CHAPTER I.

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

I. The importance of Christianity is here considered, as it can not but be a proper introduction to a Treatise concerning the credibility of it; especially as there are some who reject revelation as in its very notion incredible; and others who think it of indifferent value, as they both consider the light of nature to be sufficient.

II. The importance of Christianity is more distinctly shown by considering it, 1st, As a republication of Natural Religion, being authoritative, with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advantage. 2d, As containing an account of things not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us.

III. Two deductions are added by way of illustration, stating the distinction between moral and positive precepts, and the preference due to the former.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.

Before the positive evidence for Christianity is considered, together with the objections against that evidence, the prejudices against revelation in general, and the Christian revelation in particular, must be removed; to the former the present chapter is devoted.

I. There is no presumption from analogy against the general scheme of Christianity; for it is no presumption against it that it is not discoverable by reason and experience, or that it is unlike the course of nature; and there can be no other kind of presumption.

II. There is no presumption against a revelation, considered as miraculous, in the beginning of the world, for this is a question about a matter of fact, or about the extent of the exertion of an ordinary power, or about the extent of the exertion of a power called extraordinary, but certainly exerted.

III. There is no presumption against it from analogy after the settlement of a course of nature, for we have not a parallel case to compare with it, &c., &c., &c.

I. IT is commonly supposed that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme, at least, against miracles, so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them than would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact.Hume has gone farther; he asserts, “the credit we give to testimony is derived solely from experience”—“a miracle is contrary to experience.”—“No testimony should ever gain credit to an event, unless it is more extraordinary that it should be false, than that the event should have happened.”—“It is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false.” In short, he considers miracles as impossible, for, speaking of the Abbé de Paris’s miracles, he says, “What have we now to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility OR miraculous nature of the events they relate.” Besides the answers here given, vide the Introduction to “The Analogy,” and that to “Paley’s Evidences.” The fallacy of Hume’s reasoning consists in this, that he argues from the laws of matter and motion established in the world, which laws, being confessedly arbitrary constitutions of the Creator, the manner of their operation can not be drawn from any previous reasoning, but must be drawn solely from experience; but if we admit the existence of a God, we must admit that we can discover by reasoning “a priori” a connection between all Almighty cause and every effect which is the object of power. To establish his position it is necessary to prove, that nothing is possible but what is established in the usual course of nature. And as to his objection from testimony—for he opposes the uncertainty of testimony to the certainty of contrary experience—this is answered Infra, III. Farther, that the evidence of testimony is superior to that of experience, and that they are somewhat connected, so that the weakening of the one weakens the other, is shown in “Price’s Dissertations,” page 400, and in “Dr. Adam’s Essay on Miracles,” page 5. Now there is no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity—that God created, and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by him will hereafter judge it in righteousness; and that good men are under the secret influence of his spirit. For, if there be a presumption from analogy, it must be either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience; or else, because it is unlike the known course of nature, which is so discoverable. Now there is none on the first account, because that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them; because it is certain there are innumerable things in the constitution and government of the universe which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. And there is no presumption on the second account, for, in the natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see things in a great degree unlike one another, and therefore we ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible. However, the Christian and natural schemes are by no means entirely unlike. So that whether we call this general Christian dispensation miraculous or not, we see there is no presumption against it from analogy. But we are to consider miracles as visibleA miracle is defined by Hume to be a violation of a law of nature, by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposing of an invisible agent. It is correctly defined by others, as an extraordinary work, in which the interposition of Divine Power is clear and indisputable. and invisible. The former furnish a proof of a Divine mission; the latter, being secret, do not, but require themselves to be proved by visible miracles, as, for example, the incarnation of Christ. Revelation itself, too, is miraculous, and miracles are the proof of it—the supposed presumption against these we shall now consider.

II. There can be no peculiar presumption from the analogy of nature against a revelation considered as miraculous at the beginning of the world—no such presumption as is implied in the word miraculous; for a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at that time, or if there were, we do not know what the course of nature is upon the first peopling of worlds. And therefore this is not to be considered as a question about a miracle, but as a common question of fact, admitting of the report of tradition, like other matters of fact of equal antiquity. Or else it is a question about the extent to which an ordinary power exerted itself—a power different from the present course of nature (but not, as we have seen, to be called miraculous) namely, whether this power merely made man, or exerted itself farther in giving him a revelation. Or even if the power be called miraculous, it will make no difference, for the power, whatever it be called, was exerted; and the question will then be, the extent to which an extraordinary power exerted itself. Against this there is as little presumption as there would be, if it were granted that our Saviour exerted miraculous powers, against his exerting it in a greater degree, or in more or fewer instances. If, then this is a fact, admitting the testimony of tradition, what is that testimony? not that religion was reasoned out, but altogether the contrary—that it came into the world by revelation. This was mentioned in the former part of this treatise, as affording a confirmation of natural religion; and here we see it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent revelation.

III. But it may be objected that there is some peculiar presumption from analogy against miracles; particularly against revelation, after the settlement, and during the continuance of a course of nature.

GENERAL ANSWER. Before we can raise an argument from analogy, for or against a revelation, considered as miraculous, we should be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. And nothing short of the history of a world in like circumstances with our own can be a parallel case; and had we even this, it would be but a single instance, and a presumption from it must be infinitely precarious.

CHAPTER III.

OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION, AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.

Objections against the scheme of Christianity, as distinguished from objections against the evidences of it are frivolous, for analogy furnishes a general answer to them.

I. That we are incompetent judges of it.

II. That it is probable, beforehand, that men will imagine they have strong objections against a revelation, however unexceptionable.

III. This leads to the determining the office of reason, namely, to judge only of the meaning, the morality, and evidence of revelation.

VARIOUS OBJECTIONS: The whole scheme of Christianity is objected to; the whole manner in which it is put and left in the world; several particular relations in Scripture; things in it appearing to men foolishness; things appearing matters of offense; the incorrectness of the style of revelation, especially of the Prophetic parts, in consequence of the rashness of interpreters, and the hieroglyphic and figurative languageThus Voltaire pretended to believe that Ezekiel eat the roll of parchment in reality, which the Prophet expressly asserts to have been a mere vision. in which they are expressed.

I. General Answer to all objections against Christianity considered as a matter of fact. Upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree, and that it would contain many things apparently liable to great objections in case it be judged of otherwise than by the analogy of nature. Not that the faculty of reason is to be depreciated—for it is not asserted that a supposed revelation can not be proved false from internal characters; for it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions, and either of these would prove it false; this belongs to reason to decide. (Vide this Chap. III.)

Proof from analogy that we are likely to be incompetent judges. If the natural and the revealed dispensations are both from God, if they coincide and together make up one scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of one, must render it credible that we may also be incompetent judges of the other. Since, then, upon experience, the natural dispensation is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have been expected, and is supposed to be liable to great objections, this renders it highly credible, that if they judge of the revealed dispensation in like manner, they will find it different from expectations formed beforehand, and apparently liable to great objections. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws, and that upon some exigencies he should suspend them—if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand of the wisdom of the ordinary administration, it could not be expected that he would be a competent judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. Thus we see generally that the objections of an incompetent judgment must needs be frivolous. But let us apply these observations to a

PARTICULAR EXAMPLE. Upon supposition of a revelation, let us compare our ignorance concerning inspiration before experience, with our ignorance concerning natural knowledge. We are not judges beforehand.

