And it implies farther, the utter forsaking of sin; for repentance is not only a resolution to abstain from sin for the present, but never to return to it again. Thus Ephraim, when he repented of his idolatry, he utterly renounced it, saying, “What have I to do any more with idols?” (Hos. xiv. 8.) He that truly repents, is resolved to break off his sinful course, and to abandon those lusts and vices which he was formerly addicted to, and lived in.

2. The true penitent resolves likewise to return to God and his duty; he does not stay in the negative part of religion, he does not only resolve not to commit any sin, but not to neglect or omit any thing that he knows to be his duty; and if he has been ignorant of any part of his duty, he is willing to know it, that he may do it; he is not only deter mined to forsake his sin, which will make him miserable, but to return to God, who alone can make him happy: he is now resolved to love God, and to serve him as much as he hated and dishonoured him before; and will now be as diligent to perform and practise all the duties and parts of religion, as he was negligent of them before, and as ready to do all the good he can to all men in any kind, as he was careless of these things before: these, in general, are the things which a true penitent resolves upon. I proceed to the

III. Third thing I proposed to consider; namely, what is implied in a sincere resolution of leaving our sins, and returning to God and our duty. And this holy resolution, if it be thorough and sincere, does imply in it these three things:

1. That it be universal.

2. That it be a resolution of the means as well as of the end.

3. That it presently comes to effect, and be speedily and without delay put in execution.

1. A sincere resolution of amendment must be universal: a resolution to forsake all sin, and to return to our whole duty, and every part of it; such a resolution as that of holy David, “to hate every false way, and to have respect to all God’s commandments.”

This resolution must be universal, in respect of the whole man; and with regard to all our actions. In respect of the whole man; for we must resolve not only to abstain from the outward action of sin, but this resolution must have its effect upon our inward man, and reach our very hearts and thoughts; it must restrain our inclinations, and “mortify our lusts and corrupt affections,” and “renew us in the very spirit of our minds,” as the apostle expresses it.

And it must be universal, in respect of all our actions. For this is not the resolution of a sincere penitent, to abstain only from gross and notorious, from scandalous and open sins; but, likewise, to refrain from the commission of those sins which are small in the esteem of men, and not branded with a mark of public infamy and reproach; to forbear sin in secret, and when no eye of man sees us and takes notice of us. This is not a sincere resolution, to resolve to practise the duties and virtues of religion in public, and to neglect them in private; to resolve to perform the duties of the first table, and to pass by those of the second; to resolve to serve God, and to take a liberty to defraud and cozen men; to honour our Father which is in heaven, and to injure and hate our brethren upon earth; “to love our neighbour, and to hate our enemy,” as the Jews did of old time; to resolve against swearing, and to al low ourselves the liberty to speak falsely, and to break our word; to free from superstition, and to run into faction; “to abhor idols, and to commit sacrilege;” to resolve to be devout at church, and deceitful in our shops; to he very scrupulous about lesser matters, and to be very zealous about indifferent things; “to tithe mint, and anise, and cummin, and to omit the weightier matters of the law, mercy, and fidelity, and justice;” to be very rigid in matters of faith and opinion, but loose in life and practice.

No; the resolution of a sincere penitent must be universal and uniform; it must extend alike to the forbearing of all sin, and the exercise of every grace and virtue, and to the due practice and performance of every part of our duty. The true penitent must resolve for the future to abstain from all sin, “to be holy in all manner of conversation, and to abound in all the fruits of righteousness, which, by Jesus Christ, are to the praise and glory of God.” For, if a man do truly repent of his wicked life, there is the very same reason why he should resolve against all sin, as why he should resolve against any; why he should observe all the commandments of God, as why he should keep any one of them. For, as St. James reasons concerning him that wilfully breaks any one commandment of God, that “he is guilty of all, and breaks the whole law;” because the authority of God is equally stamped upon all his laws, and is violated and contemned by the wilful transgression of any one of them; “For he that hath said, Thou shalt not kill, hath likewise said, Thou shalt not commit adultery, and, Thou shalt not steal:” so he that resolves against any one sin, or upon performance of any one part of his duty, ought for the very same reason to make his resolution universal; because one sin is evil and provoking to God, as well as another, and the performance of one part of our duty good and pleasing to him, as well as another, and there is no difference. So that he that resolves against any sin, upon wise and reasonable grounds, because of the evil of it, and the danger of the wrath of God to which it exposeth us, ought for the same reason to resolve against all sin; because it is damnable to commit adultery, and to steal, as well as to kill; and that resolution against sin, which is not universal, it is a plain case that it is not true and sincere, and that it was not taken up out of the sense of the intrinsical evil of sin, and the danger of it in respect of God and the judgment of another world (for this reason holds against every sin, and remains always the same), but that it was taken up upon some inferior consideration, either because of the shame and infamy of it among men, or because of some other temporal inconvenience, which if the man could be secured against, he would presently break his resolution, and return to the commission of that sin with as much freedom as any other.

2. A sincere resolution implies a resolution of the means as well as of the end. He that is truly and honestly resolved against any sin, is likewise resolved to avoid, as much as is possible, the occasions and temptations which may lead or draw him to that sin; or if they happen to present themselves to him, he is resolved to stand upon his guard, and to resist them. In like manner, he that sincerely resolves upon doing his duty in any kind, must resolve upon the means that are requisite and necessary to the due discharge and performance of that duty. As he that resolves against that needless and useless sin of swearing in common conversation, must resolve also “to set a guard before the door of his lips,” seeing it is certain that it requires great care and attention, at least for some competent time, to get rid of a habit.

When David resolved not to offend with his tongue, he resolved at the same time to be very watchful over himself; (Psal. xxxix. 1.) “I said, I will take heed to my ways, that I offend not with my tongue: I will keep my mouth as with a bridle, while the wicked is before me.” For a man to resolve against any sin or vice, and yet to involve himself continually in the occasions, and to run himself into the company and temptations which do naturally, and will almost necessarily, lead and betray him into those sins, is a plain evidence of insincerity. This I take for a certain rule; that whatever can reasonably move a man to resolve upon any end, will, if his resolution be sincere and honest, determine him every whit as strongly to use all those means which are necessary in order to that end. But of this I have spoken elsewhere.

3. A sincere resolution of leaving our sins, and returning to God and our duty, does imply the present time, and that we are to resolve speedily and without delay to put this resolution in practice; that we are peremptorily determined not to go one step farther in the ways of sin, not to neglect any duty that God requires of us not for one moment; but immediately and forthwith to set upon the practice of it, so soon as occasion and opportunity is offered to us. And the reason of this is evident; because the very same considerations that prevail upon any man to take up this resolution of amendment, and changing the course of his life, are every whit as prevalent to engage him to put this resolution presently in practice and execution.

VI. To add some directions concerning the managing and maintaining this holy resolution. The three first I have spoken to; I now proceed to the

IV. Fourth, To shew that in this resolution the very essence and formal nature of repentance doth consist. A man may do many reasonable actions without an explicit resolution. In things that are more easy and natural to us, judgment and resolution are all one; it is all one to judge a thing fit to be done, and to resolve to do it. But in matters of difficulty, when a man is to strive against the stream, and to oppose strong habits that have taken deep root, there is nothing to be done without an explicit resolution. No man makes any remarkable change in his life, so as to cross his inclinations and custom, without an express resolution. For though a man’s judgment be never so much convinced of the reasonableness and necessity of such a change; yet, unless a man’s spirit be fortified and fixed by resolution, the power of custom, and the violence of his own inclinations, will carry him against his judgment. Now there is no change of a man’s life can be imagined, wherein a man offers greater violence to inveterate habits, and to the strong propensions of his present temper, than in this of repentance. So that among all the actions of a man’s life, there is none that doth more necessarily require an express purpose than repentance does.

And that herein repentance doth chiefly consist, I shall endeavour to make evident from Scripture, and from the common apprehensions of mankind concerning repentance.

The Scripture, besides the several descriptions of repentance, useth two words to express it to us, μεταμέλεια and μετάνοια. The former properly signifies the inward trouble and displeasure which men conceive against themselves for having done amiss; which if it be κατὰ Θεὸν λύπη, “a godly sorrow,” it worketh in us μετάνοιαν ἀμεταμέλητον, as St. Paul calls it, “a repentance not to be repented of;” that is, such a change of our minds, which as we shall have no cause to be troubled at, so no reason to alter afterwards. And what is this but a firm, steadfast, and unalterable resolution?

The Scripture likewise useth several phrases of the like importance to describe repentance by; as, forsaking and turning from sin, and conversion and turning to God. Forsaking and turning from sin: hence it is called, “Repentance from dead works,” (Heb. vi. 1.) and turning to God, (Acts xxvi. 20.) “I have shewed to the gentiles that they shall repent and turn to God;” that is, from the worship of idols to the true God. And we have both these together in the description which the prophet gives of repentance: (Isa. lv. 7.) “Let the wicked forsake his ways, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord.” Now this change begins in the sinner’s resolution of doing this; and the unrighteous man’s forsaking his thoughts, is no thing else but changing the purpose of his mind, and resolving upon a better course. And thus Lactantius describes it: Agere autem pœnitentiam nihil aliud est, quam affirmare et profiteri se non amplius peccaturum: “To repent, is nothing else but for a man to declare and profess that he will sin no more.” This is repentance before men. And repentance before God is a resolution answerable to this profession. And elsewhere, saith the same author, “The Greeks do most fully express repentance by the word μετάνοια, because he that repents recovers his mind from his former folly, and is troubled at it:” et confirmat animam suam ad rectius vivendum, “and confirms his mind for a better course.” And how is this done but by a resolution? And that this is the natural and true notion of repentance, appears, in that the heathens did consent and agree in it. Gellius gives this description of it: Pœnitere tum dicere solemus, cum quæ ipsi fecimus, ea nobis post incipiunt displicere, sententiamque in iis nostram demutamus: “We are said then to repent, when those things which we have done be gin afterwards to displease us, and we change our resolution about them.” And so, likewise, one of the philosophers describes it: “Repentance is the beginning of philosophy, a flying from foolish words and actions, καὶ τῆς ἀμεταμελήτου ζωῆς ἡ πρώτη παρασκευὴ, and the first preparation of a life not to be repented of.”

It is true, indeed, repentance supposeth the entire change of our lives and actions, and a continued state, as the proper consequence of it: but repentance is but the beginning of this change, which takes its rise from the purpose and resolution of our minds; and if it be sincere and firm, it will certainly have this effect, to change our lives; and if it be not so, it is not repentance. For though in the nature of the thing it be possible that a man may sincerely resolve upon a thing, and yet let fall his resolution afterwards, before it come into act; yet, in the phrase of Scripture, nothing is called repentance but such a resolution as takes effect, so soon as there is opportunity for it. If we change our resolution, and repent of our repentance, this is not that which St. Paul calls “Repentance unto salvation.” So that no man that reads and considers the Bible, can impose upon himself so grossly, as to conceit himself a true penitent, and, consequently, to be in a state of salvation, who hath been troubled for his sins, and hath taken up a resolution to leave them, if he do not pursue this resolution, and act according to it.

V. I shall, in the next place, propound some arguments and considerations to persuade men to this holy resolution, and then to keep them firm and steadfast to it, so as never to change it after they have once taken it up.

First, I shall propound some arguments to persuade men to take up this resolution; and they are these:

1. Consider that this resolution of repentance is nothing but what, under the influence of God’s grace and Holy Spirit, which are never wanting to the sincere endeavours of men, is in your power. And it is necessary to premise this; for unless this be cleared, all the other arguments that I can use will signify nothing. For nothing in the world could be more vain, than to take a great deal of pains to persuade men to do a thing which they cannot do, to entreat them to attempt an impossibility, and to urge and solicit them with all earnestness and importunity to do that which is absolutely and altogether out of their power. All the commands of God, and the exhortations of his word, and all the promises and threatenings whereby these commands and exhortations are enforced, do plainly suppose, either that it is in our power to do the thing which God commands or exhorts us to; or else, if it be not (which I grant it is not), that God is ready by his grace and strength, if we be not wanting to ourselves, to assist and enable us to those ends and purposes. For the gospel supposeth a power going along with it, and that the Holy Spirit of God works upon the minds of men, to quicken, and excite, and assist them to their duty. And if it were not so, the exhortations of preachers would be nothing else but a cruel and bitter mocking of sinners, and an ironical insulting over the misery and weakness of poor creatures; and for ministers to preach, or people to hear sermons, upon other terms, would be the vainest expense of time, and the idlest thing we do all the week; and all our dissuasives from sin, and exhortations to holiness and a good life, and vehement persuasions of men to strive to get to heaven, and to escape hell, would be just as if one should urge a blind man, by many reasons and arguments, taken from the advantages of sight, and the comfort of that sense, and the beauty of external objects, by all means to open his eyes, and to behold the delights of nature, to see his way, and to look to his steps, and should upbraid him, and be very angry with him, for not doing so. Why, if resolution be absolutely impossible to us, and a thing wholly out of our power, it is just the same case. But then we ought to deal plainly and openly with men, and to tell them, that what we so earnestly persuade them to is that which we certainly know they cannot do. So that it is necessary, if I intend that the following considerations should do any good, to assure men that it is not impossible for them to make a resolution of leaving their sins and returning to God.

It is a power which every man is naturally invested withal, to consider, and judge, and choose. To consider, that is, to weigh and compare things together; to judge, that is, to determine which is best; and to choose, that is, to resolve to do it or not: and there is nothing more evident and more universally acknowledged in temporal cases, and in the affairs and concernments of this life. In these matters resolution is a thing ordinary and of frequent practice; it is the principle of all great and considerable actions. Men resolve to be great in this world, and by virtue of this resolution, when they have once taken it up, what industry will they not use! what hazards will they not run in the pursuit of their ambitious designs! Difficulties and dangers do rather whet their courage, and set an edge upon their spirits. Men resolve to be rich; the apostle speaks of some that will be rich: (1 Tim. vi.) “They that will be rich:” and though this be but a low and mean design, yet these persons, by virtue of this resolution, will toil and take prodigious pains in it.

And as to spiritual things, every man hath the same power radically; that is, he hath the faculties of understanding and will, but these are obstructed and hindered in their exercise, and strongly biassed a contrary way by the power of evil inclinations and habits; so that, as to the exercise of this power, and the effect of it in spiritual things, men are in a sort as much disabled as if they were destitute of it. For it is, in effect, all one, to have no understanding at all to consider things that are spiritual, as to have the understanding blinded by an invincible prejudice; to have no liberty as to spiritual things, as to have the will strongly biassed against them. For a man that hath this prejudice upon his under standing, and this bias upon his will is, to all intents and purposes, as if he were destitute of these faculties. But then we are not to understand this impotency to be absolutely natural, but accidental; not to be in the first frame and constitution of our souls, but to have happened upon the depravation of nature. It is not a want of natural faculties, but the binding of them up and hindering their operations to certain purposes. This impotency proceeds from the power of evil habits. And thus the Scripture expresseth it, and compares an impotency arising from bad habits and customs to a natural impossibility; nothing coming nearer to nature, than a powerful custom. “Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also, that are accustomed to do evil, learn to do well.”

But now God by the gospel hath designed the recovery of mankind from the slavery of sin, and the power of their lusts; and therefore, as, by the death of Christ, he hath provided a way to remove the guilt of sin, so, by the Spirit of Christ, he furnisheth us with sufficient power to destroy the dominion of sin. I say sufficient, if we be not wanting to ourselves, but be “workers together with God,” and be as diligent “to work out our own salvation,” as he is ready “to work in us both to will and to do.”

So that, when we persuade men to repent and change their lives, and to resolve upon a better course, we do not exhort them to any thing that is absolutely out of their power, but to what they may do; though not of themselves, yet by the grace of God, which is always ready to assist them, unless, by their former gross neglects and long obstinacy in an evil course, they have provoked God to withdraw his grace from them. So that though, considering our own strength abstractedly, and separately from the grace of God, these things be not in our power; yet the grace of God puts them into our power.

And this is so far from derogating from the grace of God, that it is highly to the praise of it. For if the grace of God makes us able to repent and resolve upon a new life, he that asserts this does not attribute his repentance to himself, but to the grace of God: nay, he that says that God’s grace excites and is ready to assist men to do what God commands, represents God immensely more good and gracious, than he that says that God commands men to do that which by their natural power they cannot do, and will condemn them for not doing it, and yet denies them that grace which is necessary to the doing of it.