1st. What degree or kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason or experience; nor, 2d, how far he would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it; nor, 3d, whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor, 4th, whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all; nor, 5th, whether it or the faculty of obtaining it would be given us at once, or gradually. In like manner, respecting supernatural knowledge, we are ignorant beforehand, 1st, what degree of it should be expected; 2d, how far miraculous interposition would be made to qualify men for communicating it; 3d, whether its evidence would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; 4th, whether its evidence would be the same to all; and, 5th, whether the scheme should be revealed at once or gradually—committed to writing, or left to be handed down by verbal tradition.

OBJECTION. But we know that a revelation, in some of the above circumstances, one, for instance, not committed to writing, and thus secured against the danger of corruption, would not have answered its purposes.

ANSWER. What purposes? It would not have answered all these purposes which it has now answered; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees: and could we tell beforehand which were the purposes of God? It must, therefore, be quite frivolous to object to revelation, in any of the fore-mentioned respects, against its being left in one way rather than another; for this would be to object against things because they are different from expectations, which has been shown to be without reason. And thus we see that the only question concerning the truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation, not whether it be attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for; and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulgated, as weak men imagine it should be. And therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor multiplied objections of this kind, could overthrow the authority of Scripture, unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord had promised that it should be secure from these things. So that there are several ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture, at least not to the Prophetic parts of it. We can not argue that this can not be the sense of any particular passage of Scripture, for then it would have been expressed more plainly, or have been represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic; yet we may justly argue thus with respect to common books, because in Scripture we are not, as we are in common books, competent judges how plainly, or under how apt an image the true sense ought to have been represented. The only question is, what appearance there is that this is the sense, and scarce any at all how much more determinately it might have been expressed.

OBJECTION. But is it not self-evident that internal improbabilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof?

CHAPTER IV.

OF CHRISTIANITY CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.

I. Admitting the credibility of Christianity as a matter of fact there may yet be objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of it. Analogy furnishes a general answer to such objections, by showing that Christianity (like God’s moral government, Chap. VII., Part I.) must be a scheme beyond our comprehension.

II. This appears more clearly from particular Analogies. 1st. Means are used to accomplish ends; and, 2d, it is carried on by general laws.

III. The principal objections in particular, may be answered by particular and full Analogies in Nature. One of these objections, being against the whole scheme of Christianity, is considered here, namely, “That it supposes God to have been reduced to the necessity of using roundabout means to accomplish man’s salvation.”

I. IT has appeared, from the seventh chapter of the First Part, that objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of nature may be answered by its being a constitution or scheme imperfectly comprehended. We now proceed to consider the like objections against revelation. And it is evident, if Christianity be a scheme, and of the same kind, the like objections against it must admit of the like answer.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY—THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM.

I. Proceeding to answer other Particular Objections.—Analogy shows that there can be no objection against the general notion of a Mediator.

II. This analogy appears more fully upon the supposition of future punishments following in the way of natural consequences.

III. The Analogy of Nature shows that there is no probability that behaving well for the future, or any thing that we could do, would alone, and of itself, prevent the consequences of vice.

IV. The Scripture view of Redemption explained, and two Objections against the Atonement answered, viz., “That we can not see the efficacy of it, and that it represents the innocent as suffering for the guilty.”

I. THE whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of a Mediator between God and man; for we find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life, in infancy, is preserved by the instrumentality of others; and every satisfaction of it is bestowed by the like means. Is not then the supposition that His invisible government is, in part, at least, carried on by the like means as credible as the contrary? The light of nature, therefore, furnishes no presumption against the general notion of a mediatorThe instances of Codrus, the last Athenian king, exposing himself to inevitable death; and Marcus Curtius, a noble Roman, leaping into the gulf, have been both considered, from the certainty of the offering, and the feelings of their respective nations, as proofs of a disposition in mankind to think that the voluntary and certain death of a person reputed noble and innocent (Pliny says of Curtius, “virtute ac pietate ac morte præclara expleverat”), may prevent impending and Divinely threatened calamities. Vide the Epistle to the Romans, v., 7, 8. “For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.” (and it is against this that the objection is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense in which Christ is our Mediator), since we find by experience that God does appoint mediators to be the instruments of good and evil to us—the instruments of His justice and His mercy.

II. The moral government of the world (which must be supposed before we can consider the revealed doctrine of its redemption by Christ) implies that the consequence of vice shall be misery in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God; but since we are altogether unacquainted how future punishment is to follow wickedness, there is no absurdity in supposing that it may follow of course, or in the way of natural consequence, from God’s original constitution of the world (in the same way as many miseries follow particular courses of action at present)—from the nature He has given us, and from the condition in which He places us; or in like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice falls down, breaks his limbs, and without help perishes—all in the way of natural consequence.

OBJECTION. Is not this taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature?

ANSWER. When things come to pass according to the course of nature, this does not prevent them from being His doing, who is the God of nature; and Scripture ascribes those punishments to Divine justice, which are known to be natural. Yet, after all, this supposition is of no consequence, but a mere illustration of our argument; for, as it must be admitted that future punishment is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice, so it amounts to perhaps the same thing, whether they follow by a natural consequence or in any other way. Without this supposition, we have a sufficient analogy, but with it, we have a full analogy in the course of nature for a provision made for preventing the future consequences of vice from following inevitably, and in all cases. For there is at present a provision made, that all the bad natural consequences of men’s actions should not always actually follow, but should in certain degrees be prevented. As the Author of nature permits evil, so He has provided reliefs, and in many cases, perfect remedies for it—reliefs and remedies even for that evil which is the fruit of our own misconduct, and which otherwise would have ended in our destruction. And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man’s trifling upon a precipice might be prevented; or some, at least, by the assistance of others, in obedience to the suggestion of their nature, and by this assistance being accepted. Now, suppose the constitution of nature were other wise; that the natural bad consequences of actions, foreseen to have such consequences, could not, in any instance, be prevented, after the actions were committed, no one can say whether such a more severe constitution of things might not have been really good. But the contrary being the case, this may be called mercy or compassion, in the original constitution of the world—compassion, as distinguished from goodness in general. Therefore, the whole known constitution and course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according to the analogy of nature to hope that however ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of God’s government over the universe; yet provision might be made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing these ruinous consequences from inevitably following, at least from following universally and in all cases. Some will, perhaps, wonder at finding it spoken of as at all doubtful, that the ruinous consequences of vice might be prevented, having scarcely any apprehension or thought at all concerning the matter. But, judging from the present scene, we find the effects of even rashness and neglect are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death. Now, it is natural to apprehend that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater in proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these irregularities and the greater instances of vice, whereby mankind have presumptuously introduced confusion and misery into the kingdom of God. So that, as no one can say in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general rule of Divine government, so it is, by no means, intuitively certain, how far these consequences could possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet,