Let this then be established as a necessary consideration to prevent discouragement, that to resolve upon the change of our lives, is that which, by the grace of God, we are enabled to do, if we will. Resolution is no strange and extraordinary thing; it is one of the most common acts that belongs to us as we are men; but we do not ordinarily apply it to the best purposes. It is not so ordinary for men to resolve to be good, as to be rich and great; not so common for men to resolve against sin, as to resolve against poverty and suffering. It is not so usual for men to resolve to keep a good conscience, as to keep a good place. Indeed, our corrupt nature is much more opposite to this holy kind of resolution. But then to balance and answer this, God hath promised greater and more immediate assistance to us in this case than in any other. There is a general blessing and common assistance promised to resolution and diligence about temporal things; and God’s providence doth often advance such persons to riches and honour. “The diligent hand, with God’s blessing, makes rich;” as Solomon tells us, (Prov. x. 4.) and, (xxii. 29.) “Seest thou (says he) a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before kings, he shall not stand before mean men!” Now diligence is the effect of a great and vigorous resolution. But there is a special and extraordinary blessing and assistance that attends the resolution and endeavour of a holy life. God hath not promised to strengthen men with all might in the way to riches and honours, and to assist the ambitious and covetous designers of this world with “a mighty and glorious power, such as raised up Jesus from the dead:” but this he hath promised to those, who with a firm purpose and resolution do engage in the ways of religion. Let us then shake off our sloth and listlessness, and in that strength and assistance which God offers, let us resolve to leave our sins, and to amend our lives.

2. Consider what it is that you are to resolve upon; to leave your sins and to return to God and goodness. So that the things I am persuading you to resolve upon, are the strongest reasons that can be for such a resolution. Sin is such a thing, that there can be no better argument to make men resolve against it than to consider what it is, and to think seriously of the nature and consequence of it. And God and goodness are so amiable and desirable, that the very proposal of these objects, hath invitations and allurements enough to inflame our desires after them, and to make us rush into the embraces of them. If we would but enter into the serious consideration of them, we should soon be resolved in our minds about them.

Do but consider a little what sin is. It is the shame and blemish of thy nature, the reproach and disgrace of thy understanding and reason, the great deformity and disease of thy soul, and the eternal enemy of thy rest and peace. It is thy shackles and thy fetters, the tyrant that oppresses thee and restrains thee of thy liberty, and condemns thee to the basest slavery and the vilest drudgery. It is the unnatural and violent state of thy soul, the worm that perpetually gnaws thy conscience, the cause of all thy fears and troubles, and of all the evils and miseries, all the mischief and disorders that are in the world; it is the foundation and fuel of hell; it is that which puts thee out of the possession and enjoyment of thyself, which doth alienate and separate thee from God, the fountain of bliss and happiness, which provokes him to be thine enemy, and lays thee open every moment to the fierce revenge of his justice; and if thou dost persist and continue in it, will finally sink and oppress thee under the insupportable weight of his wrath, and make thee so weary of thyself, that thou shall wish a thousand times that thou hadst never been; and will render thee so perfectly miserable, that thou wouldest esteem it a great happiness to change thy condition with the most wretched and forlorn person that ever lived upon earth, to be perpetually upon a rack, and to lie down for ever under the rage of all the most violent diseases and pains that ever afflicted mankind. Sin is all this which I have described, and will certainly bring upon thee all those evils and mischiefs which I have mentioned, and make thee far more miserable than I am able to express, or thou to conceive. And art thou not yet resolved to leave it? Shall I need to use any other arguments to set thee against it, and take thee off from the love and practice of it, than this representation which I have now made of the horrible nature and consequences of it?

And then consider, on the other hand, what it is that I am persuading thee to turn to; to thy God and duty. And would not this be a blessed change indeed! to leave the greatest evil, and to turn to the chief good! For this resolution of returning to God, is nothing else but a resolution to be wise and happy, and to put thyself into the possession of that which is a greater good, if it is possible, than sin is an evil, and will render thee more happy than sin can make thee miserable. Didst thou but think what God is, and what he will be to thee if thou wilt return to him, how kindly he will receive thee after all thy wanderings from him “days with out number,” thou wouldest soon take up the resolution of the prodigal, and say, “I will arise, and go to my father!”

And consider, likewise, what it is to return to thy duty. It is nothing else but to do what becomes thee, and what is suitable to the original fame of thy nature, and to the truest dictates of thy reason and conscience, and what is not more thy duty, than it is thy interest and thy happiness. For that which God requires of us is, to be righteous and holy, and good; that is, to be like God himself, who is the pattern of all perfection and happiness. It is to have our lives conformed to his will, which is al ways perfect holiness and goodness, a state of peace and tranquillity, and the very temper and disposition of happiness. It is that which is a principal and most essential ingredient into the felicity of the Divine nature, and without which God would not be what he is, but a deformed, and imperfect, and miserable being.

5. Then be pleased to consider, that a strong and vigorous resolution would make the whole work of religion easy to us; it would conquer all difficulties which attend a holy and religious course of life, especially at our first entrance into it: because resolution brings our minds to a point, and unites all the strength and force of our souls in one great design, and makes us vigorous and firm, courageous and constant in the prosecution of it: and without this it is impossible to hold out long, and to resist the strong propensions and inclinations of our corrupt nature, which, if we be not firmly resolved, will return, and by degrees gain upon us; it will be impossible to break through temptations, and to gainsay the importunity of them: when the devil and the world solicit us, we shall not be able to say them nay, but shall be apt to yield to them.

There are many who have had faint wishes, and cold desires, and half purposes, of leading a new and better life: but having not taken up a firm resolution in the case, having not determined themselves by a severe purpose, a little thing sways them, and brings them back to their former course; it is no hard matter to divert them and engage them another way; they are “shaken with every wind” of temptation, every little blast of opposition and persecution turns them back, and carries them to the ways of sin: whereas resolution fixeth a man’s spirit, and makes it most steadfast and unmoveable, and sets him upon a rock, which, “when the winds blow, and the rain falls, and the floods come,” abides firm against all impressions.

If I would give the most probable and useful advice to engage and continue a man in a good course, I would commend to him a deliberate and firm resolution. David proved this way with very happy success; (Psal. cxix. 106.) “I have sworn (says he) and will perform it, (hat I will keep thy righteous judgments.” This was a security to him against all assaults, and nothing could turn him from his course afterwards; not the dangers he was exposed to, (ver. 109.) “My soul is continually in my hand, yet do I not forget thy law;” not the snares of wicked men that were laid for him, (ver. 110.) “The wicked have laid a snare for me, yet I erred not from thy precepts.” By virtue of this resolution, he could rise up in defiance of all those that would have tempted him to any sinful action: (ver. 115.) “Depart from me, ye evil doers, for I will keep the commandments of my God.”

When a man is thus resolved upon a holy course he is not easily diverted from it, and is able to resist the importunity and flattery of temptations, and to say to them, as men are wont to do, when they are fully and firmly resolved upon any thing, “Let me alone, I am not to be moved, it is in vain to urge me, I am resolved to the contrary.” Thus stiff and resolute men can be in other cases, where there is not near that cause and reason for it; and if we would but take up a generous resolution to break off our sins, and to live better lives, this would be the way to conquer that listlessness and unwillingness which hinders us from engaging in a good course, and is the cause of so many lame excuses and unreasonable delays. It is the want of resolution, and the weakness of our resolutions, which is the true reason why we are not more equal, and constant, and uniform in the ways of religion; but are religious only by fits and starts, in a heat, and during some present trouble and conviction of mind. “The double-minded man is unstable (says St. James) in all his ways.” When a man is of several minds, he is easily moved one way or other.

6. And lastly, Consider the infinite danger of remaining unresolved. The evil day may overtake you, while you are deliberating whether you should avoid it or not. A state of sin is liable to so many hazards, hath so many dangers continually threatening it, and hanging over it, that it is the most imprudent thing in the world to linger in it. It is like Lot’s staying in Sodom, when the Lord was going to destroy it, when fire and brimstone were just ready to be rained down from heaven upon it. Whilst men are lingering in a sinful state, if “the Lord be not merciful to them,” they will be consumed. Therefore it concerns thee, sinner, to determine thyself speedily, and to make haste out of this dangerous condition, “to escape for thy life, lest some evil overtake thee,” and lest death, finding thee unresolved, determine thy case for thee, and put it out of all doubt, and past all remedy.

How many have been cut off in their irresolution! and because they would not determine what to do, God hath concluded their case for them, and “sworn in his wrath that they should not enter into his rest.” It may be thou promisest thyself the space of many years to resolve in: “Thou fool, this night thy soul” may “be required of thee;” and whilst thou art unresolved what to do, God is resolving what to do with thee, and putting a period to his patience and long expectation of thy repentance: and thou knowest not how soon God may do this, and make an immutable determination concerning thee. And woe unto thee, when God hath resolved thus!

Suppose thou shouldest be snatched out of the world, and hurried before the dreadful tribunal of God, in this doubtful and unresolved state. And this is possible enough; because thou hast no certain tenure of thy life, thou art at no time secured from the stroke of death: nay, it is probable enough, because thou art every moment liable to ten thousand accidents, any one of which may snap in sunder the thread of thy life. And suppose this should happen to thee, what dost thou imagine would become of thee? Wouldest not thou then wish a thousand times that thou hadst resolved in time? How glad wouldest thou then be, that it were possible for thee to retrieve and call back but one of those “days without number,” which thou hast so vainly trifled away, that thou mightest resolve upon the things of thy peace! but thou wouldest not do it in that thy day, which God afforded thee to this purpose; thou hast let the opportunity slip out of thy hands, and it will never be in thy power again, but “the things of thy peace will be” for ever “hid from thine eyes.”

Why wilt thou then be so foolish, as to run thyself upon the evident hazard of losing heaven, and being miserable for ever? Why wilt thou make work for a sadder and longer repentance, than that which thou dost now so carefully decline? This was the case of the foolish virgins in the parable, (Matt. xxv.) who made account to be ready “to meet the bridegroom” at his coming, but took no care in time to get oil into their lamps. They thought the bride groom would tarry yet a while longer, and therefore “they slumbered and slept” in great security; but at midnight, when “the cry was made, Behold the bridegroom cometh;” then they arose, and in a great hurry and confusion went about “trimming their lamps;” they were resolved then, they would have begged or bought oil; and would have been at any pains or cost for it: but then it was too late; for the door was suddenly shut against them, and no importunity could prevail to have it opened to them.

Canst thou be contented to have the door shut against thee, and when thou shalt cry, “Lord open unto me,” to have him return this answer, “Depart from me, I know thee not?” If thou canst not, resolve to prevent this in time.

Didst thou but see, and know, and feel what the miserable do in hell, thou couldest not linger thus, thou couldest not continue so long unresolved. Why the time will come, when thou wilt reflect severely upon thyself, and say, That I should ever be so stupid and sottish, to be unresolved in a matter of such infinite concernment to me! How often was I admonished and convinced of the necessity of changing my course? How many inward motions had I to that purpose? How often did my own reason and conscience, and the Holy Spirit of God, by his frequent and friendly suggestions, put me upon this? How often was I just upon the brink of resolving? I resolved to resolve; but still I delayed it till death seized upon me unresolved: and now the opportunity is lost, and never to be recovered again! I would not in time resolve to be wise and happy; and now, by the sentence of the just and unchangeable God, it is resolved that I must be miserable to all eternity!

How should these considerations quicken us, who have yet these opportunities in our hands; which those who neglected and trifled them away, would now purchase at any rate! I say, how should these considerations which I have proposed, move us to take up a present resolution in the matter! Consider these things, sinner, and lay them seriously to heart, and say to thyself, Fool that I have been, to be unresolved so long; not to determine myself in a matter of such mighty consequence; to continue so long in suspense, whether I had best go to heaven or hell, and which was most advisable, to be happy or miserable for ever! Blessed be God, that hath been pleased to exercise so much patience and long-suffering towards me, that hath spared me so long, when he might have taken me away, and cut me off unresolved! My soul lies at stake, and, for aught I know, all eternity depends upon my present and speedy resolution. And now, by God’s grace, I will not delay one moment more, I will hang no longer between heaven and hell.—I shall now, in the

Second place, Offer some considerations to persuade those that have taken up this good resolution, to pursue it, and to promote it to practice and execution, and to keep firm and steadfast to it. And to this end, be pleased to consider these three things:

1. What an argument it is of vanity and inconstancy, to change this resolution, whilst the reason of it stands good, and is not changed. I suppose that thou wert once resolved to leave thy sins, and to return to God and thy duty? Why dost thou not pursue this resolution? Why dost thou not persist in it? Surely there appeared to thee some reason why thou didst take it up; and if the reason remain, and appear still the same to thee that it did, how comes it to pass that thou hast altered thy mind, and changed thy purpose? Either the case is the same it was, when thou tookest up this resolution, or it is not. If it be altered, then thou hast reason to change thy resolution: if it be not, thou hast the same reason to continue in it, that thou hadst to take it up. Shew then, if thou canst, wherein it is changed? Wert thou mistaken before about the nature of sin, and the pernicious consequences of it; or about the nature of God and goodness? Hast thou any thing now to plead for sin, which thou didst not know or consider before? Art thou now satisfied that sin is not so evil and unreasonable a thing as thou didst once apprehend, or that it does not threaten thee with so much danger as thou didst fear? Hath God altered his opinion of it, or is he become more favourable to it than he was? Hast thou received any news lately from heaven by any good hands, that God hath reversed his threatenings against sin, or that he hath adjourned the judgment of the world, sine die, without any set time? That he hath set the devils at liberty, and released them from their chains of darkness, and hath quenched and put out the fire of hell? Or art thou satisfied that there is no such being as God in the world, or that he is not so good as thou didst apprehend him to be, or that he will not reward those that diligently serve him? Hast thou found upon trial, that holiness and virtue are but empty names, and there is nothing in them? That there is not that pleasure and peace in keeping the commandments of God which thou wert told of? I am sure thou canst not with reason pretend any thing of all this. Thy reason, and conscience, and experience cannot speak one word on the behalf of sin, or give any testimony against God and his holy ways. And if the case be the same it was, nothing but thine own vanity and fickleness, or some worse reason, could move thee to alter thy purpose.

2. Let it be farther considered, that if we be not constant to our resolution, all we have done is lost. If thou repentest of thy repentance, it will not prove a “repentance to salvation.” As good to have stayed in Sodom, as to look back after thou art come out of it. Thus God tells us by the prophet, (Ezek. xxxiii. 12, 13.) “Therefore, thou son of man, say unto the children of thy people, The righteousness of the righteous shall not deliver him in the day of his transgression: neither shall the righteous be able to live in the day that he sinneth. When I say to the righteous, he shall surely live; if he trust to his own righteousness, and commit iniquity, all his righteousness shall not be remembered: but for his iniquity that he hath committed, he shall die for it.” So that, whatever we have done in the work of repentance, what resolutions soever we have taken up; if afterwards we give over and let them fall, all that we have done is lost, and will come to nothing.

3. Let us consider, in the last place, that if we be not constant to our resolution, we shall not only lose all that we have done, but we shall thereby render our condition much worse. “Remember Lot’s wife,” who, after she was escaped out of Sodom, looked back, and was made a particular and lasting monument of God’s wrath and displeasure; which seems to be meant by that expression of her being “turned into a pillar of salt;” that is, “a lasting monument.” (Prov. xiv. 14.) “The backslider in heart shall be filled with his own ways.” “Shall be filled with his own ways;” this expression doth signify a most heavy and dreadful curse upon those who fall off from their good purpose and resolution, that they shall have sorrow and trouble enough upon it. For so likewise, (Prov. i. 26, 27.) where God threatens wilful and obstinate sinners with the heaviest judgments, that he would “laugh at their calamity, and mock when their fear comes, when their fear comes as desolation, and their destruction as a whirlwind, and fear and anguish cometh upon them;” he adds, as the sum of all other judgments, that “they shall eat the fruit of their own ways, and be filled with their own devices.” (Heb. x. 38.) “But if any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him;” which words are a μείωσις, and signify a great deal more than seems to be expressed. “My soul shall have no pleasure in him;” that is, let such an one expect the effects of God’s fiercest wrath and displeasure. For so the Hebrews are wont to express things that are great and unspeakable, when they cannot sufficiently set them forth; by saying less, they say more. So, (Psal. v. 4.) where it is said, u Thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness;” the Psalmist means, and would have us to understand it so, that God is so far from taking any pleasure in the sins of men, that he bears the most violent hatred and displeasure against them. So, when the apostle here says, “If any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him;” he means, that it is not to be expressed how God will deal with such persons, and how severely his justice will handle them. To the same purpose is that declaration, (2 Pet. ii. 20, 21.) “For if, after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, they are again entangled therein and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the beginning. For it had been better for them, not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them.” The condition of all impenitent sinners is very sad; but of apostates much worse: not only because the sins which they commit afterwards are much greater, receiving a new aggravation, which the sins of those who are simply impenitent are not capable of; but likewise because such persons are usually more wicked afterwards. For they that break loose from severe purposes and resolutions of a better course, do by this very thing in a great measure sear and conquer their consciences, and then no wonder if afterwards “they give up themselves to commit all iniquity with greediness.” When, after long abstinence men return to sin again, their lusts are more fierce and violent; like a man who, after long fasting, returns to his meat with a more raging appetite. This our Saviour sets forth to us in the parable of the unclean spirit’s returning again and taking possession of the man, after he had left him: (Matt. xii. 43-45.) “When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, and findeth none. Then he saith, I will return into my house from whence I came out: and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished. Then goeth he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself; and the end of that man is worse than his beginning.” The moral of which is, that when a man hath once left his sins, if afterward he entertain thoughts of returning to them again, sin will return upon him with redoubled force and strength, and his heart will be so much the more prepared and disposed for the entertaining of more and greater vices; and his leaving his sins for a time, will he but like a running back, that he may leap with greater violence into hell and destruction.

Besides that, such persons do the greatest injury to God and the holy ways of religion that can be, by forsaking them after they have owned and approved them. For it will not be so much regarded, what wicked men, who have always been so, talk against God and religion; because they do not talk from experience, but “speak evil of the things which they know not:” whereas those who forsake the ways of religion after they have once engaged in them, do disparage religion more effectually, and reproach it with greater advantage; because they pretend to speak from the experience they have had of it, they have tried both the ways of sin and the ways of religion, and, after experience of both, they return to sin again: which, what is it but to proclaim to the world that the ways of sin and vice are rather to be chosen than the ways of holiness and virtue; that the devil is a better master than God, and that a sinful and wicked life yields more pleasure and greater advantages than are to be had in keeping the commandments of God? And this must needs be a high provocation, and a heavy aggravation of our ruin. Let these considerations prevail with us to pursue his holy resolution, after we have taken it up, and to persist in it. There remains only the

VI. Sixth and last particular which I proposed to be spoken to; viz. To add some directions for the maintaining and making good of this resolution of repentance and amendment; and they shall be these three:

1. Let us do all in the strength of God, considering our necessary and essential dependance upon him, and that without him and the assistance of his grace we can do nothing. “We are not (as the apostle tells us) sufficient of ourselves, as of ourselves,” that is, without the assistance of God’s Holy Spirit, to think any thing that is good, much less to resolve upon it. “It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do, of his good pleasure;” that is, of his own goodness, as the same apostle speaks, (Phil. ii. 13.) It is God that upholds us in being, and from whom we have all our power as to natural actions; but as to spiritual things, considering the great corruption and depravation of human nature, we stand in need of a more especial and immediate assistance.

If we know any thing of ourselves, we cannot but know what foolish and ignorant creatures we are, how weak and impotent, how averse and opposite to any thing that is good. And therefore it is wise counsel in all cases, but chiefly in spiritual matters, which Solomon gives, (Prov. iii. 5, 6.) “Trust in the Lord with all thine heart, and lean not to thy own understanding. Acknowledge him in all thy ways, and he shall direct thy steps.” Let us then address ourselves to God, in the words of the holy prophet: (Jer. x. 23.) “O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, and that it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.” And let us beg of him, that he would consider our case, commiserate our weakness, and pity our impotency, and that he would join his strength to us, and grant us the assistance of his grace and Holy Spirit, to put us upon sincere resolutions of a new life, and to keep us constant and steadfast to them; “to open the eyes of our minds, and to turn us from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan and our lusts unto God; that we may repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance, that so we may receive forgiveness of sins, and an inheritance among them that are sanctified through faith that is in Christ.”

And for our encouragement in this matter, God hath bid us to apply ourselves to him; and he hath promised not to be wanting to us, in words as express and universal as can well be devised: (Jam. i. 5, 6.) “If any man lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, who giveth to all liberally, and upbraideth no man but let him ask in faith, nothing wavering;” that is, not doubting but that God is both able and willing to give what he asks. And, (Luke xi. 9-13.) “I say unto you, Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. If a son should ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent? Of if he shall ask an egg, will he offer him a scorpion? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?” To encourage our faith, our Saviour useth such an argument as may give us the greatest assurance. We are commonly confident, that our earthly parents will not deny us those things that are good and necessary for us, though they may be otherwise evil: “How much more then shall our heavenly Father,” who is essentially and infinitely good, give his Holy Spirit to us? And if this be not enough, St. Matthew useth a larger expression, “How much more shall your heavenly Father give good things to them that ask him?” If there be any thing that is good, and we stand in need of it, and earnestly pray to God for it, we may be confident that he will give it us.

2. We ought to be very watchful over ourselves, considering our weakness and wavering, and instability and fickleness, the treachery and deceitfulness of our own hearts, and the malice of Satan. It will be a great while before the habits of sin be so weakened and subdued as that we shall have no propension to return to them again; so that our hearts will be often endeavouring to return to their former posture, and, like a deceitful bow, which is not firmly strung, to start back. And besides the deceitfulness of sin and our own hearts, the devil is very malicious, and his malice will make him vigilant to watch all advantages against us; and his great design will be to shake our resolution; for if that stand, he knows his kingdom will fall, and therefore he raiseth all his batteries against this fort, and labours by all means to undermine it; and nothing will be matter of greater triumph to him than to gain a person that was revolted from him, and resolved to leave his service. If, therefore, thou expectest God’s grace and assistance to keep thee steadfast to thy resolution, do not neglect thyself, but “keep thy heart with ail diligence,” and watch carefully over thyself; for because “God worketh in us both to will and to do,” therefore he expects that “we should work out our salvation with fear and trembling,” lest, by our own carelessness and neglect, we should miscarry.

3. Let us frequently renew and reinforce our resolutions, more especially when we think of coming to the sacrament, and approaching the holy table of the Lord. Nothing is more apt to beget in us good resolutions, and to strengthen them, than to consider the dreadful sufferings of the Son of God for our sins, which are so lively set forth and represented to us in this holy sacrament; which, as it is, on God’s part, a seal and confirmation of his grace and love to us; so, on our part, it ought to be a solemn ratification of our covenant with God, “to depart from iniquity,” and “to walk before him in holiness and righteousness all the days of our lives.”

2. Injuries are done to persons without their consent. And these, though they are not always the greatest mischiefs, yet they are the greatest injuries. And these injuries are done either by fraud and cunning, or by violence and oppression: either by overreaching another man in wit, or overbearing him by power. And these usually either respect the bodies of men, or their estates, or their good name. The bodies of men: he that maims another, or does him any other injury in his limbs or health, either by fraud or by force, is bound, so far as he is able, to make reparation for the injury. Or they respect the estates of men: if by cunning, or by violence, or by false testimony, or accusation, thou hast hindered a man of any benefit, which otherwise would have come to him, thou art bound to restitution. If by thy power or interest, by thy knowledge in the law, or skill in business, thou hast directly and avowedly helped and assisted another to do injustice to his neighbour, thou art bound to restitution; though not as the principal, yet as the accessory. If thou hast overreached thy brother in any contract, making advantage of his ignorance or unskilfulness; if thou hast made again of his necessity; if thou hast by thy power and interest, or by any more violent and forcible way detained his right, or taken away that which was his, thou art bound to make reparation for these injuries, to restore that which thou hast borrowed, to return the pledge which thou hast wrongfully kept, to release unconscionable forfeitures, to pay debts, to make satisfaction for frauds and cheats, to take off all unjust invasions and surprisals of estates: yea, though the fraud be such that thou art not liable to make satisfaction by any human law; yet thou art as much bound to it in conscience to God and thy duty, as if thou hadst stolen or taken it by violence from thy neighbour. For in truth and reality, fraud is as great an injury as violence, although human laws cannot take cognizance of it, so as to relieve every man that is over reached in a bargain: nay, of the two, it is worse; for whenever thou deceivest a man in this kind, thou dost not only wrong him in point of estate, but thou abusest his understanding.

And so likewise in respect of a man’s fame and reputation. If thou hast hurt any man’s good name by slander or calumny, by false witness, by rendering him ridiculous, or any other way, thou art bound to give such satisfaction as the thing is capable of; or if there be any other injury which I have not mentioned, thou art obliged to make reparation for it.

III. As to the manner how restitution is to be made,

1. Thou art bound to do it voluntarily, and of thy own accord, though the person injured do not know who it was that did him the injury, though he do not seek reparation by law. When a man is forced by law to make restitution, it is not a virtue, but necessity; this is not a fruit of repentance and a good mind, but of good law. And that thou dost not do it, unless the law compel thee to it, is an argument thou wouldest not have done it, if thou couldest have avoided it. And though the thing be done, yet thou hast not done it, but the law; and unless thou heartily repent of thy crime, the injury still lies at thy door, and in God’s account thou art as guilty as if no restitution had been made. Not that thou art bound, in this case, to make new restitution over again; but thou art bound to bewail thy neglect, that thou didst not do it voluntarily, and without the compulsion of the law.

2. Thou must do it in kind, if the thing be capable of it, and the injured party demand it. Thou must restore the very thing which thou hadst deprived thy neighbour of, if it be such a thing as can be restored, and be still in thy power, unless he voluntarily accept of some other thing in exchange.

3. If thou canst not restore it in kind, thou art bound to restore it in value, in something that is as good. As for spiritual injuries done to the souls of men, we are bound to make such reparation and compensation as we can. Those whom we have drawn into sin, and engaged in wicked courses, by our influence and example, or by neglect of our duty towards them, we are, so far as becomes the relation we stand in to them, to make acknowledgment of our fault, to endeavour by our instruction and counsel to reclaim them from those sins we led them into, and “to recover them out of the snare of the devil;” and should never be at rest till we have done as much, or more, for the furtherance of their salvation, and helping them forwards towards heaven, as we did contribute before to their ruin and destruction. If we have violated any one’s chastity, we are bound to marry them, if it was done upon that condition, and if they require it; thou art bound to keep and maintain those children which are the fruit of thy lust, and to make reparation to the person whom thou hast injured, by dowry or otherwise.

If thou hast defrauded and injured any man in his good name, thou art obliged to make him a compensation by acknowledgment of thy fault, by a studious vindication of him, and by doing him honour, and repairing his credit in all fitting ways. And if the injury be irreparable (as it frequently happens, that we can hardly so effectually vindicate a man, as we can defame him; and it is seldom seen that those wounds which are given to men’s reputation are perfectly healed), I say, if the injury be irreparable, especially if it prove really prejudicial to a man in his calling and civil interest; if no other satisfaction will be accepted, it is to be made in money, which, Solomon says, “answers all things;” and the rather, because the reason and equity of human laws hath thought fit to assign this way of satisfaction in many cases upon actions of scandal and defamation. And whatever the law would give, in any case, if it could be proved, that is the least we are bound in conscience to do, when we are guilty to ourselves, though the law cannot take hold of us.

So likewise, if thou hast wounded a man, thou art bound to pay the cure, to repair to him and his relations the disability for his calling, and his way of livelihood and subsistence, which he hath contracted by thy injury. And so for false imprisonment, the real detriment which comes to him by it, is to be made amends for: and so, in all other cases, the injured person is, so far as is possible, to be restored to the good condition in which he was before the injury.

IV. As to the measure and proportion of the restitution we are to make. Zaccheus here offers fourfold, which was much beyond what any law required in like cases. The measure of restitution by the judicial law of the Jews, did very much vary, according to the kind and degree of the injury. In some cases, a man was only bound to simple restitution; but then he was to do it to the full, (Exod. xxii. 5, 6.) And so if that which is another man’s be “delivered unto his neighbour to keep, and be stolen from him, he is to make restitution thereof,” (ver. 12.) “And so if a man borrow aught of his neighbour, and it be hurt or die, the owner thereof not being with it, he shall surely make it good,” (ver. 14.) “But for all manner of trespasses,” by way of theft, “whether it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, he whom the judge shall condemn, shall pay double to his neighbour;” (ver. 9.) that is, if it be of a living creature, “if the theft be found in his hands alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep, he shall restore double,” (ver. 4.) But if a man did “steal an ox or a sheep, and did kill it, or sell it,” he was to restore “five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep.” And thus we find David judged upon Nathan’s parable of the rich man, who had taken the poor man’s only lamb, and killed and dressed it for a traveller that came to him, (2 Sam. xii. 6.) “He shall restore the lamb fourfold.” Now the reason of this seems to be partly because of the advantage and usefulness of those creatures above any other: and partly because when they were once killed or alienated, a man could not, without great trouble and difficulty, make discovery; which hazard of not discovering seems to be accounted for in the restitution; but if a man did voluntarily offer restitution, before he was prosecuted, for any thing that was taken by violence, or unjustly detained from his neighbour, then he was only “to restore the principal, and to add a fifth part thereto, and to offer up an offering to the Lord,” and so “his atonement was made,” (Levit. vi. 1, &c.)

So that the highest proportion was a fourth or fifth part, and that only in the particular case of sheep or oxen stolen away, and killed or alienated afterwards. Indeed, Solomon speaks of a sevenfold restitution, (Prov. vi. 31.) where he saith, “If a thief be found, he shall restore sevenfold, even all the substance of his house;” where seven is only a number of perfection, and the meaning is, he shall make perfect and full restitution, according to the law, so far as his substance or estate will reach.

So that it seems Zaccheus, in restoring fourfold, did outdo the utmost severity of the law; which in case of fraud and oppression was but double, if demanded; if voluntarily offered, was the principal, and a fifth part added; but to testify the truth of his repentance, and his hearty sorrow for the injuries he had done, he punisheth himself beyond what the law would have done.

I do not say that this example binds as to this measure and proportion: nay, I do not say we are bound to the proportions of the law; for that only concerned the nation of the Jews: but although we be free from the letter of the law, yet we are tied to the equity of it. As to the substance of the duty of restitution, we are bound to that by the law of nature: as to the measure and proportion, the equity of the judicial law in its proportions, and of Zaccheus’s example, ought to be considerable to us.

But to speak more particularly concerning the measures and proportions of restitution, I shall lay down these propositions:

I. Where restitution can be made in kind, or the injury can be certainly valued, we are to restore the tiling or the value.

2. We are bound to restore the thing, with the natural increase of it; that is, to satisfy for the loss sustained in the mean time, and the gain hindered.

3. Where the thing cannot be restored, and the value of it is not certain, we are to give reasonable satisfaction, that is, according to a middle estimation; not the highest nor the lowest of things of the kind. The injured person can demand no more, and strict justice requires no more. But it is safe for him that hath done the injury, rather to exceed than to fall short.

4. We are at least to give by way of restitution what the law would give, for that is generally equal, and in most cases rather favourable than rigorous.

5. A man is not only bound to restitution for the injury which he did, but for all that directly follows upon his injurious act, though it were beyond his intention. For the first injury being wilful, thou art presumed to will all that which directly followed upon it, according to that rule, Involuntarium ortum ex voluntaria censetur pro voluntario: “We are presumed to will that which follows upon a voluntary action, though we did not intend it.” For instance, if a man maliciously and knowingly set fire upon another man’s house, though he intended only an injury to that particular person, yet if a wind come and drive the fire to his neighbours at some distance, though he did not intend this, yet, because the first act was unlawful, he is liable to satisfy for all the direct consequences of it. If a man wound another without any intention of killing him, and the wound prove mortal, though there was no probability that death would ensue upon it, the man is bound, because the first act was injurious, to make reparation to his relations for the damage they sustain by his death; and if they did depend solely upon him who died by such injury, thou art bound to maintain them.

6. Because those who have lived in a trade and course of injustice can hardly remember all the particular injuries they have done, so as to make exact satisfaction! for them, it will not be amiss, over and besides, to give something to the poor. So Zaccheus does here, “Half of my estate I give to the poor, and if I have taken any thing,” &c.

V. The persons who are concerned in restitution. And here I shall consider,

First, The persons who are bound to make restitution.

Secondly, The persons to whom it is to be made.

First, The persons who are bound to make restitution. In general, they who have done the injury, or they who come into their stead, so as in law or equity the injury devolves and descends upon them. But for the clearer stating of this, I shall lay down several propositions which may serve to resolve a great many cases that may be put concerning persons obliged to make restitution.

1. If the injury be done solely by one, without accomplices and partakers in the crime, he alone is responsible, and wholly bound to make satisfaction; I mean, he only is bound so long as he lives; but if the injury descends as a burthen upon the estate, then he who enjoys the estate becomes bound to make satisfaction, as I shall shew afterwards.