III. There seems no probability that any thing we could do would alone, and of itself, prevent them; for we do not know all the reasons which render future punishments necessary, nor all the natural consequences of vice, nor in what manner they would follow if unprevented, and, therefore, we can not say whether we could do ally thing which would be sufficient to prevent them. Farther, that repentance and reformation alone, and by itself, is wholly insufficient to prevent the future consequences of vice,

The case of penitence is clearly different from that of innocence—it implies a mixture of guilt precontracted, and punishment proportionably deserved; it is consequently in consistent with rectitude that both should be treated alike by God. The present conduct of the penitent will receive God’s approbation; but the reformation of the sinner can not have a retrospective effect; the agent may be changed, but his former sins can not be thereby canceled. The convert and the sinner are the same individual person, and the agent must be answerable for his whole conduct.—Balguy’s Essay on Redemption.

Cicero goes no farther on this head than to assert—Quem pœnitet peccasse, pene est innocens.—Dr. Shuckford.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION, AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT.

I. The next Objections to be considered are, 1. That Revelation is left upon doubtful evidence, and, therefore, it can not be true. 2. Revelation is not Universal, and, therefore, can not be true. These Objections are answered by full Analogies in the Constitution of Nature.

II. Admitting Revelation to be uncertain in its evidence, the three following practical reflections will tend to remove all causes of complaint: 1. The evidence of Religion not appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men’s Trial, in the religious sense. 2. Doubting implies some degree of evidence, and puts men into a general state of Probation, in the moral and religious sense; and consequently, 3. These difficulties are no more to be complained of than external circumstances of temptation.

III. But this uncertainty may partly arise from our own neglect.

IV. An apparent Analogy against the fitness of doubtful evidence answered.

I. IT has been objected, 1st, that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against it; because it can not be supposed that, if it were really true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence; 2d, that revelation can not be true from its want of Universality.

Now the weakness of these objections may be shown by observing the suppositions upon which they are founded, which are really such as these: 1. It can not be thought that God would bestow ally favor at all upon us unless in the degree we imagine might be most to our particular advantage; and, 2, that it can not be thought he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all.

General Answer to the 1st Objection. Let the objectors to revelation, on account of its supposed doubtfulness, consider what that evidence is which they act upon with regard to their temporal interests. There are various circumstances which render it uncertain and doubtful; such as the difficulty and almost impossibility of balancing pleasure and pain, to see on which side the overplus lies—of making allowances for the difference of feeling which we may have, when we have obtained the object in view—and of the casualties which may prevent our obtaining it, e. g., sudden death—the danger of our being deceived by the appearances of things, especially if we are inclined to favor deceit. Yet all this is considered to be justly disregarded, upon account of there appearing greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little probability of it; and even when the probability is greatly against success, if there be only a possibility that we may succeed.

General Answer to the 2d Objection. These objectors should observe that the Author of nature, in numberless instances, bestows upon some what he does not upon others who seem equally in need of it; for instance, health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, riches, and all external advantages; and, notwithstanding these varieties and uncertainties, God exercises a natural government over the world; and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard to our health and our affairs under this government.

Now, let us more particularly consider what is to be found in the evidence and reception of revelation analogous to the preceding, and we will see farther the futility of these objections. As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation has been universal, and, as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world at different times, so likewise at different times, both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of their religion than those had who lived in the interval between the captivity and the coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity than we have now. They had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, of which we have little remaining—the presumptive proof from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the world and of Christianity. And, farther, if we were to suppose the evidence which some have of religion to amount to little more than seeing that it may be true; others to have a full conviction of its truth; and others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of evidence between these two; if we put the case that revelation, for the present, was only intended to be a small light in the midst of a world greatly overspread with darkness, so that some at a remote distance might receive some glimmerings of it, and yet not be able to discern its origin; and others, in a nearer situation, should have its light obscured in different ways and degrees; and others within its clearer influence, enlivened and directed by it, and yet, even to these, that it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place; all this would be perfectly uniform with the conduct of Providence in the distribution of His other blessings. If the fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at all from Scripture, as many heathen nations; that others have had, by this means, natural religion enforced upon them, but never had Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to them, like, perhaps, the ancient Persians and modern Mohammedans; that others have had revelation proposed to them, but with such interpolations in its system, and with its evidence so blended with false miracles, &c., as to produce doubt and uncertainty, which may be the case with some thoughtful men in most Christian nations; and, lastly, that others have Christianity proposed to them in its proper light, but yet not light sufficient to satisfy curiosity. Now, if this be a true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, there is nothing in it but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the present natural dispensations of Providence.

But does not this unequal distribution appear harsh and unjust? By no means; for every one shall be equitably dealt with: no more shall be required of any one than what might have been equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in which he was placed: i. e., every man shall be accepted according to what he had, not according to what he had not. This, however, doth not imply that all persons’ condition here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity; and their being placed in darkness is no more a reason why persons should not endeavor to get out of it, and why others should not endeavor to bring them out of it, than it is a reason why ignorant people should not endeavor to learn, or should not be instructed.

II. What, in general, may be the account or reason of these things? It is not unreasonable to suppose that the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed Him also to place creatures of the like kinds in different situations: and that the same principle which disposed Him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed Him to place creatures of like moral capacities, in different religious situations, and even the same creatures, at different periods of their being. And the account, or reason of this, is also, most probably, the account why the constitution of things is such, that creatures of moral capacities, for a considerable part of their life, are not all subjects of morality and religion.

But can we not give a more particular account of these things. Here we must be greatly in the dark,To expect a distinct, comprehensive view of the whole subject, clear of difficulties and objections, is to forget our nature and condition, neither of which admit of such knowledge with respect to any science whatever: and to inquire with this expectation, is not to inquire as a man, but as one of another order of creatures.—Butler’s Sermon on the ignorance of Man. were it only that we know so very little, even of our own case. We are in the midst of a system; our present state probably connected with the past, as it is with the future. A system in its very notion implies variety, so that were revelation universal, yet from men’s different capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, from their difference of education, temper, and bodily constitution, their religious situations would be widely different, and the disadvantages of some in comparison to others would be altogether as much as at present; and the true account of our being placed here must be supposed also to be the true account of our ignorance of the reasons of it. But the following practical reflections may deserve the consideration of those persons who think the circumstances of mankind, or their own, in the fore-mentioned respects, a subject of complaint. 1st. The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men’s trial, in the religious sense, as it gives scope for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their understanding, in examining, or not examining, into that evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given why we may not be in a state of moral probation with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior in common affairs. For religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference; a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be by some collected by heedful attention to premises. The careful and solicitous examination of the evidence of religion before conviction, is an exercise of the same inward principle that renders a person obedient to its precepts after conviction; and neglect is as much real depravity in the one case as in the other.