2. If the injury was done by more, who did all equally concur to the doing of it, they are all equally bound to make satisfaction, and they are bound to concur together to that purpose; and in case of such concurrence, every one is not bound to satisfy for the whole, but pro rata parte, for his share; provided they do among them make full satisfaction.

3. If all will not concur, those that are willing are bound among them to make reparation for the injury: nay, if all the rest refuse to join with thee in it, thou art bound in solidum to make full reparation so far as thou art able; because every one was guilty of the whole injury. For instance, if four men conspire together to cheat a man, or to rob him, any one of these, if the rest refuse, is bound to make entire satisfaction; yea, though he was only partaker in the benefit; because, as I said before, he is guilty of the whole injury.

4. If the injury be done by more, who do unequally concur to the doing of it, he that is principal is chiefly and principally bound to make satisfaction; and here I do not take principal strictly in the sense of the law, but in the sense of equity; not for him always who is the more immediate cause of the injury, but for him who was the greatest cause, and by whose influence chiefly it was procured and done: but if the principal will not, the accessories and instruments are bound, at least for their share, and according to the proportion of the hand they had in it. But if the principal do satisfy in the name, and upon the account of the rest, then the accessories are free from an obligation to restitution, and are only bound to repentance.

5. If the injury devolve upon another, by descending as a burden upon the estate, he who enjoys the estate is bound to make satisfaction. And when injuries do thus descend as burdens and incumbrances upon estates, and when not, the civil laws of the place where we live must determine: but then where my case falls within the compass of the law, I am bound voluntarily to satisfy without the compulsion of the law. For instance, if an estate fall to me charged with a debt, which hath been unjustly detained, I am bound voluntarily to discharge the debt, so soon as it appears to me, before I am compelled thereto by the law.

6. As for personal injuries which do not lie as burdens upon the estate, nor do by the law descend upon the son or heir, though in strict justice a man be not bound to make compensation for them, for that would be endless, et infinitum in lege repudiatur, “no law can take notice of that which is in finite and endless;” for quæ exitum non habent habentur pro impossibilibus, “those things which have no end, to which no bounds can be set, are esteemed among things impossible,” to which no man can be obliged: but though in strict justice the heir be not bound to make reparation for the personal injuries of him whom he succeeds in the estate, yet in many cases it is equitable, and generous, and Christian, for such persons to make some kind of reparation for palpable and notorious injuries. For instance, if I be heir to an estate, part of which I know certainly was injuriously gotten, it is not only Christian, but prudent, to make satisfaction in the case to the party injured, if certainly known; if not, to give it to the poor; for by this means I may take out the moth which was bred by injustice in the estate, and rub off the rust that sticks to the gold and silver which was got by oppression or fraud, and so free the remaining part of the estate from that secret and Divine Nemesis which attends it and follows it. And for the same reason, it is very noble and Christian for the son and heir of an unjust father to make some reparation for his father’s injuries by restitution, if the thing be capable of it: if not, by doing all good offices to the injured persons, which is some kind of compensation. And in this case the obligation is greater, because by this means a man does not only do what in him lies to cutoff the curse, which, by his father’s oppression and injustice, is entailed upon the family and estate; but, likewise, because a son ought much more to be concerned for his father than any other person, and to consult the honour and reputation both of him and his own family; and the reparation which the son makes, is in some sort the father’s act, because he succeeds him, and comes in his stead.

Secondly, As to the persons to whom satisfaction is to be made. For the resolution of those cases which may fall under this head, I shall lay down these propositions:

1. If the injured person be certainly known, and be alive and extant, the satisfaction is to be made to him.

2. If he be not alive, or, which is all one, not to be found or come at, satisfaction is to be made to his nearest relations, his wife, or children, or brothers, or other nearest kindred. The reason is, because satisfaction being due, and I having no right to keep that which I have injuriously gotten, if I cannot restore it to the party himself, I ought in all reason to place it there where I may most reasonably presume the party injured would have bestowed his estate, and this part of it amongst the rest, had he been possessed of it. And by the same reason that I am bound thus to restore the part of his estate which I have injuriously taken or detained from him, I am likewise obliged to give satisfaction to the same person for any other injury; for to whom soever I would pay a debt due to one that is deceased, to the same person I ought to give satisfaction for the injuries by which a debt is, though not formally, yet virtually contracted.

3. If the party injured be not certainly known, or have no near relations known to me, in that case I think it very advisable to give so much to the poor, or to some charitable use; or if the party injured be not capable of proper satisfaction, as sometimes it is a community and body of men that you have injured; in this case it is proper to repair the injuries to communities or bodies of men, by equivalent good offices, or by some public good work, which may be of common benefit and advantage.—This is the fifth thing I proposed to speak to, the persons concerned in restitution; both the persons who are bound to make restitution, and the persons to whom it is to be made. Of the rest hereafter.

2. In cases where the law hath not determined the time, we may do well to observe a proportion to what the law hath determined in other cases, which come nearest our own case.

3. When the injury is so old, that the right which the injured person had to reparation is reasonably presumed to be quitted and forsaken, then the obligation to satisfaction ceaseth and expires. The reason is plain, because every man may recede from his own right, and give it up to another: and where a man may reasonably be presumed to have parted with his right to another, the obligation to restitution ceaseth, and the right of claiming it. Now when a thing begins haberi pro derelicto, that is, when a right may reasonably be presumed to be quitted and forsaken, cannot in general be deter mined: but this must be estimated according to the importance of the right and thing in controversy, as whether it be more or less considerable; and according to the reason and determination of laws about things of this nature. To illustrate this rule by instances:—the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, did at several times invade and conquer this nation, and conquered it, we will suppose, unjustly, and consequently did hold and possess that which truly belonged to others, contrary to right; and several of the posterity of each of these do probably to this day hold what was then injuriously gotten; I say, in this case, the obligation to satisfaction and restitution is long since expired, and the original title which those who were dispossessed had, is reasonably presumed to be long since quitted and forsaken: and that for very wise reasons in law and government; because it would confound and unsettle all estates, if every thing, the original title whereof is nought, were to be restored; and it is but equal to presume, that all mankind are so reasonable as to quit their right in such cases, rather than to cause endless disturbances, and to have the guilt of in justice everlastingly perpetuated. And though it be a rule in civil law, that Vitiosum initio, tractu temporis non convalescit, “A title originally bad, can never by time be made just;” it is only true thus far, that time in itself doth not alter the nature of things; but, considering the necessities of the world, and the infinite difficulties of retrieving an ancient right, and the inconveniences and disturbances that would thereby redound to human society, it is better that an injury should be perpetuated, than that a great inconveniency should come by endeavouring to redress it; so that, although, considering a thing simply in itself, an injury is so far from being lessened or nulled by tract of time, that it is increased, and the longer it continues, the greater it is; yet, by accident, and in compliance with the necessity of things, length of time may give a right to that which was at first injuriously possessed. (Judg. xi. 26.) Thus Jephthah reasons with the king of Ammon, who had made war for recovery of an ancient right, as he supposed. And though the instances I have given of the unjust conquest of a nation be great and public; yet the same is to be determined proportionably in less and particular cases. And thus I have done with the sixth thing.

VII. And lastly, As to the order of restitution. When we have injured a great many, and are not able to make restitution to all at once, our best prudence and discretion must govern us herein. Be cause no certain rule can be given, which will reach all cases, I will only say this in general, that it is reasonable first to make reparation for the oldest and greatest injuries; and, cæteris paribus, if all other considerations be equal, to consider those first who are most necessitous, and if there be any other special reason and obligation arising from the nature of the injury, or the circumstances of the person injured, to have regard to them. I come now, in the

Second place, To confirm the truth of the proposition, that to make restitution and satisfaction to those whom we have injured, is a proper and necessary fruit of a true repentance. And this will appear if we consider these two things:

I. Our obligation to this duty.

II. The nature of repentance.

I. Our obligation to this duty. Upon the same account that we are obliged to repentance, we are obliged to restitution; and both these obligations arise from natural equity and justice. All sin is an injury done; and though repentance be not strictly satisfaction, yet it is the best we can make; and he is unjust, who, having done an injury, does not make the best reparation he can. But now there are some sins, in which, besides the injury that is done to God by them, upon the general account, as they are sins and violations of his laws, there is likewise a particular injury done to men; and such are all those, the effect whereof redounds to the prejudice of other men: such are fraud and oppression, and all other sins whereby others are injured. So that in these kind of sins, there are two things considerable, the irregularity and viciousness of the act, and the evil effects of it upon other men; the former respects the law, and calls for sorrow and repentance for our violation of it; the latter respects the person that is injured, and calls for satisfaction and restitution. So that our obligation to restitution is founded in the immutable and indispensable law of nature, which is—to do that to another which we would have another do to us. We would have no man be injurious to us, or if he hath been so, we would have him make satisfaction and reparation to us of the injury he hath done; and we take it grievously from him if he do not. Now nothing is more just and equitable, than that we should do that to others which we, in like case, would expect from them: for the very same obligation that lies upon others towards us, does lie upon us in regard to others.

II. This will yet further appear, if we consider the nature of repentance, which is to be sorry for what we have done, and not to do the like for the future. Now if thou be sorry for what thou hast done, thou wishest with all thy heart thou hadst not done it; and if thou dost so, thou wilt undo, as much as in thee lieth, what thou hast done. Now the best way to undo an injury, is to make reparation for it; and till we do this, we continue in the sin. For if it was a sin to do the injury at first, it is the same continued, not to make satisfaction; and we do not cease to commit the sin, so long as we detain that which is another’s right. Nothing but restitution can stop the progress of sin; for if it be a sin to take that which is another man’s from him by fraud and violence, it is the same continued and virtually repeated, to detain and keep it from him; and nothing more contrary to repentance, than to continue in the sin thou pretendest to repent of. For how art thou sorry for doing of it, if thou continuest to do it, if thou wilt go on to do it, and do, it again? How dost thou hate thy sin, if thou enjoy the benefit and reap the advantage of it? If thou dost this, it is an argument thou lovest thy sin still: for thou didst never love it for itself, but for the profit of it; and so long as thou retainest that, thou canst not be quit of the sin. Thou boldest fast thy sin so long as thou refusest to make satisfaction for it; and repentance without restitution differs as much from true repentance, as continuance in sin does from the forsaking of it. Si res aliena non redditur, non agitur pœnitentia, sed fingitur; so St. Augustine; “If we do not restore that which we have injuriously detained from another, our repentance is not real, but feigned and hypocritical,” and will not be effectual to the obtaining of our pardon. It is a very common, but a true and terrible saying, Non demittitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum: “No remission without restitution.” If we will inherit the profit and advantage of sin, we cannot think it unreasonable or unjust that we should inherit the punishment of it.

When the Scripture speaks of repentance, it frequently mentions restitution as a proper fruit and effect of it, and as a necessary and indispensable condition of pardon and life. (Ezek. xxxiii. 14-16.) “Again, when I say unto the wicked, Thou shalt surely die: if he turn from his sin, and do that which is lawful and right; if the wicked restore the pledge, give again that he hath robbed,” &c. As if he had said, when I denounce death and destruction to the wicked, there is but this one way to escape it, and that is, by repentance; but then take notice what a repentance it is that will avail to this end; it is not a bewailing ourselves, and lamenting over our sins, but a forsaking of them, and returning to our duty; “If we turn from our sin, and do that which is lawful and right.” For instance, if he hath been guilty of injustice and oppression; if he leave his course, and deal justly and righteously with his neighbour, and not only so, but he also make restitution for the injury he hath done, and restore what he hath unjustly detained and taken away; “If he restore the pledge, and give again that he hath robbed,” and do no injustice for the future, but “walk in the statutes of life without committing iniquity;” upon these terms, and no other, “he shall live; he shall not die.” Yea, the very light of nature could suggest thus much to the people of Nineveh, that there was no hope, without this fruit of repentance, of appeasing God’s wrath. Therefore the king and the princes, after all the external solemnity of fasting and sackcloth, and crying mightily, they decree that “Every one should return from the evil of his ways, and from the violence that was in their hands;” ut rapina manus vacuefactat, et rapta restituat, sine quo non est vera pœnitentia; so Grotius upon the place, “That he empty his hands of the spoils of rapine and oppression;” that is, “that he make restitution, without which there can be no repentance:” and upon their doing this, it is said that God spared them, (Jonah iii. 10.) “And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil ways.” It is not said, that he saw their fasting and sackcloth, but he saw their works, thereat fruits and effects of their repentance; and upon this it was that “God repented of the evil he said he would do to them, and he did it not.” And elsewhere we find, that God speaks with great indignation of the most solemn repentance which is not accompanied with this fruit: (Isa. lviii. 3-6.) the people tell God how they had fasted and afflicted their soul, and made their voice to be heard on high: but God despiseth all this, because it was not accompanied with this fruit of repentance: “Is it such a fast as I have chosen?” &c. There is so much of natural justice and equity in restitution, and it is so proper a fruit of repentance, that, as Grotius observes, it is not only the doctrine of the Jews and Christians, but of heathens and Mahometans, that the repentance which does not produce this fruit, is feigned, and will never avail with God for pardon and mercy. Thus much for confirmation of this doctrine.

The third and last thing I proposed was, to persuade to the practice of this duty; and this may serve by way of application of the doctrine of restitution. The use we make of it is,

First, To persuade men to the practice of this difficult duty. I doubt not but the arguments I have used are sufficient to convince us of the equity and necessity of restitution; but what arguments shall I use to persuade to the practice and exercise of it? When we press men to their duty, though we have some advantages on our side, yet we have also great disadvantages. We have this advantage, that we have the reason and consciences of men on our side; but then we have this disadvantage, that we have to contend either with the lusts or interests of men, or both: now that these are usually more powerful, is evident in that the lusts and interests of men do so frequently bias and draw them to do things contrary to reason and conscience. When we persuade men to be just, and to make restitution to those whom they have injured, it is true we have not to contend with the lusts of men, with any corrupt and vicious inclination of nature. There are some sins that have their rise from men’s natural tempers, as passion and lust, and those sensual vices that abound in the world: but there is nothing in any man’s natural temper and disposition that inclines him to be unjust, no man’s complexion doth particularly dispose him to lie or steal, to defraud his neighbour, or detain his right from him; it is only the interests of men that prompt them to these things; and they are upon this account the more inexcusable, because no man is inclined to these sins from particular temper and constitution: so that an unjust man is in ordinary cases and circum stances a greater sinner, than a drunkard or a lustful man, because no man can pretend to be hurried away by the strong propension and inclination of his nature to cheat his brother; but al though, when we persuade men to be just, we have not the lusts of men to contend withal, yet we have another powerful adversary, and that is the interests of men, which is one of the chief “rulers and governors of this world;” so that when we press men to restitution, we touch them in their interest, which is a very touchy and tender thing; when we tell them that without restitution no man can repent and be saved, they think this to be a very hard saying, and they know not how to bear it.

But certainly it hath all the reason and equity in the world on its side. If it be so hard for them to restore that which is another man’s, is it not much harder for him whom thou hast injured, to lose that which is his own? make it thine own case; wouldest thou not think it much harder to have thy right detained from thee by another, than for another to part with that which is not his own?

But I am sensible how little it is that reason will sway with men against their interest; therefore the best argument that I can use, will be to satisfy men that, upon a true and just account, it is not so much their interest to retain what they have unjustly got, as to make restitution. And this I shall do, by shewing men that to make restitution is their true interest, both in respect of themselves and of their posterity.

I. In respect to themselves. It is better both in respect of our present condition in this world, and of our future state,

1. In respect of our present condition in this world, and that both in respect of our outward estate, and our inward peace and tranquillity.

(1.) In respect of our outward estate. If we have any belief of the providence of God, that his blessing can prosper an estate, and his curse consume it and make it moulder away, we cannot but judge it highly our interest to clear our estates of injustice by restitution; and by this means to free them from God’s curse. For if any of our estate be unjustly gotten, it is enough to draw down God’s curse upon all that we have; it is like a moth in our estate, which will insensibly consume it; it is like a secret poison, which will diffuse itself through the whole; like a little land in capite, which brings the whole estate into wardship.

Hear how God threatens to blast estates unjustly gotten, (Job xx. 12, &c.) concluding with these words, “This is the portion of a wicked man;” that is, of an unjust man. (Jer. xvii. 11.) “As a partridge sitteth on eggs, and hatcheth them not, so he that getteth riches and not by right, shall leave them in the midst of his days, and at his end shall be a fool.” Men many times live to see the folly of their injustice and oppression, and their estates wither away before their eyes: and by the just revenge of God, they are deprived of them in the midst of their days. So that the best way to fix an estate, and to secure it to ourselves, is by restitution to free it from God’s curse; and when we have done that, how much soever we may diminish our estate by it, we may look upon ourselves as having a better estate than we had; better, because we have God’s blessing with that which remains. If we believe the Bible, we cannot doubt of this. The Spirit of God tells us this from the observation of the wisest men. (Psal. xxxvii. 16.) “A little that a righteous man hath, is better than the riches of many wicked.” (Prov. xvi. 8.) “Better is a little with righteousness, than great revenues without right.”

(2.) In respect of inward peace and tranquillity, it is highly our interest to make restitution. No man can enjoy an estate, that does not enjoy himself; and nothing puts a man more out of the possession of himself, than an unquiet conscience; and there are no kind of sins lie heavier upon a man’s conscience, than those of injustice; because they are committed against the clearest natural light, and there is the least natural temptation to them. They have these two great aggravations, that they are sins most against knowledge, and have most of will in them. There needs no revelation to convince men of sins of injustice and oppression; every man hath those principles born with him, which will sufficiently acquaint him that he ought not to be injurious to another. There is nothing that relates to our duty, that a man can know with greater certainty than this, that injustice is a sin. And as it is a sin most against knowledge, so it hath most of will in it. are hurried away to other sins by the strong and violent propensions of their nature: but no man is inclined, by his temper and constitution, to fraud and oppression: and the less there is of nature in any sin, there is the less of necessity, and consequently it is the more voluntary. Now the greater the aggravations of any sin are, the greater is the guilt; and the greater the guilt is, the more unquiet our consciences will be: so that, if thou have any regard to the interest of thine own peace, if that be considerable to thee, which to wise men is the most valuable thing in the world, do not for a little wealth continue in those sins, which will create perpetual disturbance to thee, and embitter all the pleasures of thy life. Hear how Job describes the condition of the wicked oppressors in the place before cited: (Job xx. 12, &c.) “He shall not rejoice in them, because he hath oppressed; because he hath violently taken away a house which he builded not, surely he shall not feel quietness in his belly:” that is, he shall have no inward peace and contentment in the midst of all his outward enjoyments: but his ill-gotten estate will work in his conscience, and gripe him, as if a man had taken down poison into his belly.

2. But chiefly, in respect of our future estate in another world, it is every man’s interest to make restitution. Without repentance we are ruined for ever, and without restitution no repentance. “No unrighteous man hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ.” If thou continue in thy fraud and oppression, and carry these sins with thee into another world, they will hang as a millstone about thy neck, and sink thee into eternal ruin. He that wrongeth his brother hateth him, and “he that hateth his brother is a murderer, and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him.” (1 John in. 15; Rom. i. 18.) “The wrath of God is revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.” So that if it be men’s interest to escape the wrath of God, it concerns us to make reparation for those injuries which will expose us to it. That is a dreadful text, (James v. 1-4.) “Go to now ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you. Your riches are corrupted, and your garments moth-eaten: your gold and silver is cankered, and the rust of them shall be a witness against you, and shall eat your flesh as it were fire: ye have heaped treasure together for the last days. Behold! the hire of the labourers which have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth; and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of sabaoth.” Do not by “detaining the treasures of wickedness, treasure up to yourselves wrath against the day of wrath:” do not make yourselves miserable for ever, that you may be rich for a little while: do not for a little silver and gold forfeit the eternal inheritance, which was “not purchased with corruptible things, but with the precious blood of the Son of God:” and if this consideration, which is the weightiest in the world, will not prevail with men, I can only say with the angel, (Rev. xxii. 11.) “He that is unjust, let him be unjust still;” let him continue in his injustice at his peril, and remember what is added at the 12th verse, “Behold! I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to give to every man according as his work shall be.”

II. In respect of our children and posterity, it is greatly our interest to make restitution. God many times suffers an estate got by oppression to prosper for a little while: but there is a curse attends it, which descends upon the estate like an incumbrance; and parents many times, when they think they entail an estate, entail poverty upon their children. Job (xx. 10.) speaking of the children of the oppressor, he saith, “His children shall seek to please the poor, and his hands shall restore their goods.” And, (Job xxi. 19.) “God layeth up his iniquity for his children.” Thou layest up riches for thy children; and God lays up thine iniquity and injustice for them, the curse that belongs to them. (Hab. ii. 9-11.) “Woe to him that covereth an evil covetousness, or gaineth an evil gain to his house,” &c. Thou thoughtest to raise thy family by those ways, but “thou hast consulted shame to thy house.” No such effectual way to ruin thy family, as injustice and oppression. As then you would not transmit a curse to your children, and devolve misery upon your family, free your estates from the burden and weight of what is other men’s, lest, by God’s just judgment and secret providence, that little which you injuriously detain from others, carry away your whole estate to them and their family. God’s providence many times makes abundant restitution, when we will not.

Having now endeavoured to satisfy men, that it is their truest interest to make restitution for the injuries they have done to others, it remains only that I should answer an objection or two, which men are apt to make against this duty.

First, Men say they are ashamed to do it. Answer It is not matter of shame, but of praise and commendation. But it may be thou wilt say, It is matter of shame to have injured another; and this is the way to lay open thy shame. Indeed, if the injury were public, the restitution ought to be so too, as the only way to take off the shame of the injury. For thy restitution doth not in this case publish thy shame, but thy honesty: but if the injury was private, thou mayest preserve thy own credit, by concealing thyself; and provided thou do the thing effectually, thou mayest be as prudent, as to the manner of doing it, as thou pleasest.

Secondly, Another objection is, the prejudice it will be to men’s estates. But this I have answered already, by shewing that it is more their interest to make restitution, than to continue in the sin. I shall only add, that, as our Saviour reasons in another case, “It is profitable for thee, that one of thy members should perish, rather than that thy whole body should be cast into hell.” It is true likewise here, it is profitable for thee, that thou shouldest go a beggar to heaven, rather than that thou shouldest go to hell, laden with the spoils and guilt of rapine and injustice.

Thirdly, The last objection that I shall mention is, disability to make restitution. This, indeed, is something; where nothing is to be had, every man must lose his right: but then remember, that there must be a hearty repentance for the sin; and thy sorrow must be so much greater, by how much thy ability to make restitution is less; and there must be a willing mind, a firm purpose and resolution of doing it, when God shall enable thee, and diligent endeavours to that purpose. Under the law those who were not able to make restitution, were sold for six years, if their service did not make reparation in less time. It is true, indeed, the moderation of the gospel doth not suffer Christians to deal so hardly with one another: but if the gospel remit of this rigour, and do not allow Christians to challenge it, we should voluntarily do in effect that which they were forced to; that is, we should use our best endeavours and diligence to put ourselves into a condition of making satisfaction; and we should not look upon any thing beyond the necessary conveniences of life as our own, till we have done it; unless the party injured will recede from his right, in whole or in part. For though the impossibility of the thing do discharge us for the present, yet the obligation still lies upon us to do it, so soon as we are able.

And here it will be proper to consider the case of those who have compounded with their creditors for a small part, whether they be in conscience and equity released from the whole debt. I am loath to lay unnecessary burdens upon men’s consciences, therefore I am very tender in resolving such cases: but I ought to have a more tender care of the souls of men, than of their estates: therefore to deal plainly, and to discharge my conscience in this mat ter, I think such persons do, notwithstanding the composition, stand obliged in equity and conscience for the whole debt, and are bound to discharge it so soon as they can with tolerable convenience. My reason is, because, though they be discharged in law, yet the law does not intend to take off the obligation of conscience or equity, which they are under, but leaves that as it found it. Thus the case stands; men who are in a way of trade, are engaged, by the necessities of their calling, to venture a great part of their estate in other men’s hands, and by this means become liable many times to be undone with out their own fault; therefore it is usual, when any man in a way of trade becomes disabled, for the creditors to make such a composition with him as his estate will bear; and upon this composition to give him a full discharge, so as that they cannot afterwards, by law, require of him the remainder of their debt. Now, though this be a favour to the debtor, yet it is principally intended for the benefit of the creditor; because it being his act, it is to be presumed, that he intended it, as much as may be, for his own advantage; and so it is, for the creditor has as much satisfaction at present as can be had, and the debtor is hereby left in a capacity of recovering himself again by his industry and diligence, which could not be, if he were not fully discharged; for if he were still liable for the rest he would continually be obnoxious to imprisonment, which would render him incapable of following his calling; or if he were at liberty, he could have no credit to enable him to do any thing in his calling; for who would trust a man with any thing, who is liable every moment to have it taken from him? so that the reason of this plenary discharge is this, that men, who are otherwise hopeful, and in a fair probability of recovering themselves, may not be rendered incapable of getting an estate after wards, whereby they may support themselves, and discharge their debts. Now this discharge being given in order to these ends, it cannot be imagined that it should be intended to defeat them; but it is in all reason to be supposed, that the creditors did not intend to take off the obligation of equity and conscience, only to put the man into a condition of doing something towards the enabling him to discharge his debt. So that unless it were expressed at the composition, that the creditor would never expect more from him, upon account of equity and conscience, but did freely forgive him the rest, the contrary whereof is usually done; I say, unless it were thus expressed, there is no reason why the creditor’s favour in making a composition should be abused to his prejudice; and why a legal discharge given him on purpose for this reason among others, to put him into a capacity of recovering himself, and giving full satisfaction, should be so interpreted, as to extinguish the equitable right of the creditor to the remainder of his debt.

The second use of this doctrine of restitution should be by way of prevention, that men would take heed of being injurious, and so take away the occasion of restitution, and free themselves from the temptation of not performing so difficult and so unwelcome a duty. It is much easier of the two, not to cozen or oppress thy neighbour, than, after thou hast done it, it will be to bring thyself to make restitution; therefore we should be very careful not to be injurious to any one in any kind; neither immediately by ourselves, nor by aiding and assisting others, by our power and interest, or skill in the law, or by any other way, to do injustice.

So that God hath given us a plain prospect of the different issues of a virtuous and wicked life, and there wants nothing but consideration to make us to attend to these things, and to lay them seriously to heart. For while men are inconsiderate, they go on stupidly in an evil way, and are not sensible of the danger of their present course, because they do not attend to the consequence of it: but when their eyes are once opened by consideration, they cannot but be sadly apprehensive of the mischief they are running themselves upon. If men would take but a serious and impartial view of their lives and actions; if they would consider the tendency of a sinful course, and whither it will bring them at last; if the vicious and dissolute wan would but look about him and consider how many have been ruined in that very way that he is in, how many lie slain and wounded in it; that “it is the way to hell, and leads down to the chambers of death;” the serious thought of this could not but check him in his course, and make him resolve upon a better life. If men were wise, they would consider the consequence of their actions, and upon consideration would resolve upon that which they are convinced is best. I proceed to the

III. Third thing I propounded, which was, that consideration of the consequence of our actions, is an excellent means to prevent the mischiefs which otherwise we should run into. And this is necessarily implied in the wish here in the text, that if we would but consider these things, they might be prevented. For how can any man, who hath any love or regard for himself, any tenderness for his own interest and happiness, see hell and destruction before him, which, if he hold on his evil course, will certainly swallow him up, and yet venture to go on in his sins? Can any man that plainly beholds misery hastening towards him like an armed man, and “destruction coming upon him as a whirlwind,” think himself unconcerned to prevent it and fly from it? The most dull and stupid creatures will start back upon the sight of present danger. Balaam’s ass, when she saw the angel of the Lord standing in the way, with his sword drawn ready to smite her, starts aside, and could not be urged on. Now God hath given us, not only sense to apprehend a present evil, but reason and consideration to look before us, and to discover dangers at a distance, to apprehend them as certainly and with as clear a conviction of the reality of them, as if they threatened us the next moment: and will any considerate man, who hath calculated the dangerous events of sin, and the dreadful effects of God’s wrath upon sinners, go on to “provoke the Lord to jealousy, as if he were stronger than he?” It is not to be imagined, but that, if men would seriously consider what sin is, and what shall be the sad portion of sinners hereafter, they would resolve upon a better course. Would any man live in the lusts of the flesh, and of intemperance, or out of covetousness defraud or oppress his neighbour, did he seriously consider that God is the avenger of such, and that, “because of these things, the wrath of God comes upon the children of disobedience?”

I should have great hopes of men’s repentance and reformation, if they could but once be brought to consideration; for in most men it is not so much a positive disbelief of the truth, as inadvertency and want of consideration, that makes them to go on so securely in a sinful course. Would but men consider what sin is, and what will be the fearful consequence of it, probably in this world, but most certainly in the other, they could not choose but fly from it as the greatest evil in the world.

And to shew what power and influence consideration will probably have to bring men to repentance, and a change of their lives, I remember to have somewhere met with a very remarkable story, of one that had a son that took bad courses, and would not be reclaimed by all the good counsel his father could give him; at last, coming to his father, who lay upon his death-bed, to beg his blessing, his father, instead of upbraiding him with his bad life, and undutiful carriage toward him, spake kindly to him, and told him, he had but one thing to desire of him, that every day he would retire and spend one quarter of an hour alone by himself; which he promised his father faithfully to do, and make it good. After a while it grew tedious to him, to spend even so little time in such bad and uneasy company, and he began to bethink himself, for what reason his father should so earnestly desire of him to do so odd a thing for his sake, and his mind presently suggested to him, that it was to enforce him to consideration; wisely judging, that if by any means he could but bring him to that, he would soon reform his life, and become a new man. And the thing had its desired effect; for after a little consideration, he took up a firm resolution to change the course of his life, and was true to it all his days. I cannot answer for the truth of the story, but for the moral of it I will; namely, that consideration is one of the best and most likely things in the world, to bring a bad man to a better mind. I now come to the

But there is no colour for this, if we consider that our Saviour reasons from the supposition of such a thing, that therefore the case of Tyre and Sidon would really be “more tolerable at the day of judgment” than theirs; because they would have repented, but the Jews did not.

Others, perhaps, understand the words too strictly, as if our Saviour had spoken according to what he certainly foreknew would have happened to the people of Tyre and Sidon, if such miracles had been wrought among them. And no doubt but, in that case, God did certainly know what they would have done; but yet I should rather choose to understand the words as spoken popularly, according to what in all human appearance and probability would have happened, if such external means of repentance, accompanied with an ordinary grace of God, had been afforded to them of Tyre and Sidon. And thus the old Latin interpreter seems to have understood the next words: “If the mighty works which have been done in thee, had been done in Sodom, ἔμειναν ἄν, forte mansissent, “it would perhaps have remained to this day—in all likelihood it had continued till now.” Much the same with that passage of the prophet: (Ezek. iii. 5, 6.) “Thou art not sent to a people of a strange speech, and of a hard language, but to the house of Israel: surely had I sent thee to them, they would have hearkened unto thee;” that is, in all probability they would; there is little doubt to be made of the contrary. And this is sufficient foundation for our Saviour’s reasoning after wards, that “it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment, than for them.” And if we may judge what they would have done before, by what they did afterward, there is more than probability for it: for we read in the 21st chapter of the Acts, (ver. 3. 7.) that the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon received the gospel, and kindly entertained St. Paul, when the Jews rejected them both. The

III, Third thing to be cleared is, what is meant by long ago; “they would have repented long ago.”

Some understand this, as if our Saviour had said, they would not have stood out so long against so much preaching, and so many miracles; but would at first have repented, long before our Saviour gave over Chorazin and Bethsaida for obstinate and in corrigible sinners; they would not only have repented at last, but much sooner, and without so much ado.

But this does not seem to be the meaning of the words; but our Saviour seems to refer to those ancient times, long ago, when the prophets denounced judgments against Tyre and Sidon, particularly the prophet Ezekiel; and to say, that if in those days the preaching of that prophet had been accompanied with such miracles as our Saviour wrought in the cities of Galilee, Tyre and Sidon would in those days have repented.

The last and greatest difficulty of all is, how this assertion of our Saviour, that miracles would have converted Tyre and Sidon, is reconcileable with that discourse of our Saviour’s (Luke xvi.) in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, that those who would not believe Moses and the prophets, would not have been persuaded, though one had rose from the dead.

The true answer to which difficulty, in short, is this: that when our Saviour says, “if they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead:” he does not hereby weaken the force of miracles, or their aptness to convince men, and bring them to repentance; but rather confirm it: because Moses and the prophets had the attestation of many and great miracles; and therefore there was no reason to think, that they who would not believe the writings and doctrine of Moses and the prophets, which had the confirmation of so many miracles, and was owned by themselves to have so, should be wrought upon by one particular miracle—the coming of one from the dead, and speaking unto them: or, however this might move and astonish them, for the present, yet it was not likely that the grace of God should concur with such an extraordinary means, to render it effectual to their conversion and repentance, who had wilfully despised, and obstinately rejected, that which had a much greater confirmation than the discourse of a man risen from the dead, and was appointed by God for the ordinary and standing means of bringing men to repentance. So that our Saviour might, with reason enough, pronounce that Tyre and Sidon, who never had a standing revelation of God to bring them to repentance, nor had rejected it, would, upon miracles extraordinarily wrought among them, have repented; and yet deny it elsewhere to be likely, that they who rejected a standing revelation of God, confirmed by miracles, which called them to repentance, would probably be brought to repentance by a particular miracle; or that God should afford his grace to make it effectual for their repentance and salvation.