2d. Even if the evidence of religion were, in the highest degree, doubtful, it would put men into a general state of probation, in the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt whether such a person had not done him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest was not depending on that person, he could not consider himself (if he had any sense of gratitude or of prudence) in the same situation as if he had no such doubt; or as if he were certain he had received no favor from such a person, or that he no way depended upon him. So that, considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not so great a difference as is generally imagined between what ought in reason to be the rule of life to those who really doubt and those who are fully convinced of the truth of religion.For would it not be madness for a man to forsake a safe road, and prefer to it one in which he acknowledges there is an even chance he should lose his life, though there were an even chance, likewise, of his going safe through it? Yet there are people absurd enough to take the supposed doubtfulness of religion for the same thing as a proof of its falsehood, after they have concluded it doubtful, from hearing it often called in question. This shows how infinitely unreasonable skeptical men are with regard to religion, and that they really lay aside their reason, upon this subject, as much as the most extravagant enthusiast.—Butler’s Charge. Their hopes, and fears, and obligations will be in various degrees; but as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations is not so very unlike. For doubting gives occasion and motives to consider farther the important subject; to preserve a sense that they may be under the Divine moral government, and an awful solicitude about religion, so as to bind them to refrain from all immorality and profaneness; and such conduct will tend to improve in them that character which the practice of religion would in those fully convinced of its truth. And they are farther accountable for their example, if with a character for understanding, or in a situation of influence in the world, they disregard all religion, though doubtful to them; and very accountable, as they may do more injury this way, or might do more good by the opposite, than by acting ill or well, in the common intercourse among mankind.

The ground of these observations is, that doubting necessarily implies some degree of evidence for that of which we doubt: for no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts, accidentally entering his mind, and of which he had no evidence at all. In the case of an even chance, we should commonly say we had no evidence at all for either side; yet this case is equivalent to all others, where there is such evidence on both sides of a question as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the truth: and in all these cases, although there is no more evidence on the one side than on the other, there is much more for either than for the truth of a number of random thoughts. And thus, it will appear that there are as many degrees between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground for doubt, as there are between that degree. which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And it is as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced by a lower degree of evidence, when discerned, as it is in the understanding not to discern it. The lower degrees of evidence will be discerned or overlooked, according to the fairness and honesty of men, as in speculative matters, according to their capacity of understanding.

3dly. The speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, are no more a just ground of complaint than external circumstances of temptation, or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full conviction of its truth. (And there is no ground for objection here, for temptations render our state a more improving state of discipline, by giving occasion to a more attentive and continued exercise of the virtuous principle.) Now, it will appear, that the same account may be given of the doubtful evidence of religion, as of temptation and difficulties, with regard to practice; for they belong to a state of probation. (1st.) As implying trial and difficulties. The doubtfulness of its evidence affords opportunities to an unfair mind of explaining away and deceitfully hiding from itself that evidence which it might see, and of being flattered with the hopes of escaping the consequences of vice; though it is clearly seen that these hopes are, at least, uncertain, in the same way as the common temptation to many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity, i. e., the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand that such foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. The examination of this evidence requires an attentive, solicitous, and, perhaps, painful exercise of the understanding. And there are circumstances in men’s situations, in their temporal capacities, analogous to those concerning religion. In some situations the chief difficulty, with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when it is known, but the principal exercise is recollection, and being guarded against deceit. In other situations, the principal exercise is attention, in order to discover what is the prudent part to act.

(2d.) This, and, indeed, temptation in general, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts additional to what would otherwise have been wanting, can not but be an additional discipline and improvement of virtue, nay, may form the principal part of some persons’ trial; for as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to injustice or pleasure, or to live in the neglect of religion, from a frame of mind almost insensible to any thing distant, so there are others, without this shallowness of temper, of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future, who, from their natural constitution and external condition, may have small temptations and difficulties in the common course of life. Now, when these latter persons have a full conviction of the truth of religion, its practice is to them almost unavoidable; yet these persons may need discipline and exercise in a higher degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion.

(3d.) This may be necessary for their probation in the third sense of the word,Vide Chap. IV., Part I. for a farther manifestation of their moral character to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would be.

III. But all the preceding reflections suppose that men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, does not arise from their neglect or prejudices; but may it not be owing to their own fault? Levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice do hinder us from being rightly informed with respect to common things, and they may in like manner (and perhaps in some farther providential manner) hinder us with respect to moral and religious subjects. But does not the Scripture declare that every one shall not understand?Daniel, xii., 10. See also Is., xxix., 13, 14; Mat., vi., 23, and xi., 25, and xiii., 11, 12; John, iii., 19, and v., 44; 1 Cor., ii., 14; 2 Cor., iv., 4; 2 Tim., iii., 13; and that affectionate, as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, He that hath ears to hear let him hear. Grotius saw no plainly the thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say that the proof given of Christianity was less than it might have been for this very purpose. “Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur.”—Butler. Certainly. Bult it does not determine how this shall be effected; and it makes no difference whether it be effected by the evidence of Christianity being originally and with design so ordered, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it, and that honest-minded persons should;The internal evidence of religion seems chiefly to have been intended as a means of moral probation. Vide John, vii., 17. or whether it come to pass by any other means. Farther, the general proof of natural religion lies level to the meanest capacity; for all men, however employed in the world, are capable of being convinced that there is a God who governs the world; and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with this natural sense of things, so they may be persuaded and made to see that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though this general proof be liable to objections, and run up into difficulties which can not be answered so as to satisfy curiosity, yet we can see that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. It is true, this requires knowledge, time, and attention, and therefore can not be the business of every man; but it ought to be considered by such as have picked up objections from others, and take for granted upon their authority that they arc of weight against revelation, or by often retailing them, fancy they see that they are of weight. In this, as in all other matters, doubtfulness, ignorance, or error must attend the neglect of the necessary means of information.

IV. Analogy objected against the fitness of the evidence of Revelation. “If a prince or common master were to send directions to a servant, he would take care that they should always bear the certain marks of him from whom they came, and that their sense should always be plain; so that there should be no possible doubt, concerning their authority or meaning.”

ANSWER. The proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we can not argue thus with respect to Him who is the Governor of the World, and particularly that he does not afford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests. However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of religion—for they are not parallel cases. The prince regards only the external event—the thing’s being done; religion regards the inward motive—and exercise by action. Of the prince regarded the same, if he wished to prove the understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be added, the Divine Will respecting morality and religion may be considered either absolute or conditional; it can not be absolute in any other way than that we should act virtuously in such given circumstances, and not by His changing of our circumstances; so that it is still in our power to do or contradict His will. But the whole constitution of nature affords certain instances of its being conditional, that if we act so or so, we shall be rewarded; if otherwise, punished.

Several of these observations may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men; but if the persons for whose sake they are made, think so—persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence, they are desired to consider whether their thinking so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, or to their not having such a sense of religion, as even their state of skepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower than probable, and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible that possibly we may succeed in them.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.

The presumptions against Revelation, and objections against the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it being removed, there remains to be considered what positive evidence we have for its truth; this is considered under two heads.

I. The direct and fundamental evidence for Christianity from Miracles and Prophecy, and various objections answered.

II. The direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument.

WE proceed to consider what is the positive evidence for the truth of Christianity. We shall, therefore, First, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy, (which are its fundamental proofs), and consider what analogy suggests in answer to the objections brought against this evidence; and, Secondly, We shall endeavor to give some account of a general argument, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence (for the latter ought never to be urged apart from the former), considered as making up one argument; this being the kind of proof upon which we determine most questions of difficulty concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to happen, especially questions relating to conduct. The conviction arising from this kind of proof, may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of art—a result from a great number of things so and so disposed and taken into one view.

I. 1. The Historical Evidence of Miracles.

The Old Testament affords the same historical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the Prophets, as of the common affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and Acts afford the same historical evidence of the miracles and of the common facts—because they are alike related in plain, unadorned narratives. Had the authors of these books appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, the case would be different; then it might be said that the miracles were introduced, like poetic descriptions and prodigies, to animate a dull relation—to amuse the reader and engage his attention.

2. Some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as authentic and genuine from the age in which they are said to be written, down to the present.

3. The miraculous history, in general, is confirmed—by the establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions; events cotemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events, of which no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at all but what is merely imaginary and invented. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, burt that historical evidence is not demonstrative. There must be something positive alleged against the proof of the genuineness and authenticity of Scripture, before it can be invalidated; either that this evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, or the general incredibility of the things related, or inconsistency in the general turn of history; none of which can be proved.

4. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and moreover, from several of them being written, not to particular individuals, but to Churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at large. One Epistle especially, which is chiefly referred to here (the 1st to the Corinthians), has a distinct and particular evidence, from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of his own to that Church. Indeed, the testimony of St. Paul is to be considered as detached from that of the rest of the Apostles, for the author declares, in his Epistles, that he received the Gospel in general, and the institution of the Communion in particular, not from the rest of the Apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone and from Christ himself; and he declares farther, that he was endued with the power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing which was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing in the world.Vide Rom., xv., 19; 1 Cor., xii., 8, 9, 10-23, &c., and xii., 1, 2, 8, and the whole of xiv.; 2 Cor., xii., 12, 13; Gal., iii., 25. This evidence, joined with what these Epistles have in common with the rest of the New Testament, does not leave a particular pretence for denying their genuineness: for, as to general doubts concerning it, any single fact, of such kind and antiquity, may have them, from the very nature of human affairs and human testimony.

5. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an age, and that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. Now all this is peculiar to the Jewish and Christian dispensations. Mohammedism was not introduced on the ground of miracles, i. e., public ones, for as revelation itself is miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence to miracles.This was all that Mohammed pretended to. “The Koran itself is a miracle.” So far was he from claiming to himself the working of public miracles, that he declared he did not work them, since those wrought by others, the Prophets, Apostles, and Jesus Christ, failed to bring conviction with them!—Vide Sale’s Koran, passim. Particular institutions in Paganism or Popery, confirmed by miracles after they were established, or even supposed to be introduced and believed on the ground of miracles, are not parallel instances, for single things of this kind are easily accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power in their hands—when the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude, and political interests are blended with religious claims and religious distinctions. But even if this be not admitted to be peculiar to Christianity, the fact is admitted that it was professed to be believed on the evidence of miracles. Now, certainly it is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most distant parts of the world should forsake the religion of their country, and embrace another which could not but expose them to much self-denial, and, indeed, must have been a giving up of the world in a great der gree, unless they were really convinced of the truth of these miracles, as they professed, when they became Christians, and this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for those miracles as if they had written it, and their writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts of which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves. It is also distinct from the direct historical evidence, though of the same kind; for the general belief of any fact at the time in which it is said to have happened, is distinct from the express testimony of the historian. We admit the credulity of mankind; but we should not forget their suspicions, and backwardness even to believe, and greater still to practice, what makes against their interest. So that the conversion of many to Christianity, when education, prejudice and authority were against it, is an undoubted presumption of its Divine origin. It lies with unbelievers to show why such evidence as all this amounts to, is not to be credited.If it be objected that it is rather slender ground upon which to stand, merely that we cannot prove the contrary, or the falsehood of the thing, we may answer, that it is not intended to be ground to rest on; it is intended to set us in motion; and the evidence will grow in proportion to the earnestness and sincerity to ascertain the point. Now, is there not a moral fitness in this, that evidence should be progressive, and that in proportion to the singleness of eye and the diligence with which it is sought and investigated?—Wolfe’s Remains. Accordingly, there is

OBJECTED. 1st. “Numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive Christians did, and are ready to give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable.”

ANSWER. Though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at all, yet (as is allowed in all other cases) it is a proof of facts. The Apostles’ sufferings proved their belief of the facts; and their belief proved the facts, for they were such as came under the observation of their senses.

2d OBJECTION. “But enthusiasm greatly weakens, if it does not totally and absolutely destroy, the evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion.

ANSWER. If great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak or negligent, affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and ears, and are admitted to be in earnest, such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have for any matter of fact. Such an account of their testimony must be admitted, in place of that far-fetched, indirect, and wonderful one of enthusiasm, until some incredibility can be shown in the things thus attested, or contrary testimony produced. The very mention of enthusiasm goes upon this previous supposition, which must be proved before such a charge need be answered; but as the contrary has been proved, an answer to it is much less required. However, as religion is supposed to be peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, we will consider what analogy suggests. Nameless and numberless prejudices, romance, affectation, humor, a desire to engage attention or to surprise, party spirit, custom, little competition, unaccountable likings and dislikings, are to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm, because they are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by them. These influence men strongly in common matters, yet human testimony in these matters is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding.

3d OBJECTION. “But the primitive Christians might still, in part, be deceived themselves, and, in part, designedly impose upon others, which is rendered very credible from that mixture of real enthusiasm and real knavery to be met with in the same characters.”

ANSWER. It is a fact that, though endued with reason to distinguish truth from falsehood, and also with regard to truth in what they say, men are all liable to be deceived by prejudice; and there are persons who, from their regard to truth, would not. invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, but yet would propagate it after it is once invented, with heightened circumstances. And others, though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. This is analogical to the ground of the objection; yet, notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still a natural ground of assent, and this assent a, natural principle of action.

4th OBJECTION. But it is a fact that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders.”

ANSWER. They have been, by no means, oftener, nor are they more liable to be, deceived by these pretences than by others.Counterfeit coin supposes that there is such a thing in the world as good money, and no one would pretend outwardly to be virtuous, unless some were really so. In the same manner, false miracles suppose the existence of real ones; and the cheats that have been imposed upon the world, far from furnishing us with reasons to reject all miracles in general, are, on the contrary, a strong proof that some, of which they are imitations, have been genuine.—Douglas on Miracles.