The words being thus cleared, I come now to raise such observations from them, as may be instructive and useful to us.

I. How much may be said for it.

II. How little can be said against it. But before I come to speak particularly to the arguments, which natural reason affords us for the proof of this principle, I shall premise certain general considerations, which may give light and force to the following arguments. As,

First, By the soul we mean a part of man distinct from his body, or a principle in him which is not matter. I choose rather to describe it this way, than by the essential properties of it, which are hard to fix upon, and are more remote from common apprehension. Our Saviour, when he would convince his disciples, after his resurrection, that the body wherein he appeared to them was a real body, and that he was not a spirit or apparition, he bids them touch and handle him; “For (says he) a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me to have.” So that by the soul or spirit of a man, we mean some principle in man, which is really distinct from his visible and sensible part, from all that in man which affects our outward senses, and which is not to be described by any sensible and external qualities, such as we use to describe a body by: because it is supposed to be of such a nature, as does not fall under the cognizance and notice of any of our senses. And therefore I describe it, by removing from it all those qualities and properties which belong to that which falls under our senses; viz. that it is some thing in man distinct from his body, a principle in him which is not matter; that principle which is the cause of those several operations, which, by inward sense and experience, we are conscious to ourselves of; such are perception, understanding, memory, will. So that the most plain and popular notion that we can have of the soul is, that it is some thing in us which we never saw, and which is the cause of those effects which we find in ourselves; it is the principle whereby we are conscious to ourselves, that we perceive such and such objects, that we see, or hear, or perceive any thing by any other sense; it is that whereby we think and remember, whereby we reason about any thing, and do freely choose and refuse such things as are presented to us. These operations every one is conscious to himself of, and that which is the principle of these, or the cause from whence these proceed, is that which we mean by the soul.

Secondly, By the immortality of the soul, I mean nothing else, but that it survives the body, that when the body dies and falls to the ground, yet this principle, which we call the soul, still remains and lives separate from it; that is, there is still a part of us which is free from the fate of the body, and continues to perform all those operations, to the performance of which the organs of the body are not necessary; that is, when our bodies are destitute of life, and become a dead carcass, there is still some thing that did belong to us, which retains the power of understanding, which thinks, and reasons, and remembers, and does all these freely.

Thirdly, That he that goes about to prove the soul’s immortality, supposeth the existence of a Deity, that there is a God. For although there be a very intimate and strict connexion between the two principles as to us, as being these two great pillars of all religion; yet that which is first and most fundamental to all religion, is the existence of a God; which, if it be not first proved, the best arguments for the soul’s immortality lose their force. Therefore, as to the present argument, I suppose the being of God as a thing acknowledged, and not now to be proved; which I may the better do, having formerly endeavoured to make good this grand principle of religion, against the pretensions of the atheists.

Fourthly, The existence of a God being supposed, this doth very much facilitate the other, of the soul’s immortality. For this being an essential property of that Divine nature, that he is a spirit, that is, something that is not matter; it being once granted that God is, thus much is gained, that there is such a thing as a spirit, an immaterial substance, that is not liable to die or perish; so that he that goes about to prove the immortality of the soul, shall not need to prove that there may be such a thing as a spirit, that the notion of an immaterial substance does not imply a contradiction; because, supposing that there is a God, who is essentially a spirit, there can be no doubt of the possibility of such a thing as a spirit; and though there be this difference between God and all other spirits, that he is an infinite spirit, whereas others are but finite; yet no man that grants the existence of an infinite spirit, can with any pretence or colour of reason deny the possibility of a finite spirit.

Fifthly, and lastly, It is highly reasonable that men should acquiesce and rest satisfied in such reasons and arguments for the proof of any thing, as the nature of the thing to be proved will bear; because there are several kinds and degrees of evidence, which all things are not equally capable of. It is sufficient that the evidence be such as the nature of the thing to be proved will admit of, and such as prudent men make no scruple to admit for sufficient evidence for things of the like nature, and such as, supposing the thing to be, we cannot ordinarily expect better, or greater evidence for it.

There are two kinds of evidences, which are the highest and most satisfactory that this world affords to us; and those are, the evidence of sense, and mathematical demonstration. Now there are many things, concerning which the generality of men profess themselves to be well satisfied, which do not afford either of these kinds of evidence. There is none of us but doth firmly believe that we were born, though we do not remember any such thing; no man’s memory does furnish him with the testimony of his senses for this matter, nor can any man prove this by a mathematical demonstration, nor by any necessary argument, so as to shew it impossible that the thing should be otherwise. For it is possible that a man may come into the world otherwise, than by the ordinary course of generation, as the first man did, who was created immediately by God; and yet I know no man in the world who doubts in the least concerning this matter, though he have no other argument for it, but the testimony of others, and his own observation, how other persons like himself came into the world. And it is reasonable to acquiesce in this evidence, because the nature of the thing affords no greater. We, who never were at Jerusalem, do firmly believe that there is such a place, upon the testimony and relation of others: and no man is blamed for this, as being over-credulous; because no man, that will not take the pains to go thither, can have any other greater evidence of it, than the general testimony of those who say they have seen it. And indeed almost all human affairs, I am sure the most important, are governed and conducted by such evidence, as falls very much short, both of the evidence of sense and of mathematical demonstration.

To apply this then to my present purpose. That the soul of man is of an immortal nature, is not capable of all kinds and degrees of evidence. It can not be proved by our senses, nor is it reasonable to expect it should be so proved; because the soul is supposed, by every one that discourseth of it, to be a thing of such a nature, as cannot be seen or handled, or fall under any other of our senses: nor can it be proved to us by our own experience, while we are in this world; because whoever dies, which is the only trial that can be made whether our souls remain after our bodies, goes out of this world. As for mathematical demonstration, the nature of the thing renders it incapable of it. It remains, then, that we rest contented with such arguments as the nature of the thing will bear, and with such evidence as men are contented to accept of, and do account sufficient, in other matters: such evidence, as a prudent considering man, who is not credulous on the one hand, and on the other is not prejudiced by any interest against it, would rest satisfied in.

Having premised these general considerations to clear my way, I now come to speak to the particular arguments, whereby the immortality of the soul may be made out to our reason. And the best way to estimate the force of the arguments which I shall bring for it, will be to consider beforehand with ourselves what evidence we can, in reason, expect for a thing of this nature. Suppose our souls be immortal; by what kind of arguments could we desire to be assured of it? Setting aside miracles and Divine revelation, could we desire more than this?

I. That the thing be a natural notion and dictate of our minds.

II. That it doth not contradict any other principle that nature hath planted in us, but does very well accord and agree with all other the most natural notions of our minds.

III. That it be suitable to our natural fears and hopes.

IV. That it tends to the happiness of man, and the good order and government of the world.

V. That it gives the most rational account of all those inward actions which we are conscious to ourselves of, as perception, understanding, memory, will; which we cannot, without great unreasonableness, ascribe to matter as the cause of them. If all these be thus, as I shall endeavour to make it appear they are, what greater satisfaction could we desire to have of the immortality of our souls, than these arguments give us? I do not say that any one of these arguments doth sufficiently conclude this thing; nor is it necessary, that, taken singly and by themselves, they should do it; it is sufficient that they concur to make up one entire argument, which may be a sufficient evidence of the soul’s immortality. To illustrate this by an instance: suppose a man should use these two arguments, to prove that such a man deserves to be credited in such a relation:—first, because he had sufficient knowledge of the thing he relates; and, secondly, because he is a man of integrity and fidelity. Neither of these alone would prove the man to be worthy of credit, though both together make up a good argument. So it is in these arguments which I have produced; it may be no one of them is a sufficient inducement, taken singly and by itself, to satisfy a man fully that the soul is immortal; and yet they may concur together to make a very powerful argument. I begin with the

I. First, That our souls are of an immortal nature, that they do not die and perish with our bodies, but pass into another state upon the dissolution of our bodies, is a natural notion and dictate of our minds. That I call a natural notion, which the minds of all men do naturally hit upon and agree in, notwithstanding the distance and remoteness of the several parts of the world from one another, notwithstanding the different tempers, and manner and ways of education. The only way to measure whether any thing be natural or not, is by inquiring, whether it agree to the whole kind or not: if it do, then we call it natural. Omnium consensus naturæ vox est, “The consent of all is the voice of nature,” says Tully, speaking of the universal agreement of all nations in this apprehension, that the souls of men remain after their bodies. And this he tells us he looks upon as a very great argument: Maximum vere argumentum est, naturam ipsam de immortalitate animarum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ sint, et maxime quidem, quæ post mortem futura sunt: “This is a very great argument, that nature doth secretly, and in men’s silent thoughts, deter mine the immortality of the soul, that all men are solicitous of what shall become of them after death.” Nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum, idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et existit maxime et apparet facillime: “I know not how (saith he) there sticks in the mind a certain kind of presage of a future state, and this is most deeply fixed, and discovers itself soonest in the choicest spirits.” Again the same author, Ut deos esse natura opinamur, sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium: “As this opinion is planted in us by nature, that there is a God, by the consent of all nations we believe that souls remain after the body.” I might multiply testimonies to this purpose out of the ancient heathen writers; but these which I have produced out of this great author are so plain and express, that I need bring no other.

As for those barbarous nations which have been discovered in these latter ages of the world, and which, before the first planting of America, were never known to have held correspondence with these parts of the world, yet all those nations agree in this principle, of the immortality of the soul; nay, even the most barbarous of those nations, those who are most inhuman and eat one another, those of Joupinamboult, in Brasil, who are said by some authors, but I think not upon sufficient grounds, not to acknowledge the being of a God; yet even these (as Lerius tells us, who lived among them) had a very fixed and firm persuasion of this principle of religion, the immortality of the soul. “There is not (says he) any nation in the world more remote from all religion than these were; yet to shew that there is some light in the midst of this darkness, I can (says he) truly affirm, that they have not only some apprehensions of the immortality of the soul, but a most confident persuasion of it. Their opinion (says he) is, that the souls of stout and valiant men after death fly beyond the highest mountains, and there are gathered to their fathers and grandfathers, and live in pleasant gardens, with all manner of delights; but the souls of slothful and in active men, and those who do nothing for their country, are carried to Aygman (so they call the devil) and live with him in perpetual torments.” The like Xaverius and others, who laboured in the conversion of the remote parts of the East Indies, tell us concerning those nations, that they found them generally possessed with this principle, of the soul’s immortality.

Now what will we call a natural notion, if not that which mankind, in all places of the world, in all ages, so far as history informs, did universally agree in? What evidence greater than this can any man give, to shew that any thing is natural? And if we believe a God (which I told you I do all along in this argument suppose to be already proved), can we imagine that this wise and good God would plant such a notion and apprehension in the understandings of men, as would put an universal cheat and delusion upon human nature?

And that the universal consent of all nations in this principle cannot be resolved either into the fears and groundless jealousy and superstition of human nature, nor into universal tradition, which had its original from some impostor, nor into reason and policy of state, I might shew particularly: but, having formerly done that, concerning the universal consent of all nations in the belief of a God, and the reason being the very same, as to this principle of the immortality of the soul, I shall not need to do this over again upon this argument.

And that some persons, and particular sects in the world, have disowned this principle, is no sufficient objection against it. It cannot be denied, but the Epicureans among the philosophers did renounce this principle; and some also among the stoics do speak doubtfully of it. The Sadducees, likewise, among the Jews fell into this error, upon a mistake and misapprehension of the doctrine of their master, Sadoc, who, as Josephus tells us, did use to inculcate this principle to his scholars, that though there were no rewards nor punishments after this life, yet men ought to be good and live virtuously; from whence, in process of time, by heat of opposition against the pharisees, who brought in oral tradition, and made it equal with the written word of God, they fell into that error, and denied the soul’s immortality, not finding such clear texts for it in the Old Testament as to them did seem fully convincing of this truth. Xaverius likewise tells us, that among the several sects of religion which he found in Japan, there was one which denied the immortality of the soul, and that there were any spirits; but he says they were a sort of notoriously wicked and vicious persons.

To these instances, which are so few, and bear no proportion to the generality of mankind, I have these two things to say:

1. That no argument can be drawn a monstro ad naturam. A thing may be natural, and yet some instances may be brought to the contrary: but these are but few in comparison, and like monsters, which are no argument against nature. No man will deny that it is natural for men to have two eyes, and five fingers upon a hand; though there are several instances of men born but with one eye, and with four or six fingers.

2. But especially in matters of religion and discourse, which are subject to liberty, men may offer violence to nature, and, to gratify their lusts and interests, may by false reasonings debauch their understanding, and by long striving against the natural bent and bias of it, may alter their apprehensions of things, and persuade others to the same: but nothing that is against nature can prevail very far, but nature will still be endeavouring to recover itself, and to free itself from the violence which is offered to it. So that men’s understandings, left to themselves, and not having some false bias put upon them, out of a design of pride, and singularity in opinion, which was the case of Epicurus; or out of the interest of some lust, and a design to set men at liberty to sin, which is the case of most who have renounced this principle: I say, nothing but one of these two can ordinarily make men deny the immortality of the soul. Thus I have done with the first argument; namely, that the immortality of the soul is a natural notion and dictate of our minds.

1. The immortality of the soul is very agreeable to the natural notion which we have of God, one part whereof is, that he is essentially good and just.

(1.) For his goodness. It is very agreeable to that, to think that God would make some creatures for as long a duration as they are capable of. The wisdom of God hath chosen to display itself, in creating variety of things of different degrees and perfections; things devoid of life and sense; and several degrees and orders of sensitive creatures, of different shapes and figures, of different magnitude; some vastly great, others extremely little, others of middle sort between these. And himself being a pure spirit, we have no reason to doubt, but he could make creatures of a spiritual nature, and such as should have no principle of self-corruption in them. And seeing he could make creatures of such perfection, if we believe him to be essentially good, we have no reason to doubt, but that he hath done so. For it is the very nature of goodness to communicate and diffuse itself, and to delight in doing so; and we cannot imagine, but that the same goodness which prompted and inclined him to give being to those creatures which are of an inferior degree of perfection, would move him likewise to make creatures more perfect, and capable of greater degrees of happiness, and of a longer enjoyment of it, if it were in his power to make such; and no man that believes the omnipotency of God can doubt of this. For he who by a pure act of his will can command things to be, and in an instant to start out of nothing, can as easily make one sort of creatures as another. Now the power of God being supposed, his goodness secures us of his will: for we cannot imagine any such thing as envy in a Being which we suppose to be perfectly good; no thing being more inconsistent with perfect goodness, than to be unwilling to communicate happiness to others, and to grudge that others should partake of it.

Now this being supposed, that God could and would make creatures of a spiritual and immortal nature, and the utmost imaginable perfections of such creatures being knowledge and liberty, wherever these perfections are found, we have reason to conclude that creature to be endowed with a principle that is of a spiritual and immortal nature. Now these perfections of understanding and will being found in man, this argues him to be endowed with such a principle, as is in his own nature capable of an immortal duration.

It is true, indeed, this spiritual part of man, which we call his soul, is united to a visible and material part, viz. his body; the union of which parts constitutes a peculiar sort of creature, which is utriusque mundi nexus, unites the material and immaterial world, the world of matter and of spirits. And as it is very suitable to the wisdom of God, which delights in variety, that there should be a sort of creatures compounded of both these principles, matter and spirit; so it is very agreeable to his goodness to think, that he would design such creatures for as long a duration and continuance as they were capable of. For as it is the effects of goodness to bring creatures forth into the possession of that life and happiness which they are capable of; so to continue them in the enjoyment of it for so long as they are capable.

The sum of all this is, that as it is agreeable to the wisdom of God, which made the world, to display itself in all variety of creatures; so it is agree able to his goodness, to make some of as perfect a kind as creatures are capable of being. Now it being no repugnancy nor contradiction, that a creature should be of a spiritual and immortal nature, we have no reason to think, but that the fruitfulness of the Divine goodness hath brought forth such creatures; and if there be reason to conclude any thing to be of a spiritual and immortal nature, certainly the principle of understanding and liberty, which we are conscious of in ourselves, deserves to be reputed such.