5th OBJECTION. But there is a very considerable degree of historical evidence for miracles acknowledged to be fabulous.”

ANSWER. Is there the like evidence? By no means.Vide Paley’s Evidences, Part 2, where this point is satisfactorily proved. But, even admitting that there were, the consequence would not be that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted; for what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence neither confuted nor overbalanced? If two men, of equally good reputation, had given evidence in different cases no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, would this confute the testimony of the other?

In addition to all these answers, it may be observed, it can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many principles from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves, and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. It, indeed, weakens the evidence of testimony in all cases, and it will appear to do so in different degrees according to men’s experience or notions of hypocrisy or enthusiasm; but nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony, or that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human actions require that testimony be admitted. Now, the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not be deceived themselves, nor would deceive others; for the importance of Christianity must have engaged the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than they would in common matters; and the strong obligations to veracity which their religion laid them inder made them less liable to deceive others. The external evidence for Christianity, unbelievers, who know any thing at all of the matter, must admit; that is, as persons in many cases own they see strong evidence from testimony for the truth of things which yet they can not be convinced are true—supposing that there is contrary testimony, or that the things are incredible. But there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering; and it has been fully proved that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or in any part of it.

I. 2d. The evidence of Christianity from Prophecy. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy, whether it arise from the nature of prophecy or from want of learning or of opportunities of inquiry, or from the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of historians, does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight arising from the clear fulfillment of those parts which are understood. For the case is evidently the same as if those parts which are not understood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue. Suppose a writing partly in cipher and partly in plain words at length, and that in the part understood there appeared mention of several known facts; it would never come into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that, if he understood the whole, perhaps he might find that those facts were not in reality known by the writer. The fulfillment of the facts known is extensive enough to prove foresight more than human.

1st OBJECTION. “Considering each prophecy distinctly, it does not at all appear that the prophecies were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by Christians; and, therefore, if they mean any thing, they are intended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all.”

ANSWER. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, is itself a proof that it referred to them. This appears from analogy; for there are two kinds of writing which bear a great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us—the mythological, and satirical where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. In the former kind, a man might be assured that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable, related without any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And, in a satirical writing, he might be fully assured that such persons and events were intended, merely from its being applicable to them; and his satisfaction that he understood the intended meaning of these writings would be greater or less, in proportion as he saw the general turn of them and the number of particular things to be capable of such application. In the same way, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the Church, and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered; and if a long series of prophecy, delivered before the coming of Christ, is applicable to Him, these things are in themselves a proof that the prophetic history was intended of Him, and of those events, in proportion as the general turn of it, and the number and variety of particular prophecies are capable of such application. And although the appearing fulfillment of prophecy is to be allowed to determine its meaning, it may be added that prophecies have been determined beforehand, as they have been fulfilled. The prophecies of a Messiah were applied to Him, by the Jews, before the coming of Christ; and those concerning the state of the Church in the last ages, were applied to it by the primitive Christians, as the event seems to verify.

Farther, even if it could be shown, to a high degree of probability, that the Prophets thought of events different from those which Christians allege to be the completion of their predictions; or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than what Christians apply them to; yet to say that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no other or farther meaning than those persons thought or had, who first recited or wrote them, is evidently saying that those persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of these books, and not the amanuenses of the Holy Ghost; which is absurd, while the authority of these books is under consideration—it is begging the question. If we knew the whole meaning of the compiler of a book, taken from memoirs, for instance, we would not suppose that we knew, from this, the whole meaning of the author of the memoirs. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in any real sense of the words: for such completion is equally a proof of foresight, more than human, whether the Prophets are or are not supposed to have understood it in a different sense. For, though it is clear that the Prophets did not understand the full meaning of their predictions, it is another question how far they thought they did, and in what sense they understood them. So that it is useless to show that prophecy is applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it. To have proved this, before the completion, might, indeed, have answered some purpose; for it might have prevented the expectation of any such farther completion. For example, if Porphyry could have shown that some principal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance the 7th verse of the 7th chapter, which the Christians interpreted, of the latter ages, was applicable to events which happened before, or about, the age of Antiochus Epiphanes,It appears that Porphyry did nothing, worth mentioning, in this way. For Jerome, on the passage, says: “Duas posteriores bestias in uno Macedonum regno ponit.” And as to the ten kings, “Decem reges enumerat, qui fuerunt sævissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedoniæ, Syriæ, Asiæ, et Egypti, sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem.” And in this way of interpretation any thing may be made of any thing.-Vide Newton on the Prophecies, and Bishop Chandler’s Vindication of Christianity. this might have prevented them from expecting any farther completion of it. But even if he could prove his assertion—which by no means appears—these remarks show it to be of no consequence: and they are remarks which must. be acknowledged, by those of a fair mind, to be just, and the evidence referred to in them real. But it is much more easy, and more falls in with the negligence, presumption, and willfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a decisive air—there is nothing in them.

II. We shall now endeavor to give some account of the general argument for the truth of Christianity; consisting both of the direct and circumstantial evidence, considered as making up one argument, for three reasons—1st, this is the kind of evidence upon which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined—evidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm each other; 2d, this seems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every one: 3d, the matters of fact here enumerated, being acknowledged by unbelievers, the weight of the whole, collectively, must be acknowledged to be very important.

(1.) Revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly historical—for prophecy is nothing but anticipated history—and doctrines and precepts are matters of fact. The general design of Scripture, containing this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account of the world in one single view as GOD’S WORLD; by which it appears distinguished from all other books. It begins with an account of God’s creation of the world, in order to ascertain by what He has done, the object of our worship, distinct from idols, and the Being of whom the whole volume treats. St. John, perhaps in allusion to this, begins his gospel with an account of Him by whom God created all things. It contains an abridgment of the history of the world, in the view just mentioned, from the first transgression, during the continuance of its apostacy from God, till the times of the restitution of all things;Acts, iii., 21. Vide, also Rev., x., 7; Dan., ii., 44, vii., 22; Rev., xxii., 5; Dan., vii., 27. giving a general account of the governments by which religion is, has been, or shall be affected. On this it may be remarked, that the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation, in place of implying a positive argument that it is NOT true, implies a positive argument that it IS TRUE: for, if any common relation of such antiquity, such extent, and variety could be proposed to the examination of the world, and if it could not be confuted in any age of knowledge and liberty, to the satisfaction of reasonable men, this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth; strong in proportion to the probability that if it were false, it might have been shown to be so. Now Christianity is not said, by any, to have been thus confuted. Farther, the Old Testament, together with the moral system of the world, contains a chronological account of the beginning of it; and, from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins. It contains an account of God’s making a covenant with a particular nation—His government of them—His threatenings “that he would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other”—and His promise “that he would bring again the captivity of His people Israel, and plant them upon their land—and they should be no more pulled up out of the land.”Vide Deut., xxx., 2, 3; Is., xlv., 17, lx., 21; Jer., xxx. 11, xlvi., 28; Amos, ix., 15; Jer. xxxi., 36. It foretells that God would raise them up a particular person—the Messiah—in whom all His promises should be finally fulfilled; and consequently (as profane, as well as sacred, history informs us), there was a general expectation of his appearing at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that person. It foretells also, that he should be rejected by those to whom he was so long promised,Vide Is., viii., 14, 15, xlix., 5, xliii.; Mal., i., 10, 11, and iii. and that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles.Is., xlix., 6, ii., xi., lvi., 7; Mal., i., 11. To which must be added the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, and very many in the Old, which describe what shall be the completion of the revealed plan of Providence. The Scripture farther informs us, that at the time the Messiah was expected, a person arose in this nation claiming to be that Messiah, to whom all the prophecies referred. He continued some years working miracles, and endued his disciples with a power of doing the same, to be a proof of the truth of that religion which He commissioned them to publish; that they, accordingly, made numerous converts, and established His religion in the world; to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state of this religion among mankind.

(2.) Suppose now a person, quite ignorant of history, to remark these things in Scripture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction; then to be informed of the following confessed facts: that the profession and establishment of natural religion is greatly owing to this book, and the supposed revelation which it contains,But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to Scripture-revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of Euclid’s Elements is destroyed by a man’s knowing, or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician.—Butler. even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of Scripture; yet that it is acknowledged by many nations-that religion is highly important (all this, considered together, would make the appearing and receiving of this book seem the most important event in the history of mankind, and would claim for it, as if by a voice from heaven, a serious examination); that the first parts of Scripture are acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology, and common history, are entirely credible, being confirmed by the natural and civil history of the world, collected from common historians, from the state of the earth, and from the late inventions of arts and sciences; that there appears nothing related as done in any age, not conformableThere are several objections to passages of Scripture, occasioned by not considering them in reference to the manners of the times. Thus it appears that the things objected to, like many others that are censured in Christianity, and in Scripture, are, in a greater or less degree, actual proofs of their truth and authenticity. to the manners of that age; that there are all the internal marks imaginable of REAL characters; that the miracles are interwoven with the common history—which, therefore, gives some credibility to them—that the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, are acknowledged to have been an ancient nation, and divided from all others; that they preserved natural religion among them, which can not be said of the Gentile world—(which again adds a credibility to the miracles, for they alone can satisfactorily account for this event); that as there was a national expectation among them,Vide Bishop Chandler’s Vindication of Christianity, where it is fully proved that this expectation was general among the Jews and Samaritans. The effects of it may be judged from its extension among the Gentiles. To say nothing of the Arabians and of the appearing of the star to the Magi—Suetonius informs us (Vespasian, cap. iv., 8), “Percrebuerat oriente toto vetus et constans opinio, esse in fatis, ut eo tempore Judæâ profecti rerum potirentur.” And Tacitus, in his history (lib. v., cap. 9), testifies, that “Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum literis contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, valesceret oriens, prœfectique Judæâ rerum potirentur.” raised from the prophecies of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that he was rejected by this nation (as seemed to be foretold), but received by the Gentiles, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world; that, in the mean time, the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth; that, notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day; which, not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning them, but also renders it, as one may say, a visible and easy possibility that the promises made to them, as a nation, may yet be fulfilled; that there are obvious appearances of the state of the world in other respects, besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic history. Let him view these acknowledged facts in connection with what has been before collected from Scripture, and the weight must appear very considerable to any reasonable mind.

OBJECTIONS PRECLUDED: All these things, and the several particulars contained under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined. This has not been attempted here. However, the things advanced, must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for though they may say that the historical evidence of miracles, wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really wrought, they can not deny that there is such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is. They object to the appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, accounting for this fact by their religion forbidding them intermarriages with those of any other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in their food, which prevent them being incorporated with any other people. But an event, considered apart from all coincidence, may not appear miraculous, yet the coincidence with prophecy may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s being born at Bethlehem, with a long series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous, though the event itself—his birth at that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural way, of which, however, no one can be certain. Men may say, the conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident; but there are many instances in which such conformity itself can not be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful people. Men, I say, may talk thus, but no one who is serious can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished in nature from the evidence of demonstration. This general view of evidence may induce serious persons to set down every thing, which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy. Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down what he thought made for the contrary side; but let him remember that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous than a mistake on the other; but is not this prejudice? If suffered to influence the judgment,Thus, though it is indeed absurd to talk of the greater merit of assent upon little or no evidence than upon demonstration, yet the strict discharge of our duty with less sensible evidence, does imply in it a better character than the same diligence in the discharge of it upon more sensible evidence. This fully accounts for, and explains, that assertion of our Saviour—“Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed”—have become Christians, and obeyed the Gospel, upon less sensible evidence than that which Thomas, to whom he is speaking, insisted upon.—Butler’s Sermon on the Ignorance of Man. it is so indeed, and, like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways in different men; for some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear; and it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions in order to gain their assent. But, in deliberations concerning conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account than the importance of it. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of common facts, is to be judged by all the evidence taken together. And, unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies), then is the truth of it proved; in like manner as, if in any common case, numerous events acknowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed, the truth of this event would be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not, in reason, be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed ones were true.The evidences of religion being so exceedingly dissimilar are highly characteristic of its truth. If man’s contrivance, or if the favor of accidents, could have given to Christianity any of its apparent testimonies—either its miracles or its prophecy, its morals or its propagation, or, if I may so speak, its Founder—there could be no room to believe, nor even to imagine, that all these appearances of great credibility could be united together by any such causes. If a successful craft could have contrived its public miracles, or so much as the pretence of them, it required another reach of craft and new resources to provide and adapt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it demanded not only a different art, but a totally opposite character, to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, the achievement of its propagation in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world—but the hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. For, each of these suppositions of contrivance being arbitrary, as it certainly is, and unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance; and if the imbecility of art is foiled in the hypothesis, the combinations of accident are too vain to be thought of.—Davison on Prophecy.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION.

I. The Objections that may be urged against arguing from Analogy to Religion may be answered, in general, by saying that they are owing to half views—to indeterminate language, and the deficiencies and abuse of words; but each objection can be separately precluded.

II. This Treatise proceeds upon the principles of others, and, therefore, is not as full a confirmation of Religion as it might otherwise be.

I. 1st. OBJECTED. “IT is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation by saying, that there are the same in natural religion, when what is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as others their respective, difficulties.”

ANSWER. The having all difficulties cleared, may be the same as requiring to comprehend the Divine Nature, and the whole plan of Providence. As to its being a poor thing to argue from natural to revealed religion, it has always been allowed, and it is often necessary to argue in such a way of probable deduction from what is acknowledged to what is disputed; and, indeed, the epithet poor is an properly applicable to the whole of human life. Is it not a poor thing, for instance, that even the most eminent physician should have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases as often to act upon conjecture, where the life of a man is concerned? Yet it is not a poor thing in comparison of having no skill at all. Farther, it is of great consequence to show that objections urged against revelation are as much leveled against natural religion; for thus we prove that the objectors are arguing against moral Providence, while they seem, whether intentionally or not, to argue against revelation; for nothing more has been taken for granted in the second part of this treatise than there was in the first, viz., the existence of an Author of nature; so that Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the constitution of nature.