(2.) It is very agreeable to the justice of God, to think the souls of men remain after this life, that there may be a state of reward and recompence in another world. If we believe God to be holy and just, we cannot but believe that he loves righteousness and goodness, and hates iniquity; and that, as he is governor and public magistrate of the world, he is concerned to countenance and encourage the one, and to discountenance and discourage the other. Now the providences of God being in a great measure promiscuously administered in this world, so that no man can make any certain judgment of God’s love and hatred towards persons by what befals them in this world, it being the lot of good men many times to suffer and be afflicted, and of wicked men to live in a flourishing and prosperous condition; I say, things being thus, it is very agreeable to those notions which we have of the Divine holiness and justice, to believe that there will a time come, when this wise and just Governor of the world will make a wide and visible difference between the righteous and the wicked; so that though for a while the justice of God may be clouded, yet there will a time come when it shall be clearly manifested, and every eye see it and bear witness to it; when “judgment shall break forth as the light, and righteousness as the noon-day.” It is possible that sin for a while may go unpunished, nay, triumph and prosper; and that virtue and innocence may not only be unrewarded, but oppressed, and despised, and persecuted. And this may be reconcileable enough to the wisdom of God’s providence and the justice of it, supposing the immortality of the soul, and another state after this life, wherein all things shall be set straight, and every man shall receive according to his works: but unless this be supposed, it is impossible to solve the justice of God’s providence. Who will believe that the affairs of the world are administered by him who loves righteousness, and hates all the workers of iniquity, who will not let the least service that is done to him pass unrewarded, nor, on the other hand, acquit the guilty, and let sin go unpunished, which are the properties of justice; I say, who will believe this, that looks into the course of the world, and sees with how little difference and distinction of good and bad the affairs of it are managed? That sees virtue discountenanced and despised, poor and destitute, afflicted and tormented; when wickedness is many times exalted to high places, and makes a great noise and ruffle in the world? He that considers what a hazard many times good men run, how for goodness’ sake they venture, and many times quit all the contentments and enjoyments of this life, and submit to the greatest sufferings and calamities that human nature is capable of; while in the mean time prosperity is poured into the lap of the wicked, and Heaven seems to look pleasantly upon those that deal treacherously, and to be silent whilst the wicked devours the man that is more righteous than himself; he that considers this, and can, without supposing another life after this, pretend to vindicate the justice of these things, must he as blind as the fortune that governs them. Would not this be a perpetual stain and blemish upon the Divine Providence, that Abel, who offered up a better sacrifice than Cain, and “had this testimony, that he pleased God;” yet, after all this, should have no other reward for it, but to be slain by his brother, who had offender! God by a slight and contemptuous offering? If there were no reward to be expected after this life, would not this have been a sad example to the world, to see one of the first men that served God acceptably thus rewarded? What a pitiful encouragement would it be to men to be good, to see profane Esau blessed with the dew of heaven, and fatness of the earth; and to hear good old Jacob, in the end and conclusion of his days, to complain, “Few and evil have the days of my pilgrimage been!” If this had been the end of Esau and Jacob, it would puzzle all the wit and reason of mankind to wipe off this reproach from the providence of God, and vindicate the justice of it. And therefore I do not wonder, that the greatest wits among the heathen philosophers were so much puzzled with this objection against the providence of God—If the wise, and just, and good God do administer the affairs of the world, and be concerned in the good or bad actions of men, cur bonis male et malis bene? “How comes it to pass, that good men many times are miserable, and bad men so happy in the world?” And they had no other way to wipe off this objection, but by referring these things to another world, wherein the temporal sufferings of good men should he eternally rewarded, and the short and transient happiness of wicked men should be rendered insignificant, and drowned in an eternity of misery.

So that, if we believe the being of God, and the providence of God (which I do all along take for granted in this argument), there is no other way imaginable to solve the equity and justice of God’s providence, but upon this supposition—that there is an other life after this. For to say, that virtue is a sufficient and abundant reward for itself, though it have some truth in it, if we set aside those sufferings, and miseries, and calamities, which virtue is frequently attended with in this life; yet, if these be taken in, it is but a very jejune and dry speculation. For considering the strong propension and inclination of human nature to avoid these evils and inconveniencies, a state of virtue attended with great sufferings, would be so far from being a happiness, that it would be a real misery; so that the determination of the apostle (1 Cor. xv. 19.) is according to nature, and the truth and reason of things, that, “If in this life only we had hope, we were of all men most miserable.” For although it be true, that, as things now stand, and as the nature of man is framed, good men do find a strange kind of inward pleasure and secret satisfaction of mind in the discharge of their duty, and doing what is virtuous; yet every man that looks into himself and consults his own breast, will find that this delight and contentment springs chiefly from the hopes which men conceive, that a holy and virtuous life shall not be unrewarded: and without these hopes virtue is but a dead and empty name; and notwithstanding the reasonableness of virtuous actions compared with the contrary of them, yet when virtue came to be incumbered with difficulties, and to be attended with such sufferings and inconveniencies, as were grievous and intolerable to human nature, then it would appear unreasonable to choose that for a happiness, which would rob a man of all the felicity of his life. For though a man were never so much in love with virtue for the native beauty and comeliness of it; yet it would strangely cool his affection to it, to consider that he should be undone by the match; that when he had it, he must go a begging with it, and be in danger of death, for the sake of that which he had chosen for the felicity of his life. So that, how devout soever the woman might be, yet I dare say she was not over-wise and considerate, who, going about with a pitcher of water in one hand, and a pan of coals in the other, and being asked what she intended to do with them, answered, that she intended with the one to burn up heaven, and with the other to quench hell, that men might love God and virtue for their own sakes, without hope of reward or fear of punishment.

And the consequence of this dry doctrine does sufficiently appear in the sect of the Sadducees, which had its rise from this principle of Sadoc, the master of the sect, who, out of an indiscreet zeal to teach something above others, and indeed above the pitch of human nature, inculcated this doctrine upon his scholars—that religion and virtue ought to be loved for themselves, though there were no reward of virtue to be hoped, nor punishment of vice to be feared, in another world; from which his disciples inferred, that it was not necessary to religion to believe a future state, and, in process of time, peremptorily maintained, that there was no life after this. For they did not only deny the resurrection of the body, but, as St. Paul tells us, they said, that “there was neither angel nor spirit;” that is, they denied that there was any thing of an immortal nature, that did remain after this life. And what the consequence of this was, we may see in the character which Josephus gives of that sect; for he tells, that the commonalty of the Jews were of the sect of the Pharisees, but most of the great and rich men were Sadducees; which plainly shews, that this dry speculation, of loving religion and virtue for themselves, without any expectation of future rewards, did end in their giving over all serious pursuit of religion; and, because they hoped for nothing after this life, therefore laying aside all other considerations, they applied themselves to the present business of this life, and grasped as much of the present enjoyments of its power and riches, as they could by any means attain to.

And for a farther evidence of this, that it is only or principally the hopes of a future happiness that bear men up in the pursuit of virtue, that give them so much comfort and satisfaction in the prosecution of it, and make men encounter the difficulties, and oppositions, and persecutions they meet withal in the ways of religion, with so much undauntedness and courage; I say, for the farther evidence of this, I shall only offer this consideration—that, according to the degree of this hope and assurance of another life, men’s constancy and courage in the ways of virtue and religion have been. Before Christ’s coming into the world, and the bringing of” life and immortality to light by the gospel,” we do not find in all ages of the world, so many instances of patience and constant suffering for religion, as happened in the first age after Christ. God did not think fit to try the world so much in this kind, till they were furnished with a principle which would bear them up tinder the greatest sufferings, which was nothing else but the full assurance which the gospel gave the world of a blessed immortality after this life; the firm belief and persuasion of which, made Christians dead to the world, and all the contentments and enjoyments of it, and by raising them above all the pleasures and terrors of sense, made them to despise present things, “in hopes of eternal life, which God that could not lie had promised.” This was that which set them above the fears of death, so that they were not to be frightened out of their religion by the most exquisite torments, and all the most horrid and fearful shapes, that the malice of men and devils could dress up misery and affliction in. Whereas, under the old dispensation of the law, before the revelation of the gospel, when the promises of eternal life were not so clear, and men’s hopes of it more weak and faint, the express encouragement to obedience was founded in the promises of temporal blessings; God herein complying with the necessity of human nature, which is not to be wrought upon to any great purpose, but by arguments of advantage.

The sum of this argument, which I have thus largely dilated upon, because I look upon it as one of the most strong and convincing of the soul’s immortality, is this; that the justice of God’s providence cannot sufficiently be vindicated, but upon the supposal of this principle of the soul’s immortality: whereas, if this principle be admitted, that men pass out of this life into an eternal state of happiness or misery, according as they have behaved themselves in this world; then the account of the unequal providences of God in this world is easy. For if we look upon this life as a state of probation, of trial to wicked men, and of exercise to good men, in order to a future and eternal state; and if we consider withal, how vast the difference is between time and eternity; it will be easy then to apprehend how all things may be set straight in another world, and how the righteousness of God may appear, in giving an abundant recompence to good men for all their temporal service and sufferings, which do but prepare them the more for a quicker relish of the glory and happiness which is reserved for them; and, on the other hand, in punishing wicked men, whose short ease and prosperity in this world will, by the just judgment of God for their abuse of the blessings of this life, set out their misery and torment to the greatest disadvantage. For, as nothing commends happiness more than precedent sorrow; so nothing makes pain and suffering more bitter and intolerable, than to step into them out of a state of ease and pleasure; so that the pleasures and prosperity of wicked men in this life, considered with the punishment of the next, which will follow upon them, is an addition to their misery. This is the very sting of the second death; and in this sense also that of the wise man is true—“The ease of the simple will slay them;” and the prosperity of these fools shall be the great aggravation of their destruction.

2. Another notion which is deeply rooted in the nature of man, is, that there is a difference between good and evil, which is not founded in the imagination of persons, or in the custom and usage of the world, but in the nature of things: that there are some things which have a natural evil, and turpitude, and deformity in them; for example, impiety and profaneness towards God, injustice and unrighteousness towards men, perfidiousness, injury, ingratitude; these are things that are not only condemned by the positive laws and constitutions of particular nations and governments, but by the general verdict and sentiments of humanity. Piety and religion towards God; justice, and righteousness, and fidelity, and reverence of oaths; regard to a man’s word and promise; and gratitude towards those who have obliged us; these and the like qualities, which we call virtues, are not only well spoken of, where they are countenanced by the authority of law, but have the tacit approbation and veneration of mankind. And any man that thinks that these things are not naturally and in themselves good, but are merely arbitrary, and depend upon the pleasure of authority, and the will of those who have the power of imposing laws upon others; I say, any such person may easily be convinced of his error, by putting this supposition:—suppose wickedness were established by a law, and the practice of fraud, and rapine, and perjury, falseness in a man’s word and promises, were commended and rewarded; and it were made a crime for any man to be honest, to have any regard to his oath or promise; and the man that should dare to be honest, or make good his word, should be severely punished, and made a public example; I say, suppose the reverse of all that which we now call virtue were solemnly enacted by a law, and public authority should enjoin the practice of that which we call vice; what would the consequence of this be, when the tables were thus turned? Would that which we now call vice gain the esteem and reputation of virtue; and those things which we now call virtue, grow contemptible and become odious to human nature? If not, then there is a natural and intrinsical difference between good and evil, between virtue and vice; there is something in the nature of these things which does not depend upon arbitrary constitution. And I think nothing can be more evident, than that the authority which should attempt such an establishment, would there by be rendered ridiculous, and all laws of such a tendency as this would be hissed out of the world. And the reason of this is plain, because no government could subsist upon these terms: for the very forbidding men to be just and honest, the enjoining of fraud, and violence, and perjury, and breach of trust, would apparently destroy the end of government, which is to preserve men and their rights against the encroachments and inconveniences of these: and this end being destroyed, human society would presently disband, and men would naturally fall into a state of war: which plainly shews that there is a natural, and immutable, and eternal reason for that which we call goodness and virtue; and against that which we call vice and wickedness.

To come then to my purpose, it is very agreeable to this natural notion of the difference between good and evil, to believe the soul’s immortality. For no thing is more reasonable to imagine, than that good and evil, as they are differenced in their nature, so they shall be in their rewards; that it shall one time or other be well to them that do well, and evil to the wicked man. Now seeing this difference is not made in this world, but all things happen alike to all, the belief of this difference between good and evil, and the different rewards belonging to them infers another state after this life, which is the very thing we mean by the soul’s immortality; namely, that it does not die with the body, but remains after it, and passeth into a state wherein it shall receive a reward suitable to the actions of this life.

And thus I have done with the second argument for the soul’s immortality; namely, that this principle doth not contradict those other principles which nature hath planted in us, but doth very well accord and agree with those natural notions which we have of the goodness of God, and of the justice of his providence, and of the real and intrinsical difference between good and evil.

III. This principle, of the soul’s immortality, is suitable to the natural hopes and fears of men.

To the natural hopes of men. Whence is it that men are so desirous to purchase a lasting fame, and to perpetuate their memory to posterity, but that they hope that there is something belonging to them, which shall survive the fate of the body, and when that lies in the silent grave, shall be sensible of the honour which is done to their memory, and shall enjoy the pleasure of the just and impartial fame, which shall speak of them to posterity without envy or flattery? And this is a thing incident to the great est and most generous spirits; none so apt as they to feed themselves with these hopes of immortality. What was it made those great spirits among the Romans so freely to sacrifice their lives for the safety of their country, but an ambition that their names might live after them, and be mentioned with honour when they were dead and gone? Which ambition of theirs, had it not been grounded in the hopes of immortality, and a natural opinion of another life after this, in which they might enjoy the delight and satisfaction of the fame which they had purchased, nothing could have been more vain and unreasonable. If there were no hopes of a life beyond this, what is there in fame that should tempt any man to forego this present life, with all the contentments and enjoyments of it? What is the pleasure of being well spoken of, when a man is not? What is the happiness which men can promise to themselves, when they are out of being, when they can enjoy nothing, nor be sensible of any thing, because they are not? So that the spring of all those brave and gallant actions, which the heathens did with the hazard of their lives, out of a desire of after-fame and glory; I say, the spring of all those actions, could be no other than the hopes of another life after this, in which they made account to enjoy the pleasure of the fame, which they purchased with the expense and loss of this present life.

But this ardent desire and impatient thirst after fame, concerns but a few of mankind in comparison. I shall therefore instance in something which is more common and general to mankind, which plainly argues this hope of immortality. What is the ground of that peace, and quiet, and satisfaction, which good men find in good and virtuous actions, but that they have a secret persuasion, and comfortable hopes, that they shall sometime or other be rewarded? and we find that they maintain these even when they despair of any reward in this world. Now what do these hopes argue, but a secret belief of a future state, and another life after this, wherein men shall receive the reward of their actions, and inherit the fruit of their doings? Whence is it else, that good men, though they find that goodness suffers, and is persecuted in this world, and that the best designs are many times unsuccessful; what is it that bears them up under these disappointments, and makes them constant in a virtuous course, but this hope of another life, in a better state of things hereafter? They have some secret presage in their own minds of a life after death, which will be a time of recompence, as this is of trial.

2. The same may be argued from the natural fears of men. Whence is the secret shame, and fear, and horror, which seizeth upon the minds of men, when they are about a wicked action; yea, though no eye see them, and though what they are doing do not fall under the cognizance of any human court or tribunal? Whence is it that they meet with such checks and rebukes in their own spirits, and feel such a disturbance and confusion in their minds, when they do a vile and unworthy thing; yea, al though it be so secretly contrived and so privately managed, that no man can charge them with it, or call them to account for it? What art thou afraid of, man, if there be no life after this? Why do thy joints tremble, and thy knees knock together, if thou beest in no danger from any thing in this world, and hast no fears of the other? If men had not a natural dread of another world, and sad and dreadful presages of future vengeance, why do not men sin with assurance when no eye sees them? Why are not men secure, when they have only imagined a mischief privately in their own hearts, and no creature is privy and conscious to it? Why do men’s own consciences lash and sting them for these things, which they might do with as great impunity from men in this world, as the most virtuous actions? Whence is it that cogitare, peccare est, as Min. Felix expresseth it, et non solum conscios timet, sed et conscientiam? Whence is it that “a wicked man is guilty upon account merely of his thoughts, and is not only fearful because of those things which others are conscious of, but because of those things which nobody knows but his own conscience?” Whence is it that,

That “he that does but devise and imagine secret mischief in his heart, is guilty to himself, as if the fact had been committed?” And when no man can charge and accuse him for it, yet,

“He carries his accuser in his breast, who does night and day incessantly witness against him?”