2d. OBJECTED. “It is a strange way of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits.”

ANSWER. Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life, as there is reason to think is commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under His government. Now, if men can be convinced that they have the like reason to believe this as to believe that care of their temporal affairs will be their advantage—this, with the infinitely superior interest which religion proposes, will be an argument for the practice of it. But the chief and proper force of the argument, referred to in the objection, lies in another place; for it is said, that the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable difficulties as to render it doubtful; and this is made a positive argument against its truth, since, if it were true, it is said to be incredible that it should be left to doubtful evidence. Now, the observation, that, from the natural constitution of things, we must, in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument, because it is a general instance made up of numerous particular ones of somewhat in the conduct of the Author of nature toward us similar to what is said to be incredible.

3d OBJECTION. “It is a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show that the like objections lie against natural Providence. This is a way of answering objections against religion without even pretending to make out that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonable; especially when it is admitted that analogy is no answer to such objections, i. e., those against wisdom, justice, and goodness.”

ANSWER. The design of this treatise is, not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men—not to justify his Providence, but to show us our duty. For, 1st, It is not necessary to justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, any further than to show, that the things objected to may be consistent with, and even instances of justice and goodness, as has been already shown (Chap. 4, Part II.). 2d. The objections are not endeavored to be removed, by showing that the like objections, allowed to be conclusive, lie against natural Providence; but these objections being shown to be inconclusive, the credibility of the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, is shown from their conformity to the constitution of nature. 3d. This would be of weight, even though these objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion, above set down, and religion implying several facts—for instance, the fact that God will hereafter reward and punish men for their actions—the observation, that His present government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible. 4th. Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion, can not be answered without entering into the consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against the credibility or truth of the system may; because the system of it is reducible into matter of fact, and the probable truth of facts may be shown without considering their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary to prove the reasonableness of every precept and dispensation; though, in some cases, it is highly useful to do so. But the general obligations of religion are made out by proving the reasonableness of its practice. 5th. Though analogy be not an immediate answer to such objections, yet it is an immediate answer to what is intended by them, which is—to show that the things objected against are incredible.

4th. OBJECTED. “When analogical reasoning is carried to the utmost length, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state.”

ANSWER. It is acknowledged that the foregoing treatise is far from satisfactory; but so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Indeed, the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence on which we are obliged to act, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion, then, being admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, i. e., as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being; for satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man. They also forget the very notion of religion; for religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty, just as much as speaking to a man presupposes that he understands the language in which you speak, or the warning a man of danger presupposes in him self-concern. And, therefore, the question is, not whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory as to the purposes of curiosity, but whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes.

5th. OBJECTED. “It must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine that men will be prevailed upon to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.”

ANSWER. Religion is intended for a trial and exercise of the morality of every person’s character who is a subject of it; and thus considered, it has its ends upon all persons to whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice; for it puts them in a state of probation, let them behave as they will in it. And the purpose of this treatise is to show how, in reason, men ought to behave—not how, in fact, they will behave. But the objection itself allows the things insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight; hence it is probable that the treatise will have some influence; and this is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be if it were likely to have a greater influence.

II. Thus the whole of the foregoing objections arise in a great measure firom half views, and undeterminate language, but farther, it is to be observed, concerning them, that this treatise has proceeded upon the principles of others (i. e., notwithstanding these principles—even admitting them to be true). Thus we have argued upon, or notwithstanding, the principles of Fatalists, which we d( not believe; and there have been omitted two principles of the utmost importance, namely, the abstract principles of liberty and moral fitnessBishop Butler throughout the present work has only considered the moral difference, by which virtue and vice, as such, are approved and disapproved. Dr. Samuel Clarke, has demonstrated (vide his sermons at Boyle’s Lectures), that there are essential differences in the qualities of human actions established in nature, and this natural difference of things, prior to and independent of all will, creates a natural FITNESS in the agent to act agreeably to it: it is obvious that the introduction of this principle would materially confirm Bishop Butler’s arguments.—which force themselves upon the mind, and in endeavoring to avoid them, the form of expression. sometimes made use of will appear strange, to such as do not observe the reason of it. Now these two abstract principles being omitted, religion can only be considered as a question of fact, and in this view it is here considered, since Christianity, and its proof, are historical; and since also, natural religion is a matter of fact—as its general system is contained in the fact, that there is a righteous Governor of the World. This may be considered apart from these abstract principles; for instance, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, may be considered apart from their appearing so to our minds; the former is an abstract truth—the latter is only a matter of fact. So likewise, that there is in the nature of things an original standard of right and wrong, in actions, independent upon all will; but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise the moral government of finally righteous rewards and punishments—contains an abstract truth as well as matter of fact. But suppose that the government of righteous rewards took place here—it would not be an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact; and the same questions as are now raised, might still be raised about liberty and moral fitness; so that this proof would remain, however the questions might be decided. And thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, which naturally approves some actions as of good desert, and condemns others as of ill desert. This final righteous judgment is not to be considered as an abstract truth, but as mere a fact as if it took place here. This future fact has not, indeed, been proved with the force with which it might be proved, by taking in the considerations of liberty and moral fitness; but by omitting these, we have avoided the abstract questions concerning them, which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings; and we have confined ourselves to matter of fact, which must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics, who would not have admitted abstract truth, but pretended to doubt whether there was any such thing as truth, or whether we could depend upon faculties for the knowledge of it in any case.

Hence, therefore, the force of this treatise may be distinctly observed. To such as are convinced of religion upon the proof of the two last-mentioned principles, it will be an additional proof and confirmation of it; to such as are not satisfied with abstract reasonings, it will be an original proof of it. Those who believe will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and its evidence peculiarly strengthened. Those who do not believe, will be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, and they will also be shown its plain undoubted credibility at the least. Ridicule may be applied to show the argument from analogy in a disadvantageous light, but it is unquestionably a real one; for, religion implying in it numerous facts, analogy being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied; as it is the only proof of most, so it can not but be admitted by every one to be of considerable weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed.

CONCLUSION.The summaries prefixed to each chapter should now be read in continuation, as the force of the treatise consists in the whole analogy considered together. Deduct, now, what is to be deducted from the positive evidence of religion, upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in the objections against it upon the most skeptical principles, and the practical consequences will be—1st. That immorality is greatly aggravated in persons who have been made acquainted with Christianity: because the moral system of nature which Christianity lays before us, approves itself almost intuitively to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. 2d. That there is a middle, between a full satisfaction of the truth of Christianity, and a satisfaction of the contrary; which middle state of mind consists in a serious, doubting apprehension, that it may be true: and this serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it throughout the whole of their life. 3d. It will appear that blasphemy and profaneness, with regard to Christianity, are without excuse; for there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can continue to vilify or disregard Christianity—which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood—there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a demon stration of its truth.