And that these fears are natural, the sudden rise of them is a good evidence, They do not proceed from deliberation, men do not reason themselves into these fears, but they spring up in men’s minds they know not how; which shews that they are natural. Now, a man’s natural actions, I mean, such as surprise us, and do not proceed from deliberation, are better arguments of the intimate sense of our minds, and do more truly discover the bottom of our hearts, and those notions that are implanted in our natures, than those actions which are governed by reason and discourse, and proceed from deliberation. To demonstrate this by an instance: if a man upon a sudden sight of a snake, do recoil and start back, tremble and grow pale; this is a better argument of a natural antipathy and fear, than it is of a natural courage, if afterward, when he hath commanded down his fear, he should by his reason persuade himself to take up the snake into his hand. If you would know what a man’s natural apprehensions are, take him on the sudden, and give him no time to deliberate. Therefore, some cunning politicians have used this way of surprise and sudden questions, to dive into the hearts of men, and discover their secrets.

In like manner, if you would know what men’s natural apprehensions are concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future state, observe what men’s first thoughts are, whether a man’s conscience does not suggest to him such fears upon the commission of sin. There is no doubt but men may offer violence to their natures, and reason themselves into great doubts about the soul’s immortality; nay, men may be bribed into the contrary opinion: but this man who, in his deliberate discourses, denies any reward after this life, shall, by his natural actions, acknowledge them, by those fears and terrors, which his guilty conscience is ever and anon surprised withal.

The sum of this argument is, that it is natural for men that live piously and virtuously, that do just, and honest, and worthy actions, to conceive good hopes that it shall some time or other be well with them; that however they may meet with no reward and recompence in this world, yet “verily there will be a reward for the righteous:” and, on the other hand, wicked men, though they flourish and prosper in their wickedness, yet they are not free from guilt, they are fearful and timorous, even when their condition sets them above the fear of any man upon earth. Now, what does this signify, but that they have some secret presages of an after-punishment? Nature suggests this thought to them, that there will be a time when all the sins which they have committed, and the wickedness which they have done, shall be accounted for.

And it is no prejudice to this truth, that some men sin against their consciences, and by frequent acts of sin, and offering notorious violence to their own light, bring themselves into a brawny and in sensible condition, so that they have not those stings and lashes, are not haunted with those fears and terrors, which pursue common sinners. This is but reasonable to be expected, that men, by frequent acts of sin, should lose the tender sense which men’s consciences naturally have of good and evil; that men that lay waste their consciences by gross and notorious sins, should lose the sense of good and evil, and that their consciences should grow hard, like a beaten road; nay, it is suitable to the justice of God, to give up such persons to a reprobate sense, to an injudicious mind, that they, who would not be awakened and reclaimed by the natural fear of Divine justice, which God hath hid in every man’s conscience, should at last lose all sense and apprehension of these things, and be permitted securely and without remorse to perfect their own ruin.

IV. This doctrine of the immortality of the soul, does evidently tend to the happiness and perfection of man, and to the good order and government of the world: to the happiness and perfection of man, both considered singly, and in society.

1. To the happiness and perfection of man, considered in his single capacity, if it be a thing desirable to be at all, then it is a thing desirable to be continued in being as long as may be, and for ever if it be possible. If life be a perfection, then eternal life is much more so; especially if the circumstances of this present life be considered, together with the state which we hope for hereafter. The condition of men in this present life, is attended with so many frailties, liable to so great miseries and sufferings, to so many pains and diseases, to such various causes of sorrow and trouble, of fear and vexation, by reason of the many hazards and uncertainties, which not only the comforts and contentments of our lives, but even life itself, is liable to, that the pleasure and happiness of it is by these very much rebated; so that were not men trained on with the hopes of something better hereafter, life itself would to many men bean insupportable burden: if men were not supported and borne up under the anxieties of this present life, with the hopes and expectations of a happier state in another world, mankind would be the most imperfect and unhappy part of God’s creation. For although other creatures be subjected to a great deal of vanity and misery, yet they have this happiness that as they are made for a short duration and continuance, so they are only affected with the present, they do not fret and discontent themselves about the future, they are not liable to be cheated with hopes, nor tormented with fears, nor vexed at disappointments, as the sons of men are.

But if our souls be immortal, this makes abundant amends and compensation for the frailties of this life, and all the transitory sufferings and inconveniences of this present state; human nature, considered with this advantage, is infinitely above the brute beasts that perish.

As for those torments and miseries which we are liable to in another world, far greater than any thing that men suffer in this life, this ought not, in reason, to be objected against the immortality of the soul, as if this doctrine did not tend to the happiness and perfection of man: for if this be truly the case of mankind, that God hath made men’s souls of an immortal nature, and designed them for a perpetual duration and continuance in another state after this life, in order to which state he hath placed every man in this world, to be, as it were, a candidate for eternity, he hath furnished every man with such helps and advantages, such opportunities and means for the attaining of everlasting happiness, that if he be not grossly wanting to himself, he shall not miscarry; if this be the case, then an immortal nature is a real and mighty privilege. If God puts every man into a capacity of happiness, and if no man becomes miserable but by his own choice, if no man falls short of eternal happiness but by his own fault, then immortality is a privilege in itself, and a curse to none but those who make it so to themselves.

2. This doctrine tends to the happiness of man considered in society, to the good order and government of the world. I do not deny, but if this principle of the immortality of the soul were not believed in the world, if the generality of mankind had no regard to any thing beyond this present life: I say, I do not deny, notwithstanding this, but there would be some kind of government kept up in the world; the necessities of human nature, and the mischiefs of contention, would compel men to some kind of order: but I say withal, that if this principle were banished out of the world, government would want its most firm basis and foundation; there would be infinitely more disorders in the world were men not restrained from injustice and violence by principles of conscience, and the awe of another world. And that this is so, is evident from hence, that all magistrates think themselves concerned to cherish religion, and to maintain in the minds of men the belief of a God, and of a future state.

This is the fourth argument—that this doctrine does evidently tend to the happiness of man, and the good order and government of the world. I grant that this argument alone, and taken singly by itself, is far from enforcing and necessarily concluding the soul’s immortality: but if the other arguments be of force to conclude, this added to them is a very proper inducement to persuade and incline men to the belief of this principle; it does very well serve the purpose for which I bring it; namely, to shew, that if there be good arguments for it, no man hath reason to be averse or backward to the belief of it; if by other arguments we be convinced of the suitableness of this principle to reason, this consideration will satisfy us, that it is not against our interest to entertain it. And no man that is not resolved to live wickedly, hath reason to desire that the contrary should be true. For what would a man gain by it, if the soul were not immortal, but to level himself with the beasts that perish, and to put himself into a worse and more miserable condition than any of the creatures below him?

But there is one difficulty in this: for it may be said, if sensitive perception be an argument of the soul’s immateriality, and consequently immortality, then the souls of beasts will be immortal as well as the souls of men. For answer to this, I shall say these things:

(1.) That the most general and common philosophy of the world hath always acknowledged some thing in beasts besides their bodies, and that the faculty of sense and perception which is in them, is founded in a principle of a higher nature than mat ter. And as this was always the common philosophy of the world, so we find it to be a supposition of Scripture, which frequently attributes souls to beasts as well as to men, though of a much inferior nature. And therefore those particular philosophers, who have denied any immaterial principle, or a soul to beasts, have also denied them to have sense, any more than a clock, or watch, or any other engine; and have imagined them to be nothing else but a finer and more complicated kind of engines, which, by reason of the curiosity and tenderness of their frame, are more easily susceptible of all kind of motions and impressions from without, which impressions are the cause of all those actions that resemble those sensations which we men find in ourselves: which is to say, that birds, and beasts, and fishes, are nothing else but a more curious sort of puppets, which, by certain secret and hidden weights and springs, do move up and down, and counterfeit the actions of life and sense. This, I confess, seems to me to be an odd kind of philosophy; and it hath this vehement prejudice against it—that if this were true, every man would have great cause to question the reality of his own perceptions; for to all appearance the sensations of beasts are as real as ours, and in many things their senses much more exquisite than ours; and if nothing can be a sufficient argument to a man, that he is really endowed with sense, besides his own consciousness of it, then every man hath reason to doubt whether all men in the world be sides himself be not mere engines; for no man hath any other evidence, that another man is really endowed with sense, than he hath that brute creatures are so; for they appear to us to see, and hear, and feel, and smell, and taste things, as truly and as exactly as any man in the world does.

(2.) Supposing beasts to have an immaterial principle distinct from their body, it will not from hence follow, that they are immortal, in the sense that we attribute immortality to men. For immortality, when we ascribe it to men, signifies two things.

1. That the soul remains after the body, and is not corrupted and dissolved together with it.

2. That it lives in this separate state, and is sensible of happiness or misery.

1. Immortality imports, that the soul remains after the body, and is not corrupted or dissolved together with it. And there is no inconvenience in attributing this sort of immortality to the brute creatures. And here it is not necessary for us, who know so little of the ways and works of God, and of the secrets of nature, to be able to give a particular account what becomes of the souls of brute creatures after death: whether they return into the soul and spirit of the world, if there be any such thing, as some fancy; or whether they pass into the bodies of other animals which succeed in their rooms: I say, this is not necessary to be particularly determined; it is sufficient to lay down this in general as highly probable, that they are such a sort of spirits, which, as to their operation and life, do necessarily depend upon mat ter, and require union with it; which union being dissolved, they lapse into an insensible condition, and a state of inactivity. For being endowed only with a sensitive principle, the operations of which do plainly depend upon an organical disposition of the body, when the body is dissolved all their activity ceaseth; and when this visible frame of the world shall be dissolved, and this scene of sensible things shall pass away, then it is not improbable that they shall be discharged out of being, and return to their first nothing: for though in their own nature they would continue longer, yet, having served the end of their being, and done their work, it is not unsuitable to the same wisdom that made them, and commanded them into being, to let them sink into their first state.

2. Immortality, as applied to the spirits of men, imports, that their souls are not only capable of continuing, but living in this separate state, so as to be sensible of happiness and misery. For the soul of man being of a higher nature, and not only endowed with a faculty of sense, but likewise other faculties which have no necessary dependance upon, or connexion with, matter; having a sense of God, and of Divine and spiritual things, and being capable of happiness in the enjoyment of God, or of misery in a separation from him; it is but reason able to imagine, that the souls of men shall be admitted to the exercise of these faculties, and the enjoyment of that life which they are capable of in a separate state. And this is that which constitutes that vast and wide difference between the souls of men and beasts: and this degree of immortality is as much above the other, as reason and religion are above sense.

3. Another faculty in us, which argues an immaterial, and consequently an immortal principle in man, is memory; and this likewise is common in some degree to several of the brute creatures, and it seems to be nothing else but a kind of continued sensation of things. And of this we can give no account from mere matter. For if that which we call the soul, were nothing else but, as Epicurus imagined, a little wild-fire, a company of small round particles of matter in perpetual motion, it being a fluid thing, it would be liable to a continual dissipation of its parts, and the new parts that come, would be altogether strangers to the impressions made upon the old: so that, supposing the soul liable but to those changes which the grosser parts of our bodies, our flesh and blood, continually are liable to, by the evaporation and spending of the old, and an accession of new matter; (and if we suppose the soul to be fluid matter, that is, consisting of particles, which are by no kind of connexion linked to one another, it will in all probability be more easily dissipable than the grosser parts of the body; and) if so, how is it imaginable that these new and foreign particles should retain any sense of the impressions made upon those which are gone many years ago?

4. Another faculty which I shall instance in, is the will of man, which is endowed with liberty and freedom, and gives a man dominion over his own actions. Matter moves by necessary and certain laws, and cannot move if it be at rest, unless it be moved by another; and cannot rest, that is, cannot but move, if it be impelled by another. Whence then are voluntary motions? Whence is the αὐτεξσύσιον, the arbitrary principle which we find in ourselves, the freedom of action to do or not to do this or that, which we are intimately conscious to ourselves of? Of all the operations of our minds, it is the hardest to give an account of liberty from mere matter. This Epicurus was sensible of, and in finitely puzzled with it, as we may see by the question which Lucretius puts: Unde est hæc, inquam, fatis avulsa voluntas? “How comes the soul of man to have this peculiar privilege of freedom and liberty, above all other sorts of matter that are in the world? Whence is it, that when all things else move by a fatal necessity, the soul of man should be exempted from that slavery?” He does indeed attempt to give an account of it from a motion of declination which is proper and peculiar to the particles of the soul: but that is a more unintelligible riddle than liberty itself. The

5. Fifth, and last operation I shall instance in, is that of reason and understanding. Not to mention the activity and nimbleness of our thoughts, in the abstracted notions of our minds, the multitude of distinct ideas and notions which dwell together in our souls, none of which are accountable from mat ter; I shall only instance in two particulars.

(1.) Those acts of reason and judgment whereby we overrule the reports of our senses, and correct the errors and deceptions of them.

(2.) The contemplation of spiritual and Divine things.

(1.) Those acts of reason and judgment whereby we overrule the reports and determinations of sense. Our sense tells us, that things at a distance are less, than our reason tells us they are really in themselves; as, that the body of the sun is but about a foot diameter: but our reason informs us otherwise. Now what is the principle that controls our senses, and corrects the deception of them? If the soul of man be mere matter, it can only judge of things according to the impressions which are made upon our senses: but we do judge otherwise, and see reason to do so many times. Therefore it must be some higher principle, which judges of things not by the material impressions which they make upon our senses, but by other measures. And therefore, to avoid this inconvenience, Epicurus was glad, to fly the absurdity, to affirm, that all things really are what they appear to us, and that in truth the sun is no bigger than it seems to be.

(2.) The contemplation of things spiritual and Divine, is an argument that the soul is of a higher original than any thing that is material. To contemplate the nature of God, and the Divine excellences and perfections; the meditation of a future state, and of the happiness of another world; those breathings which good men feel in their souls after God, and the enjoyment of him—argue the spiritual nature of the soul. Hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suæ (saith Seneca) quod eam divina delectant, nec ut alienis interest sed suis: “The soul of man hath this argument of its Divine original—that it is so strangely delighted, so infinitely pleased and satisfied with the contemplation of Divine things, and is taken up with these thoughts, as if they were its proper business and concernment.” Those strong inclinations and desires after immortality, and the pleasure which good men find in the forethoughts of the happiness which they hope to enter into, when their souls shall quit these mansions; the restless aspirings of our souls towards God, and those blessed mansions where he dwells, and where the spirits of good men converse with him and one another; these signify our souls to be of a nobler extraction than the earth, that they are descended from above, and that heaven is their country; their thoughts are so much upon it, and they are so desirous to return to it.

I shall conclude this argument, from the noble and excellent operations of our souls, of which we are conscious to ourselves, with a passage of Tully to this purpose:—Animarum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest: nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur. “The souls of men have not their original from the earth, it is in vain to seek for it there: for there is nothing in the mind of man of a material mixture and composition, which we can imagine to be born or formed out of the earth. For (says he) among material and earthly things there is nothing,” Quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia: “There is no earthly thing which hath the power of memory, of understanding, of thought, which retains things past, foresees and provides for things future, comprehends and considers things present.” Singularis est igitur quædam natura atque vis animi, sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis; “So that the nature and power of the soul are of a peculiar and singular kind, different from all those natures which we are acquainted with in this world.” He concludes, Itaque quicquid est quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cæleste et divinum est, ob eamque rem æternum sit necesse est; “Therefore, whatever that is which is endowed with a power of perception, with wisdom, with liberty, with so much vigour and activity as the soul of man, is of heavenly and Divine original, and for that reason is necessarily immortal, and to continue for ever.”

Thus I have represented to you, as briefly and plainly as I could, those which I account the chief and strongest arguments of this great principle of religion—the soul’s immortality. Some of them are plain and obvious to every capacity; the rest, though they be above common capacities, yet were not to be neglected, because they may be useful to some, though not to all; and as those who are more wise and knowing should have patience, whilst the most common and plainest things are spoken for the instruction of ordinary capacities, so those of lower capacities should be content that many things should be spoken which may be useful to others, though they be above their reach.

To sum up then what hath been said from reason, for the proof of the soul’s immortality. It is a natural dictate and notion of our minds, universally entertained in all ages and places of the world, excepting some very few persons and sects; it doth not contradict any other principle that nature hath planted in us, but doth very well agree with those other notions which are most natural; it is most suitable to the natural hopes and fears of men; it evidently tends to the happiness and perfection of man, and to the good order and government of the world; lastly, it gives the fairest account of the phenomena of human nature, of those several actions and operations which we are conscious to ourselves of.